naval resources and the british defeat at yorktown, 1781

This article was downloaded by: [American Public University System]On: 19 February 2014, At: 04:32Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The Mariner's MirrorPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmir20

Naval Resources and the British Defeat atYorktown, 1781Richard MiddletonPublished online: 05 Feb 2014.

To cite this article: Richard Middleton (2014) Naval Resources and the British Defeat at Yorktown, 1781, TheMariner's Mirror, 100:1, 29-43, DOI: 10.1080/00253359.2014.866373

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2014.866373

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”)contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and ourlicensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publicationare the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor &Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independentlyverified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantialor systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and usecan be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmir20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/00253359.2014.866373

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2014.866373

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The Mariner’s Mirror 100:1 (February 2014), 29–43

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2014.866373© The Society for Nautical Research

Naval Resources and the British Defeat at Yorktown, 1781

Richard Middleton

Although most of the blame for the disaster at Yorktown fell on the generals, the role of the navy was equally crucial. Had the fleet converged on Chesapeake Bay in sufficient numbers, the army of Lord Cornwallis would have been rescued and the war perhaps ended differently. Responsibility for this failure has never been adequately explained though the station officers across the Atlantic, Admirals Rodney, Parker and Graves, have all been criticised along with their political masters. This article suggests that the fleet commanders did their best to deal with a difficult situation, lacking as they did sufficient ships and information. It was these factors that permitted the French to assemble a much superior force in the summer of 1781 at a critical moment in the American war. For this situation the first Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, and the prime minister, Lord North, must bear primary responsibility, having allowed a dangerous inferiority to develop in the size of the fleet due to a lack of new construction, especially of ships of the line. This article suggests, accordingly, that Yorktown was a disaster waiting to happen, given the inadequate resources deployed by Britain between 1775 and 1782.

Keywords: Yorktown, American War of Independence, Royal Navy, French navy, Spanish navy, naval logistics, Admiralty, West Indies

The surrender of Lord Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown in October 1781 concluded one of the most disastrous episodes in British history. Despite efforts

by the Royal Navy to mount a rescue from New York, the attempts proved unavailing. When Admirals Thomas Graves and Samuel Hood arrived off Chesapeake Bay on 5 September 1781 with 19 ships of the line (mounting 1402 guns), they found a superior French fleet of 24 vessels and 1784 guns under Admiral Le Comte de Grasse blocking their way. In the ensuing battle off the Capes of Virginia, Graves and Hood suffered considerable damage and had to return to New York for repairs.1 A second rescue scheme six weeks later was no more successful. Despite every endeavour the Royal Navy still had only 25 ships of the line compared to 36 under Admiral de Grasse following his reinforcement by a smaller French squadron from Rhode Island under Commodore Le Comte de Barras.2 The consequences of this inferiority were not only the surrender of Cornwallis, but the collapse of Britain’s attempts to recover her erstwhile colonies.

Few in the army doubted the cause of the disaster, as Sir Henry Clinton, its commander-in-chief in North America, made clear to the Secretary of State for America, Lord George Germain. At the beginning of the campaign, Germain had

1 A list of the two fleets and their armament can be found in Lapeyrouse Bonfils, Histoire de La Marine Française, III, 208–10. The mean average for both fleets was approximately 74 guns per ship.2 Only vessels of 60 guns and more, i.e. First, Second and Third rates, are classified as ships of the line in this article.

100(1).indd 29 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4

30 The Mariner’s Mirror

asserted that Clinton had no cause to worry should de Grasse sail northwards from the Caribbean during the hurricane season: ‘As Sir George Rodney’s force [in the West Indies] is but little inferior to his’ and ‘will be watchful of his motions, I am not apprehensive he will give him time to do you any material injury before he comes to your succour’.3 Great therefore was Clinton’s surprise ‘when I heard that de Grasse had brought with him 28 sail of the line and that Sir Samuel Hood [Rodney’s deputy] had only 14’. He could only conclude ‘to this inferiority, then, I may with confidence assert . . . is our present misfortune to be imputed’.4

Clinton mentioned no names, but his meaning was clear. Either Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty had failed to deploy sufficient ships across the Atlantic or Rodney had retained too many vessels in the West Indies. However, both firmly denied any responsibility. Rodney asserted that the defeat was entirely the fault of others. Despite ample warning, Graves had neglected to prepare his squadron at New York, while Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica had detained two of Rodney’s ships of the line and had also failed to send additional support as requested. Had those men done their duty, the two fleets would have been equal on the day of the battle.5

Sandwich readily agreed with these sentiments, though he refrained in public from blaming any individual. He asserted instead that the Admiralty had done everything possible to ensure success. The truth was that ‘the arrangements for the protection of America . . . [had] failed from accidents that could not be foreseen or guarded against by the Government at home’. Events had been beyond Sandwich’s control.6

Although aspects of the British defeat have been microscopically investigated, no adequate explanation has been given for the imbalance in numbers between the two fleets, either on 5 September or at the end of October when the second attempt was made to relieve Cornwallis. David Hannay, in his late nineteenth-century life of Rodney, is silent on the navy’s weakness at Yorktown, as is Nicholas Rodger in his biography of Sandwich.7 David Syrett acknowledges the deficit, but attributes it vaguely to ‘a strategy of dispersal in America,’ for which both the admirals and the politicians were responsible.8 Piers Mackesy perhaps addresses the issue most directly in concluding that the Yorktown ‘campaign was lost in the Leeward Islands’ because the commanders there failed to recognize the danger posed by de Grasse.9 But most historians have ignored the issue, concentrating instead on contemporary comments that all would have been well had Graves shown greater tactical aptitude

3 Germain to Clinton, 4 Apr. 1781, Davies, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 99. 4 Clinton to Germain, 29 Oct. 1781, Ibid., 253. However, Clinton soon began blaming Cornwallis for the disaster, Middleton, ‘The Clinton–Cornwallis Controversy’, 370–89. 5 Rodney to George Jackson, 19 Oct. 1781, Hannay, Letters Written by Sir Samuel Hood (hereafter Hood Letters), 44–7.6 Observations . . . in consequence of the Several Orders for Papers to be laid before the House of Commons’, 6 Feb 1782, Barnes and Owen, The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, (hereafter Sandwich Papers), IV, 343–2.7 Hannay, Rodney. Rodger, The Insatiable Earl. Although the editors of the Sandwich Papers, IV, 125–44, provide detail on the condition of the Royal Navy’s ships across the Atlantic, they refrain from any firm conclusion why the fleet was inferior during the Yorktown campaign itself, except for mild criticism of Parker, ibid., 136–7. 8 Syrett, The Royal Navy in American Waters, 218.9 Mackesy, War for America, 429–30. For a more recent assessment of the military and naval campaign, see Middleton, The War of American Independence, 270–92.

100(1).indd 30 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4

Naval Resources and the British Defeat at Yorktown, 1781 31

on 5 September 1781 and thereafter. In particular they have accepted Hood’s assertions that Graves should either have attacked the French fleet as it emerged from the Chesapeake before de Grasse could deploy his superior numbers, or he should subsequently have occupied de Grasse’s former anchorage, thereby opening a communication with Cornwallis.10 In popular literature one Briton was always worth two Frenchmen under the right leadership.

Although tactical ability in commanders is vital for success, a sufficiency of resources is equally important, whatever national myths might suggest. Who then among Rodney, Parker, Graves and Sandwich was primarily to blame for the naval imbalance at Yorktown? Clearly, in Clinton’s eyes Rodney appeared most culpable, since he made the decision to send Hood to North America with only 14 of his 21 ships of the line then in the Leeward Islands.11 But before accepting Clinton’s charge, it is necessary to put Rodney’s actions in a proper context. His original instructions on going to the West Indies were to protect the British Leeward Islands, doing ‘all in his power to destroy the French and Spanish ships and those of the American rebels’. He was, however, always to act ‘within the extent of your station’.12 Not until September 1780 was Rodney’s remit extended to include a watching brief over North America, after the Admiralty learnt that the French West Indian fleet of Admiral Le Comte de Guichen was expected to join the squadron of seven ships of the line at Rhode Island which had just arrived in early July to support the American rebels. As Philip Stephens, the Admiralty Secretary, informed Rodney on 23 September 1780: ‘The Board consider the whole of His Majesty’s possessions on the Continent of America, as well as in the islands, as requiring the attention of the commanders of all his fleets in those seas’. Rodney, therefore, was to ‘to act for the defence of the whole according to such information as you receive of the motions of the enemy’.13

Unknown to the Admiralty, Rodney had already anticipated its wishes, sensing that ‘the army and fleet in North America were in imminent danger of being overpowered’. He had accordingly gone with ten ships of the line to New York, though his voyage ultimately proved unnecessary.14 After assembling the French homeward trade at Cape François, de Guichen had sailed for Europe with most of his fleet.15 Nevertheless, the desirability of co-ordinating the Leeward Islands, Jamaica and North American squadrons was reaffirmed in April 1781 when the Admiralty received intelligence that a new transatlantic armament was preparing at Brest under de Grasse, part of which might sail to North America at the start of the hurricane season. Rodney was accordingly to keep a close watch on the enemy and send reinforcements as necessary.16 It was these instructions that prompted Germain to assure Clinton that de Grasse posed no threat even if he was joined by the squadron at Rhode Island.17

Nevertheless, Rodney faced a difficult situation as the 1781 hurricane season

10 Hood to Jackson, 10 Sep. 1781, Hood Letters, 31. Ibid., 16 Sep. 1781, 28–34.11 Mackesy, War for America, 429–30.12 Admiralty to Rodney, 8 Dec. 1779, Syrett, Rodney Papers, II, 261–3.13 Stephens to Rodney, 23 Sep. 1780, National Archives (hereafter NA), PRO/20/11. 14 Rodney to Stephens, 15 Sep. 1780, NA, PRO/30/20/9.15 Dull, French Navy, 187, 189.16 Stephens to Rodney, 2 Apr. 1781, NA, Adm 2/570. 17 Germain to Clinton, 4 Apr. 1781, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 99.

100(1).indd 31 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


approached. At this point he had just 21 ships of the line to de Grasse’s 24 at Fort Royal in Martinique, the principal French base in the Leeward Islands. Apart from neutralizing any threat to North America, Rodney had to ensure the protection of the British sugar islands, including the recently captured Dutch colony of St Eustatius. He also had to provide escorts for the homeward and outward bound convoys which customarily sailed at this time.18 Their safety was something that no commander could ignore, given the economic importance of the sugar islands to Britain and the political influence of the planters. Finally, Rodney now had to keep an eye on Jamaica, Britain’s most valuable possession in the Caribbean. Parker on that station had just four ships of the line. Opposed to him was a French squadron of similar strength under Commodore Le Chevalier de Monteil and a more numerous Spanish force of 13 battleships with Admiral José Solano, conveniently located at Havana for an attack on Jamaica.19

Fortunately the approach of the hurricane season temporarily lessened the threat to the British islands. The main question for Rodney, therefore, was to assess his opponent’s intentions. The Admiralty’s most recent intelligence from Paris was that de Grasse would only send part of his fleet to North America, as Rodney informed Parker on 9 July 1781: ‘By the last dispatches I received from [the] administration, Monsieur de Grasse was to return to Europe; and that fourteen sail of the line were to join their squadron in North America’. The information seemed credible. The European powers customarily sent a substantial proportion of their fleet home for repair and refurbishment at this time, using their ships of the line as escorts for the valuable trade convoys. De Guichen had done this the previous year and the pattern was seemingly about to be repeated when watching frigates reported that de Grasse had left Martinique on the 5 July 1781 with 26 ships of the line and 200 merchantmen, heading for Cape François, the final assembly point for French homebound convoys. Nevertheless, Rodney promised to keep a strict eye on ‘the motions of the enemy’ to prevent any surprise. Parker too should remain on his guard, though Rodney believed the danger to Jamaica had momentarily passed.20

Even before news of de Grasse’s departure, Rodney had written on 7 July to Graves in New York, similarly assuring him that he would ‘keep as good a look out as possible’ on the movements of the French, ‘by which my own shall be regulated’. It appeared that ‘the Enemy’s squadron for America’ would ‘sail . . . in a short time,’ though their precise intentions were unknown. But whatever their movements, Graves could ‘depend upon the squadron in America being reinforced should the enemy bend their forces that way’. Any detachment from Rodney would first ‘make the Capes of Virginia’ before proceeding ‘along the coast to the Capes of Delaware’

18 Stephens to Rodney, 31 Mar. 1781, NA, Adm 2/570. Rodney’s conduct at St Eustatius incurred much criticism, not least because his deployment of the Leeward Islands fleet was clearly motivated by personal interest. However, the two ships of the line that accompanied the homeward bound convoys carrying the spoils from St Eustatius, the Vengeance (74) and the Vigilant (64), both needed refitting and their hulls coppered. Their departure, hence, did not reduce the ships available for subsequent service in North America, Sandwich Papers, IV, 126. For a recent assessment of Rodney and the St Eustatius episode, see O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, 289–319. 19 An Exact List of King’s Ships at the Havana, 1 Jan. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242. 20 Rodney to Parker, 9 Jul. 1781, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, V, 253. Two of the French ships were armed ‘en flûte’, meaning they were lightly equipped as troop carriers.

100(1).indd 32 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


and Sandy Hook, unless intelligence dictated otherwise.21 The news of de Grasse’s departure meant that Rodney could now settle the

deployment of his own squadron. Clearly, reinforcements must be prepared for North America, despite the continued uncertainty about French plans. As a first step Rodney ordered Hood to take seven of his ships for refitting at English Harbour in Antigua.22 The main concern was a lack of stores for maintaining the fleet once at sea. ‘Not four ships in the whole are in a fit state to go any distance with a view of meeting the enemy,’ Hood told his brother, ‘being totally destitute of spare masts, yards, sails and every other species of stores.23 Orders were accordingly given to the yard commissioner in Antigua to rectify the deficiencies, especially for substitute masts made from shorter pieces of timber.24 But the squadron was also delayed by Rodney’s uncertainty whether to take command himself. For the past few months he had been in indifferent health. However, by 24 July 1781 a decision could no longer be postponed, being nearly three weeks since de Grasse’s departure from the islands. He accordingly ordered Hood to take 14 ships of the line to North America to match any likely French detachment. The British fleet at New York would then comprise 22 line of battle ships against an anticipated combined strength of 21 with de Grasse and de Barras at Rhode Island.

Preparing the squadron for North America, however, was not Rodney’s only concern at this point. He was also anxious about a west bound Jamaica convoy which he feared might be intercepted by de Grasse or Solano between eastern Cuba and the French colony of St Domingue (Haiti). The only apparent solution to this danger was to order Hood to accompany the merchantmen past Cape Tiberon at the western end of St Domingue before proceeding to North America.25 Such diversion would further delay the squadron but seemed the best way of simultaneously meeting two important responsibilities. The convoy could then complete its journey with Rodney’s flagship, the Sandwich (90), which was too leaky for further operations. Hopefully it could then be repaired at Port Royal in time for the 1782 campaign, as Rodney informed Parker on 26 July 1781.26

Unfortunately, the Sandwich was not the only crippled ship of the line in the squadron. The Russell (74) was also judged too foul for immediate service, necessitating her dispatch during the hurricane season to the careening wharf in English Harbour.27 This left Rodney just five large vessels for convoying the trade to Europe and protecting the islands. He accordingly made the following dispositions. First he allocated the Triumph (74) and Panther (60) to escort the 150 merchantmen waiting to depart for England with the annual sugar harvest. Then he assigned the defence of the British Leeward Islands to Rear Admiral Francis Drake with the Ajax

21 Rodney to Graves, 7 Jul. 1781, Chadwick, Graves Papers, 39. Most of the originals in this collection are in NA, Adm 1/489. 22 Rodney to Hood, 9 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 46–7. 23 Quoted in the Sandwich Papers, IV, 135. 24 Hood to Commissioner Laforey, 11 Jul. 1781, National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM), Hood Papers, HOO/11.25 Rodney to Hood, 24 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 47–9.26 Rodney to Parker, 26 Jul. 1781, NA, PRO/30/20/12.27 Hood to Drake, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. The Russell remained in dock from 5 Sep. 1781 to 11 Dec. 1781, Russell logbook, NA, Adm 51/94. Other repairs were also carried out.

100(1).indd 33 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


(74), Princessa (70) and a number of frigates. Although de Grasse had left the area, Rodney feared that de Monteil might still threaten the British islands. Drake was therefore to station himself at St Lucia close to Fort Royal.28 This left the Gibraltar (80), which Rodney had made his flagship in place of the Sandwich. Although Rodney had appointed Hood to command the squadron for North America, he was still pondering whether to go there himself. The destination of the Gibraltar for the moment remained undecided.

These arrangements were no sooner settled than reports arrived that several enemy ships of the line had appeared at Fort Royal under Commodore La Motte-Piquet. The importance of the Leeward Islands for Britain’s trade and revenue left Rodney little choice but to reinforce Drake with two of Hood’s squadron, the Alcide (74) and Belliqueux (64).29 This unwelcome development also prompted Rodney to change his arrangements for the Jamaica convoy, which was now to be escorted by two of Hood’s other ships, the Torbay (74) and Prince William (64), rather than by the whole squadron. The advantage was that Hood could sail directly to North America in pursuit of de Grasse should that be his destination. The disadvantage was that Hood would have only ten ships of the line until joined by the Torbay and Prince William. However, the commanding officer of these vessels, Captain Gidoin, had strict instructions to follow Hood as soon as the convoy reached Port Royal.30

Rodney informed Parker of these changes on 30 July, emphasizing that ‘as the enemy have a very great naval force in North America, I must beg you will dispatch the Torbay and Prince William without detaining them a single moment’. Parker could also assist by adding ‘every line of battle ship you can possibly spare from your station’.31 In the event the information about La Motte-Piquet proved false, prompting Rodney to recall not only the Alcide and Belliqueux but the Ajax and Princessa too, despite continued uncertainty about de Monteil.32 He undoubtedly made these changes because of intelligence on 31 July that a French frigate had arrived at Cape François with 30 American pilots familiar with the navigation of the Chesapeake and Delaware, indicating some kind of amphibious operation there. Numerous rebel merchantmen had also gathered, making it ‘certain that the French fleet . . . from Martinique, would proceed immediately to America’.33 The recall of Drake’s vessels would thus increase the North American squadron to 16 ships of the line, once the Torbay and Prince William had completed their mission.34

Nevertheless the information about the pilots did not alter Rodney’s overall view of the situation or his recent determination to go home in the Gibraltar.35 As he told Admiral Marriott Arbuthnot, Graves’s predecessor, on 13 August when in the vicinity of Bermuda, he still thought that de Grasse would send just 12 to 14 of his

28 Sandwich Papers, IV, 135. 29 Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. The movements of these ships can be tracked in the Alcide’s logbook, NA, Adm 51/33. 30 Rodney to Gidoin, 30 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 51.31 Rodney to Parker, 30 Jul. 1781, Correspondence of George III, V, 259. 32 Hood to Drake, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.33 Copy of Intelligence, 1 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 50–1.34 Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 57.35 Intelligence from St Thomas, 31 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 50.

100(1).indd 34 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


26 ships of the line to North America, for which Hood’s detachment would suffice. He recognized that the French might make some kind of ‘grand effort’ in Virginia, to prevent which he now recommended that the squadron in North America should join Hood in the Chesapeake to prevent any interference with Cornwallis’s operations. But he still believed the decisive naval battle in the Americas would be fought in the West Indies during 1782.36

Rodney finally sailed from St Eustatius on 1 August, leaving Hood in command. His first task was to inform Graves about the arrangements for his squadron and the news concerning the American pilots.37 But Hood had scarcely written his letter than a fresh alarm arose about the appearance of a French squadron at Martinique. Drake was, accordingly, instructed to remain at St Lucia with his four ships of the line, despite Hood’s likely inferiority should he meet de Grasse.38 Hence, before sailing, he asked Drake if he could spare the Belliqueux and Alcide, though only if St Lucia and Barbados, Britain’s two key possessions, were secure. In the event the reports about a French squadron again proved false, allowing Drake to join Hood with all four ships of the line on 10 August, just as the main group was leaving Antigua.39 The arrival of Drake left Hood in a confident mood, telling Clinton as he approached the Chesapeake that his force was now ‘equal fully to defeat any designs of the enemy, let de Grasse bring or send what ships he may, in aid to those under de Barras’.40

Such hubris of course proved fatally misplaced, though ironically Rodney and Hood were justified in their assumptions, given the initial accuracy of the Admiralty’s intelligence. De Grasse’s objectives on leaving Brest in March 1781 were to attack Britain’s remaining possessions in the Lesser Antilles, before liaising with the Spanish at St Domingue for a joint operation against Jamaica or East Florida. The only proviso was that de Grasse was to send up to half of his fleet to end the British blockade of de Barras at Rhode Island. This detachment could then co-operate with the Americans before returning to the Caribbean for the new campaign in November 1781.41 Rodney’s dispositions, consequently, seemed well designed to counter de Grasse.

What Rodney and Hood did not know was that de Grasse’s plans changed radically after reaching Cape François on 16 July. Here he met General Bernardo Galvez, the senior Spanish military officer in the region. Galvez recognized that no further operations would be sensible so close to the hurricane season. However, he was aware that a decisive blow in North America would change the balance of power in the Caribbean. He accordingly urged the Frenchman to sail with his whole force, including de Monteil’s four ships, to seek out and destroy the British fleet in North America. De Grasse could then return with his 28 vessels to join Galvez and Solano

36 Rodney to Arbuthnot, 13 Aug. 1781, Correspondence of George III, V, 264–5. It is not clear why Rodney wrote to Arbuthnot rather than Graves other than confusion because of ill health.37 Hood to Graves, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, Hood Letters, 24–5.38 Hood to Drake, 2 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Clinton, 4 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.39 Line of Battle, 10 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood Journal, 10 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 50/11.40 Hood to Clinton, 25 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.41 Dull, The French Navy, 216–23. Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France, IV, 548.

100(1).indd 35 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


for an assault on Jamaica, thus completing the destruction of British power in the western hemisphere.42

In the circumstances Rodney had done his best, given the information and resources at his command. Despite his other obligations, he had eventually allocated 16 of his 19 serviceable ships to North America. His one questionable action was to sail home in the 80-gun Gibraltar, his second most powerful vessel, rather than take passage in the Triumph or Panther.43 However, one ship would not have altered the outcome of the battle on the 5 September, since Hood and Graves would still have had only 20 line of battle ships compared to the 24 deployed by de Grasse.44

What then of Rodney’s assertions that Parker and Graves were responsible for the naval deficiency at Yorktown? Certainly Rodney appears superficially to have had a case concerning the detention of the Torbay and Prince William. The Jamaica convoy reached Port Royal on 9 August, about the same time that Hood was preparing to leave Antigua.45 But Parker too had other responsibilities, not least for the trade and safety of Britain’s most profitable sugar island, Jamaica. Although Rodney had mentioned that the French were assembling ‘a very great naval force in North America,’ his letter of 30 July did not suggest an immediate crisis, given his own intention of returning to England.46 The intelligence from the Admiralty and Rodney’s fleet dispositions indicated to Parker that Hood and Graves would be ‘at least a match for the French’.47 A large homeward bound convoy was waiting to sail which had already been delayed by de Grasse’s arrival at Cape François’.48 Gidoin’s two vessels would provide valuable extra protection and their deployment in this manner sensible too, given that they could take the same route as the merchantmen until north of the Bahamas. Any doubts about the wisdom of such arrangements were removed on 14 August when Parker heard that the French fleet had been seen off Cape Maze at the eastern tip of Cuba, apparently heading towards Havana away from the convoy’s route.49 The merchantmen accordingly started their journey on 20 August. Unfortunately westerly winds and currents detained the vessels for almost three weeks off the coast of Cuba.50 The two warships in consequence did not conclude their escort duties until 21 September and only reached New York on

42 Dull, French Navy, 243–4. Doniol, Participation de la France, IV, 649–51. Doniol mostly credits de Grasse for sending the entire French fleet, while acknowledging the support of Solano. 43 Suggestions have been made that the Gibraltar needed refitting, based on Rodney’s comments that her iron work was likely to corrode in so humid a climate, Rodney to Sandwich, 27 Apr. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 152. However the Gibraltar had only arrived from England in January 1781 and was still sufficiently seaworthy after re-crossing the Atlantic for Rodney to volunteer its deployment with the Channel squadron, Rodney to Stephens, 17 Sep. 1781, NA, Adm 1/314. 44 De Grasse had four more ships of the line blockading the York and James Rivers which took no part in the battle, Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de La France, 405.45 Rodney to Gidoin, 30 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 51. The suggestion has been made that Parker may have detained the ships through ‘pique’ because Rodney had sequestrated stores destined for the Jamaica squadron, Breen, ‘Divided Command’, 198–99.46 Parker to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.47 Parker to Sandwich, 1 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 165–6.48 Parker to Stephens, 13 Jul. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.49 Parker to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242. In reality de Grasse was heading for the old Bahamas Channel, a little used route, to avoid detection on his way northwards.50 Parker to Stephens, 1 Sep. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.

100(1).indd 36 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


11 October 1781, five weeks after the engagement.51 The presence of the Torbay and Prince William on the 5 September would probably not have had a decisive effect on the outcome, given the better condition of the French ships and determination of de Grasse to avoid a close engagement. Nevertheless, they would have strengthened Graves’s line of battle, perhaps reducing the damage suffered when the rear of the British fleet became detached from the centre and the van.

Rodney’s other complaint against Parker was that he failed to provide additional support. However, by the end of July 1781 Parker had just four ships of the line. Three of these, the Albion (74), Princess Royal (98) and Ruby (64), were urgently needed in England for the fixing of copper sheathing to their hulls to make them faster, more manoeuvrable and easier to maintain. Coppering was now the Admiralty’s key weapon in the battle to match the enemy’s naval power.52 But the Albion and Princess Royal were also long overdue a major refit, while the Ruby had been damaged in a hurricane the previous October. None consequently was fit for deployment other than as escorts for the convoy.53 Their departure consequently left Parker with just one operational ship of the line, the Ramillies (74).54 Any effective reinforcement for Graves had clearly not been practical.

What then of Rodney’s final accusation that Graves had neglected to have his squadron ready, depriving the fleet thereby of four ships of the line on the 5 September 1781? Rodney claimed that he had given Graves ample warning in his letter of 7 July about a likely junction of the two French squadrons. This should have allowed him time either to join Hood in the Chesapeake before de Grasse arrived, or to have stationed himself off Rhode Island to prevent de Barras from escaping. Instead Graves had lingered in New York, failing even to have his squadron ready. As a result only five of his ships of the line made the journey to the Chesapeake. Thus were sown the seeds of Cornwallis’s destruction.55

In reality Rodney’s charges were largely bluster, based on inaccurate information. Firstly, he had not warned Graves in his letter of 7 July that a union of de Grasse and de Barras was imminent. He had merely advised Graves that part of de Grasse’s squadron might come to North America.56 Secondly, only two not four of Graves’s capital ships missed the action on the 5 September. By the summer of 1781 the North American fleet comprised just seven ships of the line, following the loss of the Culloden (74) off New England.57 As to the uniting of the two French squadrons, Graves was fully aware of the danger. Recent intelligence from Clinton indicated that the American rebels anticipated ‘a considerable force . . . from the French commander-in-chief in the West Indies,’ acting in concert with de Barras. One of Graves’s first actions, therefore, on taking over command from Arbuthnot, was to remind

51 Graves to Stephens, 16 Oct. 1781, Graves Papers, 119–21. The progress of the two ships can be tracked in the Torbay’s logbook, NA, Adm 51/1003.52 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 97, 295–9. 53 All three ships were described on arrival in England as being in a ‘very bad condition’, Memorandum, 6 Feb. 1782, Sandwich Papers, IV, 325–6.54 Sandwich Papers, IV, 126.55 Rodney to Jackson, 19 Oct. 1781, Hood Letters, 44–7. 56 Rodney to Graves, 7 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 39.57 Rodney may have mistakenly included two 50-gun ships in his calculations. However these vessels had long been considered unfit for a line of battle.

100(1).indd 37 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


Rodney on 2 July 1781 ‘how much the fate of this country must depend upon the early intelligence, and detachments which may be sent by you hither, upon the first movement of the enemy’. Graves would certainly keep his own squadron together ‘and so placed as to secure a retreat to New York’. He would also retain cruisers to the southward for intelligence.58 A number were already co-operating with the army in Chesapeake Bay and others were stationed at Charleston and Bermuda.59

Finally Graves was aware of the need to have his ships seaworthy. As he informed Stephens on 19 July 1781, his intention was to refit the squadron once the army had ceased its coastal operations. Early attention would then facilitate the repair of vessels arriving subsequently from the West Indies.60 However, after writing this letter, Graves received information from the Admiralty that a convoy was coming from France with ‘large supplies of money, clothing and military stores’ which the ministry believed constituted ‘one of the most important supplies which the French had ever sent to the rebels . . . furnishing them with the only possible means of carrying on the war’.61 The tone of this letter left Graves little choice but to attempt the convoy’s interception near Boston, its expected destination. Crushing the rebellion was still a principal British aim and Graves had yet to receive Rodney’s letter of 7 July, let alone firm intelligence that a French fleet was actually on its way from the West Indies. His cruise, unfortunately, ran into persistent fog, which thwarted all attempts at finding the convoy. Graves accordingly returned to New York on 16 August. Here he found a copy of Rodney’s dispatch of 7 July, the original having been lost when the Swallow sloop sank off New England while searching for Graves.62 But the letter, as already noted, gave no details about what Rodney specifically intended or what the French were planning. By implication de Grasse might not even appear, like de Guichen the previous year.

Unfortunately, Graves’s lack of information was compounded by his not receiving Hood’s letter of 1 August concerning the American pilots and progress of the British squadron at Antigua.63 The Active brig carrying this dispatch had failed, like the Swallow, to complete its mission on being captured off the Delaware Capes.64 With no imminent threat, Graves decided to attend to the state of his squadron. The cruise to Boston had rendered two of his line of battle, the Robust (74) and the Europe (64), unseaworthy. Indeed the Robust was so leaky that Graves decided it would have to be sent to Halifax or England for repair.65 Both vessels also lacked coppered hulls which made it ‘very difficult to keep a close line with them’ or ‘keep up a pursuit’.66 Finally a third ship, the Prudent (64), needed new masts, though this task could be done at New York.67 In the meantime Graves discussed with Clinton a plan to attack

58 Graves to Rodney, 2 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 18–19. 59 Disposition of H.M’s Ships in North America, 4 July 1781, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 173–4.60 Graves to Stephens, 19 Jul. 1781, NA, Adm 1/489. 61 Admiralty to Graves, 22 May 1781, Graves Papers, 24–5.62 Graves to Stephens , 20 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 32–4.63 Hood to Graves, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM HOO/11.64 Graves to Hood, 28 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, lxvii.65 Graves to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 32–5.66 Graves to Sandwich, 4 Jul. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 174.67 Graves to Sandwich, 21 Aug., Sandwich Papers, IV, 179–81. Graves to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781,

100(1).indd 38 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


de Barras at Rhode Island, which Graves readily agreed to once the vessels then repairing were ready for sea.68

The first indication Graves had of an emergency was on 27 August when he received news that Hood was approaching with 14 ships of the line, though the British commander had yet to sight de Grasse or evaluate the size of his fleet. But Graves had barely read this dispatch before Hood arrived off Sandy Hook demanding action. ‘Whether you attend the army to Rhode Island or seek the enemy at sea, you have no time to lose,’ Hood suggested, since it would be easier to defeat the enemy squadrons separately rather than together. His sudden appearance consequently meant that Graves had minimal time to prepare for the situation now facing him. It certainly precluded having the Robust or Prudent ready to sail, though the Europe was pressed into service. Hence Rodney’s charge that Graves had lingered in New York and neglected his squadron was ill founded. Graves had, like Rodney, done what seemed necessary, given his various responsibilities and the available information.

In weighing up the respective actions of Rodney, Hood, Graves and Parker, it is clear that none of them were primarily responsible for the inferiority in ships on 5 September 1781. Admittedly they had not shown great perspicacity in assessing the dangers facing them. But they could only operate within their resources and apparent circumstances. Rodney and Parker were certainly in no position to anticipate the last minute arrangements of de Grasse, Solano and Galvez, even if they had deployed more shadowing frigates. By the time de Grasse’s use of the Old Bahamas Channel to approach North America had been established, it would have been too late to make alternative plans.

Superior resources, of course, are not everything in war. The condition of the weaponry, the morale of the men and the ability of commanders are vital factors that can give victory to numerically inferior combatants. The British crews were certainly capable of defeating their opponents on 5 September. Unfortunately, their ships were in a less satisfactory condition given that a majority of them had not had a major refit in over two years.69 Most of de Grasse’s fleet in contrast had been in the western hemisphere just six months. Nevertheless, the belief remains that a British victory might still have resulted had Graves shown the right leadership. Graves certainly veered towards caution, as Hood noted, in not attacking the French fleet as it emerged from Lynnhaven Bay. However such a manoeuvre would have breached the Fighting Instructions to form a line of battle before commencing action and whatever the alleged defects of those instructions, the advantages of randomly engaging a superior enemy were always likely to be outweighed by the loss of cohesion, especially given Graves’s lack of an effective signalling system.70 The want of standard flags explains why Hood with the rear division misinterpreted the command to engage on 5 September, leaving the van and the centre to bear the brunt of Graves’ vain attempt to force the French into close combat according to British practice.71 In these circumstances Graves

Graves Papers, 52–3.68 Willcox, The American Rebellion, 559–61.69 Sandwich Papers, IV, 126–7.70 Squadron commanders often added their own flags, as Rodney had done in the West Indies and Arbuthnot in North America prior to Yorktown, Sandwich Papers, IV, 142–3. See also Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 345; and Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 239, 290–1.71 The French usually attempted to disable opponents by firing at the rigging, thus preserving

100(1).indd 39 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


was wise to ignore Hood’s suggestion next day to enter the Chesapeake ahead of de Grasse.72 Several of the centre and van had suffered considerable damage during the battle and would have been difficult to manoeuvre inside the bay.73 More importantly, the arrival of de Barras meant that Graves would have had just 18 battleships to confront de Grasse’s 36, suggesting that the destruction of the British fleet rather than the relief of Cornwallis would have been the likely outcome.74 In reality more ships alone could have rectified the situation. For this deficiency Lord Sandwich and the ministry in London must primarily answer.

In assessing the culpability of Sandwich and his colleagues for the numerical inferiority of the Royal Navy at Yorktown, it is important to note that a lack of capital ships was not a new problem. Since France entered the war in 1778 Britain had struggled to match the resources of the Bourbon powers. In that year Admiral Augustus Keppel was barely equal to the French challenge in the battle of Ushant, while across the Atlantic only Lord Howe’s tactical brilliance prevented Admiral Comte d’Estaing from dealing a serious blow, first at New York and then at Newport. The navy was similarly indebted to Admiral Barrington in the West Indies for preventing disaster at St Lucia. However if 1778 was a difficult year, 1779 proved even worse with the entry of Spain into the conflict. In Europe, the Bourbon powers entered the Channel with a much superior force to support an invasion, while Gibraltar simultaneously came under close blockade. Elsewhere Britain lost the Caribbean islands of St Vincent and Grenada, while in North America d’Estaing almost captured Savannah, prompting the hasty evacuation of Newport and the scuttling of ships to protect the entrance to New York harbour. The situation improved temporarily in 1780: British control of the Channel was not threatened and Gibraltar was relieved, following Rodney’s defeat of Admiral Langara off Cape St Vincent in the Moonlight Battle. Nevertheless, the naval balance remained precarious in both the West Indies and North America, a situation that continued into 1781. Although the Admiralty knew that part of de Grasse’s squadron might go northwards during the hurricane season, the threat of a second Franco-Spanish eruption into the English Channel left just three ships of the line available to reinforce Graves. Even then their commander, Admiral Digby, was prevented from departing until late July.75

It is beyond the scope of this article to give a full analysis for the lack of resources. Traditionally the responsibility has been laid at the door of Sandwich for neglecting the fleet before and after the outbreak of the American rebellion. More recent work suggests that he was not the corrupt administrator traditionally portrayed by Whig opponents.76 The reality was that in the years before the war Sandwich was constrained by Lord North at the Treasury in the interests of reducing the national debt. As a result new building was limited, especially in merchant yards where

their fleet for other objectives. The British in contrast preferred fighting at close quarters to batter opponents into submission, a tactic which suited their sturdier ships and better disciplined crews.72 Hood to Sandwich, 16 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 188.73 For the condition of the British ships after the battle, see Graves to Stephens, 14 Sep. 1781, Graves Papers, 61–76.74 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 290–1. Graves’s squadron had been reduced to 18 by the scuttling of the Terrible.75 Syrett, Navy in American Waters, 180–1.76 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 319–30.

100(1).indd 40 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


construction had effectively ceased by December 1774.77 This pursuit of economy continued even after the start of the American rebellion, which was viewed primarily as a police action by the army. This was at a time when the Bourbon powers were expanding their fleets in readiness to challenge the terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris.78 Not until 1777 was new construction and major repair increased from a peacetime level of £280,000 to £423,000, helped by the resumption of merchant building.79 The consequence of this delay was a gap that was never closed. As Sandwich informed the Cabinet in September 1779, following the invasion threat: ‘Had we been early enough in our preparations, and not suffered them [the French and Spanish] to go on arming and building without keeping pace with them, their superiority would certainly not have been so decided’.80 Hence although Sandwich and his Admiralty colleagues had a fleet similar in size to that of Anson in 1759, it was not enough to achieve a two power standard against the current fleets of France and Spain.81

Nevertheless, despite the obvious inferiority, Sandwich believed that Britain had reached the limit of its resources. In his paper for the Cabinet he lamented: ‘we have no other source to draw from’ or ‘possibility of augmenting our strength,’ referring to the lack of slipways, materials, shipwrights and sailors.82 Fortunately others disputed such pessimism. Among them was Sir Charles Middleton, the Comptroller of the Navy Board. He reminded Sandwich that ‘what was done in the last war is no guide for this’.83 Such was the force of his arguments that Sandwich secured from North a vote in the Commons of £633,000 for new construction and repair in 1780, a 20 per cent increase over the previous year. But the largest leap in funding occurred in the last weeks of Sandwich’s regime when £890,000 was allocated.84 By January 1782, 36 ships of the line were then under construction compared to just 17 at the height of Anson’s success in December 1759.85 Over half were building in merchant yards which the Admiralty and Navy Boards had previously declined to do on such a scale.86

77 Sandwich to North, 10 Sep. 1772, Sandwich Papers, I, 23–6; Naval Estimate for Building, Rebuilding and Repair, 20 Dec. 1774, Journals of the House of Commons, XXXV, 55–6.78 Baugh, ‘The Politics of British Naval Failure’, 22–46. See also Baugh, ‘Why did Britain lose command’, 153–5; Jan Glete, Navies and Nations, II, 275; Dull, French Navy, 16–88; and Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 129–30.79 Naval Estimate, Commons’ Journal, 15 Nov. 1776, XXXVI, 37–9 and 8 Dec. 1778, XXXVII, 33–4; Baugh, ‘Command of the Sea’, 155.80 Paper read in the Cabinet by Lord Sandwich, [14] Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 170. There is another copy of this paper in the Correspondence of George III, IV, 440. 81 For Anson’s achievements during the previous war, see Middleton, The Bells of Victory, 58, 66, 108–9, 214. See also Monthly List Book and Navy Progress from Dec. 1754 to Jan. 1806, NA Adm/7/567. The Admiralty compiled this list to correct discrepancies in the Navy Board’s method of returning ships under its care.82 Paper read in the Cabinet, [14] Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 170.83 Middleton to Sandwich, 15 Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 180. 84 Naval Estimate, 2 Feb. 1780, Commons’ Journal, XXXVII, 549–50 and 21 Jan 1782, XXXVIII, 632–3. 85 List of ships building at the several periods, 26 Dec. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 301–2. The estimates given to the Commons give a slightly smaller figure of 35 line of battle ships, of which four were 50 gun vessels, 21 Jan. 1782, Commons’ Journal, XXXVIII, 633. 86 Baugh, British Naval Administration, 254–61.

100(1).indd 41 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


Unfortunately the huge increase in naval spending did not come to fruition until 1783 when for the first time the navy had more than 100 capital ships in sea pay.87 As a result Britain continued to fight the last 12 months of the war with inadequate resources. Indeed, the number of battleships in commission actually declined in 1782, from a peak of 93 in January to 84 by the year’s end, the result of hard usage and damage in action.88 The French and Spanish fleets in contrast totalled 127.89 Although Rodney achieved a modicum of success in the battle of the Saints, the Royal Navy remained on the defensive in the West Indies, as Hood lamented.90 Elsewhere, the Western Squadron had to retreat before another Franco-Spanish incursion into the English Channel, while a further relief of Gibraltar was only effected with difficulty. In these circumstances Yorktown had been a disaster waiting to happen, despite claims by some historians that Britain had virtually re-established naval superiority by 1781.91 In reality this was not achieved until after the war when the building programme came to fruition.92 Even then the gap was only temporarily closed, since the Bourbon powers continued their efforts while the Pitt administration repeated the mistake of North’s ministry in preferring economy to the maintenance of a two power naval standard.93 Only revolutionary upheaval and several major land wars prevented the French and Spanish from achieving their maritime ambitions, allowing the Royal Navy to enjoy a superiority which it had last possessed in the latter half of the Seven Year’s War.94 There were, in consequence, no more disasters like Yorktown in the period between 1793 and 1814.

Dr Richard Middleton was for many years a lecturer and reader in American History at Queen’s University, Belfast. Among his publications are: The Bells of Victory: The Pitt–Newcastle ministry and the conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1985 and 2002), Colonial America: A history (Oxford, 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2011 (with Anne Lombard); Pontiac’s War: Its causes, course and consequences (New York, 2007); and The War of American Independence, 1775–1783 (Harlow, 2012).

87 Ships in Sea Pay, 1 Jan. 1783, Monthly List and Navy Progress, NA Adm/7/567.88 Monthly List and Navy Progress, 1 Jan. 1781–1 Jan. 1782, Adm 7/567.89 Dull, French Navy, 369–71. The superiority of the French and Spanish fleets was commented on by Commodore Keith Stewart in a paper for Sandwich, 29 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 408–13. He especially noted the discrepancy in the construction of new three deck 100+ gun battleships. 90 Hood to Jackson, 30 Apr. 1782, Hood Letters, 135–7.91 See especially Baugh, ‘Command of the Sea’, 152–3, and Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 292. 92 In 1784 the ministry set a new record of £1,105,000 for building and repair, 9 Feb. 1784, Commons’ Journal, XXXIX, 897–8. However, by 1790 the figure had declined to £398.010, of which a mere £2,890 was for merchant construction, Commons’ Journal, XLV, 40. 93 Remarkably, the ministry informed Parliament as late as 31 Jan. 1792 that the continued tranquillity of Europe meant ‘some immediate reduction’ could ‘be safely made in our naval and military establishments’, Commons Journal, XLVII, 3–4. For an overview of British naval policy during these years, see Webb, ‘The Rebuilding and Repair of the Fleet’, 194–209. For French and Spanish construction between 1783 and 1793, see Glete, Navies and Nations, II, 275–7, 369 (footnote 45).94 For the respective strengths of the British, French and Spanish fleets after 1793, see Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 608.

100(1).indd 42 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4


ReferencesBarnes, G. R., and J. H. Owen (eds), The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of

the Admiralty, 1771–1782, 4 vols (Navy Records Society, 1933–8)Baugh, D. A., British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965)— ‘Why did Britain lose command of the sea during the war for America’, J. Black and P.

Woodfine (eds), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester, 1988)

— ‘The Politics of British Naval Failure, 1775–1777’, American Neptune, LII (1992), 22–46 Black, J., and P. Woodfine (eds), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth

Century (Leicester, 1988) Breen, K., ‘Divided Command: the West Indies and North America, 1780–1781’, in J. Black and

P. Woodfine (eds), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester, 1988)

Chadwick, F. E. (ed.), The Graves Papers and Other Documents (New York, 1916)Davies, K. G. (ed.), Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783: Colonial Office Series, 21

vols (Shannon, 1972–1981)Doniol, H., Histoire de la participation de la France à l’establishment des États Unis d’Amerique:

Correspondence diplomatique et documents, 5 vols (Paris, 1886–1892) Dull, J. R., The French Navy and American Independence: A study of arms and diplomacy

(Princeton, 1975)Fortescue, Sir J. (ed.), The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760–1783, 6 vols

(London, 1927–8)Glete, J., Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–

1860, 2 vols (Stockholm, 1993)Hannay, D. (ed.), Letters Written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781–2–3 (Navy

Records Society, 1895)Hannay, D., Rodney (London, 1891)Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1991)Lacour-Gayet, G., La Marine Militaire de La France sous Le Regne de Louis XVI (Paris, 1905)Lapeyrouse Bonfils, M. Le Comte de, Histoire de La Marine Française, 3 vols (Paris 1845)Mackesy, P., The War for America, 1775–1783 (London, 1992)Middleton, R., ‘The Clinton–Cornwallis Controversy and Responsibility for the British

Surrender at Yorktown’, History, 98 (2013), 370–89. — The War of American Independence, 1775–1783 (Harlow, 2012)— The Bells of Victory: The Pitt–Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ War,

1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1984)O’Shaughnessy, A., The Men Who Lost America: British Command during the Revolutionary

War and the Preservation of the Empire (New Haven, 2013) Rodger, N. A. M., The Insatiable Earl: A life of John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich (London,

1993)— The Command of the Ocean: A naval history of Britain, 1649–1815 (New York, 2004)Syrett, D. (ed.), The Rodney Papers: Selections from the correspondence of Admiral Lord Rodney,

2 vols (Navy Records Society, 2005–7)— The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775–1783 (Aldershot, 1989)Webb, P., ‘The Rebuilding and Repair of the Fleet, 1783–93’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical

Research, L (1977), 194-209Willcox , W. B. (ed.), The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s narrative of his campaigns,

1775–1782, with an appendix of original documents (New Haven, 1954)

100(1).indd 43 16/01/2014 12:40

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Am

eric

an P

ublic

Uni

vers

ity S

yste

m]

at 0

4:32

19

Febr

uary

201

4