negative wholesale power prices: why they occur and what to do about them
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Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur and What to Do about Them. A Study of the German Power Market Maria Woodman, Student Economics Department, New York University. Research Motivation: The German Power Market and Negative Wholesale Power Prices . Market Anomaly - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur
and What to Do about Them
A Study of the German Power Market
Maria Woodman, StudentEconomics Department, New York University
Research Motivation:The German Power Market and Negative Wholesale Power Prices
• Market Anomaly– Electricity doesn’t obey traditional commodity price
behaviors – Negative wholesale prices can result
• Three Causes– Increases in wind infeed when demand is low– Government incentives to favor wind producers – Flat rate prices cause customers to consume
electricity regardless of the value of each MW
Wind Behavior
01.01.2009
03.01.2009
05.01.2009
07.01.2009
09.01.2009
11.01.2009
13.01.2009
15.01.2009
17.01.2009
19.01.2009
21.01.2009
23.01.2009
25.01.2009
27.01.2009
29.01.2009
31.01.20090
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
45000
50000
55000
60000
65000Daily Variation in Wind at 12 PM - January
Wind Infeed
Total Load
Win
d In
feed
MW T
otal Load
MW
Wind generation is uncorrelated with demand, meaning it can cause erratic price swings
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
-200.00
-150.00
-100.00
-50.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
f(x) = − 930.633692798745 x + 230.635050673888R² = 0.724892998688939
High Wind Infeed, Weekend
Wind % of Total Generation
Pric
e
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
-200.00
-150.00
-100.00
-50.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
f(x) = − 325.97474887977 x + 115.715956658648R² = 0.443294399655772
High Wind Infeed, Weekday
Wind % of Total Generation
Pric
e 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
-200.00
-150.00
-100.00
-50.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
f(x) = − 392.397917461131 x + 39.826474793298R² = 0.229910999865855
Low Wind Infeed, Weekday
Wind % of Total Generation
Pric
e
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
-200.00
-150.00
-100.00
-50.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
f(x) = − 517.312095396445 x + 58.0461812081028R² = 0.136458462960702
Low Wind Infeed, Weekend
Wind % of Total Generation
Pric
e
Power Prices and Wind Generation
Power Generation Supply (without Wind)
Hydro Nuclear Lignite Coal
Bituminous Coal
Gas Turbine
Wholesale clearing price
MW of Capacity
M
argi
nal
Cost
Demand
Supply
Merit Order Curve
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
Nuclear
Lignite Coal
Bituminous Coal
Wholesale clearing price
MW of Capacity
M
argi
nal C
ost
Demand
Supply – with Wind Shifted Merit Order Curve
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
WIND0
Power Generation Supply (with Wind)
Supply – No Wind
Increased Wind Infeed
10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000 24000 26000 28000-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Volume of MW
Pric
e pe
r MW
h
An influx of wind power shifts that merit order curve rightward, which drives prices down
Flat Rate Retail Prices
• Retail prices don’t represent a consumers true willingness to pay
• In the case of negative wholesale prices, they grossly overpay in the retail market.
D
Retail Market
S
L
P
Wholesale Market
0
P
L
SD D
Is Dynamic Pricing the Answer?
• What is dynamic (“time-of-day”) pricing?– Allows retail prices to match wholesale prices in real
time• Stimulates a demand side price response
• How can it impact negative prices?– The solution isn’t simple• An estimated retail demand curve isn’t defined when
prices are negative
Existing Studies of Dynamic Pricing
• Studies evaluating the results of implemented programs have returned varied ranges of end-user price response• Long Run Elasticity – 0.3-0.5 (Borenstein, 2005)• Short Run Industrial End-User Elasticity – 0.01-0.27 (Boisvert, 2007;
Neenan, 2004; Braithwait and Sheasy, 2002; Patrick and Wolak, 1997)
• Using these ranges, the studies focused on the use of dynamic pricing to reduce peak price and load
Method for Analyzing RTP
• Construct wholesale supply and demand curves for a set of hours representing different combinations of demand and wind infeed
• Construct demand curves representing different levels of price response using differing price elasticities
• Induce an increase in wind power by shifting the supply curve
• Solve for the new equilibrium points given the new supply and demand curves
Allocation of Hours• It was found that a necessary condition for negative
prices appeared to be either high wind in-feed ( >12 GW) coupled with moderate system demand (40-50 GW) or low system demand ( <40 GW) coupled with moderate wind in-feed (5-10 GW) (Genoese, 2010).
• Using these metrics, I was able to disaggregate the hours into their respective buckets for analysis
High Wind Infeed Low Wind Infeed
High Demand
Jan 12 - 7 PM - Weekday Oct 7 - 8 PM - Weekday
Wind MW: 12594.75 Wind MW: 2361.5
Total Demand: 72826 Total Demand: 65847
Low Demand
Mar 8 – 9 AM - Weekend May 17 – 5 AM - WeekendWind MW: 9914.25 Wind MW: 2276Total Demand 43358 Total Demand: 33394
Hours of focus
Constructing the Model
13000 13500 14000 14500 15000 15500 16000 16500 17000-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Supply
Retail Demand e=-0.01
Retail Demand e=-0.05
Retail Demand e=-0.3
Increased Wind Infeed
€/M
Wh
Preliminary Results
• For the hour type of low demand and high wind infeed, on average, a price elasticity of at least -0.14 was needed to have a market clearing price of €0.00– For the case of increased wind generation
• Following the same logic, a price elasticity of approximately -0.44 was necessary to raise the price to equal the existing retail flat rate price. – The elasticity value is unrealistic given previous estimates of consumer
price response
Occurrence of Negative
PricesWeekday Weekend Grand Total
Early Morning 14.08% 36.62% 50.70%
Mid Day 2.82% 1.41% 4.23%
Night 21.13% 23.94% 45.07%
Grand Total 38.03% 61.97% 100.00%
Negative Prices: Hours of Occurrence
Of the 1% of hours that were affected in 2009
The vast majority fell during early morning and weekend hours
Conclusions• RTP may not have a significant effect and in some cases
might even be a hindrance to the market.• Other demand side management techniques may be
more effective in mitigating the market inefficiency of negative prices
• Additional R&D in electric vehicles, smart grid technology and implementation, and smart appliances could aid in making demand side management viable