NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

2

NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Imp

1. Trn similar to our scenario.

2. Emp of mech forces by Rommel & his method of comd and Tac Emp.

3. Emp of all Arms terms in a fluid mech battle fd.

4. Techniques of calling forth Air SP and mine fd breaching.

5. Sound LGS plg of Adm to afford the mvre Elements the Reqd freedom.

1. Open and desert trn.

2. World first witnessed small but highly trained to mobile force under O’Connor defeating Huge (HUGE) Italian Army.

3. Rommel. Humbled numbers of British commanders who prided themselves in these:-

(a) Professional trg.(b) Fighting qualities of soldiers.(c) High morale.

4. Rommel dominated campaign.

(a) Own style of comd. (b) Different from estb prac(c) Went every where.(d) Relied on personal comd to ensure that his intention was carried out.

5. British procedure of comd. Followed est procedure of comd and yet failed to keep subordinate commanders in check. Every British at one stage of campaign came to believe that he knew the soln to the problems his higher cdr did not. Consequently, there was discussion amongst them till Montgomerry came and put a stop to what he mildly Clleed as belly aching .

6. Emp of ARMR by Germans.

(a) Concentrated.(b) Emp with Inf, Anti tk guns, air & other arms.

7. Lessons for Armr

(a) Armr was incapable of breaking through anti tk screen w/o adequate inf SP.(b) British learnt to breach mine fd but failed to bring armour on obj at first Lt & suffered Hvy losses on three occasions.

8. Ldr Ship. Italian soldiers did not seem to have any fight in them in earlier stages of campaign. But when backed by German offrs & later in closing stags of compaign in Tunisia where there seemed no hope of victory, the same Italian soldiers fought well, proved “there no bad tps – only bad offrs.”

1. Campaign for German force can be divided into:-

(a) Fighting in the desert German force fighting for victory.(b) Fighting in Tunisia – battling for their very Existence.

Interest of maj combatant nations in relation to Southern Mediterranean

1. Germany

(a) Demands of alliance compelled her to aid weaker partner, Itlay.

3

(b) Prevent Italians with opportunity to leave the axis partnership.(c) Hitler loyalty to Rome – Berlin Axis.(d) Emotional debt which German chancellor owned to Italian duce. In 1938 Mussolini had stood apart when Austria was invaded. (e) Politics & not mil sense dictated the orders, shaped the plans and dominated the strategy.

2. Great Britain

(a) Mediterranean was shortest sea route to imperial possessions in the far east. (b) Her posn in this respect depended solely upon sea comd in Mediterranean.(c) Britain was threatened by large Italian forces from Libya in west and Ethopia in the south – east. (d) Their supply route through Mediterranean sea come under Italian attks.(e) West coast of Africa a circuitous route was difficult.

3. Itlay

(a) italia army needed time for prep. Therefoe, Mussolini declared that Itlay would not take part in the war but she would still remain in Axis.

(b) This quasi - neutral posn was abandoned during the campaign in France when Mussolioni, fearful that itlay’s influence in Hitler’s new, restructured Europe would be too small, declared war.

Q. What was imp of Mediterranean to the British?Ans.

1. Facilitated imperial poicy.

2. Shortest sea route to imperial possessions in far east.

3. Martime policy of British

(a) Cont of sea – land based En could, in time of war, be blockaded into submission.

(b) Alternatively, being vulerable to sea borne attk at many pts of his domain en could running of en financially – being forced to maintain large army inorder to defend its territory against such attks. Financially be ruined by being forced to the Expense of maintaining a very large Army to defend his territory against such attks.

(c) Spring Bd for seaborne attk - British sea cont would, allow to est a base convenient to some pt at which en was weakest and these by rapid buildup, convert this into a spring board from which an assult on mainland could be made. Then would be fought decisive battle in conjunction with Britain’s allies ; a prerequisite, this for her own manpower resources were too small to allow her to dispose both a large Navy & Army.

(d) Great Britain’s posn solely depended upon sea comd and upon sea comd in Mediterranean.

(e) British Bases in Mediterranean:-

(i) Gibraltar(ii) Minorca(iii) Malta(iv) Alexandria(v) Cyprus(vi) Egypt – key to whole southern Mediterranean.

4. Though there was hardly any hope of getting rfts from Britain but middle east theatre would be supplied men and material from British dominions.

4

Q. What was possibility considered by German Grand strategy?Ans.

1. Capturing middle east by mil pincer advancing along Northern and Southern of mediterrane.

2. Options for Northern arm :-

(a) Through Turkey.(b) Crete into Syria.(c) Through Caucasus.

3. Southern shore , - the pincer arm had, op necessity, to go via Egypt.

Q. What were conclusions reached and orders given by the chief political leaders of Germany, Italy and Great Britain?Ans.

1. Fwg was in common between their leaders on the campaign :-

(a) Each one of them was 1000 miles removed from the battle fds and not one of them comprehended the peculiar characteristics of desert warfare.

(b) None sympathized with difficulties of their respective cdr’s in the fd.

2. Conclusions reached by indl leaders is as under :-

(a) Mussioni. Grasped the political need to hold Italian African Empire but in his Army he had a tool which was too weak to carry out his grand plans.

(b) Churchil

(i) Aware of imp of middle East.(ii) Refused to accept limitation of lgs.(iii) Interfered with plans what Gens on spot had drawn. (iv) Demanded offensives or Expeditions for which the British Army in the desert was too weak to undertake with any guarantee of success, at least until middle of 1942.

(c) Hitler

(i) Central European .

(ii) Little idea of Mediterranean strategy.

(iii) No detailed, long terms plans for the German Contingent.

(iv) Had only vague concept of Southern pincer Arm.

(v) Politics and not mil sense dictated the orders, shaped the plans and dominated the strat.

(vi) As war against Russia went badly the high comd relegated Africa to status of side show denying Africa corps supplies of men and mtrl.

(vii) When tide had turned did Hitler realize the danger and tried to reverse the sit by sending across Mediterranean fresh men and arms. He was only reinforcing defeat .

Q. What was the pattern of mil ops?Ans.

1. Principal Battle fds lay in area between El Aghelia and EL Alamein and through that region via Balbia, the only wx costal road.

2. Possession of that highway dominated the fighting for the pattern of mil ops was the same whether it was the axis or the British who were attacking.

5

3. Use of Armour. Use of enveloping /Encircling ops.

4. Use of Inf. Inf and less mobile forces kept close to via Balbia, fighting to capture one of the three maj ports into which would came the ship to nourish next adv.

5. Lack of Originality in the start of successive offensives.

(a) Not due to rigidity of mil thinking.(b) Due to neither side having capb to mount a seaborne landing behind En front .

Q. What was peculiarity of war in North Africa?Ans

1. Ltd civ involvement lved. Civ population was small and conc chiefly into small coastal strip. Rival armies could, MVRC & fight in southern deserts knowing that their ops did not endanger great mass of Native population.

2. First complete Mechanised War.

3. No SS Combat units fought. Small SS security office was in Tunasia but its pers were not fighting tps.

4. “Gentleman’s War”. Fighting was Chivalrous. A defeated En had to be helped to overcome hardships of that region.

5. Continent gave new Ideas on Armd warfare Tac , dress, Language. The Ideas were passed from Southern Mediterranean into other battle Zones.

6. Importance of replacing losses and ability to bring fresh men and sups.

(a) Axis Never able to incr Significantly no of men, neither could they Equip them.

(b) British Could reinforce with new men and modern eqpt.

Q. What were Reasons of Sec World War?Ans

1. Treaty of Versailles. Germany

(a) Humiliated.(b) Disarmed.(c) Eco collapse.(d) Dismembered.

2. Italy was ally of great Britain & France in WWI; but despite suffering half a million cas got nothing out of peace treaty. Cost of living incl by 500 % since 1915.

3. 1930s – under Mussolini Italy flexes its muscles.

4. Rome- Berlin Axis. - 1939

(a) Spanish civ war 1936-39.(b) Friendship treaties – 1936-40

5. 01 Sep 39 – Hitler attk Poland.

6. By may 1940 swept most of western Europe.

7. 10 Jun 40 Mussolini declared war against British & France.

6

Q Comment on how both Axis partners, unprep for war, went into hostilities?Ans.

1. Rome – Berlin Axis 1939. Germany drawn into Mediterranean affairs against her will and against inclination of OKW.

2. Expansion and modernization of Italian and Greman Army was in prog.

(a) Italians had requested not to be asked to undertake hostilities until 1943, by which year they anticipated expansion and modernization of Armed forces would have been completed.

(b) German Army too was undergoing modernization to Expansion pgme which would not finish until the same year.

3. No Exchange of ideas, jt mil strat , plg and coop betn two Axis power.

4. Mussolini rejected advice by Badoglio, Chief of General Staff. He had advise that itlay could not sustain long war again western Allies.

5. Declaration of War by Mussolini caught Army off Balance.

(a) Mil unprep for demands - irrespective whether these were def in character to Halt British attk.

(b) Mussolini ordered advance into Egypt overriding marshal Graziani (C-in-C, Libya), that an offn should not be undertaken until spring of 1941.

Q. What was Gen Von Thoma’s report?Ans . Gen

1. Hitler & Mussolini met in Brennes pass in oct 1940.

2 Decided to send Armd Bde to North Africa Drawn from 3rd panzer Div.

3. Proposed to place it together with VIII th Air corps under Graziani’s comd.

4. Von Thoma sent on fact finding Msn to Libya. 5. Von thoma’s rpt.

(a) Successful conclusion to ops in that theatre depended upon ability to supplying forces in Fd.

(b) British cont of seas and poor harbour facilities in Libya, would not allow sup a force larger in size than 4 x Divs.

6. Hitler Rejected Thoma’s Appreciation & his counter proposal of single Div was in turn dismissed by Thoma who said single German Div could not effect sit.

Q. What was instruction No18, issued by OKW on 12 Nov 1940?Ans.Gen

1. In Nov Hitler ordered Embarkation of 3rd panzer Div to be halted & that no movement of german tps take place until Italians captured Mersa matruh in Egypt.

2. Formal declaration of intent was Exprssed in instr No18.“German force will be used , If at all, only when Italians would reached Messa Matruh & in first instance will be Air force units for whom Italiansn would have provided Aerodromes. The Armed forces are to be prep for Emp of units.

(a) Army. Make a pnaze Div available to be used in North Africa.

7

(b) Navy. Convert ships lying in Italian ports into tp tpts with which to cvy strong bodies of tps with best possible speed to Libya, or to some other placein North Africa.

(c) AF . Prep to carry out air ops against Alexendria or Suez cnl & to block latter so as to deny its use to british

Q. What was VON Brauschtisch plan?Ans.

1. Drew up a plan with five Alternative for future ops in Mediterranean.

2. Alternatives.

(a) Seizure of Gibraltar.(b) Dispatch of a panzer unit to sp Italians in their war in North Africa.

3. If both ops were successfully Exec then British influence in Mediterranean would be destroyed.

4. It was considered Malta would fall of its own accord.

5. No plan was put fwd for an attk upon that Island.

Q. Why did Mussolini asked for German Assistance which he had declined earlier ?Ans.

Gen.

1. During Dec Euphoria of victory was yet with Italians and as dscns took pace betn Axis supreme comd, Grazini expressed Mussolini’s intention of fighting war in Africa without German help.

2. Wavell’s 30,000 men Defeated Italians Army ten times in nos.

3. Fear of loss of Triponitania , defeat of Grazini’s 10th Army coupled with reverses which other Italian Armies were suffering in Greece Mussolini was forced to ask for German Assistance.

4. Imp of Tripolitania.

(a) With loss of Trioplitania whole of Libya would pass under cont of British & then would then be able to conquer Italian Somaliland and Ethiopian territories peace meal.

(b) Vital for Axis war effort - foothold along NorthAfrican coast & this Br H Expanded to from FB forfuture ops to recapture lost provinces.

(c) Prevent British from est a base from which to attk Sicily and Italian mainland.

Q. What was instruction No 22, dated 11 Jan?Ans .

1. Dealt with sending a working force capb of supporting Itlay against British Army in their Def of Tripolitania.

2. Reaction to request received from Italian Supreme HQ on 9 Jan .

Q. What was plg, prep made by Germans to send force to North Africa and what was tasks & resps?Ans. Gen.

1. Reqmt of force capb enough to operate offensively and not merely as a blocking force - appre of Gen Von rintelen serving at cdo supremo.

2. OKH Response Incr would be from forces for campaign in Greece & this in turn would weaken forces to be used against Russia.

8

3. Raising of 3 rd panzer div stood down & raising of new Div with fwg:-

(a) 5th light(b) 3rd Recce Bn(c) 39th Anti tk Bn(d) Lt Arty Bn(e) Panzer Coy(f) Med Coy

4. To be followed by 5th Panzer Regt rft by 2nd Panzer Div.

5. Adm Prep.

(a) Spl tropical service fuel & Amn .(b) Water filtering eqpt & water cans.(c) Calculation for reqmt based on Euroean campaigns (Adequate water sups and good rds).(d) Div scale of tpt laid down only at 2/3rd of reqmt.

6. Task.

(a) Blocking line to be as far as east possible in sirte desert.(b) Initial role to be aggressive def.(c) Hold Tripolitania at all cost.

7. Corps Cdr Gen Rommel.

8. Term of refs.

(a) For tac purposes the GOC German tps was to be subordinate to Italian Supreme comd in Libya. He was resp to OKH for all other decisions.

(b) German tps may only be used as complete units.

(c) German tps may not be distributed in small gps along the front.

(d) In the event of german cdr being given an order which, in his opinion, could lead to his force being lost then he had the right and duty to ask for Hitler’s Decision, although he must inform Italian high comd that he is making this appeal.

(e) The Xth Air corps to remains under Comd of supreme cdr Luftwaffe and was to collaborate with Italian Air Force.

9. Rommel’s Initial Plan.

(a) Counter offn to re conquer Cyrenaica.(b) Hold blocking line until 5th Lt and 15th Panzer Divs , had arrived.(c) Attk British together with Italian Armd Div Ariete and Motorised Div Trento.

9

Q. Carry out trn Analysis of North African campaign?Ans.

1. Characteristics:-

(a) Egyptian and Libyan Desert. Extends 2000 km from Cairo to Tunis, 1500 km southern ward.

(b) Costal regions (Extent 1000 km and 250 km wide) – most of campaign took place.

(c) Scarcity of water 50 kms from coast, except in old cistans called ‘Birs’.

(d) Belt of lime stone

(i) Runs South from coast to depth betn 80 -150 km.

(ii) Rock itself rises in broad steps to a plateau and betn each of steps there is a slope, broken slope or escarpment

(iii) Lime Stone plateau Formidable barrier

(e) Firm Grnd Beyond further South are great sand seas of Sahara Desert.

(f) Imp Passes.

(i) Lime stone plateau formidable barrier.(ii) Sidi Rezegh & Halfaya - imp gaps tac through which vehs could pass.

2. Limits of theatre of ops.

(a) Qattara Depression in East .(b) Oases of Jarabub and Jalo in south.

10

3. Climate Variable.

(a) Hot summer Days but cold ni.(b) Winter could be Extreme cold with Hvy rains.

4. Khamseen .Spring/summer sandstorms freq

5. Cover

(a) Ltd.(b) Desert colours- yellow, brown & grey.

6. RD.

(a) Only RD Existing, called Via Balbia on Italian side along coast.(b) Crux of warfare - supply, everything has to be brought from outside world.(c) Coast rd was tarmac up to Sidi Barrini beyond which tr connected it to via balbia at sollum where coastal strip was narrow.

7. Rly Existed up to Matruh on British side from Alexandria.

8. Misc

(i) Tinned Rations.(ii) Water Strictly Rationed.

Addl Info1. Gen

(a) Western Desert.

(I) Term applied to desert from EI Alamein in east to Gazala in west.(ii) Incl tract up to Siwa to Jarabub in south.

(b) Extent Rectangular Area about 400 kms long and 240 kms broad.

2. Qattara Depression & sand sea in south.

(i) In SE.(ii) Almost impassable

3. Divided in two parts.

(a) Coastal Strip. Varying width.(b) Libyan Plateau. Avg ht of more than 800 m

(i) Coastal strip Separated from plateau by 200 mtr high Escarpment.(ii) Escarpment impassable except at few places. (iii) Surface of plateau – Limestone rock.

4. RD.

(a) Via Balbia. No rds Except one running along coast called via Balbia on Italian side.

(b) Trs Trigh Capuzzo and Trigh El Abd.

(c) Mov across desert possible Except Escarpment Area.

5. Use of Dunes. Hull down posn for tks.

6. Rly.

(a) Matruh from Alexandeia

(b) Coast Rd running parallel to it from Alexandria surfaces upto Sidi Barrani.

(c) Betn sidi Barrani and frontier only one track

(d) Beyond frontier ran via Balbia to West. 6. Coastal belt Narrowest at sollum, barely few hundred meters.

11

CHRONOLOGY1940

- June Battle of fort Capuzzo.

- 16 June. The first the battle of campaign takes place – the “Battle of Girba”.

- August. Italian Conquest of British Somaliland.

- 13 Sept. Italian forces invade Egypt. Halted at Sidi Barrani.

- 9 Dec British offn begins (Op Compass). Toburuk captured. Italians collapse & retreat.

OPS TILL GERMANY JOINS THE BATTLE IN NORTH AFRICA

Q. What were operational and strat issues involved in North African Campaign?Ans.Gen

1. Never has there even a campaign in which fluctuation of fortunes so rapid betn opposing forces. Factors effecting swinging of fortunes.

2. The swing of Desert pendulum cont by fwg factors:-(a) Constraints of sups.(b) Air power.(c) Struggle at sea.(d) Str of opposing armies .(e) Quantity and quality of tks and anti tk guns.(f) Calibre of Cdrs.

3. Imp of London and Egypt vis-a-vis Moscow. Hitler was unable to realize where his strat prize lay. It was London, and not Moscow and indirect rd to London was through Egypt. Cont of Egypt would mean:-

(a) Domination of Malta.(b) An open axis to Middle East.(c) Access to Russia from South. (d) Controlling Suez cnl.(e) Crippling of British Sea power.

Q. What was British over all intentions and strat at the onset of war?Ans.

Gen1. Over all British strat was Def in North Africa.

2. British intentions

(a) To Secure Egypt, Palestine & other territories.(b) Cont Straits of Gibraltar.(c) Cont Suez Cnl.(d) Stay Prep for war, if forced

Q. What was Italian Sit as in 1940?Ans.

1. With collapse of France, Itlay had its forces in Libya rel.

2. Mussolini Directed Marshal Grazini to make prep to Invade Egypt. Grazini placed orders for Rfts.

12

3. In collaboration with German Plan of landing Tps on southern shores of England, Italians were to open front towards Egypt.

Q. What was state of British Armr?Ans.

1. 7 Armd Div in bad State.2. Consisting two partially equipped Bdes.3. Holding old Lt tks.4. Few Armr cars - old vintage

THE FIRST LIBYAN CAMPAIGN

Q. What were the highlights of first Libyan campaign?Ans.

1. Start of Campaign.11 June 1940, Day after Mussolini declared war on Britain and France.

2. Force ratios.

(a) Italian forces formidable force .(b) 50,000 British tps vis-a- vis 500,000 Italian tps.(c) Proved given high quality, a ratio of 1 to 10 could overcome adv of 10 to 1.

3. Threatening of British forces in middle East.

(a) British commitments in middle East. Simple matter to threaten them in all dirns & destroy them in detail.

(b) Threatening of Sudan, Ethiopia, British Somali land. Italian made slight headway but chose to consolidate gains.

(c) Capturing of Cyrenaica in Libya. Chose to build def system at Bardia instead of pushing to Egypt.

4. Gaining of Initiative by raids by British.

(a) Despite over whelming disparity in numbers, British forces took initiative on Ni of 11-12 June 1940, when units of 7 Armd Div crossed Libyan Border.

(b) Raids continued throughout Summer

13

British Forces

Egypt become base for Entire area . New sup depots opened, comn improved Air Fds built. Naval base facilities created at Alexandria. 7 Armd Div having 2 x Armd Bdes, each having two regts, partly equipped, instead of normal three. 4 Indian Div, Which had 2 x Bdes & only portion of its Arty. New Zealand Div, which had only one Bde in addn to 14 British Inf bns.

o C-in-C Middle East –Gen AP Wavell.

o GOC of British tps in Egypt – Lt Gen HM Wilson

o xx xx

7 4 Indian Div x

New Zealando Total – 36000 (Egypt)

o Str in others countries was :-

- Palestine - 27,500 tps- Sudan - 9000- Kenya - 5,500

5. British offn Plan.

(a) No plan of campaign.

14

Exaggerative propaganda- Highly Eff and succeeded in confusing Italian.

(b) Only a standing order – “ Make one man appear to be a Dozen, Make one tk look like a Sqn, Make a raid look an Adv.”

(c) Being unable to withstand any sort of determined adv by Italian, did the unpredicted, unexpected thing – they attacked.

(d) Not as a combined force but in small units, Swiftly, Irregularly and by ni.

(e) Fort Maddalena fell, and capuzzo, Sidi Aziz were invested.

6. Marshal Graziani’s Invasion of Egypt.

(a) After campaign in Abyssinia Graziani ordered by Mussolini on 13 Sept to launch offn in Egypt.

(b) British activities

(i) Restricted to ptlg to gain Info and Desert Experience.(ii) Consolidation of def posn near rail head at Mersa Matruh

(c) Italian Adv.

(i) Force level. Adv on narrow front with 2 x Divs in front , two in sp along with mobile gp and 200 LT and medium tks.

(ii) Italian Tac Dubbed as Hedgehog by British. Headed by motor cyclists to draw fire, followed by tks to make fwd thrust. Inf to seize grnd over run by tks, followed in lorries prot by guns and MGs on periphery.

(iii) Frontal attk with no attempt of outflanking.

(d) Drawbacks

(i) Mob gp which was to move on to south got lost and eventually followed costal rd.

(ii) Mining of trs by British. British mined trs as their retreated causing the Italian Inf to adv on foot, Sp by Arty fire .

(aa) Resultant adv slow.(ab) Grazizni on reaching Sidi Barrani decided to halt & consolidate his adv.(ac) Weeks passed in passive adv.

(e) Adm measures undertaken

(i) PPL constr to bring up water .(ii) Res of stores built.

Q. What was state /Sit of British in beginning campaign?Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Force level (as discussed).

(b) Western Desert, inside the Egyptian frontier, Separated the two sides in this north African theatre.

2. British strat (As discussed)

15

3. Def Preparedness

(a) Foremost British posn. At Mersa Matruh, 120 miles inside frontier & some 200 miles west of Nile Delta. (b) Sea- route through Mediterranean precarious

(i) Result of Itlay’s Entry into war.(ii) Rfts had to come to Egypt via cape route.

(c) Gaining moral ascendency over Italians.

(i) Wavell used part of his in complete Armd Div as an offn covering force rt fwd in desert.(ii) Series of raids over frontier to harass Italian posts.

Q. What were the Adm problems of British and how did they rectify them?Ans.

1. Hvy mechanical wear and tear.

(a) Strain on wksps.(b) Scarcity of spare parts.(c) Of 306 tks on Div’s Estb, only about 200 avbl with units.(d) Remedial measures - All tracked Vehs from frontier withdrawn for over haul & refit, in order to be sure that Armd striking force not out of action when En’s adv devp.

2. Seriously Short of comn Eqpt

(a) No tele comn. In adv of Div HQs.

(b) Wireless comn. Ltd to urgent op msgs due to security reasons.

(c) Problem of liaison Offrs. All Comns, incl orders delivered by liaison offrs in trucks- who frequently took a day to reach destination.

3. Tpt for Maintaing Units reduced to bare min. Deliveries ltd to petrol, hard rations for tps & water @ of half a gallon per head per day (Incl reqd for vehs & loss in transits).

4. Problem of quality to quantity of Rations. For weeks, fwd tps existed on biscuits, ltd tinned rations & pint of tea in morning & evening.

5. Living conditions Extremely Severe Shade temp ranged betn 800 and 1000F.

6. Problems of Stg fwd of Replacementat Matruh not less than 100 miles

16

from fwd units - All replacements having to jouraney by stgs and be driven by spare crews fwd from Matruh.

7. Problem of Evac of Cas. Until cas could get back to Sidi Barrani they too had to be laboriously staged from post to post.

8. Air Sp Ltd. Only flt of three Lysanders, which had fighter Cover of 3 gladiators – until one was lost, and remaining two were withdrawn.

9. Restn of Expdr of amn. Fwg restn imposed by GHQ at Cario :-

(a) Use of 25 pounder amn restd to 2 Rounds per gun per day.(b) Other Amn Expended only if good dividend Expected.

Q. What were Plg and prep done by the Britsh to Undertake counter offn?Ans.

1. Rft of western Desert force

(a) Str of Mediterranean fleet.

(i) 4x Battle ships, 2x crvisers and 13 destroyers. (ii) Better posn to Escort Cvys to Alexandria.

(b) Rft from UK, India and common wealth countries on receding of threat of op Sealion

(i) 126,000 tps brought in.(ii) 2nd Armd Div (UK), 2 x Bdes of 7th Aust Div (Aust), 1 x Bde gp from New Zealand, 5th Indian Div, 4 Fd Arty Regt from India, 1st SA Div from SA.

(c) Str of AF. Receive 41 Wellingtons, 87 Hurricanes & 85, Blenheim.

(d) Rft of 7 th Arm Div by fresh Armd units .

(i) 4th Armd Bde – 2nd RTR.(ii) 7th Armd Bde – 3rd Hussars(iii) 7th RTR equipped with Matildas

2. (a) Inf – tk coop. One pt strongly emphasized was that tks should not start on same timings as the inf and adv at inf speed, but move at their own best speed- leading wave of tks starting in time to arrive on the obi 10 to 20 min ahead of leading inf, while second wave of tks should arrive just ahead of inf.

(b) Combined Arms trg

(i) 7th RTR and 4th Indian Div trained together.(ii) Ex involving 40 mile Apch march followed by an attk on a gp of dummy camps.

3. Offn planned as large scale raid rather than sustained offn

4. Deception

(a) Div Ex was to be followed by a corps Ex which was actually the offn for which the first had been a full dress rehearsal.

(b) Use ac for flying continuously over area to drown the noise.

5. Change in attk plan.

(a) Plan of attk which was frontal radically changed after rehearsal. Frontal attk plan would have to be delivered straight over minefd, failure was too probable.

(b) “Indirect Apch” to take En’s camps from rear adopted.

17

6. Adoption of Indirect Apch. Frontal plans of attk radically changed after rehearsal as it would have been delivered straight over mine fd.

7. Dispersion of force. Force kept well dispersed, to minimise Effects of Expected air attks

8. Adm.

(a) 2 days sups Dumped fwd for 4th Indian Div and 3 days sups for 7th Armd Div.(b) Ops were intended to last five days at most.

Operation Compass

13 to 17 Sept 1940 – five Italian Div and Malette gp adv to Sidi Barrani. 9 to 11 Dec – Battle of Sidi Barrani. 16 Dec – British capture Sollum.

Q. What was plan, obj, Exec of Second Libyan campaign?Ans.

1. Intro

(a) Marshal Graziani’s adv ahead of Sidi Barrani failed to materialize.

(b) Therefore Wavell took initiative of going on offensive despite problems of having to occupy crete & having to further deplete his AF by sending 3 bombers and two fighter sqns to Greece.

(c) Offn ops possible due to rft of 3 x tk regt from England.

(d) British patrols discovered betn Nibeiwa and two sofafis, there was a gap of 25 km.

(e) Camps not build for all rd def .

(f) Possible for armd/motorised force to penetrate and attk camp from rear.

(g) Ops initially only planned for 5 days.

2. Force level.

(a) British. HQ western Desert force – Lt Gen O’ Connor (31,000 tps, 120 guns, 275 tks)

(i) Corps tps 7th RTR-Matilda (I) Tks

(ii) 7 th Amd Div

(aa) 4th armd bde - 7th hussars, 2nd RTR to 6th RTR.(ab) 7th Armd Bde – 3rd Hussars,8th Hussars, 1st RTR.

(iii) 4 th Indian Div

(aa) 5th Indian Inf Bde.(ab) 11th Indian Inf Bde.

(iv) Mersa Matruh Garrison.

(b) Italian Force.

Loc Fmn

(i) Maktila - 1st Libyan Div(ii) Sidi Barrani - 4th Black Shirt Div(iii) Tummar West to East - 2nd Libyan Div(iv) Pt 90 - Part of 1st Libyan Div (v) Nib weia - Maletti Gp

18

(vi) Sofafi to Rabia - Part of 63xx

(vii) Along coast from Sidi - 1st Black shirt Div.(viii) Barrani to BVQ - BVQ(ix) Along Escarpment - Reminder of 65 xx

3. British Plan

(a) Initial Plan To raid Italian posns with view to hold Italians and allow British pull out part of their force to Sudan.

(b) As opportunity presented, converted in to full pledged offn.

(c) Exploited sudden weakning of resistance on Battle fd to adv and gain rapid success far beyond imdt obj.

(d) Final Plan

(i) Phase-1

(aa) 4th Indian Div & 7th RTR to pass through Nibeiwa Rabia gap & attk camps at Nibeiwa, Tummar East & pt 90 from west.

(ab) 7th Armoured Brigade to prot these ops from interference from Dirns of Buqbuq / Sofafi.

19

(ac) Tps from Matruh Garrison (Selby force) to pin down Italian force in Maktila camp.

(ad) Role of Navy Ships of Royal Navy to Bombard Maktila to Sidi Barrani and comns upto sollum.

(ae) Role of AF

Strat offn by AF & then Navy. Air fd of Libya to be bombarded for 48 Hrs. Aim. To keep Italian AF on grnd until British tps took posn and accomplished at least first leg of adv.

(ii) Phase 2. 4th Indian Div to move north wards towards Sidi Barrani & the armd Div towards Buq Buq to disrupt comns.

(iii) Phase 3 Armd Div was to exploit north westwards or South wards towards Sofafi.

4. Italian Plan.

(a) Strat based on comn lines Extending into desert from Tripoli.

(b) Hinged on a pivot – Bardia, Tobruk, Benghazi and Tripoli. Latest was Sidi Barrani.

(c) Aim To let British Stretch Locs as they advanced causing attrition along route of adv.

(d) Key Decision Pts

(i) To be held in str in various tiers.(ii) Hold tobruk and Bardia as long as they lay across Wavell’s LOCs.(iii) Occupy def line along and derna Mechili line should Bardia & toubruk fall.(iv) Retreat to Barce and Benaghazi should this line fall.(v) If Banghazi not reinforced, then whole Italian Army would withdraw intact down the coastal rd to Tripoli.

5. British Prep Secrecy, Surprise and swiftness key notes of ops. To achieve this fwg measures were adopted :-

(a) Stocking of Adv Sup Depots.Adv sup depots were stocked with five days rations, petrol and amn and two day’s sup of water. This took about three weeks (no man’s land separating the two force was about 110 kms so these dumps had to be estb 50-60 km ahead.)

(b) Addl AF brought in from Aden.

(c) Rehearsals conducted on replicas of camps.

(d) Great care to keep the gaps open.

(e) Secrecy Great secrecy maintained. Tps told on 7 Dec of op to be launched on 09 Dec.

(f) For Deception, publicity was given to Eastrean front and of wavell landing in Crete.

6. Apch to be conducted as under:-

(a) Adv of about 50 kms on ni 7/8 Dec.(b) Halt in the open during day Lt hrs 8 Dec.(c) Adv during ni 8/9 Dec to attk at first lt 9 Dec.

7. Conduct The campaign can be divided into three phases:-

20

(a) Battle of Sidi Barrani (9-11 Dec). Resulting in capture of all fortified Italian and Eqpt Erpt Captured)

(b) Reduction of Bardia and Tobruk

(i) Conducted after three week halt to bring fwd amn & sup by sea & land.

(ii) Western Desert force was renamed XIII corps & 6 th Australian Div was brought in from Plastine for offn.

(iii) 6th Aus Div estb Br H across anti tk ditch which was then bridged by engrs for tks to cross over.

(iv) Port fell on 22 Jan 1941.

(c) Capture of Benghazi.

(i) On fall of Tobruk, it was planned to capture Benghazi. In between were strong Italian posn at Derna & at Mechili, 80 km south of Derna.

(ii) O’ connor planned to contain Derna and attk Mechili, However Mechili gp with drew to Brace. It was then planned to mov on across desert with depleted Str of 7 th

Armd Div and cut coastal rd & at Bedafomm, 80 km south of Banghazi.

(iii) Armd coln reached costal rd and surprised En coln retreating from Benghazi which surrendred immediately. Baenghazi Captured on 6th Feb 1941.

8. 2 full British Div were emp betn 7 Dec to 7 Feb. Army of 4 x Corps (10 Divs ) destroyed.

9. Leasson Learnt. (See page No 47,48,49)

10. Causes of Italay defeat (46 page No)

21

22

Q. After brilliant success achived in this campaign, why could wavell not push fwd?Ans.

1. The political necessity of sending tps to Greece.

2. Exhaustion of tps after two months of intense fighting.

3. Need for servicing tks and other vehs.

4. Lgs problem of maintaining tps over a dist of 1,200 kms.

5. Incr Luftwaffe air activity.

6. Lack of forces to make Benghazia strongly def Navel and air base to sp land ops beyond EL Agheila.

7. Benghazi was not made functional, sups had to be mov fwd from Tobruk by rd, over 450 miles.

8. 13 Corps was disbanded and a static Cyrenaica comd was set up under Gen Neame.

Q. How were principles of war followed in this campaign?Ans.

1. Selection to maint of Aim

(a) Itlay

(i) Not ready for war.

(ii) No central Dirns of war.

(iii) No clearly defined Aim & no comprehensive plan.

(iv) Mussolini took political decisions & his chief of staff marshals Badoglio was co-ordinating mil plans. Three service Chiefs did not examine the plans.

(v) Having pushed Grazani to Sidi Barrani, Mussolini did not carry adv to Matruh instead he opend up front in Greece on 28 th oct for which his armed forces were even less prep.

(b) British.

(i) Not in posn to plan entire campaign right at start.

(ii) Initial Plan 5 day raid against Sidi Barrani then allowed to continue as O’ Connor captured port after the other.

(iii) Switch to Greece denied adequate forces to pursue campaign & consolidate rapidly to evict Italians out of North Africa.

2. Surprise

(a) Italians permitted themselves to be surprised as they relied on occasional ptlg.

(b) Indl trg was poor and so was Jr Leadership.

(c) British surprised them regarding time & place of attk and in last Battle a Beda Fomm by route taken and speed of adv.

3. Offn Spirit.

(a) Wars are not won by static defs, but only by taking to offn with speed to confidence.

23

(b) Italian relied on static posts which were not even mutually sp & the British struck at them with hard hitting mob force.

(c) At Beda Fomm lack of offn spirit of Italian was glaring with tks in large number avbl to them they failed to employ them for lack of offn spirit.

4. Co-operation.

(a) Badoglio did not get on with Grazani. This affected conduct of war an Italian side.

(b) Royal Navy & Royal AF fully Co-operated with advancing army in giving sp both for recce and offn purposes.

5. Administration

(a) Long lines of L of C impose tremendous strain on tpt.

(b) British adv checked because of need to build up sups to time taken to do so.

(c) British improvised & moved fwd with min essential reqmts & making most of avbl resources.

Q. Given out operational review of O’ connor campaign?Ans.

1. Adoption of Indirect Appch & rapid out flaking thrusts.

(a) Commenced primarily to prevent Italian adv into Egypt.(b) Rapid fall of front due to adoption of indirect Apch to strong pts on frontier.(c) it was followed by rapid out flanking thrusts to the rear of En.

2. Correctly Appreciated Decision Pts.

(a) British forces correctly appreciated decision pts Tobruk & Bardia, Sollum, Mechili.

(b) By under taking wide envp towards Benghazi through desert from Mechili ops were devp towards the same to cut off a large Italian force at Beda fomm.

3. Exploitation of gaps and attacking from rear. British exploitation of gps in Italian strong pts and attacking them from rear with armr proved highly eff while taking strong pts as Bardia and Tobruk.

4. Isolation and Investment

(a) Adopted for first time.

(b) Succeeded due to threat posed to rear of Italian camps forcing them to abandon their posn even through these had not been physically reduced

5. Offn spirit and Initiative.

(a) British took many op risk in advancing in desert with a small force.

(b) Offn spirit and Initiative, Ldr Ship, superior trg and continuous pursuit led to successes.

6. Reducing lgs pause. British sups pts & amn followed in wake of adv armr thereby reducing necessity for logistics pause.

Q. Give out op review of Grazani’s Def Campaign?Ans.

1. Def Plan - reactive.

2. Reduction of offn punch. Adopted series of lines of def thereby reducing offn punch.

24

3. Plans based on En adopting Expected line of adv.

(a) Experted en to adv along coast rd.(b) Failed to appreciate that En would and seek line of least resistance.

4. Appreciation of decisive pts. Correct Appreciation of decisive pts but did not appreciate how these would be reduced

5. Prot of flanks. Failed to prot Southern flank and was out flanked.

6. Lack of arty & air. Plan for attrition lacked firepower both arty armr air.

Q. What was the maj inherent weakness of Italian Def?Ans,

1. Gen

(a) Sept 13 – made cautions mov fwd with more than five Divs and 200 tks.(b) Series of rear gd action of British took toll.

2. Maj weakness.

(a) No Exploitation of Initial success

(i) Advanced 60 miles in four days but halted at Sidi Barrani.(ii) Estb themselves in fortified camps.

(b) Occupation of static defs

(i) Camps extended in chain from sea to escarpment.(ii) Widely Separated to Sp each other.

(c) Recce of Area in rear by British mob Ptls. British mob Ptls were able to penetrate betn camps and recce area in rear, with benefit to future ops.

Q. What were the lessons learnt?Ans . All pts as mentioned in plg & prep to be mentioned.

1. Mobility in attk superior to mass in def. It enable attacker to concentrate superior force at a single pt or succession of pts in rapid succession.

2. Integration of all arms.

3. Force must be able to provide mut Sp.

4. Covering force necessary in def to give early warning of En’s activities to avoid being surprised.

5. Strong mob res is necessary for CA tasks.

6. By passing of En’s fortified posns and blocking En’s line of retreat and sup . By passing Capuzzo and Sollum and thrust north west ward to Bardia Tobruk rd, thereby blocking En’s line of retreat and sup, paid rich dividends.

7. Holding grnd is not as imp as mvre in desert warfare.

8. High std of wireless comn. Ensure Cont thus enabling the tps to maint course and reach its obj on time.

9. Exploitation/ press hard on heels of rout necessary. Sending 4th Indian Div to Sudan was contrary to well estb maxim of exploitation Dispatching a force to Greece also violated the said principle.

25

10. Lgs is a maj battle wining factor in Deserts(Plg of Lgs).

(a) Stocks are to be built within turnaround time of Div transport.

(b) Two chains of depots were built one along coast road and other along escarpment.

(c) Depots were about 80 kms apart and it were to cater for normal maint of tps, amn and petrol.

(d) Addl reqmt of tpt was met by making use of captured Italian vehs.

(e) Leap forging of depots proved strain on tpt and unless resv are avbl retail issue poses serious problem.

Q. What were the reasons for British success in Sidi Barrani?Ans.

1. Accurate int of Italian Disposition.

2. Ability to infiltrate the en from rear and achieving complete surprise.

3. Concentrating force and engaging the En’s def piecemeal without the other Italian forces providing mut Sp.

4. Good close fire Sp from Arty

5. Italian defs located too for apart to provide mut Sp.

6. Faulty concept of strong static fortification by Italians :-

(a) Forts easily outflanked.(b) Reqd mob & flexible defs.

Q. Write short on :-

(a) Long Range Desert Gp.(b) Jock colns

Ans. Long range Desert Gp.

1. Recce & raiding unit of british army

2. Formed by Maj Bagmold under dirn of Gen Archibald Wavell.

3. Italian org 3 ptls each of 2 offrs and 30 men selected from New Zealanders.

4. Dumped petrol, food to water for future use.

5. Bomber tpt sqn co-operated with Ptls carrying stores for them.

Jock colns. Small colns of all arms armoured cars for recce, 25 pounders and Inf coys which were used to probe into Italian rear and attack suitable tgts to estb moral superiority over them.

Q. Comment about conditions in desert and German state of preps?Ans.

1. Prepratory problems faced by Germans.

(a) No first hand experiences upon which the staff could make plans.(b) No papers dealing with tac or employment of motorised/Armd fmns in desert warfare.(c) Rpts produced by Italians on campaign against British in Egypt lacked details & were inaccurate. (d) Inaccurate maps.(e) Arrangement with Italians for preparing the force for North Africa was not Smooth.

26

2. First German units Supplied with unnecessary/badly designed eqpt

(a) No diesel Engines Sent to Africa. In tropical conditions diesel engine more suitable then petrol motor.

(b) No preps for prot of vehs from sand and dust.

(i) Life of German tk engine only betn 800 to 1000 miles.(ii) Only later spl filters introduced.

3. Adverse effect upon Efficiency of the engines overcome by marching by ni

(a) Prevented overheating.(b) Extended life of the tk.(c) Trg of tk crews -navigation facilitated panzer ops in dust storms.

4. Adopted lgs to suite desert

(a) Tks replenished on the front line.

(b) British tk crew moved back to leagner & returned to battle fd next day.

(i) Strain on drivers.(ii) Vehs with slight mech faults left in German dominated territory.

5. Superior tk recovery org.

(a) Local & imdt repair in front line.(b) Low loader recovery trucks for recovery to rear for specialized repairs.(c) Such org & improvisation over came numerical inferiority.

6. Used tks abandoned by British

7. Cam & concealment

(a) Posed problem both during day & moon lit nights.(b) First veh covered with std European paint.(c) Improvisation carried out by spraying oil & strewing sand.(d) Nets used & good use of grnd made to avoid detection.

8. Concealed loc by practicing wireless silence. Essential msg passed on ultra short wave wireless frequency/ tele.

9. Campaigning Wx thought by OKH as spring/winter. It was widely held by OKH that summer heat would not allow mil ops to continue and both armies would withdraw into summer Qtrs.

10. No Spl selection of men to serve in Africa.

(a) Simple med Examination.(b) No Spl trg.(c) No accln.(d) Only few lecture on hygine.

11. Tps had to learn from Experience to identify men & veh at long rg.

12. Provided wood for cooking instead of fuel in a treeless waste Resulted in reducing shipping space which could have been used for more vital sups.

13. Used double tyres for better mob.

(a) Suffered from puncher due to infiltration of sharp stores .(b) Later used wide base tyres.

27

14. Problems of Rations

(a) Did not canned potato which was staple diet.(b) Turned out rye biscuit instead of bread.(c) Experiment to use sea water to economise sweet water turned un successful.(d) Diet monotonous and lacked not only variety but vitamin-C.

15. Instrs on Hygiene was common sense though great attention to detail was given.

16. Efforts to win friendship of Arabs for assurance of freedom from gureilla warfare.

17. Uniform in the initial yrs lacked practical utility

(a) Abandoned initial uniform and sun helmet due to bitter experience.(b) Use of captured En clothing.

Q. How did German org and Tac facilitated the op Cdr or what was German doctrine for Desert/MVRE warfare?Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Tac doctrines based on European Experience found little or no relevance to new theatre of ops.

(b) 15th Panzer was made to use lulls betn summer & Autumn fighting of 1941 to develop battle drills.

2. Tactics/doctrine adopted by Germans:-

(a) Combined wpns of Blitzkireg – tk, dive bomber, Inf & guns.

(b) Doctrine based on all Arms. Inf, guns and tks.

(i) Fight as fully integrated parts.(ii) Max conc of effort upon chosen tgt within shortest possible time.(iii) In desert chosen tgt – British armr.

(c) Devp New Panzer tac for Adv to contact. Adv in Battle order than in colns and directly form up for battle and not waste time in dply maneuvering.

(d) Use of Series of boxes to mov fwd.

(i) Box formed from indl Battle gp.

(ii) Echeloned to depth four times that of front with all components located within it.

(iii) Composition/ Components:-

(aa) Recce Elements in front .(ab) Followed by anti tk guns.(ac) Armd Elements Sp by arty followed in box.(ad) Entire Softer Elements along with lgs were kept with Hvy Arty and Inf fwg up.

(iv) Force could achieve break through on its own in series of thrusts across desert.

5. Idea of tk Vs tk Battle considered as wrong Application of Armd powers by Germans

6. Application of Bait/ Gun line Tac. Panzer Elements would advance to contact & then retire to bait British armr on Screen of anti atk guns, with their view obscured by clouds of dust thereby failing prey to German anti tk fire.

28

7. German Battle Drill against British Posn.

(a) Prelim recce to determine sect to be attacked.

(b) Armd thrust to divert attn from the main thrust.

(c) Main Effort would be made of several Boxes of tks advancing at given speed with carefully regulated intervals betn indl tks and indl Boxes.

(d) Roll fwd & by combination of fire & move threaten posn would be taken.

(e) Flk prot by gun line as panzer passed attk fwd.

8. Fwd recce of Battle fd

(a) Panzer II vehs used to screen front & flks of battle fmn.

(b) Dets / Spl gp to listen to wireless msgs of British armr and lay int before Div cdr so that dirn and size of British thrust could be countered.

9. Mov of sup colns

(a) Vulnerable to British interference

(b) For a short time cvy sys introduced.

(c) Delay in reaching of sup fuel & Amn.

(d) To overcome this, number of soft skinned vehs loaded with essential sups travelled with BG in middle of Divisional Box for Prot.

(e) Att of offr of QM dept with tac HQ of BG and linked with Radio to main QM dept at corps.

10. Concept of tac HQs

(a) Difficulty of fighting fluid battle from rear.

(b) Essential that Div Cdr, his tac HQ, FOO and panzer regt Cdr well fwd.

(c) Elborate comn sys

(i) Ultra short wave radio for Div Cdr to listen into panzer net so as to pass instrs directly w/o going into time wasting procedure.

(ii) Med wave band linked remainder leading gp with Div Cdr.

11. Std format orders for mvre Reduced wastage of time and increased speed of Battle drills and helped to seize fleeting opportunities.

12. Cdrs well fwd

(a) Speeded up decision making .

(b) Improved moral.

(c) Italian & British comds were remote and decisions arrived usually after staff conferences had often been overtaken by events thereby leading new crises to be resolved.

29

Q. What was gun line bait tac (concept of gun vs tk)?Ans .

1. Concept.

(a) Tk Vs Tk Battle to be avoided.

(b) Panzer force would adv to contact & then retire bating British whose std reaction was always to mount charge.

(c) British armr fell prey to fire of screen of guns.

2. Simple Tac seldom failed until Montgomery arrived in desert.

3. Gun line Tac eff due to certain conditions:-

(a) British attacking front did not Exceed ‘gun density’ 8.8 cm German gun out ranged every British gun. One single gun could fight battle with sqn of tks.

(b) British tk cdr’s aided German gunners by committing their force piecemeal.

(c) British tk gun had shorter range than German gun.

Q. What were reasons that negated victories of Rommel?Ans.

1. Over elaborate comd structure

(a) Africa- Italian theatre of ops - Rommel subordinate to an Italian Gen.

(b) German supreme Cdr South, Kesselring was interposed & command supremo in Rome was often in accord with Kesselring’s pt of view. (c) OKH & OKW stood betn Rommel & Hitler.

(d) Layers of obstruction prevented Rommel from achieving obj.

2. Lack of sups, Amn FOL.

3. Rommel was poor subordinate Preferred not to seek orders, warnings & in junctions of his superiors.

Q. What was Italian org & op Vulnerabilities?Ans .1. Italian org.

(a) X corps

(i) Bologna Inf Div.(ii) Pavia Inf Div(iii) Sp by Ariete Armd Div with 60 tks.

(b) XXI Corps

(i) Savona inf Div(ii) Breslia Inf Div(iii) Remaining ele of other Divs which were badly hit.

2. Op Vulnerabilities

(a) Weak, badly led, poorly armed & equipped.

(b) Eqpt – obsolete

30

(c) Ldr Ship

(i) Defective comd structure from higher level down to Jr Cdrs.

(ii) Disparity in ration scales betn offr & men. Offrs ate first & best, the men last, badly and sometimes not at all.

(iii) Offrs lived almost at peace time level.

(iv) Mob brothel in large caravan.

(v) Comradeship was missing and sense of purpose absent.

(vi) Italian ldrs seldom left HQs thus had no direct & Imdt influence upon course of Battle.

(d) No wireless/tele comn betn units & Cdr. Higher echs dependent on liaison offr for relay of orders.

(e) Sup Sys.

(i) Defective(ii) Based on Static campaign.

Q. What were initial problems/Defi of British? Ans.

1. Gen Mapped desert, plotted routes & accurate maps.

2. Obsolete Eqpt.

(a) Anti tk wpn 2 pounders gun useless against German Armr.(b) AFVs generally ineffective mechanically unsound but also poorly Armd.

3. Tac No real understanding of use of mass forces & Regts were allowed to carry out Isolated and generally unsp ‘cavalry’ charges on gun lines, untill Alam Halfa when Monty took over 8th Army tk Cdrs were forbidden.

4. Measures taken to overcome weaknesses

(a) Armd Bde gp became std battle fmn & replaced Armd Bde which had formed part of Armd Div.

(b) Within the bde gp estb, there were Arty and Engr units taken from former sp gp which, with new regrouping had been scrapped.

(c) Anti tk gun regt broken up & distributed among fd arty regts.

(d) Lt anti ac batteries allotted to each bde gp.

5. BGs not eff against German moving mass. Failed to achieve Cohesion & def mechanism characterized by German BGs as they were never large enough to be eff against German armours moving in mass.

6. Direct & Imdt cont of battle essential in Armd warfare was lacking

(a) Structure too loose and too far removed from Scene of battle.(b) Too slow, as decisions arrived were usually result of long dscns.(c) At inter mediate comd level great freedom of action & at div level gp was quite firm.(d) Great deal of professionalism at Bde & lowers Echs.

7. Frequent & continual turnover of fmns.

(a) 7 Armd Div which successfully led adv to Cyrenica replaced by 2 Armd Div less 1 x Bde.(b) 9 Aus Div replaced 6th which was short of Eqpt & trg.

31

8. Emp of Armr in peni packets to sp Inf. It continued despite lessons of first Cyrenica campaign when 7 Armd Div cut across deserts to isolate Italian force.

9. Miscalculation of threat. Wavell Estimated German force would take at least 2 months after landing in Tripoli to undertake offn and thus no serious threat was anticipated till May.

10. Advantage of air superiority in case of Germans. Germans effectively concealed weak Str on grnd & British were denied air recce.

Q. What were the causes of initial British Defeat?Ans .

1. Diversion of force to Greece.

(a) Allowed time for Germans to come to rescue of Italians.

(b) Almost whole of O’Connor’s AF was removed immediately, leaving only one sqn of fighters.

2. British cabinet decision abstain f rom any attempt to follow up decisive victory in Cyrenaica

3. Overestimation of Str of Germans . Deceived by dummy tks.

4. Replaced old fmns with those of newly arrived and inexperienced fmns.

(a) 6th Aus Div was sent to Greece & the 9th Aus which replaced it was short of both eqpt & trg.

(b) 7th Armd Div sent for rest & refit, its place being taken by in experienced 2nd Armd Div (less 1 Armd Bde).

5. Change in Div Cdrs.

(i) Gambier Parry took over 2nd Armd Div as Justice Tilly had died after arr in Egypt.(ii) O’ Connor who had gone to Egypt for rest was relieved by Neame who had no recent comd Experience.

6. Wrong estimation of En’s prep for combat by wavell

(a) Wavell Estimated that Germans would take at least two months after landing before they could undertake serious offn.

(b) Wavell appreciated that it would be safe to leave comparatively unequipped and untrained tps there so long as their trg to eqpt would be completed by May.

7. Audacity & Initiative of Rommel. Rommel demonstrated the advantage of striking early when opponent, even though numerically stronger, is in state of unreadiness.

8. Shortage of tpt. Played imp part in sup sit when campaign became fluid especially for Armd Div.

9. Lack of Collective Trg in Desert.

(a) Sevre initial handicap.(b) Any fmn that has not devp team combination liable to breakdown under stress.

10. Well trained German Army. Had idea of moving wide, to produce confusion, but striking concentrated.

11. Bal of str of Germans in Air Helped to conceal weakness on grnd.

32

12. Decision to give up Benghazi.

(a) Wavell instrs to Neame to fight a delaying action & not hesitate to give up grnd as for as Benghazi.

(b) Strong posn given up for fluid sit which favored superior maneuvering power of Rommel’s force.

(c) Drin of withdrawal towards Benghazi opened way for Rommel to cut off route through desert, via Msus & Mechili.

Q. What initial prep Germans had carried out before sending their force?

Ans.

1. Gen It is mil truism that fwg to be carried out before combat ops:-

(a) Sups services must be estb.(b) LOCs laid out.(c) Depots set up.

2. First German tps which landed in tripoli on 11 Feb 1941 were sup specialists and water purifying teams.

3. Fwg was Imdt carried out :-(a) Estb store depots.(b) Ration, fuel, & amn pts(c) Preparing area for arr of fighting tps.

Q. Review the initial German Ops?

Ans.

33

ROMMEL’S FIRST ADVANCE MAR-APR 1941

1. Gen To provide max forces for Greece, Wavell denuded Cyrenaica of the trained and well tried fmns & relied on one Australian Div w/o its normal complement of arty and one Armd Bde.

2. British force in Cyrenaica COS ordered Wavell to hold with min force and concentrate all avbl forces in Greece.

(a) Force sent 6 and 7 Aus Div, New Zealand Div of two Bdes, Polish Bde, Armd Bde Ex 2 Armd Div

(b) Force Avbl 2 Armd Div less & 9th Aus. 7th Armd Div was mechanically Exhausted and tks needed complete overhaul therefore was sent to Egypt.

3. British design of Battle

(a) Covering Force In Area EL Agheila with task not to get seriously involved in battle and withdraw towards Benghazi causing delay.

(b) Armoured force. To be near Antelat and discern main thrust. Op against flank/rear of main attacking force.

(c) 9 th Aus Div to block escarpment in the area east and north of Benghazi.

(d) 3 rd Indian Motorised Bde . W/o any AFV, Arty, Anti tk wpns . Loc at Martuba (NE of Derna)

(e) Sup Depots Msus, Mechili,Tmimi.

4. German Build up

(a) Conf on 8th to 9th Jan 1941- Hitler to prevent Italy form losing North Africa, agreed to send blocking force to Tripoli.

34

(b) Force

(i) HQ Africa Korps (Lt Gen Erwin Rommel)(ii) 5th Lt Motorized Div (streich) raised from 3rd Panzer Div.(iii) 15th Panzer Div (Prittwitz) by 15th May.(iv) Sp by Flieger Corps x

5. British Appreciation.

(a) One rd & in adequate water over 410 miles from Tripoli to Agheila.

(b) A/m factor & lack of tpt limit present en threat.

(c) En could probably maintain up to 1 x Inf Div & an armd bde along coast rd in about 3 weeks and subsequently may employ second Armd Bde .

(d) May test Britishers at Agheila by offn ptlg & if he finds British weak, push to Agedabia. Force level not sufficient to recover Benghazi.

(e) Giving time of 30 days to dump sups in fwd Arch, Gemans not be ready to operate before 16th April with one German Armd & one Italian motorized div. By 14 may could fd german armd & by 24th an Italian Armd / lorry borne Div.

6. German Appreciation.

(a) Rommel considered possibility of offn to reach suez cnl.

(b) OKH Spelt that his task was to defend Tripolitania & to prepare to recapture Cyrenaica. Due to tpt & sup difficulties.

7. Conduct

(a) Launched offn w/o waiting for 15 Panzer Div.

(b) Italian Brescia Div were to relieve German force.

(c) 24 th mar - launched attk on Recce tp in EI Agheila.

(d) 30 th Mar . Launched attk on Mersa EL Brega even through OKH & Gariabaldi not permitted ops before may

(e) Breaching of Mersa EL Brega.

(i) Two pronged op with fwg was launched along Via Balbia:-(aa) Panzer Regt.(ab) 8 Recce Bn.(ac) 8 MMG Bn.

(ii) State of British Defs Held behind minefds and sp by Royal AF by 2 and 3 Armd Bde.

(iii) Defs broken through on sec day resulting into passage into Cyrenaica.

(iv) Proved German Capb to fight in Africa and his appreciation that British 8 Army was not strong as Italians had appreciated.

(f) Adv to Agedabia.

(i) Along via Balbia by 5 Lt Div Bn 2nd April.

(ii) Use of Baiting Tacs Panzer regt assaulting British in fein & then withdrawing thereby enticing British armour on screen of 88mm guns.

35

(g) British retreat

(i) Rommel orders forces to maintain contact.(ii) Air recce revealed Disorderly retreat.(iii) Abandoned Stores.(iv) Used via Balbia only Devp axis to Cyrenaica.

(h) Cutting off British force withdrawing along via Balbia .

(i) Launched force across desert over chord of Bulge to Eastern edge of Cyrenaica.

(ii) Aim To cut off British forces withdrawing along via Balbia.

(iii) Daring ventures to cross 400 miles of desert wasteland against advise of Italians.

(iv) Sup of force Sup problem was overcome by organizing ferry for self contained battle gp which could move cross country.

(c) Plan of adv .

(i) Adv along several line of march.

(ii) One element to hold British withdrawal along Via Balbia.

(iii) Capture Benghazi while member of trans desert colns to head for Mechili.

(iv) Deception Aimed to creat impression that plan only to capture Benghazi & at same time pose a force large then Panzer corps.

(f) Box of Mechili broken on 8 April. 5 Gens surrendered to incl Neame & Connor.

(g) Resulted in threat to rear comns of British Army fighting in Greece. It was also great victory for morale in Arab world.

8. Review of op Art.

(a) Rommel’s Brilliance.

(i) Exploited Audacity by staying forth across desert.

(ii) Tac enhanced eff of Panzer by drawing experience from campaign in France.

(iii) Selected line of adv which matched line of least resistance with that of least expectation being towards Mechili.

(iv) Opted for grand sweep across desert than ops along Via Balbia in form of short Hooks.

(v) Launched feint at Benghazi & quickly switched focus on Mechili.

(vi) Powers of improvisation and energy of cdrs and tps.

(viii) Swift Ni movemensts around British flank and rear.

(b) British Failures.

(i) Faulty Wavell’s appreciation that Germans would take two months after landing in Tripoli.

(ii) Lack of recce & mobility.

(iii) Tfr & turnover of tps .

36

(iv) Lack of assessment of German intent.

(v) Failed to study campaign in France - performance of Rommel.

(vi) Lack of air recce. British could not correctly ascertain Rommel’s str or dirn of attk due to lack of air recce.

Q. What were the imp factors that brought about speedy success for germans?Ans.

1. British Weakness of Transportation. Momentary weakness of British force, whose supply transportation had not yet been able to catch up full with rapid advance.

2. German Supermary in Air – Hindered British Sup colns..

3. Attk from unexpected Dirn.

4. Adv through desert from South of Benghazi toward Mechli & Derna.

5. Relentless pursuit.

6. No Lgs pause.

7. British could not use port of Benghasi and had to unload sups at Tobruk, 300 Kms East.

Q. What were causes of Rommel’s failure to capture tobruk?Ans.

1. Gen. Siege of Tobruk was confrontation that started on 11 Apr 1941 for 240 days up to 27 Nov 1941. It was relieved by 8th Army During Crusader.2. Imp of Tobruk.

(a) Tubruk port could directly sp German force in Cyrenaica as it was only port between Tripoli & Alexandria.

(b) Sups lines would be drastically shortened.

3. Adv to Tobruk

(a) Tubruk identified as CG.

(b) Conc of forces dispensed with 5 Lt Div spread across Desert with Ltd mobility due to lgs challenges.

(c) Disembarkation of 15 Panzers Div in Tripoli.

(d) Ops commenced with Brescia Div with view to capture Tobruk when it was lightly held.

(e) Failure of battle due to under Estimation of str.

4. Def to Tobruk

(a) Defs in depth by converting Italian Defs.

(b) Royal Navy Commanded the sea routes in Mediterranean, Def of Tobruk could be carried out with ease & rfts came in sea, it could not be classically isolated.

(c) 10,000 to 12,000 battle hardened tps swelled to 36,000 to incl non combatants.

(d) Two perimeters in Tobruk each comprising of belt of barbed wire & an anti tk ditch.

(e) Extensive mine fds.

37

(f) Outer belt was 30 miles across from West to East & 9 miles inland from Sea.

(g) Double row of strong pts were set within perimeter mutually supported & connected with comn trenches with sangars difficult to detect.

(h) Within inner line there were 5 mini fortresses.

5. Battle of Tobruk

(a) Phase 1 - Recce (11 th to 12 th April) . Carried out by 5th panzer Regt against front held by 20th Aus Inf Bde.

(b) Phase2 Attk on Southern Front (13 th to 14 th April) 5th Panzer Regt headed by 8th

MG Bn made br H on ni 13th/14th and by dawn it split into two colns, one heading for Tobruk & others west. Both colns met by arty & tk fire. 5th Lt Div dug thereafter. (c) Phase III Attk From west (16 th to 17 April) Attk was mounted on 16th by Ariete with one regt of Trento Div under comd. Did not suceed.

(d) Failure to peretrate Defs comprising of anti tk Ditches and fortresses mixed with fire power. German’s first failure in Africa.

6. Danger of offn by 8 th army from open flk along Halfaya pass, Sollum, Bardia, Sidi Barrani and Egyptain frontier.

(a) Screen held by 8th Army along open flk.(b) 15th panzer to secureEastern flk while Tobruk was attacked.(c) Halfya pass secured on 27 Apr by Germans.

7. Subsequent ops

(a) German tps adopted temp defensive posn.(b) Addl Italian units moved to Tobruk line to relieve German units for offn.(c) CA by British & penetration of Italian posn. 15 Panzer rushed to plug breach.

38

(d) Attk by 15 Panzer and 5 Lt Div

(i) Plg for attk from unexpected SW Dirn passing though Brescia Div on 30 th April/1 May.

(ii) Demonstration to be launched on southern front thereby giving impression in Tobruk of likely attk from east.

(iii) 5 Lt Div to attk South & SW front of Rasel Madavvr & continue eastwards towards fort pilastrino.

(iv) 15 Panzer to launch attks on left flk on strong pts north or Rasel Madavvr to cut ridge towards Acroma.

(v) Prog of Ops. Attk fell upon Australian Defenders of 26 Bde. Breach of about 2 miles held but Hvy cas & failure of attk German tps rushed by Air most affected as no food to water was avlb.

8. Causes of German failure Prime cause for German failure on Tobruk was piece mealing of forces, poor assessment of Garrison’s def str and over confidence.

(a) Lack of Inf Units Germans had lack of enough Inf Units to share load of 8 th MG Bn. Hindered by losses before 14 April attk, it did not have enough Inf to secure flks of penetration as well as Sp Panzer in attk.

(b) Unable to muster Sufficient forces at pt of penetration. Germans piecemealed their forces in orders to surround Aus Garrison.

(c) Inadequate Int.

(i) Used aerial & grnd recce & probing attks in an attempt to determine Str & loc of defs but had no accurate maps.

(ii) No info about loc of anti tk Ditch.

(iii) Believed Britishers were preparing to evac by sea & were completely demoralized

(iv) Conducted no of probes that revealed to Aus intended loc of German Attks.

(d) Comd to cont. Higher apts i.e. Rommel changed locs too frequently at times was out of radio comn leading to comd to cont problems.

(e) Sr Ldr ship. Rommel was constantly at odds with his higher comd & Italian & his imdt subordinate cdrs. He wanted Sp for all out offn while his superiors wanted to conduct strat def ops. Streich, 5 Lt Div Cdr also had altercation with Rommel.

(f) Failure to allocate enough foces to sp main attk with inf & mob res

(g) Lgs sp .

(i) Aus had sufficient sups due to Naval ops.

(ii) German had serious sup problem as Benghazi & Tripoli were 300 to 1000 miles away.

(iii) Reqmt of German was 60,000 tons of sups per month. Though Benghazi was capb of handing 50,000 tons, it was reduced to 15,000 by RAF interdiction and shortage of costal shipping.

(iv) Lack of trucks to mov sups.

(h) loss of surprise. German could not avoid Aus Obn & detection.

(j) German plan lacked simplicity. It called for ni attk against fortified posn w/o Int & recce.

39

(k) Ratio of offn force to defender in term of ability to penetrate with frontal assault remained low. It would have been better to either by pass Tobruk or its investment.

9. Causes of Australian Success

(a) Expert Application of combined arm effort.

(b) Aggressive, deep, continuous plg to keep En off Balance.

(c) Aerial, Mobile & foot recce.

(d) Air Interdiction to prevent conc of En forces outside Arty range.

(e) Strong sys of def in depth with mut sp posns reinforced by mines & obsts.

(f) Massing of combat powers by Morsehead at critical time by estb def in depth. Included mob res placed in posn to mvre on short notice to relieve pressure.

(g) German were surprised when their tks were ambushed by 25 pounders & when Aus Inf allowed tks to pass through & engage dismounted tps that followed. (h) Launching CA which were rehearsed.

Q. Discuss operation Brevity ?Ans .

40

1. (a) Gen. Ltd offn conducted in mid may 1941 (15th May)(b) Conceived by C-in –C of British middle East Comd, Gen Archibald Wavell.

2. Aim. To deliver rapid blow against weak axis front line forces in Sollum- Capizzo – Bardia.

3. Early gains lost due to local CA. Although the op got off to a promising Start, throwing Axis high Comd into confusin , most of its Early gains lost to local CAs, and with German rfts being rushed to front the op was called after one day.

4. Objs of Op Brevity

(a) Acquisition of territory for launching further planned offn toward Tobruk.(b) Recupture Halfaya pass.(c) To adv toTobruk as far as supplies would allow & without risking the force committed to op.

5. Plan of adv/tasks.

(a) 7 th Armd Gp .Move along route Bir EL Khireigat.

(b) 22 nd Gds Bde Gp Centre route To clear Halfaya pass, capture Capuzzo & Exploit North west.

(c) 22 nd Rile Bde (Contal Gp) . Prevent German Tps from moving out of Sollum & then capture Halfaya Pass,Sollum barracks and vill.

6. Conduct.

(a) 15 th may

(i) 7th Armd Bde Gp drove LT covering forces before it and reached vicinity of sidi Azeiz.

(ii) On central route Gds overan posn on top of Halfaya pass, Captured Bir wair, Musaid and Capuzzo. Herff and CA to retook capinzo.

(iii) Coast Gp captured posn below Halfaya pass.

(b) 16 th May . Panzer Bn reached Sidi Azeiz on 16th and found battle fd empty as Gott withdrew Gds Bde because it was in openground and unable to defend itself if att by tks. Herff halted on Gen line Sidi Omar – Sidi Suleiman - SolIum.

7. End state

(a) The op was a failure except that British Gained Halfaya pass, which they lost soon on 27th May.

(b) German recapture of Hafaya pass was valuable gain as t seriously hampered larger British offn that was launched in Mid June.

(c) Rommel made strenous effort to devp frontier defs, laid anti tk traps by digging in 88mm guns.

Q.. What was op Tiger?Ans..

1. Large rft of tks rushed to Egypt by British by Mediterranean route.

2. Total 295 Tks embarked in five fast ‘motor tpt Ships’.

3. 1 x motor tpt ship carrying 57 tks were sunk by mine in straits between malta and Tunis.

4. Rest cvy arrived safely on May 12, with 135 matildas, 82 cruisers & 21 lt tks.

5. This rft hastened op “Battle axe”.

41

Q. Comment upon op Battle axe, its failure of inept handling of Armr?Ans .

1. Gen.

(a) Large Rft of 135 matildas, 82 cruisers & 21 Lt tks by tiger Cvy hasted op “Battle Axe”.

(b) Pressure on wavell from Churchili to undertake imdt offn.

(c) Wavell postponed the to op 15 June 1941 in spite of Churchill’s urging of an Immediate offn. Main reason for delay :-

(i) Delay in unloading tks.

(ii) Desert modification of tks - fitting sand filters.

(iii) Trg of tk crews.

2. Aim.

(a) Aim was originally defined as (Initial Aim) “To destroy Rommel’s Forces & gain

decisive victory in North Africa.”

(b) Wavell on 25th May warned cabinet that offn might not achieve its full aims.

(c) Objective as defined in op Instrs (Aim Modified). To drive En west of Tobruk.

(i) Secure area Bardia - Sollum-Capuzzo – Sidi Azeiz.

(ii) Defeat forces in area Tobruk and then Exploit to Derna &Mechili.

(iii) Role of Toburk Garrison to be decided during each stg.

3. German Dispositions.

(a) 15th Panzer Div which had 8th panzer Regt (100 tks) took over frontier on 8th Jun.

(b) 3 x Italian Bns were manning sollum - musaid – cupuzzo. Rest of weak Trento Div was at Bardia.(c) 5th Lt Div in area South of Toburk was kept in res.

(d) Frontier Locs prep for all rd def & well concealed though not adequately stocked.

4. British western Desert Force.

(a) Cdr – Gen Beres Ford pierce.

(b) 7 th Armd Div . (O’Moore creagh)

(i) 7th Armd Bde – 2 x Regt ( cruiser 100 tks).(ii) Sp gp.(iii) 4th Armd Bde – 1 tks.

(c) 4th Indian Div (Messervy).

(i) 11 Indian Bde. (ii) 22 Gds Bde.

5. Attk Plan.

(a) 4th Indian Div with 4th Armd Bde to attack (South) Halfaya -sollum - Capuzzo while 7 th

Armd Div covered Desert flank .

(b) Once frontier Defs were captured both armd Bdes to Exploit deeper to link up with toburk.

(c) 7th Armd Div in Conjunction with Toburk garrison to thrust west wards and Areas of Derna & Mechili were to be captured.

6. Loc of Desert force HQ. At Sidi Barrini 100 Km behind.

42

7. Tasks of RAF.

(a) Interfere with German build up until 12 june, thereafter concentrate against movement between toburk & frontier upto 15th Jun.

(b) Fighters to maintain def Ptls over tps & Bombers were tasked to attk German Colns & Vehs on call.

8. Task of Royal Navy. To be prepared to open sollum Harbour & continue to supply toburk.

9. Conduct

(a) 15 th June 1941 .

(i) 11th Indian Inf Bde Gp failed to capture Halfaya Area. Lost 11 out of its 12 1 tks to 88 mm Guns and 4 of its six tks to minefd.

(ii) 4th Armd Bde & 22 Gds Bde captured pt 206 and capuzzo in which Bn Ex 8th

Panzer Regt participated (iii) 77th Armd Bde and Jaxo coln checked by 88mm Guns on Hafid ridge and Panzer Bn at gambut. Only 48 cruisers fit to fight.

43

(b) 16 th June 41.

(i) 4 xx Indian Div Planned to attk Halfaya and Exploit towards Bardia. Rommel Planned t attk Capuzzo with 8th Panzer Regt & out flk 7th Armd Bde .(ii) 11th Indian Inf Bde Attk Halfaya thrice but failed.(iii) Musaid & Sollum captured Bn by Ex Gds in morning. Consolidation by Bal Bde at Capuzzo.

(iv) 8th Panzer clashed with 4th Armd Bde, Messervy could not release it to join 7th

Armd Bde.(v) 5th Panzer Regt tried to out flank 7th Armd Bde and came in contact with sp gp at Sidi Omar.

(c) 17 th Jun 41.

(i) Rommel Shifted complete wt of armr to south i.e. on British left flank.

(ii) 4th Armd Bde Drawn into fight by 8 Panzer Regt. By 0930h only 17 Lt I tks left.

(iii) At 0800h 5 Panzer Regt reached Sidi Suleiman threatening to cut off 22 Gd Bde and 11 Indian inf Bde Gp opp Halfaya.

(iv) Messervey ordred Gps Bde to withdraw to rear.

(v) Wavell Permts divs to withdraw to SIdi Barrami & refit.

10. Caused of British Failure.

(a) Op conceived and Launched under political pressure. Wavell under tremendous pressure from Churchill to launch offn against Rommel.

(b) Lack of trg

(i) Tks were new to so were crews who were not well trained to handle tks. (ii) Units did not train as units nor did fmns.(iii) Tks were to attk Halfaya with Inf. These two did not train together either.

(c) Inept Handling of Armr

(i) Tks were not used concentrated but split in sqns and used in penny packets.(ii) Emp in piece meal and direct assaults on fortified posns.(iii) Order to tks that after attk, they were to rally in front of Inf & serve as covering chain of mobile pill boxes. Suffered due lack of Inf Prot.

(d) Imcompatability of cruisers & ‘I’ Tks.

(i) Cruisers & I tks had vastly varying speeds though they were in different Bdes, they were to cooperate with one another to fight German tks.

(ii) Tactics for fighting together did not work out and lacked comns for this purpose.

(e) Inferior British Tks.

(i) 1 Tks were too slow & Vulnerable to German Anti tk guns& cruisers tks liable to frequent break downs.(ii) For curbing menace of 88 mm, British armr was handicacapped by lack of duel purpose tk gun which could fire both HE and APS.

44

(f) Loc of western Desert force HQs. It was located at Sidi Barrani almost 100kms behind front. Coordination of activities of two Divs was a problem.

(g) Superior German Doctrine & Tac.

(i) German had excellent org, commons & Uniformity in trg.(ii) Germans had worked out that primary role of their tks were to destroy soft vehs & Deal with tps. It was task of Anti tk guns to destroy British tks.(iii) Employment of 88mm, anti AC gun in anti tk role. Tactics was to draw British tks on to the guns to then to CA them with tks.(iv) German Doctrine of permanent integration of tk, guns & inf as combat teams.(v) Rommel’s initial decision to fight defensively untill British had blunted their offn edge and then from his decision on second ni to switch his wt suddenly from one flk to other. (def – offn Appch)

(h) Lack of third Regt in British Armd Bdes.

(j) Efficient Recovery org Germans. German were always able to recover their disabled tks from battle fd while allies were not.

(k) Lack of Tpt in 7 th Armd Div . 7th Armd Div could not take larger detour because it lacked tpt. It became necessary to capture Halfaya & Sollum so that full use could be made of coast rd.

(l) Poor General Ship.

(i) Wavell allowed himself to rush into ops.(ii) Beresford commanded battle from HQ 5 hrs driving distin rear.(iii) 1 tks were to perform two different roles when it came to decide to use than concentrated, he left decision to subordinates who lacked comns to consuit each other. (iv) Messervy took dicision to withdraw the gds Bde on his own w/o reference to overall cdr.

(m) Lack of close Air sp. Fighter ptls could not maintain continuous umbrella over tps.

(n) Faulty Plg at higher level. Higher level plg was based on poor/ scanty info rather than tank tac. Attk were launched on Haffid ridge anticipating withdrawing En.

11. Lessons learnt.

(a) Surprise. Surprise was not achived Rommel anticipated British attk & allerted his fmn.

(b) Conc of force. Allies were unable to concentrate force at weakest pt of En Defs.

(c) Static Defs. Use of static Defs unsuaitable in desert warfare as they could easily be out flanked.

(d) Clear and Concise aim. Clear & concise aim which must be understood by down the chain of comd was absent before embark on op.

(e) Pol Interference. Mil Cdrs are best left to carry out their mil ops w/o pol interference, Churchill did not allowd this.

(f) Flexibility In mob warfare, force must be organized with reqd grouping to respond to any unforeseen situation. Forces & plans must also be flexible.

45

(g) Principle of Economy. Advantage gained by Rommel by applying the principle of Economy of forces & deploying just enough force for secondary tasks while concentrating his force on primary objs.

(j) Cooperation . Excellent corporation betn combat tps, sp arms & close Air Sp by AXIS force.

(l) Army Air Corp. Need to integrate efforts of grnd to AFs in battle.

46

47

Q.Ans.1. Gen.

(a) Churchill replaced wavell by Gen Auchinleck.(b) Desert force reorganized as 8th Army.(c) Cunningham appt Army cdr.(d) Despite Churchill’s dirns to launch an early offn, Auchinleck felt it appropriate to wait till the reorg & trg of Army was complete.

2. British Build up.

(a) Re equipped and heavily reinforced.(b) Beside 3 x motorized Inf Div, further 10 Armd regt were brought up.(c) Auchinleck reorganized armd forces as under :-

(i) 7 Armd Bde with various types of British cruiser tks.(ii) 4 Armd Bde with stuart (M3 lt tks).(iii) 22 Armd Bde with latest cruiser tks. (v) All avbl ‘I’ tks to form part of Army tk Bde.

3. Order of Battle & Dply of Opposing Forces.(As Marked)

(a) Axis Troops. Bastico was commanding North Africa Comd he had under him:-

(i) Armd Gp Africa (Rommel)

(aa) German Africa Corps Crewell with 15 and 21 Panzer Div, 90 Lt and Italian Savana Div.

(ab) XXI Italian (Navarrini) with Trento, Bolonga, Brrescia and Pavia Divs.

(ii) Italian Mobile (XX) corps Ariete (armd) and Trieste (motorized) Divs.

(iii) On 23 Nov, Italian xx Corps too was placed under Rommel’s comd on his request though he continued to remain under comd Bastico.

(b) Axis Dispositions.

(i) 15 Panzer, 90 lt and two Italian Divs for main attk 15 Panzer was located East of Toburk.

(ii) XX Italian Corps and 21 Panzer Div were dply South of Tobruk to form mobile def and deal with En attks from Southern flk or front. Ariete was located at Birel Gobi, 21 Panzer East of Gambut and Trieste around Bir Hachiem res or for CA.

(iii) Brescia, Trento, Pavia Divs investing Toburk.

(c) British forces. The 8th Army had:-

(i) XII corps (Lt Gen Godwin Austin). 4 Indian Div, 2NZ and 1 Army tk Bde (Half Matilda and Half Valentine)

(ii) XXX corps (Lt Gen W Norrie) 7 Armd Div ( 7 and 22 Armd Bde and One SP Gp), 1 SA Div ( 2 Bde Only) 4 Amrd Bde and 201 Gds Bde.

(iii) Toburk Garrison. (Lt Gen R Scobie) 70 Div, One Polish Regt and 32 Army tk Bde.

48

(iv) Oasis Force. 29 Indian Inf Bde Gp and 6 South Africa Armd Car Regt.

(v) Army Res. 2 SA Div.

4. AF.

(a) Force level.

(i) 16 Sqn of fighters.(ii) 8 Sqns of Med bomber.(iii) 5 Sqns for Tactical, Strategical & Svy recce.

(b) AOC moved his HQ Near that of Army Cdr’s to Ensure quick SP for rt tgt without jeopardizing allotment of ac for estb air superiority.

(c) Task

(i) Recce.(ii) Interfere force with German Sup sys.(iii) Gain Air Superiority.

5. Navy. Tasks of Royal Navy is as follows:-

(a) To continue attacking Axis Marchant Ships playing in the mediterrian.(b) Give fire sp.(c) Sup needs of army & AF.

6. Plan Aim. The Aim of the offn was two folded:-

(a) To Trap en forces to destroy them.(b) To occupy Tripolitania and clear en out of Africa.

7. Tasks.

(a) XXX Corps. To adv north west, seek and destroy En armr & prot left flk of XIII Corps with 4 Armd Bde. The corps was to initially mov to Gabr salech saleh where depending on En reaction, cunningham was to decide whether to move to Bardia or Sidi Rezegh. It was ultimately to link up with Toburk Garrison.

(i) 7th Armd Div (GOTT) (7th & 22nd Armd Bdes) and 4th Armd bde gp to adv NW, find & destroy axis armr and prot left flk of 13th corps.

(ii) 1st SA Div (1st & 5th bde) to prot comns of 7th Armd Div on West & SW; later to capture Sidi Rezeg ridge.

(iii) 201 Gds Bde to prot Comn Sup dumps & landing grounds in 30th corps Area.

(b) XIII corps. To pin down and cut off En tps on Egyptian frontier and later, advace towards West on orders.

(i) 4 th Indian Div . Invest Halfaya.

(ii) 1 st NZ Div . To ascend to the line of via Balbia and then to mov along that high way towards Toburk.

(iii) 1 st Army tk Bde . Act as res.

49

(iv) Toburk garrison. To adv and link up when ordered.

(v) 29 th Indian Bde (Oasis Force) . To secure Jarabub and seize Jalo. Drive behind Panzer Sp Africa and to threaten its rear and its lines of comn.

8. Flawed plg. The plan had fwg flaues:-

(a) Conceptual mistake in respect of objs & Aim.

(i) Destr of En forces was made imdt obj .

(aa) Anything so fluid as the armd force is not itself suited to be an obj

(ab) The aim of destroying En force is more likely to be achieved in an Indirect way – By drawing it into spas modic & unbalance effort to cover or retrieve some pt on which its own security depends.

(ii) Strat and Tac Mismatch Strategically, British Plan was well fitted to create a barrier across en’s line of sups. Tactically, it become far too much of direct attempt to smash en Gun lined traps.

(b) Dispersion of Armr.

(i) Emp of 30 th Corps. Three armd Bde of 30th corps, the initial striking force, came to be committed to action in a disposed and disjointed way. The advantage gained by strategically out flanking mvre which had placed En in very awakward and dangerous sit was forfeited in Tac execution.

(ii) Dispersion of Armr during En CA. British armr repeatedly caught in dispersed state when En CA.

(iii) Inf’s Demand for Tk prot Dispersion of British armr was partly due to inf’s demand for constant tk prot against Panzer thrust.

(iv) Inept Handling of 1 st Army tk Bde . 1st Army tk Bde was allocated to 13th

corps thereby removing it from imp armr tasks during critical pd of first six days. This was because matildas & valentines were considered as inf tks.

(c) Tactusss op Mvre.

(i) Mvre proved to be a frontal attk an a longer Axis from flk of toburk rather than Envp.(ii) Toburk could have been emp as anvil with hammer of 30 corps smashing axis forces.

(d) Lack of coord betn two corps offns. In battle of Sidi Rezegh 22 armd Bde wheeled to assist 4 Armd Bde but 13 corps NZ Div & Army tk Bde inclose proximity remained inactive & were not used.

9. German Disposition

(a) Bal Disposition Well disposed to face British offn as main assault on Toburk was planned from south east. Africa Div & 15 panzer Div were conc in this area their by enabling them to meet unexpected adv.

50

(b) Eff use of Mob force in Def. Mobile force on East of these forces to hold defs as Toburk was being tackled. Screen to shield Toburk attack, comprised of 21 Panzer on Trigh capuzzo, Ariete at Bir EL Gobi and Trieste near Bir Harcheim.

10. Conduct.

(a) Achivement of Tac Surprise by British. British offn force conc under cover of stormy wx & rain preventing recce by Luftwaffe thus achieved tac surprise.

(b) Out Flanking Attk by 30 Corps (First Sidi Rezegh).

(i) 22 Armd Bde. Suffered Hvy cas against Ariete in Bir EL Gobi .

(ii) 7 Armd Bde. Succeeded in advancing & capturing Sidi Rezegh Air Fd but did not exploit further.

(iii) 4 Armd Bde. Tasked to adv North and cover the flk, faced with hvy resistance near Gabr Saleh.

(iv) Tactical CG of Battle thus became Sidi Rezegh.

(v) Germans reinforced Ridge on Sidi Rezegh Escarpment ridge on Sidi Rezegh escarpment and estb strong def posn on westflk.

(vi) Recce in Force by battle Sp Stephan of 5 Panzer Regt.

(aa) Tks of 4 Armd Bde Destroyed .

(ab) 15 Panzer Div followed 5 Panzer Regt which lead to heavy losses to British.

(ac) 22 Armd Bde wheeled into assist 4 armd Bde but 13 corps NZ div & 1 Army Tk Bde remined inactive.

(vii) Mov of 30 Corps to relive Tobruk- Based on Exaggerated rpts of German losses.

(aa) 7th Armd Bde struck North ward to relieve Tobruk on 21 Nov.

(ab) Cruwell ordered by Rommel to attk British wedge in Sidi Rezegh by 2 panzer Divs.

(ac) 15 & 21 Panzer Div Conc against 7 Armd Bde from where Panzers shifted SW towards Sidi Rezegh. Meeting Engagement & great loss to British.

(ix) Break out from Tobruk.

(i) 15 & 21 Panzer Div repeatedly struck 7 Armd Bde till it was reinforced by 22 Armd Bde which restored sit to an Extent.

(ii) Break out from Tobruk initially succeded in breaking German line for 4 miles but could not Exploit to El DUPA.

(iii) Tobruk attk launched on too Narrow salient untill sit in South un fav for British.

(iv) See -----------

51

(x) Rommel South Westerily Strike on 23 Nov.

(aa) SW Strike by Panzer of Africa Corps & XX Italian corps to drive pincer from BIR EL Gobi.

(ab) Cruwell halted the force for conc of Armr waiting for Ariete Div to join which provided British an opportunity to slip of two Pincers.

11. Comment on Battle.

(a) Decision pt in Battle – Sidi Rezegh escarpment.

(b) Recogination of imp of SIdi Rezegh by Rommel thus reinforcing it.

(c) Frontal attk by British led to Dissemination of Armr. Out flanking mov would have turned German flank.

(d) Ltd capb of Germans to reinforce Rommel had option of Tactical pause to consolidate gains & plan ops either towards Tobruk or Egyptian frontier after reorg his force.

12. Rommel’s Start Counter Thrust.

(a) Aim.

(i) Long rg penetration from Sidi Rezegh to Sidi Omar to Halfaya to raise the seige at latter.

(ii) To Trap British Forces as they retreated From Rezegh.

(iii) Relive pressure from 13 Corps on German frontier garrison by sharp blow on British rear.Restore sit on Sollun front & adv against rearward comn of British in area of Sidi Omar Forcing them to give up offn.

(b) Basis of Plan.

(i) Rommel belived that 30 Corps had been completely mauled.

(ii) Failed to realize Cruwell’s plan to allow conc of axis for arr of ariete had allowed portion of British armr to slip away.

(iii) Based on surprise, speed and depth of thrust to produce confusion and collapse. Aim above all at mind of opposing Army Cdr.

Initial Aim. To relieve his pressuer of his frontier garrisons by sharp blow at besieging forces of 13th Corps.

Final Aim. Complete destr of remanantas of En & cut this lines of withdrawal to Egypt.

To Pursue the en with his Armd Divs, to restore sit on sollum front and at same time adv against rear ward comn of British in area of Sidi omar.

To place himself with Dak across sup routes of British 8th army & capture their sup dumps.

1. Delay of 15 Panzer div & Inertia of Italian Armd forces in backing up thrust.2. lack of info.3. Wireless Break downs.4. Misinterpreted orders.5. British threat at Sidi Rezegh & Tobruk.6. Auchinleck determination to continue the battle.7. Replacing 8th Army Cdr, who was obliged to continue battle.

52

(c) Force level.

(aa) 21st Panzer Div.

(ab) 15th Panzer.

(ac) Ariete Div.

(ad) Trieste Div.

(d) Conduct

(i) 24 th Nov . Led Africa & Gambera Corps on its South East ward drive flk prot provided by GP Bottcher.

(ii) Ltd flk prot, no cover or left and rt wings.

(iii) Weak British units brushed (7th armd) aside and (4th to 22nd ) Stronger forces avoided.

(iv) Planned 15 Panzer to secure Sidi omar there by clearing Locs for 21 Panzer & thus in a jt thrust Africa and gambara corps were to wheel northwards and close trap.

(v) Delay in arr of 15 Panzer & lack of fuel for 21 Panzer, North ward swing did not fructify. Ariete also could not follow up even through it had larger tk str than DAK. Timidity of Cdr faced with resistance by SA bde and 4 th armd Bde resulted in Ariete pulling back North.

(vi) 26 th Nov . Rommel sought to clear sollum front by 15 and 21 Panzer Div but lack of radio comns fast deteriorating sit on Tobruk resulted in recall iof Panzer rearwards.

(vii) Relief of Tobruk by 25 Nov by NZ Bde by moving to EL Duba and Launching repeated attks and making innovative use of armr 13xxx HQ moved inside Tobruk.

(viii) Forced Rommel to move back.

13. Causes of failure.

(a) Pause by Cruwell. Failed to relise cruwell’s pause for arr of Ariete to allow conc of axis had allowed portion of British armr to slip away.

(b) Info of En Poor info of En.

(c) Auchinleck Decision to continue offn . Strat counter stroke based on psy disloc could not be achieved once Auchinleck decided to continue with offn.

(d) Lacked conc Punch. 21 Panzer Div, 15 Panzer and Ariete Div were set apart.

53

(e) Neglected Tobruk Front. Ops by 13 Corps resulted in relief of garrison. Rommel behaved more like a tactical cdr, one concentrating on immediate battles at hand.

(f) Missing of British Fd Maint Centres. Two British Fd maint centres missed due to lack of info.

(g) Lgs Continous rft of British both in terms of men & machine, where as Germans had long and arderous drive from rear depots. lack of FOL & Amn.

(h) Problems of Comn . German wireless Sets already defective before offn had begun, had virtualy ceased to fn. Comns betn two panzer Divs lost & from corps HQ also there was silence.

14. Second Sidi Rezegh.

Out Come Africa corps had knocked out NZ Div & cut corridor linking Tobruk garrison with rest of 8th Army. It was astonishing achievement for force that had been out numbered nearly 6 to 1 infighting tks at outset & was still numbered 4 to 1when ended. Q . Why did Rommel retreat despite partial success at Sidi Rezegh in the second round?Ans.

54

1. Loss in Str of Africa Corps. Rommel was wary of risking the slight remaining str of Africa corps.

2. Rpts of strong out flanking attk mean Bir EL Gubi with 4 th Indian & 7 th Armd div . Fear of cut of line of sups & retreat.

3 Lack of rft, sups

4. Awareness of Romell about true weakness of his comd if Germans were to stand and fight then its str would be reduced to a pt where Tripolitania could no longer be defended.

BATTLE OF GAZALA

Q . What was op Acrobat?Ans .

1. Op Acrobat. Op planned by British to throw Rommel out of Agedabia and drive on to Tripoli after his retreat in op crusader.

2. Time of launch planned. Mid Feb 1942.

55

3. Prep by British

(a) Adm Preps.(b) Building of forces & sups in fwd Areas.(c) 1stArmd div relived 7th Armd Div which went to Egypt for rest and recoup.(d) Front held by 1st Armd Div SP Gp & Gds Bde.

4. British felt that Rommel would not be able to take offn again in near future.

Q. Commint upon plg, prep of German Counter Offn in Jan 1942?Ans . Gen

1. British Planned to launch Op Acrobat. Aimed to Exploit weaking of German in Cyrenacia and drive to Tripoli.

2. Prep Induction of 1 ArmD Div- Building of sups.

3. British did not anticipate an early German Counter offn.

4. Political Pressures to launch offn.

(a) Germans. Loss of Cyrenacia to political leadership particularly Mussolini was unacceptable.

(b) British. Auchinleck under pressure to launch offn from British war office.

5. Seizure of initiative by Rommel. British Cdr wanted more time for prep to thus offn could not materialize.

6. Genesis off summer offn. OKW order issued on 30 June 1941. Laid out grand strat in which southern pincer would drive through Egypt to link up with two Northern arms, one of which adv from Bulgaria through Turkey & other from Caucasus through Iran.

7. Prep

(a) Rft. In addn to indl tks whole coys of freshmen and machines came in, still acute shortage of Inf.

(b) Trg.

(i) Indl trg gave place to coy schemes incorporating Inf tk coop specially by day & ni.(ii) Prep and emphasis on attacking prep posns & permt fortifications. (iii) All-arms coop. Storm tp, combat engr & tks trained together.(iv) Large Scale Div Mvre.

(c) Domination of no man’s land.

(i) Extensive ptlg activity by 21 Panzer Div.(ii) Adv into no man’s land.(iii) Thickening of Battle line to provide max str should 8th Army Attk.

(d) Forming jumping off pt for Panzer.

(e) Secret recce by offrs. To familiarize with trn.

(f) Building of fuel Depots fwd.

(i) Slow build so as not to arouse suspicion.(ii) Number of shells fired was reduced in order to allow stock to be gathered.

(g) TC pt estb and sec ech details sent back.

(h) Equipping of fighting tps. All wpns, incl in trg ests & dets, handed to aslt tps.

56

7. Opposing Forces.

(a) Germans

(i) Africa Korps. 15th & 21st Panzer Divs & 90th Lt Div.(ii) 10 corps – Bologna & Brescia Div.(iii) 20 corps - Ariete Armd & Trieste Motorized Divs.(iv) 21 corps - Pavia, Trento, Sabratha Divs.

(b) British Sup Problems could not push fwd to El Agheila.

(i) 2nd armd Bde - Betn Agedabia to EL Agheila.(ii) 7th Inf bde – South of Benghazi .(iii) Remainder 4th Inf Div – Barce.

ROMMEL’S COUNTERSTROKE JAN 19428. Conduct

(a) Weakness Obscured by Westphal Sudden Decision prompted by west phal, who observed weakness of British adv forces during low fly in recce.

(b) Intentions kept secret Italian/German Supreme comd kept in dark.

(c) Adv in 3 colns.

(i) Gp Marcks. 21 PZ Div & 90 Lt under oberst Marcks North of Via Balbia.

(ii) Gambana’s Italian XX mobile corps. In the centre.

(iii) DAK. 20 miles South of Via Balbia rest of DAK under Cruwell.

(d) Deception/Ruse for capture of Benghazi. Rommel Decided that before trying to drive on Eastward he must Eliminate danger to his rear in and around BenghaziTurned main colns towards Benghazi & feint towards Mechili .

(e) British Reaction to the ruse.

(i) Convinced main effort was toward Mechili.

57

(ii) 4th Indian Div – spread out guarding the various entries to Jebel & had only one Bde gp in Benghazi.

(iii) 1st Armd Div moved towards Mechili

(iv) 3 x reinforcing Bde gps also moved.

(f) Benghanzi Abandoned by British - Stores for intended offn lost.

(g) Withdrawal of British to Ghazala line.

(i) Bold adv and flanking moves off rd, coupled with inherent threat of wider intercipting thrust from Desert.

(ii) Shock action caused by Rommel’s unexpected Adv.

(iii) British retreated from successive lines on which stand had been intended.

(h) Africa corps adv only till Mechili and remained their for two months before moving close to Gazalaling line. Reasons as under:-

(i) Sup difficulties.(ii) Italians unwilling to go beyond Agedabia.

9. Lessons learnt / comments

(a) Audacious mov by Rommel.

(i) Secured def of Cyrenaica .(ii) Prevented Break through by British to Tripoli.

(b) Psy Pressure on British tps & Cdrs. Myth of Rommel’s tac ingenunity.

(c) Quick grasp of change in sit at op level.

(d) Exploitation of shorter LOCs & Lgs.

(e) Tactical adortiness of feintsand mobility to advantage.

(f) Air fds remained key decision pts. Agedabia to Benghazi quickly converted for basing Stukas by Germans.

(g) Enasuring Bal. Rommel recognized folly of advancing beyond Gazala through well prepared def net wk.

Q. What was code Signal mercury?Ans.

1. Code Sig mercury was code to abandon Beghazi & fall to Derna Mechi line .2. The a/m code was to be activated when Germans captured Msus.3. Sign was issued on 25th Jan.

Q. What was Jock coln?Ans.

1. Jock coln derived its name and prac from Brig ‘Jock’ Cambell.2. Jock Cambell - Cdr of Sp Gp of 7th Armd Div.3. Made eff use of small mixed colns of all arms as frontier screen after ‘Battle axe’, and during’-‘Crusader’.

4. Tasks. Raiding & probing.

5. Drawbacks.

(a) Increased risk.

58

(b) Lack of coord in aim & action in contrast to the German BGs which, on whole arranged to combine op dispersion with convergence of effect.

Q . Comment plg Prep, build up and op art in Battle of Gazala?Ans.

Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Lull for four months after 8th Army’s withdrawal to Gazala line.(b) Building up its str for fresh offn effort by each side.(c) Fortifying of British posn & Covering it with minefds.

2. 8 th Army Def posn . British boxes or indep strongholds. It was continuous ‘mine marsh’ extending from Gazala to Bir Hacheim with fwg draw backs :-

(a) Plg of Def Affected by Political Pressure

59

(i) Plg of def affected. Due to urging of war caninet at home to launch the offn first.by ops idea of launching first offn at Earliest possible time which the war cabinet at home were urging.

(ii) Ration str of British Army had gone up to 6,30,000 men with more rft constantly arriving. It was unjustified that such a large army should stand idle for such a long pd at enormous Expanse.

(iii) It was also to urge Russia to fight on as Russians were fighting desperately along their whole vast front.

(iv) It was presumed that Rommel’s str might grow quicker than British.

(v) Air attk and Worsening Sup Sit in Malta.

(aa) German renewal air attk on Malta and consequent breakdown of British means of obstructing German and Italian Cvys in Tripoli also convinced Political leadership that costly interludes were unnecessarily.

(ab) Malta it self was threatened with starvation unless steadily monthly flow of sups could be maintained.

(b) Disposition Better Suited to from a springboard for an offn than to meet an attk.

(c) Lacked sufficient depth.

(d) Vulnerable to out flanking mvre.

(e) Lack of Mutual sp. Except in coastal Sect, strong pts too disconnected for eff fire sp of each other.

(f) Problem of mgt of large gaps. Def posns stretched fifty miles inland with increasing gaps. Left flk posn at Bir Hachiem held by 1st Free French Bde was 16 miles distant from 150th Inf Bde’s Posn near Sidi Muftah.

(g) Bulk of army in fwd Area with Armr too close to front.

(i) Armr liable to involved in serious fighting before main German plan unfolded.(ii) Army was to fight either a Inf Battle or tk Battle once separated from other.

(h) Flawed Division of AOR betn 13 th & 30 th Corps . Ritchy simply draw an east west line across the map & divided resp betn two corps. Fixed defs should have come under comd of 13th corps and mob forces under Norrie.

(j) Long stretches of Minefds were unguarded particularly in the southern half.

(k) Emp of Mororised Bde 2 x motor Bdes to South were too many for recce & by themselves not strong enough to offer resistance to med Armr.

(l) Lack of Exploitation of flexibility provided by two armd Div.

(i) 4th & 22nd Armd Bde were too close to front line and if Germans came in from south they would successively & not together.

(ii) Ritchie did not implement advice given by Auchinleck that Divs must fight as Divs & armr must be handled by Norrie (corps Cdr) so that he could take adv of flexibility which two fmns would give him.

(m) Lack of mvre

Gen Auchinleck proposed to make another 4 month pause in order to mount a sec set piece Battle. Neither chief of Staff nor Churchill was convinced of the same.

60

(i) Def should have been mobile & offn def.

(ii) Vast accumulation of sups in fwd base at Belhamed and made British cdrs hesitate to mvre their armr in any way that might uncover their base.

(iii) Def sys shaped by desire to impose on attacker a form of warfare more to liking of their own comd than on Mvre in open desert.

(n) Rigid sys of def with open southern flk.

(o) Belif that en could not muster sufficient str for serious attk for about 3 months

3. British Adm Prep Fwd base had been estb at Belhamed betn Tobruk and Sidi Rezegh.

4. British Disposition. As marked.

(a) Gen

(i) Box/defs based on strong pt . 8th army def postion stretched from sea to Bir Hachim having distance of 45 miles.

(ii) Sited on high/ broken grnd & capb of all round def.

(iii) Intended to be mutually sp.

(iv) Each of them had a strong Garrison usually of Bde or equivalent Estb.

(v) Extensive mine fds of considerable depth were laid on western side . In some areas even laid on Eastern/ friendly side of Boxes.

(b) Dply.

(i) 13 corps

(aa) Orbat. 1st & 2nd SA Div, 50th Div, 1st & 32nd Tk Bde with I Tks.

(ab) Tasks To hold Defs in North and South of Gazala.

(ac) Boxes/ Strong Pts.Gazala Box (1st SA Div in North). 50th Div box in South.

(ii) 30 th Corps .

(aa) Orbat. 1st armd div ( 2nd & 22nd Bdes) 7th Armd Div (four Bde), 7th

motorized Bde, 201st Gds Bde Gp, Free French Bde, 3rd Indian Motorised bde & 29th Indian Inf bde. 5th Indian Div at Gambut was directly under 8th Army.

(ab) Tasks 1st Armd Div to lay a side Trigh Capuzzo and cont central sect 7th Armd Div to be positioned south to deal with any threat from dirn of Bir Hachim.

(ac) 1 st fire French Bde .To hold left a box Bir Hachim.(ad) 3 rd Indian Motorized Bde . To Gd left wing SE of Bir Hachim.

(ae) 22 nd GDs Bde . To hold knight’s Bridge.

Q What was options avbl to Germans and what plgs and prep carried out by them to breach Gazala Line?Ans.

1. Various option avbl for attk on Gazala line is as under:-

(a) Option 1. Frontal assault. Draw back as under:-

61

(i) Loss of element of surprise.(ii) Will allow concentration of mass of British armr against the thrust.

(b) Option 2. Exploit open flk at Bir Hachim and by pincer from East & West of Gazala posn & destroy 8th Army in fd. Advantages as under:-

(i) Element of Surprise maintained.

(ii) Successful assault would divide British Army in two and separate inf from its armr.

(iii) British Divs holding Boxes in Gazala posn would not be able to rel men to aid Defs in depth because their whole attention would be needed to defend western mine fds.

(iv) Tobruk Garrison also could not spare forces & reduce its str as the town might fall to a coup de main.

2. Plg

(a) Diversionary attk in Northern Gazala Sect. A force known as Cruwell force comprising of 10th & 21 Italian corps together with non motorized bde of 90 th Lt Div would attk during afternoon of 26th May and its aggressive moves were to hide main thrust and convince British that mass of German tps were on Northern Sect.

(b) Out flanking Mvre.

(i) Africa corps and 20th Italian motorized corps would sweep round & behind southern flank of 8th Army.

(ii) Part of this gp would Strike North wards via Acroma and reach coast thereby cutting off main 8th Army in Gazala sect.

(iii) Pincer Movement. Going in with Cruwell gp from west would then destroy the British and SA Divs.

(iv) Another Part of out flanking gp would strike the British posn along Gazala line from back .

(v) To prot flk of this & northern advance , motorized elements of 90th Lt Div together with recce Bns would drive eastwards towards EI Adm & threaten Tobruk.

3. Deception Measures .

(a) Use of dust raising lorries fitted with ac engines and propellers were intended to suggest apch of large tk force.

(b) Decoy cvys sent out in Dirna of Cruwell gp.

4. Prep

(a) Marking of fwd routes with lamps.(b) Filling of stores depots.(c) 7 day ration of food and water issued to all rks.

(d) Measure to ensure Dist/dirns were maintained.

(i) Cvys to move at Exactly regulated speeds, 8 km/hr in bright moonlight on compass bearings.

(ii) Luftwaffe to drop flares through out ni over French held posn at Bir Hachim.

Q. What was code name Venice?Ans .

1. Axis code for attk on Gazala line.

62

2. Flashed at 1700 hr on 26th May 1942.

Q . What was the advisory issued to Ritchie by Auchinleck? How was armr emp by British?Ans .

1. Auchinleck had brought out fwg options of attk avbl to Rommel in advisory letter to Ritchie :-

(a) Option1 Rommel would try to pass round the southern flk at Bir Hachiem

(b) Option 2 Try to split Defending forces by a central thrust along axis of Trigh Capuzzo.

(c) Likely course of action anticipated option 2.

2. Auchinleck also advised that both armd Div to be positioned astride Tright Capozzo for a concentrated counterstroke.

3. Actual Emp of Arms by British.

(a) 1st armd Div was placed near Trigh Capuzzo. 7th Armd Div (weaker of two) was shifted south wards so that it might give quicker sp to 1st Free French Bde in Bir Hachiem, if en choose to take flk route.

(b) Britishers separation adopted as precautionary compromise turned out badly for leading to disloc, piecemeal destr under pressure of en’s quicker reaction.

(c) The Principal aim of British should have been to bring all avbl armr into action at same time.

Q . What was Sindbad?Ans.

1. It was code name of British recce in force to test en’s reaction.

2. British took initial attk on southern flk of Gazala lin as recce in force only.

Q . Comment on conduct of offn of Gazala line?Ans .

1. Gen

(a) Rommel’s plan was to fix his opponents attn by frontal attk with Italian Divs of XXI corps, while the Africa coprs and XX mobile corps made a wide sweep round the desert flk.

(b) They were then to swing North & push through Acroma to sea, with aim of cutting off British Divs in the Gazala line & destroying British forces assembled behind it.

(c) 90th Lt Div was ordered to push north Eastward into EL Adm Belhemed to cut off British sups and Tobruk garrison.

2. Phase 1.

(a) Frontal attk & deception Frontal attk launched at 2 PM on 26 May in the hope of deceiving British comd, part of Rommel’s armr moved up behind frontal attk before being switched southward to the out flanking force.

(b) Little impact of Italian attk Italian frontal attk had little impact, Where as beginning of south – east ward move was spotted and reported before dark. But the Extent of is was misjudged.

(c) Over running of 3 rd Indian Div and HQ of 7 th Armd Div . Messervy & GSO1 captured, subsequently escaped.

63

(d) Discerning of En’s armr by British higher comd.

(i) Delay in issuing of order to move 4th Armd Bde.(ii) 4th Armd bde caught on mov to battle posns by 21 & 15 Panzer Divs.

(e) Adv of Rommel to Acroma Halted. Rommel’s adv to Acroma was halted North of Knights Bridge due to Hvy resistance .

(f) Ariete Divs adv was slowed down & brought to a stand still by stiff Resistance.

(g) Failure of fresh attempts by Germans of Northward thrust.

(i) Rommel decided to pursue North ward adv on 25 May taking advantage of dispersion of British force by a concentrated push by 15 & 21 Panzer Div.

(ii) Adv could not proceed due to heavy resistance as well delay in launching 15 Panzer which had exhausted all amn.

(iii) Northward adv of 21st Panzer Div not backed by concentrated push as intended by Rommel.

(iv) 15th Panzer Div Stayed on Rigel Ridge near Knights Bridge having almost run out of Amn.

(v) Westward move of 90th LT’s BG was upset by repeated attks both from air & grnd – by 4th Armd Bde.

(h) German loss of Bal not Exploited by British.British had not managed to exploit Rommel’s loss of Bal. The German sit more precarious because of long circuit their Sup Colns had to make around Bir Hachiem.

(j) Pushing in Sup Cvys & restoring of Panzer Mobility by Rommel on Ni 28/29 May.

(k) Change over to def posture by Rommel.

(i) Rommel switched on to defensive posture & estb a def box in knight Bridge area with aim to recover his bal.

(ii) Sup corridor protected by Trieste Div.

(iii) Disposition.

(aa) 21 Panzer – Pt 209.(ab) 15 Panzer – Prot of north flk against 7 Armd Div.(ac) 90 Lt – Def Posn SE of Bir El Hachiem

(iv) Imdt aim. To widen corridor and to stay in advance posn East of British Mine fd establishing a mob def to wear out en and to prevent him from attacking Ariete across Gazala front and resume offn.

(l) Failure of British to Exploit En’s off bal sit.

(i) British seeing Germans off bal with 50 Div to rear & a strong armd force in front dicided to launch concentrated attk. Attk was slow to start and was dislocated by German thrust against 2nd Armr Bde north of knights Bridge. 22nd Armd Bde against Ariete Div became confused captured by sandstorm. 4th Armd Bde was unable to penetrate well built resistance of 90th LT’s BG.

(ii) By Next morning German had completed their with drawl and concentration in def posn - a posn, less than 10 miles wide betn Got – EL- Aslagh & Sidra.

3. Phase 2

64

(a) Elimination of 150 th Bdes def Base .

(i) Adverse sit for Rommel. Strong British force incl Armr (150x and 50xx mob res) in Sidi Muftah. Harassment by Arty fire of narrow passage throng mine fds that Trieste div had made south of it.

65

(ii) British failed to Exploit sit to Exhibited little sense of time factor. Much dscn as to most suitable Dirn to from of CA, but too little sense of time factor undue optimism that Rommel was cornered to would soon be forced to surrender.

(iii) Attk by 2 nd & 22 nd armd bde & 201 st Gds Bde from knights Brigde Box. The Germans anti tk & Arty screen turn all of these with great loss.

(iv) Capture of 150 th Bde by attk by 15 Panzer, 90 Lt and Trieste and Kampfgurppe Hecker sp by large aerial attk by Dive Bomber

(v) 8 th army did nothing to relieve En’s Pressure on 150 th Bde . Ritchie had planned to begin attk on ni 31st, but both corps Cdrs asked 24 hrs respite so that they might also assemble to prepare their forces.

(b) Attk on Bir Hacheim Box.

(i) British comd spent next 2 days in considering whether to renew its attk on Rommel’s Br H posn with greater wt or strike in some other Dirn.

(ii) 90th Lt and Trieste Div ordered to mov south at day light & eliminate Bir Hachiem box held by 1st Free French Bde. Tk attks arranged eastward & Northwards distract British comd’s attn.

(iii) Stuburn resistance by French. Lacked qty of arty Amn required to pulverize net wk of slit trenches & pill boxes. Instead of overcoming posn within 3 days & having two attacking divs became engaged in srruggle that lasted 9 days.

(iv) Hazardous state of Dispersion During the time of attk he was in hazardous state of dispersion & relied largely on opponents slowness to seize chances. Diversionary attks specially Northerly thrust had imp Effect on British Plans.

(c) Auchinleck advised Ritchie not to risk Armr against Rommel’s now Strongly Defended Front.

(i) Instead he advised a counter stroke in northern Sect against Rommel’s Base.

(ii) Ritchie abandoned that intention after conference with corps Cdr. They argved to that it was not practicable to mount an offn in Northern Sect while Rommel’s armr might intercept it by Northward thrust. For they felt British str in armr not yet sufficient to keep Rommel’s armr in check.

(iii) Turning movement in South suggested by Ritchie was also regarded Hazardous by his corps Cdrs.

(d) Battle of Cauldron Ritchie planned to defeat Rommel by doing pincer movement. But it was not true decription, as no threat to En’s rear was possible.

(i) Unsound plg by British

66

(aa) Main thrust purely frontal being delivered from East by 5 th Indian Div with 4th RTR & 22nd Armd Bde.

(ab) German benifited by several Day’s grace in which they fortified the posn.

(ac) Offn delivered & pressed in piecemeal and was complicated in org & was over optimistic in out look.

(ii) The Plan.

(aa) Phase1 Aslagh ridge to be captured in ni attk westward by 10th

Indian Inf Bde Sp by 4 Arty Regts & 4th RTR. This phase was to be directed by Cdr 5th Indian Div.

(ab) Phase 2 22nd Armd Bde was to pass through and capture SIdi Muftah, in an attk Sp by 4th Arty Regts. 9th Indian Inf Bde With 4h RTR were to follow up adv and take posn. Phase was to be Directed by Cdr 7 th Armd Div. simultaneously 82nd Army tk Bde, Sp by one Arty regt & Followed used by one Inf Bn, was to make southward thrust to capture Sidra Ridge, thus threatening En’s Flank.

(ac) Phase 3 5th Indian Div to take charge of cauldron area and 22nd

armd Bde to Switch Northward to Elult Et Tamar to join 1st Armd Div which with 2nd & 4th Armd Bde was being left out of battle with a view to exploiting En’s Defeat by thrust through Italian front.

(iii) Conduct

(aa) Ni attk by 10th Indian Inf Bde Successful as far as it went. Attk started from line too for East owing to mistaken cal & stopped short of intended obj . prep Arty Bombardment altered en’s res.

(ab) In North, 32nd Army tk Bde Attks the posns of 21 panzer Div After stiff action and losses, the Bde is driven off.

(ac) 22nd Armd Bde passes though 10th Indian Bde & completed en’s eviction from a slagh ridge. It pushes on westward driving back Ariete Div, but is checked by screen of anti tk guns that covered Sidi Muftah.

(ad) Without tks to sp the Indian Bdes, 2nd armd Bde is ordered south, but comes to a halt near knights Br & remains stalled by lack of concise Orders.

(ae) Rommel seeing isolation of Inf rallied Ariete & Panzer Divs to strike & double enveloping counterstroke was undertaken in which 15 panzer & 21 panzer scattered 7th Armd Div.

(af) 10th Indian Inf Bde decimated, Britishers failed to sp tac battle/ use full force of their armr or Inf.

(c) Phase 4

(i) Reinforced Asslt on Bir Hachiem which fell on 11 June.

(ii) North Easterly push to El Adm & two panzer pincers achieve favorable tk ratio thereby leading Ritchie to abandon Gazala line.

MAP PPT

Q. Comment upon op art Exhibited in offn of Gazala line? Ans.

1. Switching of Offn MVRE to Def and than Again to Offn. Op Mvre from offn & def on Gazala line & then again then offn to reach Tobruk to Egyptian frontier within short pd of under a month was achieved due to fwg by Germans:-

(a) Eff use of Armr.(b) Tactical flexibility.

67

(c) High Level op resilience to able to rapidly switch mvre.(d) Mental & tac mobility of operational Cdr to lowest rk and file.(e) Bal Disposition with assured supply line.

2. Flexibility in switch offn mvre to def achieved surprise placing British in decision dilemma whether to defend or attack.

3. Opening of Sup Line to Knight’s Bridge. Ensure flexibility and German Forces could be maintained on other side of defender’s front line.

4. Failure of British Cdr to grasp Assessment of rapidly changing sit. British Cdr were paralyzed and could not grasp changing sit and debated over what should be done.

5. Piecemeal application of forces by British. British Op Cdr fought series of tac battles never being able to synergise same in single whole thereby leading to defeat in detail.

Q. Why was Tobruk Abandoned?Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Tobruk held by 3 Bde, two of SA Div and11 Indian Bde. It was reinforced by GDs Bde 32 Army tk Bde.

(b) Posn weakened over pd due to neglect of defenses. Mines also lifted for break out SE during Crusader and also to strengthen Gazala Line.

2. Ritchie failed to obey comd by Auchinleck to hold Tobruk front through Auchinleck accepted isolation for short pds. 3. German panzers advanced rapidly and captured El Duda & Sidi Rezegh two key Decision pts for launching attk on Tobruk. British Plan to hold mobile def south of Tobruk did not materialize.

4. 8th Army failed to SP Defenders of Tobruk & Rommel succeeded destroying Britishers piecemeal.

5. Use of Air power by German greatly contributed to success

6. Maj Gen HB Wopper had little battle Experience & he had come from trg comd to take over 2nd SA Div one month ago.

Q. What were reasons for Allied retreat from Gazala to Murssa Matruh & El Alamein despite over whelming superiority and meager resources of Africa Korps?Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Allied 8th Army retreated from Gazala line to Mersa Mathruh under comd of Gen Neil Ritchie.

(b) Gen Auchinleck personally took over comd of 8th Army on Jun 25.

(c) Instead of fighting at Mersa Mathruh posn, which had an open left flk, Auchinleck withdraw near El Alamein on Mediterranean Coast, which had one flk to defend.

2. Causes of retreat of British despite Rommel’s exhausted resources:-

(a) Failure of British’s to destroy stocks / sups when retreating

(i) Rommel had Exhausted all his recourses by the time he stormed Tobruk.

(ii) It was only through capture of sups & tpt captured at Tobruk & nearby dumps that he was able to continue adv.

(iii) More than 4/5th of vehs he used to carry his forces on into Egypt were British.

68

(b) Unimaginativeness of Ritchie as a Cdr. Failed to make quick decisions & issue clear orders and did not inspire confidence in staff and subordinate cdrs & tps.

(c) Shock of fall of Tobruk Shock of Tobruk’s collapse, threat sufficed to produce all abandonment of the frontier posn.

(d) Failure of Ritchie Policy of ‘To gain time with dist’..

(i) After hearing fall of Tobruk, Ritchie informed Auchinleck that he could not hold out frontier as his armd force was not strong enough & that to gain time with dist he Intended to put as much dist as possible betn himself and Germany.

(ii) He proposed to retreat Matruh but difficulty of holding frontier posn without strong armd res, applied equally to Matruh posn, which could be by passed.

(iii) Relentless offn action by Rommel and Swift pursuit failed the policy of ‘gain time with dist.’

(e) No delay imposed on En

(i) 80th corps (Norrie) was sent back to org new posn, while all other tps placed under 13th corps (Gott) with orders to impose max delay on En.

(ii) No delay or serious attempt was made as armr was ordered to leave frontier on evening of 23rd & go straight to area south of Matruh.

(f) Rigid sys of British Comd

(i) British followed rigid sys of British comd where higher cdr advised lower cdr but did not interfere with detailed execution of orders.

(ii) Ritchie’ s decision to not to hold frontier due to lack of strong armd force and retreat Mersa Matruh was not over ruled by Auchinleck despite principle of lack of armd force and open flank would apply equally to Matruh as he felt he was man on spot.

(g) Delay in issuing clear directive by Auchinleck. Though Auchinleck reversed, ‘the dicision to make final stand at Matruh and issued directive to keep Army fully mobile with aim of bringing Rommel to halt in area betn Matruh & Alamein bounded by Qattera depression. He ordered strongest possible resistance to be made in area and emphasized that in no circumstance should any part o army be allowed to become isolated in Matruh. This directive should have been given on retreat from Gazala line only.

(h) Lack of Int. Britishers did not know the state of Rommel’s forces which were far weaker than them.

(j) Gap betn defs of 10 corps & 13 corps.There was a gap of nine miles betn the two corps. The gap was covered by mines but it was backed only by two Jock colns. The same was exploited by Rommel.

69

FIRST BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

(g) British in confused stated & disarray due to Bold action by Rommel.

(i) Rommel allowed no time for British to reorganize by deeper adv.

(ii) No pause for prep for attk.

(iii) Exploitation of gaps in def and clearing / negotiating mine fds.

(h) Emp of Armr In piecemeal. 1st Armd Div had widely Distributed Bde’s & thise efforts were of piecemeal kind.

(j) Defeatist impression of Battle on British higher cdr.

(i) British cdr due to indirect appch rear threat exerting multiplied power in fog of war were oblivious of actual state of tps.

(ii) Rommel’s quick & deep penetration of jt betn two British corps & threat to line of retreat magnified effect on 13th corps which made Gotts to issue order of retreat.

70

(k) Lack of Inf & Armr Coop. NZ Div left isolated by indep divergent retreat of armr manage to save it self by breaking out.

(l) Audacity in action by Rommel.

(i) Line of retreat of 10th Army was cut off for 9 hrs without their knowledge.

(ii) Rommel was on the heels of rout unconcerned by risk of leaving whole En Corps in rear.

71

FIRST BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

1. SIT

(a) Fall of Tobruk. Large stocks of food, fuel & war like store fell in Rommel’s hand facilitating his adv.

(b) Auchinleck took over comd from Richie.

(c) Disorderly retreat of British from Mersa Matruh.

(d) Withdrawl of 10 and 13 corps and joining with 30 corps preparing def of El Alamein

(e) Two forces remained in stalemate in def warfare.

(f) Rommel 96 Kms away from Alexendria.

2. On June 30, 1942, Rommel’s 90 Lt Div west of Alamein, Attk south of it after pursuit momentary pause, reason:-

(a) Rest & replenishment, prep for attk.

(b) German int services gave exaggerated picture of Alamein def line as continuous & strongly fortified.

(c) Shrunken str of Rommel, waited for Italians to join.

(d) British armr still off scene.

3. El Alamein line. El Alamein only a minor stn on desert Rly which run along coast. Line named after it. El Alamein Northern most pt of Alamein line. Choice of Def for two reason:-

(a) If well defended, Inf Divs & large armd force would not be easy to dislodge.

(b) Trn in south would cramp mvre by armr. Southern most pt formed by Qattara depression, vast expanse of sand & salt mashes and therefore perfect obst to traffic. To south of depression lay sand sea equally impenetrable.

4. Tac adv of El Alamein.

(a) Alamein line flanked on North by sea to on south by sandy patches.

(b) Only piece of land suitable for passage of army was therefore area betn these two extreme obsts.

(c) Stretch measured about forty miles across Narrowest pt, which by no means be regarded as too long a line in desert warfare.

(d) Could not be out flanked from either side – open only to frontal attk over Narrow dist.

(e) Stretch of 40 miles covered by ridges fwg three defended location.

(i) El Alamein def posn. Blocking rly & coast Rd.

(ii) Bab El Qattara. In centre

(iii) Abu Dweis. Dominated routes to cliffs and track in Qatara Depression.

5. British def / Disposn at Alamein.

(a) Four Def boxes on 35 miles stretch betn sea & Qattara Depression.

(b) Largest box on coast at Alamein - 1st SA Div.

(c) Six miles south of Alamein was Dar El Shein box – 18 Ind Bde sp by Matildas.

72

(d) Further s seven miles Bab El Qattara box – NZ Div.

(e) 14 miles betn south at edge of Qattara, Naqb Abu Dweis box- Bde ex 5 ind Div.

(f) Interval betn boxes covered by chain of mob colns.

(g) Northern sect under 30 corps and southern 13 corps.

6. Weakness of Alamein def line.

(a) Def strong but offered wide openings for isolating or bypassing Boxes.

(b) Value of Plan to sp gaps with mob colns diminished due to disorg caused by hurried retreat.

(c) Through shorter sup lines, fuel shortage was a handicap.

7. German Plan

(a) Int assumed British Arms colns placed to cover more open southern desert flk, actually wrong.

(b) To pin 1st Armd Div with Litterio & 2 Btys of 88s, after feinting in that dirn by AK.

(c) AK after launching feint, switch to North to make main penetrateion betn Alamein & Deir EL Shein box.

(d) AK followed by xx Italian mob corps then to swing south on to rear of British 13 corps.

(e) 90th Lt Div also to by pass Alamein box then turn North to get astride coast rd & rly, cutting 8th Army’s comn.

8. Conduct

(a) Phase I (Jul)

(i) 90 Lt Div bumped into Alamein box & got pinned there.

(ii) Ak arrived 10 Am found no clear gap as expected with 2 SA colns & British Armr close behind box, 15 panzer bummed into Deir - El Shein Box, corps cdr turn 21 panzer to Eliminate Deir El Shien . which ultimately was captured not before 6 pm After Stiff fight

(iii) Two British armd Bdes moved too late to help, 4th got struck in soft and North of Alamein, 22nd stayed back owing to mistaken rpt, finally arrived after 5 pm to late to save box.

(iv) Deir El Shien box stayed long to spoil German plan. German too exhausted to exploit its success. (v) British fleet sailed from Alexandria abandoning its base.

(b) Phase II (Jul 2,1942)

(i) German Plan. Encouraged by News of British fleet, plan to push Al East from Dier El Shien, & then turn North to Help 90 Lt Div to cut off coast rd, Italian xx corps to push SE to rear of British 13 Corps.

(ii) British Plan

(aa) Aucihnleck Planned to deliver powerful thrust aimed to dislocate Rommel’s attk & disrupt his Army.

(ab) Inf and Arty of 30 Corps hold en in front, 13 corps to wheel north & strike en’s rear with sp of 1st armd Div.

73

(iii) Conduct

(aa) Ak adv delayed upto 3pm checked by British mov on its southern flk.

(ab) British adv dis jointed, 4th armd Bde took wider NW circuit but 7th took too direct course.

(ac) Both German and British plans failed. British plan well conceived, could have been decisive but Execution by 1st Armd Div become disjointed. 13 corps also failed to provide sp to 1st armd div.

(c) Phase III Jul 3,1942)

(i) Rommel’s one more try for victory, Ak pushed east & AREITA moved SW but checked by 1st Armd Div. Second try, could only mov 9 miles halted by 1st armd div.

(ii) Ak failed to achieve break through left in salient exposed from all sides.

(d) Phase IV (Jul 4-5, 1942)

(i) Auchinleck kept bal of forces that no adverse turns shook his bal.

(ii) Attempts to destroy Rommel ‘s Army & end campaign. 30 corps (with1st Armd Div) to hold en and 13 corps to cut across its rear.

(iii) Lack of Sig security, leaked the plan. Rommel pulled back 21 Pzr to meet envp stroke.

(iv) Counter stroke on 4th & then on 5th failed to achieve aim, reasons:-

(aa) Lack of confidence in subordinate cdr.

(ab) Prolonged strain w/o rest, sleepiness, led to cdr & tps too weary to respond to C-in-Cs orders.

(ac) Flk attk not pressed on by 13 corps, despite orders by C-in-Cs.

(ad) Opportunities not sized by 30th corps, in prompt moves were not devp into Gen thrust by 1st Armd Div.

(ae) 1st armd div used for containment rather than push the thrust, even containment by armr was not rigorous.

(af) Auchinleck should have had cut loose from connections of comd and applied personal impulse on spot. He was basely 3 miles from 30th corps HQ and 17 miles from 13th corps HQ.

(ag) 13th corps did little to fulfill Auchinleck aims, and orders. Bdes of NZ Div, which should have led adv against en’s rear not informed of C-in-Cs Intentions & their decisive role.

(e) Brief lull in Battle (Jul 6-8) Regrouping & rfts on both side, lull more fav for Rommel.

(f) Phase v-(Jul 8-27)

(i) Auchinleck planned strong attk in North with 9 Aus Div from Alamein parameter along coast rd. Rommel struck first in south, moved 21 pz & 90 Lt Seeing en mass, 13 corps fell back from Bab EL Qattara on 8th ni. On 9th Rommel captured empty box Jul 10, 9th Aus Div launched costal attk on Italian held front, weakened by mov of Ak, also attk threatened Rommel’s rear in south, 9th Aus Div over ran SABRATHA Div Holding that sector. German tps scraped and sent to check further thrust, this indirect threat broke off German southern thrust.

74

(ii) Jul 11 to 14. Having drawn portion of Germans to coast flk, Auchinleck planned, a thrust in centre by indirect apch, with NZ Div + 5 Ind Bde to attk Reuweisat Ridge then 1st armd Div to exploit west ward, the plan failed due to lack of detailed plg & cord betn armr & Inf.

(iii) Jul 15-18 attk contd from both side but war non decisive, favorable condition for British due to strain on Rommel by contd flk thrusts in North by Australian Div & In south by 1st Armd.

(iv) Jul 19-27. Despite favorable Sit, Planned British thrust through North (Alamein) to hit en in rear and then roll up his posn from North, failed again to finally Auchinleck suspended his offn siting reason of strengthening en def & contd weakness of his Armd forces.

9. Reasons for British Failure in Alamein despite all condns in their favour

(a) Well planned ops were not Executed due to lack of Energy on subordinate cdr to long strain on tps.

(b) Higher plan mared by inadequate detail plg and by poor tac combination by combat units specially Armr & Inf.

(c) For certain main ops Newly arr fmns with inadequate desert trg & eqpt (RS not mod for hot climate) were emp.

(d) Atmosphere of distrust among Inf Wrt Armr. Tks never reached where wanted.

(e) Distrust of ldrship, specially higher, arising from many reverses of past months.

(f) Against forces of high mobility in movement & control there was no pause betn preparatory ,distraction and knock out punch. It was pauses that spoilt Auchinleck well designed pattern’s of distraction endouced with effect of indirectness.

(g) Disjointed efforts leading to dissipation of numerical superiority

(h) Failure to devp small opportunity to gen thrust and exploit success.

(j) Commonwealth composition of forces.

(k) Comd casualties at crucial moments had vital effect on course of battles.

(l) Wireless break down.

(m) A very dep exploitation was for seen & prep for successive mobile echs but initial break in process was not thought out so clearly..

(n) Auchinleck first class solutions during first half of July were repeatedly bungled in exec at corps, Div & Bde Level.

10. Conclusion. First Battle of Alamein which began with an attempt to check en’s adv & then attempt to crush en decisively. First aim was fulfilled, sec thwarted although it was very close to success.

Q. What was Auchinleck prep for fresh offn after 1st Battle of Alamein/ def plan?Ans.

1. Trg of force in combined tactis a weak pt in Alamein Battle.

2. New def plan dvlp by PSO in fd Maj Gen Dorman Smith & CE Brig Kisch, to give depth to El Alamein posn, in case en resumed offn first.

3. Def Based on plan to prep posns on the keys to def zone on 3 main ridge running East to west incl Halm Halfa.

75

4. Ridges within Fd arty rg of each other.

5. Series of strong pts on ridges to deny essential obsn to en & preserve them for own.

6. Strong pts designed to take a garrison of two Bns & a 25 pdr Regt.

7. Majority of fd arty with its mob escorts & armr to be kept mob to attk en where ever it appears using strong pts as pivots of mvre and for obsn.

8. Defended zone extended to 30 miles behind fwd posn of entry to by pass it form south, lt armd tps in front to delay & armd force & mob arty gp to attk from flk.

9. Def net formed a spider web a direct deterrent to penetration & indirect menace to out flkkg mvre.

Q. What was Ash Wednesday?Ans.

1. Rommel’s adv in June 1942, British retreat from Gazala line fall of Tobruk, further adv by Rommel, cutting of British 10 Corps holding Matruh, Grsn falls in German hand as British escape (Jun 28).

2. Waves of panic swept Cario after collapse at Matruh, further panic as British fleet leaves from Alexendria, hasty prep for mil evac of Cario, crowds at rly stn to leave before en arrival.

3. Frantic burning of mil files by rear staff, caused clouds of smk over city with papers raining down, the day came to known as Ash Wednesday.

Q. What was the problems of tk crews? Ans.

1. (a) Crew were awakened by about 0500hrs

(b) Battle commonly occurred in early morning on in late afternoon/ Evening.

(c) Rest of time spent in alert watchfulness / ptlg/waiting for prep of an attk.

(d) To get imdt all rd vision cdr’s had to stand.

(e) Usually 2100h before opposing tks gradually draw apart & finally seek respective leguers.

(f) Leaguer – refuel, load, replenish amn, minnor repair, maint, distribute ration requires 1 ½ to 2 hrs.

(g) Time to get into balnket - 0030 to 0100 hrs. each man in turn must stand for Gd.

(h) Only 3 hrs is max sleep that can be obtained.

(j) Impossible to go on fighting with any degree of efficiency for more than a week.

2. Prep of Meal

(a) Crew must prepare its own meals.(b) Black outs in leaguer prevent lighting of fires.(d) Only opportunity for a hot drink is during lull in fighting in day time.

3. Cold Nights. Nis in desert, even at mid summer are cold enough to make it necessary to wear an over coat.

4. Problems of B ech.

(a) Sending up hot food in hay Boxes by ni with B ech not proved very successful.

76

(b) Food cooked 12-15 Hrs prescious day & in impalatable on arr.(c) B ech not arriving in time men asleep.

5. Germans in contrast has Fd kitchen travelling with armd units which was kept well fd and supplied tk crew with hot food to drink in morning.

Q. What were reasons of Auchinleck removal despite the fact that he had ‘Stemmed the adverse tide’?Ans

1. Auchinneck through decisively checked Rommel’s adv & prevented over running of Egypt, his efforts lacked dramatic quality of tac victory reqd to restore shaken confidence of tps and people.

2. Doubts about mil ldrship. Persistent threat from Rommel just 60 miles from Alexandria revived doubts in govt about mil ldrship.

3. Firm Refusal to Resume offn. Auchinleck’s firm refusal to conduct offn before sept in order to give desert trg to new rfts.

4. Anxiety about Persistent threat to Egypt. Disappointment that Rommel has not been hurled back and Anxiety about his persistent threat to Egypt weighed heavily on minds of British & other common wealth govt.

5. Basic fact that en’s aim of over running Egypt had been defeated was obscured. It produced an impulsive feeling that clean sweep of higher comd was needed.

Q. Describe Battle of Alam Halfa Aug 30 – 6 Sep, 1942?Ans.

1. Sit.

(a) Gen sir Harold Alexander apptd C-in-C & sir B Montgomery as Cdr 8 th Army (Gott) apptd as Cdr 8th Army Killed in crash)

(b) Rommel received rfts, likely to deliver offn in Aug.

(c) German Rfts.

(i) Ramcke Para unit Bde (German).

(ii) Folgore Parachute Div (Italian).

(iii) Both Dismounted to emp as Inf.

(iv) Wastage in other fms made up.

(d) British Rfts

(i) Front held by four Divs with rebuilt str & 7th (Lt) Armd Div.

(ii) 1st Armd Div went for refit and replaced by 10th.

(iii) Rfts

(aa) 44 th Div Part used to reinforce NZ posn on left flk and part to reinforce rear ward posn on Alam Halfa Ridge.

(ab) 51 st Inf Div .

(ac) 23rd armd bde Ex 8th armd Div placed under 10th Armf Div.

77

THE BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA AUG 30 – SEP 1942

2. Force level

British

8 th Army - Gen Sir Montgomery

13 Corps - Lt Gen BG Horrock

44 Inf Div

51 Inf Div

2 NZ Div

10 Armd Div - Gen Gate House

8th Armd Bde

23rd Armd Bde

22 Armd Bde (4 Units)

Almost all Armr Unit had 20 sqns of Grants & one Crusader / Stuarts

Tk str 713 tk in fwd as (164 Grants)

30 Corps - Lt Gen Leese

9 Aus Div1 SA Div5 Inf Div

78

7 Armd Div (Lt)German

Afrika corps

21 PZR

Ramcke Para bde (Dis mtd)

90 Lt Div

164 Inf Div

Italian

XX mob corps (Areite & Tretstc Divs) (M Bs)

XX 1 Corps (4 Inf Divs)

200 Gun Armd Tk

240 Italian MI3s

3. British Disposn & Def Plan

(a) 30 Corps – coast to Ruweist Ridge (incl) – by 9th Aus, 1st SA, 5 Ind Div (From North)

(b) 13 th Corps South of 30 corps . NZ Div with open flk of fifteens miles till Qattara depression gap was covered by minefd but that was itself given mobile cover by 7 th Armd div .(c) 23rd Armd Bde at Ruweisat Ridge, 22nd at West edge of Alam Halfa & 8th further East of Alam Halfa.

(d) Def Plan as chaked by Auchinleck before leaving – To Strongly hold the area betn coast & Ruweisat ridge and threaten en adv south of ridge by strongly prep posn on Alam Halfa Ridge.

(e) Quick penetration possible only from southern stretch, Rommel bound to take that line of adv.

4. Rommel’ Plan.

(a) Alexander expected attk on 25 Aug, Rommel planned even earlier, delay in arr of petrol and amn, attk only on 30 Aug.

(b) Surprise in dirn ruled out, Rommel sought surprise by timed speed to break through southern sect to get astride 8th Army’s comn so quickly that it would be thrown off bal and drawn into disjointed action on reverse front.

(c) Concealed Side stepping of mob forces, mined belt to be captured by ni attk, Ak + xx italian corps to drive East 25-30 miles before morning & then at down wheel Northward to West & over run British Sup area. This would draw most of British armr in chase which is to be trapped to destroyed in open. 90 Lt to bal of xx corps to from protective corridor against attk from North. The plan laid particular reliance on slow reaction of British Cdrs.

5. Conduct of ops.

(a) In Rommel’s ni adv had gone anything like as fast as planned eff might have been upsetting - as British Armd Bdes were not kept close together at out set.

Int Failure of Rommel. British were allowed ample time to conc as int was mistaken both about depth of mined belt & of British posns.British offered no tgt in well chosen posn. Battle won by Sitting tight & offering no tgt in well chosen posn that commanded en’s line of thrust while Air Force battered attacking force.

79

(b(b) Offn on 30 ni, diversionary attks in north to centre, delay in minefd, adv of Afrika corps delayed by 6 hrs depth of minefd greater than expected ), interference by 7 th Armd Div & RAF, Sand storm. Ak ready only by 09.30AM to adv, tgt for RAF, speed surprise lost. Rommel thinks of abandoning attk, discussion with Bayerlein, attk in mod way, British armr now conc, threat to flks, Wide sweep impossible, compelled to turn early & head for pt 132 on Alam Halfa.

(c) Seeing Rommel forces turning toward Alam Halfa, armd fmns (22 & 8 Armd) ordered to occupy battle posns south of Ridge, 22nd on West edge of Alam Halfa & 8th at 10 miles further East. Risk of separation taken as each Bde was equal in str as whole Ak & will be able to hold Ak till others build up and SP attk.

(d) Due to mob of plan German attk came on 22nd armd Bde, but delayed at 5 PM, Each tk in well secured huldown posn, aimed accurate fire brought, flk attk also halted by Arty, Atk guns fire recced. Fuel sup short in German side, Germans halted & then broke off engagement at 1930, German losses 20, 22nd Armd 17.

(e) Sep 1, ptl short in German side, no large scale mov by Germans, local & ltd attk by 15 Pzr to gain Alam Halfa. Contd pounding by RAF & 13 corps Arty. En envp attks form flk repeatedly checked, frontal try also driven off. Montgomery convinced En not driving East brought 23rd Armd also to SP 22nd in west flk.

(f) Plg for counter Stroke. In afternoon 1st Sept Montgomery planned counter stroke, push south from NZ Div posn to close neck of the bag. Arrangements made to bring up 10 th

corps HQ ‘To comd a pursuit force’ that was to be prepared to push through Daba with all res avbl. All ni RAF Bomb Pzr Div.

(g) Gradual withdrawl by Rommel. On sep 2 Rommel calls off offn and makes a gradual with drawl (Strong def, fuel Shortage) German Colns thin out mov west, request to pursue pursued..

(h) Montgomery’s Refusal for Pursue Montgomery’s policy to avoid his armr being lured into Rommel’s traps. ordered southward attk by NZ Div, reinforced, on ni of sep ¾.

(j) Sep 3, Ak gen step back, no follow up. In ni attk launched against corridor held by 90 Lt & TRIESTE by 132nd Inf Bde & 5th, 6 th NZ Bde. Attk badly confused, Suffered hy losses, called up next day.

(k) Sep 4 & 5 Ak contd Step back, no attempt by British to cut off, on 6th Ak halt at high grnd six miles east of original front.

(l) 7th Sep, Alexander breaks off Battle leaving Rommel in possession of Ltd again of grnd.

(m) Losses German 2900 offrs & men, 49 tks,400 other vehs, 17 Fd arty & 38 ATk Guns.

British – 1750 offr & men , 67 tks (31 grants) , 15 ATk guns.

6. Reasons of German failure & British Success.

(a) Mistaken German Int about minefd depth & British Posn.

(b) Adv of Ak delayed by more than 6 hrs (speed surprise lost) - depth & density of mine fd, mine clearing hindered by moon lt aided fire by 7th Armd Div & NZ Arty.

(c) Delay gave time for conc of British armr which not closed together at outset.

(d) Eff def plan – well chosen British posn, sitting tight in posn comd the en line of thrust, gave no tgt.

(e) Eff use of arty & A tk guns to check en attks on Alam Halfa.

(f) British RAF role in battning Germans.

(g) Rommel’s Logistical problems, petrol.

80

(h) Successful air attks on German cvy Crossing sea Causing petrol Gisis in German force.

Q . Whether opportunity was missed by Montgomery to any annihilate Ak while in ‘Bag’ was Montgomery’s decision not to pursuit when Ak withdrawing correct ?Ans.

1. Gen

(a) Montgomery has been criticized for not pressing fight at Alam Halfa.

(b) Could have dealt axis crippling below as they retreated.

(c) Based on one’s Bias, he either ensured success late at El Alamein by preserving his army or he lost golden opportunity at Alam Halfa which would have made El Alamein unnecessary.

2. Reasons for not undertaking pursuit:-

(a) Montgomery’s Policy to avoid his armr being lured into one of Rommel’s traps.

(b) Montgomery was not strong advocate of rapid movement. He was proponent of methodical and structured approach, his activity at Alam Halfa confirm Bias. He refused to mount full blooded CA to passed up Excellent opportunity to destroy Germans as they retreated.

(c) Argument of Montgomery that many of his units had only recently arrived & still needed trg, while he also wished to build up stronger forces so that when he struck he would easily over whelm Rommel.

Q. What was code word pepsodent?Ans. During the Battle of Alam Halfa it was British code word on Radio for Armd fmn (23,22 & 8 th

Armd Bdes) in strong pts at Alam Halfa Ridge to take up Battle posn in response to German Adv. Rommel’s adv on ni of Aug 30 & mov towards Alam Halfa Ridge. Password issued on morning of Aug 31 (1:30AM).

Q. What were imp factors of British Def plan (22 Armd) and problem & their soln?Ans .

1. Dply on firm def posns & battle to be fought as per preconceived plan, little possibility of mvre.

2. Qualities & peculiarities of grant tk (main stay of Battle)

(a) Main Armt 75 mm gun on side front Mtg –prevented natural hull down posn.

(b) 75mm ltd traverse- ltd As of fire for each tk.

(c) Tk ht very high – difficulty in concealment Except in very broken grnd.

3. Very wide area to cover (atk fmn East, SE &South) , hence no res avbl.

4. Soln to above problems.

(a) 6 pdr ATk guns (easily to conceal) given A of flat & unbroken grnd to cover.

(b) Grants put on broken foot hills where no suitable posn – posns made by bull dozing.

(c) Regt (Greys) equipped with newest grant tks put on Eastern flk (Least likely dirn of en attk) to be avbl as mob res & were at same time most reliable mechanically.

Q. What was std ptl issue?Ans. An issue of ptl was qty reqd for 100kms in normal condns.

81

Q. How was British Tac of Handling armr was over departure from their previously by followed tac.Ans .

1. Changed in Armd Fighting.

(a) Change in form which took shape persisted not only in Africa but in campaigns that followed in Europe.

(b) More cautious from of action at slower tempo.

(c) Concentrated punches were surperseded by what has been aptly described as process of incessant sparring with ant tk Screens.

2. Attacking en on both the flank.

(a) Original intention of Montgomery to attk en simultaneously on both flk with 30 th Corps in North and 13th corps in south and then forcing a gap in en’s def, to push through 10 th

(armd) corps.

(b) It would posn itself on grnd of own choosing astride en sup routes, en armr would deply against it & be destroyed peace meal.

(c) Plan changed in Oct as there was question mark on capability of achieving success in a plan so ambitious because of short comings in standard of trg in Army.

3. Reversal in concept of first destroying En’s armr.

(a) It had been generally accepted that plan in modern day battle should aim first at destroying en’s armr & once this had been accomplished, armd portion of en’s army would be dealt with readily.

(b) This concept was reversed to destroy first the un armd fmns, while doing armd divs would be held back, which would be tackled subsequently.

(c) Blunting the edge of armr in efforts to relieve pressure on Inf. The edge of En’s armr will be blunted during launching of CA which will be to avert gradual destr of Inf and to relieve pressure.

(d) Earlier plans to destroy En’s armr first had led to problems. To aim first at destroying en’s armr had earlier led to British Tks to rush into Rommel’s Anti tk traps, lined with deadly 88s and than destroy themselves to advantage of En armr in next stg of battle.

4. Emp of armr in piece meal by British.

(a) Accentuated long developing tendency on British side to employ tks piecemeal rather than powerful fmns.

(b) Strong def & cramped front made necessary to break in with inf, the completion of breakthrough might have been achieved more quickly, at a lesser total cost, by more concentrated action & deeper thrusts.

(c) Vast superiority concentrated would help in gaining rapid decision with min cas.

Q. Comment upon Montgomery’s tac handling of battle at El Alamein? Ans.

1. Superiority of Resources & Tac handling 8th Army’s all round superiority of resources was most decisive factor, its effect owed much to Gen Montgomery’s tactical handling of battle.

2. Varying of Direction of Thrusts.

(a) Deceived opponents as to pt of main effort.

82

(b) Levered them off bal.

3. Delivering ‘Break in’ attks under cover of ni. Learned advantage of this method when serving in Egypt, Ardently & intensively developing prac of ni attk at a time when most soldiers regarding it dubiously, reckoning risks of confusion higher then its protective & surprise effort.

4. Indirect Action. A still grater factor in issue was indirect action, far outside battle fd, of sea power and air power against en’s lines of comn.

Q68. What were problems faced by German before second battle of Alamein?

Ans 68.

1. Sinking of Sups .

(a) Supplies were sunk in crossing Mediterranean, while even those that reached Ben ghazi /Tobruk were badly impeded in unloading by Bomb-Havoc.

(b) Multiplied 8th Army’s superiority of force by restricting restoration of en’s str.

2. Acute Shortage of FOL.

(a) Most crippling of all efforts of sinking of oil tankers, together with Italian delays in providing more.

(b) Only 3 issues of petrol was available – barely enough for 3 days of battle where as 30 issues were considered min resource needed.

(c) Acute shortage hampered counter moves at every turn and was bound to produce a fatal immobility if battle were prolonged.

3. Amn too in short sup could not be use for counter battery fire.

4. Absence of Rommel

(a) Falling sick Rommel had gone back to Europe for treatment a month before Battle opened.

(b) Replacement of Rommel by Gen Stumme, had no previous experience of African theatre . died from heart attk on second day of Battle .Rommel was handicapped by what had been done and left undone during preparatory pd.

5. Distr of Axis Armr in six packets

(a) Axis armr had been distributed in six packets along the back of the front, for local sp, instead of being concentrated.

(b) Distr was due to petrol shortage which made it impossible to keep armour concentrated well behind front for mvre battle or switch it from flk to flk as might be reqd.

(c) Distribution resulted from ltd capacity for movement thereby leading armr being thrown into battle prematurely & piecemeal.

Q. Comment upon plg conduct of sec Battle of Alamein?Ans .

1. Gen

(a) Battle of Alamein Halfa. Rommel’s unsuccessful attempt to break through at Alam Halfa.

(b) Rommel withdraw to west, posn at 6 miles east of original front.

83

(c) Montgomery & Alex continued & prep for offn, PMOs disappointed at delay, continued prep & accumulating resources for 7 weeks. , no rft on German side, German tps over strained & comn over stretched.

84

85

86

87

Notes

Deception Plan

1. Conceal British intention of attk.2. Mislead En regarding dirn & date.3. Main attk would came from south.4. Would not materialize before mid Nov.

Measures taken

1. Depict Mov in xxx crops sector by use of dummy vehs.2. Replacement by actual vehs & eqpt prior to attk.3. Dummy veh in rear areas to demo Hy conc of tps.4. Cam of massive sup dumps in Northern Sect.5. Creation of Dummy dumps in South.6. Laying of a dummy pipeline in South.7. Addl trenches for concealing the attk tps in fwd Areas.8. 8 Armd Div comn Net wk to suggest mov of armd fmns to southern flk.

Naval Task To Disrupt lines of sup by sea.

Battle preceded by continuous Air & Arty Bombardment.

Three Phases

1. Break in (23 to 24 Oct 42)2. Dog Fight (24 to 30 Oct 42)3. Break out (31 Oct to 04 Nov 42)

Lessons learnt pertaining to op art.

1. Surprise & Deception

(a) Making Axis believe that main effort will came in south.(b) Shaping of Battle fd prior to second battle of Alamein.

2. Shaping the Battle fd.

(a) Decisively defeated by the wt of British Superiority in men & Mtrl.(b) Enjoyed Numerical superiority on many occasions earlier lost.(c) AF invaluable SP to allied force.

3. Decisive pts.

(a) Mine fds of immense quality & Density.(b) New methods of mine fd clearance adopted by allied force.

(c) Deep Axis mine fds – Inf. could not go beyond them.(d) Anti Tk guns took a hy toll on British Armr.(e) Rommel judged the British difficulties well.(f) Montgomery had to mount another attk ‘op super change’.(g) Alamein most imp decisive pt in campaign.

4. Ldrship

(a) Rommel a Better Gen.(b) Successfully Disengaged out numbered army Despite lack of adequate tpt & Air cover.

5. Conclusion

(a) Churchill keen on British victory in desert before launching ‘op torch’.(b) If ‘op torch’ launched on 08 Nov 42, British would have successes in throwing Axis out of El Alamien with much less cas.

88

Op Art review.

1. OP mvre severely Hampered restricted to tactical side stepping.

(a) Org of def in depth – Facilitated hy resistance & neutralization.(b) Series of def layers comprising of mines, anti tk guns, Inf & tks.

2. Montgomery’s tac handing of Battle.

(a) 8th Army’s success – process of attrition with superiority of resources.(b) Varied thrusts & deceived opponents as to the pt of main effort & kept en off bal.(c) Ensured seizure & retention of Initiative.

3. British plan cautious & Slow.

(a) Dependent on frontal assault & Exploiting fire powers.

(b) Attrition preferred over mvre – even after initial penetration mvre was possible but Montgomery preferred to play safe keeping in view Rommel striking back with immunity.

4. Concept of attk of British radically altered.

(a) Earlier it was perceived armr should be attacked & destroyed first.

(b) Low trg of tps & ambitious plan - alteration of plan.

(c) Adopting deeper thrust & more concentrated action success would have been achieved at lesser coast.

(d) Break in attk under cover of darkness.

5. Sup challenges Impingement on mobility & flexibility as well as employment of Armr due to sup challenges.

6. Strat factor of Sea & Air action.

(a) Maj Role.(b) Striking of axis oil tankers proved to be more significant.(c) Just prior to British offn only 3 issues of petrol available.(d) Hampered German CA & led to immobility.

7. Distr of Axis armr in Six packets for local Sp

(a) Due to shortage of petrol.

(b) Difficulty to switch forces.

(c) Armr Committed to Battle prematurely.

8. Weakness in mvre British demonstrated weakness in mvre which was borne out of in experience of Cdr’s as much as ltd trg.