nsa surveillance ruled unlawful by appeals court
DESCRIPTION
Source: http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/NSA_ca2_20150507.pdfMay 7, 2015TRANSCRIPT
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1442ACLUv.Clapper
UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHESECONDCIRCUIT
AugustTerm,2014
(Argued:September2,2014Decided:May7,2015)
DocketNo.1442cv
________________
AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNION,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONFOUNDATION,NEWYORKCIVILLIBERTIESUNION,NEWYORKCIVILLIBERTIESUNION
FOUNDATION,
PlaintiffsAppellants,v.
JAMESR.CLAPPER,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectorofNationalIntelligence,MICHAELS.ROGERS,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandChiefoftheCentralSecurityService,ASHTONB.CARTER,inhisofficialcapacityasSecretaryofDefense,LORETTAE.LYNCH,inherofficial
capacityasAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStates,andJAMESB.COMEY,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectoroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation,
DefendantsAppellees.*
*TheClerkofCourtisrespectfullydirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptioninthiscasetoconformwiththecaptionabove.SeeFed.R.App.P.43(c)(2).
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Before:
SACKandLYNCH,CircuitJudges,andBRODERICK,DistrictJudge.**
__________________
PlaintiffsappellantsAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil
LibertiesUnionFoundation,andNewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionandNewYork
CivilLibertiesUnionFoundation,appealfromadecisionoftheUnitedStates
DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(WilliamH.Pauley,III,
Judge)grantingdefendantsappelleesmotiontodismissanddenyingplaintiffs
appellantsrequestforapreliminaryinjunction.Thedistrictcourtheldthat215
ofthePATRIOTActimpliedlyprecludesjudicialreview;thatplaintiffs
appellantsstatutoryclaimsregardingthescopeof215wouldinanyeventfail
onthemerits;andthat215doesnotviolatetheFourthorFirstAmendmentsto
theUnitedStatesConstitution.Wedisagreeinpart,andholdthat215andthe
statutoryschemetowhichitrelatesdonotprecludejudicialreview,andthatthe
bulktelephonemetadataprogramisnotauthorizedby215.Wetherefore
**TheHonorableVernonS.Broderick,oftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,sittingbydesignation.
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VACATEthejudgmentofthedistrictcourtandREMANDforfurther
proceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.
VACATEDANDREMANDED.
RobertD.Sack,CircuitJudge,concursintheopinionoftheCourtandfilesaseparateconcurringopinion.
ALEXANDER ABDO, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation(JameelJaffer,PatrickToomey,BrettMaxKaufman,CatherineCrump,American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY;ChristopherT.Dunn,ArthurN.Eisenburg,NewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionFoundation,NewYork,NY,on thebrief),NewYork,NY, forPlaintiffsAppellants.
STUART F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,UnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice (DouglasN.Letter,H.ThomasByronIII,HenryC.Whitaker,AppellateStaff,CivilDivision,UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,Washington,DC;PreetBharara,UnitedStatesAttorneyfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,NewYork,NY;DavidS.Jones,JohnD.Clopper,EmilyE.Daughtry,AssistantUnitedStatesAttorneys,NewYork,NY,onthebrief),Washington,D.C., forDefendantsAppellees.
LauraK.Donohue,GeorgetownUniversityLawCenter,WashingtonDC,ErwinChemerinsky,UniversityofCalifornia, IrvineSchoolofLaw, Irvine, CA, for Amici Curiae Former Members of the ChurchCommitteeandLawProfessorsinSupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.
CharlesS.Sims,ProskauerRoseLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmiciCuriaeSenatorRonWyden,SenatorMarkUdall,andSenatorMartinHeinrichinSupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.
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Cindy Cohn, Mark Rumold, Andrew Crocker, Electronic FrontierFoundation,SanFrancisco,CA,forAmiciCuriaeExpertsinComputerandDataScienceinSupportofAppellantsandReversal.
JohnW.Whitehead,DouglasR.McKusick,TheRutherfordInstitute,Charlottesville, Virginia, Daniel L. Ackman, Law Office of DanielAckman,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaeTheRutherfordInstituteinSupportofAppellantsandReversal.
EdwardJ.Davis,LindaSteinman,LacyH.Koonce,III,DavisWrightTremaineLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaePENAmericanCenter,Inc.,inSupportofAppellants.
JohnFrazer,LawOfficeofJohnFrazer,PLLC,Fairfax,VA,forAmicusCuriaeNationalRifleAssociationofAmerica,Inc.,inSupportofPlaintiffsAppellantsandSupportingReversal.
JonathanHafetz,AssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYork,GaryD.Sesser,StephenL.Kass,MichaelShapiro,LauraA.Zaccone,CarterLedyard&MilburnLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaeAssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYorkSupportingPlaintiffsAppellantsBrief.
GERARDE.LYNCH,CircuitJudge:
Thisappealconcernsthelegalityofthebulktelephonemetadatacollection
program(thetelephonemetadataprogram),underwhichtheNationalSecurity
Agency(NSA)collectsinbulkonanongoingdailybasisthemetadata
associatedwithtelephonecallsmadebyandtoAmericans,andaggregatesthose
metadataintoarepositoryordatabankthatcanlaterbequeried.Appellants
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challengetheprogramonstatutoryandconstitutionalgrounds.Becausewefind
thattheprogramexceedsthescopeofwhatCongresshasauthorized,wevacate
thedecisionbelowdismissingthecomplaintwithoutreachingappellants
constitutionalarguments.Weaffirmthedistrictcourtsdenialofappellants
requestforapreliminaryinjunction.
BACKGROUND
Intheearly1970s,inaclimatenotaltogetherunliketodays,the
intelligencegatheringandsurveillanceactivitiesoftheNSA,theFBI,andtheCIA
cameunderpublicscrutiny.TheSupremeCourtstruckdowncertainwarrantless
surveillanceproceduresthatthegovernmenthadarguedwerelawfulasan
exerciseofthePresidentspowertoprotectnationalsecurity,remarkingonthe
inherentvaguenessofthedomesticsecurityconcept[and]thenecessarilybroad
andcontinuingnatureofintelligencegathering.UnitedStatesv.U.S.Dist.
CourtfortheE.Dist.ofMich.(Keith),407U.S.297,320(1972).Inresponsetothat
decisionandtoallegationsthatthoseagencieswereabusingtheirpowerinorder
tospyonAmericans,theSenateestablishedtheSelectCommitteetoStudy
GovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities(theChurch
Committee)toinvestigatewhethertheintelligenceagencieshadengagedin
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unlawfulbehaviorandwhetherlegislationwasnecessarytogoverntheir
activities.TheChurchCommitteeexpressedconcernsthattheprivacyrightsof
U.S.citizenshadbeenviolatedbyactivitiesthathadbeenconductedunderthe
rubricofforeignintelligencecollection.
ThefindingsoftheChurchCommittee,alongwiththeSupremeCourts
decisioninKeithandtheallegationsofabusebytheintelligenceagencies,
promptedCongressin1978toenactcomprehensivelegislationaimedat
curtailingabusesanddelineatingtheprocedurestobeemployedinconducting
surveillanceinforeignintelligenceinvestigations.Thatlegislation,theForeign
IntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978(FISA),Pub.L.No.95511,92Stat.1783
(1978)(codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.1801etseq.),establishedaspecial
court,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(FISC),toreviewthe
governmentsapplicationsfororderspermittingelectronicsurveillance.See50
U.S.C.1803.UnlikeordinaryArticleIIIcourts,theFISCconductsitsusuallyex
parteproceedingsinsecret;itsdecisionsarenot,intheordinarycourse,
disseminatedpublicly.Id.1803(c).
Wearefacedtodaywithacontroversysimilartothatwhichledtothe
KeithdecisionandtheenactmentofFISA.Wemustconfrontthequestion
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whetherasurveillanceprogramthatthegovernmenthasputinplacetoprotect
nationalsecurityislawful.Thatprograminvolvesthebulkcollectionbythe
governmentoftelephonemetadatacreatedbytelephonecompaniesinthe
normalcourseoftheirbusinessbutnowexplicitlyrequiredbythegovernmentto
beturnedoverinbulkonanongoingbasis.Asinthe1970s,therevelationofthis
programhasgeneratedconsiderablepublicattentionandconcernaboutthe
intrusionofgovernmentintoprivatematters.Asinthatera,aswell,thenation
facesseriousthreatstonationalsecurity,includingthethreatofforeign
generatedactsofterrorismagainsttheUnitedStates.Now,asthen,Congressis
taskedinthefirstinstancewithachievingtherightbalancebetweentheseoften
competingconcerns.Todoso,CongresshasamendedFISA,mostsignificantly,
aftertheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001,inthePATRIOTAct.SeeUSA
PATRIOTACTof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,115Stat.272(2001).Thegovernment
arguesthat215ofthatActauthorizesthetelephonemetadataprogram.Seeid.
215,115Stat.at287(codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.1861).
I. TelephoneMetadata
Beforeproceedingtoexplorethedetailsof215ofthePATRIOTAct,we
pausetodefinetelephonemetadata,inordertoclarifythetypeofinformation
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thatthegovernmentargues215authorizesittocollectinbulk.Unlikewhatis
gleanedfromthemoretraditionalinvestigativepracticeofwiretapping,
telephonemetadatadonotincludethevoicecontentoftelephoneconversations.
Rather,theyincludedetailsabouttelephonecalls,including,forexample,the
lengthofacall,thephonenumberfromwhichthecallwasmade,andthephone
numbercalled.Metadatacanalsorevealtheuserordevicemakingorreceivinga
callthroughuniqueidentitynumbersassociatedwiththeequipment(although
thegovernmentmaintainsthattheinformationcollecteddoesnotinclude
informationabouttheidentitiesornamesofindividuals),andprovide
informationabouttheroutingofacallthroughthetelephonenetwork,whichcan
sometimes(althoughnotalways)conveyinformationaboutacallersgeneral
location.Accordingtothegovernment,themetadataitcollectsdonotinclude
cellsitelocationalinformation,whichprovidesamorepreciseindicationofa
callerslocationthancallroutinginformationdoes.
Thattelephonemetadatadonotdirectlyrevealthecontentoftelephone
calls,however,doesnotvitiatetheprivacyconcernsarisingoutofthe
governmentsbulkcollectionofsuchdata.Appellantsandamicitakepainsto
emphasizethestartlingamountofdetailedinformationmetadatacanreveal
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informationthatcouldtraditionallyonlybeobtainedbyexaminingthecontents
ofcommunicationsandthatisthereforeoftenaproxyforcontent.Joint
Appx50(DeclarationofProfessorEdwardW.Felten).Forexample,acalltoa
singlepurposetelephonenumbersuchasahotlinemightrevealthatan
individualis:avictimofdomesticviolenceorrape;aveteran;sufferingfroman
addictionofonetypeoranother;contemplatingsuicide;orreportingacrime.
Metadatacanrevealcivil,political,orreligiousaffiliations;theycanalsoreveal
anindividualssocialstatus,orwhetherandwhenheorsheisinvolvedin
intimaterelationships.1
1AreportofarecentstudyinSciencemagazinerevealedhowmuchinformationcanbegleanedfromcreditcardmetadata.Inthestudy,whichusedthreemonthsofanonymouscreditcardrecordsfor1.1millionpeople,scientistswereabletoreidentify90%oftheindividualswheretheyhadonlyfouradditionalspatiotemporalpointsofinformationforexample,informationthatanindividualwenttooneparticularstoreonfourspecificdays.Suchinformationcouldbegatheredfromsourcesasaccessibleasatweetfromthatindividual.YvesAlexandredeMontjoye,LauraRadaelli,VivekKumarSingh,AlexSandyPentland,UniqueintheShoppingMall:OntheReidentifiabilityofCreditCardMetadata,Science,Jan.30,2015,at536.Thestudysauthorsconcludedthat,inthecontextofmostlargescalemetadatasets,itwouldnotbedifficulttoreidentifyindividualsevenifthedatawereanonymized.Id.at539.Whilecreditcarddatadifferinimportantwaysfromtelephonedata,thestudyillustratesthewaysinwhichmetadatacanbeusedbysophisticatedinvestigatorstodeducesignificantprivateinformationaboutindividuals.
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Werecognizethatmetadataexistinmoretraditionalformats,too,andthat
lawenforcementandothershavealwaysbeenabletoutilizemetadatafor
investigativepurposes.Forexample,justastelephonemetadatamayrevealthe
charitableorganizationsthatanindividualsupports,observationoftheoutside
ofanenvelopesentattheendoftheyearthroughtheUnitedStatesPostalService
tosuchanorganizationmightwellpermitsimilarinferences,withoutrequiring
anexaminationoftheenvelopescontents.Butthestructuredformatof
telephoneandothertechnologyrelatedmetadata,andthevastnewtechnological
capacityforlargescaleandautomatedreviewandanalysis,distinguishthetype
ofmetadataatissueherefrommoretraditionalforms.Themoremetadatathe
governmentcollectsandanalyzes,furthermore,thegreaterthecapacityforsuch
metadatatorevealevermoreprivateandpreviouslyunascertainableinformation
aboutindividuals.Finally,asappellantsandamicipointout,intodays
technologicallybasedworld,itisvirtuallyimpossibleforanordinarycitizento
avoidcreatingmetadataabouthimselfonaregularbasissimplybyconducting
hisordinaryaffairs.
II. Section215
Theoriginalversionof215,whichpredatedthePATRIOTAct,allowed
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theDirectoroftheFBIorhisdesigneetoobtainordersfromtheFISCauthorizing
commoncarriers,amongothers,toprovidetothegovernmentcertainbusiness
recordsforthepurposeofforeignintelligenceandinternationalterrorism
investigationswherethereexistedspecificandarticulablefactsgivingreasonto
believethatthepersontowhomtherecordspertain[wa]saforeignpoweroran
agentofaforeignpower.Thatprovisionwasenactedin1998asanamendment
toFISA.SeeIntelligenceAuthorizationActforFiscalYear1999,Pub.L.No.105
272,602,112Stat.2396,241011(1998).ThePATRIOTActsubstantiallyrevised
215toprovidefortheproductionnotonlyofbusinessrecordsbutalsoof
anytangiblethings,andtoeliminatetherestrictionsonthetypesofbusinesses
suchorderscanreach.SeeUSAPATRIOTACTof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,215.
AssubsequentlyamendedbysuccessorbillstothePATRIOTAct,thecurrent
versionof215allowstheDirectoroftheFBIorhisdesigneeto
makeanapplicationforanorderrequiringtheproductionofanytangiblethings(includingbooks,records,papers,documents,andotheritems)foraninvestigationtoobtainforeignintelligenceinformationnotconcerningaUnitedStatespersonortoprotectagainstinternationalterrorismorclandestineintelligenceactivities.
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50U.S.C.1861(a)(1).Initscurrentform,theprovisionrequiressuchan
applicationtoinclude
a statement of facts showing that there are reasonablegrounds to believe that the tangible things sought arerelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment) conducted in accordance with subsection(a)(2) of this section to obtain foreign intelligenceinformationnotconcerningaUnitedStatespersonortoprotect against international terrorism or clandestineintelligenceactivities.
Id.1861(b)(2)(A).Suchanordermayonlyrequiretheproductionofatangible
thingifsuchthingcanbeobtainedwithasubpoenaducestecumissuedbya
courtoftheUnitedStatesinaidofagrandjuryinvestigationorwithanyother
orderissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesdirectingtheproductionofrecordsor
tangiblethings.Id.1861(c)(2)(D).Finally,thestatuterequirestheAttorney
Generaltoadoptspecificminimizationproceduresgoverningtheretentionand
disseminationbythe[FBI]ofanytangiblethings,orinformationtherein,received
bythe[FBI]inresponsetoanorderunderthissubchapter.Id.1861(g)(1).
Because215containedasunsetprovisionfromitsinception,originally
terminatingitsauthorityonDecember31,2005,ithasrequiredsubsequent
renewal.USAPATRIOTActof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,224,115Stat.at295.
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Congresshasrenewed215seventimes,mostrecentlyin2011,atwhichtimeit
wasamendedtoexpireonJune1,2015.SeePATRIOTSunsetsExtensionActof
2011,Pub.L.No.11214,125Stat.216(2011).
III. TheTelephoneMetadataProgram
Americansfirstlearnedaboutthetelephonemetadataprogramthat
appellantsnowchallengeonJune5,2013,whentheBritishnewspaperThe
GuardianpublishedaFISCorderleakedbyformergovernmentcontractor
EdwardSnowden.TheorderdirectedVerizonBusinessNetworkServices,Inc.
(Verizon),atelephonecompany,toproducetotheNSAonanongoingdaily
basis...allcalldetailrecordsortelephonymetadatacreatedbyVerizonfor
communications(i)betweentheUnitedStatesandabroad;or(ii)whollywithin
theUnitedStates,includinglocaltelephonecalls.InreApplicationoftheFBI
foranOrderRequiringtheProd.ofTangibleThingsFromVerizonBus.Network
Servs.,Inc.,exrel.MCICommcnServs.,Inc.,d/b/aVerizonBus.Servs.(Verizon
SecondaryOrder),No.BR1380,slipop.at2(F.I.S.C.Apr.25,2013).Theorder
thusrequiresVerizontoproducecalldetailrecords,everyday,onalltelephone
callsmadethroughitssystemsorusingitsserviceswhereoneorbothendsofthe
callarelocatedintheUnitedStates.
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Aftertheorderwaspublished,thegovernmentacknowledgedthatitwas
partofabroaderprogramofbulkcollectionoftelephonemetadatafromother
telecommunicationsproviderscarriedoutpursuantto215.Itisnow
undisputedthatthegovernmenthasbeencollectingtelephonemetadata
informationinbulkunder215sinceatleastMay2006,whentheFISCfirst
authorizedittodosoinaPrimaryOrderdescribingthetangiblethingstobe
producedasallcalldetailrecordsortelephonymetadatacreatedby
[redacted]...,includ[ing]comprehensivecommunicationsroutinginformation,
includingbutnotlimitedtosessionidentifyinginformation(e.g.,originatingand
terminatingtelephonenumber[s],communicationsdeviceidentifier[s],etc.),
trunkidentifier,andtimeanddurationofcall.InreApplicationoftheFBIfor
anOrderRequiringtheProd.ofTangibleThingsFrom[Redacted](2006Primary
Order),No.BR0605,slipop.at2(F.I.S.C.May24,2006),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_May%2024%202006%20Order
%20from%20FISC.pdf.
ThatorderspecifiedthattheitemsweretobeproducedtotheNSA;that
therewerereasonablegroundstobelievethetangiblethingssought[were]
relevanttoauthorizedinvestigations...toprotectagainstinternational
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terrorism;andthattheitemssoughtcouldbeobtainedwithasubpoenaduces
tecumissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesinaidofagrandjuryinvestigation
orwithanyotherorderissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesdirectingthe
productionofrecordsortangiblethings.Id.at3.Theorderrequiredits
recipient,uponreceivingtheappropriatesecondaryorder,2tocontinue
productiononanongoingdailybasis...forthedurationofth[e]orderand
contemplatedcreationofadataarchivethatwouldonlybeaccessedwhen
NSAhasidentifiedaknowntelephonenumberforwhich...therearefacts
givingrisetoareasonable,articulablesuspicionthatthetelephonenumberis
associatedwith[Redacted]presumably,withterroristactivityoraspecific
terroristorganization.Id.at45.TheorderalsostatesthattheNSAexclusively
willoperatethenetworkonwhichthemetadataarestoredandprocessed.Id.at
5.
ThegovernmenthasdisclosedadditionalFISCordersreauthorizingthe
program.FISCordersmustberenewedevery90days,andtheprogramhas
thereforebeenrenewed41timessinceMay2006.Mostrecently,theprogram
2TheorderpublishedinTheGuardianandservedonVerizonwasonesuchSecondaryOrder.
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wasreauthorizedbytheFISConFebruary26,2015;thatauthorizationexpireson
June1,2015.SeeInreApplicationoftheFBIforanOrderRequiringtheProd.of
TangibleThingsFrom[Redacted],No.BR1524(F.I.S.C.Feb.26,2015),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0311/BR%201524%20Primary%20Order%2
0%20Redacted.pdf.
Thegovernmentdisputesappellantscharacterizationoftheprogramas
collectingvirtuallyalltelephonymetadataassociatedwithcallsmadeor
receivedintheUnitedStates,butdeclinestoelaborateonthescopeofthe
programorspecifyhowtheprogramfallsshortofthatdescription.Itisunclear,
however,inwhatwayappellantscharacterizationoftheprogramcanbefaulted.
Onitsface,theVerizonorderrequirestheproductionofallcalldetailrecordsor
telephonymetadatarelatingtoVerizoncommunicationswithintheUnited
StatesorbetweentheUnitedStatesandabroad.VerizonSecondaryOrder2
(emphasisadded).TheVerizonorderandthePrimaryOrderdescribedabove
revealthatthemetadatacollectedincludecomprehensivecommunications
routinginformation,includingbutnotlimitedtosessionidentifyinginformation
(e.g.,originatingandterminatingtelephonenumber,InternationalMobile
SubscriberIdentity(IMSI)number,InternationalMobilestationEquipment
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Identity(IMEI)number,etc.),trunkidentifier,3telephonecallingcardnumbers,
andtimeanddurationofcall.VerizonSecondaryOrder2;seealso2006
PrimaryOrder2.ThegovernmentdoesnotsuggestthatVerizonistheonly
telephoneserviceprovidersubjecttosuchanorder;indeed,itdoesnotseriously
disputeappellantscontentionthatallsignificantserviceprovidersintheUnited
Statesaresubjecttosimilarorders.
Thegovernmentexplainsthatitusesthebulkmetadatacollectedpursuant
totheseordersbymakingqueriesusingmetadataidentifiers(alsoreferredto
asselectors),orparticularphonenumbersthatitbelieves,basedon
reasonablearticulablesuspicion,tobeassociatedwithaforeignterrorist
organization.JointAppx264(DeclarationofTeresaH.Shea).Theidentifieris
usedasaseedtosearchacrossthegovernmentsdatabase;thesearchresults
yieldphonenumbers,andthemetadataassociatedwiththem,thathavebeenin
contactwiththeseed.Id.Thatstepisreferredtoasthefirsthop.TheNSA
canthenalsosearchforthenumbers,andassociatedmetadata,thathavebeenin
contactwiththenumbersresultingfromthefirstsearchconductingasecond
3Atrunkidentifierprovidesinformationregardinghowacallisroutedthroughthetelephonenetwork,revealinggeneralinformationaboutthepartieslocations.
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hop.Id.at265.Untilrecently,theprogramallowedforanotheriterationofthe
process,suchthatathirdhopcouldbeconducted,sweepinginresultsthat
includethemetadataof,essentially,thecontactsofcontactsofcontactsofthe
originalseed.Id.Thegovernmentassertsthatitdoesnotconductanygeneral
browsingofthedata.Id.at26365.
Section215requiresthattheAttorneyGeneraladoptspecific
minimizationproceduresgoverningtheretentionanddisseminationbythe
[government]of[information]received...inresponsetoanorderunderthis
subchapter.50U.S.C.1861(g)(1).Theproceduresthathavebeenadopted
includetherequirementthattheNSAstorethemetadatawithinsecurenetworks;
thatthemetadatanotbeaccessedforanypurposeotherthanwhatisallowed
undertheFISCorder;thattheresultsofqueriesnotbedisseminatedoutsidethe
NSAexceptinaccordancewiththeminimizationanddissemination
requirementsofNSAprocedures;andthattherelevantpersonnelreceive
comprehensivetrainingontheminimizationproceduresandtechnicalcontrols.
JointAppx26769.Andasthegovernmentpointsout,theprogramissubjectto
oversightbytheDepartmentofJustice,theFISC,andCongress.Id.at269.The
minimizationproceduresrequireauditsandreviewsoftheprogrambythe
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NSAslegalandoversightoffices,theOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,attorneys
fromtheDepartmentofJusticesNationalSecurityDivision,andtheOfficeofthe
DirectorofNationalIntelligence.Id.TheFISCordersthatcreatedtheprogram
requiretheNSAtoprovideperiodicreportstotheFISC.Id.at141.Intheevent
offailuresofcompliance,reportsmustbemadetotheFISC,and,wherethose
failuresaresignificant,totheIntelligenceandJudiciaryCommitteesofboth
housesofCongress.Id.at269.FISAitselfalsoimposesasystemof
Congressionaloversight,requiringperiodicreportsontheprogramfromthe
AttorneyGeneraltotheHouseandSenateIntelligenceandJudiciary
Committees.See50U.S.C.1862,1871.
Sincetheexistenceofthetelephonemetadataprogrambecamepublic,a
numberofdevelopmentshavealteredthelandscape,atleasttosomedegree,
withinwhichweanalyzetheprogram.Amongthemostnotableare
modificationstothetelephonemetadataprogramannouncedbyPresident
ObamainJanuary2014.PresidentBarackObama,RemarksbythePresidenton
ReviewofSignalsIntelligence(Jan.17,2014),http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
pressoffice/2014/01/17/remarkspresidentreviewsignalsintelligence.Thetwo
immediatemodificationsthatthePresidentordered,whichweresubsequently
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incorporatedinaFISCordersoughtbygovernmentmotion,(1)limitedthe
numberofhopsthatcanbesearchedtotwo,ratherthanthree,and(2)required
thataFISCjudgefindthatthereasonablearticulablesuspicionstandardhasbeen
satisfiedbeforeaseedcanbequeried,ratherthan(ashadpreviouslybeenthe
case)allowingdesignatedNSAofficialstodetermineforthemselveswhether
suchsuspicionexisted.Id.BothlimitationswereapprovedbytheFISCina
February5,2014FISCorder.InreApplicationoftheFBIforanOrderRequiring
theProd.ofTangibleThings,No.BR1401(F.I.S.C.Feb.5,2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br1401order.pdf.These
modificationswerebasedinpartontherecommendationsoftheReviewGroup
onIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnologiesestablishedbythePresident.
SeePresidentsReviewGrp.onIntelligenceandCommcnsTechs.,Libertyand
SecurityinaChangingWorld:Rep.andRecommendationsofthePresidents
ReviewGrp.onIntelligenceandCommcnsTechs.(Dec.12,2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20131212_rg_final_report.
pdf.TheReviewGroupalsorecommendedthatthesystembemodifiedsuch
thatathirdpartyortheprivatecarriers,ratherthanthegovernment,collectand
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retainthebulkmetadata.Thatrecommendation,however,hassofarnotbeen
adopted.
Inadditiontothatgroup,thePrivacyandCivilLibertiesOversightBoard
(PCLOB)publishedadetailedreportontheprogram.ThePCLOBisa
bipartisanagencywithintheexecutivebranchthatwasestablishedin2007,
pursuanttoarecommendationfromtheNationalCommissiononTerrorist
AttacksUpontheUnitedStates(the9/11Commission,establishedafterthe
September11,2001terroristattackstoprepareanaccountofthecircumstances
surroundingtheattacks),inordertomonitortheactionstakenbythe
governmenttoprotectthenationfromterrorismandtoensurethattheyare
appropriatelybalancedagainsttheneedtoprotectprivacyandcivilliberties.See
ImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11CommnActof2007,Pub.L.
No.11053,121Stat.266(2007).ThePCLOBconcludedthattheprogramwas
inconsistentwith215,violatedtheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct,and
implicatedprivacyandFirstAmendmentconcerns.SeePrivacyandCivil
LibertiesOversightBoard,Rep.ontheTel.RecordsProgramConductedUnder
Section215oftheUSAPATRIOTActandontheOperationsoftheForeign
IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(Jan.23,2014)(PCLOBReport),
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https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.
pdf.
Legislationaimedatincorporatingstrongerprotectionsofindividual
libertiesintothetelephonemetadataprograminavarietyofways(oreliminating
italtogether)wasintroducedinboththeHouseandtheSenateduringthe113th
Congress.SeeUSAFREEDOMAct,H.R.3361,113thCong.(2014);USA
FREEDOMAct,S.2685,113thCong.(2014).AmodifiedversionofH.R.3361,
whichlostthebackingofsomeofthebillsoriginalsupportersbecauseitfailedto
endbulkcollection,neverthelesspassedtheHouseinMay2014.USA
FREEDOMAct,H.R.3361,113thCong.(2014).InNovember2014,however,a
motiontoinvokeclotureontheSenatesversionofthebillrelativelymore
robustintermsofprivacyprotectionsfailedbyavoteof5842,thereby
preventingthebillfromcomingupforavoteintheSenatedespitethedesireof
58senatorstoproceedtoavoteonthemeasure.USAFREEDOMAct,S.2685,
113thCong.(2014).ThecurrentCongressislikewiseconsideringbillsaimedat
modifying215;abillthatwouldplacethebulkmetadatacollectedintothe
handsoftelecommunicationsproviders,tobeaccessedbythegovernmentonly
withFISCauthorization,hasbeenintroducedinboththeHouseandtheSenatein
22
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recentweeks.SeeUSAFREEDOMActof2015,H.R.2048/S.1123,114thCong.
(2015).OnApril30,2015,thebillpassedtheHouseJudiciaryCommittee.See
USAFREEDOMActof2015,H.R.2048,114thCong.(2015).Avotefromthefull
Houseonthebillisexpectedlaterthismonth.
Finally,theprogramhascomeunderscrutinybyArticleIIIcourtsother
thantheFISC.Inadditiontothiscase,similarcaseshavebeenfiledaroundthe
countrychallengingthegovernmentsbulkcollectionoftelephonemetadata.
See,e.g.,Smithv.Obama,24F.Supp.3d1005(D.Idaho2014),No.1435555(9th
Cir.arguedDec.8,2014);Klaymanv.Obama,957F.Supp.2d1(D.D.C.2013),
No.145004(D.C.Cir.arguedNov.4,2014).
IV. ProceduralHistory
OnJune11,2013,theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil
LibertiesUnionFoundation(collectively,ACLU)andtheNewYorkCivil
LibertiesUnionandNewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionFoundation(collectively,
NYCLU)currentandformerVerizoncustomers,respectivelysuedthe
governmentofficialsresponsibleforadministeringthetelephonemetadata
program,challengingtheprogramonbothstatutoryandconstitutionalgrounds
andseekingdeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief.Thecomplaintasksthecourtto
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declarethatthetelephonemetadataprogramexceedstheauthoritygrantedby
215,andalsoviolatestheFirstandFourthAmendmentstotheU.S.
Constitution.Itasksthecourttopermanentlyenjoindefendantsfromcontinuing
theprogram,andtoorderdefendantstopurgefromtheirpossessionallofthe
callrecordsof[p]laintiffscommunicationscollectedinaccordancewiththe
program.JointAppx27.
OnAugust26,2013,plaintiffsmovedforapreliminaryinjunctionbarring
defendantsfromcollectingtheircallrecordsundertheprogram,requiring
defendantstoquarantineallofthecallrecordstheyhadalreadycollected,and
prohibitingdefendantsfromusingtheirrecordstoperformqueriesonanyphone
numberorotheridentifierassociatedwithplaintiffs.Onthesamedate,the
governmentmovedtodismissthecomplaint.
OnDecember27,2013,thedistrictcourtgrantedthegovernmentsmotion
todismissanddeniedplaintiffsmotionforapreliminaryinjunction.SeeACLU
v.Clapper,959F.Supp.2d724(S.D.N.Y.2013).Plaintiffsnowappealthat
decision.
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DISCUSSION
Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsgrantofamotiontodismissunder
FederalRulesofCivilProcedure12(b)(1)and12(b)(6).Klein&Co.Futures,Inc.
v.Bd.ofTradeofCityofNewYork,464F.3d255,259(2dCir.2006);seealso
LotesCo.,Ltd.v.HonHaiPrecisionIndus.Co.,753F.3d395,403(2dCir.2014).
Wereviewadistrictcourtsdenialofapreliminaryinjunctionforabuseof
discretion,seeCent.RabbinicalCong.ofU.S.&Canadav.N.Y.C.DeptofHealth
&MentalHygiene,763F.3d183,192(2dCir.2014),whichoccurswhenthe
courtsdecisioneitherrestsonanerroroflaw...oraclearlyerroneousfactual
finding,or...itsdecisionthoughnotnecessarilytheproductofalegalerroror
aclearlyerroneousfactualfindingcannotbelocatedwithintherangeof
permissibledecisions,Vincentyv.Bloomberg,476F.3d74,83(2dCir.2007).
I. Standing
Thedistrictcourtruledthatappellantshadstandingtobringthiscase.
Clapper,959F.Supp.2dat738.Thegovernmentarguesthatthedistrictcourts
rulingwaserroneous,contendingthatappellantslackstandingbecausethey
havenotdemonstratedthatanyofthemetadataassociatedwiththemhavebeen
orwillbeactuallyreviewedbythegovernment,andhavenototherwise
25
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identifiedaninjurythatissufficientlyconcreteorimminenttoconferstanding.
Werecognizethat[n]oprincipleismorefundamentaltothejudiciarysproper
roleinoursystemofgovernmentthantheconstitutionallimitationoffederal
courtjurisdictiontoactualcasesorcontroversies.Clapperv.AmnestyIntl
USA,133S.Ct.1138,1146(2013),quotingDaimlerChryslerCorp.v.Cuno,547
U.S.332,341(2006)(alterationinoriginal).Inordertomeetthatrequirement,
plaintiffsmust,amongotherthings,establishthattheyhavestandingtosue.
Rainesv.Byrd,521U.S.811,818(1997).StandingunderArticleIIIofthe
Constitutionrequiresthataninjurybeconcrete,particularized,andactualor
imminent;fairlytraceabletothechallengedaction;andredressablebya
favorableruling.MonsantoCo.v.GeertsonSeedFarms,561U.S.139,149
(2010);seealsoAmnestyIntl,133S.Ct.at1147(collectingcases).TheSupreme
Courthasrepeatedlyreiteratedthatthreatenedinjurymustbecertainly
impendingtoconstituteinjuryinfact,andthat[a]llegationsofpossiblefuture
injuryarenotsufficient.AmnestyIntl,133S.Ct.at1147,quotingWhitmorev.
Arkansas,495U.S.149,158(1990)(emphasisinoriginal).Weremainmindful
thatthestandinginquiryhasbeenespeciallyrigorouswhenreachingthemerits
of[a]disputewouldforceustodecidewhetheranactiontakenbyoneofthe
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othertwobranchesoftheFederalGovernmentwasunconstitutionalandin
casesinwhichtheJudiciaryhasbeenrequestedtoreviewactionsofthepolitical
branchesinthefieldsofintelligencegatheringandforeignaffairs.Id.,quoting
Raines,521U.S.at81920.
Appellantsinthiscasehave,despitethosesubstantialhurdles,established
standingtosue,asthedistrictcourtcorrectlyheld.Appellantshereneednot
speculatethatthegovernmenthascollected,ormayinthefuturecollect,theircall
records.Tothecontrary,thegovernmentsownordersdemonstratethat
appellantscallrecordsareindeedamongthosecollectedaspartofthetelephone
metadataprogram.Norhasthegovernmentdisputedthatclaim.Itargues
insteadthatanyallegedinjuriesheredependonthegovernmentsreviewingthe
informationcollected,andthatappellantshavenotshownanythingmorethana
speculativeprospectthattheirtelephonenumberswouldeverbeusedasa
selectortoquery,orbeincludedintheresultsofqueriesof,thetelephony
metadata.AppelleesBr.22.
Butthegovernmentsargumentmisapprehendswhatisrequiredto
establishstandinginacasesuchasthisone.Appellantschallengethetelephone
metadataprogramasawhole,alleginginjuryfromtheverycollectionoftheir
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telephonemetadata.And,asthedistrictcourtobserved,itisnotdisputedthat
thegovernmentcollectedtelephonemetadataassociatedwiththeappellants
telephonecalls.TheFourthAmendmentprotectsagainstunreasonablesearches
andseizures.Appellantscontendthatthecollectionoftheirmetadataexceedsthe
scopeofwhatisauthorizedby215andconstitutesaFourthAmendment
search.Wethinksuchcollectionismoreappropriatelychallenged,atleastfroma
standingperspective,asaseizureratherthanasasearch.Whetherornotsuch
claimsprevailonthemerits,appellantssurelyhavestandingtoallegeinjury
fromthecollection,andmaintenanceinagovernmentdatabase,ofrecords
relatingtothem.[A]violationofthe[Fourth]Amendmentisfully
accomplishedatthetimeofanunreasonablegovernmentalintrusion.United
Statesv.VerdugoUrquidez,494U.S.259,264(1990)(internalquotationmarks
omitted).Ifthetelephonemetadataprogramisunlawful,appellantshave
sufferedaconcreteandparticularizedinjuryfairlytraceabletothechallenged
programandredressablebyafavorableruling.
AmnestyInternationaldoesnotholdotherwise.There,theSupreme
Court,reversingourdecision,heldthatrespondentshadnotestablishedstanding
becausetheycouldnotshowthatthegovernmentwassurveillingthem,orthat
28
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suchsurveillancewascertainlyimpending.131S.Ct.at11481150.Instead,
theSupremeCourtstatedthatrespondentsstandingargumentswerebasedona
speculativechainofpossibilitiesthatrequiredthat:respondentsforeign
contactsbetargetedforsurveillance;thesurveillancebeconductedpursuantto
thestatutechallenged,ratherthanundersomeotherauthority;theFISCapprove
thesurveillance;thegovernmentactuallyinterceptthecommunicationsofthe
foreigncontacts;andamongthoseinterceptedcommunicationsbethose
involvingrespondents.Id.Becauserespondentsinjuryreliedonthatchainof
eventsactuallytranspiring,theCourtheldthattheallegedinjurywasnotfairly
traceabletothestatutebeingchallenged.Id.at1150.Astocostsincurredby
respondentstoavoidsurveillance,theCourtcharacterizedthosecostsasa
productoftheirfearofsurveillanceinsufficienttoconferstanding.Id.at1152.
Here,appellantsallegedinjuryrequiresnospeculationwhatsoeverasto
howeventswillunfoldunder215appellantsrecords(amongthoseof
numerousothers)havebeentargetedforseizurebythegovernment;the
governmenthasusedthechallengedstatutetoeffectthatseizure;theordershave
beenapprovedbytheFISC;andtherecordshavebeencollected.Amnesty
Internationalsspeculativechainofpossibilitiesis,inthiscontext,areality.
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Thatcaseinnowaysuggestedthatsuchdatawouldneedtobereviewedor
analyzedinorderforrespondentstosufferinjury.
Thegovernmentalsotakesissuewiththedistrictcourtsrelianceon
AmidaxTradingGroupv.S.W.I.F.T.SCRL,671F.3d140(2dCir.2011).In
Amidax,weheldthatplaintiffshadnotestablishedstandingtochallengethe
governmentsacquisitionoffinancialrecordsfromSWIFT,amessagingservice
thatroutesfinancialtransactions,viaadministrativesubpoenasissuedbythe
OfficeofForeignAssetControl.Id.at14849.Becausetherewasinsufficient
supportfortheallegationthatAmidaxsownrecordswereamongthosehanded
overtothegovernment,weheldthatAmidaxhadnotallegedaplausibleinjury
infact.Id.Thatcase,too,differsfromthecaseatbar,whereappellantshave
presentedevidencethattheirdataarebeingcollected.TotheextentAmidax
speakstothecircumstancespresentedbythiscase,itsupports,albeitindictum,
appellantsposition.WenotedinAmidaxthat[t]oestablishaninjuryinfact
andthus,apersonalstakeinthislitigation[Amidax]needonlyestablishthatits
informationwasobtainedbythegovernment.Id.at147(secondalterationin
original).There,too,weviewedthecollectionofthedatainquestion,ifithadin
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factoccurred,asaninjurysufficienttoconferstanding,withoutconsidering
whethersuchdatawerelikelytobereviewed.
Finally,thegovernmentadmitsthat,whenitqueriesitsdatabase,its
computerssearchallofthematerialstoredinthedatabaseinordertoidentify
recordsthatmatchthesearchterm.Indoingso,itnecessarilysearches
appellantsrecordselectronically,evenifsuchasearchdoesnotreturn
appellantsrecordsforclosereviewbyahumanagent.Thereisnoquestionthat
anequivalentmanualreviewoftherecords,insearchofconnectionstoasuspect
personortelephone,wouldconferstandingevenonthegovernmentsanalysis.
Thatthesearchisconductedbyamachinemightlessentheintrusion,butdoes
notdepriveappellantsofstandingtoobjecttothecollectionandreviewoftheir
data.
AppellantslikewisehavestandingtoassertaFirstAmendmentviolation.
AppellantscontendthattheirFirstAmendmentassociationalrightsarebeing
violated,bothdirectlyandthroughachillingeffectonclientsanddonors.The
SupremeCourthaslongrecognizedthatanorganizationcanassertassociational
privacyrightsonbehalfofitsmembers,statingthat[i]tishardlyanovel
perceptionthatcompelleddisclosureofaffiliationwithgroupsengagedin
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advocacymayconstitute...arestraintonfreedomofassociation.NAACPv.
Alabama,357U.S.449,462(1958).InNAACP,furthermore,theSupremeCourt
heldthattheorganizationargue[d]...appropriatelytherightsofitsmembers,
andthatitsnexuswiththem[wa]ssufficienttopermitthatitactastheir
representativebeforethisCourt.Id.at45859.Wehavesimilarlystatedthata
unionsstandingtoasserttheFirstandFourteenthAmendmentrightsof
associationandprivacyofitsindividualmembersisbeyonddispute.Local
1814,IntlLongshoremensAssnv.WaterfrontCommnofN.Y.Harbor,667F.2d
267,270(2dCir.1981).Whenthegovernmentcollectsappellantsmetadata,
appellantsmembersinterestsinkeepingtheirassociationsandcontactsprivate
areimplicated,andanypotentialchillingeffectiscreatedatthatpoint.
Appellantshavethereforeallegedaconcrete,fairlytraceable,andredressable
injurysufficienttoconferstandingtoasserttheirFirstAmendmentclaimsas
well.
II. PreclusionandtheAdministrativeProcedureAct
Thegovernmentnextcontendsthatappellantsareimpliedlyprecluded
frombringingsuittochallengethetelephonemetadataprogramonstatutory
grounds.Accordingtothegovernment,thestatutoryschemesetoutby215
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limitsjudicialreviewof215orderstotheFISCanditsspecializedmechanism
forappellatereview,AppelleesBr.26,andprovidesforchallengestothose
ordersonlybyrecipientsof215orders(thatis,thecommunicationscompanies),
ratherthanthetargetsofsuchorders,therebyimpliedlyprecludingappellants
herefrombringingsuitinfederalcourt.Thegovernmentalsoarguesthat18
U.S.C.2712impliedlyprecludesthereliefappellantsseek,eitherindependently
orinconjunctionwiththelargerstatutoryframeworkestablishedbythetwo
provisions.
A. Section215andImpliedPreclusion
TheAdministrativeProcedureAct(APA)waivessovereignimmunity
forsuitsagainsttheUnitedStatesforreliefotherthanmoneydamages.Under
theAPA,[a]personsufferinglegalwrongbecauseofagencyaction,or
adverselyaffectedoraggrievedbyagencyactionwithinthemeaningofa
relevantstatute,isentitledtojudicialreviewthereof,andcanbringsuitinan
actioninacourtoftheUnitedStatesseekingreliefotherthanmoneydamages.
5U.S.C.702.TheAPAthusestablishesabroadrightofjudicialreviewof
administrativeaction.TheAPAdoesnot,however,applywherestatutes
precludejudicialreview.Id.701.
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Indeterminingwhetherjudicialreviewisprecludedunderaparticular
statute,wemustbeginwiththestrongpresumptionthatCongressintends
judicialreviewofadministrativeaction.Fromthebeginningourcases[have
established]thatjudicialreviewofafinalagencyactionbyanaggrievedperson
willnotbecutoffunlessthereispersuasivereasontobelievethatsuchwasthe
purposeofCongress.Bowenv.Mich.Acad.ofFamilyPhysicians,476U.S.667,
670(1986),quotingAbbottLabs.v.Gardner,387U.S.136,140(1967)(alterations
inoriginal).[O]nly...ashowingofclearandconvincingevidenceofa
contrarylegislativeintentcanrebutthepresumptionthatCongressintended
thatanactionbesubjecttojudicialreview.Bowen,476U.S.at672,quoting
AbbottLabs.,387U.S.at141.TheSupremeCourthasemphasizedthatthereisa
heavyburdenonapartythatattemptstoovercomethispresumption.Id.
(internalquotationmarksomitted).
Thatburdenis,ofcourse,notinsurmountable,andmaybeovercomeby
specificlanguageorspecificlegislativehistorythatisareliableindicatorof
congressionalintent.Blockv.Cmty.NutritionInst.,467U.S.340,349(1984).
Suchanintentmustbefairlydiscernibleinthestatutoryscheme,id.at351
(internalquotationmarksomitted),lookingtotheschemesstructure...,its
34
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objectives,itslegislativehistory,andthenatureoftheadministrativeaction
involved,id.at345.Importantly,wheresubstantialdoubtaboutthe
congressionalintentexists,thegeneralpresumptionfavoringjudicialreviewof
administrativeactioniscontrolling.NRDCv.Johnson,461F.3d164,172(2d
Cir.2006),quotingBlock,467U.S.at351.Impliedpreclusionofreviewisthus
disfavored.
Thegovernmentpointstonolanguagein215,orinFISAorthePATRIOT
Actmoregenerally,thatexcludesactionstakenbyexecutiveoradministrative
officialspursuanttoitstermsfromthepresumptionofjudicialreviewestablished
bytheAPA.Rather,itarguesthattheprovisionofonemechanismforjudicial
review,atthebehestofpartiesotherthanthosewhoseprivacymaybe
compromisedbytheseizure,impliedlyprecludesreviewpursuanttotheAPAby
partiesthusaggrieved.Tounderstandthatargument,webeginbydescribingthe
provisionforjudicialreviewonwhichthegovernmentrelies.
Arecipientofa215ordermaychallengeitslegalitybyfilingapetition
withthepoolofFISCjudgesestablishedbythestatute.50U.S.C.
1861(f)(2)(A)(i).ThatdecisioncanthenbeappealedtotheFISACourtof
Review.Id.1861(f)(3).Thestatutealsoprovidesthat[a]nyproductionor
35
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nondisclosureordernotexplicitlymodifiedorsetasideconsistentwiththis
subsectionshallremaininfulleffect.Id.1861(f)(2)(D).
Accordingtothegovernment,thoseprovisionsestablishalimitedand
detailedframeworkthatevincesCongressionalintenttolimitjudicialreviewto
themethodspecified.Boththegovernmentandthedistrictcourtpointtothe
SupremeCourtslanguageinBlockthatwhenastatuteprovidesadetailed
mechanismforjudicialconsiderationofparticularissuesatthebehestof
particularpersons,judicialreviewofthoseissuesatthebehestofotherpersons
maybefoundtobeimpliedlyprecluded.Block,467U.S.at349.
Butthatisnotalwaysthecase.TheSupremeCourthasalsonotedthatif
theexpressprovisionofjudicialreviewinonesectionofalongandcomplicated
statutewerealoneenoughtoovercometheAPAspresumptionofreviewability
forallfinalagencyaction,itwouldnotbemuchofapresumptionatall.Sackett
v.EPA,132S.Ct.1367,1373(2012).Thequestionremainswhetherthe
governmenthasdemonstratedbyclearandconvincingordiscernibleevidence
thatCongressintendedtoprecludereviewintheseparticularcircumstances.
36
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(1) Secrecy
Thegovernmentsprimaryargumentinsupportofpreclusionisbasedon
thevarioussecrecyprovisionsthatattachto215orders.Forexample,215
statesthat[n]opersonshalldisclosetoanyotherpersonthattheFederalBureau
ofInvestigationhassoughtorobtainedtangiblethingspursuanttoanorder
underthissectionunlessdisclosureisnecessarytocomplywiththeorder;the
disclosureismadetoanattorneyforadviceorassistanceinconnectionwiththe
order;orthedisclosureismadetoothersaspermittedbytheFBIDirectororhis
designee.50U.S.C.1861(d)(1).Andthestatuteexplicitlylaysoutvarious
supplementalsecrecyproceduresaccompanyingthereviewprocess,including
therequirementsthattherecordsofanysuchproceedingsbemaintainedunder
securitymeasuresestablishedbytheChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStates,in
consultationwiththeAttorneyGeneralandtheDirectorofNational
Intelligence,id.1861(f)(4);that[a]llpetitions...befiledunderseal,
id.1861(f)(5);andthat,inthecaseofanygovernmentsubmissionthatmay
containclassifiedinformation,thecourtreviewitexparteandincamera,id.
Thesesecrecymeasures,thegovernmentargues,areevidencethatCongressdid
37
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notintendthat215ordersbereviewableinfederalcourtuponsuitbyan
individualwhosemetadataarecollected.
Uponcloseranalysis,however,thatargumentfails.Thegovernmenthas
pointedtonoaffirmativeevidence,whetherclearandconvincingorfairly
discernible,thatsuggeststhatCongressintendedtoprecludejudicialreview.
Indeed,thegovernmentsargumentfromsecrecysuggeststhatCongressdidnot
contemplateasituationinwhichtargetsof215orderswouldbecomeawareof
thoseordersonanythingresemblingthescalethattheynowhave.That
revelation,ofcourse,cametopassonlybecauseofanunprecedentedleakof
classifiedinformation.ThatCongressmaynothaveanticipatedthatindividuals
likeappellants,whosecommunicationsweretargetedby215orders,would
becomeawareoftheorders,andthusbeinapositiontoseekjudicialreview,is
notevidencethatCongressaffirmativelydecidedtorevoketherighttojudicial
reviewotherwiseprovidedbytheAPAintheeventtheorderswerepublicly
revealed.
Thegovernmentsargumentalsoignoresthefactthat,incertain(albeit
limited)instances,thestatutedoesindeedcontemplatedisclosure.Ifajudge
findsthatthereisnoreasontobelievethatdisclosuremayendangerthe
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nationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates,interferewithacriminal,counterterrorism,
orcounterintelligenceinvestigation,interferewithdiplomaticrelations,or
endangerthelifeorphysicalsafetyofanyperson,hemaygrantapetitionto
modifyorsetasideanondisclosureorder.50U.S.C.1861(f)(2)(C)(i).Sucha
petitioncouldpresumablyonlybebroughtbya215orderrecipient,because
onlytherecipient,notthetarget,wouldknowoftheorderbeforesuchdisclosure.
ButthisprovisionindicatesthatCongressdidnotexpectthatall215orders
wouldremainsecretindefinitelyandthat,byprovidingforsuchsecrecy,
Congressdidnotintendtoprecludetargetsof215orders,shouldtheyhappen
tolearnofthem,frombringingsuit.
(2) StatutoryScheme
ThegovernmentalsoreliesheavilyonBlockinarguingthatthestatutory
schemeasawholeimpliedlyprecludesjudicialreview.InBlock,theSupreme
Courtconsideredwhetherconsumersofmilkcouldobtainjudicialreviewofmilk
marketorders,whichareissuedbytheSecretaryofAgriculturepursuanttothe
AgriculturalMarketingAgreementActof1937(AMAA),codifiedasamended
at7U.S.C.601etseq.Thoseorderssettheminimumpricesthatmilk
processors(alsoknownashandlers)mustpaytomilkproducers.TheCourt
39
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heldthat,inthecontextofthatstatute,thestatutessilenceastotheabilityof
milkconsumerstochallengemilkmarketorderswassufficienttoimplythat
Congressintendedthattheybeprecludedfromdoingso.467U.S.at347.The
governmentwouldhaveusview215asasimilarlycomplexadministrative
schemethatwouldclearlybedisruptedshouldtargetsoftheordersbepermitted
judicialreviewofthem.
ButtheAMAAandtheCourtsdecisioninBlockaredistinguishablefrom
thiscase.First,theCourtinBlock,andinitsdecisionssinceBlock,hasmade
muchofwhetherastatutehasadministrativereviewrequirementsthatwouldbe
endruniftheAPAprovidedforordinaryjudicialreview.InBlock,forexample,
theCourtnotedthat,foramilkmarketordertobecomeeffective,theAMAA
requiresthat:(1)theSecretaryofAgricultureconductarulemakingproceeding
beforeissuingamilkmarketorder;(2)thepublicbenotifiedoftheproceeding
andgivenanopportunityforcomment;(3)apublichearingbeheld,inwhich
(4)theevidenceofferedshowsthattheorderwillfurtherthestatutespolicy;and
(5)certainpercentagesofmilkhandlersandproducersvoteinfavorofthe
orders.Seeid.at342.
40
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Suchaschemeisafarcryfromwhatiscontemplatedby215.Section215
containsnoadministrativereviewrequirementsthatwouldbeendrunif
targetsoftheorderswereallowedtoobtainjudicialreviewthereof.Indeed,the
onlyexpressmechanismforanyreviewatallof215ordersisviajudicialreview
albeitbytheFISC,ratherthanafederaldistrictcourt.
UnliketheAMAA,215innowaycontemplatesacooperativeventure
thatprecedestheissuanceoforders.Id.at346.InBlock,theCourtpointedout
thatthestatuteprovidedformilkhandlersandproducersandnotconsumers
toparticipateintheadoptionofthemarketorders.Seeid.Thoseparties,
accordingtotheCourt,weretheoneswhocouldobtainreviewoftheorders,not
theconsumers,whomCongresshadexcludedfromtheentireprocess.Section
215,incontrast,doesnotcontemplateexantecooperationbetween,forexample,
telephonecompaniesandthegovernmentindecidinghowproductionorders
shouldbecraftedandwhethertheyshouldbeapproved.Tothecontrary,under
215,thegovernmentunilaterallycraftsordersthatmaythenbeapprovedornot
bytheFISC.UnlikeinthecaseoftheAMAA,thereisnoindicationthat
Congress,indrafting215,intendedthatthephonecompaniesbetheonlyparty
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entitledtoobtainjudicialreviewoftheordersbyprovidingforthemtootherwise
participateintheorderissuingprocess.
BlockisfurtherdistinguishablebecausetheCourtthereemphasizedthe
factthat[h]andlersha[d]interestssimilartothoseofconsumersandcould
thereforebeexpectedtochallengeunlawfulagencyaction.Id.at352.Here,in
contrast,theinterestsandincentivesoftherecipientsof215ordersarequite
differentfromthoseoftheorderstargets.Asappellantspointout,
telecommunicationscompanieshavelittleincentivetochallenge215orders
first,becausetheyareunlikelytowanttoantagonizethegovernment,and
second,becausethestatuteshieldsthemfromanyliabilityarisingfromtheir
compliancewitha215order.See50U.S.C.1861(e).Anyintereststhatthey
dohavearedistinctfromthoseoftheircustomers.Thetelephoneservice
providersprimaryinterestwouldbetheexpenseorburdenofcomplyingwith
theorders;onlythecustomershaveadirectinterestintheprivacyofinformation
revealedintheirtelephonerecords.
Indeed,courtssinceBlockhaveinterpretedthisfactorwhetherCongress
hasextendedacauseofactiontoapartywhoseinterestsarealignedwiththose
ofapartyseekingtosueascriticaltotheheavilyfactboundBlockdecision.
42
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TheD.C.CircuithasnotedthatsomediscussioninBlock...sweep[s]broadly
buthasconcludedthat,forexample,theAMAAdoesnotprecludemilkproducers
(asopposedtoconsumers)fromobtainingjudicialreviewofmarketorders,inpart
because[u]nliketheconsumerswhoseinterestswerecoextensivewiththoseof
handlersinBlock,theproducersaretheonlypartywithaninterestinensuring
thatthepricepaidthemisnotreducedbytoolargea[namount]paidto
handlers.Ark.DairyCoop.Assnv.U.S.DeptofAgric.,573F.3d815,823(D.C.
Cir.2009)(internalcitationomitted).Inotherwords,whetherapartywith
alignedinterestscanobtainjudicialreviewisanimportantconsiderationin
interpretingandapplyingBlock.
(3) LegislativeHistory
Finally,thelegislativehistoryoftheprovisionforchallenging215orders
furthersupportsappellantsargumentthatCongressdidnotintendtopreclude
targetsoftheordersfrombringingsuit.Appellantspointoutthatthe
amendmentto215thatprovidedforjudicialreviewof215ordersintheFISC
waspassedinresponsetoDoev.Ashcroft,334F.Supp.2d471(S.D.N.Y.2004),
vacatedinpartsubnom.Doev.Gonzales,449F.3d415(2dCir.2006).Atthe
sametimeitaddedthejudicialreviewprovisionin215,Congresspasseda
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provisionforjudicialreviewinthecontextofNationalSecurityLetters(NSLs)
aformofadministrativesubpoenasusedtogathercommunicationsand
recordsinnationalsecuritymatters.Thatsubsectionwasaddedtoaddressthe
courtsconcernsinDoethat18U.S.C.2709,pursuanttowhichNSLsareissued,
effectivelybar[red]orsubstantiallydeter[red]anyjudicialchallengetothe
proprietyofanNSLrequest.Doe,334F.Supp.2dat475.Congresssprimary
purposeinadoptingbothoftheseprovisionswasapparentlytoclarifythat
judicialreviewwasavailabletorecipientsofNSLsand215ordersnotto
precludereviewatthebehestofthetargetsoforders.Infact,inDoe,the
governmentarguedthattheNSLstatutealreadyimplicitlyprovidedforjudicial
review.Seeid.at49293.Theamendment,therefore,onlyclarif[ied]thataFISA
215ordermaybechallengedandthatarecipientofa215ordermayconsultwith
thelawyerandtheappropriatepeoplenecessarytorespondtotheorder,H.R.
Rep.No.109174,pt.1,at106(statementofChairmanSensenbrenner)both
concernsraisedbythedistrictcourtinDoewithrespecttoNSLs.The
amendmentwasaclarificationofthejudicialreviewprovisionthatalready
implicitlyexisted;inthusclarifying,itdidnotaffirmativelytakeawayarightto
judicialreviewfromanothercategoryofindividualsnotmentionedinthestatute.
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ThegovernmentarguesthatCongressspecificallyconsidered,and
rejected,anamendmentthatwouldhaveallowedSection215orderstobe
challengednotonlyintheFISC,butalsoindistrictcourt.AppelleesBr.29.But
thatisanoversimplificationofthesequenceofeventsrelatingtoanamendment
proposedbyRepresentativeNadler.First,theproposedamendment
encompassedmorethantheissueofjudicialreview.Theamendmentprimarily
proposedamorerigorousstandardforobtainingordersunder215thanexisted
atthetime,andthebulkofthedebateontheamendmentconcernedwhatdegree
ofsuspicionshouldberequiredforissuanceofa215order.SeeH.R.Rep.No.
109174,pt.1,at12832,135(2005).Second,theamendmentproposedjudicial
reviewinadistrictcourtbytherecipientsof215ordersacategoryofpersons
alreadygrantedanavenueofreviewunder215,throughtheFISCprocess.Id.
at128,134.Itdidnotaddressagain,presumablybecauseCongressdidnot
havereasontoconsiderthequestionatthatpointwhetherapersonwhose
recordswereseizedasaresultofsuchanorderwouldbeable,uponlearningof
theorder,tochallengeitindistrictcourt.Indeed,RepresentativeNadler
specificallynotedthathisamendmentdidnotgrantjudicialreviewatthebehest
ofthetargetofa215orderbecausesuchatargetdoesntknowaboutthe
45
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order.Seeid.at128(statementofRep.Nadler)(Itdoesntgivethetargetofthe
ordertheabilitytogotocourt.Hedoesntknowaboutit.);id.at134(statement
ofRep.Nadler)([T]hefactisthat...thetargetoftheinvestigationneverhears
aboutthis.).
AsJusticeScaliahasremindedus,moreover,weshouldexercisecautionin
relyingonthistypeoflegislativehistoryinattemptingtodiscernCongresss
intent,becauseitissooftenimpossibletodiscernwhattheMembersof
Congressintendedexcepttotheextentthatintentismanifestedintheonly
remnantofhistorythatbearstheunanimousendorsementofthemajorityin
eachHouse:thetextoftheenrolledbillthatbecamelaw.GrahamCountySoil
&WaterConservationDist.v.UnitedStatesexrel.Wilson,559U.S.280,302
(2010)(Scalia,J.,concurring)(emphasisinoriginal).Congresssrejectionofthe
Nadleramendmentcannotreliablybeinterpretedasaspecificrejectionofthe
opportunityfora215targettoobtainjudicialreview,undertheAPAor
otherwise.
Finally,thegovernmentarguesthatCongressmusthaveintendedto
precludejudicialreviewof215orders,becauseifanycustomerofacompany
thatreceivesa215ordermaychallengesuchanorder,lawsuitscouldbefiled
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byavastnumberofpotentialplaintiffs,thusseverelydisrupt[ing]...the
sensitivefieldofintelligencegatheringforcounterterrorismefforts.Appellees
Br.30(internalquotationmarksomitted).
Thatargument,however,dependsonthegovernmentsargumentonthe
meritsthatbulkmetadatacollectionwascontemplatedbyCongressand
authorizedby215.Theriskofmassivenumbersoflawsuitschallengingthe
sameorders,andthusriskinginconsistentoutcomesandconfusionaboutthe
legalityoftheprogram,occursonlyinconnectionwiththeexistenceoforders
authorizingthecollectionofdatafrommillionsofpeople.Orderstargeting
limitednumbersofpersonsunderinvestigationcouldbechallengedonlybythe
individualstargetedwho,itwasexpected,wouldneverlearnoftheordersin
thefirstplace.Itisonlyinconnectionwiththegovernmentsexpansiveuseof
215(which,aswillbeseenbelow,wasnotcontemplatedbyCongress)that
theseriskswouldcreateconcern.
Inanyevent,restrictingjudicialreviewofthelegalityof215ordersunder
thestatuteitselfwoulddolittletoeliminatethespecterofduplicativelawsuits
challengingordersliketheoneatissuehere.Thegovernmentdoesnotcontend
thatthosewhoserecordsarecollectedpursuantto215,assumingtheyhave
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establishedstanding,aresomehowprecludedfrombringingconstitutional
challengestothoseorders.ThegovernmentwouldthusattributetoCongressa
preclusionofstatutorychallengesthatwouldnoteliminatethesupposeddangers
ofmultiplicativelawsuits,whilechannelingthoselawsuitstowardconstitutional
issues.
Suchanoutcomewouldbeanomalous.Itwouldflyinthefaceofthe
doctrineofconstitutionalavoidance,whichallowscourtstoavoidthedecisionof
constitutionalquestionsbyprovidingatoolforchoosingbetweencompeting
plausibleinterpretationsofastatutorytext,restingonthereasonable
presumptionthatCongressdidnotintendthealternativewhichraisesserious
constitutionaldoubts.Clarkv.Martinez,543U.S.371,381(2005)(emphasisin
original).Incontrast,theapproachprofferedbythegovernmentwouldpreclude
lawsuitschallengingthelegalityof215onstatutorygrounds,whileleaving
openthepathtoreviewof215undertheConstitution.Whileconstitutional
avoidanceisajudicialdoctrine,theprincipleshouldhaveconsiderableappealto
Congress:itwouldseemoddthatCongresswouldprecludechallengesto
executiveactionsthatallegedlyviolateCongresssowncommands,andthereby
channelthecomplaintsofthoseaggrievedbysuchactionsintoconstitutional
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challengesthatthreatenCongresssownauthority.Theremaybeargumentsin
favorofsuchanunlikelyscheme,butitcannotbesaidthatanysuchreasonsare
sopatentandindisputablethatCongresscanbeassumed,inthefaceofthe
strongpresumptioninfavorofAPAreview,tohaveadoptedthemwithout
havingsaidawordaboutthem.
B. Section2712andImpliedPreclusion
TheotherpotentiallyrelevantexceptiontotheAPAswaiverofsovereign
immunitylookstowhetheranyotherstatutethatgrantsconsenttosuitexpressly
orimpliedlyforbidsthereliefwhichissought.5U.S.C.702(emphasisadded).
Thegovernmenturgesthat18U.S.C.2712,passedinthesamestatutethat
contained215,isjustsuchastatute,grantingasitdoesaprivaterightofaction
formoneydamagesagainsttheUnitedStatesforviolationsoftheWiretapAct,
theStoredCommunicationsAct,andthreeparticularFISAprovisionsthat
concernelectronicsurveillance,physicalsearches,andpenregistersortrapand
tracedevices(butnot215).See18U.S.C.2712(a);seealso50U.S.C.1806(a),
1825(a),1845(a).Section2712withdrewthegeneralrighttosuetheUnitedStates
undertheWiretapActandtheStoredCommunicationsActatthesametimeit
addedarightofactionformoneydamages.Importantly,italsostatedthat
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[a]nyactionagainsttheUnitedStatesunderthissubsectionshallbethe
exclusiveremedyagainsttheUnitedStatesforanyclaimswithinthepurviewof
thissection.18U.S.C.2712(d).Accordingtothegovernment,suchprovisions
demonstratethat,whereCongressdidintendtoallowaprivaterightofactionfor
violationsofFISA,itdidsoexpressly.
Thattheprovisionextendingarightofactionmakesnomentionof215,
however,supportsappellantsargument,notthegovernments.Tobesure,
[w]henCongresshasdealtinparticularitywithaclaimand[has]intendeda
specifiedremedy...tobeexclusive,thatistheendofthematter;theAPAdoes
notundothejudgment.MatchEBeNashSheWishBandofPottawatomi
Indiansv.Patchak,132S.Ct.2199,2205(2012)(secondalterationinoriginal)
(internalquotationmarksomitted).But2712doesnotdealinparticularity
with215.Instead,thegovernmentwouldhaveusconcludethatin
authorizingonepersontobringonekindofsuitseekingoneformofrelief,
Congressbarredanotherpersonfrombringinganotherkindofsuitseeking
anotherformofrelief.Id.at2209.Section2712makesnomentionwhatsoever
ofclaimsunder215,eithertopermitthemortoprecludethem,and,asthe
SupremeCourtstatedinPatchak,[w]ehaveneverheld,andseenocauseto
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holdhere,thatsomegeneralsimilarityofsubjectmattercanalonetriggera
remedialstatutespreclusiveeffect.Id.Theexclusiveremedyprovision
appliesonlytoclaimswithinthepurviewoftheremedialsection,whichdoesnot
coverallofFISAbutratherspecifiesthoseFISAprovisionstowhichitapplies.
HadCongressintended2712sexclusiverightofaction(anditspreclusionof
otherremedies)toextendto215,itisfairtoassumethatitwouldhavealso
enumeratedthatsectionparticularlyconsideringthefactthatbothprovisions
werepassedinthesamestatute.
Section2712,moreover,explicitlywithdrawstherighttochallengethe
specificgovernmentactionstakenunderspecificauthorization,inconnection
withextendinganexplicitcauseofactionformonetarydamagesinconnection
withsuchactions.First,2712showsthattheCongressthatenactedthe
PATRIOTActunderstoodverywellhowtowithdrawtherighttosueunderthe
APA,andtocreateanexclusiveremedy,whenitwishedtodoso.Second,2712
manifestlydoesnotcreateacauseofactionfordamagesforviolationsof215,as
itdoeswithrespecttothosestatutesofwhichitdoesprecludereviewunderthe
APA.
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Section2712,therefore,doesnotprecludeappellantssuithere.Nordothe
twostatutes,whenviewedincombination,evinceanintentofCongressto
precludesuitsbytargetsof215orders.
C. Summary
Inshort,thegovernmentreliesonbitsandshardsofinapplicablestatutes,
inconclusivelegislativehistory,andinferencesfromsilenceinanefforttofindan
impliedrevocationoftheAPAsauthorizationofchallengestogovernment
actions.Thatisnotenoughtoovercomethestrongpresumptionofthegeneral
commandoftheAPAagainstsuchimpliedpreclusion.Congress,ofcourse,has
theabilitytolimittheremediesavailableundertheAPA;ithasonlytosayso.
Butithassaidnosuchthinghere.Weshouldbecautiousininferringlegislative
actionfromlegislativeinaction,orinferringaCongressionalcommandfrom
Congressionalsilence.Atmost,theevidencecitedbythegovernmentsuggests
thatCongressassumed,inlightoftheexpectationofsecrecy,thatpersonswhose
informationwastargetedbya215orderwouldrarelyevenknowofsuch
orders,andthereforethatjudicialreviewatthebehestofsuchpersonswasanon
issue.Butsuchanassumptionisafarcryfromanunexpressedintentionto
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withdrawrightsgrantedinagenerallyapplicable,explicitstatutesuchasthe
APA.
Accordingly,wedisagreewiththedistrictcourtinsofarasitheldthat
appellantshereareprecludedfrombringingsuitagainstthegovernment,and
holdthatappellantshavearightofactionundertheAPA.Wethereforeproceed
tothemeritsofthecase.
III. StatutoryAuthorization
Althoughappellantsvigorouslyarguethatthetelephonemetadata
programviolatestheirrightsundertheFourthAmendmenttotheConstitution,
andthereforecannotbeauthorizedbyeithertheExecutiveortheLegislative
Branchofgovernment,orbybothactingtogether,theirinitialargumentisthat
theprogramsimplyhasnotbeenauthorizedbythelegislationonwhichthe
governmentreliesfortheissuanceoftheorderstoserviceproviderstocollect
andturnoverthemetadataatissue.Wenaturallyturnfirsttothatargument.
Section215clearlysweepsbroadlyinanefforttoprovidethegovernment
withessentialtoolstoinvestigateandforestallactsofterrorism.Thestatute
permitsthegovernmenttoapplyforanorderrequiringtheproductionofany
tangiblethings...foraninvestigation...toprotectagainstinternational
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terrorismorclandestineintelligenceactivities.50U.S.C.1861(a)(1)(emphasis
added).A215ordermayrequiretheproductionofanythingthatcanbe
obtainedwithasubpoenaducestecumissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesin
aidofagrandjuryinvestigationoranyothercourtorder.Id.1861(c)(2)(D).
Whilethetypesoftangiblethingssubjecttosuchanorderwouldappear
essentiallyunlimited,suchthingsmayonlybeproduceduponaspecified
factualshowingbythegovernment.Toobtaina215order,thegovernment
mustprovidetheFISCwithastatementoffactsshowingthatthereare
reasonablegroundstobelievethatthetangiblethingssoughtarerelevanttoan
authorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment)conducted[under
guidelinesapprovedbytheAttorneyGeneral].Id.1861(b)(2)(A);seeid.
1861(a)(2)(requiringthatinvestigationsmakinguseofsuchordersbe
conductedunderguidelinesapprovedbytheAttorneyGeneral).Thebasic
requirementsformetadatacollectionunder215,then,aresimplythatthe
recordsberelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment).
Forallthecomplexityofthestatutoryframework,thepartiesrespective
positionsarerelativelysimpleandstraightforward.Thegovernmentemphasizes
thatrelevanceisanextremelygenerousstandard,particularlyinthecontextof
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thegrandjuryinvestigationstowhichthestatuteanalogizesordersunder215.
Appellantsarguethatrelevanceisnotanunlimitedconcept,andthatthe
governmentsownuse(ornonuse)oftherecordsobtaineddemonstratesthat
mostoftherecordssoughtarenotrelevanttoanyparticularinvestigation;the
governmentdoesnotseektherecords,asisusualinagrandjuryinvestigation,
soastoreviewtheminsearchofevidencebearingonaparticularsubject,but
ratherseekstherecordstocreateavastdatabank,tobekeptinreserveand
queriedifandwhensomeparticularsetofrecordsmightberelevanttoa
particularinvestigation.
Echoingthedistrictcourtsstatementthat[r]elevancehasabroadlegal
meaning,959F.Supp.2dat746,thegovernmentarguesthatthetelephone
metadataprogramcomfortablymeetstherequisitestandard.Thegovernment
likenstherelevancestandardintendedbyCongresstothestandardofrelevance
forgrandjuryandadministrativesubpoenas,and,tosomeextent,forcivil
discovery.
Boththelanguageofthestatuteandthelegislativehistorysupportthe
grandjuryanalogy.Duringthe2006reauthorizationdebate,SenatorKylrecalled
that,inpassingthePATRIOTActshortlyafterSeptember11,Congresshad
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realizedthatitwastimetoapplytoterrorismmanyofthesamekindsof
techniquesinlawenforcementauthoritiesthatwealreadydeemedveryusefulin
investigatingotherkindsofcrimes.Ourideawas,ifitisgoodenoughto
investigatemoneylaunderingordrugdealing,forexample,wesureoughttouse
thosesamekindsoftechniquestofightterrorists.152Cong.Rec.S1607(daily
ed.Mar.2,2006)(statementofSen.Kyl).Healsoremarkedthat[r]elevanceisa
simpleandwellestablishedstandardoflaw.Indeed,itisthestandardfor
obtainingeveryotherkindofsubpoena,includingadministrativesubpoenas,
grandjurysubpoenas,andcivildiscoveryorders.Id.atS1606.Anditiswell
establishedthatwhereCongressborrowstermsofart...,itpresumablyknows
andadoptstheclusterofideasthatwereattachedtoeachborrowedwordinthe
bodyoflearningfromwhichitwastakenandthemeaningitsusewillconveyto
thejudicialmindunlessotherwiseinstructed.Morissettev.UnitedStates,342
U.S.246,250(1952).
Somuch,indeed,seemstousunexceptionable.Inadopting215,
Congressintendedtogivethegovernment,ontheapprovaloftheFISC,broad
ranginginvestigativepowersanalogoustothosetraditionallyusedinconnection
withgrandjuryinvestigationsintopossiblecriminalbehavior.
56
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Thegovernmentthenpointsoutthat,undertheacceptedstandardof
relevanceinthecontextofgrandjurysubpoenas,courtshaveauthorized
discoveryoflargevolumesofinformationwheretherequesterseekstoidentify
withinthatvolumesmalleramountsofinformationthatcoulddirectlybearon
thematter.AppelleesBr.31.Thegovernmentasksustoconcludethatitis
eminentlyreasonabletobelievethatSection215bulktelephonymetadatais
relevanttocounterterrorisminvestigations.Id.at32.Appellants,however,
disputethatmetadatafromeveryphonecallwithapartyintheUnitedStates,
overaperiodofyearsandyears,canbeconsideredrelevanttoanauthorized
investigation,byanydefinitionoftheterm.
Theverytermsinwhichthislitigationhasbeenconductedbybothsides
suggestthatthematterisnotasroutineasthegovernmentsargumentsuggests.
Normally,thequestionofwhetherrecordsdemandedbyasubpoenaorother
courtorderarerelevanttoaproceedingisraisedinthecontextofamotionto
quashasubpoena.Thegrandjuryundertakestoinvestigateaparticularsubject
mattertodeterminewhetherthereisprobablecausetobelievecrimeshavebeen
committed,andseeksbysubpoenarecordsthatmightcontainevidencethatwill
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helpinmakingthatdetermination.4Giventhewideinvestigativescopeofa
grandjury,thestandardiseasytomeet,butthedeterminationofrelevanceis
constrainedbythesubjectoftheinvestigation.Inresolvingamotiontoquash,a
courtcomparestherecordsdemandedbytheparticularsubpoenawiththe
subjectmatteroftheinvestigation,howeverbroadlydefined.
Here,however,thepartieshavenotundertakentodebatewhetherthe
recordsrequiredbytheordersinquestionarerelevanttoanyparticularinquiry.
Therecordsdemandedareallencompassing;thegovernmentdoesnoteven
suggestthatalloftherecordssought,orevennecessarilyanyofthem,are
relevanttoanyspecificdefinedinquiry.Rather,thepartiesasktheCourtto
decidewhether215authorizesthecreationofahistoricalrepositoryof
informationthatbulkaggregationofthemetadataallows,AppelleesBr.32,
becausebulkcollectiontocreatesucharepositoryisnecessarytotheapplication
4Althoughsubpoenasmaybeusedinaidofothercourtproceedings,wetakethegrandjuryasourexamplebecausethepowersofthegrandjuryareparticularlywideranging,andthestandardofrelevanceormaterialityofinformationsoughtismuchmorerelaxedthan,forexample,inatrial,wheretoberelevantevidencemusttendtomakeafactofconsequenceindeterminingtheaction,Fed.R.Evid.401(b),moreorlessprobablethanitwouldbewithouttheevidence,id.401(a).
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ofcertainanalytictechniques,AppellantsBr.23.Thatisnotthelanguagein
whichgrandjurysubpoenasaretraditionallydiscussed.
Thus,thegovernmenttakesthepositionthatthemetadatacollecteda
vastamountofwhichdoesnotcontaindirectlyrelevantinformation,asthe
governmentconcedesareneverthelessrelevantbecausetheymayallowthe
NSA,atsomeunknowntimeinthefuture,utilizingitsabilitytosiftthroughthe
troveofirrelevantdataithascollecteduptothatpoint,toidentifyinformation
thatisrelevant.5Weagreewithappellantsthatsuchanexpansiveconceptof
relevanceisunprecedentedandunwarranted.
Thestatutestowhichthegovernmentpointshaveneverbeeninterpreted
toauthorizeanythingapproachingthebreadthofthesweepingsurveillanceat
issuehere.6Thegovernmentadmittedbelowthatthecaselawinanalogous
5Section215liststhreefactorsthatwouldrenderatangiblethingsoughtpresumptivelyrelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation,see50U.S.C.1861(b)(2)(A),buttherecordsofordinarytelephonecompanycustomersphonecallsdonotfallwithinanyofthosedescriptions.6Arecentlydisclosed,nowdiscontinuedprogramunderwhichtheDrugEnforcementAdministrationutilizedadministrativesubpoenasobtainedpursuantto21U.S.C.876tocollectandmaintainatelephonemetadatadatabasemayhavedemandedaninterpretationapproachingthebreadthofthegovernmentsinterpretationofsimilarlanguagehere.SeeECFNo.159(AppellantsFed.R.App.P.28(j)letter);ECFNo.161(AppelleesFed.R.App.P.
59
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contextsd[id]notinvolvedataacquisitiononthescaleofthetelephony
metadatacollection.ACLUv.Clapper,No.13Civ.3994(S.D.N.Y.Aug.26,
2013),ECFNo.33(Mem.ofLawofDefs.inSupp.ofMot.toDismiss)at24.That
concessioniswelltaken.Asnotedabove,iftheorderschallengedbyappellants
donotrequirethecollectionofmetadataregardingeverytelephonecallmadeor
receivedintheUnitedStates(apointassertedbyappellantsandatleast
nominallycontestedbythegovernment),theyappeartocomeveryclosetodoing
so.Thesheervolumeofinformationsoughtisstaggering;whilesearchwarrants
andsubpoenasforbusinessrecordsmayencompasslargevolumesofpaper
documentsorelectronicdata,themostexpansiveofsuchevidentiarydemands
aredwarfedbythevolumeofrecordsobtainedpursuanttotheordersinquestion
here.
Moreover,thedistinctionisnotmerelyoneofquantityhowevervastthe
quantitativedifferencebutalsoofquality.Searchwarrantsanddocument
subpoenastypicallyseektherecordsofaparticularindividualorcorporation
28(j)letter).Thatprogram,which,accordingtobothparties,hasbeendiscontinued,isnotbeingchallengedhere,andwethereforeneednotopineastowhetherthelanguageofthestatutepursuanttowhichthemetadatawerecollectedauthorizedthatprogram.
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underinvestigation,andcoverparticulartimeperiodswhentheeventsunder
investigationoccurred.Theordersatissueherecontainnosuchlimits.The
metadataconcerningeverytelephonecallmadeorreceivedintheUnitedStates
usingtheservicesoftherecipientserviceprovideraredemanded,foran
indefiniteperiodextendingintothefuture.Therecordsdemandedarenotthose
ofsuspectsunderinvestigation,orofpeopleorbusinessesthathavecontactwith
suchsubjects,orofpeopleorbusinessesthathavecontactwithotherswhoarein
contactwiththesubjectstheyextendtoeveryrecordthatexists,andindeedto
recordsthatdonotyetexist,astheyimposeacontinuingobligationonthe
recipientofthesubpoenatoprovidesuchrecordsonanongoingbasisastheyare
created.Thegovernmentcanpointtonograndjurysubpoenathatisremotely
comparabletotherealtimedatacollectionundertakenunderthisprogram.
Nevertheless,thegovernmentemphasizesthepermissivestandards
appliedtosubpoenas,notingthat,atleastinthecontextofgrandjurysubpoenas,
motionstoquashonrelevancygroundsaredeniedunlessthedistrictcourt
determinesthatthereisnoreasonablepossibilitythatthecategoryofmaterials
theGovernmentseekswillproduceinformationrelevanttothegeneralsubjectof
thegrandjurysinvestigation.UnitedStatesv.R.Enters.,Inc.,498U.S.292,301
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(1991).Thatisbecausesuchsubpoenasarecustomarilyemployedtogather
informationandmakeitavailabletotheinvestigativeteamofagentsand
prosecutorssothatitcanbedigestedandsiftedforpertinentmatterandare
thereforeoftendrawnbroadly,sweepingupbothdocumentsthatmayprove
decisiveanddocumentsthatturnoutnottobe.UnitedStatesv.Triumph
CapitalGrp.,544F.3d149,168(2dCir.2008).
Inthatvein,thegovernmentpointstocasesinwhichcourtshaveupheld
subpoenasforbroadcategoriesofinformationandforlargescalecollection[]of
information.AppelleesBr.33(internalquotationmarksomitted).Forexample,
inInreGrandJuryProceedings:SubpoenasDucesTecum,827F.2d301(8thCir.
1987),theEighthCircuitdeniedWesternUnionsmotiontoquashasubpoena
thatrequestedproductionbyWesternUnionsprimarywireserviceagentin
KansasCityofallmoneyorderapplicationsforamountsover$1,000overamore
thantwoyearperiod,andofareportsummarizingallwiretransactionsit
conductedoveranapproximateoneyearperiod.DespiteWesternUnions
argumentthatthesubpoenawouldsweepinrecordsinvolvinghundredsof
innocentpeople,thecourtstatedthatgrandjuriesarenotnecessarilyprohibited
fromengagingindragnetoperation[s].Id.at305(internalquotationmarks
62
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omitted).InInreSubpoenaDucesTecum,228F.3d341(4thCir.2000),the
FourthCircuitalsodeniedamotiontoquashasubpoenaissuedtoadoctor
requiringproductionof,interalia,allpatientrecordsanddocumentation
concerningpatientswhoseserviceswerebilledtoMedicare,Medicaid,anda
numberofinsurancecompanies,includingthepatientscompletemedicalfiles,
theirbillingrecords,officeappointmentbooks,signinsheets,andtelephone
messages,overaperiodofatleastsevenyears.Thatcourtheldthatthe
subpoenadidnotsweeptoobroadly,despitethehighvolumeofdocumentsit
demanded,inpartbecauseofthescopeofthefraudbeinginvestigatedandthe
sizeofthedoctorspractice.Id.at35051;seealsoOkla.PressPublgCo.v.
Walling,327U.S.186,209(1946)([R]elevancyandadequacyorexcessinthe
breadthofthesubpoenaaremattersvariableinrelationtothenature,purposes
andscopeoftheinquiry.).
Butbroadasthosesubpoenaswere,thecasescitedbythegovernmentonly
highlightthedifferencebetweentheinvestigativedemandsatissueinthosecases
andtheonesatissuehere.Bothofthoseexamples,andallexamplesofwhichwe
areaware,areboundedeitherbythefactsoftheinvestigationorbyafinitetime
limitation.Thetelephonemetadataprogramrequiresthatthephonecompanies
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turnoverrecordsonanongoingdailybasiswithnoforeseeableendpoint,no
requirementofrelevancetoanyparticularsetoffacts,andnolimitationsasto
subjectmatterorindividualscovered.7EvenintheEighthCircuitcasethatthe
governmentcites,moreover,althoughitupheldthesubpoenaatissue,theEighth
Circuitsuggestedthatthedistrictcourtconsidertheextenttowhichthe
governmentwouldbeabletoidentifyinadvance...patternsorcharacteristics
thatwouldraisesuspicion...designedtofocusonillegalactivitywithouttaking
inanunnecessaryamountofirrelevantmaterial.InreGrandJuryProceedings:
SubpoenasDucesTecum,827F.2dat30506.Courtshavetypicallylookedto
constrainevengrandjurysubpoenastoastandardofreasonablenessrelatedtoa
definedinvestigativescope;wehavefoundexcessivelybroadasubpoena
requiringproductionofallofanaccountantsfileswithinamerethreefiling
7Drawingananalogyagaintothecontextofadministrativesubpoenas,wenotetoothatcourtsaremorereluctanttoenforcesubpoenaswhenagencieshavesoughtrecordsofthirdpartieswhowerenottargetsoftheagencysinvestigation.InreMcVane,44F.3d1127,1137(2dCir.1995).Theoverwhelmingbulkofthemetadatacollectedbythetelephonemetadataprogram,asthegovernmentitselfconcedes,concernsthirdpartiesinthatsenseofthewordindividualswhoarenottargetsofaninvestigationorsuspectedofengaginginanycrimewhatsoever,andwhoarenotevensuspectedofhavinganycontactswithanysuchtargetsorsuspects.Theirrecordsaresoughtsolelytobuildarepositoryforthefutureapplicationoftheinvestigativetechniquesuponwhichtheprogramrelies.
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cabinets,withoutanyattempttodefineclassesofpotentiallyrelevant
documentsoranylimitationsastosubjectmatterortimeperiod,becauseit
sweptinpapersthattherewasnoreasontobelievewererelevant.Inre
Horowitz,482F.2d72,79(2dCir.1973).Wethereforelimitedthesubpoenas
timeperiodabsentthegovernmentsmakingaminimalshowingofrelevance.
Id.at7980.
Totheextentthat215wasintendedtogivethegovernment,asSenator
Kylproposed,thesamekindsoftechniquestofightterroriststhatithas
availabletofightordinarycrimessuchasmoneylaunderingordrugdealing,
152Cong.Rec.S1607(dailyed.Mar.2,2006)(statementofSen.Kyl),theanalogy
isnothelpfultothegovernmentspositionhere.Thetechniquestraditionally
usedtocombatsuchordinarycrimeshavenotincludedthecollection,viagrand
jurysubpoena,ofavasttroveofrecordsofmetadataconcerningthefinancial
transactionsortelephonecallsofordinaryAmericanstobeheldinreserveina
databank,tobesearchedifandwhenatsomehypotheticalfuturetimethe
recordsmightbecomerelevanttoacriminalinvestigation.
Thegovernmentsemphasisonthepotentialbreadthoftheterm
relevant,moreover,ignoresotherportionsofthetextof215.Relevance
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doesnotexistintheabstract;somethingisrelevantornotinrelationtoa
particularsubject.Thus,anitemrelevanttoagrandjuryinvestigationmaynot
berelevantattrial.Inkeepingwiththisusage,215doesnotpermitan
investigativedemandforanyinformationrelevanttofightingthewaronterror,
oranythingrelevanttowhateverthegovernmentmightwanttoknow.It
permitsdemandsfordocumentsrelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation.The
governmenthasnotattemptedtoidentifytowhatparticularauthorized
investigationthebulkmetadataofvirtuallyallAmericansphonecallsare
relevant.Throughoutitsbriefing,thegovernmentreferstotherecordscollected
underthetelephonemetadataprogramasrelevanttocounterterrorism
investigations,withoutidentifyinganyspecificinvestigationstowhichsuch
bulkcollectionisrelevant.See,e.g.,AppelleesBr.32,33,34.8TheFISCorders,
too,referonlytoauthorizedinvestigations(otherthanthreatassessments)being
8Whilethegovernmentpurportstohaveprovidedexamplesofspecificcounterterrorisminvestigations,seeAppelleesBr.33,citingJointAppx25455,thoseexamplesserveonlyasinstancesinwhichthemetadataalreadycollectedinbulkwereabletobequeriedandresultedinidentificationofapreviouslyunknowncontactofknownterrorists.Thegovernmentdoesnotcontendthatmostofthemetadataalreadycollectedwererelevanttoanyofthoseparticularinvestigations,letalonethatitwasabletosodemonstratepriortothecollectionofthosemetadata.
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conductedbytheFBI...toprotectagainstinternationalterrorism,see,e.g.,2006
PrimaryOrderat2;JointAppx127,317,merelyechoingthelanguageofthe
statute.ThePCLOBreportexplainsthatthegovernmentspracticeistolistin
215applicationsmultipleterroristorganizations,andtodeclarethattherecords
beingsoughtarerelevanttotheinvestigationsofallofthosegroups.PCLOB
Report59.Asthereportputsit,thatpracticeislittledifferent,inpracticalterms,
fromsimplydeclaringthattheyarerelevanttocounterterrorismingeneral....
Atitscore,theapproachboilsdowntothepropositionthatessentiallyall
telephonerecordsarerelevanttoessentiallyallinternationalterrorism
investigations.Id.at5960.Putanotherway,thegovernmenteffectivelyargues
thatthereisonlyoneenormousantiterrorisminvestigation,andthatany
recordsthatmighteverbeofuseindevelopinganyaspectofthatinvestigation
arerelevanttotheoverallcounterterrorismeffort.
Thegovernmentsapproachessentiallyreadstheauthorized
investigationlanguageoutofthestatute.Indeed,thegovernments
informationgatheringunderthetelephonemetadataprogramisinconsistent
withtheveryconceptofaninvestigation.Toinvestigatesomething,
accordingtotheOxfordEnglishDictionary,is[t]osearchorinquireinto;to
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examine(amatter)systematicallyorindetail;tomakeaninquiryorexamination
into.98OxfordEnglishDictionary47(2ded.2001).Section215slanguagethus
contemplatesthespecificityofaparticularinvestigationnotthegeneral
counterterrorismintelligenceeffortsoftheUnitedStatesgovernment.Butthe
recordsinquestionherearenotsought,atleastinthefirstinstance,becausethe
governmentplanstoexaminetheminconnectionwithasystematic
examinationofanythingatall;therecordsaresimplystoredandkeptinreserve
untilsuchtimeassomeparticularinvestigation,inthesenseinwhichthatword
istraditionallyusedinconnectionwithlegislative,administrative,orcriminal
inquiries,isundertaken.Onlyatthatpointareanyofthestoredrecords
examined.Therecordssoughtarenotevenassertedtoberelevanttoanyon
goingsystematicexaminationofanyparticularsuspect,incident,orgroup;
theyarerelevant,inthegovernmentsview,becausetheremightatsomefuture
pointbeaneedordesiretosearchtheminconnectionwithahypotheticalfuture
inquiry.
9Thenounforminvestigationissimilarlydefinedas[t]heactionofinvestigating;themakingofasearchorinquiry;systematicexamination;carefulandminuteresearch.8OxfordEnglishDictionary47(2ded.2001).
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Thegovernmentsapproachalsoreadsoutofthestatuteanotherimportant
textuallimitationonitspowerunder215.Section215permitsano