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Middle East & North Africa Regional Summary September 2014

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Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com

Middle East & North Africa Regional Summary

September 2014

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Month Day, Year Executive Summary

After 50 days of hostilities between Israel and Gaza-based militant groups, the sides have

agreed to an unlimited ceasefire with negotiations on more comprehensive issues to begin in

one month's time. Tensions in the Palestinian Territories nonetheless remain high, however,

with the possibility of renewed fighting in the coming weeks should negotiations fail. In

Lebanon, tensions remain high in the Bekaa Valley, as Syrian rebel jihadists continue to

engage Lebanese forces despite the militants’ ouster from Arsal. In Syria, the US

contemplates further military action against the Islamic State (IS), as the group makes gains

against both the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and rival militant factions. In Iraq, American

airstrikes have facilitated Kurdish advances around Mosul.

Similarly, concerns over the return of Islamic State militants continue to increase in North

Africa. Moroccan authorities have particularly expressed concerns over regarding such

threats, while additionally heightening security measures and deployments in major cities

due to rising instability in Libya. In this context, rumors have circulated regarding the threat

of airborne attacks emanating from Libya due to ongoing clashes in the vicinity of Tripoli

International Airport, leading to the Moroccan security measures, as well as the closure of

Tunisian airspace to flights from Libya and unconfirmed reports of the deployment of anti-

aircraft batteries in Algeria. Finally, in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood protests continued over

the month of August, albeit with lower turnouts after the August 14 anniversary of the

military's crackdown on the main Brotherhood protest encampments in 2013.

In the GCC, concerns remain high regarding the proliferation of militant jihadism across the

region, as governments, such as in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, crackdown on suspected

members and financiers of such groups. With the organization, however, efforts to resolve

the intra-GCC conflict have reportedly proven successful. Meanwhile, near-daily militancy,

albeit unsophisticated, continues in Bahrain, along with small-scale protests and efforts by

official opposition groups to remain relevant. In the southern Arabian Peninsula, Yemen's

government is confronted with opposition to fuel subsidy cuts, as Shiite Houthis establish

protest camps in Sanaa. Amidst reports of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's increasing

presence in the oil-rich Hadramaut Governorate and the ever-present southern secessionist

movement, the country continues to struggle with instability and persistent violence.

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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the

past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.

EXTREME RISK

Syria ....................................................................................................................................... 4

HIGH RISK

Egypt ...................................................................................................................................... 5

Iraq......................................................................................................................................... 6

Lebanon ................................................................................................................................. 7

Libya....................................................................................................................................... 8

Yemen .................................................................................................................................... 9

MEDIUM RISK

Algeria .................................................................................................................................. 10

Bahrain ................................................................................................................................ 11

Iran....................................................................................................................................... 12

Israel & Palestinian Territories ............................................................................................ 13

Jordan .................................................................................................................................. 14

Morocco .............................................................................................................................. 15

Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................................... 16

Tunisia ................................................................................................................................. 17

Turkey .................................................................................................................................. 18

LOW RISK

Kuwait .................................................................................................................................. 19

Qatar .................................................................................................................................... 20

Middle East and North Africa: MERS-CoV Update ............................................................. 21

Notable Dates for September 2014 ................................................................................. 22

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Islamic State (IS) militants capture Tabqa military airbase on August 24, consolidating

control over the entire Raqqa Province for the first time since the outbreak of the Syrian

Civil War in 2011.

US reportedly authorizes aerial reconnaissance missions over Syrian territory to combat

IS following the execution of an American journalist on August 19.

Syrian rebel militants capture Quneitra border crossing and kidnap UN peacekeepers

amidst errant mortar fire by Syrian Arab Army (SAA) into Israeli territory.

We advise against all travel to Damascus, given the general threat of indiscriminate

aerial bombardment and artillery shelling from government forces as well as attacks

by various militant groups. Attacks by rebel forces may include the use of rocket

propelled grenades, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks.

Raqqa Province

The IS seizure of the Tabqa military airbase is a notable gain for the militant group

considering that the airbase has been an active forward operating base for the Syrian Arab

Army’s (SAA) aerial bombardment campaigns in northeastern Syria. With this in mind, the

Assad regime’s abilities to conduct bombing raids in northern Syria will be significantly

diminished. Meanwhile the military hardware captured by IS militants, including a myriad of

surface-to-air missile launchers will likely improve the capabilities of IS militants, mainly in

countering Iraqi and Syrian aircraft.

US intervention

Despite reluctance to become further involved in the Syrian Civil War, the White House has

faced increased pressure to act more forcefully against IS following their gains, the execution

of the aforementioned American, and the launching of US airstrikes against such militant

sites in Iraq on beginning on August 8. There is a growing sentiment within the US

administration that successfully countering IS would require military action beyond the

borders of Iraq. The US has already announced plans to form a regional coalition of Arab

states to address the threat of IS militancy. Any military intervention, most likely in the form

of aerial surveillance and possible airstrikes, is unlikely to be implemented without support

from the recently formed regional coalition of Arab states.

Quneitra

The capture of the Quneitra border crossing and the subsequent kidnapping of 43 UN

peacekeepers by a coalition of Syrian militants underscores a renewed rebel offensive into

the Quneitra Province. At this time there is no evidence to suggest that the aforementioned

Syrian rebel groups have a strategic interest in immediately targeting Israeli territory or

engaging in clashes with the IDF.

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EXTREME RISK

Syria

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HIGH RISK Notable Dates

Egypt

Pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters demonstrate on August 14, call for further

demonstrations in bid to gain momentum.

Multiple attacks on electrical infrastructures reported, likely meant to exacerbate power

shortages, instigate public protests.

Egyptian forces raise security measures in Sinai amidst heightened militancy threat.

We advise against all nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at this time due to

the persistent risk of civil unrest in major cities, militant attacks, and violence targeting

foreigners.

Pro-Muslim Brotherhood unrest

Following a series of protests in commemoration of the 2013 Rabaa al-Adawiyah Square

dispersal, in which hundreds of Brotherhood protesters were killed, the pro National Alliance

to Support Legitimacy (NASL) called for renewed protests, due to a relative decline in the

turnouts of the commemorations after several days. We assess the call for renewed protests

an NASL attempt to regain momentum and that further such protests are likely to be

witnessed over the coming weeks in Muslim Brotherhood strongholds in Cairo. Furthermore,

such unrest may result in the targeting of security forces and infrastructure, including mobile

phone networks, electricity facilities, and public transportation installations.

Electrical infrastructure under attack

Given that Egypt is in the midst of an electricity crisis, with daily cuts affecting households

between five and nine hours each day, we assess that militants who sympathize with the

Muslim Brotherhood are likely seeking to exacerbate Egypt’s electricity issues. Extending

and widening the scale of power outages would likely feed into public frustration with the

government, and may lead to demonstrations against the government’s seeming inability to

provide citizens with enough power. Furthermore, Egypt is estimated to have about 140,000

pylons nationwide, making them difficult to secure. In this context, attacks on electricity

infrastructure are likely to continue in the coming weeks.

Heightened Sinai militancy threat

A series of bombings and security crackdowns resulting in the arrest and killing of numerous

militants underscores an uptick in militancy throughout the Sinai Peninsula, particularly

since early July, following the commencement of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.

This widened crackdown may be connected to a heightened militant threat linked with

Egypt’s perceived complicity with such offensive. Egypt may further be countering a

potential uptick in militancy stemming from the commemoration of the August 14

anniversary, as militants generally seek to stage attacks during such symbolic dates.

Counter-insurgency operations are likely to continue over the coming weeks and months.

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HIGH RISK

Iraq

PM al-Maliki announces resignation on August 14 following significant domestic and

international pressure. Fellow Shiite Dawa Party member, Haider al-Abadi, granted

mandate to form government.

President Obama authorizes airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) militants, which have,

since August 8, aided Kurdish forces to recapture parts of northern Iraq. Near-daily

attacks continue to target security forces and Shiite areas of Baghdad.

It is advised to defer all travel to Baghdad at this time due to increasing violence in

areas surrounding the capital and the risk of a broad deterioration of security

conditions.

Haider al-Abadi to form new government

Despite the September 11 deadline, no new government has been announced thus far.

Reports indicated that on August 30, members of the National Alliance to which al-Abadi

belongs, agreed on a division of ministerial posts and will present them to other parties over

the coming days. Meanwhile, Sunni leaders have been proposing demands for greater

autonomy, along with control of security ministries, the elimination of de-Baathification

laws, and the reinstatement of Sunnis into the security forces. At the same time, Kurdish

groups have been calling for control of territories disputed between the Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG) and the central government, funding for the KRG's Peshmerga security

forces, and recognition of KRG oil deals with international companies. With all that in mind,

we therefore assess that the government formation process will likely be prolonged,

exceeding the September 11 deadline, thus, further delaying necessary measures for

restoring stability.

US airstrikes assist Kurds in fight against IS

US airstrikes in Iraq were crucial in assisting Kurdish Peshmerga to drive IS militants from

the Mosul Dam area and allowing the Peshmerga to take over days later. Airstrikes also

targeted IS in other areas of northern Iraq, including Mount Sinjar. The aerial campaigns,

which focused on neutralizing defending IS fighters, halting their advances, as well as

destroying their equipment, coincides with various international actors sending military

supplies to the KRG. Meanwhile, NATO reportedly voiced readiness to consider

supporting operations in Iraq. We assess that the US and its allies are likely to expand

their involvement in the fighting against IS in Iraq, including by expanding airstrikes.

Meanwhile, the continuation of bombings in the capital indicates that IS militants are

attempting to force the continued deployment of security forces to the capital as

opposed to reinforcing troops at the fronts, in more outlying areas of the country.

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HIGH RISK

Lebanon

Fighting between Lebanese security forces and Syrian militant groups in Arsal

underscores notable uptick in spillover violence emanating from Syria.

Presidential power vacuum continues amidst increased Parliamentary deadlock between

March 8 and March 14 political blocs.

We advise against all nonessential travel to Lebanon at this time, restricting essential

travel to Beirut’s northwestern districts. Before traveling, ensure that contingency and

emergency evacuation plans remain updated, as sectarian attacks in Lebanon can

quickly deteriorate into broader violence.

Spillover Violence

Following the arrest of Imad Ahmed Jomaa, an alleged Syrian commander of the al-Qaeda-

affiliated al-Nusra Front on August 2, several days of clashes ensued between Lebanese

security forces and Syrian militants from the al-Nusra Front as well as the Islamic State (IS).

29 Lebanese soldiers were abducted by both al-Nusra Front and IS militants, underscoring a

strategy in which rival Syrian militant groups have joined together to defend their positions

in the porous border areas between Lebanon and Syria. In this context, given that Arsal has

long acted as the predominant hub and launching point for Syrian militant attacks in

Lebanon, we assess that there may be a greater frequency of militancy in and possibly

emanating from this area. This is most likely to occur in the form of attacks against Lebanese

security forces and checkpoints in the Bekaa Valley, as well as outlying areas of Beirut.

Moreover, attempted militant attacks, including suicide bombings against Shiite targets in

south Beirut remain possible. However, Lebanese security forces have already announced

the launch of a new phase of the country’s security plan for the Bekaa Valley, which will see

an increase in the frequency of raids against Sunni militant groups and bolstered border

patrols to prevent militants from infiltrating Lebanon through the porous Syrian border.

Presidential Power Vacuum

Despite increased efforts by Christian politicians within the March 14 Alliance to elect a new

president, the coalition is likely to block any efforts by the rival March 8 Alliance to reform

the presidential election process through direct elections. The parliamentary bill which calls

for direct presidential elections, was submitted by March 8 Alliance MPs on August 21;

however, given the ongoing legislative deadlock in parliament, it remains unlikely that the

bill will pass, thereby furthering the deadlock. Meanwhile, the political stalemate has led to

an increase in labor strikes and demonstrations by both public sector unions such as the

Syndicate Coordination Committee (SCC), as well as workers from the Electricite du Liban

(EDL), who continue to hold regular protests in the capital and across the country. We assess

that the continued political deadlock is likely to further hinder the chances of resolving

economic and labor-related issues.

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HIGH RISK

Libya

On August 23, coalition of pro-Islamist militias seize Tripoli International Airport from

anti-Islamist militias. Despite the setback, an anti-Islamist counter-offensive remains

possible in the coming months.

In Benghazi, clashes continue as militants seize an important headquarters in the city's

Boatni district, prompting an anti-Islamist counter-offensive which is likely to continue.

Meanwhile, Libya's political apparatus has effectively been divided into two authorities,

the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR) and the reappointed General National

Congress (GNC), thus further fueling the divide between the rival sides.

It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent uptick

in violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security

conditions.

Seizure of Tripoli Airport

Following more than a month of fighting near the Airport since the launching of "Libya

Dawn" on July 13, the seizure of the Airport represents a notable setback for anti-Islamist

forces. The HoR claimed to have ordered the withdrawal, and while this remains arguable,

we assess that anti-Islamist militias may fall back and consolidate a more defendable

position on the outskirts of Tripoli, which may lay the ground for a counter-offensive in the

coming months. Moreover, the recent rumors regarding airstrikes by UAE and Egypt in

Tripoli underscore the potential for foreign intervention, further heightened by the

impression that anti-Islamist forces may be losing ground.

Clashes continue in Benghazi

Following the seizure of their headquarters in Boatni in July, and concerns that the Benina

Airport used by Major Khalifa Haftar may also fall, the anti-Islamist Thunderbolt Brigade

reportedly executed a counter-offensive on Boatni and reclaimed control over four camps.

With this in mind, clashes are likely to continue in Benghazi while the potential failure of the

Thunderbolt Brigade to maintain control over Boatni may lead to an Islamist offensive on the

Benina airport.

Uptick in political polarization

The de facto divide between the HoR and the GNC underscores the growing polarization

between a pro-Islamist alliance backed by Misrata and an anti-Islamist coalition backed by

Zintan and Haftar. We assess that such a division, which represents the movement of

military conflicts into the political sphere, may hinder the reaching of an agreement

between the rival sides.

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HIGH RISK Notable Dates

Yemen

The government's propensity to use mediation to negotiate resolutions to conflicts

suggests that talks with the Houthis will continue in the coming days and weeks, along

with Houthi protests and counter-protests.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) interest in targeting the military and

government, along with a demonstrated limited ability to successfully counter AQAP,

attacks by the organization are likely to continue in the coming weeks.

Given the credible risk of attacks and kidnappings, avoid all nonessential travel to

Sanaa and Aden, while avoiding overland travel and travel to outlying areas.

Demonstrations

Despite likely continued negotiations, significant obstacles are liable to be confronted,

given the government's interest in preserving the recent fuel subsidy cuts undertaken to

improve the economy and secure an International Monetary Fund loan. In this context,

and given near daily demonstrations since August 18, we further assess that, at least

until an agreement may be reached, the Houthis will continue its demonstrations and

protest camps in Sanaa, with attendance remaining in the thousands.

Counter-protests in Sanaa and Aden witnessing high turnout highlights the likelihood

that such demonstrations will also continue to occur. In this context, any concessions

made by the government to the Houthis holds a high risk to anger sectors of the

population that oppose the Houthis and/or their actions, likely triggering additional

protests even if an agreement is reached that ends Houthi demonstrations in the capital.

Meanwhile, in the former "South Yemen" a counter-protest by Southern Mobility

Movement (SMM) members to a pro-government march in Aden was forcibly dispersed,

resulting in one death and four injuries. Given that a protest condemning the death was

called the following day, along with two symbolic dates in September (the anniversary of

the founding of the PDRY's army and the start of the civil war in 1962), we assess that an

uptick in SMM protests calling for independence may be recorded in September.

AQAP attacks

August 28 and August 14 attacks in Mukalla bearing AQAP's modus operandi and reports of

persistent clashes in central Hadramaut such as al-Qatn, come amidst a security plan that

was reportedly endorsed for the Hadramaut Governorate and reports that AQAP has

increased its presence in the area. Given AQAP's publicly stated plans to continue attacking

military and government targets, along with a likely interest in demonstrating its ongoing

ability to conduct attacks amidst counter-militancy operations, we assess similar attacks and

clashes will continue. They are also likely to continue targeting Houthis, given their claim of

responsibility for an August 24 attack in Sanaa against a protest tent and creation of a

subgroup specifically tasked with attacking Houthis.

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MEDIUM RISK

Algeria

A moderate earthquake in the Bay of Algiers on August 1 leads to an uptick in demands

for relocation as well as protests by residents of Algiers' shantytowns, underscoring the

persistence of housing-related unrest.

On August 20, a soldier was reportedly killed in an ambush on a military convoy in Ain al-

Hammam in Kabylie, known to be a stronghold for militants.

Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions

regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel

recommendations.

Housing-related unrest

Following the August 1 earthquake the Algerian government reportedly promised residents

of shantytowns whose houses had been affected by the natural disaster would be relocated,

in the framework of a broader campaign to lower the amount of substandard housing in the

country. The earthquake, however, led to several protests, including in Algiers on August 2,

and local authorities are reportedly overwhelmed by the number of demands for relocation.

With this in mind, we assess that frustration over the perceived lack of government

response to the crisis likely has fueled existing unrest, which may sporadically materialize

with protests, including in Algiers' numerous shantytowns.

Militancy in Kabylie

The August 20 attack on a military convoy in the city of Ain al-Hammam in Kabylie is similar

to a previous attack which occurred on April 19-20 in Iboudraren, a few kilometers away

from Ain al-Hammam, and was claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In this

context the attack serves as a reminder that Kabylie remains a stronghold for the group,

while also being critical for Algeria's security due to its proximity to the capital. With this in

mind, the attack underscores militants' ability to stage unsophisticated attacks against

security forces operating in the region, while we continue to assess that ongoing counter-

insurgency operations will likely prevent militants from moving freely and attacking other,

more desirable, targets, including in Algiers.

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MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates

Bahrain

Relative uptick in opposition activity recorded during August surrounding Bahrain's

unofficial Independence Day on August 15 and Saudi Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr’s trial dates.

Claims of attacks against security forces to condemn al-Nimr's ongoing trial by Shiite

militant groups highlight shared interests between the opposition and militants.

Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society's August 23 al-Daih march condemning Bahrain's

naturalization policies suggests attempt to utilize broader issues to garner support.

Travel to Manama's business and diplomatic districts can continue at this time, while

adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and low-level militancy.

Opposition

Although Independence Day is not officially celebrated until December, opposition groups,

including official parties, called for participation in rallies, highlighting the continuing use of

symbolic dates to mobilize the opposition. Meanwhile, al-Nimr, who is facing a death

sentence, had his trial postponed three times in August, triggering protests, particularly

surrounding these dates. This includes a February 14 Youth Coalition schedule. Such protests

highlight the symbolism of al-Nimr as a Shiite opposition figure along with feelings of

solidarity with Saudi Shiites. This is likely connected to the shared perception of

marginalization by the country’s ruling Sunni families. In this context, further protests in

solidarity with al-Nimr are likely, particularly in the event of a death sentence or continued

postponements of his trial.

Unsophisticated acts of militancy by Shiite militant groups

Such militancy, which include claims by al-Mukhtar Brigades on August 6 and August 11 and

by al-Karar Brigades on August 13 as a warning to Saudi Arabia against issuing a death

sentence to al-Nimr. These incidents not only underscore the aforementioned symbolism of

al-Nimr and perceptions of solidarity with Saudi Shiites, it also underscores the shared

interests between militant groups and the opposition, given the simultaneous February 14

Youth Coalition schedule. That said, while a relative uptick may be recorded surrounding al-

Nimr's trial dates or in the event of a death sentence, the persistency of militancy suggests

that they will continue even when al-Nimr is less relevant.

Al-Wefaq condemns naturalization of foreigners

Given that the opposition previously accused the government of naturalizing Sunnis to alter

Bahrain's demographic makeup, al-Wefaq's condemnation of the naturalization of foreigners

more broadly as against the interests of all Bahrainis may be an attempt to garner more

widespread support. This is highlighted by statements that the government is spending more

money on naturalized rather than indigenous Bahrainis. Additionally, despite their boycott

of the Fall elections, al-Wefaq may also be seeking to increase support should it participate.

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MEDIUM RISK

Iran Planned September 1 meeting between EU's Catherine Ashton and Iranian FM

Mohammed Javad Zarif regarding progress on nuclear talks underscores both sides'

efforts to proceed with discussions and achieve an agreement.

US Treasury's August 29 additions to the sanctions list highlights continued enforcement

of sanctions during the interim agreement, but is unlikely to significantly affect talks.

Western nationals are advised against all nonessential travel to Iran due to persistent

negative sentiment toward Westerners. For non-Western nationals, travel to Tehran,

Esfahan, and other major cities in Iran may continue.

Nuclear negotiations

Reports indicate that the meeting in Brussels will not discuss issues of substance but the

organization of talks ahead of the November 24 extended deadline. The meeting points

to a likely upcoming restart in negotiations following a recent break, further

underscored by reports that meetings will be held on the sidelines of the September UN

General Assembly meeting in New York. Given the relatively short length of the

extension and remaining gaps between sides, it is possible that the schedule of talks will

be more similar to the frequent and intense meetings witnessed toward the end of the

six month period.

Both sides are interested in achieving a final status agreement, highlighted by reports

that Iran is redesigning the Arak Heavy Water Reactor. They also remain committed to

preserving interests. For the P5+1, this includes limiting Iran's breakout ability, as Iran

looks to maintain a specific capability of its nuclear program and mitigate perceptions of

capitulation. Meanwhile, reports state that both sides' continue to adhere to the

extended interim agreement. While the Secretary General planned "how to move ahead

with the existing practical measures" during his August 17 visit, the deadline for such

measures passed on August 25 without confirmation that Iran had met such a deadline.

This is underlined by the absence of new "practical measures" and may indicate

continued concerns by the IAEA.

US Sanctions

The reported US sanctions do not represent expanded sanctions, but the enforcement of

existing sanctions and, thus, do not violate the interim agreement. President Rouhani's

reported statement that they are "in conflict with the spirit of talks" is similar to descriptions

of previous actions, including the US blacklisting of companies in December 2013. However,

despite the likelihood of increased rhetoric condemning such action, and potential symbolic

actions, we assess that this is unlikely to significantly affect talks. This is underscored both by

the interest in both parties to reach a final status agreement, along with the failure of similar

additions to sanctions lists.

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MEDIUM RISK & HIGH RISK Israel – Notable Dates

Palestinian Territories –Notable Dates

Israel & Palestinian Territories

Hostilities between Israel and Gaza based militants continued intermittently during

August; both parties are likely to continually adhere to the August 26 unlimited ceasefire

ahead of renewed negotiations in late September.

Wide gaps between the Israeli, Palestinian negotiators over August 5-19 likely to

complicate agreement on comprehensive, long-term ceasefire.

Uptick in Palestinian unrest and militancy witnessed throughout the West Bank and East

Jerusalem in recent weeks.

Those operating or residing in Israel, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, should adhere

to all IDF Home Front Command guidelines regarding early warning sirens for incoming

rockets. We advise against all travel to the Gaza Strip at this time due to continuous

border crossing closures and the threat of militant activity.

Hostilities between Israel and Gaza-based militants

During much of August, hostilities continued between Gaza-based militants and Israel,

however, at a lower rate than the previous month. This was the result of intermittent

ceasefires, as well as a general period of attrition warfare from August 18-26. In that period,

rocket and mortar barrages from Gaza were fired at high-frequency towards southern Israel.

Rockets also targeted Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In the evening hours of August 26, a ceasefire

was approved by both parties. Although several ceasefires have already collapsed, we assess

that the main belligerents seek to hold fire for a month's time until negotiations resume.

Nonetheless, there remains a possibility that the ceasefire will again be breached.

Wide gaps in negotiations for long-term ceasefire

During the period of August 5-19, intermittent ceasefires were held correspondingly to

negotiations in Cairo for a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.

However, due to wide gaps between the two parties, such an agreement has still failed to

materialize. In this context, we assess that when negotiations resume in around a month's

time, there will remain significant obstacles to achieving a more permanent agreement.

Moreover, an escalation in hostile rhetoric is likely during this period as well.

West Bank unrest and militancy

Along with the exacerbated tensions that surrounded hostilities between Israel and militants

in Gaza, unrest, as well as localized acts of militancy, was witnessed on a near-daily base

throughout the West Bank and Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods. Despite the new ceasefire,

given the death toll as a result of hostilities in Gaza, we assess that tensions will remain

exacerbated in these areas, while additional incidents of unrest, as well as localized attacks,

are likely to be recorded over the coming days.

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MEDIUM RISK

Jordan

Military deployments bolstered on borders with Iraq and Syria amidst increased

concerns over Islamic State (IS) gains near Jordan's borders.

While travel to Amman can continue as normal, we advise avoiding the vicinity of the

al-Husseini Mosque and al-Nakheel Square on Fridays, given heightened police

presence and increased risk for localized unrest, as the area is the traditional route of

opposition marches.

Increased defensive measures along Syria-Iraq border

Given increasing concerns over the Islamic State's gains near Jordan's borders, the Minister

of Information on August 17 said the deployments “were taken as precautionary measures

to defend the Kingdom’s eastern borders, following recent Islamic State (IS) militants’

successful campaigns”. Since IS’s major gains in Iraq, concerns in Jordan regarding spillover

violence have increased. This is highlighted by the heightened security deployments along

the border following the temporary capture of the Turaibil border crossing by IS militants

on June 22 among other measures. That being said, despite the IS’s recent territorial gains,

including in Syria, we assess that such security deployments remain largely precautionary at

this time. In this context, despite the IS militant group's significant territorial control in Iraq’s

Anbar Province, which neighbors Jordan, as well as allegations that IS has a cell in Ma’an,

there remains a limited risk for spillover violence at this time. This is largely a result of the

consistent and successful security measures implemented by Jordanian security forces

throughout the country, and particularly along its borders.

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MEDIUM RISK

Morocco

On August 15, anti-aircraft batteries are reportedly deployed in Casablanca's el-Hank

district along with tanks, indicating growing threat of regional militancy and heightened

Moroccan security measures.

On August 10, security forces reportedly dismantled an Islamic State (IS)-linked militant

cell at the Toulal Prison in Meknes, reflecting a growing awareness to dangers of jihadist

recruiting.

Travel to Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakech may continue while adhering to security

precautions regarding civil unrest and terrorism.

Heightened regional security measures

While Moroccan authorities have not commented on the reported deployments, the extent

and placement reflect the potential for an imminent attack. These measures came amidst

similar deployments in Algeria, suggesting these precautions were taken specifically with

regard to a possible aerial attack emanating from Libya. While Morocco has been relatively

less exposed to the level of militancy experienced elsewhere in North Africa, several trends

have been exacerbated during past months, including regional concerns over the return of

militants coming from Iraq and Syria, the deterioration of the situation in Libya, as well as

the increasing dismantling of jihadist recruitment cells in Morocco. In this context, Morocco

may assess that the level of threat against its facilities is now similar to the ones experienced

by other North African countries, thus calling for similar security measures.

Jihadist recruiting

While the militants’ exact activities inside the Moroccan prison remain unknown, it is likely

that the alleged cell was recruiting prisoners for militant activity in Iraq and Syria. This

assessment is underlined by recent arrests of similar recruiting cells on July 28 and June 25.

Furthermore, a reported 1,500 Moroccan nationals are thought to be operating in militant

groups in Iraq and Syria, with some 30 percent of those estimated to be former convicts.

Convicts are likely an attractive target for recruiters due to the state’s inability to limit

radicalization inside prisons, as well as a lack of reintegration programs following prisoners’

release. With this in mind, other such recruiting cells likely continue to operate within

Moroccan prisons. In this context, further such arrests are likely to be reported in the

coming weeks and months, underlined by the growing awareness among Moroccan officials

of the threat such militants represent to Morocco upon their return. This assessment is

reflected by Justice Minister Mustapha Ramid’s 2013 statement, “Our country will not be

safe even if only a hundred out of the hundreds of men who left to fight in Syria return.”

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MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates

Saudi Arabia

August 25 arrests of alleged recruiters, sentencing of 17 suspected militants for, among

others, "joining an extremist group inside the country" highlights continued crackdown

against those connected to militant jihadist organizations.

Low turnouts continue to be recorded at marches organized by Shiite opposition,

including at solidarity marches for detained Saudi Shiite Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Travel to Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah can continue as normal while adhering to

basic security precautions and cultural norms. Maintain heightened vigilance in the

Qatif region, due to Shiite opposition activity, while avoiding nonessential travel to the

border areas with Yemen and Iraq, given the potential for spillover unrest.

Crackdown against militancy

Continued crackdowns are likely connected to Saudi Arabia's ongoing concern with being

targeted by militant jihadist groups and particularly citizens returning from fighting abroad.

In this context, not only is the royal family largely perceived among Sunni jihadists as

insufficiently Muslim, but an uptick in attacks in the country in the 2000s were largely

attributed to those returning from fighting and/or training in Afghanistan. With this in mind,

such crackdowns are liable to continue, along with additional efforts to dissuade jihadist

activity, underscored by the Grand Mufti's recent statement that called on "young people

not to follow claims of jihad… under unknown banners and perverted principles".

Meanwhile, we continue to assess that the capability of the country's security and

intelligence services are liable to prevent major attacks, highlighted by the relatively limited

casualties sustained in the July 4-5 attack at the Wadia border crossing despite six attackers,

including two suicide bombers.

Shiite opposition

The prevailing status quo in the Eastern Province's Shiite populated Qatif region has

persisted throughout August, with small-scale opposition protests regularly called for and

concluding without unrest. This includes during those scheduled in solidarity with the

detained Sheikh al-Nimr, who is reportedly facing a death sentence. While neighboring

Bahrain witnessed multiple small-scale protests, tire fires, and unsophisticated acts of

militancy in days surrounding his trials on August 12 and 24, Qatif saw a continuation of its

typical demonstrations, complete with low turnout, albeit at a relatively higher frequency

surrounding August 24. In this context, it is possible that opposition activity in Saudi Arabia is

perceived as incapable of effecting change, while many may be wary of participating in

demonstrations given that arrests of activists still continue to occur. With this in mind, this

trend is liable to continue in the coming weeks, while we continue to assess that the

government's failure to enact concrete change may trigger gradually increased

dissatisfaction and a potential uptick in unrest in the long term.

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MEDIUM RISK

Tunisia

Tunisian Ministry of Interior announces the dismantling of five militant cells operating in

four Tunis neighborhoods and one in the city of Kairouan on August 7.

Amidst deteriorating security conditions linked to the crisis in Libya, security forces at

the Ras Jedir border were placed on high alert and suspend activity at their border on

August 1. In addition, Tunisian Ministry of Transport closed their airspace to flights

emanating from Libya as of August 21.

Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding

militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based tactical monitoring and

ground support options.

Uptick in Militancy

The discovery of car bombs in the militant's arsenal represents a notable shift in tactics. Past

militant tactics have largely involved the use of small arms and improvised explosive devices.

In this context we assess militants are likely attempting to destabilize the country ahead of

parliamentary and presidential elections slated to begin in October. Islamist groups have in

the past attempted to derail the political process to create further divisions between Islamist

and anti-Islamist. In this context, security forces are likely to widen the crackdown on

Islamist militants groups in both major cities and outlying areas in the lead up to elections.

With this in mind, the high degree of monitoring in Tunisia may mitigate militant threat, as is

underscored by the timely arrest.

Borders and airspace on high alert

The decision by Tunisian authorities to order a number of temporary border closures

stemmed from concerns regarding the deteriorating situation in Libya highlighted by the

shooting of a Tunisian border guard on August 1, followed by the killing of an Egyptian

national by Libyan border control on July 31. Although the Ras Jedir border has reopened,

concerns remain in Tunisia regarding the potential infiltration of militants and weapons. The

threat of Libyan militancy on Tunisian territory is further highlighted by the decision of the

Tunisian Department of Transport to close their airspace to all flights from Libya and cancel

all Tunisian flights from Libyan airports amidst rumors of 11 unaccounted for aircrafts in

Tripoli International Airport. That being said, regarding the threat of an airborne attack, we

assess reports of the potential use of civilian planes by jihadists remain largely limited by the

amount of experience required to execute such a highly sophisticated attack.

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MEDIUM RISK

Turkey

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins Presidency on August 10, vacating his role as

Premier and Chairman of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chairman. Foreign

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu becomes Premier, cabinet largely unchanged.

Tensions with Kurds increase following decision of Lice Court to remove the statue of

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) founder, Mahsum Korkmaz in Lice, Diyarbakir, and the

kidnapping of three Chinese workers from a construction plant in Sirnak.

Travel to Istanbul and Ankara may continue, although travelers are advised to remain

vigilant in central areas due to regular anti-government protests and occasional

incidents of unrest in these locales.

Erdogan wins Presidential elections

On August 28, Erdogan gave Davutoglu the mandate to form a new cabinet, which was

announced on August 29. Former President Abdullah Gul resigned, not taking any role in

the new government. The cabinet remains largely the same, but former Minister of

European Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu became Foreign Minister; and former advisor to

Erdogan, Yalcin Akdogan and another close ally, Numan Kurtulmus, became deputy

premiers. Meanwhile, Deputy PM responsible for the Economy Ali Babacan, and Finance

Minister Mehmet Simsek retained their posts.

The fact that the majority of positions remained the same highlights the likely

continuation of Erdogan's policies as well as his influence over the cabinet. This is further

underscored by the inclusion of Akdogan and Kurtulmus, as Deputy PMs. Meanwhile,

Cavusoglu's promotion to FM highlights the Turkish leadership's desire to demonstrate

continued openness to Europe, which Erdogan and Davutoglu stated as an aim. Similarly,

Babacan and Simsek retaining their positions, was likely meant to maintain economic

stability. In this context, we assess that these moves are intended to reassure foreign

investor confidence in Turkey, particularly given Babacan's leadership of the "rational

camp" that favors market-friendly policies against the "ideological camp" in the AKP.

Kurdish tensions heightened in southeast

In addition to the protest in Lice, additional clashes were reported between Kurds and

security forces in predominantly Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. The kidnapping highlights

the continued opposition to construction projects in Kurdish areas, which the Kurds view as

exploitation of and encroachment onto their territory by the central government. In the

context of the continued stagnation in the peace process between the government and the

PKK, we assess that this abduction may have aimed to prevent work on the plant and

pressure the government with regards to the talks. We assess that Turkey may increase

security measures in Kurdish areas, potentially resulting in further clashes and unrest.

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LOW RISK

Kuwait

The Cabinet's July 21 revocation of five citizenships, including two connected to the

opposition, and subsequent revocation of 10 others highlights continued crackdown by

the government on elements perceived to be threatening national stability.

Unconfirmed reports that Social Affairs Ministry ordered eight branches of three

charities closed, temporarily detained two Kuwaitis recently sanctioned by the US and

UN underscores increased actions against parties connected to financing of militancy.

Travel to Kuwait can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions

regarding civil unrest and militancy.

Revocation of citizenship

The 10 revocations reportedly include Sheikh Nabil al-Awadhi, who is allegedly involved

in fundraising for Syrian jihadist groups. This also follows US sanctions against two

Kuwaiti nationals who allegedly have ties to al-Awadhi, one of which was also included

in later similar UN sanctions. Given that those targeted for citizenship revocation include

individuals with links to jihadist groups and the opposition, the government is likely

utilizing such revocations to target those deemed to pose a threat to the country.

These measures also come amidst the authorities' interest in preventing further large-

scale protests, similar to those in July. Therefore, we continue to assess that the absence

of demonstrations since early July may suggest the efficacy of such measures. Amidst

reports that the government will continue to revoke citizenships for those “found

undeserving”, unqualified, or if they obtained it fraudulently, additional such revocations

are possible. Moreover, Kuwaitis, particularly naturalized citizens that seem to comprise

those whose citizenships were revoked, are likely wary of being targeted. However,

August 13 reports of a law establishing a Constitutional Court suggests a potential path

to contest revocations and the possibility that those affected and opposition parties will

attempt to fight these measures via the new court, rather than through protests.

Government action against militancy/jihadist organizations

According to the unconfirmed reports, the charities' branches were closed due to violations,

including "not having construction licenses for the building used". However, all three

charities reportedly maintain connections to militant organizations, the Muslim

Brotherhood, and/or radical preachers. Thus, the closures were likely triggered by these

connections rather than the minor violations. Moreover the aforementioned detainments

involved the aforementioned two Kuwaitis sanctioned by the US and UN for financing

militant jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria, suggesting their detentions were related to these

accusations; however, no charges have reportedly been filed at this time. This underscores

the government’s concern with supporting jihadist organizations, likely seen as a threat to

Kuwait's security, particularly given the presence of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq.

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LOW RISK

Qatar

Reported resolution of rift within Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) underscores interest

within organization to maintain, demonstrate unity.

Continued involvement in negotiations to release various parties abducted by militant

jihadist groups highlights likely interest in larger and perceived vital role.

Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding

making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials.

Rift with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain

Following the GCC foreign ministers meeting on August 30, reports indicate that the intra-

organizational rift between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain

on the other has been settled. According to a statement from Oman's FM, "the crisis in the

Gulf has been resolved" while Kuwait's official news agency quoted the Kuwaiti FM as saying

that the member states "have agreed on the importance of implementing commitments",

likely referring to the April Riyadh Agreement. In this context, continued efforts and the

reported resolution underscores the interest preserving the GCC institution and

demonstrating unity, despite certain differing interests and policies. This is likely particularly

important to Saudi Arabia, which perceives the organization as a counter-balance to its

regional rival Iran, and may be seen as increasingly necessary amidst a rise in militant

jihadism throughout the region.

Foreign Policy

In recent weeks, increasing reports regarding Qatar's role in mediation have surfaced.

Most notably, it assisted in securing the release of an American journalist detained by

the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front in Syria, with subsequent reports stating that it is

working to negotiate the release of additional Americans also held in Syria. Doha is also

reportedly involved in mediation efforts to release Lebanese soldiers captured by al-

Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Arsal. In March, Qatar assisted in releasing 12 nuns

abducted in Syria.

Qatar has previously pursued a foreign policy that aimed to play a larger regional role

while maintaining relationships with various parties—from the Taliban to Hamas to the

West—potentially as an insurance policy. That said, rising criticism since the 2011

regional unrest regarding the country's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and

allegations that it funds militant jihadist groups may also have contributed to an

increasingly visibility in mediation efforts as a means of demonstrating it plays a vital

role. At the same time, the country's ability to successfully mediate has similarly

increased speculation regarding Qatar's links with such organizations, while also

triggering allegations that it pays ransom to secure the abductees' release, effectively

financing militant jihadists.

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LOW RISK

Middle East and North Africa: MERS-CoV Update

● The World Health Organization (WHO) stated in its most recent report from July 23 that

it had been informed of 837 laboratory confirmed cases worldwide, including 291

deaths. Notably, there have been new updates during the month of August from WHO,

the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), and the US Center for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

● Despite concerns of greater spread of the virus in Saudi Arabia during the month of

Ramadan, only 10 new cases were recorded.

● Those traveling or residing in the Middle East, particularly in countries witnessing

recent reports of infections, are advised to practice common virus prevention

methods, such as hand washing, and avoid contact with sick persons. Consult with a

doctor if experiencing symptoms of the virus, which often include a combination of

fever with cough or difficulty breathing. As a general precaution, and in line with

advisories issued, it is recommended to avoid contact with camels when possible,

while refraining from consuming camel products in affected countries.

CURRENT SITUATION

The lack of updates in August from the WHO, ECDC, and CDC may be connected the

virus’ slower rate of infection, underscored by a significantly reduced number of new

cases recorded throughout the region. Note that any differences between number of

cases recorded by WHO and other countries is likely connect to delays in reporting by

Ministry of Health officials.

In Saudi Arabia, on August 22, although preventive measures have largely reduced the

spread of the virus, a 66-year-old individual died from the virus, increasing the total

number of deaths throughout the Kingdom to 301 out of 723 infections. In addition, on

August 12, the Ministry of Health (MoH) reported two cases of MERS-CoV. This followed

approximately a month without new reports of infections in the country, with previous

cases recorded on July 10. Additionally, the MoH stated on August 3 that, despite

increased concerns of multiple infections during the month of Ramadan, the preventive

measures were proven successful as only 10 more cases were recorded.

In Bahrain, the official news agency reported on August 5 that the country is “stepping

up preventative measures” regarding the Ebola virus, as well as Middle East Respiratory

Syndrome (MERS-CoV). According to the report, entry visas will temporarily be

suspended for nationals from countries affected by Ebola, while the deputy prime

minister “urged all air, maritime and land entry points to be on alert and take maximum

measures in monitoring” visitors from Ebola- and MERS-affected countries. That said, on

August 20, following the dismissal of hundreds of suspected cases, the MoH reportedly

stated that “there are no cases of infections of the virus in Bahrain”.

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Notable Dates for September 2014

Bahrain – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 16, 2014

Trial of Shiite Sheikh

Nimr al-Nimr, who is

detained in Saudi

Arabia.

Given al-Nimr's popularity and past

precedent, multiple small-scale

protests, tire fires, and unsophisticated

acts of militancy condemning his

detainment should be expected

surrounding this date. Remain cognizant

of calls for demonstrations.

Egypt – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 11, 2014

September 27, 2014

Copts celebrate their

New Year. Not an

official public holiday.

A court will hand down

the final verdict in the

Mubarak trial; April 6

Youth Movement

demonstration

scheduled.

Security is likely to be heightened at

Coptic churches due to increased

attendance for the holiday. Maintain

heightened vigilance.

In the event that the court hands down

a light sentence, multiple Islamist and

secular revolutionary protests are likely

in Cairo. Heightened security measures

are likely outside of the Cairo

courthouse. Avoid the vicinity of all

demonstrations.

Israel – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 11, 2005

Israeli cabinet voted

unanimously to end 38-

year occupation of the

Gaza Strip, turning over

control to Palestinian

authority

While the official cabinet decision to

end the occupation of Gaza generally

did not lead to right wing protests, the

evacuation of settlements remains a

more sensitive issue among such

activists, often times resulted in

protests. With this in mind, and

particularly given the general grievances

within Israeli society regarding recent

ceasefire in Gaza, gatherings marking

the day may be witnessed. These are

usually being held in traditional locales

for such protests, like Tel-Aviv’s Rabin

Square.

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September 24-25, 2014

September 28, 2000

Jewish holiday of Rosh

Hashanah will begin at

sundown and last for

one day. In Israel, the

holiday lasts for one

day, while abroad Jews

celebrate two days.

Ariel Sharon visited the

top of the Temple

Mount in Jerusalem and

incited mass protests.

Some claim this event

led to the start of the

Second Palestinian

intifada.

Many places of business will operate in

limited working hours, as government

offices and public transportation will be

closed. In addition, a heightened

security presence, including the closure

of the West Bank, is likely for the

duration of the holiday.

Given past precedent, as well as the

perception among Palestinians that

Sharon’s visit triggered the Second

Intifada, we assess that protests and

unrest marking the date remain

possible. Such protests are likely to be

held throughout the West Bank,

especially in Jenin, Hebron and Nablus,

as well as in East Jerusalem’s Arab

neighborhoods.

Palestinian Territories – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 28, 2000

Ariel Sharon visited the

top of the Temple

Mount in Jerusalem and

incited mass protests.

Some claim this event

led to the start of the

Second Palestinian

intifada.

Given past precedent, as well as the

perception among Palestinians that

Sharon’s visit triggered the Second

Intifada, we assess that protests and

unrest marking the date remain

possible. Such protests are likely to be

held throughout the West Bank,

especially in Jenin, Hebron and Nablus,

as well as in East Jerusalem’s Arab

neighborhoods.

Saudi Arabia – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 16, 2014

Trial of Shiite Sheikh

Nimr al-Nimr.

Given al-Nimr's popularity and past

precedent, small-scale Shiite opposition

protests are likely to be called

surrounding this date, with a potential

uptick in the event he is given a death

sentence. Recent protests, however,

have concluded without incident.

Remain cognizant of calls for

demonstrations in the Eastern

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September 23, 1932

National Day marks the

unification of the

kingdom by founder

King Abdulaziz in 1932.

Province's Qatif region.

Closures should be expected on

September 23, or on another day that

will be announced ahead of time to

mark National Day, along with

celebrations, parades, and traffic

congestion. Allot extra time for travel

throughout the country while

confirming itineraries ahead of time.

Shiite opposition demonstrations in the

Eastern Province, particularly Qatif, are

also possible. Remain cognizant for such

calls, while avoiding the immediate

vicinity of all protests.

Yemen – Back to portion

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

September 1, 2014

September 26, 1962

September 1 marks the

anniversary of the

founding of the army of

the former People's

Democratic Republic of

Yemen (PDRY or "South

Yemen") and the first

"martyr" of the

Southern Mobility

Movement (SMM, also

known as the "South

Movement" or al-Hirak).

Revolution Day

commemorates the

ouster of Shiite Imam

Mohammad al-Badr's

rule in 1962 and led to

the creation of the

Yemen Arab Republic

(YAR or "North

Yemen"). It also marked

Given the symbolism of the anniversary

date as well as past precedent,

commemorative marches and activities

that also call for independence are likely

in various locales in the south in

addition to those planned in Mukalla

and Aden's Shaykh Uthman District.

High turnouts numbering in the high

thousands to tens of thousands are

likely, particularly in the main

demonstration in Mukalla, with likely

relatively lower turnout in Aden. An

increased security presence should be

expected along with the potential for

clashes. Avoid the locales of all such

rallies.

Closures and commemorative

ceremonies are likely to be held,

including in Sanaa as well as elsewhere

in the former YAR governorates. Shiite

Houthi protests condemning the ouster

of the Shiite monarchy are also

possible, while the former PDRY

governorates are liable to call for rallies

to mark the beginning of the civil war

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the beginning of the

civil war with the PDRY.

and call for independence. In Sanaa,

plan itineraries ahead of time while

allotting extra time for travel. Avoid all

protests, government buildings, and

large scale gatherings throughout the

country.

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