middle east & north africa regional summary...middle east & north africa regional summary...
TRANSCRIPT
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Middle East & North Africa Regional Summary
September 2014
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
Month Day, Year Executive Summary
After 50 days of hostilities between Israel and Gaza-based militant groups, the sides have
agreed to an unlimited ceasefire with negotiations on more comprehensive issues to begin in
one month's time. Tensions in the Palestinian Territories nonetheless remain high, however,
with the possibility of renewed fighting in the coming weeks should negotiations fail. In
Lebanon, tensions remain high in the Bekaa Valley, as Syrian rebel jihadists continue to
engage Lebanese forces despite the militants’ ouster from Arsal. In Syria, the US
contemplates further military action against the Islamic State (IS), as the group makes gains
against both the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and rival militant factions. In Iraq, American
airstrikes have facilitated Kurdish advances around Mosul.
Similarly, concerns over the return of Islamic State militants continue to increase in North
Africa. Moroccan authorities have particularly expressed concerns over regarding such
threats, while additionally heightening security measures and deployments in major cities
due to rising instability in Libya. In this context, rumors have circulated regarding the threat
of airborne attacks emanating from Libya due to ongoing clashes in the vicinity of Tripoli
International Airport, leading to the Moroccan security measures, as well as the closure of
Tunisian airspace to flights from Libya and unconfirmed reports of the deployment of anti-
aircraft batteries in Algeria. Finally, in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood protests continued over
the month of August, albeit with lower turnouts after the August 14 anniversary of the
military's crackdown on the main Brotherhood protest encampments in 2013.
In the GCC, concerns remain high regarding the proliferation of militant jihadism across the
region, as governments, such as in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, crackdown on suspected
members and financiers of such groups. With the organization, however, efforts to resolve
the intra-GCC conflict have reportedly proven successful. Meanwhile, near-daily militancy,
albeit unsophisticated, continues in Bahrain, along with small-scale protests and efforts by
official opposition groups to remain relevant. In the southern Arabian Peninsula, Yemen's
government is confronted with opposition to fuel subsidy cuts, as Shiite Houthis establish
protest camps in Sanaa. Amidst reports of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's increasing
presence in the oil-rich Hadramaut Governorate and the ever-present southern secessionist
movement, the country continues to struggle with instability and persistent violence.
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e3
The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the
past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.
EXTREME RISK
Syria ....................................................................................................................................... 4
HIGH RISK
Egypt ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Iraq......................................................................................................................................... 6
Lebanon ................................................................................................................................. 7
Libya....................................................................................................................................... 8
Yemen .................................................................................................................................... 9
MEDIUM RISK
Algeria .................................................................................................................................. 10
Bahrain ................................................................................................................................ 11
Iran....................................................................................................................................... 12
Israel & Palestinian Territories ............................................................................................ 13
Jordan .................................................................................................................................. 14
Morocco .............................................................................................................................. 15
Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................................... 16
Tunisia ................................................................................................................................. 17
Turkey .................................................................................................................................. 18
LOW RISK
Kuwait .................................................................................................................................. 19
Qatar .................................................................................................................................... 20
Middle East and North Africa: MERS-CoV Update ............................................................. 21
Notable Dates for September 2014 ................................................................................. 22
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e4
Islamic State (IS) militants capture Tabqa military airbase on August 24, consolidating
control over the entire Raqqa Province for the first time since the outbreak of the Syrian
Civil War in 2011.
US reportedly authorizes aerial reconnaissance missions over Syrian territory to combat
IS following the execution of an American journalist on August 19.
Syrian rebel militants capture Quneitra border crossing and kidnap UN peacekeepers
amidst errant mortar fire by Syrian Arab Army (SAA) into Israeli territory.
We advise against all travel to Damascus, given the general threat of indiscriminate
aerial bombardment and artillery shelling from government forces as well as attacks
by various militant groups. Attacks by rebel forces may include the use of rocket
propelled grenades, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks.
Raqqa Province
The IS seizure of the Tabqa military airbase is a notable gain for the militant group
considering that the airbase has been an active forward operating base for the Syrian Arab
Army’s (SAA) aerial bombardment campaigns in northeastern Syria. With this in mind, the
Assad regime’s abilities to conduct bombing raids in northern Syria will be significantly
diminished. Meanwhile the military hardware captured by IS militants, including a myriad of
surface-to-air missile launchers will likely improve the capabilities of IS militants, mainly in
countering Iraqi and Syrian aircraft.
US intervention
Despite reluctance to become further involved in the Syrian Civil War, the White House has
faced increased pressure to act more forcefully against IS following their gains, the execution
of the aforementioned American, and the launching of US airstrikes against such militant
sites in Iraq on beginning on August 8. There is a growing sentiment within the US
administration that successfully countering IS would require military action beyond the
borders of Iraq. The US has already announced plans to form a regional coalition of Arab
states to address the threat of IS militancy. Any military intervention, most likely in the form
of aerial surveillance and possible airstrikes, is unlikely to be implemented without support
from the recently formed regional coalition of Arab states.
Quneitra
The capture of the Quneitra border crossing and the subsequent kidnapping of 43 UN
peacekeepers by a coalition of Syrian militants underscores a renewed rebel offensive into
the Quneitra Province. At this time there is no evidence to suggest that the aforementioned
Syrian rebel groups have a strategic interest in immediately targeting Israeli territory or
engaging in clashes with the IDF.
Back to table of contents
EXTREME RISK
Syria
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e5
HIGH RISK Notable Dates
Egypt
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters demonstrate on August 14, call for further
demonstrations in bid to gain momentum.
Multiple attacks on electrical infrastructures reported, likely meant to exacerbate power
shortages, instigate public protests.
Egyptian forces raise security measures in Sinai amidst heightened militancy threat.
We advise against all nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at this time due to
the persistent risk of civil unrest in major cities, militant attacks, and violence targeting
foreigners.
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood unrest
Following a series of protests in commemoration of the 2013 Rabaa al-Adawiyah Square
dispersal, in which hundreds of Brotherhood protesters were killed, the pro National Alliance
to Support Legitimacy (NASL) called for renewed protests, due to a relative decline in the
turnouts of the commemorations after several days. We assess the call for renewed protests
an NASL attempt to regain momentum and that further such protests are likely to be
witnessed over the coming weeks in Muslim Brotherhood strongholds in Cairo. Furthermore,
such unrest may result in the targeting of security forces and infrastructure, including mobile
phone networks, electricity facilities, and public transportation installations.
Electrical infrastructure under attack
Given that Egypt is in the midst of an electricity crisis, with daily cuts affecting households
between five and nine hours each day, we assess that militants who sympathize with the
Muslim Brotherhood are likely seeking to exacerbate Egypt’s electricity issues. Extending
and widening the scale of power outages would likely feed into public frustration with the
government, and may lead to demonstrations against the government’s seeming inability to
provide citizens with enough power. Furthermore, Egypt is estimated to have about 140,000
pylons nationwide, making them difficult to secure. In this context, attacks on electricity
infrastructure are likely to continue in the coming weeks.
Heightened Sinai militancy threat
A series of bombings and security crackdowns resulting in the arrest and killing of numerous
militants underscores an uptick in militancy throughout the Sinai Peninsula, particularly
since early July, following the commencement of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.
This widened crackdown may be connected to a heightened militant threat linked with
Egypt’s perceived complicity with such offensive. Egypt may further be countering a
potential uptick in militancy stemming from the commemoration of the August 14
anniversary, as militants generally seek to stage attacks during such symbolic dates.
Counter-insurgency operations are likely to continue over the coming weeks and months.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e6
HIGH RISK
Iraq
PM al-Maliki announces resignation on August 14 following significant domestic and
international pressure. Fellow Shiite Dawa Party member, Haider al-Abadi, granted
mandate to form government.
President Obama authorizes airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) militants, which have,
since August 8, aided Kurdish forces to recapture parts of northern Iraq. Near-daily
attacks continue to target security forces and Shiite areas of Baghdad.
It is advised to defer all travel to Baghdad at this time due to increasing violence in
areas surrounding the capital and the risk of a broad deterioration of security
conditions.
Haider al-Abadi to form new government
Despite the September 11 deadline, no new government has been announced thus far.
Reports indicated that on August 30, members of the National Alliance to which al-Abadi
belongs, agreed on a division of ministerial posts and will present them to other parties over
the coming days. Meanwhile, Sunni leaders have been proposing demands for greater
autonomy, along with control of security ministries, the elimination of de-Baathification
laws, and the reinstatement of Sunnis into the security forces. At the same time, Kurdish
groups have been calling for control of territories disputed between the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and the central government, funding for the KRG's Peshmerga security
forces, and recognition of KRG oil deals with international companies. With all that in mind,
we therefore assess that the government formation process will likely be prolonged,
exceeding the September 11 deadline, thus, further delaying necessary measures for
restoring stability.
US airstrikes assist Kurds in fight against IS
US airstrikes in Iraq were crucial in assisting Kurdish Peshmerga to drive IS militants from
the Mosul Dam area and allowing the Peshmerga to take over days later. Airstrikes also
targeted IS in other areas of northern Iraq, including Mount Sinjar. The aerial campaigns,
which focused on neutralizing defending IS fighters, halting their advances, as well as
destroying their equipment, coincides with various international actors sending military
supplies to the KRG. Meanwhile, NATO reportedly voiced readiness to consider
supporting operations in Iraq. We assess that the US and its allies are likely to expand
their involvement in the fighting against IS in Iraq, including by expanding airstrikes.
Meanwhile, the continuation of bombings in the capital indicates that IS militants are
attempting to force the continued deployment of security forces to the capital as
opposed to reinforcing troops at the fronts, in more outlying areas of the country.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e7
HIGH RISK
Lebanon
Fighting between Lebanese security forces and Syrian militant groups in Arsal
underscores notable uptick in spillover violence emanating from Syria.
Presidential power vacuum continues amidst increased Parliamentary deadlock between
March 8 and March 14 political blocs.
We advise against all nonessential travel to Lebanon at this time, restricting essential
travel to Beirut’s northwestern districts. Before traveling, ensure that contingency and
emergency evacuation plans remain updated, as sectarian attacks in Lebanon can
quickly deteriorate into broader violence.
Spillover Violence
Following the arrest of Imad Ahmed Jomaa, an alleged Syrian commander of the al-Qaeda-
affiliated al-Nusra Front on August 2, several days of clashes ensued between Lebanese
security forces and Syrian militants from the al-Nusra Front as well as the Islamic State (IS).
29 Lebanese soldiers were abducted by both al-Nusra Front and IS militants, underscoring a
strategy in which rival Syrian militant groups have joined together to defend their positions
in the porous border areas between Lebanon and Syria. In this context, given that Arsal has
long acted as the predominant hub and launching point for Syrian militant attacks in
Lebanon, we assess that there may be a greater frequency of militancy in and possibly
emanating from this area. This is most likely to occur in the form of attacks against Lebanese
security forces and checkpoints in the Bekaa Valley, as well as outlying areas of Beirut.
Moreover, attempted militant attacks, including suicide bombings against Shiite targets in
south Beirut remain possible. However, Lebanese security forces have already announced
the launch of a new phase of the country’s security plan for the Bekaa Valley, which will see
an increase in the frequency of raids against Sunni militant groups and bolstered border
patrols to prevent militants from infiltrating Lebanon through the porous Syrian border.
Presidential Power Vacuum
Despite increased efforts by Christian politicians within the March 14 Alliance to elect a new
president, the coalition is likely to block any efforts by the rival March 8 Alliance to reform
the presidential election process through direct elections. The parliamentary bill which calls
for direct presidential elections, was submitted by March 8 Alliance MPs on August 21;
however, given the ongoing legislative deadlock in parliament, it remains unlikely that the
bill will pass, thereby furthering the deadlock. Meanwhile, the political stalemate has led to
an increase in labor strikes and demonstrations by both public sector unions such as the
Syndicate Coordination Committee (SCC), as well as workers from the Electricite du Liban
(EDL), who continue to hold regular protests in the capital and across the country. We assess
that the continued political deadlock is likely to further hinder the chances of resolving
economic and labor-related issues.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e8
HIGH RISK
Libya
On August 23, coalition of pro-Islamist militias seize Tripoli International Airport from
anti-Islamist militias. Despite the setback, an anti-Islamist counter-offensive remains
possible in the coming months.
In Benghazi, clashes continue as militants seize an important headquarters in the city's
Boatni district, prompting an anti-Islamist counter-offensive which is likely to continue.
Meanwhile, Libya's political apparatus has effectively been divided into two authorities,
the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR) and the reappointed General National
Congress (GNC), thus further fueling the divide between the rival sides.
It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent uptick
in violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security
conditions.
Seizure of Tripoli Airport
Following more than a month of fighting near the Airport since the launching of "Libya
Dawn" on July 13, the seizure of the Airport represents a notable setback for anti-Islamist
forces. The HoR claimed to have ordered the withdrawal, and while this remains arguable,
we assess that anti-Islamist militias may fall back and consolidate a more defendable
position on the outskirts of Tripoli, which may lay the ground for a counter-offensive in the
coming months. Moreover, the recent rumors regarding airstrikes by UAE and Egypt in
Tripoli underscore the potential for foreign intervention, further heightened by the
impression that anti-Islamist forces may be losing ground.
Clashes continue in Benghazi
Following the seizure of their headquarters in Boatni in July, and concerns that the Benina
Airport used by Major Khalifa Haftar may also fall, the anti-Islamist Thunderbolt Brigade
reportedly executed a counter-offensive on Boatni and reclaimed control over four camps.
With this in mind, clashes are likely to continue in Benghazi while the potential failure of the
Thunderbolt Brigade to maintain control over Boatni may lead to an Islamist offensive on the
Benina airport.
Uptick in political polarization
The de facto divide between the HoR and the GNC underscores the growing polarization
between a pro-Islamist alliance backed by Misrata and an anti-Islamist coalition backed by
Zintan and Haftar. We assess that such a division, which represents the movement of
military conflicts into the political sphere, may hinder the reaching of an agreement
between the rival sides.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e9
HIGH RISK Notable Dates
Yemen
The government's propensity to use mediation to negotiate resolutions to conflicts
suggests that talks with the Houthis will continue in the coming days and weeks, along
with Houthi protests and counter-protests.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) interest in targeting the military and
government, along with a demonstrated limited ability to successfully counter AQAP,
attacks by the organization are likely to continue in the coming weeks.
Given the credible risk of attacks and kidnappings, avoid all nonessential travel to
Sanaa and Aden, while avoiding overland travel and travel to outlying areas.
Demonstrations
Despite likely continued negotiations, significant obstacles are liable to be confronted,
given the government's interest in preserving the recent fuel subsidy cuts undertaken to
improve the economy and secure an International Monetary Fund loan. In this context,
and given near daily demonstrations since August 18, we further assess that, at least
until an agreement may be reached, the Houthis will continue its demonstrations and
protest camps in Sanaa, with attendance remaining in the thousands.
Counter-protests in Sanaa and Aden witnessing high turnout highlights the likelihood
that such demonstrations will also continue to occur. In this context, any concessions
made by the government to the Houthis holds a high risk to anger sectors of the
population that oppose the Houthis and/or their actions, likely triggering additional
protests even if an agreement is reached that ends Houthi demonstrations in the capital.
Meanwhile, in the former "South Yemen" a counter-protest by Southern Mobility
Movement (SMM) members to a pro-government march in Aden was forcibly dispersed,
resulting in one death and four injuries. Given that a protest condemning the death was
called the following day, along with two symbolic dates in September (the anniversary of
the founding of the PDRY's army and the start of the civil war in 1962), we assess that an
uptick in SMM protests calling for independence may be recorded in September.
AQAP attacks
August 28 and August 14 attacks in Mukalla bearing AQAP's modus operandi and reports of
persistent clashes in central Hadramaut such as al-Qatn, come amidst a security plan that
was reportedly endorsed for the Hadramaut Governorate and reports that AQAP has
increased its presence in the area. Given AQAP's publicly stated plans to continue attacking
military and government targets, along with a likely interest in demonstrating its ongoing
ability to conduct attacks amidst counter-militancy operations, we assess similar attacks and
clashes will continue. They are also likely to continue targeting Houthis, given their claim of
responsibility for an August 24 attack in Sanaa against a protest tent and creation of a
subgroup specifically tasked with attacking Houthis.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
0
MEDIUM RISK
Algeria
A moderate earthquake in the Bay of Algiers on August 1 leads to an uptick in demands
for relocation as well as protests by residents of Algiers' shantytowns, underscoring the
persistence of housing-related unrest.
On August 20, a soldier was reportedly killed in an ambush on a military convoy in Ain al-
Hammam in Kabylie, known to be a stronghold for militants.
Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions
regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel
recommendations.
Housing-related unrest
Following the August 1 earthquake the Algerian government reportedly promised residents
of shantytowns whose houses had been affected by the natural disaster would be relocated,
in the framework of a broader campaign to lower the amount of substandard housing in the
country. The earthquake, however, led to several protests, including in Algiers on August 2,
and local authorities are reportedly overwhelmed by the number of demands for relocation.
With this in mind, we assess that frustration over the perceived lack of government
response to the crisis likely has fueled existing unrest, which may sporadically materialize
with protests, including in Algiers' numerous shantytowns.
Militancy in Kabylie
The August 20 attack on a military convoy in the city of Ain al-Hammam in Kabylie is similar
to a previous attack which occurred on April 19-20 in Iboudraren, a few kilometers away
from Ain al-Hammam, and was claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In this
context the attack serves as a reminder that Kabylie remains a stronghold for the group,
while also being critical for Algeria's security due to its proximity to the capital. With this in
mind, the attack underscores militants' ability to stage unsophisticated attacks against
security forces operating in the region, while we continue to assess that ongoing counter-
insurgency operations will likely prevent militants from moving freely and attacking other,
more desirable, targets, including in Algiers.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
1
MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates
Bahrain
Relative uptick in opposition activity recorded during August surrounding Bahrain's
unofficial Independence Day on August 15 and Saudi Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr’s trial dates.
Claims of attacks against security forces to condemn al-Nimr's ongoing trial by Shiite
militant groups highlight shared interests between the opposition and militants.
Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society's August 23 al-Daih march condemning Bahrain's
naturalization policies suggests attempt to utilize broader issues to garner support.
Travel to Manama's business and diplomatic districts can continue at this time, while
adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and low-level militancy.
Opposition
Although Independence Day is not officially celebrated until December, opposition groups,
including official parties, called for participation in rallies, highlighting the continuing use of
symbolic dates to mobilize the opposition. Meanwhile, al-Nimr, who is facing a death
sentence, had his trial postponed three times in August, triggering protests, particularly
surrounding these dates. This includes a February 14 Youth Coalition schedule. Such protests
highlight the symbolism of al-Nimr as a Shiite opposition figure along with feelings of
solidarity with Saudi Shiites. This is likely connected to the shared perception of
marginalization by the country’s ruling Sunni families. In this context, further protests in
solidarity with al-Nimr are likely, particularly in the event of a death sentence or continued
postponements of his trial.
Unsophisticated acts of militancy by Shiite militant groups
Such militancy, which include claims by al-Mukhtar Brigades on August 6 and August 11 and
by al-Karar Brigades on August 13 as a warning to Saudi Arabia against issuing a death
sentence to al-Nimr. These incidents not only underscore the aforementioned symbolism of
al-Nimr and perceptions of solidarity with Saudi Shiites, it also underscores the shared
interests between militant groups and the opposition, given the simultaneous February 14
Youth Coalition schedule. That said, while a relative uptick may be recorded surrounding al-
Nimr's trial dates or in the event of a death sentence, the persistency of militancy suggests
that they will continue even when al-Nimr is less relevant.
Al-Wefaq condemns naturalization of foreigners
Given that the opposition previously accused the government of naturalizing Sunnis to alter
Bahrain's demographic makeup, al-Wefaq's condemnation of the naturalization of foreigners
more broadly as against the interests of all Bahrainis may be an attempt to garner more
widespread support. This is highlighted by statements that the government is spending more
money on naturalized rather than indigenous Bahrainis. Additionally, despite their boycott
of the Fall elections, al-Wefaq may also be seeking to increase support should it participate.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
2
MEDIUM RISK
Iran Planned September 1 meeting between EU's Catherine Ashton and Iranian FM
Mohammed Javad Zarif regarding progress on nuclear talks underscores both sides'
efforts to proceed with discussions and achieve an agreement.
US Treasury's August 29 additions to the sanctions list highlights continued enforcement
of sanctions during the interim agreement, but is unlikely to significantly affect talks.
Western nationals are advised against all nonessential travel to Iran due to persistent
negative sentiment toward Westerners. For non-Western nationals, travel to Tehran,
Esfahan, and other major cities in Iran may continue.
Nuclear negotiations
Reports indicate that the meeting in Brussels will not discuss issues of substance but the
organization of talks ahead of the November 24 extended deadline. The meeting points
to a likely upcoming restart in negotiations following a recent break, further
underscored by reports that meetings will be held on the sidelines of the September UN
General Assembly meeting in New York. Given the relatively short length of the
extension and remaining gaps between sides, it is possible that the schedule of talks will
be more similar to the frequent and intense meetings witnessed toward the end of the
six month period.
Both sides are interested in achieving a final status agreement, highlighted by reports
that Iran is redesigning the Arak Heavy Water Reactor. They also remain committed to
preserving interests. For the P5+1, this includes limiting Iran's breakout ability, as Iran
looks to maintain a specific capability of its nuclear program and mitigate perceptions of
capitulation. Meanwhile, reports state that both sides' continue to adhere to the
extended interim agreement. While the Secretary General planned "how to move ahead
with the existing practical measures" during his August 17 visit, the deadline for such
measures passed on August 25 without confirmation that Iran had met such a deadline.
This is underlined by the absence of new "practical measures" and may indicate
continued concerns by the IAEA.
US Sanctions
The reported US sanctions do not represent expanded sanctions, but the enforcement of
existing sanctions and, thus, do not violate the interim agreement. President Rouhani's
reported statement that they are "in conflict with the spirit of talks" is similar to descriptions
of previous actions, including the US blacklisting of companies in December 2013. However,
despite the likelihood of increased rhetoric condemning such action, and potential symbolic
actions, we assess that this is unlikely to significantly affect talks. This is underscored both by
the interest in both parties to reach a final status agreement, along with the failure of similar
additions to sanctions lists.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
3
MEDIUM RISK & HIGH RISK Israel – Notable Dates
Palestinian Territories –Notable Dates
Israel & Palestinian Territories
Hostilities between Israel and Gaza based militants continued intermittently during
August; both parties are likely to continually adhere to the August 26 unlimited ceasefire
ahead of renewed negotiations in late September.
Wide gaps between the Israeli, Palestinian negotiators over August 5-19 likely to
complicate agreement on comprehensive, long-term ceasefire.
Uptick in Palestinian unrest and militancy witnessed throughout the West Bank and East
Jerusalem in recent weeks.
Those operating or residing in Israel, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, should adhere
to all IDF Home Front Command guidelines regarding early warning sirens for incoming
rockets. We advise against all travel to the Gaza Strip at this time due to continuous
border crossing closures and the threat of militant activity.
Hostilities between Israel and Gaza-based militants
During much of August, hostilities continued between Gaza-based militants and Israel,
however, at a lower rate than the previous month. This was the result of intermittent
ceasefires, as well as a general period of attrition warfare from August 18-26. In that period,
rocket and mortar barrages from Gaza were fired at high-frequency towards southern Israel.
Rockets also targeted Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In the evening hours of August 26, a ceasefire
was approved by both parties. Although several ceasefires have already collapsed, we assess
that the main belligerents seek to hold fire for a month's time until negotiations resume.
Nonetheless, there remains a possibility that the ceasefire will again be breached.
Wide gaps in negotiations for long-term ceasefire
During the period of August 5-19, intermittent ceasefires were held correspondingly to
negotiations in Cairo for a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
However, due to wide gaps between the two parties, such an agreement has still failed to
materialize. In this context, we assess that when negotiations resume in around a month's
time, there will remain significant obstacles to achieving a more permanent agreement.
Moreover, an escalation in hostile rhetoric is likely during this period as well.
West Bank unrest and militancy
Along with the exacerbated tensions that surrounded hostilities between Israel and militants
in Gaza, unrest, as well as localized acts of militancy, was witnessed on a near-daily base
throughout the West Bank and Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods. Despite the new ceasefire,
given the death toll as a result of hostilities in Gaza, we assess that tensions will remain
exacerbated in these areas, while additional incidents of unrest, as well as localized attacks,
are likely to be recorded over the coming days.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
4
MEDIUM RISK
Jordan
Military deployments bolstered on borders with Iraq and Syria amidst increased
concerns over Islamic State (IS) gains near Jordan's borders.
While travel to Amman can continue as normal, we advise avoiding the vicinity of the
al-Husseini Mosque and al-Nakheel Square on Fridays, given heightened police
presence and increased risk for localized unrest, as the area is the traditional route of
opposition marches.
Increased defensive measures along Syria-Iraq border
Given increasing concerns over the Islamic State's gains near Jordan's borders, the Minister
of Information on August 17 said the deployments “were taken as precautionary measures
to defend the Kingdom’s eastern borders, following recent Islamic State (IS) militants’
successful campaigns”. Since IS’s major gains in Iraq, concerns in Jordan regarding spillover
violence have increased. This is highlighted by the heightened security deployments along
the border following the temporary capture of the Turaibil border crossing by IS militants
on June 22 among other measures. That being said, despite the IS’s recent territorial gains,
including in Syria, we assess that such security deployments remain largely precautionary at
this time. In this context, despite the IS militant group's significant territorial control in Iraq’s
Anbar Province, which neighbors Jordan, as well as allegations that IS has a cell in Ma’an,
there remains a limited risk for spillover violence at this time. This is largely a result of the
consistent and successful security measures implemented by Jordanian security forces
throughout the country, and particularly along its borders.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
5
MEDIUM RISK
Morocco
On August 15, anti-aircraft batteries are reportedly deployed in Casablanca's el-Hank
district along with tanks, indicating growing threat of regional militancy and heightened
Moroccan security measures.
On August 10, security forces reportedly dismantled an Islamic State (IS)-linked militant
cell at the Toulal Prison in Meknes, reflecting a growing awareness to dangers of jihadist
recruiting.
Travel to Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakech may continue while adhering to security
precautions regarding civil unrest and terrorism.
Heightened regional security measures
While Moroccan authorities have not commented on the reported deployments, the extent
and placement reflect the potential for an imminent attack. These measures came amidst
similar deployments in Algeria, suggesting these precautions were taken specifically with
regard to a possible aerial attack emanating from Libya. While Morocco has been relatively
less exposed to the level of militancy experienced elsewhere in North Africa, several trends
have been exacerbated during past months, including regional concerns over the return of
militants coming from Iraq and Syria, the deterioration of the situation in Libya, as well as
the increasing dismantling of jihadist recruitment cells in Morocco. In this context, Morocco
may assess that the level of threat against its facilities is now similar to the ones experienced
by other North African countries, thus calling for similar security measures.
Jihadist recruiting
While the militants’ exact activities inside the Moroccan prison remain unknown, it is likely
that the alleged cell was recruiting prisoners for militant activity in Iraq and Syria. This
assessment is underlined by recent arrests of similar recruiting cells on July 28 and June 25.
Furthermore, a reported 1,500 Moroccan nationals are thought to be operating in militant
groups in Iraq and Syria, with some 30 percent of those estimated to be former convicts.
Convicts are likely an attractive target for recruiters due to the state’s inability to limit
radicalization inside prisons, as well as a lack of reintegration programs following prisoners’
release. With this in mind, other such recruiting cells likely continue to operate within
Moroccan prisons. In this context, further such arrests are likely to be reported in the
coming weeks and months, underlined by the growing awareness among Moroccan officials
of the threat such militants represent to Morocco upon their return. This assessment is
reflected by Justice Minister Mustapha Ramid’s 2013 statement, “Our country will not be
safe even if only a hundred out of the hundreds of men who left to fight in Syria return.”
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
6
MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates
Saudi Arabia
August 25 arrests of alleged recruiters, sentencing of 17 suspected militants for, among
others, "joining an extremist group inside the country" highlights continued crackdown
against those connected to militant jihadist organizations.
Low turnouts continue to be recorded at marches organized by Shiite opposition,
including at solidarity marches for detained Saudi Shiite Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.
Travel to Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah can continue as normal while adhering to
basic security precautions and cultural norms. Maintain heightened vigilance in the
Qatif region, due to Shiite opposition activity, while avoiding nonessential travel to the
border areas with Yemen and Iraq, given the potential for spillover unrest.
Crackdown against militancy
Continued crackdowns are likely connected to Saudi Arabia's ongoing concern with being
targeted by militant jihadist groups and particularly citizens returning from fighting abroad.
In this context, not only is the royal family largely perceived among Sunni jihadists as
insufficiently Muslim, but an uptick in attacks in the country in the 2000s were largely
attributed to those returning from fighting and/or training in Afghanistan. With this in mind,
such crackdowns are liable to continue, along with additional efforts to dissuade jihadist
activity, underscored by the Grand Mufti's recent statement that called on "young people
not to follow claims of jihad… under unknown banners and perverted principles".
Meanwhile, we continue to assess that the capability of the country's security and
intelligence services are liable to prevent major attacks, highlighted by the relatively limited
casualties sustained in the July 4-5 attack at the Wadia border crossing despite six attackers,
including two suicide bombers.
Shiite opposition
The prevailing status quo in the Eastern Province's Shiite populated Qatif region has
persisted throughout August, with small-scale opposition protests regularly called for and
concluding without unrest. This includes during those scheduled in solidarity with the
detained Sheikh al-Nimr, who is reportedly facing a death sentence. While neighboring
Bahrain witnessed multiple small-scale protests, tire fires, and unsophisticated acts of
militancy in days surrounding his trials on August 12 and 24, Qatif saw a continuation of its
typical demonstrations, complete with low turnout, albeit at a relatively higher frequency
surrounding August 24. In this context, it is possible that opposition activity in Saudi Arabia is
perceived as incapable of effecting change, while many may be wary of participating in
demonstrations given that arrests of activists still continue to occur. With this in mind, this
trend is liable to continue in the coming weeks, while we continue to assess that the
government's failure to enact concrete change may trigger gradually increased
dissatisfaction and a potential uptick in unrest in the long term.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
7
MEDIUM RISK
Tunisia
Tunisian Ministry of Interior announces the dismantling of five militant cells operating in
four Tunis neighborhoods and one in the city of Kairouan on August 7.
Amidst deteriorating security conditions linked to the crisis in Libya, security forces at
the Ras Jedir border were placed on high alert and suspend activity at their border on
August 1. In addition, Tunisian Ministry of Transport closed their airspace to flights
emanating from Libya as of August 21.
Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding
militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based tactical monitoring and
ground support options.
Uptick in Militancy
The discovery of car bombs in the militant's arsenal represents a notable shift in tactics. Past
militant tactics have largely involved the use of small arms and improvised explosive devices.
In this context we assess militants are likely attempting to destabilize the country ahead of
parliamentary and presidential elections slated to begin in October. Islamist groups have in
the past attempted to derail the political process to create further divisions between Islamist
and anti-Islamist. In this context, security forces are likely to widen the crackdown on
Islamist militants groups in both major cities and outlying areas in the lead up to elections.
With this in mind, the high degree of monitoring in Tunisia may mitigate militant threat, as is
underscored by the timely arrest.
Borders and airspace on high alert
The decision by Tunisian authorities to order a number of temporary border closures
stemmed from concerns regarding the deteriorating situation in Libya highlighted by the
shooting of a Tunisian border guard on August 1, followed by the killing of an Egyptian
national by Libyan border control on July 31. Although the Ras Jedir border has reopened,
concerns remain in Tunisia regarding the potential infiltration of militants and weapons. The
threat of Libyan militancy on Tunisian territory is further highlighted by the decision of the
Tunisian Department of Transport to close their airspace to all flights from Libya and cancel
all Tunisian flights from Libyan airports amidst rumors of 11 unaccounted for aircrafts in
Tripoli International Airport. That being said, regarding the threat of an airborne attack, we
assess reports of the potential use of civilian planes by jihadists remain largely limited by the
amount of experience required to execute such a highly sophisticated attack.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
8
MEDIUM RISK
Turkey
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins Presidency on August 10, vacating his role as
Premier and Chairman of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chairman. Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu becomes Premier, cabinet largely unchanged.
Tensions with Kurds increase following decision of Lice Court to remove the statue of
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) founder, Mahsum Korkmaz in Lice, Diyarbakir, and the
kidnapping of three Chinese workers from a construction plant in Sirnak.
Travel to Istanbul and Ankara may continue, although travelers are advised to remain
vigilant in central areas due to regular anti-government protests and occasional
incidents of unrest in these locales.
Erdogan wins Presidential elections
On August 28, Erdogan gave Davutoglu the mandate to form a new cabinet, which was
announced on August 29. Former President Abdullah Gul resigned, not taking any role in
the new government. The cabinet remains largely the same, but former Minister of
European Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu became Foreign Minister; and former advisor to
Erdogan, Yalcin Akdogan and another close ally, Numan Kurtulmus, became deputy
premiers. Meanwhile, Deputy PM responsible for the Economy Ali Babacan, and Finance
Minister Mehmet Simsek retained their posts.
The fact that the majority of positions remained the same highlights the likely
continuation of Erdogan's policies as well as his influence over the cabinet. This is further
underscored by the inclusion of Akdogan and Kurtulmus, as Deputy PMs. Meanwhile,
Cavusoglu's promotion to FM highlights the Turkish leadership's desire to demonstrate
continued openness to Europe, which Erdogan and Davutoglu stated as an aim. Similarly,
Babacan and Simsek retaining their positions, was likely meant to maintain economic
stability. In this context, we assess that these moves are intended to reassure foreign
investor confidence in Turkey, particularly given Babacan's leadership of the "rational
camp" that favors market-friendly policies against the "ideological camp" in the AKP.
Kurdish tensions heightened in southeast
In addition to the protest in Lice, additional clashes were reported between Kurds and
security forces in predominantly Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. The kidnapping highlights
the continued opposition to construction projects in Kurdish areas, which the Kurds view as
exploitation of and encroachment onto their territory by the central government. In the
context of the continued stagnation in the peace process between the government and the
PKK, we assess that this abduction may have aimed to prevent work on the plant and
pressure the government with regards to the talks. We assess that Turkey may increase
security measures in Kurdish areas, potentially resulting in further clashes and unrest.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e1
9
LOW RISK
Kuwait
The Cabinet's July 21 revocation of five citizenships, including two connected to the
opposition, and subsequent revocation of 10 others highlights continued crackdown by
the government on elements perceived to be threatening national stability.
Unconfirmed reports that Social Affairs Ministry ordered eight branches of three
charities closed, temporarily detained two Kuwaitis recently sanctioned by the US and
UN underscores increased actions against parties connected to financing of militancy.
Travel to Kuwait can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions
regarding civil unrest and militancy.
Revocation of citizenship
The 10 revocations reportedly include Sheikh Nabil al-Awadhi, who is allegedly involved
in fundraising for Syrian jihadist groups. This also follows US sanctions against two
Kuwaiti nationals who allegedly have ties to al-Awadhi, one of which was also included
in later similar UN sanctions. Given that those targeted for citizenship revocation include
individuals with links to jihadist groups and the opposition, the government is likely
utilizing such revocations to target those deemed to pose a threat to the country.
These measures also come amidst the authorities' interest in preventing further large-
scale protests, similar to those in July. Therefore, we continue to assess that the absence
of demonstrations since early July may suggest the efficacy of such measures. Amidst
reports that the government will continue to revoke citizenships for those “found
undeserving”, unqualified, or if they obtained it fraudulently, additional such revocations
are possible. Moreover, Kuwaitis, particularly naturalized citizens that seem to comprise
those whose citizenships were revoked, are likely wary of being targeted. However,
August 13 reports of a law establishing a Constitutional Court suggests a potential path
to contest revocations and the possibility that those affected and opposition parties will
attempt to fight these measures via the new court, rather than through protests.
Government action against militancy/jihadist organizations
According to the unconfirmed reports, the charities' branches were closed due to violations,
including "not having construction licenses for the building used". However, all three
charities reportedly maintain connections to militant organizations, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and/or radical preachers. Thus, the closures were likely triggered by these
connections rather than the minor violations. Moreover the aforementioned detainments
involved the aforementioned two Kuwaitis sanctioned by the US and UN for financing
militant jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria, suggesting their detentions were related to these
accusations; however, no charges have reportedly been filed at this time. This underscores
the government’s concern with supporting jihadist organizations, likely seen as a threat to
Kuwait's security, particularly given the presence of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
0
LOW RISK
Qatar
Reported resolution of rift within Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) underscores interest
within organization to maintain, demonstrate unity.
Continued involvement in negotiations to release various parties abducted by militant
jihadist groups highlights likely interest in larger and perceived vital role.
Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding
making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials.
Rift with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain
Following the GCC foreign ministers meeting on August 30, reports indicate that the intra-
organizational rift between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain
on the other has been settled. According to a statement from Oman's FM, "the crisis in the
Gulf has been resolved" while Kuwait's official news agency quoted the Kuwaiti FM as saying
that the member states "have agreed on the importance of implementing commitments",
likely referring to the April Riyadh Agreement. In this context, continued efforts and the
reported resolution underscores the interest preserving the GCC institution and
demonstrating unity, despite certain differing interests and policies. This is likely particularly
important to Saudi Arabia, which perceives the organization as a counter-balance to its
regional rival Iran, and may be seen as increasingly necessary amidst a rise in militant
jihadism throughout the region.
Foreign Policy
In recent weeks, increasing reports regarding Qatar's role in mediation have surfaced.
Most notably, it assisted in securing the release of an American journalist detained by
the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front in Syria, with subsequent reports stating that it is
working to negotiate the release of additional Americans also held in Syria. Doha is also
reportedly involved in mediation efforts to release Lebanese soldiers captured by al-
Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Arsal. In March, Qatar assisted in releasing 12 nuns
abducted in Syria.
Qatar has previously pursued a foreign policy that aimed to play a larger regional role
while maintaining relationships with various parties—from the Taliban to Hamas to the
West—potentially as an insurance policy. That said, rising criticism since the 2011
regional unrest regarding the country's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and
allegations that it funds militant jihadist groups may also have contributed to an
increasingly visibility in mediation efforts as a means of demonstrating it plays a vital
role. At the same time, the country's ability to successfully mediate has similarly
increased speculation regarding Qatar's links with such organizations, while also
triggering allegations that it pays ransom to secure the abductees' release, effectively
financing militant jihadists.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
1
LOW RISK
Middle East and North Africa: MERS-CoV Update
● The World Health Organization (WHO) stated in its most recent report from July 23 that
it had been informed of 837 laboratory confirmed cases worldwide, including 291
deaths. Notably, there have been new updates during the month of August from WHO,
the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), and the US Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
● Despite concerns of greater spread of the virus in Saudi Arabia during the month of
Ramadan, only 10 new cases were recorded.
● Those traveling or residing in the Middle East, particularly in countries witnessing
recent reports of infections, are advised to practice common virus prevention
methods, such as hand washing, and avoid contact with sick persons. Consult with a
doctor if experiencing symptoms of the virus, which often include a combination of
fever with cough or difficulty breathing. As a general precaution, and in line with
advisories issued, it is recommended to avoid contact with camels when possible,
while refraining from consuming camel products in affected countries.
CURRENT SITUATION
The lack of updates in August from the WHO, ECDC, and CDC may be connected the
virus’ slower rate of infection, underscored by a significantly reduced number of new
cases recorded throughout the region. Note that any differences between number of
cases recorded by WHO and other countries is likely connect to delays in reporting by
Ministry of Health officials.
In Saudi Arabia, on August 22, although preventive measures have largely reduced the
spread of the virus, a 66-year-old individual died from the virus, increasing the total
number of deaths throughout the Kingdom to 301 out of 723 infections. In addition, on
August 12, the Ministry of Health (MoH) reported two cases of MERS-CoV. This followed
approximately a month without new reports of infections in the country, with previous
cases recorded on July 10. Additionally, the MoH stated on August 3 that, despite
increased concerns of multiple infections during the month of Ramadan, the preventive
measures were proven successful as only 10 more cases were recorded.
In Bahrain, the official news agency reported on August 5 that the country is “stepping
up preventative measures” regarding the Ebola virus, as well as Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS-CoV). According to the report, entry visas will temporarily be
suspended for nationals from countries affected by Ebola, while the deputy prime
minister “urged all air, maritime and land entry points to be on alert and take maximum
measures in monitoring” visitors from Ebola- and MERS-affected countries. That said, on
August 20, following the dismissal of hundreds of suspected cases, the MoH reportedly
stated that “there are no cases of infections of the virus in Bahrain”.
Back to table of contents
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
2
Notable Dates for September 2014
Bahrain – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 16, 2014
Trial of Shiite Sheikh
Nimr al-Nimr, who is
detained in Saudi
Arabia.
Given al-Nimr's popularity and past
precedent, multiple small-scale
protests, tire fires, and unsophisticated
acts of militancy condemning his
detainment should be expected
surrounding this date. Remain cognizant
of calls for demonstrations.
Egypt – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 11, 2014
September 27, 2014
Copts celebrate their
New Year. Not an
official public holiday.
A court will hand down
the final verdict in the
Mubarak trial; April 6
Youth Movement
demonstration
scheduled.
Security is likely to be heightened at
Coptic churches due to increased
attendance for the holiday. Maintain
heightened vigilance.
In the event that the court hands down
a light sentence, multiple Islamist and
secular revolutionary protests are likely
in Cairo. Heightened security measures
are likely outside of the Cairo
courthouse. Avoid the vicinity of all
demonstrations.
Israel – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 11, 2005
Israeli cabinet voted
unanimously to end 38-
year occupation of the
Gaza Strip, turning over
control to Palestinian
authority
While the official cabinet decision to
end the occupation of Gaza generally
did not lead to right wing protests, the
evacuation of settlements remains a
more sensitive issue among such
activists, often times resulted in
protests. With this in mind, and
particularly given the general grievances
within Israeli society regarding recent
ceasefire in Gaza, gatherings marking
the day may be witnessed. These are
usually being held in traditional locales
for such protests, like Tel-Aviv’s Rabin
Square.
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
3
September 24-25, 2014
September 28, 2000
Jewish holiday of Rosh
Hashanah will begin at
sundown and last for
one day. In Israel, the
holiday lasts for one
day, while abroad Jews
celebrate two days.
Ariel Sharon visited the
top of the Temple
Mount in Jerusalem and
incited mass protests.
Some claim this event
led to the start of the
Second Palestinian
intifada.
Many places of business will operate in
limited working hours, as government
offices and public transportation will be
closed. In addition, a heightened
security presence, including the closure
of the West Bank, is likely for the
duration of the holiday.
Given past precedent, as well as the
perception among Palestinians that
Sharon’s visit triggered the Second
Intifada, we assess that protests and
unrest marking the date remain
possible. Such protests are likely to be
held throughout the West Bank,
especially in Jenin, Hebron and Nablus,
as well as in East Jerusalem’s Arab
neighborhoods.
Palestinian Territories – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 28, 2000
Ariel Sharon visited the
top of the Temple
Mount in Jerusalem and
incited mass protests.
Some claim this event
led to the start of the
Second Palestinian
intifada.
Given past precedent, as well as the
perception among Palestinians that
Sharon’s visit triggered the Second
Intifada, we assess that protests and
unrest marking the date remain
possible. Such protests are likely to be
held throughout the West Bank,
especially in Jenin, Hebron and Nablus,
as well as in East Jerusalem’s Arab
neighborhoods.
Saudi Arabia – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 16, 2014
Trial of Shiite Sheikh
Nimr al-Nimr.
Given al-Nimr's popularity and past
precedent, small-scale Shiite opposition
protests are likely to be called
surrounding this date, with a potential
uptick in the event he is given a death
sentence. Recent protests, however,
have concluded without incident.
Remain cognizant of calls for
demonstrations in the Eastern
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
4
September 23, 1932
National Day marks the
unification of the
kingdom by founder
King Abdulaziz in 1932.
Province's Qatif region.
Closures should be expected on
September 23, or on another day that
will be announced ahead of time to
mark National Day, along with
celebrations, parades, and traffic
congestion. Allot extra time for travel
throughout the country while
confirming itineraries ahead of time.
Shiite opposition demonstrations in the
Eastern Province, particularly Qatif, are
also possible. Remain cognizant for such
calls, while avoiding the immediate
vicinity of all protests.
Yemen – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 1, 2014
September 26, 1962
September 1 marks the
anniversary of the
founding of the army of
the former People's
Democratic Republic of
Yemen (PDRY or "South
Yemen") and the first
"martyr" of the
Southern Mobility
Movement (SMM, also
known as the "South
Movement" or al-Hirak).
Revolution Day
commemorates the
ouster of Shiite Imam
Mohammad al-Badr's
rule in 1962 and led to
the creation of the
Yemen Arab Republic
(YAR or "North
Yemen"). It also marked
Given the symbolism of the anniversary
date as well as past precedent,
commemorative marches and activities
that also call for independence are likely
in various locales in the south in
addition to those planned in Mukalla
and Aden's Shaykh Uthman District.
High turnouts numbering in the high
thousands to tens of thousands are
likely, particularly in the main
demonstration in Mukalla, with likely
relatively lower turnout in Aden. An
increased security presence should be
expected along with the potential for
clashes. Avoid the locales of all such
rallies.
Closures and commemorative
ceremonies are likely to be held,
including in Sanaa as well as elsewhere
in the former YAR governorates. Shiite
Houthi protests condemning the ouster
of the Shiite monarchy are also
possible, while the former PDRY
governorates are liable to call for rallies
to mark the beginning of the civil war
Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Pag
e2
5
the beginning of the
civil war with the PDRY.
and call for independence. In Sanaa,
plan itineraries ahead of time while
allotting extra time for travel. Avoid all
protests, government buildings, and
large scale gatherings throughout the
country.
Back to table of contents
DISCLAIMER: Please note that any views and/or opinions and/or assessment and/or recommendations presented in this text are solely those of Max Security. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this text. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. Max Security Solutions accepts no liability for (i) the contents of this text/report being correct, complete or up to date; (ii) consequences of any actions taken or not taken as a result and/or on the basis of such contents. Copyright - 2014 Max Security