neo gramscian perspectives

28
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE This article was downloaded by: [University of York] On: 16 April 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 903268926] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Rethinking Marxism Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395221 Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy Adam David Morton To cite this Article Morton, Adam David(2003) 'Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy', Rethinking Marxism, 15: 2, 153 — 179 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0893569032000113514 Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Upload: -

Post on 30-Mar-2015

413 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [University of York]On: 16 April 2010Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 903268926]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Rethinking MarxismPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395221

Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectivesin International Political EconomyAdam David Morton

To cite this Article Morton, Adam David(2003) 'Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectivesin International Political Economy', Rethinking Marxism, 15: 2, 153 — 179To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0893569032000113514

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Page 2: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

RETHINKING MARXISM VOLUME 15 NUMBER 2 (APRIL 2003)

ISSN 0893-5696 print/ISSN 1475-8059 online/03/020153-27© 2003 Association for Economic and Social AnalysisDOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514

Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy

Adam David Morton

Introduction

Situated within a historical materialist problematic of social transformation anddeploying many insights from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a crucial breakwith neorealist mainstream international relations approaches emerged by the 1980sin the work of Robert Cox. In contrast to mainstream problem-solving routes tohegemony in international relations—that develop a static theory of politics; anabstract, ahistorical conception of the state; and an appeal to universal validity—debate shifted toward a critical theory of hegemony, world order and historicalchange.

1

Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation with the maintenance ofsocial power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to ques-tioning the prevailing order of the world. It therefore “does not take institutions andsocial and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerningitself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox1981, 129). Yet, instead of contrasting the concerns of these competing approaches,the aim here is to pursue a critical theoretical route to questions of hegemony. Thismove does not necessarily foreclose dialogue between problem-solving and criticaltheory, as they are not mutually exclusive enterprises, but it does remain wary ofthe assimilatory calls for synthesis that emanate from mainstream exponents.

2

The critical impetus bears a less than direct affiliation to the constellation ofsocial thought known as the Frankfurt School represented by, among others, the work

1. While differences exist, the neorealist work of Kenneth Waltz, as well as that of RobertKeohane, can be included within mainstream, problem-solving international relationsapproaches to hegemony (see Waltz 1979, 1990, 1998, 1999; Keohane 1984, 1986, 1989a). Theclassic critique remains that by Richard Ashley (1984).2. The call for synthesis has been an abiding concern among many advocates of mainstreaminternational relations theory (see Baldwin 1993; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998;Keohane 1989a, 173–4, 1989b, 1998). It can be regarded as a principal tactic in allocating theterms of debate and settling competing ontological and epistemological claims (see Smith1995a, 2000; Tickner 1997, 1998; Weber 1994).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 153 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 3: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

154 MORTON

of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno or, more recently, Jürgen Habermas (Cox 1995a,32).

3

Although overlaps may exist, it is specifically critical in the sense of asking howexisting social or world orders have come into being; how norms, institutions, orsocial practices therefore emerge; and what forces may have the emancipatorypotential to change or transform the prevailing order. As such, a critical theorydevelops a dialectical theory of history concerned not just with the past but with acontinual process of historical change and with exploring the potential for alternativeforms of development (Cox 1981, 129, 133–4). This critical theory of hegemony thusfocuses on interaction between particular processes, notably springing from thedialectical possibilities of change within the sphere of production and the exploita-tive character of social relations—not as unchanging, ahistorical essences but as acontinuing creation of new forms (132).

The emergence of this problematic can also be situated within a reaction to themore scientific or positivistic currents within historical materialism. It is well knownthat Antonio Gramsci himself reacted against the crude reasoning of Nikolai Bukharinin the “Popular Manual” that sought to establish historical materialism as a positivescience or sociology (Bukharin 1969; Gramsci 1971, 419–72). Similarly, for Cox, ahistorical mode of thought was brought to bear on the study of historical change asa reaction to the static and abstract understanding of capitalism associated withLouis Althusser. Not unlike neorealist problem-solving approaches, Althusser soughtto design an ahistorical, systematic, and universalistic epistemology that amountedto a “Theological Marxism” in its endeavor to reveal the inner essence of the universe(Althusser 1969). The “scientific” character of Marxist knowledge was customarilyasserted by Althusser (1970, 132) in contrast with Cox’s divergent, historicalmaterialist insistence on considering the ideational and material basis of socialpractices inscribed in the transformative struggles between social forces stemmingfrom productive processes (Cox 1981, 133; 1983, 163).

The first section of this paper therefore outlines the conceptual frameworkdeveloped by Robert Cox and what has been recognized (see Morton 2001a) assimilar, but diverse, neo-Gramscian perspectives in international political economythat constitute a distinct critical theory route to considering hegemony, world order,and historical change. Subsequently, attention will turn to situating the worldeconomic crisis of the 1970s within the more recent debates about globalization andhow this period of “structural change” has been conceptualized. Finally, variouscontroversies surrounding the neo-Gramscian perspectives will be traced beforeelaborating in conclusion the directions along which future research might proceed.

A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order, andHistorical Change

According to Cox, patterns of production relations are the starting point for analyzingthe operation and mechanisms of hegemony. Yet, from the start, this should not be

3. For useful discussion of the contradictory strands and influences between Frankfurt Schoolcritical theory and critical international relations theory, see Wyn Jones (2000).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 154 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 4: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 155

taken as a move that reduces everything to production in an economistic sense:“Production . . . is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to theproduction of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production andreproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions thatare prerequisites to the production of physical goods” (Cox 1989, 39).

These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations of production, whichencapsulate configurations of social forces engaged in the process of production. Bydiscerning different modes of social relations of production, it is possible to considerhow changing production relations give rise to particular social forces that becomethe bases of power within and across states and within a specific world order (Cox1987, 4). The objective of outlining different modes of social relations of productionis to question what promotes the emergence of particular modes and what mightexplain the way in which modes combine or undergo transformation (103). It isargued that the reciprocal relationship between production and power is crucial. Toexamine this relationship, a framework is developed that focuses on how power in

social relations of production

may give rise to certain

social forces

, how these socialforces may become the bases of power in

forms of state

, and how this might shape

world order

. This framework revolves around the social ontology of historicalstructures.

A social ontology merely refers to the key properties that are thought to consti-tute the social world and thus represents claims about the nature and relationship ofagents and social structures. In this case, the social ontology of historical structuresrefers to “persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and trans-formed through collective human activity” (4). An attempt is therefore made tocapture “the reciprocal relationship of structures and actors” (Cox 1995a, 33; 2000b,55–9; Bieler and Morton 2001). Three spheres of activity thus constitute an historicalstructure:

the social relations of production

, encompassing the totality of socialrelations in material, institutional and discursive forms that engender particularsocial forces;

forms of state

, consisting of historically contingent state/civil societycomplexes; and

world orders

, which not only represent phases of stability andconflict, but permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms of world ordermight emerge (Cox 1981, 135–8). These are represented schematically in fig. 1 (138).

If considered dialectically, in relation to each other, then it becomes possible torepresent the historical process through the particular configuration of historicalstructures. Social forces, as the main collective actors engendered by the social

Fig. 1. The dialectical relation of forces

Socialrelations of production

Forms ofstate

Worldorders

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 155 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 5: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

156 MORTON

relations of production, operate within and across all spheres of activity. Throughthe rise of contending social forces, linked to changes in production, there may occurmutually reinforcing transformations in the forms of state and world order. There isno unilinear relationship between the spheres of activity, and the point of departureto explain the historical process may vary. For example, the point of departure couldequally be that of forms of state or world orders (153 n. 26). Within each of thethree main spheres it is argued that three further elements reciprocally combine toconstitute an historical structure:

ideas

, understood as intersubjective meanings aswell as collective images of world order;

material capabilities

, referring to accumu-lated resources; and

institutions

, which are amalgams of the previous two elements.These again are represented schematically in fig. 2 (136).

The aim is to break down over time coherent historical structures—consisting ofdifferent patterns of social relations of production, forms of state, and world order—that have existed within the capitalist mode of production (Cox 1987, 396–8). In thissense the point of departure for Cox is that of world order, and it is at this stagethat a discrete notion of hegemony begins to play a role in the overall conceptualframework.

Within a world order, a situation of hegemony may prevail “based on a coherentconjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collec-tive image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions whichadminister the order with a certain semblance of universality” (Cox 1981, 139).Hegemony thus becomes more than simply state dominance. It appears as anexpression of broadly based consent manifest in the acceptance of ideas, supportedby material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forcesoccupying a leading role within a state but is then projected outward on a worldscale. Hegemony is therefore a form of dominance, but it refers more to a consensualorder so that “dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficientcondition of hegemony” (139). As Cox has put it, “hegemony is a form in whichdominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence . . . as if it werethe natural order of things . . . [It is] an internalized coherence which has mostprobably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed into anintersubjectively constituted reality” (1994: 366). Hence the importance ofincorporating an intersubjective realm within a focus on hegemony. If hegemony isunderstood as an “opinion-molding activity” rather than as brute force or domi-nance, then consideration has to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order isbased on values and understandings that permeate the nature of that order (Cox

Fig. 2. The dialectical moment of hegemony

Ideas

Materialcapabilities

Institutions

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 156 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 6: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 157

1996b, 151), hence to how intersubjective meanings—shared notions about socialrelations—shape reality. “‘Reality’ is not only the physical environment of humanaction but also the institutional, moral and ideological context that shapes thoughtsand actions” (Cox 1997, 252). The crucial point to make, then, is that hegemonyfilters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, andideology. These are dimensions that escape conventional international relationsroutes to hegemony that simply equate the notion with state dominance. As a result,they conflate the two forms of power. There is a failure to acknowledge that “therecan be dominance without hegemony; [and that] hegemony is one possible formdominance may take” (Cox 1981, 153 n. 27).

By including the intersubjective realm within a theory of hegemony, it is alsopossible to begin appreciating alternative conceptions and different understandingsof the world. In this sense Cox refers to civilizations as different realms of intersub-jectivity, although there might exist common ground or points of contact betweenthe distinct and separate subjectivities of different, coexisting civilizations (Cox1996a, 2000a, 2001). Rival forms of capitalism are tied up with struggles betweendifferent civilizations or ways of life so that the challenge is to articulate sharedideas that can bridge the different realms of intersubjectivity (Cox 1995b, 16). Thisapplies as much to the maintenance of a hegemonic situation as it does to bids forcounterhegemony that aim to challenge and transform a prevailing hegemony.

Attention within this alternative route to hegemony therefore moves beyondsimply defining hegemony in state centric terms. It does so by broadening the inquiryto include an intersubjective realm as well as encompassing a focus on the socialbasis of the state. The latter key development will now be discussed in a little moredetail. This part of the discussion will also begin to indicate the role played by someof Antonio Gramsci’s pivotal concepts.

Rather than reducing hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on thecapabilities of states, the neo-Gramscian perspective developed by Cox broadens thedomain of hegemony. The conceptual framework outlined above considers how newmodes of social relations of production become established within distinctive

formsof state

; how changes in production relations give rise to configurations of

socialforces

upon which state power may rest; and how

world order

conditions mayimpinge upon these other spheres. Therefore, rather than taking the state as a givenor preconstituted institutional category, consideration is given to the historicalconstruction of various forms of state and the social context of political struggle.This is accomplished by drawing upon the concept of historical bloc and widening atheory of the state to include relations within civil society.

A historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social forces within a specificnational context establish a relationship over contending social forces. It is morethan simply a political alliance between social forces represented by classes orfractions of classes. It indicates the integration of a variety of different classinterests that are propagated throughout society “bringing about not only a unisonof economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity . . . on a‘universal’ plane” (Gramsci 1971, 181–2). The very nature of a historical bloc, asAnne Showstack Sassoon (1987, 123) has outlined, necessarily implies the existenceof hegemony. Indeed, the “universal plane” that Gramsci had in mind was the

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 157 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 7: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

158 MORTON

creation of hegemony by a fundamental social group over subordinate groups.Hegemony would therefore be established “if the relationship between intellectualsand people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, isprovided by an organic cohesion . . . Only then can there take place an exchange ofindividual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders . . . and led, and can theshared life be realized which alone is a social force—with the creation of the‘historical bloc’” (Gramsci 1971, 418).

These issues are encompassed within the focus on different forms of state which,as Cox notes, are principally distinguished by “the characteristics of theirhistoric[al] blocs, i.e. the configurations of social forces upon which state powerultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forces defines in practice thelimits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action,defines, in other words, the

raison d’état

for a particular state” (Cox 1987, 105). Inshort, by considering different forms of state, it becomes possible to analyze thesocial basis of the state or to conceive of the historical “content” of different states.The notion of the historical bloc aids this endeavor by directing attention to whichsocial forces may have been crucial in the formation of a historical bloc or particularstate; what contradictions may be contained within a historical bloc upon which aform of state is founded; and what potential might exist for the formation of a rivalhistorical bloc that may transform a particular form of state (409 n. 10). A widertheory of the state therefore emerges within this framework. Instead of underratingstate power and explaining it away, attention is given to social forces and processesand how these relate to the development of states (Cox 1981, 128). Consideringdifferent forms of state as the expression of particular historical blocs and thusrelations across state/civil society fulfils this objective. Overall, this relationship isreferred to as the state/civil society complex that, clearly, owes an intellectualdebt to Gramsci.

For Gramsci, the state was not simply understood as an institution limited to the“government of the functionaries” or the “top political leaders and personalitieswith direct governmental responsibilities.” The tendency to solely concentrate onsuch features of the state was pejoratively termed “statolatry”: it entailed viewingthe state as a perpetual entity limited to actions within political society (Gramsci1971, 178, 268). It could be argued that certain neorealist, state centricapproaches in international relations succumb to the tendency of “statolatry.”However, according to Gramsci, the state presents itself in a second way, beyondthe political society of public figures and top leaders: “the state is the entirecomplex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not onlyjustifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent ofthose over whom it rules” (244). This second aspect of the state is referred to ascivil society. The realms of political and civil society within modern states wereinseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of theintegral state.

What we can do . . . is to fix two major . . . “levels”: the one that can becalled “civil society,” that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called“private,” and that of “political society” or “the state.” These two levels

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 158 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 8: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 159

correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which thedominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to thatof “direct domination” or command exercised through the state and“juridical” government. (Gramsci 1971, 12)

The state should be understood, then, not just as the apparatus of governmentoperating within the “public” sphere (government, political parties, military) butalso as part of the “private” sphere of civil society (church, media, education)through which hegemony functions (261). It can therefore be argued that the statein this conception is understood as a social relation. The state is not unquestioninglytaken as a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a formof social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed (Poulantzas1978). At an analytical level, then, “the general notion of the state includeselements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sensethat one might say that state = political society + civil society, in other wordshegemony protected by the armour of coercion)” (Gramsci 1971, 263). It is thiscombination of political and civil society that is referred to as the integral statethrough which ruling classes organize intellectual and moral functions as part of thepolitical and cultural struggle for hegemony in the effort to establish an “ethical”state (258, 271).

Once again, the notion of hegemony is therefore extended and more fullydeveloped than in conventional approaches in international relations. Hegemony isunderstood, as Overbeek (1994) has added, as a form of class rule, not primarily asa hierarchy of states. For Cox, class is viewed as a historical category and employedin a heuristic way rather than as a static analytical category (Cox 1987, 355–7, 1996e,57). This means that class identity emerges within and through historical processesof economic exploitation. “Bring back exploitation as the hallmark of class, and atonce class struggle is in the forefront, as it should be” (Ste. Croix 1981, 57). As such,class-consciousness emerges, as E. P. Thompson (1968, 8–9; 1978) has argued, outof particular historical contexts of struggle rather than mechanically deriving fromobjective determinations that have an automatic place in production relations.Hence class identity is captured within the broader notion of social forces. Classidentity is inscribed in social forces, but those are not reducible to class. Other formsof identity are included within the rubric of social forces—ethnic, nationalist,religious, gender, sexual—with the aim of addressing how, like class, these derivefrom a common material basis linked to relations of exploitation (Cox 1992, 35).

The construction of hegemony, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, thereforeoccurs when a leading class transcends its particular economic-corporate interestsand is capable of binding and cohering the diverse aspirations and general interestsof various social forces. Within some neo-Gramscian perspectives, the constructionof hegemony is sometimes referred to as a comprehensive concept of control.

A concept of control represents a bid for hegemony: a project for theconduct of public affairs and social control that aspires to be a legitimateapproximation of the general interest in the eyes of the ruling class and, atthe same time, the majority of the population, for at least a specific period.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 159 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 9: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

160 MORTON

It evolves through a series of compromises in which the fractional, “special”interests are arbitrated and synthesized. (van der Pijl 1984, 7)

4

Reference to the construction of hegemony, or the propagation throughoutsociety of a comprehensive concept of control, may be interchangeable. In eithercase, to paraphrase Gramsci (1971, 181–2), the process involves the “most purelypolitical phase” of struggle and occurs on a “‘universal’ plane” to result in theforging of a historical bloc.

A historical bloc therefore implies the constitution of a radical and novel recon-struction of the relational nature and identity of different interests within a socialformation (Nimni 1994, 107). It indicates an organic link between a diverse groupingof interests that merge forms of class and cultural identity. The construction of ahistorical bloc, Cox (1983, 168) adds, is therefore a national phenomenon and cannotexist without a hegemonic social class. Yet the hegemony of a leading class canmanifest itself as an international phenomenon insofar as it represents the develop-ment of a particular form of the social relations of production. Once hegemony hasbeen consolidated domestically, it may expand beyond a particular social order tomove outward on a world scale and insert itself through the world order (171; 1987,149–50). By doing so it can connect social forces across different countries. “A worldhegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national)hegemony established by a . . . social class” (Cox 1983, 171). The outward expansionof particular modes of social relations of production and the interests of a leadingclass on a world scale can also become supported by mechanisms of internationalorganization. This is what Gramsci (1971, 243) referred to as the “internal andinternational organizational relations of the state”: that is, movements, voluntaryassociations and organizations, such as the Rotary Club, or the Roman CatholicChurch that had an “international” character though rooted within the state. Socialforces may thus achieve hegemony within a national social order as well as throughworld order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of a mode of production.Hegemony can therefore operate at two levels: by constructing a historical bloc andestablishing social cohesion

within

a form of state as well as by expanding a modeof production

internationally

and projecting hegemony through the level of worldorder. The “national” point of departure, however, remains vital. It is within aparticular historical bloc and form of state that hegemony is initially constructed.Yet, beyond this initial consolidation, as hegemony begins to be asserted inter-nationally, it is also within other different countries and particular forms of state thatstruggles may develop as a result of the introduction of new modes of production.

For instance, in Gramsci’s time, this was born out by the expansion of Fordistassembly plant production beyond the United States which would lead to the growingworld hegemony and power of “Americanism and Fordism” from the 1920s and 1930s.The way in which world hegemony may consolidate itself locally within a differentnational setting is illuminated by the following passage: “It is in the concept ofhegemony that those exigencies which are national in character are knotted together

4. For further perspectives developing this notion of hegemonic, or comprehensive, conceptsof control see, Overbeek (1990, 1993) or van der Pijl (1998).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 160 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 10: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 161

. . .

A class that is international in character has

—in as much as it guides social stratawhich are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less thannational: particularistic and municipalistic (the peasants)—

to ‘nationalize’ itself ina certain sense”

(241; emphasis added).As van der Pijl (1989, 12) has noted in relation to this passage, the struggle for

hegemony therefore involves “translating” particular interests, from a particularform of state into forms of expansion that have universal applicability across avariety of different states. Hence the importance of the “national” point of depar-ture. It is within this context that hegemony is initially constructed, prior to outwardexpansion on a world scale, and it is within this context that struggles unfold incontesting hegemony. “The national context remains the only place where anhistoric[al] bloc can be founded, although world-economy and world-political condi-tions materially influence the prospects for such an enterprise . . . [T]he task ofchanging world order begins with the long, laborious effort to build new historic[al]blocs within national boundaries” (Cox 1983, 174).

As indicated above, world hegemony can be attained when international institu-tions and mechanisms support a dominant mode of production and disseminateuniversal norms and ideas, involving the intersubjective realm, in a move to trans-form various state structures. In particular, international organizations can play akey role in adjusting subordinate interests while facilitating the expansion of thedominant economic and social forces (172–3). With this emphasis, three successivestages of world order are outlined by Cox within which the hegemonic relationshipbetween ideas, institutions, and material capabilities varied, and during whichdifferent forms of state and patterns of production relations prevailed. These arethe liberal international economy (1789–1873); the era of rival imperialisms(1873–1945); and the neoliberal world order (post-World War II) (Cox 1987, 109).

Concentrating on the third era, known as pax Americana it is contended that aUnited States-led hegemonic world order prevailed that was maintained through theBretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and institutions like the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions, along with the Group of Seven(G-7) industrialized countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-opment, and the Bank for International Settlements, have been collectively referredto as the “G-7 nexus” (Gill 1995a, 86). They have established mechanisms ofsurveillance to ensure the harmonization of national policies in the attempt toreconcile domestic social pressures with the requirements of a world economy (Cox1981, 145). In the countries of advanced capitalism, the prevailing form of state wasbased on principles of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982). There was a compro-mise between certain domestic social groups (i.e., established labor seeking stabilityand protection from economic and political vulnerabilities) and the interests ofmultilateral institutions in the “G-7 nexus” with the aim of encouraging comparativeadvantage, tariff reductions and international free trade, and increasing the inter-national division of labor through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT). Within this form of state of “embedded liberalism,” Keynesian demandmanagement was promoted alongside Fordist techniques of mass production (Gill andLaw 1988, 79–80). The role of the state was to act as a mediator between the policypriorities of the world economy and domestic groups. This was generally maintained

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 161 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 11: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

162 MORTON

through social relations of production known as tripartite corporatism involvinggovernment-business-labor coalitions. Such arrangements lent priority to centralagencies of government that maintained links between the national and the worldeconomy—to wit, finance ministries, foreign trade and investment agencies, and theoffice of presidents or prime ministers (Cox 1987, 219–30).

5

This situation waseventually accentuated following the world economic crisis of the 1970s and thecollapse of the Bretton Woods system during a period of “structural change” in theworld economy.

Elsewhere in the emerging global political economy, in countries of peripheralcapitalism, the form of state during the post-World War II period of United States-led hegemony was generally based on principles of neomercantilist development.This entailed more state-directed leadership that sought autonomy over the nationaleconomy and growth through a model of import substitution industrialization. Thisform of state was characterized by state corporatist social relations of production.Yet, due to foreign penetration of the national economy, such production relationsdid not encompass the whole economy. There would therefore be overlaps betweendifferent modes, including enterprise and tripartite corporatism as well as subsist-ence agricultural production, organized within a hierarchical arrangement (230–4).In the “embedded liberal” and “neomercantilist” forms of state, however, it isargued that the forms and functions of United States-led hegemony began to alterduring a phase of “structural change” in the 1970s (see Morton 2003b). This conten-tion is based around twin propositions linked to the internationalization of the stateand the internationalization of production. It is commonly argued that these devel-opments precipitated moves toward the phenomenon that is now recognized asglobalization.

Structural Change, Alternative Forms of State, andProduction Relations

The world economic crisis of 1973–4 followed the abandonment of the U.S. dollar/gold standard link and signaled a move away from the Bretton Woods system of fixedexchange rates to more flexible adjustment measures. The crisis involved oil pricerises initiated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) andheightened inflation and indebtedness within the countries of advanced capitalism.The post-World War II “embedded liberal” world order based on Keynesian demandmanagement and Fordist industrialism, involving tripartite, corporatist-type rela-tions between government-business-labor, gave way to a restructuring of the socialrelations of production. This involved the encouragement of social relations ofproduction based on enterprise corporatism, leading a shift in the coalitional basisof various states away from a secure, unionized state sector toward the promotion

5. It is worth noting that though the state form of “embedded liberalism” is referred to by Coxas the “neoliberal state,” this precedent is not followed. This is because confusion can resultwhen using his term and distinguishing it from the more conventional understanding ofneoliberalism related to processes in the late 1970s and 1980s, which he calls “hyper-liberalism.”

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 162 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 12: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 163

of private business interests and the creation of favorable conditions for internation-ally and transnationally oriented business (Cox 1987, chap. 8). Hence a period ofstructural change unfolded in the 1970s during which there was a tendency toencourage, through different state/civil society relations, the consolidation of newpriorities. However, the ongoing changes stemming from the context of 1970sstructural change have been far from uniform. Nevertheless, the rising priorities ofenterprise corporatism—among others, monetarism, supply-side economics, and thelogic of competitiveness—began increasingly to establish, albeit alongside prolongedsocial struggle, a “hegemonic aura” throughout the world order during the 1980s and1990s often referred to as the Reagan-Thatcher model of capitalism (Cox 1991/1996,196). As Craig Murphy has noted, “adjustment to the crisis occurred at different ratesin different regions, but in each case it resulted in a ‘neo-liberal’ shift in govern-mental economic policy and the increasing prominence of financial capital” (1998a,159). During this period of structural change in the 1970s, then, the social basisacross many forms of state altered as the logic of capitalist market relations createda crisis of authority in established institutions and modes of governance (see Morton2003b). This overall crisis, both of the world economy and of social power withinvarious forms of state, has been explained as the result of two particular tendencies:the internationalization of production and the internationalization of the state thatled the thrust toward globalization.

Since the erosion of pax Americana principles of world order in the 1970s, therehas been an increasing internationalization of production and finance driven, at theapex of an emerging global class structure, by a “transnational managerial class”(Cox 1981, 147). Taking advantage of differences between countries, there has beenan integration of production processes on a transnational scale with transnationalcorporations promoting the operation of different elements of a single process indifferent territorial locations. Besides the transnational managerial class, otherelements of productive capital (involved in manufacturing and extraction), includingsmall- and medium-sized businesses acting as contractors and suppliers and import/export businesses, as well as elements of financial capital (involved in bankinginsurance and finance) have been supportive of this internationalization of produc-tion. Hence there has been a rise in the structural power of internationally mobilecapital supported and promoted by forms of elite interaction that have forgedcommon perspectives among business, state officials, and representatives of inter-national organizations favoring the logic of capitalist market relations (Gill and Law1989, 484). While some have championed such changes as the “retreat of the state”(Strange 1996) or the emergence of a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990, 1996), andothers have decried the global proportions of such changes in production (Hirst andThompson 1996; Weiss 1998), it is argued here that the internationalization ofproduction has profoundly restructured—but not eroded—the role of the state. Afterall, “the state as an institutional and social entity . . . creates the possibility for thelimitation of such structural power, partly because of the political goods and serviceswhich it supplies to capitalists and the institutional autonomy it possesses. Thestance of the state towards freedom of enterprise . . . is at the heart of this issue”(Gill and Law 1989, 480).

The notion of the internationalization of the state captures this dynamic by

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 163 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 13: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

164 MORTON

referring to the way transnational processes of consensus formation, underpinned bythe internationalization of production and the thrust of globalization, have beentransmitted through the policy-making channels of governments.

6

The network ofcontrol that has maintained the structural power of capital has also been supportedby an “axis of influence” consisting of institutions within the G-7 nexus (see above).These institutions, along with the Trilateral Commission and other forums, haveensured the ideological osmosis and dissemination of policies in favor of theperceived exigencies of the global political economy. As a result, those stateagencies in close contact with the global economy—offices of presidents and primeministers, treasuries, central banks—have gained precedence over those agenciesclosest to domestic public policy—ministries of labor and industry or planning offices(Cox 1992, 31). It has been argued that this tendency in the transformation of thestate and the role of transnational elites (or a

nébuleuse

) in forging consensusremains to be fully deciphered and needs much more study (30–1). Indeed, theoverall argument concerning the internationalization of the state was based on aseries of linked hypotheses suggestive for empirical investigation (Cox 1996d, 276).Nevertheless, across the different forms of state in countries of advanced andperipheral capitalism, the general depiction is that the state became a transmissionbelt for neoliberalism and the logic of capitalist competition from global to localspheres (Cox 1992, 31).

Although the thesis of the internationalization of the state has received muchrecent criticism, the work of Stephen Gill has greatly contributed to understandingthis process as part of the changing character of United States-centered hegemonyin the global political economy, notably in his detailed analysis of the role of theTrilateral Commission (Gill 1990). Similar to Cox, the global restructuring of produc-tion along post-Fordist lines is located within a context of structural change in the1970s. It was in this period that there was a transition from what Gill recognizes asan

international historical bloc

of social forces, established in the post-World WarII period and centered in the United States but expanding on a world scale. This blocbrought together fractions of productive and financial capital and elements withinstate apparatuses to form a transatlantic political community. Since the 1970s,conditions have emerged for the consolidation of a

transnational historical bloc

,forging links and a synthesis of interests and identities not only beyond nationalboundaries and classes but also creating the conditions for the hegemony of tran-snational capital. While there is reluctance to presume that transnational hegemonyhas thus been attained, it is added that certain social forces have become prominentand have attempted to achieve transnational hegemony.

Yet Gill departs from Gramsci to assert that a historical bloc “may at times havethe potential to become hegemonic,” implying that hegemony need not prevail fora historical bloc to emerge (Gill 1993, 40). The case of the European Economic andMonetary Union is analyzed within the terms of a transnational historical bloc (Gill2001, 54–5). Elsewhere it is added that the consolidation of neoliberalism within sucha bloc is based on supremacy rather than hegemony. Again drawing in principle fromGramsci, it is argued that supremacy prevails when a situation of hegemony

is not

6. For a similar, but competing, interpretation, see Picciotto (1991).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 164 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 14: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 165

apparent and when dominance is exercised through a historical bloc over fragmentedopposition. It is therefore argued that dominant forces within the contemporarytransnational historical bloc of neoliberalism practice a politics of supremacy (Gill1995b, 400, 402, 412).

7

This politics of supremacy is organized through two keyprocesses, the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism, and the concom-itant spread of market civilization.

According to Gill, new constitutionalism involves the narrowing of the social basisof popular participation within the world order of disciplinary neoliberalism. Itinvolves the hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in matters of politicaleconomy, of a set of macroeconomic policies such as market efficiency, disciplineand confidence, policy credibility and competitiveness. It is “the move towardsconstruction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially thenew economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability” (Gill1991; 1992, 165). It results in an attempt to make neoliberalism the sole model ofdevelopment by disseminating the notion of market civilization based on an ideologyof capitalist progress and exclusionary or hierarchical patterns of social relations(1995b, 399). Within the global political economy, mechanisms of surveillance havesupported the market civilization of new constitutionalism in something tentativelylikened to a global “panopticon” of surveillance (1995c). Overall, it is argued by Gillthat these features of new constitutionalism, disciplinary neoliberalism, and marketcivilization are supported by the politics of supremacy rather than hegemony.

The overarching concept of supremacy has also been used to develop an under-standing of the construction of U.S. foreign policy toward the “Third World” and howchallenges were mounted against the US in the 1970s through the New InternationalEconomic Order (Augelli and Murphy 1988). It is argued that the ideological promo-tion of American liberalism, based on individualism and free trade, assured Americansupremacy through the 1970s and was reconstructed in the 1980s. Yet this projectionof supremacy did not simply unfold through domination. Rather than simply equatingsupremacy with dominance, Augelli and Murphy argue that supremacy can be main-tained through domination

or

hegemony (132). As Murphy (1994, 295 n. 8) outlinesin a separate study of industrial change and international organization, supremacydefines the position of a leading class within a historical bloc and can be secured byhegemony as well as through domination. As Gramsci himself states, “the supremacyof a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectualand moral leadership’” (1971, 57). Where the former strain of supremacy involvessubjugation by force, the latter involves leading allied groups. In sum, just ashegemony itself should not be equated with domination, neither should the notionof supremacy suffer the same fate.

In addition to the neo-Gramscian perspectives discussed so far, there also existsa diverse array of similar perspectives analyzing hegemony in the global politicaleconomy. This includes, among others, an account of the historically specific way inwhich mass production was institutionalized in the United States and how thispropelled forms of American-centered leadership and world hegemony in the post-World War II period (Rupert 1995a). Extending this analysis, there has also been

7. The same argument is also apparent in Gill (1998).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 165 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 15: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

166 MORTON

consideration of struggles between social forces in the United States over the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement and globalization (Rupert 1995b, 2000). There havealso been analyses of European integration within the context of globalization andthe role of transnational classes within European governance (Bieler 2000; Bieler andMorton 2001b; van Apeldoorn 2000; Holman and van der Pijl 1996; Holman, Over-beek, and Ryner 1998; Shields 2001, 2003); the internationalization and democratiz-ation of Southern Europe, particularly Spain, within the global political economy(Holman 1996); and analysis of international organizations, including the role ofgender and women’s movements (Lee 1995; Stienstra 1994; Whitworth 1994). Therehas also been a recent return to understanding forms of U.S. foreign policy interven-tion within countries of peripheral capitalism. This has included analyzing thepromotion of polyarchy defined as “a system in which a small group actually rulesand mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elec-tions carefully managed by elites” (Robinson 1996, 49). Polyarchy, or low-intensitydemocracy, is therefore analyzed as an adjunct of U.S. hegemony through institu-tions such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the NationalEndowment for Democracy in the particular countries of the Philippines, Chile,Nicaragua, and Haiti, and tentatively extended with reference to the former Sovietbloc and South Africa. Other recent research has similarly focused on the promotionof “democracy” in Southern Africa (Taylor 2001) as well as the construction andcontestation of hegemony in Mexico (Morton 2002, 2003a, 2003b). Furthermore,aspects of neoliberalism and cultural hegemony have been dealt with in a study ofmass communications scholarship in Chile (Davies 1999). There are clearly a varietyof neo-Gramscian perspectives dealing with a diversity of issues linked to the analysisof hegemony in the global political economy. The next section outlines some of thecriticisms leveled against such perspectives and indicates in what direction currentresearch is proceeding.

Welcome Debate: Controversies SurroundingNeo-Gramscian Perspectives

Since the challenge of neo-Gramscian perspectives to mainstream problem-solvingapproaches in international relations, a more recent period of intellectual andpolitical ferment has arisen. This has involved closer scrutiny of the neo-Gramscianperspectives themselves from a variety of viewpoints. Yet, there has been rareengagement with such criticisms. Beneath the surface impression of claims toopenness, therefore, it seems that, in relation to criticisms, a politics of forgettinghas persisted. Yet, as Steve Smith (1995b) has forewarned, it is incumbent upon suchperspectives to remain self-reflective about possible weaknesses. This section willtherefore outline a series of criticisms made against the perspectives as well ashighlight issues of disagreement with such criticisms.

In broad outline, neo-Gramscian perspectives have been criticized as too unfash-ionably

marxisant

or, alternatively, as too lacking in Marxist rigor. They are seen asunfashionable because many retain an essentially historical materialist position ascentral to analysis—focusing on the “decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 166 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 16: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 167

1971, 161)—but without succumbing to expressions of economism. Hence theaccusation that analysis remains caught within modernist assumptions that take asfoundational the structures of historical processes determining the realms of thepossible (Ashley 1989, 275). However, rather than succumbing to this problem, thefallibility of all knowledge claims is accepted across neo-Gramscian perspectives,which leads to a degree of diffidence about the foundations for knowledge (seeNeufeld 1995). A minimal foundationalism is therefore implied, based on a cautious,contingent, and transitory universalism that combines dialogue between universalvalues and local definitions within historically specific circumstances (Booth 1995;Cox 1995b, 14; Cox 2000b, 46; Linklater 1998, 4–5, 101, 106–7; Rengger and Hoffman1996).

8

Elsewhere, other commentators have alternatively decried the lack ofhistorical materialist rigor within neo-Gramscian perspectives.

According to Peter Burnham (1991), the neo-Gramscian treatment of hegemonyamounts to a “pluralist empiricism” that fails to recognize the central importanceof the capital relation and is therefore preoccupied with the articulation of ideology.By granting equal weight to ideas and material capabilities, it is argued, thecontradictions of the capital relation are blurred, resulting in “a slide towards anidealist account of the determination of economic policy” (81). Hence there is aninability to grapple with the dynamics of globalization because the categories ofstate and market are regarded as opposed forms of social organization that operateseparately, in external relationship to one another. This leads to a supposed reifica-tion of the state as a “thing” in itself standing outside the relationship betweencapital and labor (Burnham 1997, 1999, 2000). Instead, it is recommended that a“totalizing” theory, rooted in central organizing principles, be developed that isattentive to the relations between labor, capital, and the state. To what extent this“totalizing” approach results in a unified view of labor and a heroic vision of theworking class as an undifferentiated mass is, however, an open question.

In specific response to these criticisms, it was outlined earlier in the paper howthe social relations of production are taken as the starting point for thinking aboutworld order and the way they engender configurations of social forces. By thus askingwhich modes of social relations of production within capitalism have been prevalentin particular historical circumstances, the state is not treated as an unquestionedcategory. Indeed, rather closer to Burnham’s own position than he might admit, thestate is treated as an aspect of the social relations of production so that questionsabout the

apparent

separation of politics and economics or states and markets withincapitalism are promoted (see Burnham 1994). Although a fully developed theory ofthe state is not evident, there clearly exists a set of at least implicit assumptionsabout the state as a form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemonyare expressed. Therefore, akin to arguments elsewhere, it is possible from within aneo-Gramscian perspective to raise questions about how different forms of state areestablished and how—through the contradictions of capital—the functions of thestate are revised and supplemented (Holloway and Picciotto 1977).

Additionally, Burnham (1991, 76) argues that the account of hegemony developedacross neo-Gramscian perspectives “is barely distinguishable from a sophisticated

8. These issues are usefully surveyed in George (1994).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 167 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 17: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

168 MORTON

neo-realist account.” Yet this undervalues a critical theory route to hegemony andthe insistence on an ethical dimension to analysis in which “questions of justice,legitimacy and moral credibility are integrated sociologically into the whole and intomany . . . key concepts” (Gill 1993, 24). Ideas are accepted as part of the globalpolitical economy itself, which facilitates recognition of the ideology and normativeelement underpinning a perspective. The production of intersubjective meaningswithin this theory of hegemony is therefore also undervalued. While Burnham’scritique does rightly point to the danger of overstating the role of ideas within neo-Gramscian perspectives (Bieler 1996), the function of intellectual activity acrossstate/civil society relations and the role of consent as a necessary form of hegemonyshould not be overlooked. After all, “ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they arereal historical facts which must be combated and their nature as instruments ofdomination exposed” (Gramsci 1995, 395). The point is therefore not to take theposition of “Theological Marxists” who focus on the “law of value” and the “law ofmotion of capital” as absolute knowledge rather than as hypotheses (Cox 1996c,176). Rather than upholding a fixed notion of historical materialism, the point is tofollow the spirit of Raymond Williams (1977, 3–4) and remain open to a body ofthinking that is active, developing, and unfinished. Therefore, though neo-Gramscianperspectives cannot be separated from historical materialism, they may be distin-guished within it (Smith 1996).

A different series of criticisms have separately centered on the thesis of globali-zation and the internationalization of the state proposed by neo-Gramscian perspec-tives. In particular, Leo Panitch has argued that an account unfolds which is too top-down in its expression of power relations, assuming that globalization is a processthat proceeds from the global to the national or the outside-in. The point thatglobalization is authored by states is thus overlooked by developing the metaphor ofa transmission belt from the global to the national within the thesis of the inter-nationalization of the state (Panitch 1994, 2000). It has been added that this is aone-way view of internationalization that respectively overlooks reciprocal inter-action between the global and the local; overlooks mutually reinforcing socialrelations within the global political economy; or ignores class conflict within nationalsocial formations (Ling 1996; Baker 1999; Moran 1998). The role of the state,following Panitch’s (1994, 74) argument, is still determined by struggles among socialforces located within particular social formations, even though social forces may beimplicated in transnational structures. Instead, it is argued that neo-Gramscianperspectives fail to identify and engage with these contradictions of capitalism. Yet,these issues are not necessarily beyond the scope of a neo-Gramscian conceptualframework.

It will be recalled from the above discussion that the point of departure withinsuch an approach could equally be changing social relations of production

within

forms of state

or

world order (Cox 1981, 153 n. 26). Indeed, Cox’s focus has beenon historical blocs underpinning particular states and how these are connectedthrough the mutual interests of social classes in different countries. Further,following Cox, the national context is the only place where a historical bloc can befounded and where the task of building new historical blocs, as the basis forcounterhegemony to change world order, must begin. Alternatively, though Gill

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 168 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 18: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 169

tends to take a different tack on the application of notions such as historical blocand supremacy, he is still interested in analyzing attempts to constitutionalizeneoliberalism at the domestic, regional, and global levels. As Gill puts it, “there isa growing contradiction between the tendency towards the globality and universalityof capital in the neoliberal form and the particularity of the legitimation andenforcement of its key exploitative relations by the state. Whereas capital tendstowards universality, it cannot operate outside of or beyond the political context,and involves, planning, legitimation, and the use of coercive capacities by the state”(1995b, 422).

Therefore, the emphasis should not be misunderstood. Like attempts elsewhereto grapple with globalization (Radice 1998, 1999, 2000), there is a focus on trans-national networks of production and how national governments have lost muchautonomy in policymaking, but also how states are still an integral part of thisprocess. The overall position adopted on the relationship between the global andthe national, or between hegemony and historical bloc, may differ from one neo-Gramscian perspective to the next, but it is usually driven by the purpose andempirical context of the research. Yet, noting the above concerns, the peculiaritiesof history within specific national historical and cultural contexts should not beoverlooked. It is therefore perhaps important to admit the significance of taking a“national” point of departure—following Gramsci—that involves focusing on theintertwined relationship between “international” forces and “national” relationswithin state/civil society relations that react both passively and actively to themediation of global and regional forces (Showstack Sassoon 2001).

Further criticisms have also focused on how the hegemony of transnationalcapital has been overestimated and how the possibility for transformation withinworld order is thereby diminished by neo-Gramscian perspectives (Drainville 1995).Analysis, notes André Drainville, “must give way to more active sorties againsttransnational neoliberalism, and the analysis of concepts of control must begetoriginal concepts of resistance” (1994, 125). It is therefore important, as PaulCammack (1999) has added, to avoid overstating the coherence of neoliberalism andto identify materially grounded opportunities for counterhegemonic action. All toooften, a host of questions related to counterhegemonic forms of resistance are leftfor future research. Hence the importance of focusing on movements of resistanceand addressing strategies of structural transformation that may be seen as theformation and basis of counterhegemony (Morton 2002).

9

The demonstrations duringthe “Carnival Against Capitalism” (London, June 1999), mobilizations against theWorld Trade Organization (Seattle, November 1999), protests against the Inter-national Monetary Fund and World Bank (Washington, April 2000, and Prague,September 2000), and “riots” during the European Union summit at Nice (December2000), as well as the G-8 meeting at Genoa (July 2001), would all seemingly furtherexpose the imperative of analyzing globalization as a set of highly contested socialrelations. Such demonstrations might even precipitate the realization that globaliz-ation

is

class struggle.

9. For further initial attempts to deal with issues of resistance, see Cox (1999) and Gill (2000,2001). A version of the former is available in Spanish; see Cox (1998).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 169 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 19: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

170 MORTON

The final and most recent criticisms arise from the call for a much neededengagement by neo-Gramscian perspectives with the writings of Gramsci and thusthe complex methodological, ontological, epistemological, and contextual issuesthat embroiled the Italian thinker (Germain and Kenny 1998). This emphasis waspresaged in an earlier argument warning that the incorporation of Gramscian insightsinto international relations and international political economy ran “the risk ofdenuding the borrowed concepts of the theoretical significance in which theycohere” (Smith 1994, 147). To commit the latter error could reduce scholars to“searching for gems” in the

Prison Notebooks

in order to “save” internationalpolitical economy from pervasive economism (Gareau 1993, 301; see also Gareau1996). To be sure, such criticisms and warnings have rightly drawn attention to theimportance of remaining engaged with Gramsci’s own writings. Germain and Kennyalso rightly call for greater sensitivity to the problems of meaning and understandingin the history of ideas when appropriating Gramsci for contemporary application. Insuch ways, then, the demand to remain (re)engaged with Gramsci’s thought andpractice was a necessary one to make and well overdue. However, once such tasksare undertaken, it is clear that problems do arise with some of the key claims madeby Germain and Kenny (Morton 2003c). In particular, they have asked whether theconcept of hegemony can sustain explanatory power beyond the national contextand thus withstand the way hegemony has been “internationalized” within a neo-Gramscian framework (Germain and Kenny 1998, 17). Also, they have claimed thatconcepts such as hegemony, civil society, and historical bloc “were used exclusively”in the grounding of national social formations by Gramsci (20). Yet, once the demandto historicize and develop a wider theoretical and practical reading of Gramsci istaken seriously, these claims are revealed to be somewhat hollow.

Once again the pivotal issue is the “national” point of departure. The notion ofhistorical bloc, as argued above, was certainly limited to

“relations within society”—

involving the development of productive forces, the level of coercion, or relationsbetween political parties that constitute

“hegemonic systems within the state

.

Yetconstant references were made by Gramsci to hegemony based on

“relationsbetween international forces”—

involving the requisites of great powers, sovereigntyand independence that constitute

“the combinations of states in hegemonicsystems”

(Gramsci 1971, 176). Indeed, within Gramsci’s “national” point of depar-ture there was a constant and dialectical juxtaposition between the national andinternational realms.

[T]he internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination whichis “original” and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must beunderstood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishesto dominate them and direct them. To be sure, the line of development istowards internationalism, but the point of departure is “national”—and itis from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective isinternational and cannot be otherwise. (Ibid.: 240)

Moreover, Gramsci himself discussed features of world hegemony and madereference to the “hegemony of the United States” and “American global hegemony”

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 170 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 20: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 171

while also discussing identity movements, voluntary associations, and internationalpublic and private organizations that had an “international” character while main-taining a presence within the “national” realm (Gramsci 1977, 79–82, 89–93; 1992,167–70, 291, 354–5; 1996, 269–71, 282, 318–20). Therefore, rather than an undulynarrow and restrictive reading of Gramsci, it is better to appreciate that the pointof departure for Gramsci was “national” which involved a focus on how social forceswithin this realm were intertwined and shaped by the dialectic of global

and

localsocial forces (Murphy 1998b; Rupert 1998). After all, Gramsci commented on thedynamic of hegemony and treated “both the Renaissance state system and politicswithin the twentieth-century within the same framework and with the sameconcepts” (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 127).

Conclusion

To summarize, this argument has pursued a critical theory route to hegemony thatprovides a distinctive alternative to mainstream international relations theory aswell as so-called structural Marxism that has little practical applicability to concreteproblems. Notably, a case was made for a critical theory of hegemony that directsattention to relations between social interests in the struggle for consensual lead-ership rather than concentrating solely on state dominance, by demonstrating howvarious neo-Gramscian perspectives have developed a particular historical materi-alist focus on and critique of capitalism.

As a result, it was argued that the conceptual framework developed by such neo-Gramscian perspectives rethinks prevalent ontological assumptions in internationalrelations due to a theory of hegemony that focuses on social forces engendered bychanges in the social relations of production, forms of state and world order. It washighlighted how this route to hegemony opens up questions about the socialprocesses that create and transform different forms of state. Attention is thus drawntowards the

raison d’état

or the basis of state power, including the social basis ofhegemony or the configuration of social forces upon which power rests across theterrain of state/civil society relations. With an appreciation of how ideas, institu-tions, and material capabilities interact in the construction and contestation ofhegemony, it was also possible to pay attention to issues of intersubjectivity.Therefore, a critical theory of hegemony was developed that was not equated withdominance and thus went beyond a theory of the state-as-force. Finally, by recog-nizing the different social purpose behind a critical theory committed to historicalchange, this route to hegemony poses an epistemological challenge to knowledgeclaims associated with positivist social science.

In a separate section, the thesis of the internationalization of the state and theinternationalization of production was outlined within which, it was argued, theforms of world hegemony were altered in a period of structural change in theemerging global political economy of the 1970s. Subsequently, a series of criticismswas also outlined concerning the neo-Gramscian perspectives. Analysis can bepushed into further theoretical and empirical areas by addressing some of thesecriticisms. For example, in terms of further research directions, benefit could be

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 171 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 21: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

172 MORTON

gained by directly considering the role of organized labor in contesting the latestagenda of neoliberal globalization (Bieler 2003).

10

It is also important to problema-tize the tactics and strategies of resistances to neoliberalism by giving furtherthought to autonomous forms of peasant mobilization in Latin America, such as theMovimento (dos Trabalhadores Rurais) Sem Terra (MST: Movement of Landless RuralWorkers) in Brazil and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN: ZapatistaArmy of National Liberation) in Chiapas, Mexico (Morton 2002). At a more explicitlytheoretical level, additional work could also be conducted in revealing Gramsci’stheory of the state and then situating this within a wider discussion of state theory(Bieler and Morton 2003).

The overall theoretical and political consequences of such research can beascertained from two angles. First, there is a rejection of objectivist or empiricistclaims to value-free social enquiry dominant throughout the academy. This meansthat, however controversial it may be, there is an emancipatory basis to research.Second, linked to the rejection of such empiricist and positivist knowledge claims,greater emphasis is also accorded the principle of theoretical reflexivity. This entailsreflection on the process of theorizing itself and includes three traits: self-awareness, as much as possible, about underlying premises; recognition of theinherently politico-normative dimension of analysis; and an affirmation that judg-ments about the merits of contending perspectives can be made in the absence of“objective” criteria (Neufeld 1995, 40–1). The advantage of theoretical reflexivityis that an opportunity is left to explain the emergence and social purpose of aparticular perspective and one’s own political position. However, though theory isitself a form of political practice, it is not sufficient—hence the importance of instillinga greater degree of invigorated social engagement within and beyond the practice oftheory to encompass the realm of everyday life. What ultimately matters, then, “isthe way in which Gramsci’s legacy gets interpreted, transmitted and used so that it[can] remain an effective tool not only for the critical analysis of hegemony but alsofor the development of an alternative politics and culture” (Buttigieg 1986, 15).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Andreas Bieler, Joseph Buttigieg, David Ruccio, and theanonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on previous versions of thispaper. The financial support of an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)Postdoctoral Fellowship is also acknowledged (Ref.: T026271041).

References

Althusser, L. 1969.

For Marx

. Trans. B. Brewster. London: Allen Lane.——. 1970. Marxism is not historicism. In L. Althusser and E. Balibar,

Reading Capital,

trans. B. Brewster. London: Verso.

10. Many of Gramsci’s own insights on the conflict between capital and labor, arising frompolitical action within new workers’ organizations known as Factory Councils in Turin duringthe

biennio rosso

(1919–20), can be found in Gramsci (1977, 1978, 1994). Also see the engagingdiscussion in Schecter (1991).

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 172 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 22: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 173

van Apeldoorn, B. 2000. Transnational class agency and European governance: Thecase of the European round table of industrialists.

New Political Economy

5 (2):157–81.

Ashley, R. K. 1984. The Poverty of Neorealism.

International Organization

38 (2):225–86.

——. 1989. Living on border lines: Man, poststructuralism and war. In

International/intertextual relations: Postmodern readings of world politics

, eds. J. Der Derianand M. Shapiro. Toronto: Lexington Books.

Augelli, E. and C. Murphy. 1988.

America’s quest for supremacy and the Third World:A Gramscian analysis

. London: Pinter.——. 1993. Gramsci and international relations: A general perspective with examples

from recent US policy toward the Third World. In

Gramsci, historical material-ism and international relations

, ed. S. Gill. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Baker, A. 1999.

Nébuleuse

and the “internationalization of the state” in the UK?

Review of International Political Economy

6 (1): 79–100.Baldwin, D. A. ed. 1993.

Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate

.New York: Columbia University Press.

Bieler, A. 1996. Neo-Gramscian approaches to IR theory and the role of ideas: Aresponse to Open Marxism. Working paper presented at the 21st annual BritishInternational Studies Association conference, 16–18 December, University ofDurham.

——. 2000.

Globalization and enlargement of the EU: Austrian and Swedish socialforces in the struggle over membership

. London: Routledge.——. 2003. Labour, neoliberalism and the conflict over Economic and Monetary Union:

a comparative analysis of British and German trade unions.

German Politics

12 (2):24–44.

Bieler, A. and A. D. Morton 2001a. The Gordian knot of agency-structure in inter-national relations: A neo-Gramscian perspective.

European Journal of Inter-national Relations

7 (1): 5–35.——. 2001c. Globalization, the state and class struggle: A “critical economy” engage-

ment with Open Marxism.

British Journal of Politics and International Relations

5 (4): Forthcoming.——, eds. 2001b.

Social forces in the making of the new Europe: The restructuringof European social relations in the global political economy

. London: Palgrave.Booth, K. 1995. Human wrongs and international relations.

International Affairs

71(1): 103–26.

Bukharin, N. 1969.

Historical materialism: A system of sociology

. Ann Arbor: Univer-sity of Michigan Press.

Burnham, P. 1991. Neo-Gramscian hegemony and the international order.

Capital &Class

, 45: 73–93.——. 1994. Open Marxism and vulgar international political economy.

Review ofInternational Political Economy

1 (2): 221–31.——. 1997. Globalization: States, markets and class relations.

Historical Materialism:Research in Critical Marxist Theory

. 1 (Autumn): 150–60.——. 1999. The politics of economic management in the 1990s.

New Political Economy

4 (1): 37–54.——. 2000. Globalization, depoliticization and “modern” economic management. In

The politics of change: Globalization, Ideology and critique

, ed. W. Bonefeld andK. Psychopedis. London: Palgrave.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 173 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 23: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

174 MORTON

Buttigieg, J. A. 1986. The legacy of Antonio Gramsci. Boundary 2 14 (3): 1–17.Cammack, P. 1999. Interpreting ASEM: Interregionalism and the new materialism.

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 4 (1): 13–32.Cox, R. W. 1981. Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international

relations theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 (2): 126–55.——. 1983. Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: An essay in method.

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (2): 162–75.——. 1987. Production, power and world order: Social forces in the making of history.

New York: Columbia University Press.——. 1989. Production, the state and change in world order. In Global changes and

theoretical challenges: Approaches to world politics for the 1990s, ed. E.-O.Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau. Toronto: Lexington Books.

——. [1991] 1996f. The global political economy and social choice. In Cox and Sinclair1996.

——. 1992. Global perestroika. In The Socialist Register: New world order?, ed. R.Miliband and L. Panitch. London: Merlin Press.

——. 1994. The forum: Hegemony and social change. Mershon International StudiesReview 38 (2): 366–7.

——. 1995a. Critical political economy. In International political economy: Under-standing global disorder, ed. B. Hettne. London: Zed Books.

——. 1995b. Civilizations: Encounters and transformations. Studies in PoliticalEconomy 27: 7–31.

——. 1996a. Civilizations in world political economy. New Political Economy 1 (2):141–56.

——. [1992]1996b. Towards a posthegemonic conceptualization of world order:Reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun. In Cox and Sinclair 1996.

——. [1992]1996c. “Take six eggs”: Theory, finance and the real economy in the workof Susan Strange. In Cox and Sinclair 1996.

——. [1993]1996d. Production and security. In Cox and Sinclair 1996. ——. [1985]1996e. Realism, positivism, historicism. In Cox and Sinclair 1996. ——. 1997. Reconsiderations. In The new realism: Perspectives on multilateralism

and world order, ed. R. W. Cox. London: Macmillan.——. 1998. Gramsci y la cuestión de la sociedad civil a fines sel siglo xx. In Los estudios

gramscianos hoy, ed. D. Kanoussi. Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés Editores.——. 1999. Civil society at the turn of the millennium: Prospects for an alternative

world order. Review of International Studies 25 (1): 3–28.——. 2000a. Thinking about civilizations. Review of International Studies 26 (Special

Issue): 217–34.——. 2000b. The way ahead: Towards a new ontology of world order. In Critical theory

and world politics, ed. R. Wyn Jones. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.——. 2001. Civilizations and the 21st century. International Relations of the Asia

Pacific 1 (1): 105–30.\Cox, R.W., and T.J. Sinclair, eds. 1996. Approaches to world order. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Davies, M. 1999. International political economy and mass communication in Chile:

National intellectuals and transnational hegemony. London: Macmillan.Drainville, A. 1994. International political economy in the age of open Marxism.

Review of International Political Economy 1 (1): 105–32.——. 1995. Of social spaces, citizenship and the nature of power in the world

economy. Alternatives 20 (1): 51–79.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 174 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 24: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 175

Gareau, F. H. 1993. A Gramscian analysis of the social sciences. International SocialScience Journal 45 (136): 301–10.

——. 1996. International institutions and the Gramscian legacy: Its modification,expansion and reaffirmation. The Social Science Journal 33 (2): 223–35.

George, J. 1994. Discourses of global politics: A critical (re)introduction to interna-tional relations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Germain, R. D., and M. Kenny. 1998. Engaging Gramsci: International relations theoryand the new Gramscians. Review of International Studies 24 (1): 3–21.

Gill, S. 1990 American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

——. 1991. Reflections on global order and sociohistorical time. Alternatives 16 (3):275–314.

——. 1992. The emerging world order and European change: The political economyof European Union. In The Socialist Register: New world order?, ed. R. Milibandand L. Panitch. London: Merlin Press.

——. 1993. Epistemology, ontology and the “Italian school.” In Gramsci, historicalmaterialism and international relations, ed. Stephen Gill. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

——. 1995a. Theorizing the interregnum: The double movement and global politics inthe 1990s. In International political economy: Understanding global disorder, ed.B. Hettne. London: Zed Books.

——. 1995b. Globalization, market civilization and disciplinary neoliberalism. Millen-nium: Journal of International Studies 24 (3): 399–423.

——. 1995c. The global panopticon? The neoliberal state, economic life and demo-cratic surveillance. Alternatives 20 (1): 1–49.

——. 1998. Gramsci, modernidad y globalización. In Los estudios gramscianos hoy,ed. D. Kanoussi. Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés Editores.

——. 2000. Toward a postmodern prince? The battle in Seattle as a moment in thenew politics of globalization. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (1):131–40.

——. 2001. Constitutionalizing capital: EMU and disciplinary neoliberalism. In Socialforces in the making of the new Europe: The restructuring of European socialrelations in the global political economy, ed. A. Bieler and A. D. Morton. London:Palgrave.

Gill, S. and D. Law. 1988. The global political economy: Perspectives, problems andpolicies. London: Harvester and Wheatsheaf.

——. 1989. Global hegemony and the structural power of capital. InternationalStudies Quarterly 33 (4): 475–99.

Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the prison notebooks. Trans. and ed. Q. Hoareand G. Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

——. 1977. Selections from political writings, 1910–1920. Trans. J. Matthews, ed. Q.Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

——. 1978. Selections from political writings, 1921–1926. Trans and ed. Q. Hoare.London: Lawrence and Wishart.

——. 1992. Prison notebooks. Vol. 1. Trans. J. A. Buttigieg and A. Callari, ed. J. A.Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.

——. 1994. Pre-prison writings. Trans. V. Cox, ed. R. Bellamy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

——. 1995. Further selections from the prison notebooks. Trans. and ed. D.Boothman. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 175 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 25: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

176 MORTON

——. 1996. Prison notebooks. Vol. 2. Trans. and ed. J. A. Buttigieg. New York:Columbia University Press.

Hirst, P., and G. Thompson. 1996. Globalization in question: The internationaleconomy and the possibilities of governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Holloway, J., and S. Picciotto. 1977. Capital, crisis and the state. Capital & Class 2:76–101.

Holman, O. 1996. Integrating southern Europe: EC expansion and the transnational-ization of Spain. London: Routledge.

Holman, O., H. Overbeek, and M. Ryner, eds. 1998. Neoliberal hegemony andEuropean restructuring. International Journal of Political Economy 28 (1–2).Special Issues.

Holman, O., and K. van der Pijl. 1996. The capitalist class in the European Union. InThe impact of European integration: Political, sociological and economic changes,ed. G. A. Kourvetaris. Westport: Praeger.

Katzenstein, P., R. O. Keohane and S. D. Krasner. 1998. International Organizationand the study of world politics. International Organization 52 (4): 645–85.

Keohane, R. O. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world politicaleconomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——, ed. 1986. Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press.——. 1989a. International institutions and state power: Essays in international

relations theory. Boulder: Westview Press.——. 1989b. International relations theory: Contributions of a feminist standpoint.

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 18 (2): 245–53.——. 1998. Beyond dichotomy: Conversations between international relations and

feminist theory. International Studies Quarterly 42 (1): 193–8.Lee, K. 1995. A neo-Gramscian approach to international organization: An expanded

analysis of current reforms to UN development activities. In Boundaries inquestion: New directions in international relations, ed. J. Macmillan and A.Linklater. London: Pinter.

Linklater, A. 1998. The transformation of political community: Ethical foundationsof the post-Westphalian era. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ling, L.H.M 1996. Hegemony and the internationalizing state: A post-colonial analysisof China’s integration into Asian corporatism. Review of International PoliticalEconomy 3 (1): 1–26.

Moran, J. 1998. The dynamics of class politics and national economies in globaliza-tion: The marginalization of the unacceptable. Capital & Class 66: 53–83.

Morton, A. D. 2001a. The sociology of theorizing and neo-Gramscian perspectives:The problems of “school” formation in IPE. In Social forces in the making of thenew Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global politicaleconomy, eds. A. Bieler and A. D. Morton. London: Palgrave.

——. 2001b. “La Resurrección del Maíz”: Some aspects of globalization, resistanceand the Zapatista question. Working paper presented at the 42nd annual conven-tion of the International Studies Association, 20–4 February, Chicago.

——. 2002. “La Resurrección del Maíz”: globalization, resistance and the Zapatistas.Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (1): 27–54.

——. 2003a. The Social Function of Carlos Fuentes: A critical intellectual or in the“shadow of the state”? Bulletin of Latin American Research 22 (a): 27–51.

——. 2003b. Structural change and neoliberalism in Mexico: “passive revolution” inthe global political economy. Third World Quarterly 24 (4): 631–53.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 176 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 26: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 177

——. 2003c. Historicizing Gramsci: Situating ideas in and beyond their context.Review of International Political Economy 10 (1): 118–46.

Murphy, C. N. 1994. International organization and industrial change. Cambridge:Polity Press.

——. 1998a. Globalization and governance: A historical perspective. In Globalizationand Europe: Theoretical and empirical investigations, ed. R. Axtman. London:Pinter.

——. 1998b. Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci. Review of InternationalStudies 24 (3): 417–25.

Neufeld, M. 1995. The restructuring of international relations theory. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Nimni, E. 1994. Marxism and nationalism: Theoretical origins of a political crisis.London: Pluto Press.

Ohmae, K. 1990. The borderless world. New York: Fontana.——. 1996. The end of the nation state: The rise of regional economies. New York:

Free Press.Overbeek, H. 1990. Global capitalism and national decline: The Thatcher decade in

historical perspective. London: Routledge.——. 1994. The forum: Hegemony and social change. Mershon International Studies

Review 38 (2): 368–9.——, ed. 1993. Restructuring hegemony in the global political economy: The rise of

transnational neoliberalism in the 1980s. London: Routledge.Panitch, L. 1994. Globalization and the state. In The Socialist Register: Between

globalism and nationalism, ed. L. Panitch and R. Miliband. London: MerlinPress.

——. 2000. The new imperial state. New Left Review, 2nd ser., 2 (March–April):5–20.

Picciotto, S. 1991. The internationalization of the state. Capital & Class 43: 43–63.van der Pijl, K. 1984. The making of an Atlantic ruling class. London: Verso.——. 1989. Ruling classes, hegemony and the state system: Theoretical and historical

considerations. International Journal of Political Economy 19 (3): 7–35.——. 1998. Transnational classes and international relations. London: Routledge.Poulantzas, N. 1978. State, power, socialism. London: New Left Books.Radice, H. 1998 “Globalization” and national differences. Competition and Change

3 (4): 263–91.——. 1999. Taking globalization seriously. In The Socialist Register: Global capitalism

versus democracy, ed. L. Panitch and C. Leys. London: Merlin Press.——. 2000. Responses to globalization: A critique of progressive nationalism. New

Political Economy 5 (1): 5–19.Rengger, N. and M. Hoffman. 1996. Modernity, postmodernity and international

relations. In Postmodernism and the social sciences, ed. J. Doherty, E. Graham,and M. Malek. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, W. I. 1996. Promoting polyarchy: Globalization, US intervention andhegemony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruggie, J. G. 1982. International regimes, transactions and change: Embeddedliberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organization 36 (2):379–415.

Rupert, M. 1995a. Producing hegemony: The politics of mass production andAmerican global power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 177 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 27: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

178 MORTON

——. 1995b. (Re)politicizing the global economy: Liberal common sense and ideo-logical struggle in the US NAFTA debate. Review of International PoliticalEconomy 2 (4): 658–92.

——. 1998. (Re-)engaging Gramsci: A response to Germain and Kenny. Review ofInternational Studies 24 (3): 427–34.

——. 2000. Ideologies of globalization: Contending visions of a new world order.London: Routledge.

Schecter, D. 1991. Gramsci and the theory of industrial democracy. Avebury:Aldershot.

Shields, S. 2001. Transnational social forces and the configuration of Polishtransition: Neoliberalism revisited. Irish Studies in International Affairs 12:21–37.

——. 2003. The charge of the “right brigade”: Transnational social forces and theneoliberal configuration of Poland’s transition. New Political Economy 8 (2):225–44.

Showstack Sassoon, A. 1987. Gramsci’s politics. 2d ed. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.

——. 2001. Globalization, hegemony and passive revolution. New Political Economy6 (1): 5–17.

Smith, H. 1994. Marxism and international relations theory. In Contemporary inter-national relations: A guide to theory, ed. A. J. R. Groom and M. Light. London:Pinter.

——. 1996. The silence of the academics: International social theory, historicalmaterialism and political values. Review of International Studies 22 (2): 191–212.

Smith, S. 1995a. The self-images of a discipline: A genealogy of internationalrelations theory. In International relations theory today, ed. K. Booth and S.Smith. Cambridge: Polity.

——. 1995b. The Canadian-Italian school of international theory. Mershon Inter-national Studies Review 39 (1): 164–6.

——. 2000. The discipline of international relations: Still an American social science?British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2 (3): 374–402.

Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de. 1981. The class struggle in the ancient Greek world fromthe archaic age to the Arab conquests. London: Duckworth.

Stienstra, D. 1994. Women’s movements and international organizations. London:Macmillan.

Strange, S. 1995. The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the worldeconomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, I. 1999. Hegemony, “common sense” and compromise: A neo-Gramsciananalysis of multilateralism in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. Ph.D.diss. University of Stellenbosch.

——. 2001. Stuck in middle GEAR: South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign relations.Westport: Praeger.

Thompson, E. P. 1968. The making of the English working class. Harmondsworth:Penguin.

——. 1978. Eighteenth-century English society: Class struggle without class? SocialHistory 3 (2): 133–65.

Tickner, J. A. 1997. You just don’t understand: Troubled engagements betweenfeminists and IR theorists. International Studies Quarterly 41 (4): 611–32.

——. 1998. Continuing the conversation . . . International Studies Quarterly 42 (1):205–10.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 178 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010

Page 28: Neo Gramscian Perspectives

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 179

Waltz, K. N. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.——. 1990. Realist thought and neorealist theory. Journal of International Affairs 44

(1): 21–37.——. 1998. Interview with Ken Waltz. Interview by F. Halliday and J. Rosenberg, 7

May 1993, London. Review of International Studies 24 (3): 371–86.——. 1999. Globalization and governance. Political Science and Politics 32 (4):

693–700.Weber, C. 1994. Good girls, little girls and bad girls: Male paranoia in Robert

Keohane’s critique of feminist international relations. Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies 23 (2): 337–49.

Weiss, L. 1998. The myth of the powerless state: Governing the economy in a globalera. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Whitworth, S. 1994. Feminism and international relations: Towards a politicaleconomy of gender in interstate and non-governmental institutions. London:Macmillan.

Williams, R. 1977. Marxism and literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Wyn Jones, R., ed. 2000. Critical theory and world politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

01 RMX15-2 Morton (JB/D).fm Page 179 Tuesday, September 30, 2003 9:41 AM

Downloaded By: [University of York] At: 20:14 16 April 2010