moore v. state, alaska ct. app. (2016)
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NOTICE
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INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTHESTATEOFALASKA
ETHANRYANMOORE,
Appellant,
v.
STATEOFALASKA,
Appellee.
CourtofAppealsNo.A-11397
TrialCourtNo.3DI-11-210CR
OPINION
No.2501May27,2016
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Dillingham,FredTorrisi,Judge.
Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Mendel & Associates,
Anchorage,undercontract with thePublicDefenderAgency,
and Quinlan Steiner , Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. MaryA.Gilson,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Office
of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards,
AttorneyGeneral,Juneau,fortheAppellee.
Before: Mannheimer,ChiefJudge,andAllard,Judge.
JudgeMANNHEIMER.
OnJune9,2011,actingon severalinformantstips,twopoliceofficers
stoppedEthanRyanMooreattheDillinghamairportshortlyafterheretrievedhistwo
piecesofluggage frombaggageclaim. TheofficerstoldMoorethattheybelievedhe
wastransportingmarijuana,andtheyaskedMooreforpermissiontosearchhisluggage.
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Moore,whowasonhiswaytoTogiak,declinedtoconsenttothissearch. Theofficers
thenseizedbothpiecesofMooresluggage,transportedthemtotheDillinghampolice
station,andcontactedthelocalmagistratetoapplyforasearchwarrant.
Afterhearingthewarrantapplication,themagistrateconcludedthatthere
wasnoprobablecauseforthesearch,soherefusedtoissuethesearchwarrant. More
specifically, themagistrateconcludedthattheofficershadfailedtoprovidesufficient
proofoftheirinformantscredibilitytosatisfytheAguilar-Spinelli test.1
Whenthemagistrateissuedthisruling,heinvitedtheofficerstopresent
moreinformationtocorroboratetheirinformants.
Buttheofficersdidnotpresentmoreinformationtothemagistrateandask
him to reconsider his decision. Nor did the officers acquiesce in the magistrates
decisionandreturnMooresluggagetohim. Instead,theofficerskeptMooresluggage
overnightandthen,thenextmorning, theyshippedittotheAlaskaStateTroopersin
Anchorage. AftertheluggagearrivedinAnchorage,itwassubjectedtosniffingbya
drug-detectiondog. Thedogalertedtotheluggage,andthetroopersthenappliedfora
searchwarrant,thistimeinfrontofanAnchoragejudge. Thewarrantwasgranted.
The ensuingsearch ofMoores luggagedisclosedsevenvacuum-sealed
bagsofmarijuanatotalingapproximatelysevenounces. Basedonthediscoveryofthis
marijuana,Moorewaschargedwith,andlaterconvictedof, fourth-degreecontrolled
substancemisconduct.2
1
Aguilar v. Texas,378U.S.108,84S.Ct.1509,12L.Ed.2d723(1964); Spinelli v.United States,393U.S.410,89S.Ct.584,21L.Ed.2d637(1969). See State v. Jones,706
P.2d317,322-25(Alaska1985)(holdingthat,asamatterofstatelaw,theAguilar-Spinelli
testcontinuestogoverntheevaluationofhearsayinformationofferedtosupportasearchor
seizure).
2 AS11.71.040(a)(3)(F)(possessionoffourouncesormoreofmarijuana).
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Inthisappeal,Moorearguesthat,aftertheDillinghammagistraterefused
toissuethesearchwarrant,itwasillegalfortheDillinghamofficerstoretainhisluggage
overnightandthenshipit to Anchorageandthatallof theensuinginvestigative
efforts(thedogsniffandthesecondsearchwarrant application)weretaintedbythis
illegality.
Forthereasonsexplainedinthisopinion,weagreewithMoore,andwe
thereforereversehisconviction.
TheStates contention that the Dillingham officers needed only reasonable
suspicion to hold Moores luggage overnight and then ship it to Anchorage
for further investigative inspection
Moore does not contest that the Dillingham officers had reasonable
suspiciontobelievethathewascarryingmarijuanaforcommercialpurposesandthat
theofficersthereforehadtheauthoritytotemporarilyseizehisluggagesothattheymight
applyforasearchwarrant. See Pooley v. State,705P.2d1293,1307(AlaskaApp.
1985);LeMense v. State,754P.2d268,272-73(AlaskaApp.1988).ButMoorearguesthattheofficersexceededtheirauthoritywhenthey
retainedhisluggageovernightandthenshippedittoAnchorageforfurtherinvestigative
efforts. TheState,inturn,respondsthattheofficersweresimplypursuingthemost
promptinvestigativeeffortsthatwereavailabletothemunderthecircumstances,since
therewerenodrug-sniffingdogsinDillingham.
Toresolvethesearguments,wemustexamineandmoreclearlydefinethe
scope of police authority to conduct temporary investigative seizures of travelers
luggagebasedonreasonablesuspicion.
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TheUnited StatesSupremeCourtdiscussedthe limitsthattheFourth
Amendmentplacesontemporaryinvestigativedetentionsofluggagein United States v.
Place,462U.S.696,708-710;103S.Ct.2637,2645-46;77L.Ed.2d110(1983).
InPlace,theSupremeCourtfirmlyrejectedthegovernmentsargument
that temporaryinvestigativeseizuresoftravelersluggagecouldbemoreintrusive
i.e.,ofgreaterscopeanddurationthaninvestigativeseizuresoftravelersthemselves:
ThepremiseoftheGovernmentsargumentisthatseizuresof
property are generally less intrusive than seizures of the
person. Whiletrueinsomecircumstances, thatpremiseis
faulty on the facts ... in this case. The precise type of
detention we confront here is seizure of personal luggagefromtheimmediatepossessionof[a]suspectforthepurpose
of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog.
Particularly in thecaseofdetention of luggagewithin the
travelersimmediatepossession,thepoliceconductintrudes
onboththesuspectspossessoryinterestinhis luggageas
wellas his libertyinterestinproceedingwithhis itinerary.
Thepersonwhoseluggageisdetainedistechnicallystillfree
tocontinuehistravelsorcarryoutotherpersonalactivities
pendingrelease of theluggage. ... Nevertheless,sucha
seizure can effectively restrain the person[,] since he is
subjected to the possible disruptionofhis travelplans in
ordertoremainwithhisluggageortoarrangeforitsreturn.
Therefore,whenthepoliceseizeluggagefromthesuspects
custody,wethinkthe limitationsapplicabletoinvestigative
detentionsofthepersonshoulddefinethepermissiblescope
ofaninvestigativedetentionofthepersonsluggageonless
thanprobablecause.
Place,462U.S.at708-09,103S.Ct.at2645.
Although the Supreme Court decline[d] to adopt any outside time
limitationforapermissible [investigative]stop, theCourtnotedthat ithad never
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approved[aninvestigative]seizureof thepersonfortheprolonged90-minuteperiod
thatwaspresentedinPlaceandtheCourtthenruledthatthis90-minutedetentionof
PlacesluggageviolatedhisFourthAmendmentrights. Id.,462U.S.at709-710,103
S.Ct.at2646.
ThisCourtfirstaddressedthepermittedscopeofinvestigativeseizuresof
luggage inPeschel v. State, 770P.2d 1144 (Alaska App. 1989). InPeschel, we
concludedthatthereasonablenessoftheinvestigativeseizureitsscopeandduration
shouldbeevaluatedusingamulti-factortest:
thelengthofthedetention;
whetherthetravelerwasforcedtochoosebetweeninterruptingtheirjourney
(to remain with their luggage) or continuing their journey without their
luggage;
whetherthepolicegavethetraveleranadequateexplanationofwherethey
weretakingtheluggage,andwhenandhowitwouldbereturned;
whetherthepoliceacteddiligentlyin pursuingtheirinvestigationduringthe
periodofdetention;and
whetherthepoliceusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossiblewhenconducting
theirinvestigation.
Peschel,770P.2dat1147-48.
InMoorescase,thefirst twofactorsclearlyfavorhispositionthatthe
detentionofhisluggagewasunlawful. Thepolicekepthisluggageforcloseto24hours
substantiallylongerthanthe90minutesthatwasdisapprovedinPlace. AndMoore
wasforcedtocontinuetravelingtohisdestination(Togiak)withouthisluggage.
TheState,foritspart,focusesontheotherthreefactors.
WhentheDillinghamofficersspoketoMooreattheairport,theytoldhim
thattheyweregoingtosendhisluggagetoAnchoragesothatitcouldbesubjectedtoa
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drug-sniffingdog. TheofficersalsoinformedMoorethattheycouldnotshiphisluggage
toAnchorageuntilthenextday.
Onthisissue,wenotethattheofficersgaveMoorenoestimateofwhenor
howhisluggagemightbereturnedtohim. TheymerelyassuredMoorethathisluggage
wouldultimatelybereturned.
But more importantly, even though the police may have accurately
informedMoorethat theyweregoingto shiphis luggage toAnchorage,andthathe
wouldbedeprivedofhis luggageat leastuntilthenextday, thefactthat thepolice
communicatedthisinformationtoMoorecouldnotturnanunconstitutionalseizureinto
alawfulone. Inotherwords,thepolicecouldnotobtainalicensetoviolateMoores
FourthAmendmentrightsmerelybyinformingMoorethattheyintendedtodoso.
Weturn, then, tothediligenceofpoliceinvestigation,andwhether the
policeusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossibletopursuetheirinvestigationwhiletheyhad
Moores luggage in their possession. Regardingthese two factors, the State relies
heavilyonthefactthattherewerenodrug-sniffingdogsinDillingham,and that the
closest drugdetectiondogs were in Anchorage. The State argues that, practically
speaking, there was no way for the police topursue their investigationother than
detainingMooresluggagefornearlyaday,andshippingithundredsofmilesaway.
ButinChandler v. State,830P.2d789,791-92(AlaskaApp.1992),we
rejected the argument that the duration and scope of a temporary investigative
detention of luggage could be expanded to accommodate whatever investigative
measuresmightbeneededunderthecircumstances.
In Chandler, based on reasonable suspicion, the police transported
ChandlersbagfromtheKetchikanairport tothepolice station, wheretheofficers
preparedthepaperworktoobtain a searchwarrant. Thesearchwarrantwasissued
slightlymorethan90minutesafterthepoliceseizedChandlersbag.Id. at791.
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Weconcludedthatthis90-minutedetentionofthebagviolatedChandlers
rights under theFourthAmendment. Id. at 792. Inreaching this conclusion, we
explainedthat even thoughtherewasnostricttimelimitforinvestigativedetentions,
[a]tsomepoint,...thelengthof[the]detentionalonewillprecludeanyclaimthatthe
police seizure of the luggage detention constituted only a temporary investigative
detention(i.e.,thekindoflimiteddetentionthatcanbejustifiedbyreasonablesuspicion
ratherthanprobablecause). Ibid.
InChandler,wedidnotsuggestthatthepolicedisplayedalackofdiligence
inapplyingforthesearchwarrant. Rather, we heldthatthelengthofthedetention,
coupledwiththefactthatthepoliceremovedthedefendantsbagfromtheairport,meant
that the seizure and detention of the bag could no longer be justified merely by
reasonablesuspicion:
Chandlersbagwas...seizeddirectlyfromChandlers
possession. Thebagwasnotmerelyimmobilizedatthepoint
ofseizure. Rather,itwastransportedasignificantdistance
fromtheairporttotheKetchikanpolicestation. Thepolice
mitigatedtheintrusivenessof this90-plusminutedetentionby tellingChandler where they were takinghis bag, their
purpose in takingit, theapproximate lengthoftimethat it
would beheld,andhowChandlercouldreclaimit. [But
though] such measures might make the difference in a
borderlinecase,theydonotconvertthekindofseizurethat
occurredhereintoabrief,minimallyintrusivedetentionof
property. Weconcludethatthewarrantlessseizurerequired
probablecause.
Chandler,830P.2dat792.
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WereachthesameconclusioninMoorescase. Itwasunlawfulforthe
Dillingham police tohold Moores luggage overnight and then ship the luggage to
Anchorageforfurtherinvestigativemeasures,basedmerelyonreasonablesuspicion.
The States argument that the Dillingham officers had probable cause to
believe that Moores luggage contained marijuana intended for
commercial purposes, and thus the officers were authorized to hold the
luggage overnight and then ship it to Anchorage for the dog sniff
TheStatearguesthateveniftheactionsoftheDillinghampoliceexceeded
the type of temporary investigative detention that would be authorized based onreasonablesuspicion, theiractionswereneverthelessjustifiedbecausetheDillingham
officersactuallyhadprobablecausetobelieve(asopposedtomerereasonablesuspicion)
thatMoorewastransportingmarijuanaforcommercialpurposes.
Whenthepolicehaveprobablecausetobelievethatanarticleofluggage
containsevidenceofacrime,andwhentherearenoexigentcircumstancesauthorizing
animmediatewarrantlesssearch,thepoliceareauthorizedtoseizetheluggage(butnot
searchit)andtocarrytheluggageawayforsafe-keepingwhiletheyapplyforasearch
warrant.3
ButtheStatesargumentinMoorescasegoesconsiderablybeyondthis
propositionoflaw. TheStateiseffectivelyarguingthatifthepolicehaveprobablecause
tobelievethatanarticleofluggagecontainsevidenceofacrime,thepolicemayseize
theluggage,hold it foras longasis reasonablynecessarytocomplete any desired
additional investigation or testing, andeven ship the luggage hundreds of miles to
3 United States v. Chadwick, 433U.S. 1, 13; 97S.Ct. 2476,2484-85;53 L.Ed.2d538,
551(1977);Metcalfe v. State,593P.2d638,640(Alaska1979).
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accomplish this additional investigation or testing all without seeking a judicial
warrantuntiltheadditionalinvestigationisdone.
Weareawareofnolegalauthoritytosupportthisargument.
TherearetwoadditionalproblemswiththeStatesprobablecauseargument
inMoorescase.
First,theDillinghampolicedidpromptlyseekasearchwarrantandit
wasrefused. TheStatecitesnoauthorityforthepropositionthatthepolicecouldignore
thisadversejudicialruling,continuetoholdtheluggage,shipitawaytoAnchoragefor
furthertesting,andthenapplyforasearchwarrantagaininfrontofadifferentjudge.
YetthisisessentiallywhattheStateisarguinginMoorescase.
TheStatecontendsthattheissuecurrentlybeforethisCourtiswhetherto
affirm the trialjudges rulingthat the policehad probable cause when they seized
Mooresluggage. ButeveniftheDillinghampolicehadprobablecausetoseize Moores
luggage,theofficerswereonlyauthorizedtoholdtheluggagelongenoughtosecurea
searchwarrant. Thus,thequestionpresentedhereiswhethertheDillinghammagistrate
shouldhaveissuedtherequestedsearchwarrant.
Inlitigatingthisquestion,theStateisnotallowed torelyoninformation
thatwasadducedafter-the-fact.4 AndtheStateacknowledgesthattheevidenceobtained
inAnchorage (thealertof thedrug-detectiondog) shouldnotbeconsideredwhen
assessingwhethertheDillinghampolicehadprobablecausewhentheyappliedforthe
searchwarrant. ButtheStateneverthelessreliesonpolicetestimonythatwasadduced
later,attheevidentiaryhearingonMooresmotiontosuppress.
4 State v. Jones,706P.2d317,326(Alaska1985);State v. White,707P.2d271,277
(AlaskaApp.1985);United States v. Anderson,453F.2d174,177(9thCir.1971).
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This evidentiary hearing testimony offered a fuller description of the
informationthatwasknowntotheDillinghampolicewhentheyinitiallyappliedforthe
searchwarrant. Buttothe extent that this testimonysupplemented theinformation
presentedtotheDillinghammagistrate,itisirrelevanttoourreviewofthemagistrates
decisionbecausethelawrequiresthatalloftheinformationsupportingtheissuance
ofasearchwarrantbecontainedwithinthefourcornersoftheaffidavitsortestimony
presentedinthesearchwarrantapplication.5
TurningtothecontentsoftheDillinghamsearchwarrantapplication,the
warrantapplicationwasprimarilybasedoninformationobtainedfromthreeinformants.
AdheringtotheAguilar-Spinelli test, theDillinghammagistratequestioned thepolice
abouthowthesethreeinformantsobtainedtheirinformation,whytheseinformantschose
tosharethisinformationwithpolice,andwhethertheseinformantshadprovedreliable
inthepast.
Twooftheinformantswereanonymous;thatis,thepolicedidnotdisclose
theiridentitiestothemagistrate.
Whenthemagistrateaskedtheofficerhowthefirstanonymousinformant
obtainedhisinformation,theofficerreplied,Idonthaveanyanswersforthat. When
themagistrateaskedtheofficerifheknew why thefirstanonymous informanthad
wantedtosharehisinformationwiththepolice,theofficerreplied,No,Idonot. And
whenthemagistrateaskedtheofficerifthisfirstanonymousinformantwasfromthe
criminalmilieu,theofficerrepliedthat,asfarasheknew,theinformanthadnohistory
ofdrugactivity,buttheinformantssignificantotherdid.
5 State v. White,707P.2d271,277(AlaskaApp.1985);United Statesv.Anderson,453
F.2d174,177(9thCir.1971).
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With regard to the second confidentialinformant, the officer told the
magistrate that hehad the impression that this second informant had personally
witnessedoneormoremarijuanasalesbyMoore. Butwhenthemagistrateaskedthe
officerifthissecondanonymousinformanthadgiventhepoliceanyideahowrecently
thesesalesweresupposedtohaveoccurred,theofficerreplied,No,hedidnot. The
officeralsoconcededthat[t]hereliabilityofthispersonhasnotbeenestablished.
Thethirdinformantwasidentifiedbyname. Shehadnodirectinformation
aboutMoore,butsheclaimedtoknowthedrug-transportationmethodsusedbyanother
man whowasallegedtobeMooresaccomplice. Whenthemagistratebeganasking
morequestionsaboutthisthirdinformant,theofficervolunteeredthatthisinformanthad
givenherinformationtothepolicewhenshewascontact[ed]foralcoholimportation
approximatelyninemonthsearlier. Themagistrateaskedtheofficer, So[thisthird
informant]wasbeingaccusedofimportingalcohol? ... Whywouldshebeproviding
thatkindofinformationtoyou,doyouknow? Theofficerrepliedthatsheprovided
[theinvestigatingofficer]withthatinformation...to[distract]himfromhiscontactwith
her. Themagistrateasked,[So]shewastryingtopointthefingeratsomebodyelse,
totakethefocusoffofheristhatkindofwhatyourethinking? Andtheofficer
answered,Yesortotryto,youknow,sortofmakeadeal.
Afterhearingthistestimony,themagistrateconcludedthatthepolicehad
failedtoadequatelyestablishthecredibilityorreliabilityoftheirinformantsunderthe
Aguilar-Spinelli test.Basedonthisrecord,wecannotsaythatthemagistratesdecision
constitutedanabuseofdiscretion.6
6 We couldnot findanypriorcasewhere thisCourtwas calleduponto reviewa
magistratesdecisionnot to issue asearchwarrant. Butincasesraisingtherelatedissueof
whetheramagistratewascorrectin issuing asearchwarrant , thisCourthasemployedan
(continued...)
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WethereforeholdthatthepoliceviolatedMooresrightsundertheFourth
Amendmentwhentheycontinuedtoholdhisluggageafterthemagistratedeniedtheir
applicationfora searchwarrant. Allevidencederivedfromthelatersearchof that
luggagemustbesuppressed.
Conclusion
ThejudgementofthesuperiorcourtisREVERSED.
6 (...continued)
abuseofdiscretionstandardofreview. See McClelland v. State ,928P.2d1224,1225
(AlaskaApp.1996);State v. Bianchi,761P.2d127,129-30(AlaskaApp.1988).
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