Book Reviews 101

Minds, Brains and Science, John Searle (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 198-l) (The 198-l Reith lectures), 107 pp., r’1.95.

In the Introduction to his 1954 Reith lectures John Searle tells us that he first planned to expand each chapter in an attempt to meet all possible objections coming from his ‘cantankerous’ fellow philosophers, not to mention colleagues in cognitive science, at-titicial intelligence, and other fields. But hechanged his mindanddecided that the book should be accessible ‘to anybody interested enough to try to follow the argumenrs’(p. 7). We must thank Searle for this decision because he has presented us with a very readable book which, without being easy, is yet very rewarding. Here we have a philosopher who has come down from the ivory tower of abstract thought and presented us with all the practical implications of his philosophy of language. Thus the intelligent layman will, when reading the book carefully. learn that the philosophy of language ofSearle includes in its scope the discussion of human action and behaviour generally. (See the Introduction to Searle’s earlier book, The Philosophy of‘longuage. Oxford University Press. 1971.)

The recasting of the philosophy of language into this larger context explains the sequence of chapters. The book can be seen as divided into two logical parts: Part One deals with ‘The Mind-Body Problem’, with the rejection of the computer model for understanding the working of our minds and lastly with the research programme of cognitivism, which seeks to study thinking by studying ‘computational symbol- manipulating programs’ (p. 43). Part Two deals successively with the nature of human action (Searle calls it ‘The Structure of Action’) as caused by internal mental states, with the methods of positivistic social sciences, and ends with a chapter on ‘The Freedom of the Will’.

By contrast to other philosophers of mind and of action, Searle’s approach regarding the development of mind is strictly scientific. He insists that, although mind and body interact, they are not different things since mental phenomena are simply features of the brain. He asks us to see his position as both that of a mentalist and of a physicalist. Searle seems to imply that if ‘naive physicalism’ means that all that exists in the world are physical particles with their properties and relations, then its true that the brain and its function-thinking or mind-is also physical. On the other hand, if ‘naive mentalism’ means that mental phenomena really exist and interact with the physical world, then mentalism is not only consistent with physicalism but also true. By not basing his mentalist view on an opposition to the physicalist theory of mind, Searle is able to reject any ‘intelligence’ which has not its origin in a biological development.

What distinguishes Searle’s approach to the problems of the philosophy of action from that of many other opponents of the positivistic social sciences (which seeks to apply to man and society the same methods as to the natural sciences), is his special view of the philosophy of language. Searle believes that eventually philosophers, grammarians and linguists will evolve through their study of language a Science of Language just as in the nineteenth century mathematics evolved a Science of Logic. But he rejects the temptation to call this philosophy of language a science. Science, he writes, ‘has become something of an honorific term which suggests arcane infallibility’(p. I 1). He prefers to call the product of his enquiry ‘knowledge or understandin g’ and whether the scholar is writing literary criticism, history, physics or philosophy, for Searle the end product is always knowledge or understanding.

It is clear by now that Searle’s approach is neutral vid-vir the epistemological status of the natural sciences. His humanism is grounded in the belief that a systematic knowledge of language and of mind is possible. Yet despite Searle’s lip service to physicalism, to the biological grounding of mental acts, his general attitude to humanism should be made clear. We should recall that his book is Searle’s defence of a version of humanism in the sense of an anthropocentric and secular approach to the study and evaluation ofhumanity

and 1s ultlmarzly the founding of humanism on a distinct theoF of thInkIn<. Ssarle:‘s

approach may not be popular. @ut his theme drrlnltely IS The iast amount of science ,

t‘ict~cn rhrlves on the nJtural fear of loslny our hegemon\ to naturAl or artiiiclJl monsters

of our o~vn making. In trynp to console man that the human mlnd cannot be

mechanically duplicated. Searlr joins a Ion 5 list of thinkers who sought to oppose, ever

s(nc: the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the idea that man 1s completely part

of nature. that the science of man will merge eventualI>. in a um\ersal sclcnce. In this

contev. the anti-Chrlst is surely Humc and his Science of Human Sature. Kant. Hrgsl

and most of the German Idealists tried in one rvaq’or another to refute the ‘naturallsstion

of the human mind’ which started with Hums. It is ironic that one of the pioneers of the

philosophy of language was Bertrand Russell who was also a humanist of the rntionallst

association. But when Russell succeeded in refuting the Hegelian idea that unllkr Science which travesties reality philosophy yields absolute knowledge of reality. when the

philowphicnl tactics to enhance humanism by deprecntlng science failed. It seems that a

new \,:rsion of philosophical idealism havin, u a different tactics came into beIn:. .-\ustin

and Searle’s Philosophy of Language or thslr philosophical idealism does not clash vvlth

the eplstrmological claims ofthe physlcai xlenct’s. Recastins language In a brhnl+iouristlc

settlng In the wake of \L’lttgrnstein’s Pi~rioropi~icalInr~esfr~utiat~.r, .Austin and Searle have.

under the cloak of an empirical approach to ‘speech acts’. e\,olr-rci an idealistic

rsplanation of human brhaAour which only seer~s to coexist with the rcalistlc approach

to natural phenomena. \l’c have to thank Srarle for his book on computers and minds it

only because he has offered us the opportunity to examine his working hypothrsls as well

as his aims. Attractive as It might be. Searle’s picture ofths human mind isditticult for us

to accept ~fonl> because It 1s based on a spurious p~~tldo-theor)-oi,Llind. Like all idealist

philosophers. Searlr overlooks the basic fact that the concept of an ‘Inert nature <It

phhslcal particles‘ IS a s~rnplc logical opposite of the concept of thInkIng. ‘Inert’ means

Incapable of art. of action. in opposition to man who IS capable of action. l‘hi, means th,lt

the concept ot‘thlnklng is to be taken as known AS Itwlf. as transparent, and can only be

octopi to describe inert nature. The momc‘nt ‘thinking’ is taken to be the object ot

knowledge-as Sear1 r: wants-it becomes obscure and systematically unknowable.

,Austtn and Searie thought that they had avoid4 the u\ual ambiguity of the concept

of ni~nnin~ as use b\ specifying an endless division of uws or speech acts. The)

should have heeded with \\‘ittgensteln’s warning: to avoid bullclin~ or evolving an>

tiicor> of language. or of mlnti. \\‘ittgenstein, though he opposed the C‘arteslan

substantialism of the mind. followed at Icast part 01’ Descartes’ project: the n-w physics

is bawd on a bracketins of the human rn~nd To unhracket it loads dlrrc:l\ back to

philosophical idealism.

It I> obvious that behind an) sp cculation on thinkIn: and language, ivtiethsr In i.ic\v ot

probing the validity of knowledge or sol~lv concerned with language and nlnd. there

lurks a very tempting hope that such a speculation will eventually Isad to ;I ‘new’ and

‘authcntlc’ view on the meaning of life. And so perhaps Descartes !\;I< won? In thmklng

that I[ is enough once in a lifetime to entertain the transcendental doubt !ii order to

bepar,ite once and for atl the theologIcal speculntlons about the ends of Ilie from the

scientlf?c manlpulatlan of nature. Recent developments in analytic philosophy both in

England and in .America indicate that phIIo~ophlc:~I speculation could not he

‘contained and rr‘maln :I second-order actlvlty. and do nothlns mow than an.ilyse the

language of science. By making both language and mind the object of their first-order

activity. .Anglo-Saxon philosophers hn\s overlooked the fact that onecannot at the same

time admit the notion of inert physical particles and enquire paslti\,cly inti) the htructure

of lanzuapr and mind. There is no half-\vay house: clthrr you accept the notion of truth

(about inert particles etc.) and abstain from speculation about meanins in both

language and mind. or you reject the notion of truth and Indulge freeI> 111 ;I \$ild

Book Rer’iervs 19

speculation about the meaning. In sum. if you do not iollow Descartes and bracket

mind, msaning and language, then I~OLI have no working alternative except to foIloh

Nistzschs, Heidegger and Dcrrida.

L:niversiry of Haifu

Ezra Talmor

The Congress Dances: 1.ienna 1811-1815. Susan Y.lnry .Alsop (New York: Harper & Rou.

1951). 178 pp.

The L’iennese Enlightenment. Murk Francis, ed. (X<w \I.ork: St Martin’s Press. 1985). I68

PP.

In her, T/W Cony~~s Daters. Susan Mary Alsop takes the reader from the twilight ofthe

great Napoleon to the close of the Congress of l’lenna. But other than giving a liveI>

description of events Ieadin g up to certain selected nocturnal acti\.ltles of members ofthe

great world, Alsop focuses on none of the great political events that took place during this

period. Xnd no more than half the book deals tvrth Vienna 181-l-15. So. for example,

Waterloo or the Hundred Days is \,irtually ignored ivhile many pages are given to the r.islt

of Czar Alexander I to Britain in the sprin g of ISI4 where he-along with the Prince

Regent-became \,ictlms in the quite personal intrigues of the Czar’s much beloved sister

(was their relationship incestuous’?). the Grand Duchess ofoldenburg. Indeed,ifthcre isa

1‘ocus in this reading. it is’on the great romp. The pages of this book are replete with

handsome, brave ].oung generals and beautiful young women of clever mind and

vivacious manner. 01‘ course the handsome young men are seeking love. and the women

arc of ca5y virtue. And so it was that the sexes came together very often. Not that there 1s

anything intrinsically wrong with such goings-on:aftcr all. one can hardly ha\e espected

dashing. brave diplomats to have been all work and no plav. Nevertheless. beyond the

sheets of the boudoir. one learns very little of what made the congress dance when its

members faced one another over green baize tables.

The I’iorrr~~sr En‘nlighrennwn~ contains seven essays, the bulk of Lbhich deals with what

has by now become de r~,~uerrr when one writes on Fin-de-Siide Vienna: Freud,

Schoenberg. Schnitzlrr as bvell as many allusions to the unseen presence of the Emperor

Franz Joseph I. Ne\srthelsss, these essays are useful as well as nicely written and

Informed. Moreover. a fe\v of them especially are thoughtful and incisive. But these

essays-and they are quite diverse in their content-are not for the casual reader ot

Habsburg history. One must be very familiar with time and place if one is to derive

understanding from these readings. Too. each aficionado of Habsburg history will have

his fa\,ourltc among these essays. For myself. I found S.A.M. Adshead’s analysis of the

components making up i’xnna’s //(ILII~~ Ho~r,yeocs/c at the turn of the century \‘erh

enlightening (S.:Y.41. .-\dsh<ad. ‘7%~ Genesis of the Imperial Mind’), I think Adshrad I:,

quite right in pointing out that the tenor of Viennese cultureat the turn of the century W;I~

in great part determined by the bort of bourgeoise that resided in the capital. Vienna’,

capltatlsm, .Ac!shead demonbtrates. ~vas ‘Olltist’--‘a l~~w technology. sweated labour

industry unlikeI> to attract a middle class at either Its upper or lower levels. Busine>>

~~1s either bureaucratic or banausrc.’ So the most lntrlllgent people in the Empire. and

thebe often loved in Vienna. rschc\ved business. But neither was politics open to them

and so [these circumstances] left them very little to do but think.’ .Adshead’s conclusions

do not quite bear out u hat both Schnitzler and Stsfan Zwei g had to sav on this matter.

Ne\,ertheless, I think .Adshead’s analysis very useful to anyone trying to comprehend the

soul of the culture of Fin-de-S/?c/c V~ennrl.