national identity and ethnic‐religious conflicts: some statistical correlations

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National identity and ethnic‐religiousconflicts: Some statistical correlationsJun Osawa aa IIPS Research Fellow , IIPSPublished online: 11 Apr 2007.

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National identity andethnic-religious conflicts:Some statistical correlations

JUN OSAWA

Statistical analysis is used to examine the relationship between economicdevelopment and ethnic conflicts. IIPS Research Fellow Jun Osawa arguesthat the data does not suggest a simplistic cause-and-effect relationship,as one would initially assume. Not surprisingly, ethnic minorities whohave lost their independence are more likely to resort to violence to getit back, and feelings of antagonism can be exacerbated by economicinequalities. States with high economic growth can possibly prevent ethnicconflicts from breaking out within their borders, but the level of growthneeded is much higher than in developed countries and must be sustained.

Introduction

At this moment, there are ongoing conflicts in approximately fifty countries

and seventy regions around the world. In many of these conflicts, ethnic problems

play a role in spurring continued violence. The level of ethnic conflict runs the gamut

from small-scale repression of specific ethnic groups by their own governments to

protests, riots, terrorism, and even large-scale conflicts that can best be described as

civil wars.

Ethnic conflicts received international attention in the 1990s as they erupted in

former socialist countries.1 A typical example of this is the bloody civil war in the

former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But there are also other problems,

such as with the Serbs in the Krajina area of Croatia, the Armenians in the Nagorno-

Karabakh area of Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union, the Russians in Georgia

and Moldova, and the Islamic guerrillas in Tajikistan in Central Asia.

Ethnic conflicts are becoming a focus of attention in international relations because

they are especially related to the security of the international community. Today's

international relations are, of course, based upon the nation-state system. The basic

prerequisites under this system are that governments are in control of their respective

ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW • VOLUME 4 NUMBER 1 125

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territories, that each government exercises its own sovereignty, and that states recognize

each other's existence as such. But ethnic conflicts that occur within such states

threaten to disintegrate the states that comprise the nation-state system. This is easily

seen from an examination of the chain of unfortunate events that followed the

dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia in 1991-1992, and

1 JlG Ongoing the string of ethnic troubles that broke out in a number of

PPiy* £\ \ pi-c i-ri republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

t O Q 3 . y S WOrlCL Ethnic conflicts can also become a destabilizing factor

£»TY=» n o t lAfPirc for regional security if they spread across national boundaries,

as with Croatians and Serbians in Bosnia and Armenians in

U6TZV66TI S TciTcS, Azerbaijan, when there is a state whose majority population

|_ 1 1 j . /-"pjt-jfi-ipf c *s °f ^ e same ethnicity as a minority population in ethnic

conflict in an adjacent country. In these cases, ethnic conflicts

WltnlYl t n G S t c i t C demand serious attention because they exert a direct impact

on the international security environment.

Why do ethnic conflicts occur at all? Is it simply because diverse ethnic groups

reside in large numbers within the framework of one state?

There are approximately 190 states today, all of which are treated as if they are

nation-states. But the fact is that only about ten of these states comprise a single

ethnicity.2 In other words, most states do have ethnic minorities within their national

boundaries. But not all of these 170 countries with ethnic minorities have ethnic

troubles, let alone conflicts. Only fifty-six countries actually have ongoing problems

that fall under the accurate definition of ethnic conflict, and of those, only about

twenty cases represent the most intensive category, which could be called "wars."

These figures indicate that the mere existence of a minority ethnic group or groups

does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflict. Therefore, there must be other factors

that prompt ethnic conflict. It should be possible to identify some of these in order to

solve current conflicts and to prevent future ones.

Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia are three areas with many ongoing ethnic

conflicts. In contrast, there are relatively few conflicts in Europe, East Asia, Southeast

Asia, and the Americas (see Figure 1). But this does not mean that there are fewer

numbers of ethnic minorities in regions like Europe and Southeast Asia. In France,

126 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW • SPRING/SUMMER 1997

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National identity and ethnic-religious conflicts

Figure 1: Ethnic conflicts throughout the world

Source: Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).


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for example, the Basques comprise 0.4 percent and the Bretons 6.8 percent of the

country's total population. Malaysia and Thailand have Chinese populations of 34

percent and 10 percent respectively of their total populations. A comparison of

areas with ethnic conflicts and those without ethnic conflicts quickly shows that

ethnic conflict is more common in developing countries, while developed countries

enjoy relative peace. To use quantitative indicators in measuring economic affluence,

the average per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power

parity (PPP) and the average per-capita GDP based on market exchange rate (MER)

for conflict-ridden areas are respectively US$ 1,635 and US$3,125, while worldwide

averages are US$5,346 and US$6,100.3

These figures would appear to show that the economic environment is perhaps

one factor that affects ethnic conflicts. To answer the question of what kinds of factors

help cause ethnic conflicts, this paper shall examine both economic conditions and

outbreaks of ethnic conflicts with a primary focus on economic causative factors.

Further, to analyze the factors that lead to ethnic minority conflict, 233 ethnic group

cases were analyzed, classified by criteria developed by Professor Ted Robert Gurr

of the University of Maryland. In conducting the present analysis, the paper adds

some more economic data to those developed by Professor Gurr for further statistical

analysis.

There is a long list of past studies in international politics and international

relations about conflict, especially about wars between states. The ongoing conflicts

in today's world, however, are not wars between states but are, rather, conflicts

within the state.

This means that a different approach from the state-centered methodology used

in the past is needed for analyzing today's conflicts, and analyses of the relationship

between the international system and conflict traditionally dealt with in international

relations studies must be reexamined. The characteristics of intra-state conflict should

be considered from different aspects, including why, from a sociological viewpoint,

an ethnic identity develops; what might be the political processes by which ethnic

groups demand their economic and political rights and clamor for autonomy and

independence; and what kind of income gap and other economic conditions might

lie behind such ethnicity issues.


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The present state of ethnic conflictsThere are ongoing conflicts in fifty-six countries and sixty-seven areas. According

to Professor Gurr's classification method, the conflicts fall into the following categories:

twenty-two "War (WAR)-level" major armed conflicts; thirty-one "Low-Intensity

Conflict (LlC)-level" low-intensity conflicts with violence, including armed clashes,

terrorism, or deadly rioting; four "Dispute (DlS)-level" serious disputes with little

armed violence; and ten "Repression (REP)-level" serious conflicts in which most

violence is a consequence of state repression (see Table 1). An analysis according to

relative intensity carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) classified twenty-eight of the world's ongoing conflicts as "large-scale."

Table 1: Scale of ethnic conflicts

WAR

22

LIC

31

DIS

4

REP

10

Places experiencing ongoing ethnic conflicts include ten countries and twelve

areas in Europe (west of the Urals), eight countries and eleven areas in the Middle

East and North Africa, eight countries and twelve areas in Central and South Asia,

six countries and ten areas in the Asia-Pacific region (which includes East Asia,

Southeast Asia, and Oceania), nineteen countries and nineteen areas in Africa south

of the Sahara Desert, and four countries and four areas in the Americas.

Of these, ten of the twelve European ethnic conflicts are a result of the dissolution

of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. A common characteristic of

this region's ethnic conflicts is that they were caused by the fact that the Serbs and

the Russians, who once constituted majorities in the former communist states of

Yugoslavia and the USSR respectively, have become ethnic minorities within the

newly independent states. In the former Yugoslavia, Serbs used to be a plurality,

with 36.3 percent of the total population. They are now a minority of only 5 percent

in the newly independent Croatia, while in Bosnia Muslims account for 43.7 percent of


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the population whereas Serbs now account for only 31.4 percent. As for the former

Soviet Union, ethnic Russians have become a minority in the newly independent Azerbaijan,

Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, where there

is a geographical concentration of people of ethnic Russian origin, Russians are engaged

in ethnic conflicts demanding independence or local autonomy."

In the Middle East, the Kurds, who live dispersed across national borders in Iran,

Iraq, and Turkey, are involved in ethnic conflicts and are demanding local autonomy

or independence. This region has seen other local conflicts related to Islam in Iran,

Iraq, Bahrain, and Algeria.

In Central and South Asia, India must contend with a pro-independence movement

in the Kashmir region that is supported by Pakistan, and an active movement for

local autonomy in Assam. In Sri Lanka, the Tamijs have waged sporadic local fighting

and used terrorism to push for independence. India has been involved in this conflict

as well because of its concern that the conflict might spread to the Indian Tamil

population. There are also a number of ethnic minorities living in the mountainous

regions of Bangladesh and Myanmar who are still engaged in independence movements.

In the Asia-Pacific region, China faces the Tibetans' clamor for independence

while the Islamic Uighurs and Kazakhs demand greater autonomy. In Indonesia,

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, has been engaged in a sometimes violent

independence movement against the Indonesian government ever since Indonesia

invaded Timor in 1975. In the Philippines, the Islamic Moros have been waging a

war for their independence and have achieved limited autonomy in some areas of the

country.

In Africa south of the Sahara Desert, there are many countries in which intertribal

confrontations have become civil wars. In Burundi and Rwanda, the Tutsis and the

Hutus have been involved in a retaliatory bloodbath that has now spread into Zaire,

and Christian minorities have been in conflict with their Islamic governments in

Nigeria and Sudan. In the Americas, local conflicts have subsided because pro-communist

guerrilla activities have either diminished or disappeared altogether as a result of the

end of the Cold War. But new ethnic independence movements by native Indian tribes

have arisen and flared into open conflicts in Guatemala and Mexico.


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Economic factors and ethnic conflictPer-capita GDP and the economic growth rate of states with ethnic conflicts should

be among the factors taken into consideration when the causes of such conflicts are

examined. Data was collected from 197 countries and areas of the world and the

average per-capita GDP and economic growth rates from 1980 through 1990 were

plotted (see Figure 2).7 For further comparison, economic indicators were plotted

for countries with ethnic conflicts at four different levels: WAR, LIC, DIS, and REP.

As per-capita GDP data, figures based on MER and others based on the PPP series

estimated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of Great Britain

have been used.8 The GDP axis is logarithmically expressed.

Figure 2: Per capita GDP and economic growth rates worldwideand in countries with ethnic conflict

[Worldwide average [

GDP per capitain USS (MER)

Growth rate(av. 1980-1991)

Conflict group

GDP per capitain USS (MER)

. 9 .0 . • :


[Worldwide average I | Conflict group |

•15.00 -10.00

100000

ioaot

-soo • o

100

10

1

GDP per capitain USS (PPP)

* •* * V * * *•

fo* t W», 5.00•

*

10.00 15.00


GDP per capitain USS (PPP)

-15.00 -10.00 -5.00 • • 5 . 0 0 10.00 15.00


Sources: Market exchange rate (MER) data from Saishin Sekaigensei 1996 (Tokyo: Heibonsha,1996). Purchasing power parity (PPP) data from International Institute for StrategicStudies, The Military Balance 1995-1996 (Oxford: OUP, 1995).


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A comparison of countries with ethnic conflicts and the world as a whole for the

period between 1980 and 1991 shows that the average economic growth rate of 2.16

percent for the former came fairly close to the world's 2.41 percent, while the figure

for countries free from conflicts was 2.51 percent (see Table 2). The figures for per-

capita GDP based on MER were US$1,635 for countries with ethnic conflicts; US

$6,751 for countries free from ethnic conflicts; and US$5,346 as the worldwide average.

Figures for per-capita GDP based on PPP were US$3,152 for countries with ethnic

conflicts; US$7,408 for countries free from ethnic conflicts; and US$6,100 as the

worldwide average. These figures make clear that per-capita GDP in countries with

ethnic conflicts is substantially lower—0.4 percent lower, on average—than in countries

free from such strife.

Table 2: Ethnic conflicts and economic growth

GDP (MER)

GDP (PPP)

Economicgrowth rate

Worldwideaverage

$5,346

$6,100

2.41%

Countrieswith ethnicconflicts

$1,635

$3,152

2.16%

Countries freefrom ethnicconflicts

$6,751

$7,408

2.51%

(all monetary figures in US dollars)

Ethnic conflicts have a direct and debilitating impact on economic growth and

per-capita GDP, but from these numbers it is impossible to find a direct causal link.

The per-capita GDP differentials are statistically meaningful, however, as an indication

that ethnic conflicts and economic conditions are closely interrelated in some ways.

Therefore, the relationship between economic conditions and ethnic conflict will be

examined in some depth.

A direct correlation cannot be made because, from the viewpoint of economic

development, economic growth rate is simply a flow indicator. Per-capita GDP expresses

only annual flow and functions as a stock indicator of past economic development

achieved by a given country. The per-capita GDP indicator is customarily used for

sorting states into separate groups, such as developed countries and developing countries,


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by the levels of their economic development. The fact that economic development indicators,

per-capita GDP, and ethnic conflicts are interrelated shows that ethno-religious problems

and economic development tend to influence each other, either in a positive or negative

direction. A faltering economy can lead to dissatisfaction among the populace that may

in turn bring ethnic tensions into the open. Once ethnic conflict erupts, with subsequent

interruption of normal economic activities, a vicious cycle that retards economic growth

is generated. As was the case in Bosnia, deteriorating economic development and a

slowdown in growth in turn made it more difficult to resolve ethnic conflicts.

On the other hand, in countries whose economic development has been uninterrupted,

even where ethnic minorities exist, sustained economic growth has helped prevent

existing ethnic problems from deteriorating into open conflict. In other words, in

areas free from ethnic conflicts, economic growth is apt to go smoothly, which in

turn helps prevent ethnic conflicts. That there are relatively few ethnic conflicts in

East Asia and Southeast Asia, areas with many ethnic minorities, can be interpreted

as a beneficial consequence of positive economic growth. Of course, government

repression of ethnic minorities must also be considered in a discussion of Asia's low

number of ethnic conflicts, but that topic is beyond the scope of this paper.

To examine whether the negative spiral of "ethnic conflict-economic slowdown-

further ethnic conflict" is a case of cause and effect, actual cases must be looked at

more closely. First, the relationship between examples of ethnic conflicts (see Appendix

1) and economic growth shall be examined. It is conventional wisdom that conflicts

result in economic chaos and slow down economic growth. This section, however,

will examine case studies where the deterioration of economic conditions might be

responsible for the outbreak of ethnic conflicts.

As mentioned earlier, the apparent "chicken-and-egg" relationship between economic

conditions and ethnic conflicts is not nearly as clear when it is looked at more carefully.

A closer examination shall be made of the relationship between economic growth

rates and the actual outbreak of ethnic conflict for conflicts that arose during the

latter half of the 1980s and through the 1990s. Generally speaking, to ascertain a

causative relationship one must find a close interrelationship between the variables

in question: one group of variables must precede the other, and there must be universality

and conformity to the interrelationship between the variables. Since it has been shown

that there is a high degree of interrelationship between macroeconomic indicators


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and ethnic conflicts, the time lag between these two factors should also be examined.

Appendix 1 is a list of sixty-eight ethnic conflicts that either started during, or continued

into, the 1990s (see Appendix 2). Of these, thirty-three occurred after 1988 and

through the 1990s. Table 3 shows economic growth rates in the year immediately

preceding the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and the average annual growth rate for the

five-year period preceding the outbreak for these thirty-three cases.

Table 3: Ethnic conflicts and rates of growth

Growth rate (%)

Year beforeconflict

Average of 5years beforeconflict

Negativegrowth

12 countries

10 countries

0-5%

13 countries

19 countries

Over 5%

7 countries(8 regions)

4 countries

In terms of the preceding year's growth rate, seven out of these thirty-three countries

registered a growth rate of 5 percent or more, namely, Ghana, Afghanistan, Djibouti,

India, Mali, Azerbaijan, and Somalia. Of these, in all but Ghana and India the year

before that was marked by negative growth. In effect, therefore, in only two countries

out of the total of thirty-three was the economy healthy just before the outbreak of

conflict. Twelve countries recorded negative growth in the year just before the outbreak.

In terms of average growth rates for the five-year period immediately before the outbreak

of conflict, ten out of the thirty-three countries had negative growth rates while four

posted rates of 5 percent or more.

The analysis shows that most countries experienced growth at a rate of between

0 and 5 percent. It should be noted that a growth rate of around 3 percent represents

a sustainable growth rate in developed countries. Thus, judged subjectively by an

analyst from a developed country, a growth rate of around 3 percent would be considered

satisfactory. In a developed economy, if this growth rate is achieved with low inflation

and low unemployment rates, the government ought to be congratulated, and one

can be reasonably certain that such a country is likely to enjoy an enduring government

and a stable political environment. In developed countries with per-capita GDP of


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US$20,000 or so, the sense of affluence will certainly continue even with a relatively

low growth rate, and there is unlikely to be any threat of social disorder unless economic

reverses cause a drastic drop in the rate of growth. But in the case of the countries

with ongoing ethnic conflicts, per-capita GDP hovers around a level of US$2,000,

and in these cases economic growth of 3 percent merely continues this level of poverty,

a very different situation from that of developed countries. Unless there is a period

of sustained economic growth at a considerably higher rate—5 percent or more—it

is impossible for countries with ethnic conflicts and low per-capita GDP to develop

favorable economic conditions. It can be concluded that in two-thirds of the countries

listed in the table, economic conditions were bad just prior to the outbreak of conflicts

and had been so for some time.

Given these facts, it appears that deteriorating economic conditions, or in more

concrete terms, a slowdown of economic growth as the flow indicator of economic

development, is one factor that leads to the outbreak of ethnic conflicts.

Ethnic minorities under analysis: Minorities at riskIn the preceding section, the interrelationship and causality between the economic

environment and ethnic conflicts was examined. So far, only areas with ongoing ethnic

conflicts have been examined, and this places obvious limitations on correctly identifying

specific causes of ethnic conflicts. It is necessary to examine all existing ethnic groups

and examine what other factors cause some ethnic problems to become open conflicts.

But first the concept of an ethnic minority must be clearly defined. The definition

of an ethnic minority, or the concept of ethnicity itself, remains ambiguous at best,

and currently can include a group of only eight individuals in Brazil, for example, or

far larger populations running into tens of millions of people. To include them all in

a clearly defined system of categories will be an extremely difficult task. Given the

scope of the present analysis, however, an examinination of ethnic conflicts in today's

international community can disregard groups as small as those in Brazil, but this

still leaves a large and diverse group that must be defined for proper analysis.

During the latter half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, a research

project called "Minorities at Risk" was undertaken by a group of researchers headed

by Professor Ted Robert Gurr of the University of Maryland as part of a master

project launched by the United States Institute for Peace. The research results were


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published as a book under the same title in 1993. In his analysis, Professor Gurr

selected 233 politicized ethnic groups from the worldwide list of all ethnic minorities

and named them "Minorities at Risk," meaning that they are prone to be sources of

ethnic problems. The ethnic conflicts examined in this paper can be defined as violent

manifestations of ethnic problems. Ethnic conflicts arise when a group of people

whose ethnic identity has been strengthened by political and economic inequalities

and by cultural prejudices and discrimination choose to use force against the ruling

group to redress their grievances. Factors that propel ethnic problems into ethnic

conflicts* using some of the "Minorities at Risk" examples as places prone to have

ethnic problems, will be analyzed.

Professor Gurr has developed the following indicators of the "Minorities at Risk"

according to their population sizes, ratios within the total populations (as of 1990),

and other characteristics in eighteen categories. Professor Gurr's eighteen categories

are as follows:

1) group coherence (COHERE)2) group concentration (CONCEN)3) cultural differentials (CULDIF)4) intergroup differentials in economic status or position (ECODIF)5) intergroup differentials in political status or position (POLDIF)6) demographic traits signifying group poverty (DEMSTRESS)7) pressures on group lands and resources (ECOSTRESS)8) economic discrimination (ECODIS)9) political discrimination (POLDIS)

10) loss of historical autonomy (AUTLOST)11) demands for greater economic rights (ECOGR)12) demands for greater social and cultural rights (SOCGR)13) demands for greater political rights (POLRI)14) demands for greater political autonomy (AUTGR)15) conflict with communal groups (COMCON)16) nonviolent group protest (PROT)17) violent group protest (RIOT)18) group rebellion (REBEL).

To these indicators this paper adds two more:

19) annual average economic growth rates from 1980 through 1991, and20) per-capita GDP.

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Two methods of analysis have been used to explore causes that contribute to

ethnic conflicts pertaining to the 233 "Minorities at Risk." The first method is based

on a comparison of the twenty indicators' averages by sorting the "Minorities at

Risk" list with the conflicts list in Appendix 1 into ongoing conflicts (using the

conflict levels 1-4—REP, DIS, LIC, and WAR) and those free from conflict, or conflict

level 0.

Results indicate that statistically meaningful differences (discarding those with

zero differences among the averages) are found in the POLDIF, ECOSTRESS, ECODIS,

AUTLOST, ECOGR, SOCGR, POLRI, AUTGR, COMCON, PROT, RIOT, REBEL,

and per-capita GDP categories. Among these, especially large differences were found

among the average values in the AUTLOST, POLRI, AUTGR, COMCON, REBEL

and per-capita GDP categories. From these results, the indices closely related to

ethnic conflicts are AUTLOST, AUTGR, per-capita GDP, and POLRI.

In the second methodof analysis, correlation coefficients were made by analyzing

the twenty indicators with each other, using the data in the "Minorities at Risk" list.

From an analytical standpoint, no indicators were found to have a close correlation

with the levels of ethnic conflict. Some relatively weak correlations were observed,

however (see Table 4). Of these, REBEL showed the strongest interrelationship with

AUTGR, with a correlation coefficient of .434 (see Table 5). From this result, it is

possible to assume that there is some sort of relationship between ethnic conflicts

and group rebellion, and group rebellion and demand for political autonomy. Correlation

between other indicators and AUTGR makes clear that there is a strong correlation

with AUTLOST (.628). This shows the importance of understanding the problem of

and concepts behind autonomy.

Almost all ethnic conflicts involve a state that exercises or attempts to exercise

Table 4: Correlations with Conflict Level

ConflictLevel

AUTLOST

.221

POLRI

.275

AUTGR

.304

COMCON

.268

PROT

.217

REBEL

.345 .

ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW •VOLUME 4 NUMBER 1 137

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Table 5: Correlations with REBEL

REBEL

COMCON

.348

AUTLOST

.344

POLRI

.327

AUTGR

.434

sovereign rights over certain territory and a group that demands autonomy or independence

within that territory. This pattern can also be found in political or colonial conflicts,

and is by no means limited to ethnic conflicts. The Dutch fought against Spain for

many years in order to gain freedom for Holland. In 1776 the American colonies

declared their independence from England and began the War of Independence. During

the nineteenth century some Latin American countries succeeded in gaining independence

from former suzerains Spain and Portugal.

This type of confrontation between the nation-state and ethnic groups within it

stems from the contradiction between the exercise of sovereignty by the state on the

one hand and, on the other, the assertion of principles of national self-determination

by groups of citizens within that state who identify themselves as a separate nation

and feel entitled to form separate state and assert their own sovereign rights on matters

concerning themselves. Most states assert absolute sovereignty over affairs within

their territorial domain, and consider that the principle of national or ethnic self-

determination should be subordinate to national authority in accordance with the

principle of national sovereignty. But since the principle of national or ethnic self-

determination calls for sovereignty for the national or ethnic group, such self-determination

will obviously seriously conflict with the concept of national sovereignty.

As seen in the previous analyses, ethnic conflicts and REBEL, REBEL and AUTGR,

and AUTGR and AUTLOST are closely correlated. Groups that have lost their autonomy

in the past are likely eventually to demand political autonomy and inevitably clash

with government authority because of the contradiction between national or ethnic

self-determination and state sovereignty. The clash may take the form of strongly

anti-government movement, and this could eventually become an armed ethnic conflict

with the state.


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ConclusionsThese analyses make clear that both economic factors and issues relating to ethnic/

national self-determination play roles in outbreaks of ethnic conflicts. Although it is

easy to draw simplistic cause-and-effect conclusions when economic data from countries

with ethnic conflicts is examined, it must be remembered that social, political, and

economic factors are all intertwined and often have a ripple effect on each other.

Likewise, observers should not be lulled into thinking that the moderate growth rates

considered satisfactory in developed countries will permit economic progress in

developing countries. These countries need sustained, high rates of economic growth

that will substantially improve the living conditions of the populace, including ethnic

minorities, in order to prevent ethnic problems from becoming open conflicts.

For the modern state, the existence of ethnic minorities is often a holdover from

past political or social processes. It is impossible for states with ethnic minorities to

ignore their presence or the historical factors that have produced them. But their

existence does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflicts. By developing and implementing

policies that produce economic growth and better economic conditions, the state can

possibly prevent, or at least ameliorate, ethnic conflicts.

To carry out such policies, however, it will be necessary to use not only the

policy instruments available within the state, but also to effectively utilize the

services of bilateral governmental aid for development and developmental programs

and projects financed by such international agencies as the IMF and the World

Bank. In so doing, it is also important not to treat the economy of the recipient

country as a homogeneous macroeconomic unit, as has often been the case in the

past, but to develop new, multifaceted programs that take into account a number

of internal social, political, and ethnic conditions and problems confronting the

recipient country.

Such recent cases as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda show that it is extremely

difficult and costly both for the victimized country and the international community

to extinguish ethnic conflicts after they have been allowed to flare up. Therefore,

perhaps the most important task before the international community today is to

explore and develop policy measures that will enable us to prevent ethnic conflicts.

An important point to remember in the interim is that, as an old Japanese axiom

says, "the rich will not fight." In other words, the "Minorities at Risk" countries


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Jun Osawa

and areas must be on a firm economic footing, with healthy, growing economies, to

prevent them from becoming victims of ethnic conflicts that will only lead them

further down the road to economic, political, and social ruin.


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Notes1. Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threat to European Security,

SIPRI Research Report No. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

2. David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed.,Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993), p. 43.

3. Market exchange rate (MER) data from Saishin Sekaigensei 1996, (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 1996). Purchasing power parity (PPP) data from International Institute forStrategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-1996 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).

4. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

5. Gurr, Minorities at Risk and Saishin Sekaigensei 1996.

6. An agreement for peace between the Philippines government and the Moro NationalLiberation Front was reached in June 1996.

7. Growth rate data from World Statistical Yearbook 1995 (CD-ROM edition), (UnitedNations, 1995).

8. Market exchange rate (MER) data from Saishin Sekaigensei 1996 (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 1996). Purchasing power parity (PPP) data from International Institute forStrategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-1996 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).

9. Gurr, Minorities at Risk. The statistical analysis by the author which follows usesGurr's data, which appear in Tables A.1 to A. 18 in the Appendix to Minorities atRisk,pp. 326-363. Space constraints prevent reproduction of the data here.

10. Masayuki Yamanouchi, Sekai no Shukyo Minzoku Chizu [Ethnic and ReligiousMap of the World] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1996), pp. 15-16.


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Appendx 1: Serious ethnic conficts in the 1990s

Area Country Groups and Issues of Conflict

Europe

Group Conflict Scateof Conflict Since Deatis Deatstype1 type2 cortfirf type4 (SIPRI) (Gurr)

Other comments

Azerbaijan

AsiA

-PA

CI

2n

1

SPRIT

s.onc

1ER IS

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Middle Eastand N. Africa


Bosnia

Croatia

Georgia

Georgia

Russia

Moldovi

Serbia

Russia

Ukraine

NorthenIreland

Spain

Iran

Iran

Armenians fighting for independence of ETHNATNagorno-Karabakh enclave

Serbians and Croats seek to partition ETHNATBosnia, eliminate Muslims from theirregions

Serbians sought autonomy and to control ETHNATKrajina

Russian-backed Abkhazians wonautonomy

ETHNAT

North Ossetians seek union with South ETHNATOssetians in Georgia

Russian-backed Slavic minority ETHNATestablished autonomous trans-Oniestrrepublic

Protest in Kosovo by ethnic Albanians ETHNATrepressed by Serbia

Chechens seek independence ETHNAT

Ukraine Russians seek independence of Klimia ETHNAT

Northern Catholic Irish Republican Army has fought ETHNATI l against Protestant militants and for union

with Republic of Ireland

Militant Basques carry out terrorcampaign for independence

ETHNAT

Persecution of Baha'is has declined from RELIGits peak in early 1980s

WAR

WAR

LIC

WAR

South Ossetians fighting for union with ETHNAT LICNorth Ossetians in Russia

LIC

LIC

REP

WAR

REP

LIC

LIC

REP

1988 10,000

T 1991 20,000-50,000

1991

1992 2,500

1992

1992

1992

1992

1995

1995

Iraq-backed religious group attackingfrom Iraq

COMCON WAR

1968

1979

1970

15,000 Religious differences. Islamic sta-in Middle East support AzerbaijatCease-fire agreement concluded1994

200,000 Peace agreement concluded 19!NATO peacekeepers in place

50,000 Croatian Army suppressed Kraijir1995

3,000

700

300

1,000

200

About 30,000 deaths. Russian Asuppressed rebellion

T 1969 4,700 3,000 Religious group

1,000

300

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n3nJOtn<

1•

Ocm

•zimm73

Group Conflict Scale Conflict Since Deaths Deathstype1 type2 of type4 (SIPRI) (Gurr)

conflict3

Other comments










Central andSouth Asia






Iran

Iraq

Iraq

Turkey

Israel(WestBankand Gaza)Bahrain

Yemen

Morocco

Algeria

Afganistan

Bangladesh

Myanmar

India

India

India

Rebellion by Kurds wanting autonomy ETHNAT DIShas been largely suppressed

Supporters of 1991 Shiite rebellion RELIG REPcontinue to suffer reprisals

Rebel Kurds established autonomous ETHNAT LICregion with Allied protection

Terrorist campaign by Kurdish militants ETHNAT WARseeking independence

Palestinians used violent protest to seek ETHNAT LICautonomy in the period 1987-1993

Majority Sunni people rebel against RELIG DISShiite government

Civil war between former North Yemen COMCON WARand South Yemen

Western Sahara independence ETHNAT/ LICmovement defeated INDIG

Muslim fundamentalists have been RELIG LICsuppressed

Civil war among factions based on ETHNAT/ WARPashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks COMCON

Chittagong hill peoples resist settlers from INDIG LIClowlands, demand autonomy

Autonomy rebellion by Karens, Shan, INDIG WARKachin, Mon, Arakanese, other hill andtribal peoples

Pakistan-supported Kashmiris fighting for ETHNAT WARindependence

Shik insurgents fighting for an ETHNAT WARindependent Khalistan since early 1980s

Autonomy rebellions in Assam by INDIG/ WARTripuras, Santals, Nagas, others ETHNAT

T

G

1979

1980

1979

1984 13,000

3,000-5,000

20,000-50,000

180,000-250,000

11,000

T mid- 12,500 1,700 Israel accepted autonomy of PLC1980s

1994

T 1994 1,500-7,000

1975 15,000

1993 25,000

1992 14,000 10,000

1975

[1948]1993

1990

1981

[1952]1988-1992

3,000-3,500

17,000

9,000

24,000

24,000

20,000-30,000

20,000-50,000

10,000-16,000

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Area Country Groups and Issues of Conflict Group Conflict Scale Conflict Since Deaths Deaths Other commentstype1 type2 of type4 (SIPRI) (Gurr)

conflict3



India Hindu nationalists provoke riotous clashes RELIGwith Muslims

Pakistan Small-scale rebellion in Baluchistan

LIC

ETHNAT DIS

1991

1972

2,000-3,000




Pakistan Minor insurgency, rioting in Sindis COMCON DIS

Sri Lanka Militant Tamils fighting for an ETHNAT WARindependent Tamil state

Tajikistan Rebellion by Muslim guerrillas RELLIG WAR

[1972]1992

1985

1992

27,000

20,000-50,000

9,000

50,000100,000


Bhutan Dominant Drukpas expel protesting COMCON REPNepalese

1991

Asia Pacific Cambodia Guerrilla fighting by Khmer Rouge

Asia Pacific China Suppression of Tibetans who seekrestoration of autonomy lost in 1951

COMCON LIC

ETHNAT REP

G [1979] 25,0001991 since197

9

1959 100,000

Asia Pacific China Sporadic pro-autonomy activity among ETHNAT/ LICMuslim Uighurs and Kazakhs in Xinjiang INDIG

1980 1,000-2,000

Asia Pacific Fiji

•n

nSO

in

Fijian minority used military rule to repress COMCON LICIndian minority

Asia Pacific Indonesia Suppression of East Timor rebels fighting ETHNAT REPf

Asia Pacific Indonesia

Asia Pacific Indonesia

for independence

Suppression of West Irian (Papuan)peoples resisting Indonesian control

Suppression of Aceh rebels in NorthSumatra who seek autonomy

ETHNAT REP

ETHNAT REP

1976

1963

1975

15,000-16,000

200,000

5,000-32,000

10,000-20.000

inc22m50

Asia Pacific Papua-NewGuinea

Rebellion for independence onBougainville Island

ETHNAT LIC

Asia Pacific Philippines Minor insurgency by Moros (Muslims) who ETHNATfought for independence in 1970s andgained limited autonomy in 1990

LIC

1988 1.000

50,000

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3o

•

VO

LU

l

s.m•t-ZU

MB

ER

145

Asia Pacific

Africa south ofthe Sahara














Philippines

Angola

Burundi

Chad

Djibouti

Ethiopia

Ghana

Kenya

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Rwanda

Senegal

SierraLeone

Insurgency by NPA (New People's Army)

Mbundu-Ovimbundu rivalry underliesprotracted civil war that resumed in 1992after collapse of peace pact

Formerly dominant Tutsi minority in 1993massacred supporters of Hutu-dominatedregime

Current phase in protracted civil war pitsAnakaza against Bideyet peoples

Rebellion as Afars challenge Somali-dominated government

Oromo have resumed insurgency againstrevolutionary government that took powerin 1991

Conflicts between tribes in north-easternGhana

President Moi prompted his Kalenjinsupporters to attack other peoples in theRift Valley

Ethnic rivalries fuel a civil war nowchecked by peacekeepers and 1995peace accord

Insurgency by Tuareg nomads seekingautonomous region

Insurgency by Tuareg nomads seekingautonomous region

Deadly Muslim-Christian clashes in east-central region

Exiled Tutsi minority fought againstrepressive Hutu regime

Autonomy rebellion in Casamanceprovince

Rebellion by RUF

COMCON

COMCON

COMCON/ETHCLS

COMCON

COMCON

COMCON

COMCON

COMCON

INDIG/ETHNAT

RELIG

COMCON/ETHCLS

ETHNAT

COMCON

Group Conflict Scale Conflict Since Deaths Deathstype1 type2 of type4 (SIPRI) (Gurr)

conflict3

Other comments

LIC

WAR

WAR

WAR

WAR

LIC

LIC

WAR

LIC

LIC

WAR

LIC

LIC

G

G

1986

1990

1990

1986

1982

1995

21,000-25,000

1975 110,000

1988

1979

1991

1963

1994

1992

500,000 Cease-fire agreement concluded1995. UN peacekeeping operatic

100,000

100,000

1,000 Peace agreement concluded in1994.

1,000-2,000

1989 20,000 150,000 11 attempts at peace since 1989Abuja accord signed August 199

1,000

11,000

1990 5,500 3,500

500

2

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4ON

>

n

m<

C/3

Africa south of Sudanthe Sahara

Grouptype1

ETHNAT/COMCON

COMCON

ETHNAT

COMCON

COMCON

IND1G

INDIG

INDIG

COMCON

Conflicttype2

WAR

LIC

WAR

LIC

LIC

REP

LIC

LIC

LIC

Scaleofconflict3

X

X

X

X

X

Conflicttype4

G

T

G

G

G

Since

1988

1989

1983

1986

1992

1972

1980

1994

Deaths(SIPRl)

77,000

46,300

28,000

Deaths(Gurr)

350,000

14,000

1,000,0001,500,000

12,000

5,00020,000

150,000

30,000

1,000

Other comments

Africa south of Somalia Isaaq clan seeks independence forthe Sahara Northern Somalia since 1991, other clans

battle in southAfrica south of South Four years of communal war betweenthe Sahara Africa ANC and Zulu supporters prior to 1994

electionsMuslim government broke agreementwith southerners leading to renewal ofcivil war; in 1993 factional fighting beganamong southerners

Africa south of Uganda Fighting between Baganda-dominatedthe Sahara army and northern Acholi and Langi

rebelsAfrica south of Zaire Multiple communal rebellions, clashes,the Sahara ethnic cleaning campaigns in Northern

Kivu, Shaba, between Luba and Lunda,others

Americas Guatemala Mayans victimized in governmentcampaign against rural peoplessuspected of supporting leftist insurgents

Americas Peru Indigenous peoples have been forced tosupport leftist Sendero Luminosoguerrillas

Americas Mexico Well organized indigenous rebellion withleftist leaders in Chiapas state

Americas Colombia Rebellion by leftist guerrillas

Notes1. Type of ethnopolitical groups are based on classifications used by Gurr, with some modifications by the author.

ETHNAT: Ethnonationalists: large, regionally concentrated peoples with history of organized political autonomy who pursue separatist objectivesINDIG: Indigenous peoples: conquered descendants of original inhabitants of a country who typically live in peripheral regions and have cultures sharply distinct from dominant groupsETHCLS: Ethnoclasses: ethnically or culturally distinct minorities, descended from immigrants or slaves, who are economically stratifiedCOMCON: Communal contenders: culturally distinct peoples, tribes or clans in heterogeneous societies who hold or seek a share in state power

2. Conflict types based on classification used by Gurr, with some modifications by the author.WAR: WarLIC: Low-intensity conflictDIS: Serious disputeREP: Serious dispute in which most violence is a consequence of state repression

3. "X" indicates large-scale conflict, based on classification used by Sollenberg and Wallensteen.4. Conflict type based on classification used by Sollenberg and Wallensteen.

T" indicates contest concerns control over territory (interstate conflict, secession or autonomy)"G" indicates contest concerns control over government (type of political system, a change of central government or in its composition)

SourcesTed Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).-~, "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347-377.—, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

3

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Appendix 2: Ethnic conflict and growth rates

Growth rates

Country

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Bhutan

Bosnia

Burundi

Croatia

Djibouti

Georgia

Georgia

Ghana

India

Groups and issues of conflict

Civil war among factions based on Pashtuns, Tajiks,Uzbeks

Muslim fundamentalists have been suppressed

Armenians fighting for independence for Nagorno-Karabakh enclave

Majority Sunni people rebel against Shiite government

Dominant Drukpas expel protesting Nepalese

Serbians and Croats seek to partition Bosnia, eliminateMuslims from their regions

Formerly dominant Tutsi minority in 1993 massacres ofsupporters of Hutu-dominated regime

Ethnic Serbians sought autonomy and to control Krajina

Rebellion as Afars challenge Somali-dominatedgovernment

Russian-backed Abkhazians won autonomy

South Ossetians fighting for union with North Ossetians inRussia

Conflicts between tribes in north-eastern Ghana

Pakistan-supported Kashmiris fighting for independence

Conflicttype

WAR

LIC

WAR

DIS

REP

WAR

WAR

LIC

WAR

WAR

LIC

LIC

WAR

Since

1992

1993

1988-1994

1994

1991

1991-1995

1988

1991-1995

1991-1994

1992

1992

1994

1990

Last yr beforeconflict

7.60

2.25

5.91

4.00

4.90

-23.20

4.09

-23.20

8.91

-20.29

-20.29

5.00

5.42

Av. for 5 yrsbefore conflict

-4.22

1.49

4.11

4.64

7.73

-4.34

3.70

-4.60

2.69

-3.35

-3.35

4.75

6.14

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Country

India

Kenya

Liberia

Mali

Mexico

Moldova

Niger

Nigeria

Papua-New Guinea

Russia

Russia

Rwanda

Serbia


Hindu nationalists provoke riotous clashes with Muslims

President Moi prompted his Kalenjin supporters to attackother peoples in the Rift Valley

Ethnic rivalries fuel a civil war now checked bypeacekeepers and 1995 peace accords

Insurrection by Tuareg nomads seeking autonomousregion

Well organized indigenous rebellion with leftist leaders inChiapas state

Russian-backed Slavic minority established autonomoustrans-Dniestr republic

Insurrection by Tuareg nomads seeking autonomous region

Deadly Muslim-Christian clashes in east-central region

Rebellion for independence on Bougainville Island

North Ossetians seek union with South Ossetians inGeorgia

Chechens seek independence

Exiled Tutsi minority wars against a repressive Hutu regime

Protest in Kosovo by ethnic Albanians repressed by Serbia

Conflicttype

LIC

LIC

WAR

LIC

LIC

LIC

LIC

LIC

LIC

LIC

WAR

WAR

REP

Since

1991

1992

1989

1990

1994

1992

1990

1986

1988

1992

1995

1990

1992

Growth


5.65

1.67

2.83

7.49

0.80

-12.59

2.57

-0.70

2.77

-0.92

-15.00

3.25

-29.93

rates


6.18

4.54

0.17

6.00

2.69

3.57

2.76

0.19

2.55

-0.65

-7.03

2.47

-10.84

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Growth rates

Country

Sierra Leone

Somalia

South Africa

Tajikistan

Ukraine

Yemen

Zaire


Rebellion by RUF

1991 Isaaq clan declares independence for NorthernSomalia; other clans battle in south

4 years of communal warfare between ANC and Zulusupporters prior to 1994 elections

Rebellion by Muslim guerillas

Ethnic Russians seek independence for Klimia

Civil war between former North Yemen and South Yemen

Multiple communal rebellions, clashes, ethnic cleansingcampaigns in Northern Kivu, Shaba, between Luba andLunda, others

Conflicttype

LIC

WAR

LIC

WAR

REP

WAR

LIC

Since

1995

1988

1989

1992

1995

1994

1992


3.60

10.09

4.20

-3.47

-23.00

2.50

-2.80


1.49

1.99

2.04

2.49

-7.69

-1.70

0.79

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national identity and ethnic‐religious conflicts: some statistical correlations

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