Meta-ethics

• What do we mean when we say “stealing is wrong”?

• Is morality objective or subjective (up-to-me)?

• Is morality a natural feature of the world (naturalism)?

• The fact/value problem - can I make a prescriptive statement “I ought” from a descriptive statement?

Issues

Fact-Value ProblemFact-Value Problem►The problem of determining The problem of determining whether values are essentially whether values are essentially different from facts, whether moral different from facts, whether moral assessments are derived from facts, assessments are derived from facts, and whether moral statements can and whether moral statements can be true or false like factual be true or false like factual statements.statements.

Meta-ethics is used as a type of Meta-ethics is used as a type of inquiry to address the fact-value inquiry to address the fact-value problem.problem.

Hume and Moore: The Problem Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically StatedClassically Stated

►Hume: The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from IsHume: The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from Is

►Moore: The Naturalistic FallacyMoore: The Naturalistic Fallacy

The Fallacy of DerivingThe Fallacy of DerivingOught from IsOught from Is

Hume:Hume:““In every system of morality which I have hitherto met In every system of morality which I have hitherto met

with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and

establishes the being of a God, or makes observations establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am

surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not”.that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not”.

The Fallacy of DerivingThe Fallacy of DerivingOught from IsOught from Is

►Moral theories begin by observing some specific Moral theories begin by observing some specific facts about the world, and then they conclude from facts about the world, and then they conclude from

these some statements about moral obligation. these some statements about moral obligation. ►In other words, they move from statements about In other words, they move from statements about what what isis the case to statement about what the case to statement about what oughtought to to

be the case.be the case.►Hume was a naturalist himself (morality derives Hume was a naturalist himself (morality derives from a natural feeling of sympathy), but is asking from a natural feeling of sympathy), but is asking us to provide the us to provide the missing premisemissing premise. .

Moore: The Naturalistic FallacyMoore: The Naturalistic Fallacy

►It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any specific It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any specific natural property such as “pleasure” or “natural natural property such as “pleasure” or “natural

rational purpose”.rational purpose”.►G. E. Moore claims that a concept like “Good” is G. E. Moore claims that a concept like “Good” is

indefinable because it is a indefinable because it is a simple propertysimple property, a , a property that cannot be reduced further, like the property that cannot be reduced further, like the

colour “yellow”.colour “yellow”.

Open-Question ArgumentOpen-Question Argument

►A test to help determine whether a moral theoryA test to help determine whether a moral theory

commits the naturalistic fallacy.commits the naturalistic fallacy.

►For any property that we identify with For any property that we identify with “goodness” we can ask, “Is that property itself “goodness” we can ask, “Is that property itself good?” So “it may be pleasurable, but is it good?”good?” So “it may be pleasurable, but is it good?”

Ayer and EmotivismAyer and Emotivism

Ayer's Two Pronged Approach:Ayer's Two Pronged Approach:►Argues that the fact-value problem arises because Argues that the fact-value problem arises because

moral statements cannot pass a critical test of moral statements cannot pass a critical test of meaning called the meaning called the verification principleverification principle

►Ayer's solution is that moral utterances are only Ayer's solution is that moral utterances are only expressions of feelings, a position called expressions of feelings, a position called

emotivismemotivism

Verification PrincipleVerification Principle

A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either tautological or empirically verifiable.tautological or empirically verifiable.

Derives from Hume’s fork: meaningful statements Derives from Hume’s fork: meaningful statements are either analytic or synthetic.are either analytic or synthetic.

Analytic: 2+2 = 4 or “all bachelors are unmarried”.Analytic: 2+2 = 4 or “all bachelors are unmarried”.

Synthetic: John is a bachelor (this could be true or Synthetic: John is a bachelor (this could be true or false: we need to apply the verification test and false: we need to apply the verification test and ask him).ask him).

Ayer's TheoryAyer's Theory

►Emotivism holds that moral judgments do not Emotivism holds that moral judgments do not

have truth values.have truth values.► They are neither analytic nor synthetic, soThey are neither analytic nor synthetic, so

meaningless (Hume’s fork).meaningless (Hume’s fork).►Moral judgments are expressions of our attitudes.Moral judgments are expressions of our attitudes.►These judgments express our feelings and help usThese judgments express our feelings and help us

to persuade others to act as we desire.to persuade others to act as we desire.

Criticisms of EmotivismCriticisms of Emotivism►The verification theory of meaning doesn't pass The verification theory of meaning doesn't pass it's own test - it’s neither analytic nor synthetic.it's own test - it’s neither analytic nor synthetic.

►There is a problem with Ayer’s view that ethical There is a problem with Ayer’s view that ethical disagreements are disagreements in attitude. We disagreements are disagreements in attitude. We believe we are disagreeing about facts (such as believe we are disagreeing about facts (such as agreed goals, or a common view of welfare).agreed goals, or a common view of welfare).

►Moral language seems to say more than merely Moral language seems to say more than merely express emotions.express emotions.

Hare and PrescriptivismHare and Prescriptivism►Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact) Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact)

and prescriptive (value) element.and prescriptive (value) element.►The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and recommends that others adopt our value attituderecommends that others adopt our value attitude►Moral judgments add a prescriptive element to Moral judgments add a prescriptive element to the descriptive element, the prescriptive being the the descriptive element, the prescriptive being the

more important element.more important element.►Moral language is different from descriptive Moral language is different from descriptive

language - it has its own logic, one we recognise.language - it has its own logic, one we recognise.

The Logic of Moral ReasoningThe Logic of Moral Reasoning

►There is a logic to prescriptive judgmentsThere is a logic to prescriptive judgments►Moral judgments do not have truth value but theyMoral judgments do not have truth value but they

do have a logical form.do have a logical form.►Hare is inspired by Kant’s view that ethical Hare is inspired by Kant’s view that ethical statements have a logic of universalisability.statements have a logic of universalisability.

UniversalizabilityUniversalizability

►In making moral judgments one has to say that In making moral judgments one has to say that one would make the same judgment in all similar one would make the same judgment in all similar cases. A judgment is not moral unless the agent is cases. A judgment is not moral unless the agent is

prepared to universalize his or her principleprepared to universalize his or her principle►Universalizability is both a necessary and a Universalizability is both a necessary and a

sufficient condition for moral principlessufficient condition for moral principles

PrinciplesPrinciples►Principles are central to moral reasoning.Principles are central to moral reasoning.►Principles serve as major premises in our moralPrinciples serve as major premises in our moral

arguments.arguments.►We acquire or learn a basic set of principles.We acquire or learn a basic set of principles.►Then we learn when to use or when toThen we learn when to use or when to

subordinate those principles.subordinate those principles.►We choose when, where, and why to apply our We choose when, where, and why to apply our specific principles but we are committed to them specific principles but we are committed to them and to universalizing themand to universalizing them

We may illustrate this process of modifying principles from the example already used, that of learning to drive. I am told, for instance, always to draw into the side of the road when I stop the car; but later I am told that this does not apply when I stop before turning into a side-road to the offside -- for then I must stop near the middle of the road until it is possible for me to turn. Still later I learn that in this manoeuvre it is not necessary to stop at all if it is an uncontrolled junction and I can see that there is no traffic which I should obstruct by turning. When I have picked up all these modifications to the rule, and the similar modifications to all the other rules, and practice them habitually as so modified, then I am said to be a good driver, because my car is always in the right place on the road, travelling at the right speed, and so on. The good driver is, among other things, one whose actions are so exactly governed by principles which have become a habit with him, that he normally does not have to think just what to do. But road conditions are exceedingly various, and therefore it is unwise to let all one's driving become a matter of habit. One can never be certain that one's principles of driving are perfect -- indeed, one can be very sure that they are not; and therefore the good driver not only drives well from habit, but constantly attends to his driving habits, to see whether they might not be improved; he never stops learning.1

Hare’s analogy: driving a car The Language of Morals

Criticisms of PrescriptivismCriticisms of Prescriptivism1. It is too broad and allows for conduct that we 1. It is too broad and allows for conduct that we

typically deem immoral. It permits fanaticism.typically deem immoral. It permits fanaticism.

2. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral 2. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral ones as long as we can universalise them.ones as long as we can universalise them.

3. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away 3. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away from ethical theory.from ethical theory.

4. There are no constraints on altering one's 4. There are no constraints on altering one's principles.principles.

NaturalismNaturalism

Links moral terms with some kind of natural Links moral terms with some kind of natural property. property. NaturalNatural in that they are found in the in that they are found in the natural world, specifically the natural realms of natural world, specifically the natural realms of

human psychology and human societyhuman psychology and human society

• Utilitarianism, good = pleasure or happiness.

• Natural law, good = natural rational purpose.

• Virtue ethics, good = agreed social goal of eudaimonia or flourishing.

Examples of naturalism

Naturalism and the Naturalism and the Open-Ended ArgumentOpen-Ended Argument

Moore's theory regards the idea of goodness as Moore's theory regards the idea of goodness as though it were a thing, the fallacy of though it were a thing, the fallacy of hypostatizationhypostatization..

Moore commits a mistake by equating “good” with Moore commits a mistake by equating “good” with “yellow”. “Good” is a general, complex term, like “yellow”. “Good” is a general, complex term, like “colour”, not a specific, non-reducable term like “colour”, not a specific, non-reducable term like “yellow”.“yellow”.