moises & pompan

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What is the Strategy of the "New Syndicalism"?Author(s): Jose Alvaro Moises and Claudia Maria PompanSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 55-73Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633387 .Accessed: 21/03/2011 19:25

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WHATIS THESTRATEGYOF THE"NEWSYNDICALISM"?byJose Alvaro Moises*

Translated by Claudia Maria PompanRESURGENCE OF THE BRAZILIAN LABOR MOVEMENT:THE STRIKE OF 1980After long and painful hours of waiting and tension, a dramaticconfrontationbetween the repressiveforcesof the Sao Paulo militarypoliceand about sixtythousand strikersseemed immanent.For a second, thenerves

and muscles of the resistingworkerscontractedsharply;fearwas etched ontheirfaces. But therewas no confrontation.Suddenly,as ifby a miracle,theenormousmass that had jammed into the plaza of the Matriz Church tookoff,chantingtheirprotestand occupyingthe main streetsof Sao Bernardo doCampo. Thousands of demonstratorsjoined the procession, and shortlythemultitudetotaled 120 thousand. It was the firsttime that the workers hadblown off steam after a succession of small and partial defeats.That day the plaza belonged to the people. The demonstration hadrequired an enormous effortand a lot of courage,but it had been worth it.The repressive forces,consistingof fivethousand armed soldiers,abandonedthe city without incident. The demonstratorstook over the famous VilaEuclides soccer stadiumwhere in 1979, beginningwith the big strikes of themetalworkersof the ABC industrialregion (Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo, andSao Caetano), daily gatheringsof seventy,eighty,and sometimeseven ninetythousand workers took place. What happened that May 1, 1980, in SaoBernardo do Campo-industrial heart of Brazil, epicenterof capitalism, andheadquarters for the highest rates of monopolistic exploitation in thecountry-was that for the second time since 1968, the Brazilian labormovement succeeded in commemoratingInternationalLabor Day accordingto its own wishes and determination.1*The authoris an editor ofthe Revistade CulturaContemporaneaand one of thedirectorsof theCentrode Estudos de CulturaContemporanea(CEDEC) in Sao Paulo. The translatoris a graduatestudent in the Department of Political Science, Universityof California, Riverside.'The last recorded May 1 workers' protest in Brazil dates fromthe eve of the Osasco andContagem strikes in 1968. The strikes were violentlyrepressed and ended with the state'sinterventionin theunions.Within a fewmonths,the "hard-line"militaryleaders imposedthe In-55


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56 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESThe powerful display of class solidarity served to rekindle the spirits ofabout 125 thousand strikerswho had forthirty-onedays-and forthe thirdtime since 1978-denied their labor power to the employers. Demanding anincrease in pay and social rights,they openly challenged the "revolutionary"laws, which originatedfromthe 1964 regimeand which (such as Decree 4.030)virtuallysuppressed all labor rights,includingthe rightto strike. With theirunion militancy,the strikersreaffirmedtheir resistance to the wage-freezepolicy which was an importantingredientof the model created after1964.However, as in 1978 and 1979,the strikewas explicitlydeclared illegal by thelabor court,2and the new refusal of business leaders to negotiate with theunion leadership carried the conflictto an overtimpasse. To those awaitingthe outcome of the strike,the overridingquestion became how the strike

would end. Though the outcome would be decided by the President's CivilCabinet, the Ministryof Labor, and the Federacdo das Industriasdo Estadode Sdo Paulo (FIESP-Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo), itwas now becoming clear that there was an explicit determination bygovernmentleaders not only to defeat the movementin its specific sphere3but also to "break" the new union leadership that had been developingsincethemid-1970sand which more and more had acquired a visible political rolestitutionalAct Number 5 which lasted until 1978.Thereafter,the celebration of May 1 in Braziltended to become more and more "official,"with the Secretariats of Labor of each statecoordinating its planning. These official commemorations never attracted large numbers ofworkers.However, in 1978 with theemergenceof a vigorous and combative union movementinthe country,workers regained the initiative and began to plan an alternativecommemoration,unifyingall the unionist currents in the country.2When the unfeasibility of direct negotiations between business and labor became evident(business leaders offereda 4 percentincrease and were unwillingto negotiateon otherpoints),the Sao Paulo Labor Tribunal in a preliminaryhearing declared itselfincompetenttojudge thele-galityor illegalityof the strikeand decided to set thewage increase at 7 percent.Other labor de-mands were not considered. Since at their mass gatheringstheworkersdecided to continue thestrikeuntilbusiness leaders returnedto thebargainingtable,the FIESP demanded a new verdict.Ostensibly pressured by the government,the labor tribunal found the strike illegal, thusretractingitsdeclaration of incompetencyto judge the issue. The way was paved fortheMinistryof Labor to decree interventionin the unions.'The 1980 strikewas punctuated by eventsindicatingthat thegovernmentwas unwillingto yieldan inch,even if it onlyconcernedthe lengthof time fornegotiationsbetweenbusiness and labor.If in 1978 and 1979 business leaders and the authorities were caught off guard by labor'sinitiative,now it was a differentsituation. The press declared repeatedlythatthe toughness ofbusiness leaders in refusingto discuss issues with labor leaders was directlyguided by Golberydo Couto e Silva, the ministerin chargeof the President's civil cabinet. As for Ministerof LaborMurillo Macedo, even thoughhe had been meetingat least twice a week with FIESP leaders, notonce did he accept invitationsfromleaders of the Sao Bernardo do Campo Metalworkers' Unionto participatein the daily gatheringswhich were taking place in the Vila Euclides stadium. Onthe eve of the decree to intervenein the Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre union, the ministerwassought out by labor leaders who were soliciting his help in reopening the bargaining. Theministerpromisedto look intothe matter.On the followingday the storyofthe interventionap-peared in the newspapers. The ministerhad signed the decree before the interviewwith the laborleaders (see Folha de Sao Paulo and 0 Estado de Siao Paulo, April 15, 16, and 17, 1980). As forFIESP, fromthe beginningof the conflict,the behavior ofrepresentativesof the so-called Groupof 14, which was in charge of the discussions, was marked by stubbornesss and rigidityindealing with labor's proposals. When an impasse was reached, after the interventionin theunions, theystated that"theywould not returnto the bargainingtable even ifso ordered by thegovernment"(O Estado de Sao Paulo).


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 57in the so-called democratic opening.4What would then be the outcomeof the1980 strike-would it simply end with the humiliationof the workers, orwould it take on some other meaning?These questions are of even greaterimmediate interestin that this was amovementwhich had been carefully prepared and involved an enormouscontingentof workers fromthemost importantsector of Brazilian capitalism.As was stated above, the ABC industrial region contains the largestconcentrationofindustrialworkersin the country.5Thoughspatial concentra-tion is a sociological variable which helps to explain the movements of theworkingclass, there are other factorswhich are also fundamental.The ABCregion includes workers with the highest levels of professional skills andformaleducation in the country;it has thereforea relativelywell-informedworkingclass. A large number of its ranksfall into a young age bracketandthereforelack experiencein pre-1964unionmilitancy;forthis reason theyareworkers who were born, in terms of a class, outside the state and arefrequently"against the state." The majorityare first or second generationmigrants-seen clearly in theirbrown northeasternfaces. To them falls thetask of decreeingthe continuityor the end of the strikers'movements.Thusthereis an enormous contingentof the "poor" confrontingthe world of the"rich"-the powerfulmultinationals.Supported by a Church which seeks therestorationofthe "dignityof those who sufferand are oppressed" and awareof thefact thattheyare facing powerfuland richemployers,theyask foranddemand betterwages. An extremelycombative labor movement has beendevelopingthroughoutalmost a decade, and thegreatsecretof its success, be-sides theoutstandingabilityof its leadership to identifywith themasses, hasbeen the attentionit has directed toward the mobilization ofworkersat thefactorylevel-the old stumblingblock oftheBrazilian labor movement.It hasintroducedinto thehistoryof the past sixteenyears unheard of organization-al formssuch as the various grass-rootslabor congresses,where the logic and4Themost obvious sign of thispoliticalrole is expressed in the actions of "Lula," Luis Inacio daSilva, the president of the Sao Bernardo Metalworkers'Union. In early 1979,along with otherunion leaders, Lula proposed the creation of thePartidodos Trabalhadores (PT) which is, in fact,the only initiativethatescapes the provisionsfor"partyreform"carried out by the authoritarianregime startingin 1978. However, Lula's political functionsare not restrictedto the PT; since1977,when he was soughtby theMinisterofJusticein theGiesel administrationon the occasionof the so-called PortellaMission, Lula has been presentinghimself as an authorizedinterlocutorfor the country'svarious politicalgroupsand forces.Capable ofspeakingvigorouslyon behalfofhis class, he once again made it theorder of theday to discuss topicsrelated to theautonomyofworkingclass participationin the political life of the country.5While the city of Sao Paulo has about 400,000 metalworkers,the ABC region has 205,00distributedas follows: Santo Andre, 47,000; Sao Bernardo do Campo, 133,000; Sao Caetano,25,000.Althoughthe Sao Paulo labor forceis distributedamongapproximately13,000companiesin the industry,in Sao Bernardo just threelarge companies-Ford, Volkswagen,and Mercedes-Benz-account for80,000workers out ofthe total of 133,000.Without doubt these are the largestindustrialconcentrationsin the country;althoughthereare also "workingclass communities"inOsasco and Quarulhos in thegreaterSao Paulo area; in Betim,Contagemand Monlevada in Mi-nas Gerais; as well as some "dormitory-cities"in thegreaterRio area. However,the existence ofthese otherworkingclass communitiesshould not necessarilyraise questions as to why thenewsyndicalism emerged in the ABC region and not in other parts of the country.Besides thestructuralcauses in the ABC region, particularly in Sao Bernardo do Campo, very preciseorganizational and political factorswere operating.For more on this subject, see Tavares deAlmeida (1975) and Mois6s (1978).


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58 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVEScontentof union actions have been fullydiscussed.6Based on the experience of the greatmovements of previous years, the1980 strikewas prepared and organized "with the precision of a manufac-tured product"(Vianna, 1980). In Sao Bernardodo Campo it was preceded bythreehundredpreparatorymeetingsat the factorylevel, the most importantresultof which was the selection of fourhundreddelegates to the so-calledmobilization committee,from which was to come the more limited wagecommittee.These committeestogetherwith the union governingboard wereto carryout the importantfunctionsof the strikecommand and were to act asintermediariesbetween therank-and-fileand the leadershipof themovement,which previously had depended on mass gatherings.Preparation of theworkers also took place at the factorygates where numerous meetingswereheld on the spur of the moment and where many hundreds of thousands offlyers,according to union leaders, reached more than 80 percent of theirintended recipients. In reality the labor leaders of Sdo Bernardo preparedthemselvesfor all eventualities:in case of state interventionin the union thealternativemeetingplaces would be the Church and residentialareas; in caseof imprisonmentof the most importantand well-knownleaders, they wouldbe automaticallyreplaced by others who already had the confidence andlegitimacyof the masses, i.e., the wage and mobilization committees;in theeventualityof a long strike(theyspoke of twenty-fivedays), a resourcefund,outsidetheunion,was createdin orderto help the workersbear theweightofdays without work or pay, and so forth.Nevertheless,the concern over the fate of the 1980 strike,which spreadthroughoutthe countryafterthe historicdemonstrationof May 1, was fullyjustified. After the judicial ruling that the strike was illegal, there wereinterventionsin theunions in Sdo Bernardoand Santo Andre. Afterwardsthepoliticalpolice, showingno arrestwarrants,virtuallykidnapped fifteenunionleaders fromtheir homes in Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre, fourteenpeoplelinkedto the opposition as membersof the Justiceand Peace Commission oftheArchdiocese of Sdo Paulo, as well as formerpoliticalprisoners.The pressand television networks showed the Ministerof Labor explicitlythreateningstrikingworkerswith mass dismissals (as a result of the strike).The FIESPbegan to publish notices in the press calling strikersback to work. The bigautomobilefactoriesbegan to recruitalternativelabor,and so, everyday hugelines of unemployed people formed at the doors of the personnel depart-ments.Finally,the repressiveforces,which had remained as a latentthreat,began attacking the strikerswith bombs and batons, imprisoning largenumbersof strikersfor questioning,and preventingthe continuation of thebig mass gatheringsin the Vila Euclides stadium. The demonstrationofMay6Reportsavailable fromcurrentunionmilitantsand dating fromthe early 1970s indicate thatthegrass-rootsunion congresseswere thefirstbig opportunityfor a broad public debate among thenew youngmilitantswho were comingout of Sao Bernardo do Campo. The attractionexertedbythe union on these youngworkers was in large part tied in with the decision of the union boardsto trydirectbargainingwithbusiness. This was entirelynew in Brazilian labor unionexperience,and as can be imagined,it exerted a strongattractionin the context of a labor unionmovementwhich,since 1964,had been practicallycircumscribedto auxiliaryactivitiesand to the ritualofwage increases that were determinedaccordingto the wishes of theregime'stechnocrats.On thissubject,see Vidal (n.d.). Paulo Vidal was presidentof the Sao Bernardo Metalworkers'Union inthe early 1970s and Lula began his union activities as a member of Vidal's board of directors.


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 59Day had releasedpentup feelings,butit didnot enablethe striketo changeits course.The signsof isolationcontinuedto mount.Whatwas thentobecomeof thisgreatmovement?

AfterMay 1, the strikelasted anotherelevendays. Contradictingallpredictionsmade by publicauthorities,businessleaders,themajorpress-whichat a certainpointdideverythingto isolatethemovementfrompublicopinion-and evenbycertainsectorsoftheopposition,theworkerssucceed-ed in maintaininga greatpart of theirinitialmobilization.They werepreparedfora longresistance.It is truethattheyhad to returntotheirareasofresidence,butonce there,theyworkedon behalfofthesolidarityoftheneighborhoodworking-classorganizationsand theChurch'sbase communi-ties.Backedbyvisiblesupportfromthetoplevelof theCatholichierarchyinSao Paulo and the ABC region,whicheven agreedto openlyconfrontstateleaders,the strikersbegan to meeton the groundsof theMatrizChurch,where theyheldtheirgatheringsafterthecelebrationofmass.7Fromtheretheytriedto coordinateeffortsto reestablishnegotiationswiththeentrepre-neursbyanyavailablechannels.8Althoughtherewas nounanimityamongitsmembers,thewage committeeadmittedthatthemovementhad reachedapointat whichit was necessaryto seek a negotiatedsolution.9Butthisbattlewas alreadylost.The regimehaddirectedbusinessleaderstoavoidat all costanysignofa willingnesstonegotiate.Nowthestrategyofthestateleadersbecamecompletelyclear:themovementshouldbe isolated,and thendefeatedon specificgrounds,thusavoidingtheobviousrisksand"demonstrationeffect"thiswould haveon othersectorsof theworkingclassas had happenedin the past.10In effectingits "democraticopening,"the7Attheheightof theABC crisis,Presidentloao BaptistaFigueiredoaccusedDomPauloEvaristoArns,CardinalandArchbishopofSao Paulo,of"incitingtheworkerstostrike."In hisopinionthisattitudedidnotcorrespondtotheorientationof themajorityofBrazil'sarchbishops.Thefol-lowingday DomPaulo respondedbychallengingthePresidentto appointbishopswhotohisknowledgewoulddisagreewiththeorientationof outrightsupportforthe strikemovement(Folhade Sao Paulo,April24,1980).In thefollowingdaystheepiscopateexpresseditssupportofDom Paulo.8Bna statementmade beforethe SecondHearingsBoardof theMinistryof War (theofficeresponsibleforjudginglaborleaderswhowerecaughtup in theNationalSecurityLaw),SeveroGomes,businessmanand formerMinisterof Industryand Commerce,declaredthatat therequestofunionleadershehad triedtoreestablishcontactswithrepresentativesofthe"Group14"who,however,statedthattheywerepreventedfrombargainingbythefederalgovernment.9Recentstatementsindicatethattheopinionofthewagecommitteewas splitontheissueoftheresumptionofbargaining,butat notimediditmakea decisionthatwouldimplya rejectionofthetalks.On thecontrary,the attitudethatprevailedwas oneofseeking,throughthemediationof politicians,unionleaders,and miiembersoftheChurchhierarchy,a reestablishmentofthedialoguewithbusinessleadersas wellas withfederalgovernmentauthorities.A triptoBrasiliamadebyPT Secretary-GeneralJac6Bitter,alongwithSao BernardoMayorTitoCostaandSantoAndres BishopDom ClaudioHumes,was a concreteindicationof thisconcern.loTounderstandlabor'spowertopropagatelaborstruggles,wemustrecallthatin 1978,aftertheunexpectedbeginningof the "armscrossed,machinesstopped"strikein theScaniacompanyinSao Bernardo,the movementspreadtoa largenumberofcompaniesinSao Bernardoandto alloftheABC regionand outwardto Sao Paulo,Osasco,andCampinasintheinteriorof thestate.Laterthemovementspreadto othertypesofindustryand to otherstatesin thecountry.TheagreementsreachedbetweentheunionsandaboutthirtycompaniesintheABC regionaffectedmorethan150,000workerswho obtainedreal wage increasesof 11 and 15 percent.It isimpressiveto registertheoccuranceofno less than 430strikesin 1979.On this subject,seeDIEESE (1980)and Moises (1979).LatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX,No. 4


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60 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESfederalgovernmentpresenteditselfto the public as a relentlesslaw enforcer:the law prohibitsstrikes,therefore,the ABC unions must be brokenup byforceand theirleaders removedfrompower-thus impedingtheircontinuedeffect on society as a whole.l The Sao Bernardo movement had to becompletely destroyedwithout so much as a trace that would even remotelysuggest the political effectivenessof its combativity.None of the workers'demands were accepted, and the hours lost in work stoppages werediscounted from theirpaychecks. According to union records by June1980about fifteen thousand workers had lost their jobs as a reprisal for theirparticipationin the movement."2In the end, with theirunions under intervention,theirleaders caught upin the National Security Law, and theirmeeting places occupied by the SaoPaulo militarypolice, theworkers startedback to work.The difficulttimes ofthe forty-two-daystrikehad come to an end. After two years of relativesuccess in economic demands and in the affirmationof its presence insociety, the new syndicalism had its first taste of reversal. Innumerableanalysts, observers,and even protagonistsin the events have asked whetherthiswas a victoryor a defeat.But thequestion cannot be stated so simply.Ananalysis of the results of the big strikeinvolves a multiplicityof dimensionsand cannot be restrictedmerely to labor aspects and thus to its specificrationale as a social movement.Within the social and political conditionsimposed by authoritarian Latin American regimes,social movements tendtoward immediate and dangerous politicization because theirmere occur-rence conflictswith an institutionalorder organized to contain them and toprevent class participation. Social conflicts become permanent politicalconflictsthatgo unresolved and reallyhave no solution since partof the au-thoritarianand despotic logic is the subordinationof the citizenryto theexistingsocial condition,and such conflictsare notrecognized as a legitimatedimensionof society (see Delich, 1980).No matterhow well it succeeds in re-coveringand broadeningits specific functions,the unionmovementdoes notescape this centripetal tendency, and for this very reason it oversteps itsboundaries and invades an area which, in theory,belongs to the politicalmovements, political parties, and the state.It is thereforemost appropriateto seek the mostgeneral meaningof thestrikein termsof its social and political effecton the whole of society.Thisprocedure should not exclude an intense analysis of the trade unionobjectives of the movement. But to understand the effectiveness of the"It is interestingto observe thatin order to isolate the ABC movement,the state leaders insistedthatthe political goals of the union leadership were illegitimatein the eyes of the law. This ex-plains the repeated assertions that interventionin the unions were directed "toward removingLula and his comrades forever." But it was Minister Golbery do Couto e Silva who bestillustratedthe fears of the regimewithregardto the new syndicalism.In a speech given at theSuperiorWar College, the ministerreferredto the necessityfor the government"in the face of abroad and vigirousstrikemovement"to "demoralize" the new union leaders by arguingthatthepolitical objectives of the union leaders were in sharp contrastwith the strictlytrade unionaspirationsof the workers.On thissubject,see 0 Estado de Sao Paulo (October 19 and 26, 1980)where the text of General Golbery's speech was published.12Froma strictlylegal pointofview thesedismissals could be questioned.Even some juridicalad-visorsto FIESP recognizedthat the threatto dismiss strikersfor "abandoningtheirjobs" was ex-aggeratedand had no basis under Brazilian labor laws, althoughthe threatshould be used as apsychological weapon to pressure the strikers(see Rangel, 1980).


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 61movement,it mustbe placedin thebroadestcontextof societiesin whichthepresence of the state chronicallyrefersto a dialectic of strengthandweakness,theoriginsofwhichmustbe soughtin the crisiswhichmarksitsown formationas a nation-state(Moises, 1980).The 1980 strikecan be placed in the broadercontextof the politicalsettingwhichemergedin Brazilafter1978withthe end of InstitutionalActNumber5, theconcessionofamnestyto politicalprisoners,andthe "politicalpartyreform"whichimposedan end to the old politicalparties.Distinguish-ing between"liberalization"and "democratization"the regimehas soughttomaintainitsleadovertheoppositiongroupsby"takingsomeflagsout of theirhands" and by maintainingstrictcontrolover the transitionprocess.Thisimpliesa veryclear limitationon the routestowardthe so-calleddemocraticopening.At thesame time,as thestrategyforthereconstructionof publicau-thorityby state leaders confrontsthe creationof an enormous publicexpectationwith respectto this particularprocess, certaincollisions areinevitable(which,infact,broadenthemarginof riskfortheseveralpartiesindispute).By takingadvantageof the forcedopeningsin the monolithicpoliticalsystem of authoritarianism,the labor movementand all the democraticoppositiongroupshave soughtto expand their room foraction.In thismanner,the labor movementhas adopteda decisivepolicyforthe mobiliza-tionof social forceswhichuntilyesterdaywerecompletelyon the marginofpolitics.One earlyresulthas been an increasein expectationswithrespecttotheopeningprocess,butmoreimportantly,thesurpassingofthelimitswhichwereestablishedbythemilitary(see Cardoso,1980).Forthisreason,attemptsbythecontenderstoredefinetheselimitshave beenincreasing,leadingto aconstantwideningor narrowingof the area in which those forceswhichresistanychangeof theauthoritarianordercollidewiththosethatdo battlefor the introductionof a new orderof liberation.Ifwe do not wishto lookonlyat thereversesof the1980strike(whichwere considerable),then we shouldlook at thetrulydisruptiveand trans-formingimpactit had onsomeof theauthoritarianstructuresof theBraziliansociety.It struckat the whole.set of old and anachronisticcorporativistinstitutionswhichregulatethe relationsbetweencapitaland laborinBrazil.The prohibitionof therightto strikewas checkedin a muchbroaderanddeepersense thanin thepastby thethousandsof workerswho refusedtoobey Decree 4.030.At the same timethe labor court was faced withanenormouscrisisin theformofa laborlegislationill-equippedtofacethenewconflictsemergingin society.Bythe incoherenceofits attacksand counter-attacks,bythe limitedrangeofitssentences,and bythe lack ofmoralandpoliticalauthorityof its judges,the labor courtlost the confidenceof anenormousmass ofworkerswhopreviouslymaynot haveexpectedfromit asolutionto theirproblemsbut did believe in its general impartialityinmediatingconflicts.Finally,mentionmust be made of the crisis in thecorporativistunion structureitselfwhich,thoughdesignedto preventthemobilizationofworkers,has been unableto preventthetransformationofold unionsintoinstitutionsfor the defenseand representationof workersrights.In fact,withtheimmensemobilizationbroughtabout withthestrikesLatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX,No. 4


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62 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESofrecentyears,the unionstructurehas actedas a true"sociologicalsolvent,"which,wheneveritreachestheproportionsof theABC conflict,resultsin ex-pandingtheinstitutional-legalpossibilitiesof theuniontoits utmostpossibili-ties.At thispointit demonstratesall thelimitationsandweaknessesofstatecontrolovertheworkers'movement.Leavingaside otheraspects,we see theenormouseffectsof this sociologicalprocesson the consciousnessof theparticipants,clarifiedby the resumptionof the strugglesforthe reconquestand transformationof the unions.Nevertheless,in the currentpoliticalsituation,theABC metalworkers'strikehas been theone real rupturepointin the schemeof the controlled"opening."It may be said that the strikehas led the Brazilianpoliticalsituation,with all its ambiguities,to thepointof"bursting."Because of thestrikeand thehighlyvisiblerepressiverole of the state,it became easiertoperceiveto what point the currentstage of transitioncould be taken.Whateverillusionstherewere regardingthe "opening"becamemorerealisticafterthe shocktreatmentimposedinresponseto thestrike.Byrefusingtoletitselfbe controlledbythe rulersof thestate,thestrikewas one of thefewar-eas whichescapedthepredictionsoftheregime'sstrategists.Thus,itbecamea symbolfor resistanceand forpopularstruggleon behalfof theworkingclass forbetterstandardsoflivingandforsocial and politicalrights,even inthe face of politicalconditionsso adverse as those of the authoritarianregime.

In placingthe demand for social and politicalrightsof the Brazilianworkingclass alongsidethespecificissues ofwageincreases,job security,theforty-hourworkweek,and therightof unionrepresentationin thefactory,the ABC metalworkerstranscendedthe strictarea of unionfunctionsandtheirimmediateinterests.In doingso, itmustbe emphasizedthatinfightingforjob security(at leastforoneyear)theissue was notonlytheproblemoflaborturnoverin the large enterprises,but theveryrightof theBrazilianworkerto strike.Withjob securityguaranteed,theincidenceofdismissals,caused bythecollectiverefusaltowork,would be regularizedby agreementor by law (at least untilthe next dissension).Likewise,the limitationofworkinghours to fortyper week,withoutgrantingemployersthe use offorcedovertime,would signifya horizontalexpansionin job opportunitieswithinthe contextof a societywhichis markedby inequalitiesand byenormouscontingentsof people situatedon thefringeof subsistence.It is in the area of thestruggleforsocial and politicalrights,therefore,thatwe mustseek the significanceof the movementof recentyearsandparticularlythe1980strike.Outherwise,we risktreatingthenewsyndicalismas simplya tradeuniontendency,moreefficientthantheothers,butwithre-sponsibilitiesdefinedexclusivelyin termsof its union functions.THE NEW SYNDICALISM AND THE STRUGGLEFOR BRAZILIANDEMOCRACY

A step away fromtheimmediateconjuncturemaybe helpfulin bettercharacterizingtheargument.Let us examinethe broadermeaningwhichthe"new syndicalism"assumes when contrastedwiththe unionexperienceoftheLatin Americanworkingclass in the 1950s and early1960s.


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 63Untila fewyears ago,sociologistsand politicalscientists,when talkingabouta particularunionexperiencedevelopedin variouscountries,tendedtoreferto themodel of "politicalsyndicalism,"a typicalphenomenonof the

various experiencesof Latin Americanpopulism.The famousconceptofpoliticalbargaining,putforthby Payne(1965)in his studyof Peru,providedavery useful synthesisof the various steps of the argument.More thancontractualfunctions-themselvespartof the collectivebargainingprocess-the LatinAmericanunionsassumed the functionsof intermediarypoliticalbodies (Torreand Sigal,1979).This contrastsmarkedlywiththe natureand politicalefficacyof theunionsand workers'movementsin more recentyears.The experienceofalmosttwo decades of authoritarianregimesin various countries,withabroad tendencytowardthegeneralizationofwage laborand theintensifica-tion and deepeningof the industrializationprocess,has provokedtheemergenceand consolidationof a newheterogeneousindustrialworkingclass(comprisedofworkersofthe monopolisticenterprisesand workersof small-and medium-sizedcompanies,not to mentioncivil servants).The crisisinvokedbytheauthoritarianregimesintheirstrategyof politicalpressure,ifnotopen repressionof theunions,makesit imperativeto reviseourimagesaboutLatinAmericansyndicalism.The old modelof thepreviousperiodis nolongervalidat this time.Butthe new tendencies(unionorganizationat thefactoriesand mobilizationin themostcentralizedand dynamiceconomicsectors)perhapshave notyetsufficientlymatured-atleastintermsofa setof countries-tojustifytheformulationof a new globalmodel.Butthisdoes notmean thattheanalysisof variousindividualexperiencesis not already demandinga new interpretationof syndicalismin theauthoritarianperiod.This is particularlytrueinBrazilwherethereemergenceof the unionmovement,with the developmentof the new syndicalism,presentsentirelynew theoreticaland practicalproblemsand where thedynamicsof theprocessitselfcalls for a deepeningof the analysis.Whilethemodelofpoliticalsyndicalismhypothesizeda social movementwhich,althoughnotalways efficientin themobilizationof itsbroadunionbases (Weffort,1974),had decisiveinfluenceinthepoliticalsystemofvariousLatinAmericancountries,thepresentmodelprojectsa new syndicalismofthemasseswith broad representationbut whose capacityto influencethepoliticalsystem,if notnull,is veryproblematic.That is, if in thepast theunionswere efficientin pressuringfor certaindemandsand forcinganexpansionof the supportbases forthe nationalstate-in-formation,in thepresent,a mass syndicalismsuch as the one developingin Braziltendstoquestiontheveryligitimacyof thepolicyofsocial containmentbythestate.This mass syndicalismis situatedoutsidethestate and is opposed by it.

In otherwords,at a historicalconjunctureinwhichitwas crucialtofinda solutionto thepoliticalcrisisfacedbythe dominantgroupsin orderto en-able these groups to continueto dominate,the state had to allow theextensionof a "regulatedcitizenship"to the workers.This impliedthesubordinationof the workers'politicalconditionto the social conditionimposedbythe state(dos Santos,1979).As a weaponofpoliticalpressure-and nota negligibleweapon-the vote was givento the massesofworkers,LatinAmericanPepctivs: Issue 35, FaIl 1982, Vol. IX,N I. 4


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64 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESbut the dependencyresultingfromthe imposed social conditionwas notbroken.On thecontrary,it was reinforcedin thejuridicial-institutionaldecreegrantedto the unionsas "dependents"of the state (Weffort,1979).Thissituationvariedfromcountrytocountryaccordingto thetraditionofworkingclass strugglewhich had developed,but in essence, it had this genericmeaning.Underthe conditionsdescribedabove,the LatinAmericanunionsplayedtherole ofco-participantsindefiningthepoliticsof nationaldevelopmentinvariouscountries.As is known,nationaldevelopmentwas onlyachievedincertainEuropeancountriesduringthe Second WorldWar afterthedevelop-mentof a long experienceofgainingsocial and politicalrights.In the unionexperienceof suchcountriesas Italyand England,the expandedinfluenceofthe unionsin nationalpoliticswas precededbythewinningoffundamentalrightsofcitizenship,whichservedas supportforthe entranceof the unionsintopolitics.Itis importanttopointouttheweightof thistradeunionroleinthepoliticalsystemof the LatinAmericancountriesalthoughit is frequentlycontrastedwiththefragilityoftherecognizedrightsofthe workers.It wasnotalways easyfortheleadersof the stateto definetheireconomicand so-cial objectiveswithoutat leastcallingattentionto thesymbolicmechanismsof integrationand/orconsultationof theworkingmasses. This was donethroughtheirunions,particularlythroughthe leaders of the largecentralunions and the large verticalorganizationsin which the unions wereorganizedduringthepopulistperiod.The PeronistConfederaci6nGeneraldeTrabajadores(CGT) inArgentinaandthe"reformist"Confederag&oGeral deTrabalhadores(CGT) inBrazilintheearly1960sprovidedimportantevidenceof thisprocess.It mustbe added thatwiththeweightofall itsorganizationalinconsistency,13itsdismantlingwiththe adventof authoritarianregimesis anindicationof how the contradictionsofpoliticalsyndicalismhad penetratedthepopuliststate.This does notnecessarilymeanthatthissyndicalismwas an authorizedspokesmanwithinthe stateof the workers'realaspirationsforparticipationand fortheexpansionofregulatedcitizenship.One ofthe characteristicsofitsorganizationwas thevertical,diffuse,and massivenatureof therelationsbetweentherankandfileand thedirectorateswho didnotalwaysknowhowto adjustto the exigenciesof thedevelopmentof internaldemocracy.The broaderpolitical questions which were definedin termsof theinterestsofa multiplicityof classes-e.g., the characterofnationaldevelop-ment-tendedtopredominateoverthe morespecificissueswhichreferredtotheverylegitimacyofthe workers'citizenship.Withoutquestioninga logicwhichsoughtto definea spacefortheinterventionoftheworkingclass in thequestionofdevelopment,it is stillnecessaryto call attentionto a dynamicwhichactivelyprojectedthepoliticaldemandsof the unionswithrespecttothestate while at the same timerelegatingsocial demandsto a secondaryrole.Thisnotonlydidnothelp to strengthentheunionsbutcreateda vicious"The mostclassic sign of thisorganizationalinconsistencywas, withoutdoubt,thegeneralstrikecalled by the Brazilian CGT on March 31,1964 (on the eve of thecoup d'etat),whichdid not re-ceive any response fromtheworkingclass. At thatmomentthe leaders of thepowerfulCGT re-alized thefragilityof the structurestheydirectedand organizedas well as theperceptionthatthemasses had of theirweak capacity to interveneas a collective subject.


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 65circlewhichundoubtedlyis at the coreof the fragilityand weaknessofthelabormovementwithrespectto authoritarianattacks.Because of itsstrategicfunctionsin the politicalsystem,LatinAmericansyndicalismof the 1950sand early1960swas surelya decisiveelementinthepoliticalcrisiswhichstruckvariousLatinAmericancountries.The interven-tionofthestatein theunions,thesuppressionofpoliticalparties,andtheliq-uidationof thelegislativebodieswere the initialstepstowardtheimplemen-tationofrepressivesocial and economicstandards;thelatterwereextremelyfunctionalfortheexpansionofmultinationalenterprisesand local and statecompanies.In the Braziliancase, as Fuchtner(1980) observed,politicalrepressionand thewage squeeze wereonlytwoof theseconditions.Theseconditionshad to rely upon the "continuity"of the old corporativistmechanismsof unioncontrol,e.g.,the CLT,whichhadbeeninstitutedinthebeginningofthe"modernization"phaseof thecountry-duringthe1930s-aperiodwhichconcludedwiththe establishmentof populismwhichlastedfromthe 1940sto the 1960s.The CLT outlastedpoliticalsyndicalism.Now, after an interregnumof more than fifteenyears, the labormovementbeginsto rearticulateitselfas it has in manycountriesof thecontinent,becomingmorevisiblein Braziland particulariyin theindustrialregionofgreaterSao Paulo.Withoutdoubt,thissyndicalismhas hadpoliticaleffects,butit does not seemtorepeattheexperienceof thepopulistperiod,whenthe statewas a moredirectand accessibleinterlocutor.Now theexactopposite is occurring.What are the main characteristicsof this newsyndicalism?In thefirstplacewe mustnotethattheprotagonistsarenew;theyarenolongerthecontingentsfromcertainenterprisescontrolledbythestate,as wasthecase of therailwayemployeesand thelongshoremenof thepast.14Thebackboneof thenew syndicalismis comprisedof workersfromthemostimportantsectorof Braziliancapitalism(as describedabove).These workersarefullyawarethattheybelongtoa strategicsectorof thenationaleconomy.Secondly,we should look at the evolutionof the demandsof thisnewsyndicalism.Havingemergedin themiddleof a series ofstrugglesforwageincreaseslargerthan the officialindexes,and thus reflectingthe wage-squeeze policy,theunionof the ABC metalworkersintroduceda criterionof''egalitarianism"intotheBrazilianunionstruggle;theydemandedbiggerwageincreasesforthosewho werepaid less and smallerwage increasesforthosewhoearnedmore.Afterwards,theyturnedtowardtheproblemofwages forskilledprofessionalsand theregulationofworkinghours.Morerecently,theyintroduceddemandsclearlyof a social andpoliticalcharacter,suchas job se-curity,therighttostrike,unionautonomyand uniondelegationat thefactorylevel.

As to theformsofstruggle,thenewsyndicalismhas combinedthe use ofavailablelegalchannelsofferedbytheregimeandbytheCLT alongwithoth-ermechanismswhichare notprotectedbyBrazilianlaws,suchas the ad hocCentralUnica dos Trabalhadores(CUT) whichhas workedwith strikesinseveralothersectorsof laborless organizedthanthe metalworkers.Further-140n thestronginfluenceofthecategoriesbelongingto state-controlledcompanies in thepre-1964syndicalism,see Castro Andrade (1974).LatinAmericanPerspectivesssue 35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX, No. 4


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66 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESmore,in differentinstancestheyresortedtoproclaimingstrikesfrom"withinthefactory"as in 1978,and theproclamationofgeneralstrikesby a singlesectoras in 1979and1980attheinitiativeoftheunionand withpreviousrec-ognitionby businessleaders,public authorities,and public opinion.It is evidentthat,intermsoftheorganizationofthe unionsandthe con-duct of the struggles,the so-callednew syndicalismhas distinguisheditselffromthesyndicalismof thepast. Todaywe arefacinga broad movementofthe masses which refersboth to theplebiscitarygatheringsheld at soccerstadiumsandto effortstodemocratizetheveryconductof theunionand thusbroadenthebase ofparticipation.It should be notedthatthese effortshavenotyetyieldedsufficientresultsto enable one to talkaboutan actualprocessofinternaldemocratizationof theunions.Thisuniondemocratizationimpliesan increasein rank-and-filecontrolover unionpolicy.Since theearly1970seffortshave beendevelopedtowardprovidinga newstructureforrepresent-ingthe bases inthefactoryunions.The demandforuniondelegateswas an-ticipatedby the action of numerousrank-and-filemilitantswho in recentyearshaveformedtheactualnucleusoftheleadershipinthemorecombativeABC unions. Union delegatesand some partial experiencesof factorycommissionsinSdoBernardodo Campo (inthecases of Schullerand Scania)arepartofthebroaderwork,the resultsofwhicharethemass strikesofre-centyears.Its success resultsfromtheparticipationofthousandsofworkersandnotonly,as someanalystsdeclared(Federico,1980),fromtheroleplayedbytheunionleadersortheskilledworkers.This becameveryclearduringthestrikebecause even when the union leaders wereimprisonedand a signifi-cantpartofthe strikecommandodismantled,thousandsof workersstillkeptthe movementgoingfor severaldays,while attemptingto guideit in thedirectiontheybelieved best.Perhapsone may pointto a doublepressurefordemocratizationin thecase oftheABC unions:onewhichappearsmoreclearlyintheformofdirectdemocracyexpressedby thelarge gatherings;another,which is still in theprocess of articulation,manifestingitself in the attemptsto create newmechanismsof delegatingpower-as in the case of the union delegateexpressingan aspirationtoward democratizationby the rank and file. Itremainsto be seenbywhichmeansthenewsyndicalismwill articulatetheseformsof directdemocracyand ofbase democracyinto a permanentunionstructurecapable ofreplacingthepresentcorporativiststructure(Fuchtner,1980).One of thesalientcharacteristicsofearlierstudiesof politicalsyndicalismwas to referto theseparationbetweenthesocial andpoliticaldemandsoftheworkers.Precariousorganizationas well as the low level ofrepresentationinthe political syndicalismof the 1950s and 1960s frequentlyimpededtheemergenceof factoryproblemsas themesof workers'struggles(exploitationat theworkplace,level of productivity,discipline)and almostdirectedthefocusof unionmilitancyentirelytowardtheorientationof nationaldevelop-mentpolicy. Manytimesthe issue of nationaldevelopmentdominatedtheunionstruggleto thedetrimentof thesocial issuesand theveryquestionofdemocracy.However,whatismoststrikinginthenewsyndicalismis preciselythein-


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 67tegrationofeconomic,social,and politicaldemands.Since itsemergence,thismovementhas addresseditselfto the new conflictswhicharedevelopingintheheartof thelargeunitsofproduction.The recoveryof theunionin thisframeworkhas resultedinthe generalizationof the newsyndicalistmodelinthe ABC region.Furthermore,the issue of specificsocial rights,(e.g., jobsecurity,limitationof workinghours,criteriafor dismissals)has beenintegratedwiththestruggleforwageincreasesand fortherightofworkerstofightforbetterlivingconditions,i.e.,therightto strikeand unionautonomy.Therefore,socialrightsappear as conditionsforpoliticalrights.Likewise,politicalrightsare perceived as conditionsof the social conquest. Theexperiencesof recentyears have demonstratedto the workersthatif theywantbetterwages it is necessarytoguaranteethisby fightingfortherighttostrike.As thisrightis denied by a despoticregime,the workers,by fightingforbetterlivingconditions,arebeingconvertedintothe newartificersof thestrugglefordemocracyin Brazil.Because ofitspoliticalsignificance,theABC crisisbecamethefocalpointforthecontradictionswithinBraziliansociety.In preparingthemselvesforthestrike,themetalworkersalso preparedthemselvesto winfullcitizenshipand thusguidedtheiractionstowardthisobjective.Ifthereis anymethodtobe recognizedin theABCmovements,it is intheformationofa movementofthemasses fordemocracy,one such as perhapstherehas neverbeen in all ofBrazilianhistory.This does not abolishthespecificproblemsconfrontedbythismovementin thestricttradeunionarea;theseproblemsremainto be re-solved.But theseconsiderationshelpto place theissue of the movement'ssuccessor defeatin properperspective.There are alwaysrelativesuccessesand defeats,but in this case, more than any other,we are facingthevicissitudesin the formationof a significantmovementwhich,in theprocessofitsstruggles,has changedpriorities.It makes thestrugglefordemocracymoreconcreteand,at the same time,guidesthe constitutionof a collectivesubject.This constitutionis not an easyorsimpleprocess;itdependson thedefinitionthattheworkerswantto formulateabouttheirroleinthestateandin thepoliticalsystemas a whole.Perhapsthe clearestsignof thisnew reali-tyis itsaspirationto constituteitselfas a party,as expressedin theproposalof theworkers'Partidodos Trabalhadores(PT).Nevertheless,what is significantat themomentis that thismovementunitesforthe firsttimethestruggleforsocial equalitywiththestruggleforpoliticalliberty.This is an immensenoveltyin thepoliticalhistoryof thecountry.It is the concreteformassumedbythestruggleforthe extensionofcitizenshipto the Brazilianworkingclass.In summary,the significanceof the new syndicalismis not only itscharacteras a broad social movementof the masses whichpressuresforitsowninternaldemocratization(whichis veryimportant),but also theuniquepenetrationof this movementin the processof the strugglefor Braziliandemocracy.By linkingits social demandsto theeconomicstruggle,the newunionmovementcollidedwiththe limitsimposedbyBrazilianauthoritarian-ism on theexerciseofcitizenshipbytheworkers.Becauseofthis,by startingwithverypreciseand concretedemandsdefinedin thespecifictradeunionarea, the new syndicalismhas evolved toward certainpoliticaldemandsLatin American Perspectives Issue 35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX, No. 4


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68 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESwhichare not toleratedbythe state.In definingitselfas a movementfortheconquestof social and politicaldemandsfor theworkers,it qualifiedas anew and decisiveprotagonistin thestrugglefordemocracyin the country.Thus,it wentbeyondthearea ofits unionfunctionsand redefineditselfintermsof those whofightfordemocracyin Brazil.There is open talk todaythatthe workersare the backboneof the Braziliandemocraticmovementandcertainlywithoutthemany"opening"or"liberalization"willonlyreconstructthe viciouscycleof crisesbroughton by the authoritarianregime.

THE NEW SYNDICALISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENTWe maynow turntowarda preliminaryeffortto answerthequestion:whatis thestrategyof the new syndicalism?A firstproblemdeals withthe

verylegitimacyof theinquiry.Perhapsitwould be bestto invertthequestionand ask: does the new syndicalismhave a strategy?The answerto this questionis bothyes and no. On the negativeside, itcan be arguedthat a union movementwhichis unable to guaranteethecontinuityof its own institutionsis a movementwith a self-destructivevocation.Afterall,whatevervirtuesonemayfindin thenewsyndicalism(asa social movement)they cease to exist the momentthe unions sufferinterventionbythestate-becauseoftheundeniablefactthatthe recoveryofthe unionbythemass ofworkersis preciselythestartingpointwhichmakesthe very emergenceof thenew syndicalismpossible.The recoveryof theunionimpliesa broaderutilizationof thepossibilities,howeverslimtheymaybe, of the existingunion apparatus-i.e., of the corporativistunion-tomobilizeand organizethe workersto fightfortheirinterests.Whyrun therisk of loosingthe union? Would not the oversteppingof certainlimitsimposedon unionactionby theauthoritariansituationindicatethe lack ofany strategyon thepartof the new union leaders?Itwouldbe easytosimplyreplyyes. Againthequestionis morecomplex.If the loss of the unions partiallycompromisesthe continuityof themovement,thentheissueof its internalconsistency,i.e.,therelationbetweensubstanceand form,does not depend solely upon the union apparatus.However,if the unionsare lacking-whichis certainlyregrettable-thesamecannotbe said ofthebroadermassmovement,theidentityof whichhas al-ready surpassed the purelyeconomic-corporativistcategory.As a socialmovementthenewsyndicalismhas its owndynamic.It becomesless intensewiththe absence of theunions,butitdoes not havea tendencytodisappearor to loose itsimpetus.The latternotonlyreferstotheunionlogic,but alsoincludessocial andpoliticaldemands.In thisrespectthedifficultylies inthefluidnatureof the terrainthroughwhich the unionappears to pass; thetransformationof its strictlytrade union functionsto sociopoliticalonesappears imperceptibleand sometimestoo rapid and thus tendsto risk astrategydesignedto strengthentheunion.Letus examinehowthisprocessoccurs.The strategyofunionrecovery-anobjectiverepeatedmanytimesbythenew unionleaders-impliesa deliberateefforttowardpermanentmobiliza-tion and organizationof the rankand file.However,as theexperienceofre-centyearshas indicated,each timethishappenstheuniontendstogo beyond


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 69the limits imposed by the corporativistlegislation and by the logic ofauthoritarianinteraction;thus it bringsupon itselfthe oppositionof busines~sleaders and the ire of the state leaders. This is not affectedif, as part of theeffortto recoverits legitimacywith the workers,the union movementleadspart of the process toward direct bargaining with the entrepreneurs.Ifsuccessful, this process could attenuate part of the repressive avalanchewhich mobilizes itselfagainst theunion; however,as the entrepreneursrefuseto bargainseriouslyand the state does everythingto impede the possibilityofan institutionalizationof agreements(oppositionto direct bargaining,mainte-nance of the politicaleconomy),theresulthas exactly the opposite effect.Theunions remain at themercy of the labor court'sdecision and subsequentlyofthe labor laws administered by the Ministryof Labor, which permanentlyrescinds the unions' autonomy.The recent tendencyhas guided the unionleaders to adopt a strategyof the type"he who can do more,cries less," i.e., astrategywhich advises those who want to negotiateto preparethemselvesfora fight;if thereis negotiationthey will be sufficientlystrongto enter into it,but if negotiation is refused, they will at least be prepared to resist theinevitable attacks.At this point it can be asked where is the specificallyunion forecastandrationality?Where is the contractual function,which in the experience ofvarious countries,expresses more and more the substance of union action?Where is the logic which advises the union movement,withits conquests,todelineate the terrain,where and when possible, as long as this delineationdoes not implythe loss of the guaranteesof the union movement'spossibilityof action?

At thispointwe returnto the old debate withrespectto the functionsofthe union within a capitalist society (or within the various experiences ofcapitalist development).Withoutthe necessity of addressingthe dilemma of"revolutionarysyndicalism" versus "reformistsyndicalism,"we can suggestfromthe start a clear distinctionbetween the functionsofthe unions and thefunctionsofpoliticalparties.The formeroperate in the area of economic-cor-porativistinterests,while the lattertranslatethe social and political interestsofa groupof classes intoa politicalproject.The formeract-although notex-clusively-at the level of the state (especially if one takes into account theever increasingrole ofthe state in monopolycapitalism),buttheydo not aimat formulatingan alternative to the state. The political parties, on thecontrary,aspire to the state,because "anticipations" of a new state are (orshould be) in fact an alternative to the state.

This distinctioncould help to establish the boundaries for the unions'definitionof theirstrategy,i.e., theirspecificrationality.However,we shouldrecall that these definitionsare characterizedmore by analytical goals thanconcrete historical substance. In practice, depending upon the concretesituation,the unions expand or reduce the area of their functions.As statedabove, underthe recentexperienceofmilitarydespotism,the LatinAmericanunions are constitutedin a particularinstitutionthat triesto place itselfin the"always existent"intermediaryspace of societyand politics.Squeezed into aterrainin which theirspecificfunctionsare not recognized,while pressuredby the realityof a mass of workersfromwhom therightsofcitizenshipwereLatin Americon Perspectives: Issue 35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX, No. 4


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70 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESliterallytorn,the union is converted into an instrumentof protectionfor theworkingclass and of defense of the condition of citizenship "and only in thelast resort to corporativistdefense" (Delich, 1980: 100). In LatinAmerica, andparticularlyin Brazil, the unions functionwithin a settingwhich denies thefundamentalrightsof citizenship (union freedom,political freedom) to theworkers and, more than that, dilutes the specific functionswhich in othercontextsare attributedto the union (collective bargaining,contracts).For thisvery reason, the unions tend to assume sociopolitical functions,expandingtheirown boundaries as soon as theyenter into the scene. The motivationoftheir action, more than their politics, is the very affirmationof the unionmovement. Thus the situation becomes inevitable in which the strictlycorporativist functions of the union are momentarily hidden. At thesemoments the following type of logic seems to be at work: above all, thenecessityofpreventingthe class frombeing completelyremoved fromhistoryin order to subsequently define the stages of its corporativiststruggles.We need to overcome our surprisewhen such movementsas the ABCmetalworkersgo beyond their limits.The strategy underlyingthese move-ments points toward the formation of a new collective subject. It is thestruggleforfullcitizenshipwhichgivescontentto theunion movementwhichfinds itselfenteringinto politics to affirmitself.By enteringinto politics-forced by circumstances which were reinforcedby despotism-the unionmovement realizes that it cannot make specific demands when certainguarantees, i.e., of social and political rights,are not maintained. Thus thestrategyof the struggleforthe extension of the rightsof citizenshipderivesfrom the specific trade union struggle,but at the same time, it tends tostrengthenthe veryconditions for union struggle.It should be clear by nowthat the strategyof the new syndicalismis a strategyfor the establishmentofa new collectivesubject. However, this is oftenan obscure pointforanalystsas well as for the protagonists.The root of this confusion lies in the fact that this collective subject informationreferssimultaneouslyto social union roles and to political institu-tional roles. It is as if the social movement was given a double challenge: itsformation into unions and its formation into political parties. Both aredecisive, but within the Latin American experience both exist more asprojectsthan as experience.Here again a parallel with theexperienceof someEuropean countries could be helpful.Mass parties,as forces for the politicalrepresentationof the subordinateclasses, fully emergein historyonly whenthe unions are already formed.This is particularlyclear in the English case,but it also applies to the experience of other countries.However, under thecircumstances of various Latin American countries,thoughnot all of them,the problems pose themselves simultaneously and thus require a simulta-neous response.For some timeyet thingswill tend to remainthisway. However, as thissocial movementbecomes capable of attainingmore stable and recognizableunion structures,and concomitantly,as experiences in the formationof newpolitical parties form from "bottom to top," like the PT, consolidate them-selves, the union movementwill tend to distinguishits corporativistexpres-sion from the strictlypolitical dimension. However, it is difficultto predict


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 71exactlywhenthiswill happen.Iftheabove is sufficientlyillustrative,thenperhapsone could answerthequestionraised at the beginningof this sectionin the followingway: thestrategyof the newsyndicalismis thestrategyof "throwingthe blockon thestreet."15Themovingforcewhichpropelsthenew unionleadersis the desiretotransformtheworkingclass intoan actoreffectivelypresentin thesociety.The restshould followfromthis condition.However,as in othercases, theexampleapplies onlypartially;to "throwthe blockon the street"is certainlythestartingpoint,but it does not resolvea series of otherissues resultingfromthis decision.In thecase ofsocietyas a whole,the "carnival"has notyetbegun.For example,it could be suggestedthatthefirstissue refersto thegoals of unionactionwhichlead to decisionswhichtendto give prioritytothe conquestof certainshort-termdemands over medium-and long-termones. Clearly,this decision affectsthe capabilityof the rank and file tomaintainitselfmoreor less mobilized,since it is naturalthatthe workersseekto achievetangibleresults.It is necessary,thereforeto finda criterionformakingthis decisionwhich,in thefinalanalysis,involvesplacingtheproblemof therelationshipbetweenthe representedand the representativesat the heart of the new syndicalism.The big problemof the plebiscitarygatheringsis thatthereis always the possibilitythattheywill concludein amanneropposedto thatwhicha coolevaluationof forceswouldrecommend.The second issue refersto the statutedefiningtheunion'sfunctionsincollectivebargaining.The tacticof he "who can do more,criesless"maybeuseful duringa phase in which bargainingbetween entrepreneursandworkersis notyetallowedbythestate.Businessleaderstendtobenefitfromthissituation.However,if theworkersrealize thatthereis somethingwhichcan andmustbe negotiatedwithemployers,theymustalso realize thatthiswillnot occurspontaneouslysimplybecause someemployersarewillingtonegotiate.Under conditionsin which the state has a preponderantrole in thedevelopmentof monopoly capitalism,and even more,in the historicalconditionsofthe formationof the statein LatinAmerica,it is evidentthatcollectivebargainingdemands a tripartiterelation.This requirescleardefinitionsofthefunctionsofeachparticipantandofthepointtowhichstateinterferencewill be allowed.Inotherwords,theissue ofdirectnegotiationre-fersto an institutionalresponseto the contractualrelationsbetweenemploy-ersand employees.This responserequiresa politico-institutionalprojectonthepartoftheunions;somethingwhich does not exist at themomentandwhichrequiresthe role of politicalparties.Itseemsclearthatthe issueof therelationsbetweenunions,parties,andthestatehas yetto be workedout.Evenacceptingthattherewillalwaysbemomentsin which the social movementwill tend to presentworkers'demandsin a comprehensivemanner,i.e.,includingsocial andpoliticalrights,itmustbe recognizedthat thepossibilityof success of thisstrategyin thelongrundependslargelyon itscapacityto providepermanentchannelsforoperationin their own terrainand thus realize the potentialof mass"sThisrefersto a popular sayingwhich,in termsofBrazilian carnival means that whoeverwantsto have fun(which is the object of carnival)has to "throwtheblockon the street."The rest,i.e.,the fun itself,derives fromthe act of enteringin the carnival.Latin American Perspectives: Issue 35, Fall 1982, Vol. IX, No. 4


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72 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVESmovements.That is, theproblemis notso muchthatofa movement,led andpropelledbyunionswhich are the carrierofpoliticaldemands(the righttostrike,partyfreedom),butthat,facedwiththereal possibilityof havingtore-verseits role,the movementwill refuseto do so.In otherwords,in the currentBraziliansituation,the conditionof apartisanpoliticalproposal,like the PT, dependsfundamentallyupon theimpulseit receivesfromthe social movement.The social movementis itsoriginand providesits greatestadvantagewithrespectto the otherexperi-ences. However,thissymbioticrelationship,whichis properto the originofthe new syndicalism-to-PTrelation,cannotpersistif it compromisesthedevelopmentof theproposalitself.In psychology,symbiosisis a symptomofa certain patternof relationships,and its result is the suffocationorannulmentof the personalitiesinvolvedin the process.In contrastto theclassical cases, the problemhere does not appear to be so much thesubordinationof the unionsto theparty,butthe contrary,thatof thepartytakingtoo longtomatureand thusconstitutingitselfintoan instrumentthattendsto followthe large-scalemovementsratherthanlead them.Here, the youthfulnessof this social movementand, in fact, of thepartisanpoliticalproposalitselfshouldbe noted.In a historicalcontextinwhichpartieshavetraditionallybeenunderstatetutelage,it is not surprisingthattheseinstitutionsare so weak in theexperienceof themasses. Forthisreason,theyhavedifficultiesin assumingtheirspecificrole.However,in thecase ofthe new syndicalism,this issue is centralto theabilityof thesocialmovementto survive.

Luis Inaicioda Silva ("Lula"), presidentof theSao BernardoMetalworkersUnion,who was chargedwith violationof national securityforhis role in the1980 strike and convicted by a military tribunal,won his appeal at theSupremeMilitaryCourtin April 1982. The court decided thathe had not en-dangered national securityand that any charges against him for violatingantistrikelaws in 1980 would have to be handled by civilian courts. Thiscleared theway forhis candidacy forgovernorof Sao Paulo in the 1982elec-tions on the Partido dos Trabalhadores ticket. Economic recession severelyaffectedthe Brazilian automobile industryin 1981-1982,causing layoffs ofworkerswhichweakened the unions' bargainingposition in the 1981and 1982salary negotiations.[The Editors]REFERENCES

Cardoso,FernandoHenrique1980 "Regime e mudaga," Revista de Cultura e Polftica (Rio de Janeiro,CEDEC), 4Castro Andrade,R.1974"Movimentotrabalhistase sindicatossob o nacional-populismono Brasil,"Sao Paulo,mimeographedDIEESE (DepartamentoIntersindicalde Estradfsticae EstudosS6cio-Econ6micos)1980"Balangodos greves,"Sao Paulo: DIESSEDelich, F.1980 "Class obrera:sindicatosy democracia,"Crfticay Utopia,2


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MOISES: NEW SYNDICALISM 73Frederico, C.1980 A vanguarda operaria, Sao Paulo: Ed. SimboloFuchtner,H.1980 Os sindicatos brasileiros-organizapaoe fun ao politica,Rio de Janeiro: GraalGuilherme dos Santos, W.1979 Cidadania e justiga,N.p.: Ed. CampusMoises Jose Alvaro1978 "Problemas atuais do movimentooperario no Brasil," Revista de CulturaContemporanea (Rio de Janeiro),1

1979 "O ciclo de greves do final dos anios 70," Sao Paulo: CEDEC, mimeographed1980 "Crise politicae domocracia: a transigcaodificil,"Revista de Cutura e Politica(Rio de Ja-neiro, CEDEC), 3

Payne, James L.1965 Labor and Politics in Peru,New Haven: Yale University"Por que Sao Bernardo?"1980 Folha de Sao Paulo, November 5Rangel, D.1980 "Relat6riocomentado sobre as negociag6es e a grevedos metahirgicosdo interiore doABC," Actualidades (Sao Paulo, Escrit6rio de Relag6es Trabalhistas), 73, 74, and 76Tavares de Almeida, M.H.1975 "O sindicato no Brasil: novos problemas, velhas estruturas,"Debate e Crftica(SaoPaulo), 6Torre, J.C. and S. Gigal

1979 "Una reflexi6nen torno a los movimientoslaborales en America Latina," in Katzmanand Reyna, Fuerza de trabajo y movimientolaborales en Am6rica Latina, Mexico City: ElColegio de M6xicoVidal, P.n.d. "O Brasil ainda sera um grande Sao Bernardo," FolhetimVianna L. J.1980 "A greve do ABC e a cidadania operaria," Voz de Unidad, July5Weffort,F. C.1974 "Sindicalismo e desarrollo en el Brasil," (Simp6sio sobre Sindicalismo e Desarrollo),Bariloche, Argentina,mimeographed

1979 "A cidadania dos trabalhadores,"Rio de Janeiro:CEDEC, mimeographed

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