moore v. state, alaska ct. app. (2016)

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  • 7/25/2019 Moore v. State, Alaska Ct. App. (2016)

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    NOTICE

    The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the

    Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal

    errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:

    303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501

    Fax: (907) 264-0878

    E-mail: corrections@ akcourts.us

    INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

    ETHANRYANMOORE,

    Appellant,

    v.

    STATEOFALASKA,

    Appellee.

    CourtofAppealsNo.A-11397

    TrialCourtNo.3DI-11-210CR

    OPINION

    No.2501May27,2016

    Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,

    Dillingham,FredTorrisi,Judge.

    Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Mendel & Associates,

    Anchorage,undercontract with thePublicDefenderAgency,

    and Quinlan Steiner , Public Defender, Anchorage, for the

    Appellant. MaryA.Gilson,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Office

    of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards,

    AttorneyGeneral,Juneau,fortheAppellee.

    Before: Mannheimer,ChiefJudge,andAllard,Judge.

    JudgeMANNHEIMER.

    OnJune9,2011,actingon severalinformantstips,twopoliceofficers

    stoppedEthanRyanMooreattheDillinghamairportshortlyafterheretrievedhistwo

    piecesofluggage frombaggageclaim. TheofficerstoldMoorethattheybelievedhe

    wastransportingmarijuana,andtheyaskedMooreforpermissiontosearchhisluggage.

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Moore,whowasonhiswaytoTogiak,declinedtoconsenttothissearch. Theofficers

    thenseizedbothpiecesofMooresluggage,transportedthemtotheDillinghampolice

    station,andcontactedthelocalmagistratetoapplyforasearchwarrant.

    Afterhearingthewarrantapplication,themagistrateconcludedthatthere

    wasnoprobablecauseforthesearch,soherefusedtoissuethesearchwarrant. More

    specifically, themagistrateconcludedthattheofficershadfailedtoprovidesufficient

    proofoftheirinformantscredibilitytosatisfytheAguilar-Spinelli test.1

    Whenthemagistrateissuedthisruling,heinvitedtheofficerstopresent

    moreinformationtocorroboratetheirinformants.

    Buttheofficersdidnotpresentmoreinformationtothemagistrateandask

    him to reconsider his decision. Nor did the officers acquiesce in the magistrates

    decisionandreturnMooresluggagetohim. Instead,theofficerskeptMooresluggage

    overnightandthen,thenextmorning, theyshippedittotheAlaskaStateTroopersin

    Anchorage. AftertheluggagearrivedinAnchorage,itwassubjectedtosniffingbya

    drug-detectiondog. Thedogalertedtotheluggage,andthetroopersthenappliedfora

    searchwarrant,thistimeinfrontofanAnchoragejudge. Thewarrantwasgranted.

    The ensuingsearch ofMoores luggagedisclosedsevenvacuum-sealed

    bagsofmarijuanatotalingapproximatelysevenounces. Basedonthediscoveryofthis

    marijuana,Moorewaschargedwith,andlaterconvictedof, fourth-degreecontrolled

    substancemisconduct.2

    1

    Aguilar v. Texas,378U.S.108,84S.Ct.1509,12L.Ed.2d723(1964); Spinelli v.United States,393U.S.410,89S.Ct.584,21L.Ed.2d637(1969). See State v. Jones,706

    P.2d317,322-25(Alaska1985)(holdingthat,asamatterofstatelaw,theAguilar-Spinelli

    testcontinuestogoverntheevaluationofhearsayinformationofferedtosupportasearchor

    seizure).

    2 AS11.71.040(a)(3)(F)(possessionoffourouncesormoreofmarijuana).

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    Inthisappeal,Moorearguesthat,aftertheDillinghammagistraterefused

    toissuethesearchwarrant,itwasillegalfortheDillinghamofficerstoretainhisluggage

    overnightandthenshipit to Anchorageandthatallof theensuinginvestigative

    efforts(thedogsniffandthesecondsearchwarrant application)weretaintedbythis

    illegality.

    Forthereasonsexplainedinthisopinion,weagreewithMoore,andwe

    thereforereversehisconviction.

    TheStates contention that the Dillingham officers needed only reasonable

    suspicion to hold Moores luggage overnight and then ship it to Anchorage

    for further investigative inspection

    Moore does not contest that the Dillingham officers had reasonable

    suspiciontobelievethathewascarryingmarijuanaforcommercialpurposesandthat

    theofficersthereforehadtheauthoritytotemporarilyseizehisluggagesothattheymight

    applyforasearchwarrant. See Pooley v. State,705P.2d1293,1307(AlaskaApp.

    1985);LeMense v. State,754P.2d268,272-73(AlaskaApp.1988).ButMoorearguesthattheofficersexceededtheirauthoritywhenthey

    retainedhisluggageovernightandthenshippedittoAnchorageforfurtherinvestigative

    efforts. TheState,inturn,respondsthattheofficersweresimplypursuingthemost

    promptinvestigativeeffortsthatwereavailabletothemunderthecircumstances,since

    therewerenodrug-sniffingdogsinDillingham.

    Toresolvethesearguments,wemustexamineandmoreclearlydefinethe

    scope of police authority to conduct temporary investigative seizures of travelers

    luggagebasedonreasonablesuspicion.

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    TheUnited StatesSupremeCourtdiscussedthe limitsthattheFourth

    Amendmentplacesontemporaryinvestigativedetentionsofluggagein United States v.

    Place,462U.S.696,708-710;103S.Ct.2637,2645-46;77L.Ed.2d110(1983).

    InPlace,theSupremeCourtfirmlyrejectedthegovernmentsargument

    that temporaryinvestigativeseizuresoftravelersluggagecouldbemoreintrusive

    i.e.,ofgreaterscopeanddurationthaninvestigativeseizuresoftravelersthemselves:

    ThepremiseoftheGovernmentsargumentisthatseizuresof

    property are generally less intrusive than seizures of the

    person. Whiletrueinsomecircumstances, thatpremiseis

    faulty on the facts ... in this case. The precise type of

    detention we confront here is seizure of personal luggagefromtheimmediatepossessionof[a]suspectforthepurpose

    of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog.

    Particularly in thecaseofdetention of luggagewithin the

    travelersimmediatepossession,thepoliceconductintrudes

    onboththesuspectspossessoryinterestinhis luggageas

    wellas his libertyinterestinproceedingwithhis itinerary.

    Thepersonwhoseluggageisdetainedistechnicallystillfree

    tocontinuehistravelsorcarryoutotherpersonalactivities

    pendingrelease of theluggage. ... Nevertheless,sucha

    seizure can effectively restrain the person[,] since he is

    subjected to the possible disruptionofhis travelplans in

    ordertoremainwithhisluggageortoarrangeforitsreturn.

    Therefore,whenthepoliceseizeluggagefromthesuspects

    custody,wethinkthe limitationsapplicabletoinvestigative

    detentionsofthepersonshoulddefinethepermissiblescope

    ofaninvestigativedetentionofthepersonsluggageonless

    thanprobablecause.

    Place,462U.S.at708-09,103S.Ct.at2645.

    Although the Supreme Court decline[d] to adopt any outside time

    limitationforapermissible [investigative]stop, theCourtnotedthat ithad never

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    approved[aninvestigative]seizureof thepersonfortheprolonged90-minuteperiod

    thatwaspresentedinPlaceandtheCourtthenruledthatthis90-minutedetentionof

    PlacesluggageviolatedhisFourthAmendmentrights. Id.,462U.S.at709-710,103

    S.Ct.at2646.

    ThisCourtfirstaddressedthepermittedscopeofinvestigativeseizuresof

    luggage inPeschel v. State, 770P.2d 1144 (Alaska App. 1989). InPeschel, we

    concludedthatthereasonablenessoftheinvestigativeseizureitsscopeandduration

    shouldbeevaluatedusingamulti-factortest:

    thelengthofthedetention;

    whetherthetravelerwasforcedtochoosebetweeninterruptingtheirjourney

    (to remain with their luggage) or continuing their journey without their

    luggage;

    whetherthepolicegavethetraveleranadequateexplanationofwherethey

    weretakingtheluggage,andwhenandhowitwouldbereturned;

    whetherthepoliceacteddiligentlyin pursuingtheirinvestigationduringthe

    periodofdetention;and

    whetherthepoliceusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossiblewhenconducting

    theirinvestigation.

    Peschel,770P.2dat1147-48.

    InMoorescase,thefirst twofactorsclearlyfavorhispositionthatthe

    detentionofhisluggagewasunlawful. Thepolicekepthisluggageforcloseto24hours

    substantiallylongerthanthe90minutesthatwasdisapprovedinPlace. AndMoore

    wasforcedtocontinuetravelingtohisdestination(Togiak)withouthisluggage.

    TheState,foritspart,focusesontheotherthreefactors.

    WhentheDillinghamofficersspoketoMooreattheairport,theytoldhim

    thattheyweregoingtosendhisluggagetoAnchoragesothatitcouldbesubjectedtoa

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    drug-sniffingdog. TheofficersalsoinformedMoorethattheycouldnotshiphisluggage

    toAnchorageuntilthenextday.

    Onthisissue,wenotethattheofficersgaveMoorenoestimateofwhenor

    howhisluggagemightbereturnedtohim. TheymerelyassuredMoorethathisluggage

    wouldultimatelybereturned.

    But more importantly, even though the police may have accurately

    informedMoorethat theyweregoingto shiphis luggage toAnchorage,andthathe

    wouldbedeprivedofhis luggageat leastuntilthenextday, thefactthat thepolice

    communicatedthisinformationtoMoorecouldnotturnanunconstitutionalseizureinto

    alawfulone. Inotherwords,thepolicecouldnotobtainalicensetoviolateMoores

    FourthAmendmentrightsmerelybyinformingMoorethattheyintendedtodoso.

    Weturn, then, tothediligenceofpoliceinvestigation,andwhether the

    policeusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossibletopursuetheirinvestigationwhiletheyhad

    Moores luggage in their possession. Regardingthese two factors, the State relies

    heavilyonthefactthattherewerenodrug-sniffingdogsinDillingham,and that the

    closest drugdetectiondogs were in Anchorage. The State argues that, practically

    speaking, there was no way for the police topursue their investigationother than

    detainingMooresluggagefornearlyaday,andshippingithundredsofmilesaway.

    ButinChandler v. State,830P.2d789,791-92(AlaskaApp.1992),we

    rejected the argument that the duration and scope of a temporary investigative

    detention of luggage could be expanded to accommodate whatever investigative

    measuresmightbeneededunderthecircumstances.

    In Chandler, based on reasonable suspicion, the police transported

    ChandlersbagfromtheKetchikanairport tothepolice station, wheretheofficers

    preparedthepaperworktoobtain a searchwarrant. Thesearchwarrantwasissued

    slightlymorethan90minutesafterthepoliceseizedChandlersbag.Id. at791.

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    Weconcludedthatthis90-minutedetentionofthebagviolatedChandlers

    rights under theFourthAmendment. Id. at 792. Inreaching this conclusion, we

    explainedthat even thoughtherewasnostricttimelimitforinvestigativedetentions,

    [a]tsomepoint,...thelengthof[the]detentionalonewillprecludeanyclaimthatthe

    police seizure of the luggage detention constituted only a temporary investigative

    detention(i.e.,thekindoflimiteddetentionthatcanbejustifiedbyreasonablesuspicion

    ratherthanprobablecause). Ibid.

    InChandler,wedidnotsuggestthatthepolicedisplayedalackofdiligence

    inapplyingforthesearchwarrant. Rather, we heldthatthelengthofthedetention,

    coupledwiththefactthatthepoliceremovedthedefendantsbagfromtheairport,meant

    that the seizure and detention of the bag could no longer be justified merely by

    reasonablesuspicion:

    Chandlersbagwas...seizeddirectlyfromChandlers

    possession. Thebagwasnotmerelyimmobilizedatthepoint

    ofseizure. Rather,itwastransportedasignificantdistance

    fromtheairporttotheKetchikanpolicestation. Thepolice

    mitigatedtheintrusivenessof this90-plusminutedetentionby tellingChandler where they were takinghis bag, their

    purpose in takingit, theapproximate lengthoftimethat it

    would beheld,andhowChandlercouldreclaimit. [But

    though] such measures might make the difference in a

    borderlinecase,theydonotconvertthekindofseizurethat

    occurredhereintoabrief,minimallyintrusivedetentionof

    property. Weconcludethatthewarrantlessseizurerequired

    probablecause.

    Chandler,830P.2dat792.

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    WereachthesameconclusioninMoorescase. Itwasunlawfulforthe

    Dillingham police tohold Moores luggage overnight and then ship the luggage to

    Anchorageforfurtherinvestigativemeasures,basedmerelyonreasonablesuspicion.

    The States argument that the Dillingham officers had probable cause to

    believe that Moores luggage contained marijuana intended for

    commercial purposes, and thus the officers were authorized to hold the

    luggage overnight and then ship it to Anchorage for the dog sniff

    TheStatearguesthateveniftheactionsoftheDillinghampoliceexceeded

    the type of temporary investigative detention that would be authorized based onreasonablesuspicion, theiractionswereneverthelessjustifiedbecausetheDillingham

    officersactuallyhadprobablecausetobelieve(asopposedtomerereasonablesuspicion)

    thatMoorewastransportingmarijuanaforcommercialpurposes.

    Whenthepolicehaveprobablecausetobelievethatanarticleofluggage

    containsevidenceofacrime,andwhentherearenoexigentcircumstancesauthorizing

    animmediatewarrantlesssearch,thepoliceareauthorizedtoseizetheluggage(butnot

    searchit)andtocarrytheluggageawayforsafe-keepingwhiletheyapplyforasearch

    warrant.3

    ButtheStatesargumentinMoorescasegoesconsiderablybeyondthis

    propositionoflaw. TheStateiseffectivelyarguingthatifthepolicehaveprobablecause

    tobelievethatanarticleofluggagecontainsevidenceofacrime,thepolicemayseize

    theluggage,hold it foras longasis reasonablynecessarytocomplete any desired

    additional investigation or testing, andeven ship the luggage hundreds of miles to

    3 United States v. Chadwick, 433U.S. 1, 13; 97S.Ct. 2476,2484-85;53 L.Ed.2d538,

    551(1977);Metcalfe v. State,593P.2d638,640(Alaska1979).

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    accomplish this additional investigation or testing all without seeking a judicial

    warrantuntiltheadditionalinvestigationisdone.

    Weareawareofnolegalauthoritytosupportthisargument.

    TherearetwoadditionalproblemswiththeStatesprobablecauseargument

    inMoorescase.

    First,theDillinghampolicedidpromptlyseekasearchwarrantandit

    wasrefused. TheStatecitesnoauthorityforthepropositionthatthepolicecouldignore

    thisadversejudicialruling,continuetoholdtheluggage,shipitawaytoAnchoragefor

    furthertesting,andthenapplyforasearchwarrantagaininfrontofadifferentjudge.

    YetthisisessentiallywhattheStateisarguinginMoorescase.

    TheStatecontendsthattheissuecurrentlybeforethisCourtiswhetherto

    affirm the trialjudges rulingthat the policehad probable cause when they seized

    Mooresluggage. ButeveniftheDillinghampolicehadprobablecausetoseize Moores

    luggage,theofficerswereonlyauthorizedtoholdtheluggagelongenoughtosecurea

    searchwarrant. Thus,thequestionpresentedhereiswhethertheDillinghammagistrate

    shouldhaveissuedtherequestedsearchwarrant.

    Inlitigatingthisquestion,theStateisnotallowed torelyoninformation

    thatwasadducedafter-the-fact.4 AndtheStateacknowledgesthattheevidenceobtained

    inAnchorage (thealertof thedrug-detectiondog) shouldnotbeconsideredwhen

    assessingwhethertheDillinghampolicehadprobablecausewhentheyappliedforthe

    searchwarrant. ButtheStateneverthelessreliesonpolicetestimonythatwasadduced

    later,attheevidentiaryhearingonMooresmotiontosuppress.

    4 State v. Jones,706P.2d317,326(Alaska1985);State v. White,707P.2d271,277

    (AlaskaApp.1985);United States v. Anderson,453F.2d174,177(9thCir.1971).

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    This evidentiary hearing testimony offered a fuller description of the

    informationthatwasknowntotheDillinghampolicewhentheyinitiallyappliedforthe

    searchwarrant. Buttothe extent that this testimonysupplemented theinformation

    presentedtotheDillinghammagistrate,itisirrelevanttoourreviewofthemagistrates

    decisionbecausethelawrequiresthatalloftheinformationsupportingtheissuance

    ofasearchwarrantbecontainedwithinthefourcornersoftheaffidavitsortestimony

    presentedinthesearchwarrantapplication.5

    TurningtothecontentsoftheDillinghamsearchwarrantapplication,the

    warrantapplicationwasprimarilybasedoninformationobtainedfromthreeinformants.

    AdheringtotheAguilar-Spinelli test, theDillinghammagistratequestioned thepolice

    abouthowthesethreeinformantsobtainedtheirinformation,whytheseinformantschose

    tosharethisinformationwithpolice,andwhethertheseinformantshadprovedreliable

    inthepast.

    Twooftheinformantswereanonymous;thatis,thepolicedidnotdisclose

    theiridentitiestothemagistrate.

    Whenthemagistrateaskedtheofficerhowthefirstanonymousinformant

    obtainedhisinformation,theofficerreplied,Idonthaveanyanswersforthat. When

    themagistrateaskedtheofficerifheknew why thefirstanonymous informanthad

    wantedtosharehisinformationwiththepolice,theofficerreplied,No,Idonot. And

    whenthemagistrateaskedtheofficerifthisfirstanonymousinformantwasfromthe

    criminalmilieu,theofficerrepliedthat,asfarasheknew,theinformanthadnohistory

    ofdrugactivity,buttheinformantssignificantotherdid.

    5 State v. White,707P.2d271,277(AlaskaApp.1985);United Statesv.Anderson,453

    F.2d174,177(9thCir.1971).

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    With regard to the second confidentialinformant, the officer told the

    magistrate that hehad the impression that this second informant had personally

    witnessedoneormoremarijuanasalesbyMoore. Butwhenthemagistrateaskedthe

    officerifthissecondanonymousinformanthadgiventhepoliceanyideahowrecently

    thesesalesweresupposedtohaveoccurred,theofficerreplied,No,hedidnot. The

    officeralsoconcededthat[t]hereliabilityofthispersonhasnotbeenestablished.

    Thethirdinformantwasidentifiedbyname. Shehadnodirectinformation

    aboutMoore,butsheclaimedtoknowthedrug-transportationmethodsusedbyanother

    man whowasallegedtobeMooresaccomplice. Whenthemagistratebeganasking

    morequestionsaboutthisthirdinformant,theofficervolunteeredthatthisinformanthad

    givenherinformationtothepolicewhenshewascontact[ed]foralcoholimportation

    approximatelyninemonthsearlier. Themagistrateaskedtheofficer, So[thisthird

    informant]wasbeingaccusedofimportingalcohol? ... Whywouldshebeproviding

    thatkindofinformationtoyou,doyouknow? Theofficerrepliedthatsheprovided

    [theinvestigatingofficer]withthatinformation...to[distract]himfromhiscontactwith

    her. Themagistrateasked,[So]shewastryingtopointthefingeratsomebodyelse,

    totakethefocusoffofheristhatkindofwhatyourethinking? Andtheofficer

    answered,Yesortotryto,youknow,sortofmakeadeal.

    Afterhearingthistestimony,themagistrateconcludedthatthepolicehad

    failedtoadequatelyestablishthecredibilityorreliabilityoftheirinformantsunderthe

    Aguilar-Spinelli test.Basedonthisrecord,wecannotsaythatthemagistratesdecision

    constitutedanabuseofdiscretion.6

    6 We couldnot findanypriorcasewhere thisCourtwas calleduponto reviewa

    magistratesdecisionnot to issue asearchwarrant. Butincasesraisingtherelatedissueof

    whetheramagistratewascorrectin issuing asearchwarrant , thisCourthasemployedan

    (continued...)

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    WethereforeholdthatthepoliceviolatedMooresrightsundertheFourth

    Amendmentwhentheycontinuedtoholdhisluggageafterthemagistratedeniedtheir

    applicationfora searchwarrant. Allevidencederivedfromthelatersearchof that

    luggagemustbesuppressed.

    Conclusion

    ThejudgementofthesuperiorcourtisREVERSED.

    6 (...continued)

    abuseofdiscretionstandardofreview. See McClelland v. State ,928P.2d1224,1225

    (AlaskaApp.1996);State v. Bianchi,761P.2d127,129-30(AlaskaApp.1988).

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