modernization and decline: an eco-historical perspective on regulation of the tisza valley, hungary

lable at ScienceDirect

Journal of Historical Geography xxx (2014) 1e14

Contents lists avai

Journal of Historical Geography

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jhg

Modernization and decline: an eco-historical perspective onregulation of the Tisza Valley, Hungary

Zsolt Pinke
University of Pécs, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Institute of History, Department of Modern Age, H-7624 Pécs, Ifjúság útja 6, Hungary
Abstract

This paper surveys the biggest river regulation of nineteenth-century Europe from new perspectives, examines its social and economic justification andtests the validity of the arguments buttressing the heroizing historical picture of the megaproject. By taking economic, enviro-historical and geopoliticalperspectives it broadens the geo-historical picture attached to the symbol of nineteenth-century Hungarian modernization. I argue that the planning anddecision making levels of river regulations were dominated by a narrow stratum of landowners who possessed a decisive proportion of floodplains andwho became interested in extending cropland farming. The paper illuminates certain covert details of the Tisza regulation by presenting unpublisheddocuments on levying floodplain tax. As a result of one-sided plans reflecting only the interests of the privileged stratum the Tisza regulation proved to bea delayed and mistimed venture, since the European markets of reclaimed Tisza Valley wetlands producing grain for export collapsed right in the secondphase of regulation because of the ‘overseas transport-induced price shock’.� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Carpathian Basin; Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; Wetland reclamation; Grain price shock; Criticism of river control

The dubious rationale of the regulation of the Tisza river

Hydrological megaprojects were intrinsic and defining elements ofthe modernization of many states and the establishing of a ratio-nalized socio-economic order founded on scientific principles inthe modern era.1 The subject of the present study, the process ofriver regulation in the Tisza Valley, constitutes an importantelement in the history of eighteenth and nineteenth-centurymodernization. The term ‘regulation’ refers to the elimination ofthe organic unit of the Tisza and its wetlands by cutting the wet-lands off from the riverbed by dikes. This process meant dis-continuing and draining the water supply of aquatic habitats

E-mail address: [email protected]

1 L. Katus, A modern Magyarország születése. Magyarország története 1711e1914 (The birtAge of Revolution, London, 1962; M. Kaika, Dams as symbols of modernization: the urbsociation of American Geographers 96 (2006) 276e301. In the Enlightenment, the reclamathe mission of the creative and scholarly man building a happy and healthy new world, aGoethe’s Philosophy of Nature, Pittsburgh, 2002. Hungarian hydrological literature subordmodernization and social progress. Hungarian economic and social historians have genersimilar initiatives were undertaken in almost every corner of the globe; see W. Lászlóff

2 In NewMexico, the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Anglo elite influencing couthe state in accordance with his own interest; see K.M.D. Lane, Water, technology, andHistorical Geography 37 (2011) 300e311.

0305-7488/$ e see front matter � 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2014.02.001

Please cite this article in press as: Pinke Zs, Modernization and decline: anJournal of Historical Geography (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.201

mainly to convert them to croplands, straightening the river toaccelerate piling up water in the river now bereft of its floodplainsand the transformation of the river into a canal.

Increasing grain production and mitigating socio-economic ten-sions were a common goal of hydrological investments by statesworldwide. The scientific preparation and social acceptance of theselandscape transformations affecting wide social strata varied greatly.The implementation of centralized hydrological systems served theeconomic and political interests of the elite groups controlling theadministration as well as legal and scientific discourse.2 The work ofFrigyes Pesty, István Györffy, Bertalan Andrásfalvy and Ágnes R. Vár-konyi on historical, ethnographic and ecological analyses focused on

h of Modern Hungary: a history of Hungary 1711e1914), Pécs, 2012; E.J. Hobsbawn, Theanization of nature between geographical imagination and materiality, Annals, As-tion of aquatic habitats, seen as embodying the image of the ancient chaos, becames seen in J.W. Goethe’s Faust II (Weimar, 1832) and in A.O. Tantillo, The Will to Create:inated to sectoral interests described river regulation as one of the achievements ofally looked at river regulation as an inevitable concomitant of modernization, sincey, A Tisza (The River Tisza), Budapest, 1982.rts towards local communities through the implementation of irrigation programs ofthe courtroom: negotiating reclamation policy in territorial New Mexico, Journal of

eco-historical perspective on regulation of the Tisza Valley, Hungary,4.02.001

mailto:[email protected]

www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03057488

http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jhg

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2014.02.001



Z. Pinke / Journal of Historical Geography xxx (2014) 1e142

the background and aftermath of local river regulations.3 Theyconcluded that river regulations homogenized not only the mosaicpatterned landscape but also the diverse social structures that hadadapted to these landscape conditions. Andrásfalvy demonstratedthese landscape transformations as a governmentmeans to diminishthe autonomy of local communities. Eric Swyngedouw reached asimilar conclusion when examining the hydrological policy of Fran-co’s fascist state.4

This paper presents arguments regarding the Tisza Valley,where influential aristocratic families implemented and operated adefence system and drainage of wetlands, which led to the exten-sion of state power and declining access to resources by localcommunities.5 This paper also surveys the biggest river regulationof nineteenth-century Europe from new perspectives and tests thevalidity of the arguments buttressing the heroizing historical pic-ture of the megaproject, which changed land-use in most of theGreat Hungarian Plain and much bigger areas protected frominundation and drained in the Tisza Valley than in theNetherlands.6 The questions I will seek to answer are: Can thegenerally held supposition that the almost total elimination ofwetlands once covering one-third of the Great Hungarian Plain(GHP) be justified as reasonable and rational on social and eco-nomic grounds?7 Did the gigantic river regulation help themodernization of Hungary and the GHP or facilitate their conver-gence to the Western European level when it transformed the en-ergy and the material fluxes of the landscape?

The Hungarian Kingdom was a part of the Habsburg Empire,whichmay have had themost colourful pattern of cultural diversityin Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and ruledCentral Europe until its disintegration after the First World War. Itswestern part, Austria, Bohemia and Northern Italy (the latterremaining a part of the Empire until the unification of Italy in1859e1866) were parts of the economically developed zone ofEurope, while the Croatian, Hungarian and Polish Kingdoms thatconstituted the eastern part of the Empire struggled with theeconomic problems of emerging countries. After a succession of

3 F. Pesty, Magyarország vízhálózata a régi korban, (The hydrological network of Hungaof Nagykunság), Budapest, 1955; J.M. Turner, From Woodcraft to ‘Leave No Trace’. Wildronmental History 7 (2002) 462e484; B. Andrásfalvy, Vízhaszonv. tel és árvízvédelem hHungary), Magyar Tudomány 6 (2000) 709e720; Á.R. Várkonyi, A Tisza-völgy rendezésén367e373.

4 The fascist government’s hydrological reforms matched the most important objectformization of Spain. Dams, irrigation systems and river regulations proved to be anTechnonatural revolutions: the scalar politics of Franco’s hydro-social dream for Spain,

5 Samuel J. Imlay and Eric D. Carter extend Karl Wittfogel and Donald Worster’s theoryon marshy East Central Illinois; see Drainage on the Grand Prairie: the birth of a hydrauli

6 L. Koncsos, Árvízvédelem és szabályozás (Flood control and regulation), in: L. SomManagement in Hungary: Situation and Strategical Tasks), Budapest, 2011, 207e232.

7 The GHP encompasses about 110,000 km2, the area of the state of Virginia in the U8 M. Flandreau, The logic of compromise: monetary bargaining in Austria-Hungary, 186

1867,” which established the Dual Monarchy in Austria-Hungary, gave Hungary autonouation of the customs union without internal tariffs established in 1850.’ See M.S. Eddie,Journal of Economic History 1 (2006) 298e315. The integrative ability of the AHM is the suand stagnation in the late nineteenth century Habsburg economy, European Review of E

9 J. Majdán, Modernizáció e vasút e társadalom, (Modernization e Railway e Society),10 Diking and flood prevention were undertaken by individuals and minor associations760.9 km in extent, dikes along the Körösök 447.6 km while their length along the othevízjárásának kialakulása (Hydrology of the Carpathian Basin and its evolution), in: D. IhrigBudapest, 1973, 5e52.11 J. Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in Au12 M. Evenden, Precarious foundations: irrigation, environment, and social change inography 32 (2006) 74e95. On the efficiency of crop production in former floodplains pevaluation of drought and inundation losses of flood protection ecosystem service in theLapok 10 (2012) 271e286.


military fiascos, the Battle of Königgratz and the loss of Veneto (in1866), the Austrian emperor was forced to make an economic andpolitical compromise with the political elite of Hungary, which ledto the establishment of the Dual Monarchy of AustriaeHungary(AHM) and accelerated modernization of the Hungarian Kingdom.8

The most important chapter in the process of modernizationopened with the development of railway networks in Hungary,resulting in enormous investments streaming into heavy industryand offering much promise for the high-technology sectors of thelate nineteenth-century economy.9 Since Hungary had traditionallybeen themost important food supplier in the economic structure ofthe Habsburg Empire and continued to be so in the AHM, it madeconsiderable efforts to develop its agrarian sector during the longnineteenth century. Between 1846 and 1867 most of the availablefunds were ploughed into agriculture, while in the second part ofthe nineteenth century most agro-investments targeted riverregulation and the drainage.10 Among these, the regulation of theTisza stood out as the biggest such experiment of late-nineteenth-century Europe. Grains coming from croplands that had expandedby some 60% after river regulation contributed considerably to thegrowth of the Hungarian economy. The success of these in-vestments seems to be underlined by the fact that between 1870and 1910 the Hungarian economy enjoyed a dynamic growth thatmatched the European average and outperformed that of theAustrian part of the Empire.11 However, this growth was merely animprovement of a quantitative index, for which Hungarian societypaid a high price. But whereas grain production became thedominant form of land-use in former floodplains, the yields of thesecroplands were unable to cover either the costs of production orthose of the regulatory infrastructure.12 On the other hand,Hungary had been self-sufficient in cereals even before the rivercontrols, so grain produced in former floodplains could only be soldabroad. In view of this it may seem contradictory that the regula-tion of the Tisza gathered momentum in the 1870s when the Eu-ropean market had for years been under pressure from the ‘NewWorld grain invasion’. This raises the question of whether the

ry in old times), Századok 1 (1867) 77; I. Györffy, Nagykunsági krónika (The chronicleerness, consumerism, and environmentalism in twentieth-century America, Envi-agyománya Magyarországon (The tradition of water-usufructs and flood control inek történetéhez (On the regulation of the Tisza Valley), Magyar Tudomány 44 (1999)

ive of the dictatorship: the policy of the socio-cultural, political and physical uni-excellent communication opportunity for the fascist regime; see E. Swyngedouw,1939e1975, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 1 (2007) 9e28.on ancient ‘hydraulic civilizations’ to modern drainage programs in their case studyc society on the Midwestern Frontier, Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 1e14.lyódy (Ed), Magyarország vízgazdálkodása: helyzetkép és stratégiai feladatok (Water

SA.7e1913, European Review of Economic History 10 (2006) 3e33. ‘The “Compromise ofmy in its internal affairs but imposed a common external policy, including contin-The terms of trade as a tax on agriculture: Hungary’s trade with Austria, 1883e1913,bject of a wide range of investigations, for example M.S. Schultze, Patterns of growthconomic History 4 (2000) 311e340.Pécs, 2001.in the Tisza Valley between 1846 and 1867, when dikes built along the Tisza reachedr tributaries of the Tisza exceeded 300 km. D. Ihrig, A Kárpát-medence és vízrajza,(Ed), A magyar vízszabályozás története (A History of Hungarian Water Management),

stria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century, Princeton, 1983.the Canadian Pacific Railway’s eastern section, 1900e1930, Journal of Historical Ge-lease see the Hungarian Water Strategy of 2013. See also Zs. Pinke, The role of theconversion of areas exposed to excess surface water into wet habitats, Tájökológiai


Z. Pinke / Journal of Historical Geography xxx (2014) 1e14 3

leaders of the Tisza regulation project had failed to perceive thisserious crisis.13

To answer this we have to go back to the beginning of riverregulation in 1846. Count István Széchenyi, the initiator of theregulation of the Tisza, projected apocalyptic pictures of floodhazard in the extraordinarily wet years between 1838 and 1845preceding the commencement of river regulation.14 His program forthe complex water management of the GHP intended to solvesimultaneously the issue of flood protection and the socio-economic problems of the society of the environs.15 Yet thismegaproject was preceded neither by thorough scientific prepara-tion and economic planning nor by cost-benefit analysis or socialnegotiation, which were indispensable elements of huge contem-porary hydrological investments.16 An international overview onrecentmegaprojects stated: ‘The initiators of projectsworth billionsof dollars deceive their parliaments and the public in order toimplement the projects’.17 This communication process failed, onthe one hand, in its underestimation of the costs and environmentaldamage while, on the other hand, it overestimated the benefits andeconomic yields. The result of this disinformation adversely affectedfinanciers, tax payers and local communities facing the negativeenvironmental impacts concomitant to the Tisza regulation.

The landowners of the Tisza Valley, who played a predominantrole in political life,18 imposed their will through the decision-making structure of the Hungarian Kingdom, converting wetlandsinto croplands and collectivizing the expenses of regulationthrough the Hydrological Acts of 1879 and 1884. It is understand-able that the actors interested in land speculation and those whoinitiated and led themegaproject did not even think of stopping theprogram when its economic justification collapsed after theAmerican grain invasion in the 1870s. Their attempts at adapting tothe price fall of foreign agricultural markets was that as leaders ofthe agrarian lobby they forced the state to take an even larger stake

13 The leaders of the Tisza regulation noticed the danger and were concerned about Amwould soon stop and prices would level off. In 1881 a group of Hungarian aristocrats travelittle data and their conclusions were inadequate to help clarify the situation or shape a ne magyar szemmel (The land of threats: the USA in the second part of the nineteenth14 Lacking broad social support, regulation gathered favor only in wet periods or after membanking and that these were crucial points of the regulation process needs to be higcreated the occasion for Széchenyi for his putsch-like intervention in the Palatine Courtlitigating with each other on the grounds that one of them had built a dike without presides with the embanker county, and he used the lawsuit as an occasion to present to theobtained an appointment as Royal Commissioner for the preparation of a plan for the r15 I. Széchenyi, Eszmetöredékek, különösen a Tisza-völgy rendezését illet}oleg (Fragments,16 Detailed economic analyses had been made to build the Ferenc Canal (1802) and todeterred the Greek Baron Sina, one of the greatest tycoons of the epoch, from financingTisza-szabályozás története (Sweating Conquestion: History of the Tisza Regulation), Budapesee A Duna-Tisza csatorna terveinek elbírálása tárgyában 1906. 06. 21e22-én a KereskedelmConcerning the Decision on the Plans of Duna-Tisza Canal on 21e22 June 1906 in the Mini17 B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius and W. Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy o18 A. Ger}o, Az elsöpr}o kisebbség. Népképviselet a Monarchia Magyarországán (Overwhelmarchy), Budapest, 1988.19 Count Sándor Károlyi, a co-founder and Chairman of the central Regulatory Associatiowas one of the founding fathers and leaders of the so called ‘Agrarian Movement’.20 A. Zussman. The Rise of German Protectionism in the 1870s: A Macroeconomic Perspec21 The GHP lies on the border of hot and warm summer subtypes of the humid continKöppen-Geiger climate classification, Hydrology and Earth System Science 11 (2007) 163322 T. Bellon, A Tisza néprajza. Ártéri gazdálkodás a tiszai Alföldön (Ethnography of the Tis23 T. Bellon, Beklen. A nagykunsági mez}ovárosok állattartó gazdálkodása a XVIII-XIX. százaNineteenth Centuries), Karcag, 1996.24 L. Makkai, A pusztai állattartás történelmi fordulói (Turning points in extensive anBeluszky, A Nagyalföld történeti földrajza (Historical Geography of the GHP), BudapestePé25 Johannes Renes also worded the town forming function of fourteenth and sixteenthIntroduction: water management and cultural landscape in the Netherlands, in: H.S. DInfluence of Dutch Engineers on Water Management in Europe, 1600e2000, Utrecht, 200526 Its livestock reared on the floodplains accounted for the bulk of fifteenth to sevent(Hungarian Market Towns in the Fifteenth Century), Budapest, 1965.27 S. Sz}ucs, A régi Sárrét világa. (The World of Old Sarrét), Budapest, 1942.


in developing the agricultural sector and in river regulation.19

Under their influence the AHM introduced protectionist regula-tions that secured the AHM market of 50 million people for Hun-garian grain.20

Humanenature interactions in the great Hungarian plain

In the GHP, the heartland of the Carpathian Basin, an enormousquantity of water arrived from the Carpathians and was stored inthe plain, covering about one-third of it and counterbalancing itsdry climate.21 Apart from environmental factors, it was the pre-modern proprietary land structure and the farming traditions of thecommunities settled there that had jointly led to the dominance ofanimal husbandry in the plain.22 The structure of production andthe commercial networks established there delivered marketableproducts that created a financial basis for the unique autonomy thatcertain settlements had enjoyed in the GHP throughout the halfmillennium from the Middle Ages until the Modern Age.23 Hun-garian social historians, human geographers and ethnographershave pointed out the significance of animal husbandry in the for-mation of GHP towns.24 As animal husbandry of the GHPwas basedon the ecosystem services of wetlands it seems justified toemphasize the role that wetlands played in the fifteenth- to nine-teenth-century urbanization of the GHP.25 Numerous documentshighlight the fact that it was the outstanding biomass yield of thefloodplains that lay in the background of the success of GHP animalhusbandry, since local communities with legal immunities andtechnical knowledge were able to utilize this natural resourceefficiently.26 Apart from animal husbandry other typical usufructsof aquatic habitats (fishing, hunting, pomiculture, and forestry) alsoprovided income for the communities.27

Extensive livestock husbandry e one of the most profitableeconomic sectors of the Tisza Valley, which made Hungary the

erica’s grain. Both liberals and conservatives thought that American grain dumpinglled to the USA to study the competitiveness of American agriculture. They collectedew strategy. See A. Vári, Fenyegetések földje. Amerika a 19. század második felébencentury, a Hungarian perspective), Korall 26 (2006) 153e184.ajor floods. Record flood peaks occurred in certain river sections as a consequence ofhlighted. It was also a dike built arbitrarily and the litigation connected to it that. In effect, two neighbouring counties on the left and right banks of the Tisza wereliminary negotiations, which caused flood risk in the other county. Széchenyi tookPalantine the regulation plan that he had made Pál Vásárhelyi prepare so hastily. Heegulation of the entire Tisza.Especially on the Planning the Tisza Valley), Pest, 1846.embank the Sárvíz (1824). It was the negative results of cost-benefit analyses thatthe Danube-Tisza canal. See S. Dunka, L. Fejér and I. Vágás, A verítékes honfoglalás. Ast, 1996. Economic reasons had led to the postponement of the construction of this;i Minisztériumban tartott szaktanácskozmány jegyz}okönyve (Report of the Consilium

stry of Commerce), Budapest, 1906.f Ambition, Cambridge, 2003.ing Minority Political Representation in Hungary under the Austro-Hungarian Mon-

n of the Tisza Valley (1846), the organization operating in the whole river basin. He

tive, Stanford, 2008.ental zone. M.C. Peel, B.L. Finlayson and T.A. McMahon, Updated world map of thee1644.za: Floodplain farming in the Great Hungarian Plain of the Tisza), Budapest, 2003.dban (Beklen: Animal Husbandry of the Oppidums in Nagykunság in the Eighteenth and

imal husbandry), Ethnographia 82 (1976) 30e34; Bellon, Beklen (note 23), 387; P.cs, 2001.-century specialization based on the aquatic habitats of the Netherlands. J. Renes,anner, J. Renes, B. Toussaint, G.P. van de Ven, F.D. Zeiler (Eds), Polder Pioneers: The, 13e32.eenth-century Hungarian exports. V. Bácskai, Magyar mez}ovárosok a XV. Században



biggest exporter of livestock in Europe from the Middle Ages to theeighteenth century e relied on the abundance of water in thefloodplains.28 As a result of transforming market demands,consolidating meat prices and the commercial policy of the Impe-rial Court, livestock export declined in the course of the eighteenthcentury. As to the second most profitable source of income in theTisza Valley, sturgeon fishery e especially that of Huso huso, aspecies highly demanded in Europe e it plummeted as the specieswas driven to extinction in Hungarian rivers.29 The temporaryboom of wool provided good possibilities for numerous commu-nities in the GHP during the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-turies, but not in the floodplains, since they were less suitable forsheep husbandry.30

The eighteenth century was an epoch of the dominance ofgrain, due to the emergence of mass armies for whom bread wasthe staple food and as Austria waged wars throughout the cen-tury. Thus Western Hungarian counties that had been sellingtheir grain crops in neighbouring Austria since the Middle Agesnow gained extra income due to wartime demand. Dezs}o Dányihas pointed out that the price of grain rose not only in thewestern counties in the vicinity of the Austrian grain market butalso in the central and eastern regions of the country (see Figs. 4and 5), although the Hungarian Kingdom was still characterizedby a regional market price system during the late eighteenth andthe early nineteenth centuries.31

Persistent rises in grain prices in the late eighteenth century ledlandowners to convert waste lands, pastures, forests and marshesin the Tisza Valley to arable land (see Fig. 4).32 The governmentcarried out the first regulations in the Tisza Valley in the area of theMilitary Frontier. In Nagykunság, a landscape which belonged tothe market zone of Debrecen and had been resettled after thedevastation of the Turkish occupation, the Kakat Stream wasregulated to prevent the flooding of the DebreceneSzolnok salt-route.33 It was also in Nagykunság landscape where the first majorprivate regulation in the Tisza Valley, the embankment of theMirhó-waterway, was undertaken between 1754 and 1786 as theprecursor of the regulation of the whole Tisza catchment.34 Nagy-kun settlements in the Jász-Kun District that had enjoyed auton-omy since the Middle Ages regained their economic sovereigntyafter they payed a redemption sum amounting to the annualbudget of the contemporary Hungarian Kingdom to the TeutonicOrder of Knights. Redemption, however, put an end to the tradi-tional common land use.35 Families participating in the redemption

28 F. Braudel, Les structures du quotidien. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalismeHalászat 80 (1987) 188; A. Vári, Rural societies and environments at risk: river regulatio1914, in: B. van Bavel, E. Thoen (Eds), Ecology, Property Rights and Social Organisation in29 G. Guti and T. Gaebele, Veszélyeztetett tokfélék (Acipenseridae) a Duna magyarországDanube), Természetvédelmi Közlemények 15 (2009) 57e67.30 Gy. Benda, Statisztikai adatok a magyar mez}ogazdaság történetéhez, 1767e1867. (Statisdrained floodplains were first utilized as dry grazing lands or meadows that served partwool boom did not lead to a breakthrough in the use of floodplains covering most of th31 D. Dányi, ‘Az élet ára’. Gabona és élelmiszerárak Magyarországon, 1750e1850 (‘The pri32 Some water regulation programs in Trans-Danubia, for example the Sárvíz project, gcentury. The principle and practice of water regulation association law evolved in these33 Debrecen, the commercial centre of the North-GHP Region, was regarded as the third1937.34 ‘Fok’ refers to an interruption of the high river banks in the GHP where floods inun35 Redemption was made possible by the revenues of stock husbandry that relied on c36 The Acts on enclosure include the Acts of 1767, of 1836, of 1848, of 1853 and their37 Data on the water-level changes of the Tisza have been available since 1832. Earlier38 Augsburg Algemeine Zeitung (1845) 277. Quoted in L. Kossuth, Editorial note, Hitel 139 H.H. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World, New York, 1982; A.S. Fotheringhama greater geographical understanding, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers40 L. Rácz, Climate History of Hungary Since the 16th Century: Past, Present and Future, P


obtained the right to enclose property from the common lands,which led to the common lands being split up. As a result of theeighteenth-century grain price boom, the building of the Mirhóembankment led to sharp conflicts among the strata of societyinterested either in enclosure, community land-uses, croplandfarming or animal husbandry.36

The large extension of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuryfloodplains can be put down to an interplay of anthropogenic andclimatic factors. Runoff changed dramatically in places where for-ests had stood, especially evergreen pinewoods which were cutdown in areas as extensive as counties. As well as melting, thespeed of rainfall running into waterbodies and erosion accelerated.As a result of these processes, the major part of the annual pre-cipitation on the upper catchment (800e1500 mm) reached thefloodplains more rapidly than before, which increased the intensityof inundations, especially in wet periods.37 Winter and summerprecipitation increased notably around 1835. Certain extremelywetyears in the mainly chilly 1840s caused serious failures in supplywhich preceded the upheavals of 1848 all around Europe. Accord-ing to an observer in 1845,

, XVe-XVn, landFragilei szakas

tical Daticularlye Hungce of lifeuaranteprojectbiggest

dated thommonexecutivflood le(1845) c, M.H. K38 (201écs, 199

eco-h14.02.0

The crop was downgraded by wet weather in Poland, Galiciaand Silesia in 1844. 1845 saw some provinces in Germany hitby intense heat, while other areas suffered considerabledamage due to wet weather. .The government has to pro-vide grain from granaries to prevent people from starving todeath in Hungary of very much crop. Prussia was hit byserious floods, Poland needs grain import, Russia can supplyits yield losses without import because of its reserves.Bavaria suffered a lot because of rain damage. infertility isreported from Belgium and the Netherlands.38

Bad meteorological conditions and potato-blight affected thewhole Western European potato crop severely and the ensuing‘potato famine’ led to the most serious European mass disaster andto food rebellion in Ireland between 1846 and 1849.39 The secondhalf of the 1850s also saw precipitation maxima. The predomi-nantly cool and wet character of the nineteenth century wasinterrupted by a period with relatively warm summers in the mid-1860s. Some researchers say that the end of the Little Ice Age camewith the drought years of the early 1860s, while others date the endof the cold period to the mid 1890s.40 1861e1864 period broughtthe most serious drought in Hungarian history. Its climax was in1863, when the whole of Europe, several parts of North-America

IIIe siècle, 1, Paris, 1979; E. Solymos, Paksi vizák (The Huso Huso of Paks),use, property and rural society in Hungary from the eighteenth century toAreas (Middle Ages-Twentieth Century), Turnhout, 2013, 228e262.zán (Endangered Sturgeons (Acipenseridae) in the Hungarian section of the

a to History of Hungarian Agriculture, 1767e1867), Budapest, 1973; Althoughthe purposes of sheep-farming, they were soon converted into tillages. Thearian Plain.’: grain and food Prices in Hungary, 1750e1850), Budapest, 2007.ed a huge profit for landowners in the late eighteenth and early nineteenths. See Lászlóffy, A Tisza (note 1), 211.grain market of Hungary. See M.M. Tatai, A jászok és kúnok története, Szeged,

e deep floodplain behind high banks.land-use.e orders.vels can be reconstructed only indirectly.olumn 919.elly and M. Charlton, The demographic impacts of the Irish famine: towards3) 221e237.9.

istorical perspective on regulation of the Tisza Valley, Hungary,01

Fig. 1. Wetlands in the Hungarian section of the Tisza Valley before nineteenth-century river regulations and recent croplands with excellent agroecological potential. Source: Ihrig1973; Map of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Covered Areas and Wetlands in the Carpathian Basin Before the Commencement of Flood Protection and Draining, (1:500 000),Budapest, 1938. The other source of the figure is Attachment 3/3 on the Zone of croplands with excellent agroecological potential of the National Spatial Plan (1:500 000), Budapest,2003. http://gis.teir.hu/rendezes_otrt_trt_ov/. 02.10.2013. 1: Former floodplains, 2: Areas suitable for cropland farming with excellent agroecological potential, 3: Overlap of cat-egories (Reclaimed good tillages).


Please cite this article in press as: Pinke Zs, Modernization and decline: an eco-historical perspective on regulation of the Tisza Valley, Hungary,Journal of Historical Geography (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2014.02.001

http://gis.teir.hu/rendezes_otrt_trt_ov/


and even parts of Australia were hit by the biggest drought inmemory.41

It is at this point when the significance of the tragic drought of1863e1864, which some experts have defined as a turning point inHungarian agro-history, becomes apparent. This event revealedboth the vulnerability of the GHP to drought and the function of itsfloodplains as a defence against it. In the worst known drought ofthe history of the Carpathian Basin the majority of the livestock inthe GHP, especially in the Trans-Tisza region, perished from thirstand hunger. This drought hit the animal husbandry sector duringthe bullish trend of the grain market that had been going on sincethe 1840s with some major long-lasting peaks. In response to thedevastating effects of the drought, aid associations were organizedand a broad relief program was set up to help the thousands offamilies that had gone bankrupt.42 The general public blamed riverregulations for ‘drying out the plain’, because the embankmentsprevented water from inundating a large proportion of the aridplain. Extensive animal husbandry, which had grown to benefitfrom the huge biomass yield of the wetlands, could not adapt to thechanging conditions.43

The examples of the successful water regulation in Bánát andTrans-Danubia, soaring grain prices in the 1840s, the lack of alter-native land-use strategies, the support of the Royal Court, im-provements of transportation, the opportunity for real estatedevelopment and accumulating venture capital were all used toargue for the embanking of the Tisza Valley floodplains.44 With hisexcellent tactical sense Széchenyi exploited all wet years and pe-riods, all major floods and the exposed condition of the populace topromote the cause of regulation. The first stage of the fifty-yearprocess of the regulation of the Tisza started in the extremely wet1840s, while the second took place in the wet period lasting be-tween themid-1870s and themid-1890s, a period which witnesseda series of severe floods.45 In response to these challenges themajority of floodplains, about 23% of the present territory ofHungary, was eliminated by the end of the century.

Polemics on the Tisza river regulation

István Széchenyi, the leading figure of Hungarian modernization,launched the comprehensive river regulation of the Tisza Valley inthe forest of Urkom in August 1846. The only scientific investigation

41 J.M. Guinn, Exceptional years: a history of Californian floods and drought, Historic41167825; O. Mankell, ‘1863 Drought in Kandiyohi County’, 1988, http://mankell.org/drhttp://ozdocs.climatehistory.com.au/search/text, accessed 22.06.2012.42 ‘The Municipal Council and the Famine Mitigation Committee it founded shall do theNagy-Váradi Értesít}o és Bihar-Szabolcs Megyei Hirdet}o 33 on 2 August 1863).43 Contemporary discussion on the drought of 1863e1864 was summarized in A. Érköv1863.44 Á.R. Várkonyi, A kultúra ‘kett}os spirálja’ (The ‘double helix’ of culture), Liget 3 (199945 This period saw a decline in temperatures and an increase in the amount of precipitaand North America. Floods with record levels were recorded at several points of theEquatorial East Africa during the nineteenth century as inferred from the record of Lake V115; T.P. Burt and B.P. Horton, Inter-Decadal variability in daily rainfall at Durham (UK) sijoc.1443. R.M. Trigo, F. Varino, J. Vaquero and M.A. Valente, Atmospheric circulation leadiGeophysical Research Abstracts, European Geosciences Union General Assembly, 2012.46 Pál Vásárhelyi was commissioned to prepare the plan on 1 June 1845, and using the fi

A.A. Deák, A háromszögelést}ol a Tisza-szabályozásig (From Triangulation to the Regulation47 The Palatine was the second highest political office in contemporary Hungary.48 L. Kossuth, Tiszaszabályozás ügy (The case of the Tisza regulation), Hitel 1 (1847) 9e49 S. Galambos, Hetilap 126 (1847) 342.50 Exchanging water technologies and hiring foreign experts was not unusual in this aexperts appeared as partners integrated into the Dutch commercial network since the latWallon’s water management activity on the Military Frontier in the 1750se1760s, seerecognized the significance of water management in the Hungarian Kingdomwith its abuthe end of the eighteenth century. The Institutum Geometrico Hydrotechnicumwas estabfor civil engineers for the first time in the world. Experts for the nineteenth-century rivsocial and professional disputes that had emerged.


that preceded the project and included some hydrological data wasa geodetic survey of the Tisza Valley between 1833 and 1841. The‘Preliminary Proposal’ which summarised the concept and thetechnical and financial plans for the regulation of the upperapproximately 500 km long section of the Tisza was prepared byVásárhelyi in eight days in June 1845.46 This ‘eight-day proposal’served as a basis for the Palatine’s decree on financing the Tiszaregulation and founding the Tisza Valley Association.47 Followingthe Palatine’s approval a team from the Hydrological and Archi-tectural Directorate prepared the ‘General and Detailed RegulationPlan’ (the Vásárhelyi Plan) for the 1419 km long Tisza in eightmonths under Vásárhelyi’s supervision. The position and size of theTisza dikes and the number and location of the transsections ofriver bends were decided on the basis of Vásárhelyi’s parameters.Because of its lack of detailed elaboration, the Plan came underwidespread criticism from the moment of its publishing. LajosKossuth, a leading Hungarian liberal politician of the age said, ‘TheTisza regulation plan is, so to say, not yet sufficiently cooked.’48

The water engineers Sámuel Galambos and Jakab Lám likewiseexpressed their doubts:

al Societought.h

ir utmos

y, Az 18

).tion in tTisza inictoria, Cnce theng to re

ndingsof the T

12. Col

ge ande MiddlIhrig, Andancelished ier regu

eco-h14.02.0

I am of the opinion that if owners of the Tisza Valley havebeen bearing through so many centuries of damage from theTisza until now, they should not despair to carry on to avoidthe bigger danger for some more years of the regulation andto endeavour to build the dikes in such a way that makessafety available.49

According to Galambos’s criticism of the Vásárhelyi Plan, thedesignated position of dikes would not curtail flood risk in the TiszaValley but rather raise the level of floods and significantly increasethe extent of potential damage. The Plan, he said, would makewater-level fluctuation more extreme than planned and would notserve the interest of shipping.

After Vásárhelyi’s sudden heart attack during the meeting of theCentral Committee of the Tisza Valley Association, and in conse-quence of the heated criticisms concerning the Plan, the Palatineinvited Pietro Paleocapa, senior engineer of Venice and the regu-lator of the River Po, to provide an opinion on Vásárhelyi’s Plan.Paleocapa’s proposal, like that of all the other contemporary Eu-ropean engineers, was based on diking and river straightening.50

Recognizing that embanking the Sárrét Basin was economically

y of Southern California Annual Publication 1 (1890) 33e39. DOI: 10.2307/tml 10.07.2012; The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 21 January 1863,

t to create jobs as an income source for those capable of working.’ (Debrecen

63. évi aszályosság a magyar alföldön (The Drought of 1863 in the GHP), Pest,

he Carpathian Basin, the Iberian Peninsula, East-Africa and parts of England1876, 1879, 1881 and 1888. E.N. Sharon and X. Yin, Rainfall conditions inlimatic Change 48 (2001) 387e398; Rácz, Climate History (note 40), 106, 109,

1850s, International Journal of Climatology 27 (2007) 945e956. DOI: 10.1002/cord breaking precipitation and floods in Southern Iberia in December 1876,

of mapping he submitted it as his ‘Preliminary Proposal’ on 8 June 1845. Seeisza), Budapest, 1996.

umns.

shows an interesting spatial pattern. Johannes Renes describes how Dutche Ages. Renes, Polder Pioneers (note 25), 16. On military engineer M. Fremautmagyar vízszabályozás története (note 10), 69. The Habsburg government

of wetlands and launched university training for civil engineers as early as atn the Faculty of Arts of the Buda University. It conferred university diplomaslations were locally trained. Paleocapa was only invited owing to the sharp


http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41167825

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41167825

http://mankell.org/drought.html

http://ozdocs.climatehistory.com.au/search/text

http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/joc.1443

http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/joc.1443


unreasonable, Paleocapa sharply criticised the idea. He rejected theplan to build a canal across the Sárrét region and to drain the hugemarshland as futile:

51 Lám52 MaA magyregulatiprime m53 S. D54 A. Gbecame55 Num56 ThiRenes aagricult

PleasJourn

.it is a plan based on day-dreaming and groundless ru-mours, which regards neither shipping, nor the condition ofthe spongy, sandy and swampy area and whose expenseswould run so high that if the nation launched this project itwould soon be balked and pushed far back from the prom-ised opportunity of improvement.51

After returning home, Paleocapa elaborated his argument in anessay titled Opinion on the Management of the Tisza Valley. His workpaid less attention to the owners’ interests in land speculation andriver regulation than did Vásárhelyi, whose career depended onSzéchenyi, the lobbyist for a circle of landlords. Paleocapa proposed asignificantly wider floodplain, bigger dikes and approximately tentimes fewer transsections than Vásárhelyi. This, of course, did notserve the short-terminterests of theownersof theareaalong the riverbank,whohadenormous stakes in theproject. Tisza regulationwouldhavemeant the conversion of tens of thousands of square kilometresof aquatic habitat into unflooded pastures and arable land. Translatedinto current terms, it represented a real estate development prom-isingbillions ofdollars of profits.Mostproperties fell into the categoryof medium estates of 100e1000 acres and latifundia of more than10,000 acres. This meant that the actors were some of the mostinfluential families of theHungarianKingdom: countsandbarons, theAlmásy, Andrássy, Dessewffy, Károlyi, Lónyay, and Szapáry familieswho dominated the board of the Tisza Valley Association.52

Paleocapa’s criticism of Lám’s proposal targeted the economicbasis of the venture, since according to the plans the regulationwasto be financed from the yields of the lands replacing the drainedfloodplains and the rise in land prices. This was certainly to thegreatest annoyance of Count György Károlyi, the president of theKörös Regulation Association. Thus, on the pretext that ‘he spentonly a week on the Tisza’, Paleocapa’s opinion was disregarded andno changes were implemented. Nobody was in a position to defySzéchenyi and the board of the Tisza Valley Association, least of allthe communities who opposed the regulation on the grounds thattheir extensive animal husbandry depended onwater as a resourceand this was endangered by the consequences of excessive regu-lation. In the town of Debrecen the opponents of Vásárhelyi’s planfeared that the regulation might dry up the watercourses andcurtail grazing large herds of livestock in the Hortobágy plain.53

Their fears turned out to be completely justified, as the biomassyield of the pastures declined dramatically and their ecologicalcarrying capacity declined to nothing during droughts.

The imperial decree of 1850: the military aspect of the Tiszaregulation

The expressly anti-Hungarian interim military government thathad neglected the economic development of the country now took

worked out his own alternative Tisza regulation plan.riann Nagy’s regional analysis suggests that the extent of latifundia in the countiesar mez}ogazdaság regionális szerkezete a 20. század elején (The regional structureon was initiated in the Andrássys’ Tiszadob latifundium in 1846. The Andrássys (finisters or ministers in several Hungarian governments from the formation ofunka, A Hortobágy-medence régi vizei és tógazdálkodása (The Old-time Water andörgey, Életem és m}oködésem Magyarországon 1848-ban és 1849-ben (My Life and Athe Chief of the Hungarian Army Staff. Several Polish officers, such as Bem anderous Polish military officer fought in the Hungarian army in 1848e1849.

s aspect has so far been overlooked in Hungarian historiography, even though milind Piasta reveal the geopolitical policy of the Italian fascist regime in connectionural landscapes in Italian and Dutch wetlands, 1920s to 1950s, Landscapes 1 (20

e cite this article in press as: Pinke Zs, Modernization and decline: anal of Historical Geography (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.201

a step that is surprising in hindsight. On 16 June 1850 an imperialdecree ordered the Tisza regulation to proceed, defined the re-sponsibilities of both the state and the private sector and providedstate support to restart construction. The decree and the measuresit envisaged incorporated the principle that waterway develop-ment, in other words river straightening, was to be financed by thecentral budget, while flood-prevention, that is diking, was to befinanced by floodplain landowners interested in flood protection. Itis a commonly held view in hydrological literature that theChamber played a major role in the development of the Tiszawaterway in order to safeguard salt transportation because thisoffered a secure income for the state. But this is hard to accept,because its costs were orders of magnitude higher than revenuesfrom salt. The Hungarian Kingdomwas governed by soldiers at thetime and they looked at everything, including river regulation, froma political-military angle. It was only one and a half years before theannouncement of the decree that the events of 1848 and 1849called the attention of the Austrian High Command to the strategicsignificance of the floodplains.

In October 1848, subsequent to initial military defeats from theAustrian army, General Görgey proposed the government to movefrom Buda to Debrecen, a town defended by floodplains and situ-ated 50 km east of the Tisza.54 As a result of further fiascos Presi-dent Kossuth convened the two houses of the parliament and theNational Defence Committee which held executive power at thetime and proposed to move the seat of public administration fromPest-Buda to Debrecen on 31 December 1848. After taking Pest-Buda the main body of the imperial army advanced to the MiddleTisza as early as in the first half of January. Yet they were unable tobreak through the Tisza line either in the area of Szolnok or at thebridge of Tokaj, however hard Lieutenant General Schlick’s troopstried. The icebound river could only be crossed by lightly armedinfantry familiar with the place, as the Polish General Dembi�nski’sHungarian soldiers did at theMiddle Tisza in February.55 The vernalflood narrowed the foreground of the bridges from early in Marchfor some months, so an army on the offensive had to face not onlycrossing the flooding Tisza but also kilometres of spreading flood-plains. The floodplains of the Tisza inhibited the occupation of theTrans-Tisza region by the imperial troops in January and Februaryof 1849 when their military superiority would have made a swiftcrushing of the Hungarian rebellion possible. The aquatic terrain ofthe GHP frustrated the plans of the Austrian strategists once again,as had happened many times since the Habsburgs assumed theHungarian crown.

Considering the events of the 1848e1849 rebellion, I proposethe hypothesis that the elimination of floodplains with the poten-tial to paralyse the manoeuvers of armies served the eminentmilitary interest of the empire. So, in terms of river regulation theHabsburg raison d’État coincidedwith the economic interests of thelandowners.56 The assumption, however, that the endeavors ofCount Széchenyi e leader and royal commissioner of the Tiszaregulation, and one of the symbolic figures of Hungarian

along the Tisza was at its greatest in late nineteenth century Hungary. See M. Nagy,of Hungarian agriculture in the early twentieth century), Budapest, 2003. The Tiszaather and son) from Upper Hungary were foreign ministers of the AHM and acted asthe AHM in 1867 until its collapse in 1918.Aquatic Management of the Hortobágy Basin), Budapest, 1996.ctivity in Hungary in 1848 and 1849), Budapest, 2004. On 1 November 1848 GörgeyDembi�nski, fought in the Hungarian war of independence (1848e1849).

tary objectives often played a role in river regulations and floodplain embankments.with the regulation of the Po; see J. Renes and S. Piasta, Polders and politics: new

11) 24e41.


Fig. 2. The area of the Lower-Szabolcs Tisza Association according to the map of Károly Posner, at a scale of 1:800 Viennese fathoms in Cassini-Soldner projection, 1892, KVL. Theaccuracy of the georeferred map is ca. 150 m.

modernization e ultimately served the interests of the Habsburgmilitary organization oppressing Hungarian independence doesnot match the views of mainstream Hungarian historiography.Refutation or justification of this geopolitical hypothesis thus re-quires further investigation.


The scope of operation of the Lower-Szabolcs Tisza floodprotection association

Since the formation of the Lower-Szabolcs Association in 1846 theareas inundated by the great flood of 1830 had been considered as



floodplains, then in the 1880s as ‘old floodplains’ or ‘deep floodzones’ (see Fig. 2).57 Until 1884 the membership of the Associationwas organized on a voluntary basis from among the owners of thelands flooded in 1830. The Association’s scope of operation becamean area for military manoeuvres during the 1848e1849 war of in-dependence so regulation works were suspended. Later, as regu-lation progressed, it became clear that the expenses greatlyexceeded the potential profits achievable via flood protection oflands, so continued construction made additional resourcesnecessary.58 Poor technical and financial planning meant thatlandowners initiating the constructions calculated significantlylower costs thanwhat they actually faced. Thus, they were forced tospend higher amounts on financing the flood prevention of theirestates than the total value of their embanked lands. On the otherhand, deeply indebted associations were forced to patch up andheighten dikes to keep pace with continuously rising flood levels.By the turn of the century dikes had grown two and a half timeslarger than those proposed in Vásárhelyi’s plan fifty years before.

Certain years in the wet periods e for example 1855, 1876, 1879,1881 and 1888 e saw even formerly floodless areas of the plaininundated by unprecedented floods.

The flood that destroyed Szeged in 1879 was not only provokedby a series of erroneous human decisions, but also a psychologicalturning point that forced politicians and engineers responsible forthe Tisza regulation to demonstrate standards and professionalism.In the winter of 1879 an icy flood destroyed Szeged, the centre ofthe Southern GHP Region. About 150 people died and 60,000people lost their homes. In 1879 a committee of international ex-perts identified the reasons for the tragedy in conceptual mistakesin the Vásárhelyi Plan, a series of errors in construction, and in-adequacies of scheduling diking and straightening meanders.Owing to the fact that planning and constructionwas subordinatedto the interests of local landowners and financers, the distancebetween dikes fluctuated between 200 and 4000m, thus the flux ofthe river was piled up at strictures; moreover, the startling differ-ences in the cross sections of dikes increased flood risk evenfurther.59 The town of Szeged made a contract with the Pallavicinilatifundium on shared financing of their common flood protectionobligations. Then in the neoabsolutist era of the 1850s the Marquis,with excellent connections to the court and government, refused tofinance the construction of the common flood defence section, andin 1859 a home affairs ministerial decree ordered that Szegedfinance the Pecsora-Szeged Flood Protection Association. Thismeant that the majority of the flood protection costs of the marshyPallavicini latifundium was de facto financed by Szeged. Moreover,an expert report revealed that diking on the swampy soil at thesection of river above the townwas a very dangerous and pointlessmove, since the dikes were designed to resist the pressure of aminimum 6e7 m high floodwaves. In 1875, as a result of Szeged’sresistance to unfair practices the government suspended the au-tonomy of the Pecsora-Szeged Association and appointed acommissioner to oversee the embankment of the Pallavicini lati-fundium. It was the bursting of this very dike that led to inundationof Szeged.60

As a result of public indignation following the Szeged tragedythe Parliament finally set to addressing the matter. However,

57 Before 1893 46 associations were set up and 14 stopped. L. Ger}o (Ed), Pallas Nagyle58 Tiszavölgyi Társulat Központi Bizottságának Jegyz}okönyvei (Protocols of the CentralVízügyi Levéltár (Environmental Protection and Hydrological Archive), Budapest [hereaf59 G. Nendtvich (Trans), A hazai folyókon végrahajtott szabályozási munkálatok megbírálásof Foreign Experts Invited to Review Regulations Implemented on Domestic Rivers), Budape60 I. Dégen and Zs. Károlyi, A szegedi árvíz 1879 (The Flood of Szeged 1879), Budapest, 19691879.61 Articles in the Codex of Hungarian Laws. http://www.1000ev.hu/index. 01.02.2010.


unexpectedly high flood levels and public sentiment that deman-ded efficient flood protection and order in river regulation providedan excellent opportunity for landowners to codify their interests.Five years later, the Parliament passed the ‘Tisza Law’ (Act XIV of1884); then the ‘Water Law’ (Act XXIII of 1885) was enacted tosummarize the accumulation of water legislation since the 1820s.Article 12, Act XIV of 1884 extended the scope of the flood pro-tection associations to estates endangered by continuously risinglevels of floods.61

xikon IICommiter KVLára megst, 1879; K. Mik

eco-h4.02.0

For associations that are either in existence or will beformed and whose flood area has not yet been establishedor whose flood area is to be established again, it is thehighest flood level experienced until the development offlood zones that is to be considered as a basis of flood zonedevelopment.

Article 21 ordered that every owner of lands lying in the floodzones should bear the costs:

The members of boards of the associations shall e ac-cording to Article 6 of Act XXXIV of 1879 and Act XL of1883 e be made responsible for levying on the members ofthe associations a sum in proportion of the imposed rateand make sure to enforce this in compliance with thebudget approved by the Minister of Communal Labour andTransport.

As a result of new legislation the borders of about10,000 square kilometres of ‘old floodplains’ registered in theTisza Valley before 1879 were redefined. This step increased theextension of floodplains by some 10% in accordance with theinterests of flood prevention associations. Approximately3,000 square kilometres of formerly floodless areas that becameinundated because of rising flood levels due to diking wereregistered as new floodplains in the Tisza Valley. After the Acts of1884 and 1885 the associations seized the opportunity to developfloodplains even further and raised the circle of tax payers alongthe tributaries of the Tisza by about 40%. Landowners in the ‘newfloodplains’ were affected by river regulation from two aspects.As their lands had never seen any floods before the regulation,they were mostly engaged in arable farming. Newly increasedflood levels however changed their lives significantly. Not onlywere their crop yields and buildings severely damaged byincreased flood levels as negative externalities of the Tiszaregulation, but they were also forced to pay floodplain devel-opment tax.

The floodplain development tax

According to Articles 12 and 21 of Act XIV of 1884, those with landsin floodplains were obliged to pay a tax. Defining floodplainsbecame a priority for the purpose of establishing the circle offloodplain development tax payers. An accurate definition offloodplain borders could not be carried out by way of landsurveying techniques, because this would have involved knockingdown the pickets on the edge of thousands of square kilometres ofwater-covered areas simultaneously and making the necessary

(Pallas Encyclopedia II), Budapest, 1893.ttee of the Tisza Association), 04 Febr. e 02 Dec. 1902. Környzetvédelmi és].hívott külföldi szakért}okb}ol alakult bizottság jelentése (Report of the Committee.száth (Kákay Aranyos), Szeged pusztulása (The Destruction of Szeged), Szeged,


http://www.1000ev.hu/index

Fig. 3. Certification of the Head Engineering of Gyula shows the factual and measured data of culmination levels in the River Körös that were disregarded by the Lower-SzabolcsAssociation, 1889, KVL.


measurements. So the levels of highest floods locked between dikeswere projected onto floodplains lying as much as tens of kilometresaway by the associations with the approval of the supervisingministry. As the averagewater coverage of the former floodplains inthe Trans-Tisza was very low and the differences in the height oftopographic elements were less than a few metres, a few


decimetres differences in inundation levels had the potential toaffect huge areas. According to the historical geographer GyörgyGyörffy,

eco-h14.02.0

.on the maps of the flood protection associations the actualconditions of the past were not always indicated, but rather


62 Gy.63 IsmDevelop64 188to the H65 Tisz66 Ism67 The57), s.v.68 Hirdthe prot69 TiszKözép-Ttions), 170 M.1879. C71 Pall72 B. T1892e1


PleasJourn

areas were taxed on the basis of projection levels accordingto maximum water-levels. Hence the dry ridge of Nagy-kunság was indicated as wetland.62

A number of archival documents show that members forced tojoin an association were confronted with the fact that their estateslying in floodless areas were now classified as floodplain estatesafter new projection levels had been defined.63 Defining theinundation level and the extension of floodplain in the area of theLower-Szabolcs Tisza Association was implemented by projectingfrom the surveyed highest flood level of the Tisza and the RiverKörös. One of themost important surveying points of the projectionsystem of this Associationwas at the mouth of the rivers Hortobágyand Körös. The certificate of the Head Engineer’s Office of Gyulashows that the highest actual flood level surveyed at the mouth ofthe Hortobágy-Körös was 84.93 m metres above the Adriatic Sea(MaA) (see point B of Fig. 3).

In a petition dated 1889 and addressed to the Minister ofCommunal Labour and Transport supervising the associations, PálBenedek, head engineer of the Association, clearly implies that theLower-Szabolcs Tisza Association had applied a level 137 cm higher(MaA 86.30) than the actual flood level (MaA 84.93 m) at point B atthe mouth of the Hortobágy-Körös when calculating the projectionlevel.64

The Honourable Ministry orders us with its eminent decreeNo. 57275/88 wisely. that ‘the correctness of the observedflood level where the Hortobágy flows into the Körös will becertified by the Royal Head Engineering Office of Gyula’. If,on the basis of this certification, the 84.93 [MaA] water levelwere considered at point B, the present projection could notbe matched with that of the Middle-Tisza. At this point 86.30[MaA] high Tisza flood level has been defined. for the samereason when the inundation was considered by the Associ-ation, the 84.93 [MaA] high water level of the Körös had to,with due respect, be disregarded. (see Fig. 3)

By applying a projection level 137 cm higher than the actual onehuge areas that had never seen floods were arbitrarily included fortaxation within the scope of the Lower-Szabolcs Association.Although affected landowners put their cases to the highest forum,the Parliament, in similar cases, neither was any correction of thefabricated projection level made nor was the unfair way of calcu-lating floodplain taxation stopped.65 Moreover, the Association’sminutes (1892) reveal that the ministry supervising the associa-tions defended the Association’s practice against complainants.

On the basis of either accurate or inaccurate surveying andcalculation, people living in the Tiszadob-Tiszafüred area became

Györffy, Történeti atlasz készítésének kérdéséhez (On the Issue of Making a Historicertetés! Az ezen ‘Értesítéssel közszemlére kitett ártérfejlesztési munkáról’ Alsó-Szabment Activities on Display’ From the Directorate of the Lower Szabolcs Flood Defen9. 59. sz. II. Felterjesztés a Királyi Közmunka és Közlekedési Minisztériumnak; 57275/ungarian Royal Transportation Ministry, map and workpaper), KVL.avölgyi Társulat (Tisza Association), 1902 KVL (note 58); Képvisel}oházi Napló (Jouertetés! 1893 KVL (note 63).debt of the associations in the Tisza Valley was 72.381 million florins in 1893 accof ‘Ármentesít}o társulatok’ (Flood defence association).etmény, kivonat az Alsó-szabolcsi Tiszai Ármenetesít}o Társulat 1893. évi május hó 2-ocol of the general meeting of the Lower-Szabolcs Association Flood Defence Associavölgyi Társulat (Tisza Association), 1902 KVL (note 58); 1890. évi felterjesztéiszai Társulat közös területei tárgyában (Attachment of the petition concerning com890, KVL.Dékány, Vízügyeink, különösen a Tiszaszabályozás és ármentesítés fejl}odésér}ol (On tited in Vári, River regulation (note 28), 21.as Nagylexikon II, s.v. (note 57), s.v. of ‘Ármentesít}o társulatok’ (Flood defence asomka: Érdek és érdektelenség. A bank-ipar viszony a századforduló Magyarország913), Debrecen, 1999.

e cite this article in press as: Pinke Zs, Modernization and decline: anal of Historical Geography (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.201

tax payers after the flood of 1876, and those inhabiting in the areaof Tiszadob-Rakamaz after the flood of 1888. In the Tiszadob-Tis-zafüred area of the Lower-Szabolcs Tisza Association the inunda-tion level of 1830 was 80 cm lower than ‘the actually observed andverified’ inundation level of 1876, which redefined the extent of theold floodplains.66

The Laws of 1884 and 1885 forced the associations to cover theirconstantly rising expenses by levying taxes and increasing thenumber of tax payers. It is also known that the associations’ debtswere growing dramatically, while the government payed refunds tothem from land tax paid by individuals introduced after thecadastre survey.67 So it was a considerably complex financialbackground that provided for their operation. It seems that thelevel of tax rates imposed on old and new flood zones depended onthe power relations of association members.68 A protocol (1902)refers to the fact that floodplain tax could reach up to 88% of thecalculated yield of estates, and the statement of the Lower-SzabolcsTisza Association (1890) reveals that as much as 50e70% of theyields of floodplain properties was to be paid as floodplain devel-opment tax over 10 years for the development of the dike systemconstructed after 1879.69 According to András Vári the cost ofdiking may have been around 90 florins per hectare in the TiszaValley at the end of the 1890s.70 On the other hand the estimatednational average value of drained floodplains was 191 florins perhectare according to the Agricultural Ministry, or 382 florins perhectares as per the editor of Pallas Encyclopedia in 1893. Landvalues in the Tisza Valley were under the national average.71 Thetotal costs of diking, draining, straightening, damage and man-agement e that is, the regulation e in the Tisza Valley may havebeen many times more than the costs of the diking which wasdispersed among the state, local communities and individuals whopaid floodplain development tax.72 Themagnitude of the estimatedcosts of conversion of the 2,000,000 hectares of drained wetlandsprobably exceeded the value of investments in Hungarian indus-trial stocks between 1867 and 1895.

The catch

Grain prices grew steadily between the late eighteenth century andthe 1870s, though military conflicts, political insecurity, unfav-ourable weather conditions and good yields led to major fluctua-tions within the increasing trend. The Tisza regulation launched in1846 was preceded by an inflationary period due to poor crops allaround Europe. As an example, theWestern European potato-blightof 1845 resulting from bad weather conditions increased prices andfurther aggravated the nutritional crisis, leading tomass death from

al Map), Budapest, 1982.olcsi Tiszai Ármentesít}o Társulat igazgatóságától, Debrecen (Notification! ‘Floodplaince Association, Debrecen), 1893, KVL.888 sz. rendelet nyomán készült vízelosztási térképbeterjesztés és háttéranyag, (Petition

rnal of the Chamber of Deputies), 598 10 April 1896. www.arcanum.hu. 2010.03.10.

ording to the Pallas Lexicon. Ger}o, Pallas Nagylexikon II (Pallas Encyclopedia II) (note

án Debrecenben tartott rendes közgy}ulésének jegyz}okönyvéb}ol. (Notice and extract fromation held in Debrecen on 2 May 1893), KVL.s melléklete az Alsó-Szabolcsi Tiszai Társulat, a Berettyó-Körösvidéki Társulat és amon areas of Lower-Szabolcs Tisza, Berettyó-Körös Region and Central-Tisza Associa-

he Development of Our Water Management Especially the Tisza Regulation), Budapest,

sociation).án, 1892-1913 (Interest and Unconcern: the Bank-Industry Relationship in Hungary,


http://www.arcanum.hu/

Fig. 6. Grain price indices in Hungary, 1830 ¼ 100,0 (1830e1858). Source: Dányi, 2007.Fig. 4. Indices of the average prices of wheat in certain provinces of the HabsburgEmpire, 1795 ¼ 100, (1775e1827). Source: Tafeln zur Statistik der ÖsterreichischenMonarchie für die 1828.

Fig. 5. Indices of the average prices of wheat in two major urban markets of theHungarian Kingdom and Dalmatia, 1795 ¼ 100, (1775e1847). Source: Dányi, 2007;Tafeln 1828, 1827e1851.


starvation. The English Corn Law of 1846 intensified the demand forgrain even further and boosted prices on the Continent in the shortrun, but in the long run contributed to the liberalization of marketson a continental scale and the development of a single worldmarket (see Fig. 5).

The boom associated with the Crimean War and the fact thatSouthern Russia dropped out of the Mediterranean export marketfor some years pushed up grain prices in the mid nineteenth cen-tury. Then, in the first year of good harvests (1858) subsequent tothe Treaty of Paris (1856) when Russian grain exporters returned tothe market they plummeted again (see Fig. 6). As a result of theAustro-Sardinian War (1859) grain prices recovered and theextraordinary weather conditions of 1861e1863 (see above) keptthem relatively high until the first good harvest (1864e1865) whichmade them drop again. The AustrianePrussian War (1866) and theFrenchePrussian War (1870) was a blessing for landowners. Theyear of the Battle of Königgrätz (1866) and the Great Panic of 1873saw prices reach extreme highs. To sum up, the price index ofvegetal raw materials rose by 260%, while those of animal productsgrew by 200% in the Hungarian Kingdom between 1823 and 1876(see Figs. 4e6).73

Although the cool andwet period in the second part of the 1870sresulted in poor yields, the influx of American and Russian grain

73 L. Katus, A Monarchia közös piaca, in: M. Nagy, L. Vértesi (Eds), Sokszólamú történelemPécs, 2008, 119e133.74 Fiume in Croatia was the most important seaport in this period for Hungary, as Odeseaports was a significant factor of the marketability of grains. L. Katus, Szállítási forradaHungary), in: Nagy, Vértesi (Eds), Sokszólamú történelem (note 73), 134e154.


into the European markets led to a downward trend in grain pricesuntil 1895, when it was curbed only by the protectionist policies ofthe European states. The fate of the Hungarian grain sector, how-ever, had already been sealed by that time.

. Válog

ssa waslom Mag

eco-h14.02.0

One mér}o (some 61.5 litres) of wheat was half a Hungarianforint cheaper in Southern Hungary than Russian wheat inOdessa. But while sea transport of Russian wheat fromOdessa to Trieste or to Fiume (Rijeka) cost one forint permér}o, Hungarian wheat was forwarded from Szeged(Southern Hungary) to Fiume at the cost of 2.7 forints andthis grew by 0.9 forints when it reached London. So it is clearthat Hungarian grain could not compete with Russian grainin the Adriatic ports either.74

The insurmountable handicap which Hungarian grain facedstemmed from the fact that, unlike its competitors, Hungarian arablelands were landlocked. It is this relative isolation from the marketsthat lies behind the fact that Hungarian wheat was significantlycheaper in the southernGHP thanRussianwheat inOdessa. SouthernRussian and North American grain producing areas are connected torivers navigable by seagoing vessels all through the year. In addition,the Russian, Ukrainian and American steppes were virgin lands withexcellent agroecological potential for cropland farming that did notrequire water regulations similar to those of the GHP. Hungarianrailroaddevelopment started inparallelwith the Tisza regulation andspeeded up subsequent to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of1867. One may think that by developing its transport infrastructureHungarymight haveworked out a solution to themajor disadvantageof its rawmaterial exports. Yet, the positive effects were confined to arelatively narrow geographical framework, since rail transport isfundamentally more expensive than sea transport. Thus the con-struction of the railway network simply preserved the structuraldisadvantages that had already existed compared to overseas ex-porters. Railways were able to transport Hungarian agricultural rawmaterials at a competitive price only to landlocked Central Europeanmarkets within a maximum 500 km radius, although they didimprove the export opportunities of food industry products.

Developments in sea transport reduced transport costs by 45% onaverage between 1870 and 1909, so the costs in comparison to theprice of American wheat sold in England or the Mediterraneum

atott tanulmányok és cikkek (Polyphonic History: Selected Articles and Papers),

for Southern Russia. The length of the land routes between croplands andyarországon a 19. században (Transportation revolution in the 19th century


Table 1Grain, corn and flour export averages of Hungary, 1000 tons, (1843e1913).

1843e1847 1882e1886 1892e1896 1909e1913

Export to Austria

1. Grain and corn 232 883 1241 1416

2. Flour 4 202 500 719

Export to foreign customs areas

1. Grain and corn 14 253 234 64

2. Flour 2 137 103 18

Grain and corn yield of Hungary 4740 8664 11,004 12,624

Source: Katus, 2008.


decreased from41% to 22.6% on average.75 As a result of the ‘overseastransport-induced price shock’ the price index ofwheat fell by 30% inthe United Kingdombetween 1875 and 1894.76 The situation broughtpanic on the continent. In defence of the German latifundia Bismarckimposed protective duties and ‘wartime tariffs’ aimed especially atHungarian grain. This triggered a chain reaction over the wholecontinent.77 Hungary, which had been self sufficient in grain andplant products even before regulating its rivers, established tillage onformer aquatic habitats exclusively for the purpose of increasedexport production. It is an irony of fate that the excess grainproducedin the former floodplains could only be sold in the protected internalmarket of the AHM, since Hungary had lost almost all of its foreignmarkets by the 1890s, the final decade of the Tisza regulation.Hungary could keep and improve its position only on the flour mar-ket, due to the world record capacity of Pest-Buda’s milling industrywhich had been established by the 1860s. The Hungarian agriculturalstructure that produced rawmaterials for a single subsidized marketcarried the risk that accompanied the sectorall through the twentiethcentury: its expensive raw materials became uncompetitive onforeign markets (Table 2).

The period between 1840 and 1890 saw the output of croplandfarming triple and the area of tillages almost double, while between1853 and 1913 they grew by 62.2% (see Table 2). Between 1870 and1914 the area of arable land grew by some 50,000 km2 and themajority of that expansion came from river regulation.

Besides the extension of arable land, the productivity of culti-vation also increased due to technological development. In thecourse of agro-modernization 60% of Hungary became plough-lands, but the extension of gardens and vineyards capable ofproviding more added value did not occur or only slightly changed,while the ratio of all other land uses slumped. The ratio of forestsand grasses plummeted even more sharply, by 13.1% and 37%respectively, leading land-use structure to become ratherhomogenous.

Although the economic justification of the Tisza regulation hasbeen emphasized in studies discussing Hungarian modernizationand agrarian history, they have focused only on one aspect: howmany hectares were converted to croplands.78 In reality, draining or

75 K.H. O’Rourke and J.G. Williamson, Around the European periphery 1870e1913: gl153e190, Table 1.76 Zussman, The Rise of German Protectionism (note 20), Fig. 1.77 European economies resorted to isolation as a response to American trade expansio78 J. Gallacz, Monográfia a Körös-Berettyó völgy ármentesítésér}ol és ezen alakult vízrendeand water management associations in this area), Nagyvárad, 1896; P. Ordódy, El}oterjesel}oforduló lényegesebb kérdések tárgyában (Report on the Regulation of the Tisza and its Tri1880.79 J.G. Williamson, Globalization, convergence, and history, The Journal of Economic His80 H. van Mijl and F. van Tongeren, Multilateral Trade Liberalisation and Developing Counhttp://www.ptt.fi/eaaenjf/papers/vanmeijl.pdf. 10.12.2012.81 Even in 1910 the agricultural sector employed 60.1% of the economically active pop82 Two-thirds of Hungary’s pre-war territory was allocated to neighbouring countries bmozgalom gazdasági-társadalmi gyökerei (Economic and social roots of the popular movem2011.


‘drying’ wetlands in the Tisza Valley resulted in croplands withmostly low agro-ecological potential that did not increase the ef-ficiency of Hungarian agriculture. By the time Tisza Valley recla-mation ended Hungary had lost its foreign grain markets owing tothe ‘transport-induced price shock’. Thus the economic justificationof draining wetlands in the Tisza Valley is fairly dubious.79

Fig. 1 shows that wetlands before river regulation and recentcroplands with excellent agro-ecological potential overlap only onsmall areas (see Fig. 1).

Discussion

The over-extended hydrological infrastructure built with direct andindirect government support made the structure of the agrariansector rigid and inflexible. When aquatic habitats hardly, if at all,suitable for cropland farming were drained, diverse landscape andcultural potentials were neglected. The situation of counties in theTisza Valley became increasingly peripheral because of the impair-ment of landscape functions providing ecosystem services and theconflict between landscape conditions and farming structure. Thisresulted in a production structure with high maintenance costsconcentrated on producing agricultural raw materials and semi-finished food products which were highly exposed to price fluctua-tions. Monocultural stock producing economies are more vulnerablethan those with diversified economic structures, because the formerhave no resilience.80 Resilience is the key in the face of competitionand crisis. By siphoning investable capital from industrial and com-mercial sectors and other adaptive agricultural sectors capable ofproducing higher added value, the extension of tillage conserved aprecapitalist labour-market.81 The social and economic difficulties ofPost-Trianon Hungary cast light on the gravity of the implications ofthe points above. According to I. P. Gunst,

obalizat

n.z}o társulztés a Tbutaries

tory 56tries: A

ulation.y the Trent), Zem

eco-h4.02.0

The remaining area of the country included that particular,central part of the Carpathian Basin where the proportion ofthe latifundia and the concomitant agrarian proletariat werethe highest and where the layer of the peasantry in posses-sion of viable family farms was the thinnest.82

The global economy saw an unprecedented epoch of openness,prosperity and globalization in the second half of the nineteenthcentury, which was only ended by the protectionism preceding theFirst World War. The period of capital influx experienced in the lastthird of the nineteenth century was, in retrospect, a unique chancefor Hungary, since a similar opportunity arose only a century laterin the 1990s. In this period of capital influx, investments andamounts of credit flowing into the Hungarian economy wereabsorbed by infrastructure development projects implementedwith state support and under government control. While devel-opment of transportation infrastructure led to increasing efficiencyin passenger transport and the delivery of goods and fostered a

ion, schooling and growth, European Review of Economic History 1 (1997)

atokról I-II, (Monography on the flood prevention of the Körös-Berettyó Valleyisza és mellékfolyóinak szabályozása valamint a Temes-Béga vizszerkezetbenas well as Important Questions Concerning the Temes-Béga Rivers), Budapest,

(2002) 277e306, 286.North-South Perspective on Agriculture and Processing Sectors, Helsinki, 2001.

eaty of Trianon, signed in 1920 after the end of World War I.P. Gunst, A népipléni Múzsa 2004. http://www.zemplenimuzsa.hu/04_4/gunst.htm. 01.08.


http://www.ptt.fi/eaaenjf/papers/vanmeijl.pdf

http://www.zemplenimuzsa.hu/04_4/gunst.htm

Table 2Land-uses in Hungary, (%), (1853e1913).

Year Arable Garden Vineyard Grasses Forest Reed Uncultivated Summary

1853 37.1 0.9 2.2 28.8 13.6 1.5 15.9 100.01867 40.4 0.9 2.2 29.4 14.4 1.1 11.6 100.01883 52.1 1.0 2.3 23.4 13.1 0.6 7.5 100.01895 55.4 1.0 1.9 22.4 12.9 0.5 5.7 100.01913 60.2 1.1 2.3 18.2 11.8 0.3 6.1 100.0

Source: http://www.ksh.hu.


rapid development in other sectors including high-technology in-dustries, most of the hydro-infrastructure established during theprocess of river regulation became the basis of a system producinglow added value. Rather than developing sectors producing higheradded value, public interest and capital investments turned to-wards land speculation promising rapid profit realization by theconversion of wetlands into extensive tillages that ultimately pro-duced low yields.

This paper argues against the generally held belief that thenineteenth-century regulation of the Tisza River performed well ona technical basis. This case, the biggest river regulation of Europe,was not preceded by thorough scientific preparation; moreover,construction was based on a concept put together in haste. This,together with the antidemocratic practice of excluding social stratarepresenting different interests and sectors from planning anddecision making, led to the ultimate failure of the Tisza regulation,one of the most important attempts at Hungarian agro-modernization. As a consequence of the rigid property and pro-duction structure involved in this process, agroproletarians andsmallholders, together constituting one-third of the population,sank into deep poverty.

The underlying reason for this was that a narrow group oflandowners, who had ownership of a decisive proportion of thefloodplains and who became interested in extending croplandfarming, dominated the planning and decision making levels inregard to river regulation through flood protection associations,county administration and the government. This group used theirinfluence to collectivize the expenses of the regulation and pri-vatize the available revenues.83 Documents cited in this paper

83 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,84 ‘Those who control this (hydraulic) network are uniquely prepared to wield supremeNew Haven and London, 1957, 27.


suggest that the antidemocratic practices pursued in legislationand state administrationwere carried to such a point that tax mapswere deliberately falsified to extend the circle of taxable people,with the minister supervising the associations’ connivance. Asrepresentatives of other social strata or economic sectors, either asa consequence of their low political representation or their weak-ened economic position, were included neither in the planningstages nor on the board of the associations, the plans became one-sided, reflecting the will of decision makers sharing the same in-terest. Thus the regulation of the Tisza River, like many other hy-drological investments, reflected the concentration of power insociety and led to strengthening of antidemocratic practices.84

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank to J. Majdán, L. Fejér, K. Ferber, F. Gyulai, L.Katus, L. Leopold, G. Lövei, I. Orlóczi for comments on methodologyand language use. Special thanks to J. Mészáros, B. Szabó and G.Timár for help concerning figures and GIS as well as the support ofthe Hungarian Environmental Protection and Hydrological Archive.This research was supported by the European Union and the Stateof Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in theframework of TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-11/1-2012-0001 ‘National Excel-lence Program’.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2014.02.001.

New York, 1990.political power’ K. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power,




http://www.ksh.hu