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~ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE
Intelligence Information Cable IN Tc.'Li::J.'OUCH
PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES STATE/INR CIA NMCC/MC ( SECDEF JCS ARM\" NAY\" AIR I CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE ens:
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Thia nu1trr1i,1 1"••111ntn11 111romt1111on ntrcctlnlf the N11t101111I l)('fen&e or the United Statell within the 111rn11ln1: ot the E.splon111:e 1..Aw11, TIUe 18, u.e.c. &cs. i!r.l 1111d ~94. u,e tron111111ss1on or revelation or which In on:, manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law. ..-...,,.,.~,---.·
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NO FGRl!:IGN DISSEM THIS 15 AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT INALL EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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~ CITE .3.5(c).
'.)
Of Z :,: DIST 31 JANUARY 1968 '
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 3.3(h)(2)
(:)
SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN,).DNG AN PROVINCE
ACQ
SOURCE
DURING DECEMBER 1967
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C.
C.t
SUMMARY•- ACCORDING TO A PRISONER INTERROGATION THE VIET (0
0
CONG /VC/ IN LONG AN PROVINCE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORM VILLAGE-LEVEL
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c, C
LIBERAT)ION cmlMITTEES IN ORDER TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT AMONG THE
PEOPLE ANI) TO PREPARE F'OR A POSSIB'l.E COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF' A
COALITION FAILS JO MATERIALIZE,-THE LIBERATION CO~M~TEES CAN BE
USED TO SPEARHEAD A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF
4. VIETNAM. 3
THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY DIVIDED SOl!,TH ,?IETiNAM INTO TWO C
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\ • fduum control• O~SEM
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AREAS AND WILL CONDUCT A SEPARATE MILITARY PROGRAM IN EACH AREA•
THE VC CONTINUE TO SUFFF.R FOOD, MEDICAL AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES,
BUT THESE SHORTAGES DO NOT YET 'APPEAR TO HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED ·._ .
MORALE. THE LOW RALLIER RATE MAY BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY THE
CURRENT RICE HARVEST AND THE PROMISED HWLT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN LONG AN AFTER TET. END SUMMARY.
.. .
POLICY 3.3(h)(2)
I. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION, OBTAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF
PEOPLES• REVOLUTIONARY PARTY L__ _______________ ~
MEMBF.R, THE VC ARE ATTEMPT! NG TO ESTABLISH VILLAGE LIBERATION 3.3(h)(2)
COMMITTEES DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING
CAMPAIGN. THE VC FEEL THAT THEY LACK SUFFICIENT
CONTROL AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEOELS AND, IN ORDER TO CO~PETE .. i: ... ;.:· ..
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM:,jr,vN/, THEY NEED TO ESTABLISH THEIR
O.,.'N GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBERATION
CO~MITTEES WILL HAVE TWO ADVANTAGES FOR THE VC-- IT WILL FACILITATE
THE FORMATION OF LOCAL VC GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION~ IN THE
EVENT f\ COALITION GOVERN~ENT IS ESTABLISHED AND, IF' NEGOTIATIONS FAIL,
THE COM~ITTEES CAN BE CALLED UPON TO INSTIGATE A GENERAL UPRISING <
5 AGAINST THE,·GVN. THE SOURCE STATED THAT DISTRICT, PROVINCIAL ANO ': ·:- '
4 CENTRAL-LEVEL LIBERATION COMMITTEES "1ILL BE FORMED DURING THE 3 2 1
SECOND PHASE ,OF' THE WUJTER-SPRING ,CAMPAIGN. COMPETENT AMERICAN .. -.·,··,!'
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\ NOF~ISSDl
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:OBSF.RVF:RS IN THE PROVINCE BELIEVE THAT THE VC ARE ATTEMPTING TO
DE-EMPHASIZE THE COMMUNIST OVERTONES OF THE ''LIBERATION''
MOVE~'ENT AND, BY CREATING A NEW GOVERNMENTAL FRONT, PRESENT A !
NON-COfwlMUNIST OR NEUTRALIST F"ACE. THIS NEW F'ACE WOULD ALLOW
NEGOTIATION~ TO BE STARTED WHILE THE VC CONTINUE THE REVOLUTION
THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION INSTEAD OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. EXTENSIVE
DEBRIEFINGS OF RALLIERS ANO PRISONER INTERROGATIONS DURING THE
PAST SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATED A FEELING AMONG THE VC THAT THE
3.5(c)
WAR WILL NOT BE WO~ ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT WILL BE WON BY POLITICAL
MEANS. THAO STATED THAT THE VC::HAVE. DIVIDED SOUTH VIETNAM INTO 3.3(h)(2) -~···\' .>. <-, ..
. TWO ARF.AS, AND THAT A DIFFERENT MILITARY PLAN WILL BE FOLLOWED IN
EACH AREA. THE AREA NORTH OF AN IMAGINARY LINE
DRAWN ACROSS THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF III CORPS WILL BE THE SCENE
OF THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE \JAR. THE AREA TO THE SOUTH Or THIS LINE L
WILL FOLLOW A PROGRAM OF TYING DOWN U.S. AND GVN FORCES.
OPERATIONS
2. DURING DECEMBER THE VC ATTEMPTED TO ISOLATE GVN-CONTROLLED
AREAS AND DESTROY OR CUT LINES OF' COMMUNICATION A.OC/ .. THE MA1.IORITY
OF VC MILITARY A_CTIVITIES WERE DIRECTED AT NATIONAL ROUTE 4, WHICH
5 RUNS THROUGH LONG AN PROVINCE AND SERVES AS THE MAIN TRAFFIC LINK 4 .•· · . · .... :,:;;i "',,; -.:,_ _;~:: :?t }:/ ·:... . 'I •
7·~ ~I~EEN s~l~-~~D THEi MEKONG o~~IA.::, ' AMERICAN 09SERVERS IN LONG AN
. 1 BELIEVE VC Mit:lTARY ACTIVITIES WERE.INTENDED NOT ONLY TO CUT THE • CONFIDiu,-!"AL NO~ISSE.l(
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. LOCS, BUT WERE ALSO DESIGNED TO~PRES£NT A SHOW OF vc STRENGTH TO
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THE POPULACF. IN CONTESTED AREAS ANO TO APPLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS A MeANS OF ENCOURARING A CONDITION WHERE
FAVORABLE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE INITIAT~D.
3.
3.3(h)(2)
VC EFF'ORTS TO RECRUIT YOUTHS ANO FEMALES INTO THEIR RA~JY.~.
ACCORDING TO AN ALLEGED DISTRICT-LEVEL VC DOCUMENT
THE VC LONG AN PROVINCE 3.3(h)(2) l__ _________________ ~
CURRENT AFFAIRS COfl4MITTEE I SSUEO AN ORDER ON 9 OECF.:MBER CALLI NG FOR I
RECRUITMENT OF ABOUT 1500 VILLAGE · HAMLET GUERRILLAS BY 10
JANUARY 1958. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT EACH DISTRICT WAS REAUIRED
TO RECRUIT 402' GUERRILLAS AND EAC~ VILLAGE WAS TO RECRUIT 100
GUERRILLAS. THERE H.I\S BF.EN NO INDICATION THAT THE VC HAVE HAD ANY
OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN THIS RECRUIT~ENT DRIVE. ArEP.ICAN OBSERVERS
IN LONG AN BELIEVE THAT IN VC-CONTROLLEO AREAS ·Or THE PROVINCE SOME
SUCCESS WILL BE MET, BUT THAT IT ' IS UNLIKELY -THAT THE vc CAN RECRUIT ('~~~ _j ~
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1500 USEF'UL GUERRILLAS \1JITHIN THE ONE MONTH TIME FRAME.
PROBLEMS
4. F'OOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE VC.
NGUYEN VAN THAO STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE VC HAVE SUFFICIENT RICE, 5 . . I 4 OTHER STAPLES: SU.CH AS MEAT, FISH ANO VEGETABLES ARE BECOMING SCARCE•
~ >£ STRESSt:O'.(:il¥1 ·vc REAR SERVIC~~::~~t~ ,M~NTS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE A 1 ..
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. GREATER PROBLEM OF FOOD SUPPLY THAN DO LOCAL UNITS BECAUSE THE GVN
HAS DIRECTED ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY MORE TOWARD THESE TARGETS. THIS
GVN MILITARY ACTIVITY AL90 HAS FORCED MANY PEOPLE TO MOVE TO MORE
SECURF.: AREAS.
5. THE LACK OF MEDICAL FACILlTIES AND SUPPLIES IS A CONTINUING
PROBLEM FOR THE VC. GVN MILITARY AND POLICE CHECl< POINTS ON MAJOR
. LOCS HAVE ErF"ECTIVELY REDUCED THE.'.At,,QUNT OF' MEDICINE BEING 3.3(h)(2) :/, _ ' ~---------i \
TRANSPORTED TO THE VC BY SUPPLIERS FROM SAIGON.
THE VC HAVE SOUGHT
TO REPLACE A PORT I ON OF' THEIR SUPPLY LOS!;ES, CAUSED BY THE GVIJ
RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM, BY DIRECTING LEGAL RESIDENT VC AND FEMALE ~--• ('.;····.
CADRE~ WITH F'RIENDS IN GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS TO HAVE THEIR rRIENDS
PURCHASE ANTIBIOTICS AND MEDICINES FOR THE VC.
6. THE AC~UISITION OF SUFFICIENT ~ANPOWER TO SUPPORT THE VC 3-3(h)(2)
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MOVEMENT CONTINUES TO BE A CHRONI9 VC PROBLE~. ACCORDING TO RALLISR
• GVN AND ALLIED SWF.EPS AND PACIF'ICATION OPERATION~
HAVE F'ORCEf) PEOPLE TO FLEE TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREA~, THEREBY RF.DUCING
THE SIZF. OF' THE MANPOWER POOL AVAILABLE TO THE VC. THAT THE VC ARF.
SHORT OF' PERSONNEL IS SUGGESTEDL-------~ THAT IN PAST 3
.3
(h)(2
)
YEARS THE VC COULD CONSCRIPT LABOR FORCES TO ASSIST IN MINING ROAf.)~
4 AND IN REr.OVHJG WOUNDED AND DEAD<FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT THAT NOW 3 ~. .· .··,:#'~TS:~
2 THREE-~N uN1rS:; coNoucr{ rHE MINttf~?,oPERATioNs AND vc TROOPS SOMETIMES 1 c a~u F I » ·_ /,,: ··. ·~ A L Ndi~mD«·\ · -•
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T I A L NO~ISSEM (tfi.unn ~onlMI ! •
/LEAVE :HEIR DEAD BEHIND AFTER AN OPERATION.
7. VC REACTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS ARE OIF'F'ICULT TO ASCERTAIN.
RALLIER f0
IGURES CONTINUE ·TO BE'.'"LOW AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN LONG AN
F'OR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THESE LO\,J FIGURES SUGriEST THAT THE
ffiOBLEMS FACED BY THE VC ARE NOT AS SERIOUS AS HAS BEEN BELIEVED
AND THAT CADRES ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPS FROM THE CURRENT
THEME BEING EXPRESSED_ IN THE PROVINCE THAT OF"F'ENSIVE OPERATIONS
WILL CEASE AFTER THE TET HOLIDAYS. THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST IN
LONG AN PROVINCE MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOW DECEMBER
F'IGURES OF' TWO INFflASTRUCTURE RALLIERS. OTHER VC INF"RASTRUCTURE
LOSSES WERE 9 KILLED A ND 12 CAPTURED.
3.5(c) s. I DIS EM-- STATE USMACV CORDS 7TH AF' USARV COMNAVF'ORV
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