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Negotiating integrative collective

labour agreements

Negotiation process factors related to integrative collective labour agreements in the

Netherlands: a comparison of two case studies

Willemien van Helden 5679818

Master thesis Comparative Labour and Organisation Studies, University of Amsterdam

October 2010

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Paul de Beer

Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jelle Visser

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Table of contents

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3

2. Framework of negotiation and collective bargaining ..................................................................... 5

3. Method .......................................................................................................................................... 10

4. Case descriptions ........................................................................................................................... 15

5. Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 23

6. Discussion and conclusion ............................................................................................................. 30

7. Literature ....................................................................................................................................... 33

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1. Introduction

This research was triggered by an observation by Walton and McKersie (1965) in a behavioral theory

of labor negotiations: “one often wonders why under similar circumstances some negotiations

produce innovative solutions and others produce deadlock and conflict” (p. 155). The outcome of

negotiation, in particular collective bargaining as a specific type of negotiation, can be seen as a

product of the negotiation process and its context: economic, institutional and societal (Rojer, 1996).

The classic adversarial relationship between labour and management has been forced into revision.

Especially in the Netherlands, where, faced with increasing competition from abroad and the effects

of the global economic crisis, labour and management have been called upon to work together. One

important way of cooperation for social partners is through collective bargaining, and formulating

collective labour agreements in which this cooperation is agreed upon benefiting both parties. The

focus of this thesis in on Dutch collective labour agreements and on the aspects of the negotiation

process that lead to agreements benefiting both employees and employers (integrative agreements).

In the institutional environment of industrial relations in the Netherlands, several actors are important.

These are the social partners: the tripartite Social Economic Council, bipartite Labour Foundation and

the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. These bodies provide recommendations and policy

advice, typically containing calls for labour and capital, and for employees and employers to work

together to tackle issues that pose challenges for the future. A characteristic of these

recommendations is that they call for cooperation between the social partners, and also often advise

that the collective labour agreement is a method or route to effect these agreements.

The Netherlands are faced with a number of economic and labour problems, and the social partners

have been explicitly identified as actors in accomplishing solutions.

Firstly, as mentioned before, competition from abroad is an issue. To ensure that the Netherlands

remain competitive, initiatives such as increasing the employability of the workforce have been

advanced in the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2006). Another proposed option is

stimulating smarter working methods and labour productivity through collective labour agreements

(Stichting van de Arbeid, 2008). Furthermore, the Social Economic Council has communicated that

work organisation innovation (“sociale innovatie”) is necessary to maintain the current welfare level

and at the same time emphasising the role of social partners to create agreements on the

management of working hours, training and employability, reducing absence through illness,

modernising labour relations, result driven pay and increasing the quality of work (Sociaal

Economische Raad, 2006).

Another, second, future problem concerns labour market issues, in particular the increasingly ageing

workforce. A proposed solution is to increase the labour participation of women (Taskforce deeltijdplus

report, 2010). Increasing work-life balance for both women and men is seen as an important

contributing factor to allow men to work longer (above the age of 65) and women to work more hours a

week. Increasing the opportunities for teleworking contributes to combining work and private life, and

social partners have been called upon to come to agreements to facilitate this (Stichting van de

Arbeid, 2009).

Thirdly, environmental issues are becoming more and more prominent as a problem to be tackled, for

example, traffic congestion. Teleworking is also seen as a partial solution to this problem and one in

which social partners can step in (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2009).

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Lastly, the current economic crisis is a problem the Netherlands are facing and the social pact that

social partners concluded in the spring of 2009 sees a role for social partners, through collective

labour agreements, to put work above income as a way of combating the crisis.

Considering all these policy advices and declarations, one starts to wonder as to what extent these

types of agreements that should be beneficial to employers and employees, are actually present in

collective agreements, and as to what factors are conducive to creating these agreements. Policy is

one thing, but to actually have it in the collective agreement and having social partners agreeing on a

sectoral or company level, is another.

Thus the need to understand and promote integrative collective labour agreements is becoming more

important and with this, understanding the mechanisms that lead to more integrative agreements in

collective bargaining, is important. The question guiding this research is: How can collective labour

agreements in the Netherlands be made more integrative? Understanding what negotiation process

related factors encourage the creation of this type of agreements is important because it gives

practical directions to act on.

Derived from this general question, the research question of this thesis is: to what extent do aspects of

the process of negotiation between social partners explain whether the collective labour agreements

concluded are more or less integrative considering collective bargaining within similar economic

conditions? Methodologically, by keeping the economic context constant, the negotiation process

related factors can be identified. This research has not yet been done in the Dutch context. By

comparing two cases of collective labour agreements within the same economic circumstances, this

study is exploratory in how process and outcome are related in the Dutch context.

A distinction made in labour negotiations (and negotiation theory in general) is between distributive

and integrative bargaining processes and outcomes. According to Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale

(1983) “an agreement is said to be integrative when the negotiators locate and adopt options that

incorporate the needs of both parties and produce solutions of high joint benefit “(p. 1). Integrative

outcomes are seen as win-win outcomes (value creating, mutual gains bargaining,

cooperative/collaborative approach, non-zero-sum game), in which both parties benefit, whereas

distributive outcomes are seen as win-lose in character in which one party gains at the expense of the

other ( win-lose, value claiming, competitive approach, zero-sum game). Classically, collective

bargaining has focused on distributive elements and it still always contains these elements when it

comes to wages. Yet there is an incentive to create more integrative agreements in order to deal with

the challenges that both employers and employees are facing.

The structure of this paper is as follows: first the theory on negotiations will be explained, followed by

empirical literature on the relationship between the negotiation process and integrative agreements

and the formulation of the hypotheses to guide the research. Next, the methodology used in this

exploratory case study design research will be described, followed by the case descriptions of the two

cases. Subsequently, the cases will be analysed by means of the hypotheses. Lastly, the results will

be discussed and concluded.

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2. Framework of negotiation and collective bargaining

2.1. Theory of negotiations

A definition of negotiation is “a process by which two or more parties attempt to resolve their opposing

interests” (Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, 2010). Characteristic of negotiation is the interdependence

between parties, in which each needs to give in to the other in order to achieve the outcome they

prefer.

In this part a short overview will be given of the two broad perspectives of looking at negotiations: the

rational (game theory) perspective and the behavioural perspective. These have been converging over

the years (e.g. in behavioural economics), but elements of both perspectives can be useful in studying

negotiations. Negotiation has been studied in a large variety of disciplines, ranging from economics, to

sociology to psychology and management. The rational or game theoretical perspective is based on a

mathematical and classical economical way of looking at negotiations. It assumes humans act purely

to maximise their personal advantage. From a rational perspective, negotiation is seen as “an

economic exchange that is conceptually isolated from the noneconomic bonds between the parties,

their history, and their future relationship” (Greenhalgh & Lewicki, 2003, p 20)

The prisoner‟s dilemma is the most classic example of a rational perspective. The concept of the

prisoner‟s dilemma is that exploitation of the other party results in a higher „utility‟ or gain for the

exploiting party than mutual cooperation. Yet mutual cooperation results in a higher utility than mutual

noncooperation, which in turn creates a higher utility than being exploited. So, summarising in terms of

utility:

Exploitation of other > mutual cooperation > mutual noncooperation > exploitation by other.

The structure of the prisoner‟s dilemma directs the actors to the non cooperative option as the most

rational option for a party (as you gain maximum). The paradox is that if both parties do not cooperate,

they lose more that if they would both cooperate. The strong interdependent character of negotiation is

apparent here. If the game would be a repeated game this would mean that each time, each party

would defect. Yet in reality this is not the case.

A contribution of game theory important to this study is the concept of repeated game and the

negotiators dilemma. These aspects have been further incorporated in the behavioural schools. The

dynamics of a game change when it becomes a repeated game. This makes punishment in case of

non-cooperation possible, as well as reward in case of cooperation. In negotiation, the prisoner‟s

dilemma, also known as the negotiator‟s dilemma (Lax and Sebenius, 1986), refers to the tension that

exists between cooperating to increase your gain and not cooperating to avoid being exploited.

Axelrod (1984) described the tit for tat strategy as a way of managing this negotiator‟s dilemma in

which a party acts cooperatively, in order to elicit a cooperative response, but responds with a

“punishment” of noncooperative behaviour if the other acts noncooperatively in order not to be

exploited. This tit-for-tat strategy is only possible for negotiations that are repetitive in character,

because they allow for successive actions to be punished or rewarded. Collective bargaining, as an

infinite and repeated game, allows for punishment and reward tactics.

Game theory has given some insights into negotiations, but the general critique of the rational

perspective is that it is an oversimplification of reality and has failed to take into account the complex

human interaction that takes place during the process of negotiation. Therefore, behavioural theory

has been developed to provide for a more realistic way to explain behaviour.

The idea of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) showed that whereas the pure rational perspective

assumes that actors have full information and then choose the optimal option, actors rarely do have

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full information about their options or of the other party. Therefore, it can be expected that the more

information is exchanged between parties, the better the solution.

Walton and McKersie (1965) provided a model of labour negotiations focussing on the negotiation

process in which four sub processes can be indentified: integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining,

attitudinal structuring and intraorganisational bargaining. Both the integrative bargaining process and

the distributive bargaining processes are joint decision making processes, whereas the attitudinal

structuring and intraorganisational bargaining processes are both processes aimed at managing

relationships. Attitudinal structuring deals with the relationship between two negotiating parties, and

intraorganisational bargaining deals with the relationships within parties between negotiators and their

constituencies.

The process of integrative bargaining involves the activities that allow for common problems between

two parties to be addressed. The aim is to find common interests and solutions to the problems that

satisfy the interests of both parties. Three conditions facilitating problem solving are identified, the first

being that both parties have the motivation to solve the problem. Secondly, information and language

are important, to the extent that the actors must be able to access relevant information and possess

the language and communication skills to exchange the information. The risks of low levels of

information are detrimental to the problem definition, the number of alternatives designed, the

examinations of the possible consequences and the overall quality of the solutions. Lastly, trust is an

important facilitating condition for several reasons according to Walton and McKersie (1965): trust

allows for actors to assess the information provided more accurately, and leads to more creativity and

experimenting with ideas. A lack of trust on the other hand, leads to distortion of information from the

sender to the receiver and leads to defensive behaviour which takes focus away from the problem

solving. The three conditions may also be interrelated, as higher trust may lead to more information

exchange, or vice versa.

The process of distributive bargaining involves activities of a party to attain its goals while these are in

conflict with the goals and interests of the other party. This is similar to the zero-sum perspective of

game theory, in which one party‟s gain is the other party‟s loss. Walton and McKersie (1965) call the

topics around which one party‟s gain is the other party‟s loss “issues”.

The third sub process is attitudinal structuring. This refers to the activities of both parties to influence

their mutual relationship and attitudes. Attitudinal structuring addresses the non substantive aspect of

negotiations, as negotiations also produce an outcome in the relationship. The dimensions that lead

to specific attitudes are: the motivational orientation towards each other, beliefs about the other‟s

legitimacy, feelings of trust towards the other and lastly feelings of friendliness- hostility towards the

other.

Intraorganisational bargaining is the final sub process. The negotiators of the parties are

representatives of their constituencies i.e. unions represent the employees and the employer

delegation represents the company or organisation. There may be tension between the interests and

behaviour of the representatives and their constituency, also known as the principal-agent problem.

Intraorganisational bargaining refers to the negotiation within a party between the agents and the

principal to build consensus as these two may not always be fully aligned to begin with. According to

Walton and McKersie, the union steward may be more subject to intraorganisational bargaining and

constituency pressure than company representatives because unions are political organisations with

elected representatives.

The four sub processes are not completely independent, and they may occur simultaneously. For

example, labour negotiations often contain both distributive potential e.g. wages, and integrative

potential, creating a mixed motive negotiation and thus collective bargaining would show signs of both

processes. Also, intraorganisational bargaining issues may interfere with integrative bargaining as

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pressure from constituencies can affect to what extent negotiators can engage in integrative

bargaining. Also, low trust from the attitudinal structuring process can inhibit integrative bargaining.

In sum, in such a complex situation as collective bargaining with multiple issues and many different actors, where moreover the negotiations are a repeated game and parties have constituencies, the process aspect of the negotiations becomes important in understanding the outcomes. The behavioural theory is a helpful theory to analyse collective bargaining processes. The process eventually leads to outcomes. The empirical evidence on how process and outcomes are related will be explained in the next section.

2.2. Integrative outcomes and the negotiation process

In the empirical literature, several factors have been distinguished that contribute to more integrative

agreements in general and in labour negotiations specifically. Similar to the main theoretical

perspectives, these insights have come from different disciplines and approaches. Some of these

factors are more psychological, referring to negotiators‟ personality traits that contribute to more

integrative agreements (e.g. Barry & Friedman, 1998), and gender (Calhoun & Smith, 1999 and

Rognes & Schei, 2010), but the focus of this research is on the process related factors.

Garaudel et al. (2008) identified several factors that contributed to integrative bargaining between

unions and management in two cases of French restructuring. They emphasise that the relationship

pattern of cooperation and mutual trust increased integrative agreements. Friedman (1993) and

Peterson, Tracy and Cabelly (1981) found that trust between the negotiating parties was an important

factor in successful mutual gains bargaining in labour negotiations. This importance of trust is

consistent with Walton and McKersie‟s theoretical claim that trust between parties is an important

facilitator in creating integrative agreements. Thus, a hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of trust between employer and union before and during the

negotiation process, the more integrative the collective labour agreement.

The literature has identified different types of trust in negotiations. Two types advanced by Lewicki and

Bunker (1995, 1996), and Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992) are knowledge based trust and

identification based trust. Knowledge based trust is trust one has in another because his behaviour

can be predicted. Identification based trust includes a cooperative motivational orientation and full

understanding of the other‟s preferences and interests.

Next to trust, Information exchange has been empirically found to improve chances of finding

integrative solutions. (Butler, 1999; Thompson 1991). The other way round, lack of information

exchange was also found to decrease possibilities for creating integrative agreements (Butler, 1999).

Thus, another hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: The more exchange of information shared between employers and unions before and

during the negotiation process, the more integrative the collective labour agreement.

There is a difference between integrative bargaining as a process and integrative outcomes. However,

it is more likely that integrative bargaining activities will lead to more integrative outcomes as the

search for integrative outcome through integrative bargaining will lead to more integrative outcomes.

Rognes and Schei (2010) in their comparison of various studies found that integrative bargaining

approach led to more satisfactory integrative agreements. In another study, integrative bargaining

was found to create more mutual gains in collective labour agreements, especially on topics that

address the relationship between parties and the labour contract (Paquet, Gaétan & Bergeron, 2000).

Thus, another hypothesis is:

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Hypothesis 3: The more integrative bargaining by employers and unions during the negotiation

process, the more integrative the collective labour agreement.

Going back to the negotiator‟s dilemma ( tension arising from pursuing joint interests - through

integrative bargaining - may worsen the bargaining position, but at the same time, pursuing

competitive interests - through distributive bargaining - may squander the opportunity of finding

solutions to improve the position of both sides), it could be said that if parties have enough trust,

enough information exchange and engage in integrative bargaining, they are able to overcome the

negotiator‟s dilemma and effectively conclude integrative agreements.

As can be seen from the theory and various empirical results, the process related aspects of trust,

information sharing and integrative bargaining are important in integrative outcomes. They may be not

fully independent (for example: higher trust may lead to more information exchange, and integrative

bargaining may entail exchanging information) but for the purpose of this study, they will be treated

separately. To what extent do aspects of the process explain the outcomes of the level of

integrativeness of collective labour agreements?

2.3. Context of collective bargaining in the Netherlands

This section explains the context of collective bargaining in the Netherlands as well as the usual

process of collective bargaining. The Netherlands are a coordinated market economy (Hall and

Soskice, 2001) and collective bargaining is a highly institutionalised process and an integral part of

industrial relations. A collective labour agreement contains agreements about the terms of

employment between one or more employers (organisations) and one or more employee

organisations (trade unions) for a particular group of employees. The collective labour agreement may

also contain other provisions, such as mutual obligations and agreements to organise and finance

mutual activities (Labour Foundation, 2004). Benefits of collective bargaining have been industrial

peace and fewer transaction costs involved in organisations negotiating terms of employment with

each individual employee.

Collective labour agreements are made at an enterprise level or at a sectoral level. From a legal

perspective, two laws govern collective labour agreements. The first is the Law on the collective labour

agreement (Wet CAO, 1927). The second is the law that regulates the coverage of collective labour

agreements to encompass also those who are employed by companies not taking part in collective

bargaining but in the same sector (De Wet op het algemeen verbindend en het onverbindend

verklaren van bepalingen van CAOs, 1937, Law on mandatory extension). In order for a collective

labour agreement to be deemed generally binding, a request must be placed and acknowledged by

the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

At the time this research was conducted, mid 2010, the economic context of the Netherlands was

influenced by the consequences of the global economic crisis. The social pact of spring 2009

concluded by social partners stated that employment would be put above income as a way to combat

the economic crisis.

The nature of Dutch collective bargaining holds that employee interests are represented by a

combination of unions. This is also known as union pluralism. Furthermore, collective bargaining is a

multi-issue negotiation, as topics such as employability and safety are addressed, next to wages. In

collective bargaining, the different unions representing the employees usually work together with the

largest union delivering the spokesperson for the negotiations.

The process of collective bargaining in the Netherlands involves both unions and employers collecting

constituency demands and formulating demand letters. These demands shape the agenda of the

negotiations. The negotiations usually consist of several negotiation rounds after which three types of

outcomes are possible: agreement in principal („principeakkoord‟), bargaining result

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(„onderhandelingsresultaat‟) or final offer („eindbod‟). With an agreement in principal, the negotiations

have stayed within their mandate and present the collective labour agreement to their constituencies

with a positive advice. In the case of a bargaining result, the parties have not stayed within their

mandate and the result is presented to the constituency with either a negative or neutral advice. In the

case of final offer, the parties have not been able to agree. The constituencies either accept or reject

the result of the negotiations, leading to the creation and signing of a collective labour agreement if

accepted or going back to the negotiation table if rejected.

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3. Method

3.1. Research design and method

The research followed a case study research design with data collection conducted in two stages.

First two collective labour agreements were chosen as case studies that differed in the rate of

integrativeness. Subsequently, information on the negotiation processes was gathered using semi-

structured interviews with union executives and employer representatives.

3.2. Case selection: Integrative agreements in Dutch collective labour agreements

Since the research question focuses on the process of collective bargaining, the context i.e. economic

situation of the organisation was kept stable by choosing two cases from the same sector and same

period of time, so that the external influences such as social pacts concluded, or the economic crisis,

would have affected both. Moreover, the cases were negotiated recently, to diminish the effects of

reduced memory recollection.

The case selection was done by gathering information and suggestions from experts in the field of

collective labour agreements and collective bargaining in the Netherlands. These suggestions were

investigated. Within the available time and resources, the cases of the Water boards and the

Watercompanies were found to be suitable and the negotiators were willing to cooperate in the

research.

Two observations were made during the case selection. Firstly, when collective agreements are made

in the same sector, they often imitate each other in terms of employment and collective agreement

(presumably because they want to eliminate competitive advantage of the other, or simply because

the union negotiators are the same and have the same points of view in both cases). Secondly, where

the agreements do differ in collective agreements within a sector, they are often on a different level,

for example a sectoral collective agreement or a company level agreement.

The two cases of collective labour agreements that were examined were similar enough to be

compared in that they were constructed under similar economic contexts as both had public duties

and government ties (the water chain sector) and matching level of collective labour agreement i.e.

both sectoral collective labour agreements. Yet the two cases differed in the number of integrative

agreements in the collective labour agreement, thus being different enough to allow for a comparison.

The level of integrativeness in Dutch collective labour agreements was defined and operationalised by

considering the number of agreements in the collective labour agreement that aim to increase the

productivity of the employees, without negatively affecting their work load or causing a proportional

cost increase for the employers.

From the policy advices and declarations and literature, several indicators of integrative agreements

for both employees and employers in collective labour agreements can be distilled. Qualitative topics

are more likely to have integrative potential than topics with pure economic values, such as wages

(Walton and McKersie, 1965). The indicators that have been defined are:

1. Employability. This refers to agreements that increase the human capital of employees,

making it easier for them to find a new job within or outside of the current organisation of

employment, thereby increasing their value. At the same time, the employer benefits by

obtaining better skilled employees with increased productivity or by a reduction in

outplacement costs when an employee is made redundant.

2. Flexible terms of employment. Agreements which allow for more flexible terms of employment allow for employees to choose the terms of employment that best fit their

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needs at different periods of their lives. This is expected to lead to a better work-life balance, beneficial to both employee and employers, and at the same time does not increase costs for the employer, as it only implies a reshuffling of the already present terms of employment

3. Employment relations on organisational level. Involves agreements to improve

employment relations between social partners in an organisation, through, for example, working groups to tackle joint issues. (Pacquet, Gaéton & Bergeron, 2000)

Three aspects of work organisation innovation („Sociale innovatie‟), which by definition entails

an advantage for both employers and employees, are also indicators of integrative

agreements (Startnota CSI, 2006).

4. Flexible ways of organising. This entails the organisation of working time, such as different daily, monthly, quarterly or yearly windows of working hours, and more control of employees over working hours, resting times such as individual scheduling (Pot, Peltzer and Xavier, 2007 and Pacquet, Gaéton & Bergeron, 2000). Moreover, arrangements (technological, organisational aspects) to facilitate time- and location- independent working („Het Nieuwe Werken‟) are part of flexible ways of organising the work force. An important aspect is increased freedom and responsibility of the employees to organise their work.

5. Dynamic management involves new ways of management, for example when trust plays

an important role

6. Working smarter involves effective production of goods and services and at the same time taking into consideration the interests of the organisation and the employees. It involves improvements and innovations that increase the quality of the products, keep the costs under control and decrease the stress on employees. (Sociaal Economische Raad, 2006)

Table 1 below shows the integrative agreements of both Water boards and Watercompanies cases.

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Table 1:

Integrative agreements in the collective labour agreements of the Watercompanies and the Water

boards.

Types of integrative agreements

Collective labour agreement

Water boards

Watercompanies

Employability

Career guidance with career budget (loopbaaan traject met loopbaanbudget)

Second career with career budget possibilities ( tweede loopbaan met loopbaan budget)

Stimulating labour participation of older workers (arbeidsparticipatie ouderen (stimuleren langer doorwerken)

Training budget per employee aimed at current job (inzetbaarheidsbudget)

Employability budget per employee, aimed at future jobs within or outside the organisation

Flexible terms of employment Individual choice budget (individueel keuzebudget)

Flexible employment conditions budget (Flexibel arbeidsvoorwaarden budget)

Employment relations on organisational level

Research into the impediments and possibilities of flexible working arrangements such as self scheduling and training for management and works councils in social innovation and “the New way of working” (onderzoek naar belemmeringen en mogelijkheden flexibeler werken vb zelf roosteren, training en voor management en medezeggenschap over SI, Het Nieuwe Werken)

-

Flexible ways of organising Arrangements to increase possibilities of telework (telewerken)

Arrangements for volunteer aid givers (mantelzorger) such as flexible working hours.

Increasing the possible working hours

(verruiming dagvenster)

Expansion of the system of

Arrangements to increase possibilities of telework (telewerken)

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overtime and „undertime‟ across a year so that employers and employees have more flexibility to organise work (plus en min uren systematiek verruimd zodat meer flexibiliteit)

Dynamic management

- -

Working smarter

- -

Total number of integrative agreements

9 4

Thus, this overview shows that the collective labour agreement of the Water boards in total contains

more integrative agreements than the collective labour agreement of the Watercompanies, and also

covers more topics of integrative agreements. Not all topics of integrative agreements are covered by

the two water cases. This could be due to the nature and culture of a sector, which makes it more

suitable for some types of integrative agreements than others.

The general hypotheses formulated in the theoretical section can be translated into specific

expectations related to these two cases:

Hypothesis 1: The process of collective bargaining in the Water boards is expected to contain higher

levels of trust between employers and unions than the process of collective bargaining in the

Watercompanies.

Hypothesis 2: The process of collective bargaining in the Water boards is expected to contain more

exchange of information before and during negotiation by employers and unions than the process of

collective bargaining in the Watercompanies.

Hypothesis 3: The process of collective bargaining in the Water boards is expected to contain more

integrative bargaining by employers and unions than the process of collective bargaining in the

Watercompanies.

3.3. Interviews

For both cases, one employer representative and one union representative were approached and

interviewed in order to obtain a complete picture of the negotiation processes. For the Water boards‟

case the secretary chairperson of the Union of Water boards was interviewed as well as the union

executive of the Abvakabo FNV union. For the Watercompanies‟ case, the secretary chairperson of

the employers association of the Watercompanies and the union executive of the CNV publieke zaak

union were interviewed. Due to the time constraints for the research, only one interview for each party

was conducted.

The semi-structured interviews started with an open question “could you tell me about the negotiation

process concerning the most recent collective labour agreement?”. Based on the interviewees‟ stories,

clarifying questions were asked with the aid of an interview guide to delve deeper into answers that

would provide information on the topic of the three hypotheses: trust between union and employer,

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information exchange between union and employer and knowledge and practice of integrative

bargaining of both parties.

The phases of the collective bargaining process were used to help structure the interviewees‟ stories

(see figure 1).

Figure 1: Phases of the negotiation process

3.4. Information processing

Next to the information collected through the semi-structured interviews, documents on the negotiation

process such as demand letters, communiqués were also examined. However, they did not contain

much additional information to the interviews but helped in structuring the chain of events. To capture

the information on trust, information exchange and integrative bargaining several indicators were

prepared beforehand. Some responses from the interviews provided information about more than one

hypothesis.

The level of trust between union and employers was identified by looking at such aspects as the

number of informal meetings in the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases, the length of the

negotiation phase and statements made by the interviewees about the relationship with the other

party. The literature has identified different types of trust in negotiations, as mentioned before.. This

distinction between knowledge based trust and identification based trust proved useful in

understanding the trust demonstrated in the Watercompanies case, as explained further below.

The extent of information exchange was identified by the number of meetings held between parties,

the extent to which the demand letters contained surprises, or the number of surprises during the

negotiation process.

The knowledge and application of integrative bargaining was recognised by two factors in the

interviews. Firstly, the strategy and style of negotiating the interviewees said they had at the start of

the process was an indication. A second indication was the actual manifestation of integrative

bargaining during the negotiation.

Lewicki, Barry and Saunders (2009) identified a number of characteristics of integrative negotiation (p.

72):

Focus on commonalities rather than differences

Attempt to address the needs and interests, not positions

Commit to meeting the needs of all involved parties (Did you feel that you understood the priorities

of the opposing team (person) in the negotiation?)

Exchange information and ideas

Invent options for mutual gain

Use objective criteria for standards of performance.

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4. Case descriptions

The two cases of the Water boards and the Watercompanies in this research are both part of the

water chain. The concluded collective labour agreements are both on the sectoral level, meaning the

collective labour agreement of the Water boards is applicable to all Water boards in the Netherlands,

and the collective labour agreement of the Watercompanies is applicable to all the Watercompanies

that are member of the employers organisation of Watercompanies. Both collective bargaining

processes took place in the same time frame between 2008 and 2010, which meant they were

affected by the same external circumstances such as the spring 2009 social partner pact and the

economic crisis. Both organisations are also linked to the public sector, with the provinces and

municipalities owning part of the Watercompanies and the Water boards being public official entities,

which is also demonstrated by the fact that the unions present are form the public sector blocks of the

unions (CNV publieke zaak, FNV Abvakabo).

The following section contains an introduction to both cases including the aim of the organisations, the

context of the collective bargaining process and the actors and a description of the events of the

negotiation process following three phases of the process: the pre-negotiation phase, the negotiation

phase and the finalising phase. The comparison of the process will be discussed in chapter 5.

4.1. The Water boards

The Union of Water boards consists of twenty six Water boards, with a total of 11000 employees. The

aim of the Water boards is to ensure clean waters, including the purification of waste water, protection

of the country against flooding and controlling the volume of surface water. The case description of the

Water boards refers to the negotiations leading up to the collective labour agreement 2009-2011

concluded by the unions and the Union of Water boards representing the employers.

Context

Certain events and circumstances have impacted the negotiations of the Water boards‟ collective

labour agreement 2009-2011. Firstly, the negotiations took place within the context of the social pact

that had been concluded between social partners on a national level. This social pact, agreed upon in

March 2009, stated that the economic crisis necessitates prioritisation of employment above income.

This meant that resources must be used for job security and employability and training measures

rather than for income increase. The main purpose of the social pact is to maintain the purchasing

power of all employees and consumers. The pact influenced the position of social partners in the

Water boards case regarding the topic of wage increases.

A second contextual aspect and also an effect of the economic crisis was the loss of capital of

speculating pension funds. The Water boards‟ pension fund was one of the pension funds that had

lost greatly in the crisis, and therefore had informed the Water boards that they would be increasing

their pension dues. This meant that employers‟ contributions for the pensions would also increase.

Thirdly, even though the Water boards enjoy a degree of independence from politics and other

governmental organisations because they raise their own taxes, they are at the same time facing

economising measures. The Water boards are affected by discussions on the division of tasks within

the public sector, particularly between the Ministry of Waterways and Public Works, the Water boards

and the municipalities. Furthermore, there is a current political discussion on the future of the Water

boards, and the Water boards have committed themselves to a retrenchment of 100 million euro‟s.

There is also political pressure on the Watercompanies not to increase the water prices, which affects

the Water boards as well as they are the supplier of the clean water that the Watercompanies deliver

16

to consumers. This economising has also affected the negotiations of the collective labour agreement

and the employers‟ financial leverage.

A last contextual aspect which interfered with the negotiations was that the cabinet, and the minister of

interior affairs in particular, had been following the negotiations with the Water boards closely to keep

track of how the employers proceeded with sticking to the income freeze called for in the social pact. It

was important for the Water boards from an employer‟s point of view to demonstrate externally to

politics and the general public that they were not a rich sector and were not offering any income raise.

The cabinet was pushing for this because an income increase for the employees of the Water boards

would mean a spill over effect could take place and other sectors would demand the same.

Actors

Two delegations of negotiators were involved in the collective bargaining, a union and an employer

delegation. The union delegation consisted of three unions: Abvakabo FNV, CNV publieke zaak and

CMHF. Both the Abvakabo FNV and CNV Publieke zaak unions were represented by a union

executive (vakbondsbestuurder) from the central union and a union steward (kaderlid) from within the

organisation. As is customary in collective bargaining in the Netherlands, the largest union also acts

as a spokesperson. In this case, the interviewed Abvakabo FNV union executive was also the

spokesperson. The employers were represented by a delegation consisting of the secretary director of

the Union of Water boards (management level), two dike wardens (with political responsibility) a policy

adviser of the Union of Water boards specialised in terms of employment and a secretary chairperson.

Furthermore, the employers‟ delegation consisted of an adviser from the General Employers‟

Association of the Netherlands (AWVN).

All three lead negotiators on the union side were new to the process i.e. they had not previously been

involved with collective bargaining in this specific collective labour agreement. The negotiator

interviewed for the union side was from the Abvakabo and had nine years of negotiating experience.

This was the first time he negotiated in the Water boards‟ collective labour agreement. He had

previously negotiated in the municipality collective labour agreement as second negotiator. On the

employers‟ side, the secretary director and the secretary chairperson were both new to collective

bargaining. The secretary chairperson of the union of Water boards was interviewed for this research

to represent the employers‟ side. The union density in the Water boards is 33%.

Pre-negotiation phase

The prepatory pre-negotiation commenced in March 2009. During this phase the employer

representatives and the three unions (FNV Abvakabo, CNV Publieke Zaak and CMHF) prepared their

demands. The employers‟ delegation formulated their demands based on their general agenda for

terms of employment and the mandate for the agenda points was confirmed by the members. At the

same time, a working group consisting of union members and employers presented their advice on

increasing flexibility and extension of the annual bonus, a decision which had been agreed upon in the

former collective labour agreement. Parallel to the preparation period, regular meetings between

employer and unions continued, as is usually the case throughout the year. Apart from the advice on

the working group and the regular meetings, there was no further exchange of information during the

preparation phase.

The interviews of the union executive and the secretary chairperson of the Union of Water boards

differed in that, according to the secretary chairperson, there were regular meetings between unions

and employers during the pre-negotiation phase, as well as the joint working group results, whereas

the union executive maintained there was no exchange of information at all (formal or informal) during

the pre-negotiation phase.

17

The three unions prepared for the negotiations jointly and agreed on the themes they wished to

address. For the unions, retaining purchasing power and employment were the most important items.

They indicated they were prepared to moderate wages in exchange for clear agreements on job

security. The unions also wanted to strengthen the control employees had over working hours, work-

life balance and working from home. The social pact agreed on by social partners in spring 2009 was

leading in their demands. The unions also coordinated their demands with those in other „lower‟

government bodies, such as the municipalities and provinces.

Negotiation phase

On August 31st, at a specified time, the demand letters were exchanged by email. Shortly following

the exchange a meeting was held to explain and clarify the content of the demand letters. The

secretary director of the Union of the Water boards acted as chairman of the meeting and he initiated

the process of jointly seeking the common themes that were to be found in the demand letters. The

four themes that emerged were „employee development and career flexibility‟, „work-life balance‟,

„modernising terms of employment‟ (e.g. individual choice budget) and „maintaining purchasing power‟

and the „pay/wages paragraph‟. The unions‟ representative stated and then discussed with the

employers‟ delegation that their starting point would be the social pact that had been decided upon in

spring, which meant maintaining purchasing power and job security. According to the unions, the

employers agreed to this point of departure.

The search for these common themes took three formal meetings and consisted of discussions that

aimed to clarify the underlying motives for the wishes of both parties. Questions asked were: what do

you aim to achieve, how to achieve this, what would be the best route. For example, unions requested

a job rotation measure and employers wanted an „algemene dienst‟ („general service‟ meaning

employees are not pinned to one job and job title but may change from time to time). Eventually both

discovered for this topic that they both wanted the same i.e. a way to increase employability and

create flexibility as well as interesting career opportunities. The bottleneck was that the expression

„algemene dienst‟ was one with negative connotations for the unions. Once parties had discovered

this, they were able to move on with the discussions.

In October and November working groups met to discuss the practical implications of the first three

themes and calculate the effects. The theme of maintaining purchasing power and wages was not

treated in the working groups, but was explicitly left for a later date. These working groups consisted of

the union executives and the secretary-director of the Union of Water boards.

On 2nd

December parties met in another formal negotiation meeting and concluded they had reached

agreement on the three first themes, yet realised they could not find agreement on the topic of

maintaining purchasing power and wages. The employers wanted to maintain an income freeze, while

the unions were prepared to moderate the wage claim but not to freeze incomes. The parties

adjourned to decide on their positions on the topic. The union executive interviewed maintained that

the employers had given a final offer of an income freeze. The employer representative interviewed

claimed that the employers did not want to put pressure on the situation, and therefore did not make a

final offer, but that all parties agreed they differed too much on the wages topic so would consult their

respective constituencies on what their positions would be.

The union executives went to their constituency who agreed they would not be accepting the offer on

the table. The unions saw two options, either joining the actions directly, or search for alternatives.

The idea of proposing a 36 hour working week instead of 37 was launched and tested with the

constituency. Some were against the idea, but most thought it was a good solution under the

circumstances the Water boards were in.

18

On January 25th, the union spokesperson contacted the chairman of the employers informally to

propose a solution. They offered the option of reducing the working week from 37 hours to 36 hours in

exchange for letting go of their wage claim. The unions also threatened that they would join the

actions that the unions of the municipalities had started if the wage claim would not be honoured.

The employers‟ representatives took the proposal to their constituency, and emphasised that it was a

chance to increase a reduction in capacity. The benefits would be that with equal labour costs and

equal employment, a reduction of 11000 productive hours could be achieved. The employers also

added that taking into consideration the whole atmosphere of negotiations, which had been

constructive for the most part, and the fact that they had continuously vented that the sector and

employment were under pressure, it would be impossible to not treat the proposal seriously now that

the unions had provided a solution. The employers‟ delegation told their constituency that they would

treat the union‟s proposal seriously. The members were not in favour as they felt the solution was too

expensive but eventually agreed on conditions under which the proposal would work. The general

employers association (AWVN) was asked to develop these plans.

The employers asked the unions if their counter offer including the conditions was interesting enough

to refrain from action. Unions concurred with this, but stated that if no agreement was reached on 11th

February, they would still join the national actions on February 12th. This put pressure on the process,

although according to the employer representative interviewed the unions were more in a hurry to

conclude negotiations than the employers, as the employers did not assess the willingness of their

employees to go on strike to be very high.

Information meetings were held throughout the country at different Water board locations during which

the unions explained their point of view to the employees and the employers explained theirs.

On February 11th parties met and agreed on an “agreement in principle”. However, the unions felt that

the counter offers were severe deteriorations to the offer, such as handing in local holidays and

starting the 36 hour working week in January 2011. The unions offered that a 100% coverage of the

hours lost with the change to a 36 hour working week would not be necessary, as a way to lessen the

financial burden on the Water boards. Also, they proposed a one off payment for 2010 to account for

the 36 hour working week coming into effect in 2011.

Unions were however uncertain whether their constituency would agree to the agreement in principle.

They were right, as the union stewards did not accept the agreement in principle due to the income

freeze of two years and other changes, such as the cancellation of local holidays, and the unions

informed the employers that the agreement in principle had been rejected and they would join the

actions. Again information meetings were held throughout the country. The employers felt they could

explain their point of view well, as they felt the agreement in principle was attractive for a large part of

the employees, particularly those that were not organised in unions. The unions represented only 30%

of the employees, who were mostly older men. The employers‟ delegation thought the offer on the

table was a good one.

On April 1st the union spokesperson and the secretary-director met informally. The union

spokesperson had called the secretary director to discuss the issues that the unions‟ constituency had

provided. In May parties met informally to discuss and set the agenda for the topics the unions wanted

to discuss and identify the aspects that the employers agreed to investigate. In two subsequent

meetings the topics were explored further.

On 3rd

June parties met formally to agree on a new agreement in principle. After two formal meetings,

the actual text of the collective labour agreement had to be formulated. For the three themes decided

on the year before, this had already been done. But for the final theme on the topic of wages the text

still needed to be written. There had been no time to do this between 25th January and 11th February,

19

when fast reaction was called for to avert union actions. A technical meeting was held to address

some content issues. At the same time, the agreement in principle had been sent to both

constituencies so both delegations felt no changes could be made in the meantime, as it would not be

fair to make changes after the constituencies had seen the agreement. It would not be possible to ask

for approval for one version and at the same time alter it. It was decided that the remaining points

would be dealt with in the fall.

Post negotiation phase

The agreement in principle was agreed upon by both parties‟ constituencies and the negotiating

delegations signed the agreement on 7th July 2010. During the signing of the agreement in principle,

which would make it a formal collective labour agreement, the unions addressed some additional

points, such as the loss of local holidays for some water board employees in the new collective labour

agreement. Employers did not want to respond to this during the signing, and it was decided to

address these issues at a later date.

4.2. The Watercompanies

The Watercompanies are part of the water chain and their main task is to produce and distribute clean

drinking water. The collective labour agreement examined is the agreement signed between the

Employers Association of Watercompanies (Werkgeversvereniging Waterbedrijven WWb) which

consists of fifteen Watercompanies, encompassing 5500 employees, and the unions FNV Abvakabo

and CNV publieke zaak. The union density in the Watercompanies is around 40%.

The collective bargaining case examined in this study is the process leading up to the last collective

labour agreement, which has a term of two years, from 1st August 2009 until 31

st July 2011. The

process from exchange of demand letters until the final agreement in principle was reached took six

months.

Context

The collective labour agreement for the period of 2009-2011 was formed against the backdrop of a

number of contextual factors that are important for understanding the process fully. Firstly, in the

collective labour agreement concluded in 2007 the remuneration system and job grading system had

been thoroughly revised. Even though this had not led to actual pay decreases for the current

employees, it had damaged the employment relationship because it had resulted in employees

distrusting their employers. Employees were found to be apprehensive of change if it meant things

were taken away from them. This also seemed to have affected the relationship between employees

and their union executives.

Secondly, just before the start of the present collective bargaining cycle in the summer of 2008, both

union executives of Abvakabo and CNV were changed, so both union executives were new to the

collective bargaining in the Watercompanies and were less affected by the problematic history of the

remuneration system.

Thirdly, the social pact of the spring of 2009 influenced the process. In this social pact, employers and

employee representatives in the Labour Foundation agreed to an income freeze in exchange for

keeping employment as a way of combating the economic crisis.

Actors

The main task of the employers‟ association is to represent the Watercompanies‟ management

interests in collective bargaining. They are a member of the general employers‟ society of the

20

Netherlands (AWVN). The interviewee of the employers‟ association of the Watercompanies was the

secretary chairperson of the association, with ten years of experience in the negotiation delegation.

Employees of the Watercompanies are represented by two public sector specialised unions, CNV

publieke zaak and FNV Abvakabo. Both union executives had been changed in summer 2008. The

CNV publieke zaak union executive interviewed for this case had eleven years of experience in

negotiating, and had joined the CNV one year before the start of the current collective bargaining

cycle.

The delegations taking part in the negotiation process consisted of five representatives of the

employers, amongst which the director of the Employers‟ Association of the Watercompanies, the

secretary chairperson, and an advisor from the general employers association of the Netherlands. On

the union side, there were two representatives from CNV and two from Abvakabo. Next to these two

formal negotiating delegations, there was a group of technical experts, in which for example also trade

union stewards were present to help in developing ideas in more detail.

Informal meetings often consisted of the secretary chairman of the employers association WWb, the

director of the employers‟ association, the advisor of the general employers‟ society of the Netherlands

(AWVN) and the two union executives.

Pre-negotiation phase

The previous collective labour agreement ended in 2009. During the pre-negotiation phase of the

collective labour agreement studied, a number of informal meetings were held in which both unions

and employers expressed their wishes to modernise the collective labour agreement and exchanged

their motives for wishing to change certain aspects, such as age discriminatory clauses. The unions

had invested in creating a close relationship between themselves so they would be able to operate as

one solid actor. The new union executives knew each other before they started on the

Watercompanies‟ Collective Labour Agreement and decided to make sure they were fully aligned to

present a uniform position to the employers. This was important because in a previous collective

bargaining period, there had been disagreement amongst the unions on special holidays that were

found to be age discriminatory. The employer had been able to use this to their advantage by

speaking to the CNV and therefore putting pressure on the Abvakabo to rejoin the discussions.

In 2008 parties had decided to start a research on age discriminating clauses in the collective labour

agreement. This was an exercise dealt with by equal representation groups (“paritatire” werkgroep). A

working group of around ten people was established, with HR professionals and union stewards. The

general employers‟ association AWVN was asked to conduct the research into the age discriminatory

clauses.

Subsequently, during visits to ten different Watercompanies throughout the country, meetings were

held in which HR professionals, union members, members of works councils and employees

discussed the alternatives to the age discriminatory clauses. The ideas and options generated were

the basis of further research into feasible solutions. The solution was found to be an employability

budget (Inzetbaarheidsbudget), which would use the freed up funding from the former clauses to

increase employability for employees of all ages. Employers and unions met to discuss how to shape

this employability budget, in three more meetings, and in the autumn of 2008 a mid-report was

presented to all parties. The plans were developed further up until the start of the negotiations. The

mid-report was a joint communication, in newspaper form with the logos of both the employers‟

association and the unions.

In the process a suggestion came from one of the larger Watercompanies Vitens to not only include

the freed up funds from the age discriminatory clauses into the employability budget, but to create a

broader flexible employment conditions budget (Flexibel arbeidsvoorwaarden budget – FAB). This

21

would also include holiday pay, annual bonus etc. There was agreement amongst both parties that

this was a good idea to redistribute the resources equally amongst all employees.

A joint communiqué for both constituencies was made. However, the union executives learnt that their

constituency did not approve of the flexible employment conditions budget, so this was omitted from

the communiqué at the last moment. According to the employer interviewed, the reason why the union

constituency was against the flexible employment conditions budget was because it was an idea that

came from the employers, and thus the history of distrust influenced the process. There was informal

contact between the union executives and the employer representatives to explain this change in

position on the flexible employment conditions topic.

In technical committees the effects of a number of the proposed changes in the employability budget

(Inzetbaarheidsbudget) were calculated. Union stewards and employers were represented in these

technical committees.

Several informal meetings were held throughout the pre-negotiation phase indicating regular contact

between unions and employers. These were usually working groups with equal representation to

discuss the agreements made in the previous collective labour agreement and preparations for the

new collective labour agreement. The dates for these informal meetings were 7th March 2007, 12

th

February 2008, 2nd

April 2008, 13th May 2008, 14

th October 2008, 3

rd December 2008, 26

th January

2009 and March 2009.

Negotiation phase

The demand letters were exchanged in May 2009, with de demand letter of the unions sent to the

employer association on the 4th May 2009, and the demand letter of the employers association sent to

the unions on the 8th May 2009. The employers had included the flexible employment conditions (FAB)

in their demand letters, and as announced, the unions had left it out. The first negotiation meeting

was on 18th May 2009. The pre-negotiation phase and negotiation phase seamlessly flowed into each

other, as there was still a working group meeting after the start of the negotiations. The formal

negotiation meetings were held on 18th May 2009, 2

nd June 2009, 22

nd June 2009, 8

th July 2009 (first

agreement in principle signed), 8th October 2009, 19

th October 2009, 4 November 2009 (second

agreement in principle signed). It took a period of six months between the exchange of the demand

letters until the last and final agreement in principle was reached.

As the preparations had been extensive and both parties were to a large extent aware of the others‟

wishes, most topics in the formal negotiations were treated with relative ease. The main bottleneck

was the topic of the flexible employment conditions budget. Employers maintained that they would not

let go of the topic and wanted it in the collective labour agreement and threatened to stall negotiations

if this topic was not addressed. Eventually, with the unions realising it was a serious topic for the

employers, both parties agreed to take on the flexible employment conditions budget, with the

exclusion of the length of service bonus (diensttijd gratificatie) until 2016, so that this would only go

into effect after the oldest union members had retired. Throughout the negotiation process, there were

around four moments of informal contact between employer representatives and union executives, in

whom they discussed the difficulties experienced, how to proceed with the negotiations without the

pressure of actually negotiating and discuss the sentiments of both parties‟ constituencies and how to

handle these.

On 8th July, the first agreement in principle was reached. This was presented to the constituencies with

a positive advice, and subsequently rejected by the union constituency. The union interviewee

explained that the transitory arrangements for employees from the new to the old situation regarding

the age discriminatory clause were not fairly distributed and this caused the union constituency to

reject the agreement. One reason for this rejection, advanced by the employer interviewee was that

22

the transitory arrangements were unclear and not well presented for the employees on the shop floor,

and therefore too threatening. Secondly, the Abvakabo union executive had left on maternity leave

and her colleague who had come to replace her had not been able to convince the constituency of the

plans. Both interviewees mentioned that due to her upcoming maternity leave of the Abvakabo union

executive, there was extra time pressure to reach an agreement quickly, leading to some inaccuracies

in the agreement text.

After the rejection, unions held a general meeting with their constituency to find out what the exact

issues were that had led to the rejection and discuss possible solutions. The lack of transparency of

the transitory clauses and the unfairness of some of these clauses for certain groups of employees

was the main issue, and in an informal meeting the negotiating parties discussed what had gone

wrong in the process and what to do about the points raised by the union constituency. Both union

and employer delegations accepted the arguments of the employees and adjusted the agreement text

accommodate the points raised.

On 4th November a new agreement was reached. The union executives did not call it an official

agreement in principle yet but first wanted to check with their union stewards if they would accept this

agreement. They concurred; so on 11th November a new agreement in principle was reached. The

main difference between the two agreements in principle was more transparent transitional

arrangements for the employability budget (Inzetbaarheidsbudget).

Post negotiation phase

No particular events took place between the signing of the agreement in principle and the signing of

the collective labour agreement.

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5. Analysis

In this section, the two cases are analysed according to the hypotheses. To summarise the purpose of

this research, it was found that the case of the Water boards contained more integrative agreements

than the Watercompanies. The question was to what extent do aspects of the negotiation process

explain this. The hypotheses were that in the collective labour agreement with the most integrative

agreements (the Water boards), the process would be characterised by higher trust, more sharing of

information and more knowledge and application of integrative bargaining than in the agreement with

fewer integrative agreements (the Watercompanies). In addition to the hypotheses, other aspects of

the negotiation process that emerged from the research are treated.

5.1. Water boards

5.1.1. Trust

In the case of the Water boards, the level of trust changed over time and parties also did not seem to

trust each other equally. Unions were wary of the employers to begin with during the pre-negotiation

phase, as they had experienced during collective bargaining with the municipalities and the provinces

that the employers did not want to adhere to the social pact. However, at the beginning of the

negotiation phase the union executive was hopeful. He claimed "we were happily relieved that the

Water boards appeared to be differently inclined" [and did seem to want to stick to the social pact].

Both parties said that the negotiation process started constructively and positively. The employer

interviewee maintained that the atmosphere stayed constructive during the entire process, whereas for

the unions the turning point came when the topic of wages came onto the table, and the unions felt

confused when the employers stated they were not offering any income increase and had never

intended to do otherwise. The unions had expected that some form of wage increase would have been

possible as there had been positive signs pointing at that direction. The union executive said: "All

signs seem favourable. If you hear they are offering 0 for two years, then the relationship is strained.

You get a bit of distrust. You kept us up dangling while you weren‟t planning it all along, while you

knew we asked for x percent. Should have told us from the start".

After the agreement had been made with the 36 hour working week and unions had asked for a one-

off payment to compensate for 2010, the employers introduced some topics which were perceived as

deteriorations to the agreement by the unions. The unions felt all solutions had come from their side

and that the employers were in no hurry to take action, thus decreasing the level of trust even more:

"your trust in the process just gets less and less. You trust less that you will get out of the situation.

And we had several moments that we thought we should break it off. If this is the way it will go, then

it's finished, then we should just take action".

The employers, from their side, did not demonstrate significant changes in the basic level of trust they

had from the start and the employer maintained that the relationship between both delegations was

constructive and there was a willingness to search for solutions. However, the employer did mention

that the demand letters were exchanged at exactly a specified time and date. The reason for this was

said to be so that you would not know each other‟s preparations, as the other party‟s ambitions and

preparations would be visible from these documents. This does also demonstrate some reservations

in trust of both parties.

Furthermore, during the negotiation phase, there were two instances of informal contact, in which the

union‟s spokesperson telephoned the chairman of the employer delegation to approach the other

carefully about a possible way for a solution. Even though it can be seen as a basic level of trust to

24

hold informal discussions, the fact that the union used the threat of actions was also a sign of little

trust during the negotiation phase.

The employer interviewee indicated that towards the end of the process they did not quite understand

why the union had some problems with the content when signing the agreement in principle as they

thought all matters had been settled. Similar issues came up during the signing of the collective labour

agreement. Also, according to the employer both parties had agreed that no changes could be made

to the agreement in principle, so it was perceived as a futile action.

The whole negotiation process lasted from 1st September 2009 with the exchange of the demand

letters until 3rd

July 2010 with the agreement in principle. This was a period of ten months and can be

seen as a long time to conclude a collective labour agreement, which also indicates a low level of trust

between parties during the negotiation process. The parties themselves also thought this was a long

time to conclude a collective labour agreement.

In sum it can be said that the level of trust from the point of view of the unions was basic, but

weakened to a fragile state over time. From the employers‟ side there was a more stable basic level

of trust in which both parties were seen as open minded and willing to for the common problems and

solve issues, yet it weakened towards the end of the process. An important side note is that both

interviewees were new to this collective bargaining of the Water boards, so they had no previous

experience with each other.

5.1.2. Information exchange

The sharing of information between parties was average with frequently meeting working groups and

some informal information exchange. There were several informal moments of information exchange,

when the union spokesperson and the employer spokesperson phoned and met for preliminary

discussions during the negotiation period, for example on the topic of the 36 hour working week.

However, there were a number of surprises for each party. There were also differences in the

accounts of the process of both interviewees, showing differences in the information exchanged.

Interestingly, there was a difference in perceived exchange of information during the pre-negotiation

phase. The union interviewee held that there was no contact between union and employer delegations

before the exchange of demand letters, while the employer interviewee held there were regular

meetings between unions and management, as well as a working group consisting of union members

and management that had given advice to the regular meeting on a social statute.

During the negotiation phase, unions were surprised that the employer was not willing to offer any

wage increase, and that this was only made explicit in December, after all other communal themes

had been successfully tackled. There was also a difference in perception of the „final offer‟ that had

been given by the employer in December. The union spokesperson maintained that it had been called

final offer by the employer, signalling unwillingness to continue negotiations. The employer

representative maintains that they explicitly did not make a final offer, so as not to put more pressure

on the process. Whatever the case, the information exchange was not clear at this point

5.1.3. Integrative bargaining

In the case of the Water boards, certain aspects of integrative bargaining were present at the start of

the negotiation phase. Firstly, both parties committed to identifying the different problems they had

addressed in their demand letters and fit these into themes, thus turning individual problems into joint

problems. The employer interviewee mentioned that this way of working helped in uncovering the

concerns underlying the statements in the demand letters. For example, it turned out that the job

rotation method called for by the unions and the „general service‟ method called for by the employers

addressed the same, mutual concerns: flexibility and creating more attractive jobs. Yet „general

25

service‟ had a negative connotation for the unions, as it was associated with simply an administrative

change in job title. Through the discussions, both parties were able to achieve these insights. The

initiative for working with the idea of common themes came from the employer.

Solutions to problems that arose later on in the negotiation process, such as the stalemate posed

when employers stuck to the income freeze, were tackled with much creativity meeting the interests of

both parties. The initiatives however came mostly from the union side. It was the unions who proposed

the solution of the 36 hour week, so that both interests were met („invent options for mutual gain‟): the

unions received their wage increase indirectly and the employer could maintain to the outside world

that they had not given in to letting go of the income freeze. Furthermore, after the employers had

accepted the 36 hour week proposition, they introduced some wishes of their own which were

perceived as deteriorations to the agreement by the unions. The employers however called it a

package deal. The unions asked to discuss the matter, but the employer stated it was non-negotiable,

according to the unions. Eventually the unions conceded they were willing not to pursue the demand

for a hundred percent compensation of lost hours, so no extra costs for employer would be made. The

employer interviewee stated that “In the delegations there were very different characters. The power of

differences could really be seen, creativity, always someone to side with, [...]. Both delegations were

prepared to look for solutions and be creative”. It seems difficult to join the different sides of the story,

even though both parties agree that the solutions found were creative. It seems that the unions were

more forthcoming in coming up with solutions to negotiation stalemates, and that the employers were

more reactive. The employers felt that they were cooperative towards the unions‟ suggestions, yet the

unions did not always feel this cooperative attitude. Even though there were problems with trust,

parties did manage to return to integrative bargaining tactics.

Understanding of each other‟s concerns was generally quite high. Both interviewees were able to

explain the contexts of the other party. For example, the unions understood the political pressure the

Water boards were under not to let go of the income freeze, and the employers understood that the

name „general service‟ was problematic for the union constituency.

The unions‟ strategy at the beginning of the negotiation process was to assure joint commitment to the

social pact, so that a common framework for the negotiations would be established. They also aimed

to ask for more than they would need at the beginning so they would be able make concessions on

minor issues in exchange for more important issues. The employers‟ main strategy was to discuss the

common themes at the beginning of the process and depart from there. This was also the approach

that was taken during the process. Both strategies show evidence of the intention to engage in the

“focus on commonalities instead of differences” aspect of integrative bargaining.

5.1.4. Additional factors

In addition to the process related factors formulated in the hypotheses, two important factors emerged

from the interviews. These are intraorganisational bargaining and time pressure.

Intraorganisational bargaining

The intraorganisational bargaining between union executives and their constituencies emerged as a

factor influencing the negotiations. The issue of union constituency is complex as the union

constituency consists of the employees of the employers. So there is at times a joint responsibility,

where the unions are mostly tied to their members, and employers feel responsible for the entire

employee population. For both parties the union constituency of older men was seen as a barrier to

modernise the collective labour agreement. This was seen by both employers and unions. Employers

were sometimes frustrated because the unions only represented part of the employees, and unions

negotiators were caught in the middle because their ambitions were more modern than those of their

members. This influenced the process because it caused the agreement in principle to be rejected two

26

times. It also affected the union interviewee‟s satisfaction with the outcome because part of the union

constituency was unhappy with the collective labour agreement.

Time pressure

Time pressure played a role in the negotiations as some aspects of the agreement had not been able

to be adequately transferred to texts in the pressure period between the end of January and early

February. The unions had doubts and reservations about some aspects of the eventual text, and

addressed these in the process and during the signing of the agreement, but by then the agreement in

principle had already been presented to the constituencies so it was deemed unacceptable to change

these in the process.

5.2. Watercompanies

5.2.1. Trust

The cycle of collective bargaining for the 2009-2011 Watercompanies Collective Labour Agreement

started off with new union executives, who had changed in 2008 and new members of the employer

delegation. The union interviewee commented that there was an advantage to him and the FNV

Abvakabo union executive being new to the process, as they were not contaminated with the past.

The union executives were able to tell the employer and the union constituency that the mistakes and

hard feelings were “before our time”. The history of scarred employment relations due to the new

remuneration system was still fresh in employees‟ minds, as well as the role their employers and union

executives had played in agreeing on this solution.

From the interviews it seems that there were two different types of trust between the employers and

the unions in the Watercompanies‟ case. The first type of trust is the acknowledgement of the

expertise of the other as a negotiator and negotiating partner at the table (identification based trust).

The second type is the trust as a belief in the legitimacy of the other party and the mandate they have.

(knowledge based trust).

The identification based trust was high, as on a personal level the relationship was trusting. In many

informal moments the parties exchanged how they felt about and saw the process, even in the pre-

negotiation phase. Also, when the employer needed to inform the unions that there was little room for

a wage increase, this was first done informally. The union interviewee also stressed the mutual

interest in solving issues in a positive manner and to maintain a good relationship. There were never

threats of action. He also said that parties had agreed in the pre-negotiation phase to solve a number

of issues, and that surprising each other in this process would not be considered fair play. Another

token of the trust between parties in the pre-negotiation phase was that the General Employers

Association of the Netherlands (AWVN), at the suggestion of the unions and by mutual consent, was

given the task of carrying out the research on age discriminating clauses. As the employer interviewee

noted: “Because we had regular meetings with the union, we could do those kinds of things, yes,

discussing amongst ourselves how are we going to do that, the research. And we said should we write

out a tender and have companies react, and research companies. [...] and then the unions said, on the

basis of that good relationship, can‟t the AWVN do that?”. Furthermore, the demand letters were sent

at different dates, which also shows that the two parties were already so knowledgeable about each

others‟ demands that the bargaining advantage of having information first before disclosing your own

was not an issue. Also when the employer interviewee was asked when exactly the collective labour

agreement was signed, i.e. when the final agreement in principle was translated into texts and signed,

he said “that is completely irrelevant. If you agree on such an agreement, and you agree on the text,

which was between 4 and 11 November, and there has been an exchange of the draft, [...] then it

doesn‟t matter if you sign it. We only just signed it recently”. There was trust that even an unsigned

27

collective labour agreement would be effective and signing it was merely a formality. Certain

publications to both constituencies were also done jointly, and demonstrate a high degree of trust.

There was lower trust when it came to the employers trusting that the unions were legitimate enough,

and had enough mandate from their constituency to conclude agreements that would hold. The

employer interviewee mentioned that the employers sometimes felt the union executives were „yoyo‟s‟

of their constituency, always needing to go back and forth to check with their constituency. The

employers were also shaken in their trust when the first agreement in principle was rejected by the

union constituency, even though the unions had agreed to present it to their constituency with a

positive advice. “That is the yoyo effect I mean, the union executives that are hanging by a thread.

They don‟t dare. They don‟t know the room [ to manoeuvre], are too afraid to be shot down by their

constituency. It sounds a bit crude, but that is the way it is.”

Thus, the employers and unions can be seen as having high identification based trust, as they worked

together, had common goals, yet the employers had low knowledge based trust of the unions as they

found the unions unpredictable to the extent that they were capable of convincing their constituency

of the agreements made during negotiations.

5.2.2. Information exchange

The level of exchange of information about interests and options between unions and employers was

high. There were many meetings between parties. In total, there were eight informal meetings,

additional informal contact moments by phone, and seven formal (negotiation) meetings. Next to this,

there were working groups who met regularly and discussed the topics in more depth.

The union executive interviewed commented that in the pre-negotiation phase the employers and

unions discussed what would be necessary to gain support for a result. Information was shared on

how the union executives perceived their constituency, which was deemed important for the employer

to know, particularly since the relationship between employees and employers had been strained in

the past. He also mentioned that discussing the process of negotiation without the content was an

important part of the process, and occurred about three to four times. Furthermore, he also mentioned

that it was necessary to discuss the bottlenecks of the negotiations with the employer in an informal

context. For example, an indication of the little room for income increases was also exchanged

informally. Another demonstration of the high level of information exchange was that both parties

acknowledged that there were no real surprises in the demand letters of the other party. In other

words, they had exchanged sufficient information in the pre negotiation phase to know what to expect

of the content of the demand letters.

Information exchange about the union constituency was found to be important and done frequently.

The union interviewee commented that it was necessary for the employer to hear what the union

executive knew of their constituency. The union side repeatedly explained to the employers the

necessity of sharing the information from the negotiation table with the union constituency, to stay

transparent. In the employer interview, it became apparent that the employer understood this, yet

found the very frequent communication between union and employees somewhat disturbing.

During the negotiation phase, information exchange continued both formally and informally.

Information was exchanged on topics such as: why is it important to change certain regulations? The

informal meetings were deemed crucial to hear each others‟ views freely without pinning the other

down on what was said. Also, with the research on age discriminating clauses, a feedback group was

made with representatives from both unions (union stewards) and employers (HR officials) and to

discuss the topics that arose. In addition, when at the last moment the flexible employment conditions

budget (FAB) needed to be cut from the communal publication due to union constituency reservations,

there were informal phone calls to understand why. The employers also informed the unions that they

28

would be putting it into their demand letters, so there was no surprise when the topic of flexible

employment conditions budget eventually did show up in the employers demand letter, but not the

unions‟ one.

5.2.3. Integrative bargaining

The level of integrative bargaining was high for the Watercompanies, both in strategy and in

behavioural manifestation.

The strategy of the unions was to find a way to come to agreements that would benefit both parties.

The union interviewee commented that he wanted to “attain a result in which everyone felt they had

won something, the constituency, but also the employer”. The employer had also said that they did not

simply want to delete the age discriminatory clauses, but create something beneficial to all in return.

The union interviewee did stress that working on a good relationship with the employers was

important and that it was important to start negotiations with informal meetings as starting with formal

meetings would push parties to negotiate from positions instead of looking for common ground.

Turning to what was behaviourally evident of integrative bargaining, there were various attempts to

understand and meet the needs of both parties both in the pre-negotiation phase and negotiation

phase. In the pre-negotiation phase for example, alternatives were discussed in equal representation

working groups such as alternatives to the age discriminatory clauses. This is part of the integrative

bargaining aspect „invent options for mutual gain‟. In the negotiation phase, after the first agreement in

principle had been rejected, an informal meeting was held to discuss the obstacles that the union

constituency had, leading to adaptations to accommodate these.

The use of integrative bargaining also led to some creative solutions. The unions at first wanted to

push the topic of the flexible employment conditions budget to the next collective bargaining cycle, but

the employers insisted on using the momentum present. The solution found was to agree on the

flexible employment conditions budget in the current collective labour agreement, but to include that

this agreement would only come into force in 2016 when many of the union constituency not in favour

of the arrangement would have retired.

5.2.1. Additional factors

In addition to the factors described above, additional factors emerged from the interviews that

influenced the process.

Intraorganisational bargaining

Intraorganisational bargaining played a role for the unions especially. The legacy of low trust due to

the remuneration system was still hanging in the air and the union constituency was wary of having

rights taken away from them again. This meant that unions spent a lot of time discussing and checking

with their constituency. Indirectly, the intraorganisational bargaining influenced the trust between the

parties at the negotiation table as it decreased the knowledge based trust (legitimacy and

predictability) between unions and employers.

Time pressure

Both employers and unions agreed that the time pressure that was put on the process to achieve an

agreement in principle before the Abvakabo union executive went on maternity leave, caused it to be

rejected. The replacing Abvakabo union executive had had the difficult task to promote to his

constituency the plans he had not helped to construct, and the time pressure had led to wordings in

the text that were not transparent.

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5.3. Summary of results

A summary of the results is given below in table 2. It shows that the process of the more integrative

collective labour agreement (the Water boards) was characterised by medium trust in the beginning to

lower trust later on. Information exchange was a medium level and the level of integrative bargaining

was high. The process of the less integrative collective labour agreement (the Watercompanies) was

characterised by high identification based trust, low knowledge based trust from the point of view of

the employers and a high level of information exchange and integrative bargaining (both strategy and

behavioural manifestation).

Table 2:

Summary of results

Water boards Watercompanies

Trust Medium during pre-negotiations, Medium at beginning negotiation phase, then deteriorated to low trust

High identification based trust and low knowledge based trust employers for unions.

Information exchange

Medium High

Integrative bargaining High

High

Additional factors Intraorganisational bargaining between union and constituency and time pressure affected process

Intraorganisational bargaining between union and constituency and time pressure affected process

Level of integrativeness of collective labour agreement

More integrative than Watercompanies

Less integrative than Water boards

30

6. Discussion and conclusion

The aim of this research was to gain insight into the negotiation process related factors that contribute

to integrative agreements in collective labour agreements in the Dutch context. This study followed a

case study design, so it is exploratory in nature and generalisations to other collective bargaining

cases are not possible. Yet a number of conclusions can be drawn contributing to theory and also

giving rise to future research suggestions.

The three hypotheses are not supported as they predicted that in comparing the two cases, the Water

boards process, which resulted in more integrative agreements, would show higher levels of trust,

information exchange and integrative bargaining than the Watercompanies process, which led to

fewer integrative agreements. Trust was higher in the Watercompanies than the Water boards case,

but there was a difference in trust between negotiators personally, which was high, and trust as

legitimacy of union executives as seen by employers, which was low. Information sharing was higher

in the Watercompanies case than Water boards case and both cases showed high levels of integrative

bargaining. These results point out that the negotiation process factors of trust, information exchange

and integrative bargaining alone do not explain the difference in the rate of integrativeness in the

collective labour agreements studied.

One explanation of the results relates to the importance of crisis and conflict in achieving integrative

solutions. In the case of the Water boards the negotiators faced a crisis at a certain point when the

threat of strikes from the unions put pressure on the negotiators and their relationship. Crises and

oncoming conflict have been found to aid in forging integrative outcomes. Garaudel et al (2008) found

that the threat of unions acted as a catalyst for cooperation between parties and better outcomes for

both unions and management. Also, Bacon and Blyton (2007) found that where union negotiators

applied conflictual tactics in collective bargaining, more integrative solutions were achieved than

where there was purely cooperative negotiating. The mechanism through which this works can also be

explained: negative emotions elicited through the use of threats and upcoming crisis can be used to

indicate the seriousness of the problem and the focus on the problem. As Shapiro (2002, p. 72) notes:

“Emotion serves a forward-looking communicative function and conveys an imperative about a desire,

concern, or goal in an interpersonal relationship.” This in turn serves to motivate both parties to

address the problem and look for a solution. If parties are able to address this satisfactorily, then the

outcome is beneficial to both (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders, 2010). A combination of forcing (threat)

followed by problem solving was found to be effective in achieving integrative outcomes (Van de Vliert,

1999). This was the case in the Water boards case.

Another explanation is that trust is a less important factor contributing to integrative agreements than

theory would dictate. This is consistent with some mutual gains bargaining scholars who claim that

integrative solutions can be found without trust. According to Fisher and Ury (1981), and their claim

“separate the people from the problem”, trust between parties is not an important aspect of achieving

integrative solutions. Indeed, Walton and McKersie mitigate the importance of trust: “some caution is

required in relating conditions of trust and support to effectiveness in problem solving. We are

convinced that some minimum level of trust and support is a precondition to the process [ ...] However,

there is no clear evidence that a completely harmonious context is the one most productive for

problem solving” (p. 143). It is not my claim that trust is unimportant in negotiation or in achieving

integrative outcomes, but this research shows that trust may be less important than thought before.

Thus, theory may need to be revised as to the importance of trust in achieving integrative solutions.

However, as this study stopped at the point the collective labour agreement was reached, it has not

taken into account the implementation of the agreements made. It may well be that trust plays a very

important role in this phase, where the words need to be put into action and further cooperation based

on mutual trust between unions and employers is needed.

31

A third explanation for the unsupported hypotheses is that other process related factors are important,

which were not included in hypotheses. In addition to the information gathered in this research on trust

between union and employers, level of information exchange and integrative bargaining, two

additional factors emerged in both cases that help in better understanding the dynamics of the

negotiation process of collective bargaining in the Netherlands. These should be included in the

theoretical model.

Firstly, time pressure was found to influence the agreements made during the negotiation process in

both cases. Indeed, time pressure in general has been found to increase the making of concessions,

and reduces the possibilities of win-win agreements (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). An explanation is

that finding innovative integrative solutions takes time, as information must be assembled and options

tried out. By going back to the drawing board after the first failures, the actors in the cases studied

were able to overcome the effects of time pressure to a large extent.

Secondly, intraorganisational bargaining strongly influenced the process. It was not taken into this

research as a hypothesis as it addresses the relationship between negotiators and their constituency,

yet this research has shown that it also strongly affects the relationship between negotiators at the

negotiating table. In the case of the Watercompanies, it affected the trust between parties by lowering

knowledge based trust. The problem of representativeness of union negotiators of their constituencies

is a theme that has been around for several years and has caused union legitimacy to be under

attack. Interestingly, the intraorganisational bargaining in the two cases was between the union

representatives and their constituencies, but no mention was made of intraorganisational bargaining of

union executives with union executives of other collective labour agreements or with their superiors

(such as union leaders).

The theoretical implications of this exploratory study are that the importance of allowing conflict

potential in negotiations is made apparent. It shows that more creative integrative solutions are

possible when there is a combination of conflict (potential) and integrative bargaining. In sum, when

both stand to lose from a potential conflict, this may increase the ability to find integrative solutions.

This does not mean that actors should intentionally aim for conflict, but that they should allow for the

possibility of conflict and not aim to maintain a harmonious and cooperative stance at all costs. Within

this framework, elements such as trust and information exchange, time pressure and

intraorganisational bargaining, coupled with integrative bargaining are important.

This research hopes to have contributed to the better understanding of the process related aspects in

integrative agreements. There are however some limitations to the study and suggestions for future

research. The aim of this exploratory study was to guide future research on process related factors

important in achieving integrative agreements.

To obtain a better picture of the negotiation process, an observation of the whole process would have

given more information than retrospective accounts of a number of the interviewees. This was

however not feasible within the time and resources available.

Secondly, the level of integrativeness of the agreements was calculated as the total number of

integrative agreements in the collective labour agreement. Future research could also take the depth,

impact and level of successful implementation of the integrative agreements into account. In addition,

the collective labour agreements were each examined as more or less independent cases, without

assessing previous collective labour agreements, or expectations of the future. Even though some

information on the history was gathered through the interviews, both the content of the collective

labour agreement and the process related factors may be cumulative in nature. Only looking at one

single collective labour agreement may not be enough to understand the dynamics between process

and outcome. For example, it is to be expected that trust is built up through many rounds of collective

32

bargaining. However, the negotiators interviewed in these cases were mostly new to these sectors

and had no previous negotiating experience with each other. Also relating to the level of

integrativeness, it is important to note that although in this research the cases were compared as one

being more integrative and the other less integrative; they did both contain integrative agreements.

Using cases with larger discrepancies may provide clearer results.

Thirdly, the process related factors seem interrelated and more research is needed to understand how

precisely they interact. For example, low trust may influence the amount of information exchange,

which in turn decreases the amount of integrative bargaining possible. And intraorganisational

bargaining may influence integrative bargaining negatively, by shifting focus to the own constituency

instead of the other party. Alternatively, intraorganisational bargaining may influence integrative

bargaining positively if both parties stand to lose by not reaching agreement and this motivates one

party to put in some extra effort to find an integrative solution. Future research would be needed to

distinguish the exact interplay and unique contributions of each factor.

Lastly, integrative bargaining does not only revolve around integrative topics. In the Water boards

case the topic of retaining purchasing power in the Water boards case, which is a distributive topic,

was solved by introducing the thirty-six hour working week which is an integrative solution. Thus,

future research could also examine collective labour agreements not only by limiting the rating of

agreements to integrative types of agreements, but also distributive issues. These distributive issues

may be solved in ways that lead to integrative solutions.

33

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