objections to change of venue

In the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

In Re: C. A. Nos.: 01-3815, 00-3743, 99-3278

In Re: W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos.: 98-cv-00479, 99-cv-00979

In Re: F-01883777 (PA Public Utility ) Commission

Judge Richard W. Roberts

J. Todd Chapman,

Plaintiff, Pro Se,

v.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit, Et al.;

Defendants.

Civil Complaint No: 1:09-cv-02107-RWR

Notice of Objections to the Change of Venue, Nunc Pro Tunc and Motion for Reconsideration.

Pittsburgh, PA 15219Washington, DC 20001

700 Grant Street Courtroom 9C, 9th Floor333 Constitution Avenue, NW

United States CourthouseUnited States Courthouse

United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania

United States District Court for the District of

Columbia

Amy Reynolds Hay, Chief MagistrateRoyce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge

Enclosed are Objections to the Change of Venue, directed to the Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, filed Nunc Pro Tunc due to the failures of this court

to grant electronic filing and the failures of this court to provide written or verbal notices of its actions.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the Change of Venue is attached. A CD-ROM is included.

J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

1308 Glenn Street

Homestead, PA 15120

(412) 461-5993

[email protected]

CC: Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Dated: March 23, 2010 Signed:___________________________________________

/s/ J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

mailto:[email protected]

Constitutional Errors

1. The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution is cited on page -11- in ¶5 of the

Complaint, explaining why 28 U.S.C. §47 is vitally important to the proper functioning of the

federal courts. Judge Roberts' transfer order was not a valid exercise of Congressional Authority.

Roberts' actions violated this provision of the Constitution as well as the Due Process component of the

Fifth Amendment. Complaint at ¶179. and ¶490. Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U. S. 153 (1899).

2. The refusals of docketing of the notices and motions also rise to the level of Fifth Amendment

Due Process violations. This Plaintiff was never served with the transfer order and was prevented

from raising any prior objections by the lack of notice. Nevertheless, Judge Roberts' personal

jurisdiction over this case was raised immediately upon the appointment by the Clerk of this Court.

3. This court is bound by the Supreme Court precedential ruling of Stewart Organization, Inc. v.

Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The Chief Judge of the DC court, Royce C. Lamberth, must now

make the decision, and the record must be certified. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 18

(1954). Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).

4. Judge Roberts' Constitutional violations led to Clerk Barth, Jr.'s Constitutional violation of the

Appointments Clause. Barth, Jr., is not empowered to bypass both the Senate and the Congress.

5. Judge Roberts' behaviors violated the Constitution, Article III, Section 1, Khanh Phuong Nguyen

v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69 (2003), requiring federal judges to hold office during good behavior.

6. The failure of this court to overrule Judge Roberts upon this Reconsideration application will

constitute further Constitutional error. The possibilities of appeal must be preserved for all parties,

such possibilities which require a venue vested beyond the "embrace" of the Third Circuit.

Objections to Change of Venue of 27

Procedural History

7. The subject Complaint was mailed to the clerk of this court on November 4, 2009, and received by

the court on November 6, 2009. Pursuant to local court rule

1

electronic filing was requested by leave of

court and motion, and two complete copies of the Complaint were attached to the motion. The case

was docketed as No: 1:09-cv-02107-RWR.

8. The cover letter for the motion and the Complaint explained the contents of the CD-ROM

containing the PDF versions of the Complaint and the separate component parts which were provided

to comply with the electronic file size filing guidelines.

9. The required NOTICE OF DESIGNATION OF RELATED CIVIL CASES PENDING was included in

the initial mailing with sufficient copies for all named defendants. The contents of the form stated (a)

the common property relationship, (b) the involvement of common issues of fact, (c) the growth out of

the same event or transaction, and (e) that the case was filed by the same pro se party. The box to

indicate the relationship to a dismissed case was checked. The case docket numbers were provided,

and were listed in the Caption as well.

10. Each of the major cases were explained by detailed allegations. The First Amended Complaint at

WDPA 98-479 was cited extensively by reference to the important paragraph allegations. The

allegations of denial of access to the courts in each instance were explained, citing the events and

providing a multitude of Supreme Court case citations regarding the access violations. The actors were

identified by their functional roles and the parts that they played in the years of conspiratorial events.


1

See 4:08-cv-00370-RP-RAW, http://www.iowamedicalmarijuana.org/petitions/dea_docket.aspx,

Olsen v. Holder, JUDGMENT in favor of Hillary Clinton, dated 04/27/2009, exactly as stated in Judge

Roberts' disqualification application, whereat other district courts require the motion. Docket

transaction #3 was the motion for electronic filing.

http://www.iowamedicalmarijuana.org/petitions/dea_docket.aspx

The actions of law firm of Covington & Burling were identified throughout, and the events concerning

the United States Department of Justice were detailed throughout the new Complaint and the First

Amended Complaint at WDPA 98-479. The roles of the officials of the Third Circuit and how they

acted beyond their personal jurisdictions and in violation of many federal criminal statutes were

documented. The nullities of the court orders and the non-final decisions were explained by

referencing United States Supreme Court Cases and the Constitutional Provisions infringed.

Detailing the events (p. 1 - 481) and the claims for relief (p. 482 - 502) took five hundred and two (502)

pages of text, and was written over several years, during which times the events continued to develop.

11. The Venue Section of the Complaint (here) stating this Plaintiff's venue preference, is of sufficient

clarity for the venue to rest in the District of Columbia. Covington & Burling's principal office is in

the District of Columbia, and its corporate decisions and most of its actions are governed from the

District. By inclusion, it is clear that the Venue of the case was proper in the District of Columbia, as

stated. It is also clear that venue is improper in any district of either Pennsylvania, New Jersey,

Delaware, the United States Virgin Islands, or anywhere where the Third Circuit may normally exercise

jurisdiction. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Eric H. Holder, Jr., and Gregg H. Levy are all believed to reside in

the District of Columbia, and all clearly work within the District. Federal question jurisdiction, as

legislated by the Congress, has granted this Plaintiff a forum preference.

12. Kevin C. Newsom may be occasionally found within the District of Columbia and has never

claimed to have appeared in any Pennsylvania district. This action requires that venue lie where he

may eventually be found again. He does not currently reside in Pennsylvania.

13. The choice of forum is the Plaintiff's right where jurisdiction may be invoked. Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994). Res judicata can not be invoked against the Plaintiff where a

full and fair opportunity to litigate was thwarted by the Defendant conspirators.


14. Judge Richard W. Roberts, while deeply conflicted, was assigned to the case on November 6,

2009. The court provided written notification of the judicial assignment and the docketing file number.

15. Judge Roberts failed to either approve or deny the motion for leave and electronic filing.

16. A request for Judicial Notice and a Motion for Judge Roberts' possible disqualification was mailed

to this court and dated November 15, 2009, and received by the court. See Exhibit I. The actual

mailing date was Saturday, November 14, 2009. On November 15, 2009, a confirming e-mail

2

was sent

to [email protected] <[email protected]> and was not rejected by this

Plaintiff's e-mail server. The Motion is still pending, as is the Leave of Court.

17. Further Internet research revealed the importance of including more definitive information for

Judge Roberts to consider in his response to the prior requests for Notice and the Motion. The

supplemental request for Notice of Judge Roberts' disqualification was mailed to the court on

November 18, 2009, and received by the court.

18. Both notices for Judge Roberts to consider and the motion for his possible disqualification were

never responded to, thereby violating the binding requirements of 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(2) and

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978), relying on Commonwealth ex rel.

Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A. 2d 134 (1974). The case specifies that a judge may not decide

his own disqualification motion

3

(Complaint at page -41-), and that In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133


Continued on next page...

3

28 U.S.C. 144, Bias or prejudice of judge, provides the procedural method for resolving the question.

"Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient

affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either

2

An electronic copy of the e-mail is included on the enclosed CD-ROM and a print image of the message

is included in PDF form as well. See Exhibit II


mailto:<[email protected]>

(1955), at page -136-137, specifically bars a judge from trying cases where he has an interest in the

outcome. These binding United States Supreme Court citations were stated in the text of the November

15, 2009, pleading. An alternative judge makes the disqualification decision

4

. Complaint ¶61.

19. Without explanation or notice, neither of the judicial notices and the motion were publicly

docketed by either the Clerk or Judge Roberts.

20. On November 16, 2009, a one page Motion for Leave to Amend the Caption was mailed to the

Clerk in paper form, CD-ROM form, as well as e-mailed

5

. The confirming e-mail to the Clerk's Office

at [email protected] <[email protected]> was sent on November 16,

2009, and was not rejected by this Plaintiff's e-mail server. The motion addressed this Plaintiff's

oversight in inadvertently leaving Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.'s information out of the

Caption. A new page 1 of the Caption was included in both forms.

21. Without explanation or notice, the motion was not publicly docketed by the Clerk. The Clerk failed

to return the requested stamped copy of the Notice of Motion to this Plaintiff. Two months passed.


5

An electronic copy of the e-mail is included on the enclosed CD-ROM and a print image of the message

is included in PDF form as well.

4

In Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), the Supreme Court struggled, mightily, with the judge's

right to determine the sufficiency of the affidavit as opposed to the truth of the averments, therein. The

court split the baby. Being a court of review, as opposed to a court of first view, it is imperative that some

judge, inferior to a Supreme Court justice, make the first view determination.

against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but

another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding".

3

Continued from previous page...


mailto:<[email protected]>

22. On Saturday, January 23, 2010, this Plaintiff received Magistrate Robert C. Mitchell's recusal

order.

23. On Saturday, January 30, 2010, this Plaintiff received Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster's recusal

order.

24. On February 2, 2010, this Plaintiff mailed to this court a combined motion to strike Magistrate

Mitchell's recusal order, motion to strike Chief Judge Lancaster's recusal order, and motion for

prohibition against Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. for his attempt to steal this plaintiff's inheritance. The court

received the papers and the CD-ROM and, once again, failed to list the documents on the docket. No

response was received from the court, from Eric Holder, Jr., or from Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. Both

Holder and Zappala, Jr. received the COMPLAINT filings on their CD-ROMs.

25. With this court having failed to act on the required motion for leave to file documents

electronically, this Plaintiff initiated a PACER inquiry on March 5, 2010, to attempt to find out why no

responses had been received from the court. The PDF docket report was mangled and unreadable.

26. On Saturday, March 6, 2010, this Plaintiff received a ten page docket report from the office of

Pittsburgh Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay, dated 3/5/2010.

27. On Monday, March 15, 2010, the Office of the Clerk of the Western District of Pennsylvania, had

Tim Tarby call this Plaintiff in an attempt to have this Plaintiff withdraw the March 12, 2010,

application for the electronic filing password. The attempt was the second time that the tactic of

negative persuasion was used.

28. Next comes this Application.


Electronic (Shadow) Docket Reports

29. This court's (DC) docket transactions contain notations under item #1 that no summonses were

issued to any of the defendants.

30. At transaction #4, entered on December 17, 2009, despite being subject to disqualification, Judge

Roberts issued a case transfer order, and failed to serve the order upon this Plaintiff. The court never

docketed the notices or the motion for Judge Roberts' disqualification.

31. On January 20, 2010, the clerk implemented the change of venue and failed to serve the order on

this Plaintiff. No notation of any case closing was included in the docket transactions.

32. Despite listing this Plaintiff's request for leave of court and for approval of electronic filing, the

docket item at #3 was never addressed by the court. The court never electronically served any

transaction upon this Plaintiff.

33. All of this court's actions were performed sua sponte. and without notice or service.

34. The Western District of Pennsylvania's (WDPA) electronic docket report, generated by Magistrate

Amy Reynolds Hay, and dated March 5, 2010, erroneously listed the Demand as $9,999,000, all federal

judges knowing that the upper limitation on the original pleaded relief is operable in cases of default.

Not only did the COMPLAINT cover state $10,000,000+, but also the DC court's docket stated

$10,000,000 after having dropped the plus sign (+).

35. As a matter of statute, Chief Magistrate Hay's mail notification of the WDPA case was null and

void, her not having been assigned to the case by a district court judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 363.

36. Despite this Plaintiff's motions to strike both Chief Judge Lancaster's and Magistrate Judge

Mitchell's self-generated recusal orders, neither motion was listed in the WDPA docket report.

37. In the shadows, the new WDPA docket listed a November 20, 2009, transaction for (Court only)

Staff notes. The entry never appeared on the DC docket. See the WDPA item between #3 and #4. The

clandestine revelation defies due process.


38. The next shadow transaction on the WDPA docket (between #4 and #5) is the "(Court only)" civil

case terminating entry, such entry which does not appear on the DC docket. The failure of the DC

court to list the termination caused the case termination decision to be unlisted on LEXIS/NEXUS.

Again, this Plaintiff was not provided with notice or any electronic notification by e-mail. The date of

the WDPA transaction was 12/18/09.

39. The third shadow transaction on the WDPA docket (between #4 and #5) is the "(Court only)"

category number 7 assignment.

40. The WDPA docket reports (transaction #1) lists Robert V. Barth, Jr., Robert C. Mitchell, and Gary

L. Lancaster as individual capacity defendants.

41. Foreshadowing the Mitchell recusal order at item #6 (void as a matter of law) was the concealed

assignment of the case to Magistrate Robert C. Mitchell by Clerk Robert V. Barth, disqualified as a

matter of law. 28 U.S.C. §636. ¶16 of the judicial notices and motions for Magistrate Mitchell and

Chief Judge Lancaster's non judicial recusal orders to be stricken having cited United States v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), for its unambiguous holding that the term "district court" means "the

judge" in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. §631(i), and 28 U.S.C. §632(a). A United

States district clerk is not empowered by the Constitution or by any statute to appoint a magistrate

judge absent, inclusively, (1) an appointment by a district court judge, or (2) the unanimous consent of

all parties. Barth, Jr.'s recent choice of Chief Magistrate Hay also violated the Appointments Clause.

42. Following the recusal order of Magistrate Mitchell, not before, the WDPA docket actually lists the

clerical appointment of Chief Judge Lancaster, Clerk Barth being already disqualified. The transaction

is listed before the recusal order of Lancaster at item #7.

43. Chief Judge Lancaster was disqualified as a matter of law before he issued item #7. Inclusively, his

disqualification as a named defendant or an appointee of Barth made his recusal completely null and

void, and he was precluded, jurisdictionally, from ordering Barth to make yet another non jurisdictional


assignment. Any judge who employs bad behavior is disqualified by the Constitution. The shadow

appointment by Barth prior to item #8 is null and void as a matter of law. United States v. Raddatz,

447 U.S. 667 (1980). Only the Supreme Court can overrule one of its precedents. Thurston Motor

Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.

6

, 460 U.S. 533 (1983).

44. Chief Magistrate Judge Hay's appointment, before item #8, is an idempotent

7

legal nullity, it having

been made by a disqualified district court clerk by order of a disqualified chief district court judge.

45. The null and void ORDER of Chief Judge Hay appears at item #8. The entry was docketed on

March 5, 2010, with no notice of the order having been given in advance. On the merits, the WDPA

Chief Magistrate had no jurisdiction over the local DC court rule under which the court

8

, itself,

compelled this Plaintiff to file the motion for leave and electronic filing.


8

The court's very own procedures require a pro se party to file the motion for access. See the PDF

document from https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov. Magistrate Hay's order is a legal nullity.

7

http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June08/HPpatent.ws.html. See ¶275 of the Complaint. Once

null and void, always null and void. http://www.freepatentsonline.com/5974522.html.

6

''Perhaps unsure of its distinction of Rice, the Court of Appeals went on to "doubt that Rice is still

good law." Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents. Until that occurs,

Rice is the law, and the decision below cannot be reconciled with it.''

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov

http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June08/HPpatent.ws.html

http://www.freepatentsonline.com/5974522.html

Applicable Federal Statutes

Jurisdiction

46. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 plainly establishes federal question jurisdiction in any United States District

Court. The Complaint invoked the statute at ¶188 on Page -116- to address "several acts of conspiracy

mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42, and seeks redress for each and all of the harms", and ¶195 on

Page -118- "for injuries which are actionable directly under the Constitution. Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U. S. 403 (2002) (backward looking access to the courts).".

Venue

47. 28 U.S.C. §1294 establishes both jurisdiction and venue for Circuits in which decisions

reviewable, although the title of the statute is of no legal consequence. The Complaint invoked the

statute at ¶197 on page -121- to "to bring all of the defendants together in a common forum where

their diverse residencies can be addressed.".

48. 28 U.S.C. §1294 explicitly states "appeals from reviewable decisions of the district and

territorial courts shall be taken to the courts of appeals as follows: (1) From a district court of the

United States to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district;".

49. The Complaint at ¶208, plainly stated venue was improper at the Third Circuit or in any district

within its influence (embrace!). See ¶394 of the Complaint. The Relief section was referenced for the

reasoning made apparent in Sections VII, and VIII, pages -497-502- being included wherein without

explicit restatement.

50. 28 U.S.C. § 391. Venue generally, states:

(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except

as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,


(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or

(3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the

action may otherwise be brought.

51. 28 U.S.C. §47 states, as a matter of the personal jurisdiction of appellate judges, that "No judge

shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.". See ¶5 of the

Complaint on page -11-.

52. See Khanh Phuong Nguyen v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69, 70, 80 (2003), relying upon Moran v

Dillingham, 174 US 153 (1899), and basing the decision on, in part, the federal quorum statute, 28 U.

S. C. § 46(d), cited at page -47- of the Complaint. Paragraphs 72 through 75 of the Complaint pled

the multiple organizational statutes governing the composition of the federal courts.

Change of Venue

53. Judge Roberts' transfer order cites no precedential cases yet claims (emphasis added):

"ORDERED that this case be, and hereby is, TRANSFERRED to the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) in the interests of justice".

The Transfer of Venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §1404, contains several operative provisions and, in

relevant part reads:

(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.

(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil

nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the

division in which pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem

brought by or on behalf of the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of

the United States where all other parties request transfer.


Disqualification of Judge Roberts

54. Richard W. Roberts was disqualified from the moment that he was assigned by the Clerk. The

second Notice, dated November 18, 2009, which he was requested to address by affidavit or by sworn

testimony before another district court judge, referred the court and the judge to Web address

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/May95/247.txt.html, identifying an "unconstitutional potential

for bias

9

". Judge Roberts' appointment as Section Chief in the Civil Rights Division's Criminal

Prosecution Section suggests that his prior supervisor was Eric H. Holder, Jr., and that his next

supervisor was Duval Patrick. The term of his service was from May 1, 1995, and for a few years,

thereafter. Judge Roberts was, therefore, Section Chief of the Criminal Division on October 30, 1996,

when this Plaintiff began mailing several letters on the fraudulent Commonwealth proceedings. Judge

Roberts must have personal knowledge of this Plaintiff's complaints about the crimes which were

occurring in Pittsburgh and at the hands of the police and the courts. See ¶116 of the Complaint and

referencing http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LgEdMtZIVQ. Duval Patrick refused to even

investigate the crimes against this Plaintiff before refusing his required duties in his letter of November

15, 1996, which is attached as Exhibit III. Exhibit IV is the second refusal letter, dated, December 30,

1996, falsely claiming no statutory authority when 18 U.S.C. §241 and 18 U.S.C. §242 had provided

the federal statutory authority for nearly a century and a half. This Plaintiff's acquittal on the Double

Jeopardy barring disorderly conduct claim had eliminated any Commonwealth claim as to jurisdiction,

making the Patrick refusals fraudulent. The Patrick refusals were the Roberts refusals, and Roberts

was mandatorily barred from any proceedings in this matter as a matter of statute. 28 U.S.C.

§455(b)(2). Robert's failure to either file an affidavit or give sworn testimony on the particulars

violated binding Supreme Court precedents, particularly In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), at page


9

See http://docs.justia.com/cases/supreme/slip/556/08-22/index.pdf, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,

556 U. S. ____ (2009), disqualifying a judge with an indirect conflict of interest.

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/May95/247.txt.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LgEdMtZIVQ

http://docs.justia.com/cases/supreme/slip/556/08-22/index.pdf

-136-. No judge can decide an issue in his own case, and Eric Holder, Jr. was plainly named here in his

official capacity as United States Attorney General. Both failed to prevent the subsequent acts of

slavery, thus violating the Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §3332. It was mandatory that the

Commonwealth's actors' actions be brought before a federal special grand jury. Thus, both Holder, Jr.

and Patrick violated 42 U.S.C. §1986, a pattern which was repeated for years as the Commonwealth's

actors continued to impose unconstitutional acts of slavery.

55. ¶38 of the Complaint seems to fit Judge Roberts behavior, although this Plaintiff could not have

identified him in advance by any other means. "When functor = judicial fact-finder, the Sixth

Amendment is often offended".

56. The attached letters (Exhibit III & Exhibit IV) from Duval Patrick's office demonstrate the

concealments. Judge Roberts is still required to come completely clean on his failure to submit the

affidavit or to let a clerk subject him to recorded testimony

10

under oath before another judge of this

court. His testimony is essential to a complete airing of the failures of the politicized Justice

Department

11

, such failures which led to Samuel Alito's far reaching perjuries and omissions before

Senator Arlen Specter's Judiciary Committee about this Plaintiff's cases at the Third Circuit. The "first

view" functor is that of a judge. Complaint, p. 81, n.81.

57. Now for the statement on malice. Judge Roberts is not the most dishonest federal judge that this

Plaintiff has encountered. He is merely the latest. His functional background might otherwise be

exemplary. However, his factor conflicts as a Covington & Burling man and as one of Holder's

deputies placed him in an overwhelmingly conflicting position, clearly bad behavior. See Khanh


11

See Complaint, ¶40, ¶42, ¶44, ¶48, ¶52, ¶77, ¶113, ¶116, ¶151, ¶211, ¶256, ¶260, ¶261, ¶262, ¶273,

¶287, ¶381, ¶435, ¶441, ¶443, ¶454, ¶458, ¶459, ¶460, ¶474, ¶503, ¶509, ¶510, & ¶519.

10

The functor recording of Judge Roberts' proposed (by this Plaintiff) testimony would be essential to

fairness. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984), called for a review, not a first view.

Phuong Nguyen v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69(2003), stating "Among other things, Chapter 5 creates a

“United States District Court” for each judicial district, § 132(a), exhaustively enumerates the

districts so constituted, § 133(a), and describes “district judges” as holding office [functor] “during

good behavior [factor],” § 134(a)".

58. Judge Robert's concealment of this Plaintiff's mailed pleadings violated 18 U.S.C. § 2071, and

delayed the filings of defendant summonses. A plaintiff can not submit summonses to a vacuum.

59. The trick that Judge Roberts has illegally imposed is to transfer this matter back into the forum

where the access was originally denied. His intent is to create a self-referential circular fraud from

which there is no escape. It is to be expected that the Pennsylvania courts and the Third Circuit will

continue to deny access to the courts, the intended consequence of Judge Roberts' trick transfer. Such a

transfer would protect the interests of Eric Holder, Jr. and Covington & Burling. The strong evidence

appears in the Complaint under ¶27 and New Evidence.

60. The further disqualifying functors are (1) Judge Roberts' failure to issue the required electronic

access password in sufficient time for this Plaintiff to provide electronic service on all parties within

120 days, (2) the concealments of the Notices and Motions from the electronic docket, (3) the failure

of Judge Roberts to serve this Plaintiff with his transfer of venue order, and the abuse of the statute

under which Judge Roberts claimed to be transferring the matter. The unauthorized transfer functor

will be discussed next.


Preservation of Appellate Jurisdiction

61. Since 28 U.S.C. §1294 explicitly states that jurisdiction and venue must be identical for district

courts and appellate courts, the statute does not provide the judicial power where a district court is not

subject to the Congressionally appointed appellate court. The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §

391(3), mandates that the venue lie "where a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought". Both 28 U.S.C. §47 and 28 U. S. C.

§ 46(d) completely barred Judge Roberts' attempt to transfer the venue, as both statutes qualify

appellate jurisdiction. As the Third Circuit is presently composed, more than half of the judges are

named defendants, and no quorum is possible. 28 U.S.C. §47 and 28 U. S. C. § 46(d) would be jointly

offended by a transfer back to the Western District of Pennsylvania because no embracing appellate

quorum could possibly exist for an en banc appellate reconsideration of any decision reached.

Therefore, the Western District Court, and any court within the reach of the miscreant Third Circuit,

are barred from any proceedings here. The action can not be brought in the Western District and hope

to preserve appellate jurisdiction as of right. This new matter has already been generated due to the

prior jurisdictional violations of the Western District Court and the miscreant Third Circuit.

Reprobation for another federal court is not only not required, it is Constitutionally forbidden.

62. 28 U.S.C. §47 and 28 U. S. C. § 46(d) would disqualify the Third Circuit even if none of the

officials were named defendants. Without even considering the merits of this new Complaint, the

"ORDERED" change of venue is jurisdictionally barred based upon the Statutes.

63. "In the interest of justice" is a balancing test. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), at page

-136-. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). Here, this Plaintiff has given no consent and

none of this Plaintiff's rights have been addressed. And because of the obstructions of electronic access

to the court, none of the defendants have been served with summonses. Only Attorney General Eric H.

Holder, Jr. and Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. have been served with this new Complaint by this Plaintiff,


and both Chief Judge Lancaster, Magistrate Judge Mitchell and Robert V. Barth, Jr.'s service by the

WDPA court was concealed by the WDPA court. Therefore, these five already defaulting defendants

have offered no interests to be weighed on the justice scales. Judge Roberts' abuse is a jurisdictional

violation, sua sponte changes of venue not being incorporated in the change of venue statutes.

64. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , the controlling principle of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510,

523, was recited as the "objective" standard to be applied to a disqualification case:

“Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average

man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the

defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear

and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process

of law.”.

Here, the change of venue without notice or the appearance of any defendant satisfies the test that

the balance was not kept "nice, clear and true". In fact, there was no balance at all. See footnote 91 of

the Complaint, which begins on page -60-. Here, the use of the wrong procedure is the wrong result.

65. Judge Roberts has not asserted that there was improper venue in the District of Columbia because

he could not under the statutes. Even if the defendants were to weigh in on opposite sides from this

Plaintiff, the disqualification of the Third Circuit could not be overcome. 28 U.S.C. §47 and 28 U. S.

C. § 46(d). The Congressional texts of the statutes are controlling, and all of the statutes must be read

together. The change of venue statute is not written broadly enough to confer sua sponte changes of

venue without calculation

12

of the "interest of justice" balance. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh

Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 23

13

(1988). The balance must lie somewhere between zero and infinity, not at


12

Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), states:

"It is a well settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will

prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove

controlling".

Section 1404(a) is not written in specific terms, and is too general to be applied sua sponte.

either extreme. With no opposing parties weighed in, the interest of justice ratio is either zero or

infinity, depending upon which absent factor would appear in the denominator. No party should favor

an appeal to a disqualified court.

66. While it is conceded that Stewart read the requirements for a "motion" into the text of part (a), the

proximity of part (b) and its explicit "motion" requirement and its "discretionary" requirement made the

expansion of the meaning of part (a) permissible by the Supreme Court. The language of the Supreme

Court is binding regarding both the "motion" requirement and its "discretionary" requirement. Judge

Roberts' ORDER violates both requirements.


13

Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), states:

(b) Section 1404(a) is sufficiently broad to control the forum-selection issue. The statute is intended to

place discretion in the district courts to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized,

case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness. A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) calls on

the district court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors, and the presence of a

forum-selection clause will figure centrally in the calculus. A forum-selection clause should receive

neither dispositive consideration nor no consideration, but rather the consideration for which

Congress provided in § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) must be applied, since it represents a valid exercise

of Congress' authority under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this

case, the District Court should determine in the first instance the appropriate effect under federal law

of the parties' forum-selection clause on respondent's § 1404(a) motion.

13

Continued from previous page...

Substantive Nullity

67. Judge Roberts' ORDER makes an illegal reference to the Third Circuit's null and void order at

Chapman v. Pennsylvania, 82 Fed. Appx. 59 (3rd Cir. 2003)

14

, the order which the civil rights panel

showed its schizophrenia and repeated the Commonwealth's defamations. The voidances of his

reference renders his ORDER as null and void. A federal jury must consider the facts of the prior

pleadings, those facts which will include the statements

15

of this Plaintiff in objecting to the prior

Report and Recommendation of defendant Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell. This Plaintiff's

Objections were ignored by Judge Cindrich after he joined in the misprison of the Tabano judgment,

rendering the dismissal a legal nullity. The here footnoted statements from this Plaintiff's prior

Objections plainly stated the res judicata effect of the trial court's release by citing the Abney v.


15

3.2.2.1.6 Heck, supra., itself, invalidates the Recommendation of the Report since the

First Amended Complaint, as opposed to violating Heck, supra., is entirely consistent with it.

Again nowhere does the First Amended Complaint state that the action is for a federal writ of

habeas corpus. Nor could it properly do so since I am not confined and there was a habeas

corpus release on September 4, 1997, issued by the trial court. No matter how hard This Court's

magistrate has tried to misstate the facts, res judicata bars his attempt to restate the release

language which appears in the September 10, 1997, "Opinion" of the trial court judge. Nor can

the trial court judge's recommendation that I serve another sentence be used to reverse his very

own decision to release me. The release is a done deal, and was done based upon my clear

showing that he lacked any jurisdiction to do any of the things which he did to me, including

jailing me for a second time for an alleged "Failure to confirm counsel".

3.2.2.1.7 Since it is clear from his "Opinion" that the trial court's judge is trying to

reinstate the conviction, Heck, supra., would allow the declaratory and injunctive relief against

him for his attempts are precluded by Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), on double

jeopardy grounds. Heck, supra., does not address former jeopardy. But what the Report calls for

is a declaration that there is a pending conviction. That abuse of discretion, if it is to occur,

would unconstitutionally violate these cases.

3.2.2.1.8 Heck, supra., clearly relies on Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465

U.S. 75 (1984), for its res judicata dicta, and upon Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), for

its conclusions regarding habeas corpus exhaustion in the context of a 42 U.S.C. š1983 action.

The next passage from Heck, supra., is important:

14

Chapman v. Pennsylvania, 82 Fed. Appx. 59 (3rd Cir. 2003).

United States

16

, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), case and the Heck reliances upon the res judicata principle, even

though the Heck reliance was dicta.

68. The maintenance of Judge Roberts' non jurisdictional transfer of venue order can not be permitted

without violating this Plaintiff's "superior immunity" under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy

Clause. See ¶525 of this new Complaint, demonstrating that "Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 85

U.S. 163 (1873), barred the execution of the second judgment after the (tow pound) fine had

been paid.", and that "under Kepner v. U. S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904), where at page -101-. the

Supreme Court recognized no need for a verdict judgment under a Double Jeopardy violation".

Even when the Commonwealth refused and failed to issue any "final judgment" paperwork, this

Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Immunity was superior to all of their bogus immunity

and other defenses. Even though the named conspirators and their conspiratorial lawyers implemented

the retaliatory continuation elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, their unproven and illegal

efforts were inferior to this Plaintiff's Double Jeopardy Immunity. Complaint, ¶220.

69. The narrow Double Jeopardy superior immunity is controlling in a criminal proceeding, and the res

judicata component of the superior immunity is controlling in a civil proceeding. See Haring v.

Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), clarifying the concept of issue preclusion in a civil context. See Berger

v. United States

17

, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), requiring an indictment to protect the accused against a Double

Jeopardy violation.

70. At this stage in the proceedings, Judge Roberts' reliance upon the Third Circuit's "final judgment"

is a sheer fantasy, that "opinion" having ignored the preclusive effects of the Commonwealth's losses of

their case and controversy frauds. Not only is his ORDER a procedural nullity, its substance is

completely void for his having referenced the disqualified Third Circuit's dismissal.


17

http://supreme.justia.com/us/295/78/case.html.

16

New Complaint, passim.

http://supreme.justia.com/us/295/78/case.html

Western District of Pennsylvania Non Judicial Assignment Practice and

Unavailability of a District Judge.

71. No district court judge is currently assigned to the case docketed in the Western District of

Pennsylvania. There is no court structured.

72. Disqualified Clerk Robert V. Barth, Jr. first assigned the illegally transferred case to Magistrate

Robert C. Mitchell and then to Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster. This court concealed the pleadings

which this Plaintiff filed in DC against both recusal orders. This repeat of history has already been

reviewed by the Supreme Court. Roell v. Withrow

18

, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).

73. Next, Barth hand picked Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay and assigned her without the

statutory authority of 28 U.S.C. §363. The disqualified and non jurisdictional assignments by

defendant Barth were to be expected after he bravely misprized the Tabano Judgment entry for at least

the second time.

74. Every act of the court officials after Judge Roberts' illegal and non jurisdictional transfer has

continued the criminal enterprise of obstructing this Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1981 rights as authorized

under the self-executing Thirteenth Amendment. See all of the new Complaint sections under

Constitutional Provisions and pay particular attention to ¶169 and pages -107- and -108-. This

racketeering enterprise by the federal court officials seems to have no bounds. It has no legitimate

governmental purpose. As Judge Roberts and Clerk Barth have recently applied it, they both seem bent

upon having the change of venue statute invalidated as applied based upon Thirteenth Amendment


18

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Act) empowers full-time magistrate judges to conduct “any or

all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,” as

long as they are “specially designated . . . by the district court” and acting with “the consent of the

parties.”

and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. No white man would expect this treatment, and no intelligent

man should have to respect it. Complaint at ¶99 and ¶227 and ¶251 and ¶599.

75. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1

19

(1986), ruling that a transcript of a

preliminary hearing is a mandatory requirement in every criminal proceeding, unless waived by the

defendant. The requirement was binding precedent upon the Commonwealth ever since 1986 and

plainly applied to Lester G. Nauhaus when he was the chief public defender of Allegheny County.

Given that Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay remains married

20

to Lester G. Nauhaus, a

signatuary of District Court Judge Donald E. Ziegler's court order, under which Nauhaus was fined, it is

impossible under the Constitution for Chief Magistrate Hay to be impartial, especially when she, too,

served in the Office of the Public Defender of Allegheny County which has always been a public

disgrace from its inception. See ¶125 of the Complaint and its footnotes at #117 and #118. Chief

Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay cannot possibly judge her own sins and those of her husband as

they apply to the public defenders and their agents. The violations of the federal court order of Judge

Ziegler

21

was pled upon appeal to the Third Circuit and was raised in the First Amended Complaint at

WDPA 998-479.

76. Chief Magistrate Hay also can not adjudge her own behaviors at the Justice Department where her

bio says that she served as "Chief of the Civil Division from 1989 to 2003" Donetta Ambrose and


21

The text of the executed agreement is attached as Exhibit V. Page -30- of the First Amended

Complaint at WDPA 98-479, and referencing the practices of defiance of the federal court order by the

public defenders and others is attached as Exhibit VI.

20

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Public/Reference/Hay.pdf.

19

2. The qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary

hearings as conducted in California.

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Public/Reference/Hay.pdf

staff and Gary Lancaster were gutting my case to protect my children and recover my assets from the

IRS and Merck & Co. Inc.

77. It is unimaginable that Chief Judge Hay will rule against defendant Ambrose, or any other federal

judge within the Western District under whom she works. How can she judge her own bosses, and how

could Judge Roberts adjudge Eric Holder, Jr. is a non justiciable question.

78. The judicial assignment system, based upon conflicts of interests, has clearly broken down already

and again.

79. All of these issues resulted from Judge Roberts' illegal transfer of venue, justifying that the case be

immediately transferred back to the District of Columbia in the interest of justice.

80. This applications is submitted nunc pro tunc due to the misconduct of Judge Roberts and Clerk

Nancy M. Mayer-Whittington who both failed to serve this Plaintiff with any notice of the transfer.


Relief

81. This court should vacate the transfer of venue order of Judge Roberts.

82. This court should order that Clerk Nancy M. Mayer-Whittington is disqualified and that a deputy

clerk is assigned to handle the duties of the clerk for all matters involved in this litigation and for

its duration.

83. This court should order the newly assigned deputy clerk to locate all of this Plaintiff's submissions

and update the docket, electronically, to reflect all of the submissions of this Plaintiff.

84. This court should grant this Plaintiff's Motion to permit electronic filing and issue a password by

e-mail.

85. This court should issue an order that the Caption of the Complaint is Amended to included the

submitted information for Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

86. This court should conduct the requested hearing concerning Judge Roberts' disqualification, and

electronically file the transcript of the proceedings.

87. This court should order that Judge Roberts is disqualified from this case.

88. This court should order that the time for service of the Amended Complaint is extended to 120

days from the date of the illegal transfer order and that the newly assigned deputy clerk issue the

necessary summonses and electronic services of all of the pleadings to all of the defendants.

89. This court should make the finding that the delay in the service of the Amended Complaint was

caused by the misconduct of Judge Roberts and the Clerk.

90. This court should order that a hearing will be held to adjudge the disqualifications of Magistrate

Robert C. Mitchell and Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster, that their orders of recusal be STRICKEN, and

that they answer the Amended Complaint as any other defendant is required to do under the statutes

and rules.

91. This court should GRANT the injunctive relief applied for against Stephen A. Zappala, Jr.


Table of Exhibits

.


Transfer of Venue OrderExhibit VIII

ComplaintExhibit VII

Page -30- of the First Amended Complaint at WDPA 98-479 ( & Complaint)

Exhibit VI

Consent decree court order of District Court Judge Donald E. Ziegler - 6 filesExhibit V

Duval Patrick letter of December 30, 1996Exhibit IV

Duval Patrick letter of November 15, 1996Exhibit III

November 15, 2009, a confirming e-mailExhibit II

Certificates of Mailing

Exhibit I

Description of PDF Exhibit

Exhibit No.

FORM OF ORDER

This court, having reviewed the Plaintiff's Objections and Requests for Reconsideration.

hereby ORDERS all of the Relief requested in the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration to be

GRANTED.

Dated March ___, 2010 Signed:___________________________________________

Royce C. Lamberth, Chief District Judge.


CERTIFICATION

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States

of America that the foregoing is true and correct and not submitted for the purpose of delay.

Dated March 23, 2010 Signed:___________________________________________

/s/ J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff Pro Se.
