mips 2009 debrief

U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

MIPS 2009 Debrief

23 February 2009


Agenda

• Brief Summary of Speaker Presentations

• Co-opted version of TF 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update

• Q&A


Presentations

• MIP ConOps• Critical Infrastructure Protection• Understanding the Threat• US Global Infrastructure Strategy• Infrastructure Security Development• Creating a Common Operating Picture• The Danish Model: VTS and AIS• CTF 150 Operations• USCG Contributions• Identity Management Initiatives• MSSIS Update• Addressing WMD threats• Panels and Scenario


Task Force 150

Maritime Security Operations

Operational Update

Commander Thomas Stig Rasmussen RDN

Branch Chief Operations

Danish Task Group

4 FEB 2009


Aim of Brief

Bridging the gap by explaining: • What we did• How we did it• Why we did it• Did it work?


Geo Strategic Situation

1000 NM

1000 NM

1000 NM

14 regional coastal nations3 chokepoints16.8 million km2

23.000 ships passing the Gulf of Aden Fragile and failed states with porous coast lines


CTF 150 is to counter or defeat acts of violent extremism, aggression and associated

terrorist networks in littoral and maritime TF 150 AOR. Work with regional, joint and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations maritime capabilities. Be ready to respond to full range of crises, including environmental and humanitarian events until further notice in order to achieve secure and stable maritime environment free from terrorist activity

CTF 150 mission


Crisis Response

Actively prevent

smuggling of narcotics

Theatre Security Cooperation

Safeguarding traffic and explore pattern of life

Deter and disrupt piracy

Protect vulnerable shipping

DNK CTF 150 Campaign Effects Schematic


Piracy• Key to long term solution is ashore in Somalia. Remove the motivation

– Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore– Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law

• Piracy is about money – no proven link to terrorism. But could inspire terrorists future actions

– Impact of Al Shabaab? Stopping piracy or using piracy for funding?– No ransom no piracy

• Pirates are not fanatic. They are not willing to die for the “case”

• Definitions of piracy– Hijackings– Attacks– Attempts– Armed robbery


Hijackings per Month

What is the threat?

Has the problem moved?

Ships Pirated off Somalia (As of 31 Dec 2008)

0123456789

10

Jan-

05F

eb-0

5M

ar-0

5A

pr-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

n-05

Jul-0

5A

ug-0

5S

ep-0

5O

ct-0

5N

ov-0

5D

ec-0

5Ja

n-06

Feb

-06

Mar

-06

Apr

-06

May

-06

Jun-

06Ju

l-06

Aug

-06

Sep

-06

Oct

-06

Nov

-06

Dec

-06

Jan-

07F

eb-0

7M

ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

Jul-0

7A

ug-0

7S

ep-0

7O

ct-0

7N

ov-0

7D

ec-0

7Ja

n-08

Feb

-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

-08

Sep

-08

Oct

-08

Nov

-08

Dec

-08

East Coast of Somalia Gulf of Aden


A problem out of control?

According to IMB:

- Risk of being attacked: 1: 340

- Risk of being hijacked: 1: 907

Media hype?


Acts of Piracy 2008

Categorization

TOTAL 130

GOA 112

HOA 18

As of 31 DEC 08


Darod Clan Group

• AOO Sea: GOA

• AOO Ashore:Bosasso Eyl

• Base: Eyl

• FOB: Caluula and Bargaal

Hawiye Clan Group

• AOO Sea:Somali East Coast

• AOO Ashore:Hobyo Mogadishu

• Base: Harardera & Hobyo

HARADHERE

BOSASSO

EYL

MOGADISHU

HARARDERA

HOBYO

HAWIY

E CLA

N GRO

UP

CALUULADAROD CLAN GROUP

BARGAAL

Piracy Areas


Typical Piracy Event (Darod)

BOSSASSO

CALUULA

EYL

Attack

Anchorage area

Stopover areas

GARACAD

XABO

BARGAAL


Traffic in GOA (MAR 08)


Traffic in GOA (JAN 09)


Piracy Activity

62 events of which 20 were successful

15 SEP 2008 – 12 JAN 2009


New Transit Corridor

The old corridor

The new corridor


Claim:

A combination of international focus, naval forces passive deterrence, offensive disruption and improved self protections measures from ships is now to some degree keeping the piracy in Gulf of Aden at bay

But an enduring solution must be linked to improved situation ashore in Somalia

TF 150 Anti-piracy Ops


• Most targets are slow moving ships with low freeboard (tankers and bulk carriers)

• Few examples of attacks on containerships or cruise liners

• Almost all attacks in GOA in daylight

• Direct connection between sea state and piracy

Piracy characteristics & tactics


• Pirates use different kinds of mother ships (skiffs, dhows, tugs etc.) to support operations

• One team consisting of one or two skiffs with 5 or 10 pirates

• Up to five teams observed operating simultaneously. Normally no more than two teams



• Pirates have become more determined, but not more violent

• When met with with overwhelming force pirates in small skiffs are willing to surrender. Only dhow mother ships have resisted apprehension

• Leaders know they are “safe” when onboard and in control of M/V

• Reappearance of pirates not observed



• Pirates may de-conflict actions

• Coordination rarely observed

• Pirates are using spoofing



Port Visit

DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF150

ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF150

NATIONAL TASKING

CDT BIROT

OAK HILL

BADR

ABSALON

IROQUOIS

Operations – 23 SEP

CHATHAM

VIL. D. QUEBECK

MALAYSIAN TG

COURBET


GOKOVA GORKOVA

Port Visit

DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF 150

ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF 150

NATIONAL TASKING

ABSALON

Operations – 18 DEC

TOWADA

NORTHUMBL.

WAVE KN.

KARLSRUHE

TIPPU SULTAN

MASON

MYSORE

PORTLAND

PSARA.

EU

PRE M LHER

MVP

SRI INDERA SAKTI NEUSTRASHIMY

DILIGENCE

ARIAKE

ABHA YELNYA

NIVOSE

JEAN DE VIENNE


Legal Framework

• UNCLOS • UNSCR 1816• UNSCR 1838• UNSCR 1846• UNSCR 1851• But no legal frame-

work to handle detaines


• Most effective efforts are provided by the M/V themselves

• After successful hijacking little we can do

• Find and board when tripwires met

• Measurement of success? Number of attacks versus number of successful hijackings?

Counter Piracy


• The traffic corridor enables naval forces to concentrate resources, but pirates know where the targets are

• Naval forces are spread along the corridor, ready to react with Helo

• Quick reporting by M/V is essential. The golden 30 minutes

• Air surveillance is crucial to success

• Convoy/escort operations only part of solution

• Best solution is combined escort and disruption operations

Counter Piracy


September

16 NOV: Update to Commanders guidance and intent for MSPA operations.

20 SEP: ABS disarms 10 pirates.

17 SEP: ABS detains 10 pirates.

02 OCT: BRT disarms 12 pirates.

20 OCT: ABS helo and rhib fires warning shots. Pirates looses skiffs, ladder and RPG.

December

03 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates.

30 NOV: JDV disarms 4 pirates.

04 DEC: ABS disarms 7 pirates.

13 DEC: MYS detains 12 pirates.

04 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates.

07 NOV: CMB disarms 8 pirates.

11 NOV: CMB disarms a total of 31 pirates in 2 incidents.

17 DEC: ABS disarms 9 pirates.

19 DEC: JDV disarms 7 pirates.

25 DEC: KAR foils attack and disarms 4 pirates.

18 NOV: TAB destroys Ekawatnava 5.

November

01 JAN: LHR detains 8 pirates

02 JAN: ABS detains 5 and disarms 19 pirates

January

04 JAN: JDV detains 19 pirates

02 JAN: MYS disarms 7 pirates

Kinetic encounter

Hijacking

Failed Attack

October

Piracy activity

1 – 4 JAN 48 pirates disarmed of which 32 were detained


Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles

RPG launchers

Other arms Ladders Action taken

17SEP08 ABS 10 8 1 0 2 Detained – landed, 1 skiff and 1 mothership destroyed

20SEP08 ABS 10 9 1 2 2 Disarmed

02OCT08 BRT 12 ? ? ? ? Disarmed

20OCT08 ABS ? ? 1 ? 1 Shots fired, 1 skiff destroyed

03NOV08 ABS 10 2 0 0 1 Disarmed

04NOV08 ABS 10 8 1 0 0 Disarmed

07NOV08 CMB 8 6 1 0 0 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed

11NOV08 CMB 16 7 1 0 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed

11NOV08 CMB 9 5 1 1 1 7 Detained 2 killed - handed over to Kenya. 1 skiff confiscated

18NOV08 TAB ? ? ? ? ? Vessel neutralised. Crew and pirates killed XMT one. 1 skiff escaped

30NOV08 JDV 4 4 0 0 0 Disarmed - put on a dhow to Somalia, 1 skiff destroyed

04DEC08 ABS 7 5 1 0 0 Handed over to Yemen as sailors in distress, 1 skiff destroyed

13DEC08 MYS 12 7 1 3 0 Handed over to Yemen, 1 skiff confiscated

17DEC08 ABS 9 5 1 1 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed in the attack on MV Zhen Hua 4

19DEC08 JDV 7 5 2 0 1 Disarmed

25DEC08 KAR 4 3 1 1 0 Disarmed

01JAN09 LHR 8 6 1 0 2 8 pirates detained

02JAN09 MYS 7 ? ? ? ? Disarmed

02JAN09 ABS 5 ? ? ? 1Crew abandoned skiff due to fire, skiff sunk by ABS. 5 pirates detained. Samanyolu incident

Encountered pirates


Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles

RPG launchers

Other arms Ladders Action taken

02JAN09 ABS 7 3 1 0 1 Disarmed

02JAN09 ABS 3 3 0 2 0 Disarmed, engine repaired

04JAN09 JDV 10 6 1 0 1 Disarmed, handed over to Puntland

04JAN09 JDV 9 5 1 0 1 Disarmed, handed over to Puntland

Total 177+ 97+ 17+ 10+ 16 11 skiffs destroyed or confiscated

Encountered pirates

Of the 177 pirates encountered: 063 were handed over to authorities107 were released after disarming002+ died005 are still in custody

No confirmed reappearance by any of the 177, but not all had their biometrics registered


• Malaysian units (1-2 units since SEP 2008)

• Russian units (2-3 units since OCT 2008)

• Indian units (1 unit since NOV 2008)

• TF 169 (Chinese Force) (2-3 units since JAN 2009)

• TF 432 (NATO Force) (4-6 units OCT – DEC 2008)

• TF 465 (EU Force) (3-4 units since DEC 2008)

Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces


• Welcome paperwork• Staff visit – explaining about pattern of life• Exchange of SITREPs including area allocation for

units, convoy schedules, and reports on any actual piracy activities

• Daily summery of activities, intelligence information and assessments (classified, but releasable to all military forces)

• De facto tactical coordination including tasking of units, aircraft and alert helicopters

• Communication crucial

Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces

• Each force provider will have a requirement to promote own presence, which must be accepted and respected


Conclusion• Combined Maritime Forces / Navies and international organizations have

taken actions:– Maritime Security Patrol Area and traffic corridor established– Vulnerable shipping provided escorts– Naval Forces assigned to deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment– Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information– UNSCRs passed, providing robust legal mandate for military actions

• Most important factor is merchant ships self defense and information sharing

• Need to focus on counter piracy alone. CTF 151 do just that• Legal framework to deal with apprehended pirates crucial. Significant

movements observed • CTF 150 will revert to “old” mission• Operations are having effect. Problem contained but not eradicated.

When is security good enough? Need to convince commercial shipping• Improvement of conditions ashore in Somalia is the long term solution

mips 2009 debrief

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