office of marine safety influences on master and pilot
TRANSCRIPT
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Office of Marine Safety
Influences on Master and PilotInfluences on Master and Pilot
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Master’s ErrorsMaster’s Errors
• Not aware of pilot’s passage plan• Did not engage in master/pilot
exchange• Did not understand the pilot’s
question about the symbols on the electronic chart
• Did not recognize that the ship was headed toward the Delta tower
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Likely InfluencesLikely Influences
• Experience• Language• Culture• Perceived pilot attitude
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ExperienceExperience
• Master had 10 years of experience in command and working with pilots, including U.S. pilots
• Master had never captained a vessel out of San Francisco
• This was the master's first voyage on the Cosco Busan without supervision by the company's superintendent
• The master and crew were still relatively new to the ship, each other, and Fleet Management.
• Pilot spent 26 years piloting vessels in San Francisco Harbor
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LanguageLanguage
• Master and crew operating in native English language environment
• Master conversant in English, but not a native English-speaker
• Language differences impeded master’s ability to communicate with pilot
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CultureCulture
• Cultures differ in certain key dimensions
• Asian cultures found to perceive greater differences in status or power between superior and subordinate than Western cultures
• Asian language and culture not unusual for crews in San Francisco
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Master/Pilot InteractionMaster/Pilot Interaction
• VDR recorded professional but limited discussion between pilot and master
• Pilot and master can be heard attending mostly to their own areas of responsibility
• Pilot asserted that presenting pilot card, stating that he would answer questions, was sufficient to provide information to master
• The master did not inquire about the intended route or precautions to take because of reduced visibility
• Minimal interaction between master and pilot once the ship was under way
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ExperienceExperience
• Disparity in experience increases likelihood that senior but less experienced person will defer to subordinate
• Master was superior to pilot on vessel but pilot was experienced in San Francisco Harbor
• Blurring and reversal of roles
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SummarySummary
• Considerable disparity in experience in San Francisco Harbor
• Language and cultural factors• Perception of pilot’s attitude• Lack of effective communication• Master deferred all navigation
planning and execution to pilot • Master played little or no role
overseeing pilot
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Pilot’s ErrorsPilot’s Errors
• Inability to interpret “red triangles”• Failed to release tug• Inability to interpret radar images • Failed to detect RACON • Failed to effectively query VTS • Failed to integrate available
information
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Potential AntecedentsPotential Antecedents
• Experience • Training• Navigation equipment design,
and/or• Physiological or behavioral issues
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ExperienceExperience
• 26 years of experience as a San Francisco pilot
• He had piloted all types of ships:– In all likely environments– With all likely vessel bridge
components– With vessel crewmembers of diverse
cultural, language, and experiential backgrounds
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TrainingTraining
• Likely an issue with operators with limited experience
• Trained in radar interpretation and BRM
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Equipment DesignEquipment Design
• Likely an issue with operators who have limited experience using the equipment
• Over time, experience with equipment will compensate for design deficiencies
• Pilot’s 26 years of experience effectively ruled out equipment design as a factor affecting his performance
• Pilot relied on ship's crew for assistance in using bridge equipment
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Physiological or Behavioral FactorsPhysiological or Behavioral Factors
• Permanent, e.g., hearing loss• Temporary, e.g., fatigue • Fatigue cannot be ruled out• Medical factors – medical conditions
& medication use cannot be ruled out
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Medical FactorsMedical Factors
• History of medical conditions• Numerous prescription medications
with documented adverse effects on cognitive performance
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Previous PerformancePrevious Performance
• No information on factors affecting previous voyages
• May have committed errors previously
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SummarySummary
• Extensive use of medications with known adverse effects on cognitive performance
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