MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

INDEX1. General Presumption pp2-3 (a) Mens rea p2 (b) Tripartite categorization of statutory offences p2 (c) Construction of statutes p3 (d) Defence of honest and reasonable mistake p3 (e) ClassificationofOffencesp3

2. Examples of the application of the Mens Rea/Strict Liability/Absolute Liability Principle pp4-32

(a) Mens rea in statutory offences – defence of mistake of fact – burden of proof – mental element where "false" and "misleading" used in statute p4(b) Companies – aid and abet commission of an offence – mens rea p5(c) Offensive language in a public place –mens rea – offender intoxicated – whether prosecutionrequiredtoprovevoluntaryconductpp5-7(d) Overloadingmotorvehicle–whetherhonestandreasonablebeliefisadefencepp7-9(e) Mens rea–statutoryoffence–evasionoftaxi-cabfare–exculpatoryprovisionsavailable– whether mens reaanecessaryingredientofoffencepp9-10(f) Prohibited import – producing customs statement with untrue particular – import placed inluggagebyunknownperson–whetherdefenceof"wrongfulactofastranger"available–whetheroffenceabsoluteorstrictliabilitypp10-11(g) Income tax – fail to furnish return – accountant engaged by taxpayer – notice sent to accountant – return not furnished by accountant – taxpayer unaware of notice – charge laid against taxpayer – whether mens reaorhonestmistakeoffactapplypp11-12(h) EnvironmentProtectionoffence–whetherabsoluteoffence–whetherdefenceofreasonableprecautionsavailablepp12-14(i) Weights and measures – certain goods found to be under weight stated on package – defencesavailabletoemployer–whetherinconsistencybetweendefence–whethermens rea ingredientofoffencepp14-15(j) Motortraffic–speeding–mens rea–whetherstrictliabilityimposedp15(k) Exceedingspeedlimit–defenceofhonestandreasonablemistakepp16-17(l) Failing to stop/render assistance/report to police – categorisation of offences – whether involvingstrictliabilitypp17-18(m)Drink/driving–whetheroffenceunders49(1)(f)ofRoad Safety Act1986isoneofstrictliabilitypp18-19(n) Useofunregisteredvehicle–whetheroffenceofstrictliabilitypp19-21(o) Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals offence – whether offence one of absolute or strict liability–principlestobeappliedinclassifyingoffencepp21-22(p) Importinganozonedepletingsubstancewithoutalicence–whethersuchoffenceinvolvesabsoluteorstrictliabilitypp22-23(q) Failingtoproduceavalidticketuponrequest–reasonforfailingtoproduceticketpp23-24(r) Poisoningofnativetreesincontraventionofstatutoryplanningcontrols–whethermens reaanelementoftheoffencepp24-26(s) Whethervoluntarinessanelementoftheoffence–applicationofprincipleoflegalitytointerpretationofstatutoryoffences,includingdrivingoffencespp26-27(t) Use of unregisteredmotor vehicle – referral toMagistrates’ Court – during hearingcertificate tendered to thecourt – certificatedidnot containallprescribedparticulars –whetherabsoluteliabilityoffencepp27-29(u) Whether intention of accused to commit an indecent act in presence of child known to be underage was an element of offence – whether honest and reasonable mistake as to age wasadefencepp29-32(v) ProbationarydriverfailedtodisplayPPlatepp32-33

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY1. General PresumptionThere is a presumption that in creating a criminal offence, the legislature intends a guilty intent appropriate to the nature of the offence to be an ingredient of the offence. This presumption can only be displaced if the language of the statute read along with its subject matter requires the conclusion that the legislature intended that such guilty intent should not form part of the prescription of the offence.

Therationaleofthepresumptionisthatitisrepugnanttobasicandlong-acceptednotionsofcriminal responsibility to hold a person to be guilty of a crime without some element of mental fault, such as intention or knowledge.

In CTM v The Queen [2008]HCA25; (2008)236CLR440;(2008)247ALR1;(2008)82ALJR978;(2008)185ACrimR188,GleesonCJ,Gummow,CrennanandKiefelJJsaidthepresumptioninvolved‘abasiclegalprincipleofcriminalresponsibilitywhichinformsourunderstanding,andinterpretation,ofthecriminallaw’.

(a) Mens reaThe starting point when considering statutory offences, is that it is to be inferred that mens rea is an essential element in the criminal offences which the statute creates. That is, a person cannot beconvictedunlesshe/she has a guilty mind. Acourtrequiresgoodgroundsformovingawayfrom such a presumption.

The expression "mens rea" is ambiguous,imprecise,difficulttodefinebutcanmeanvoluntariness,knowledgeofallthefactsconstitutingthenecessaryingredientsoftherelevantdefence,knowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheact,intenttocausethewrongfulnessandevenrecklessnessinsomecases. Mens rea hastwoelements:(1)mind;(2)whichisguilty,andthefirstisalwaysessential.

The manner in which the mental element is to be ascertained from the statute was expounded byWrightJinSherras v de Rutzen (1895)1QB918inafamousdictum at921;(1895-9)AllERRep1167at1169;11TLR369:

"There is a presumption that mens rea,anevilintention,oraknowledge of the wrongfulness of theact,isanessentialingredientineveryoffence;butthatpresumptionisliabletobedisplacedeitherbythewordsofthestatutecreatingtheoffenceorbythesubject-matterwithwhichitdeals, and both must be considered."

(b) Tripartite categorization of statutory offencesIn He Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,theHighCourtrecognizedatripartitecategorizationof statutory offences namely, "mens rea","strictliability(or'halfwayhouse'"and"absoluteliability".If mens rea is not an element of the offence, the common law defence of honest and reasonable mistakeisneverthelessavailable unless the offence is one of absolute liability. Theterms'strictliability'and'absoluteliability'arenotalwaysusedpreciselyandsometimesinterchangeably.

GibbsJinTeh's Case consideredfivemattersinassessingwhetherthepresumptionofmens rea was displaced namely:

1.Thelanguageofthesectioncreatingtheoffence;2. The subject matter of the statute;3. The consequences for the community of an offence;4.Potentialconsequencesforanaccused,ifconvicted;5. Whether strict liability would assist in the enforcement of the regulations..

In He Kaw Teh v R, BrennanJsaidthat:

"...Itisnowfirmlyestablishedthatmens rea isanessentialelementineverystatutoryoffenceunless,havingregardtothelanguageofthestatuteandtoitssubject-matteritisexcludedexpressly or by necessary implication ... Earlier doubts as to the existence of the presumption orastoitsstrength...havenowbeenremoved."

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(c) Construction of StatutesA statute must be construed against the whole background of the law which includes the principles bywhichthequestionwhetherthepresumptionthathonestandreasonablemistakeprovidesadefence has been excluded is to be determined.

(d) Defence of honest and reasonable mistakeThe rule is that honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if true, would take the defendant outside the defence charged, is a good answer to a statutory offence, unless the language usedclearlyexcludesthatdefence,orunless,althoughthelanguageleavesthematterindoubt,the object and scope of the enactment, the nature of the duty imposed, or other considerations arisingfromthesubjectmatterofthelegislation,makeitprobablethatthelegislativeauthorityintended to impose a duty of absolute responsibility.

(e) Classification of OffencesOffencescanbeclassifiedintothreecategoriesasfollows:

1.Offencesinwhichmens rea,consistingofsomepositivestateofmindsuchasintent,knowledge,orrecklessness,mustbeprovedbytheprosecutioneitherasaninferencefromthenatureoftheactcommitted,orbyadditionalevidence.

2.Offencesinwhichthereisnonecessityfortheprosecutiontoprovetheexistenceofmens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie importstheoffence,leavingitopentotheaccusedtoavoidliabilitybyprovingthathe/shetookallreasonablecare.Thisinvolvesconsiderationofwhatareasonablepersonwouldhavedoneinthecircumstances.Thedefencewillbeavailableiftheaccusedreasonablybelievedinamistakensetoffactswhich,iftrue,wouldrendertheactoromissioninnocent,orifhe/shetookallreasonablestepstoavoidtheparticularevent.Theseoffences may property be called offences of strict liability.

3.Offencesofabsoluteliabilitywhereitisnotopentotheaccusedtoexculpatehimself/herselfby showing that he/she was free of fault.

Professor Sayre, in a celebrated article entitled Public Welfare Offences(1933)33Columbia Law Review51atp73classifiedregulatoryoffencesintothefollowingcategories:

(1) illegalsalesofintoxicatingliquor;(2) salesofimpureoradulteratedfoodordrugs;(3) salesofmisbrandedarticles;(4) violationsofanti-narcoticacts;(5) criminalnuisances: (a)annoyancesorinjuriestothepublichealth,safety,reposeorcomfort; (b)obstructionsofhighways;(6) violationsoftrafficregulations;(7) violationsofmotorvehiclelaws;(8) violationsofgeneralpoliceregulationspassedforthesafety,healthorwell-beingofthecommunity.

ItmusthoweverberecognisedthatthecategoriesofoffencessaidbyProfessorSayretoattracttheprincipleofstrictliabilitycoverabroadspectrumandmustbeconsideredbythecourts,notonlyinthelightofthepurportedpurposesofindividualstatutes,butalsohavingregardtothespecificscopeofindividualsectionswithinsuchstatutes.

It is generally accepted that statutes which create offences for the purpose of regulating social or industrialconditionsortoprotecttherevenue,particularlyifthepenaltyismonetaryandnottoolarge, may more easily be regarded as imposing absolute liability. This approach may be displaced if to regard an offence as one of absolute liability could not promote the object of the legislation bymakingpeoplegoverntheirconductaccordingly.

Althoughitisconvenienttobeabletoclassifyanoffenceinitsentiretyasoneof‘strict’or‘absolute’liability,thetaskisoneofconstructionanditisbynomeansinevitablethattheapplicationofthesame principles of construction should produce the same result with respect to each ingredient in an offence.

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY2. Examples of the Mens rea/Strict Liability/Absolute Liability Categories

(a) Mens rea in statutory offences – defence of mistake of fact – burden of proof – mental element where "false" and "misleading" used in statute

HELD: Allowing the appeal againstconvictionon the "mens rea ground" only. (1)PerKingCJ(Mitchell Jagreeing):There is a presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient ofeveryoffence.PerLegoeJ:Thefundamentalruleisthatapersoncannotbeconvictedunlesshe has a guilty mind.

(2)PerKingCJ(MitchellJagreeing):Theabovepresumptioncanbedisplacedbystatute;theelements of a statutory offence must be determined by reference to the statute which creates it. Statement in Sweet v Parsley [1969]UKHL1;(1970)AC132atp162;(1969)1AllER347atp361;53CrAppR221;[1969]2WLR470;perLordDiplock, applied.

(3)Per curiam:Ontheproperinterpretationofs138(1)(d)initscontext,mens rea is an element of theoffenceinquestion,andevenifthedefendanthasactedunreasonablyitmustbeshownthatheacted"dishonestly"(perKingCJandMitchellJ)orwith"guiltymind"(perLegoeJ). R v Erson [1914]VicLawRp20;(1914)VLR144;20ALR46;35ALT117, considered.

(4) PerKingCJ (Mitchell J agreeing; Legoe J to similar effect): When the words "false" and "misleading" are found together in a penal statute,theycarryadistinctflavourofdishonesty.

PerKingCJ(MitchellJagreeing):Themens rea, which is an element of the offence is knowledge of the falsity of the statement or at least reckless indifference as to its truth or falsehood.

(5)Per curiam:Onthefacts,thespecialmagistratewasjustifiedinfindingthattheappellanthadno belief in the truth of his answer. [Upon appeal see: Cameron v Holt[1980]HCA5;(1980)142CLR342;28ALR490;54ALJR202atp166;MC39/1980.Appealdismissed.]

Per King CJ:"The crime with which this appeal is concerned is a creature of the statute. Its elements must be determined by reference to the statute which creates it. The manner in which the mental element is tobeascertainedfromthestatutewasexpoundedbyWrightJinSherras v de Rutzen (1895)1QB918inafamousdictum at921;(1895-9)AllERRep1167at1169;11TLR369:

"There is a presumption that mens rea,anevilintention,oraknowledge of the wrongfulness of theact,isanessentialingredientineveryoffence;butthatpresumptionisliabletobedisplacedeitherbythewordsofthestatutecreatingtheoffenceorbythesubject-matterwithwhichitdeals, and both must be considered."

It is beyond question that if mens rea is not an element of the offence, the common law defence of honestandreasonablemistakeisneverthelessavailable: Proudman v Dayman [1941]HCA28;(1941)67CLR536.Therecouldbenoquestionofstrictliability.Thesectiondoesnot,ofcourse,indicateexpressly whether mens rea is an element in the offence or whether, on the other hand, the protection of thosewhoinfringeitsprovisionsinnocentlyisleft to the common law defence of mistake.

The intention of the legislature must be gathered by implication from the words and subject matter ofthestatute.ThefirststepinattemptingtoascertainwhatParliamentmusthaveintended,istodeterminethedifferenceinthelegaleffectofthecompetingviewsinrelationtotheoffenceunderconsideration.

... Itseemstomethatinpracticalterms,puttingasiderefinements and distinctions, the difference betweentheeffectofthecompetingviewsastothesectionisthatifmens rea is an element of the offence, there must be dishonesty; if it is not, and the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of factmustbereliedon,unreasonablenessissufficient.

The real question to be considered is whether an intention can be gathered from the statute that dishonestyisnotnecessaryandthatunreasonablenessissufficientforguilttoattach."

PerKingCJinHolt v Cameron (1979)22SASR321;38FLR226;27ALR311;1ACrimR402;MC21/1980,19September1979.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(b) Companies – aid and abet commission of an offence – mens rea

Per Marks J:"...Thegeneralruleprevailsthatignoranceofthelawprovidesnoexcuse.Theexceptions,astheaboveauthoritiesindicate,arewherethestatuteunderconsiderationrequiresinterpretationtothecontrary of the general rule. The authorities on this subject are too numerous to discuss. I summarise as best I can my understanding of the law. There is a rebuttable presumption that mens rea orevilintentionorknowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheactisanessentialingredientineveryoffence(perWrightJinSherras v DeRutzen(1895)1QB918at921;11TLR369approvedbytheHouseofLordsin Lim Chin Aik v R [1963]AC160;[1963]1AllER223;[1963]2WLR42)andtheHighCourtinCameron v Holt [1980]HCA5;(1980)142CLR342;28ALR490;54ALJR202).

In determining whether the presumption is rebutted regard should be had to the wording of the statute and the mischief with which it purports to deal. In Lim Chin Aik (abovecited)theirLordshipssaid(atp174)that

"it is pertinent also to enquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulation. That means that there must be something he can do, directly or indirectlybysupervisionorinspection,byimprovementofhisbusinessmethodsorbyexhortingthosewhomhemaybeexpectedtoinfluenceorcontrol,whichwillpromotetheobservanceofthe regulation."

Againatp175theysaid:

"Where it can be shown that the imposition of strict liability would result in the prosecution and convictionofaclassofpersonswhoseconductcouldnotinanywayaffecttheobservanceofthelaw,theirLordshipsconsiderthat,evenwherethestatuteisdealingwithagravesocialevil,strictliability is not likely to be intended."

(SeealsoCameron v Holt [1980]HCA5;(1980)142CLR342at346;28ALR490;54ALJR202;Sweet v Parsley [1969]UKHL1;[1970]AC132atp162;[1969]1AllER347;53CrAppR221;[1969]2WLR470;Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)2AC256;[1968]2AllER356;(1968)52CrAppR373;[1968]2WLR1303.)

The general rule is that where mens rea must be established it is knowledge of the facts which constitutetheoffenceandnotofthelawwhichmustbeproved:Bank of New South Wales v Piper (1897)AC383atpp389-390;R v Warner (1969)2AC265atp276.ItwasacceptedonbehalfoftheCommissionerthatshewasobligedtoprovethatMid-EastandthereforeNicholas"becameaware"oftherelevantinterestataparticulartime.Thisconcessionwasnecessarybecausethe14dayswithinwhichthenoticehadtobegivenonlycommencedtorunafter"awareness"oftherelevantinterest.

Accordingly that mental element was an ingredient of the offence which the prosecution was obliged toprove.Saveastothat,Iconsiderthattheobligationtogivenoticewasabsolute.Itcouldhardlybeotherwise.MrGillard'scontentionsthattheprosecutionhadtoproveknowledgeofthestatute,of the legal obligation and a wilful intention to disobey it, cannot be supported by any reasonable constructionoftheAct.Theconstructionforwhichhecontendedwouldmaketherelevantprovisions,inmyview,virtuallynugatory. It isunnecessarytoanalysethoseprovisions indetail. Iobservemerelythattheyreflectaclearintentiononthepartofthelegislaturetopreventcompanytake-oversbystealthandtocastthelegislativenetaswidelyaspossibletocatchallmannerofschemesof contrary purpose. ..."

PerMarksJinNicholas v Wade (Commissioner of Corporate Affairs)[1983]VicRp66;[1983]1VR703;7ACLR45;MC71/1982,10September1982.

(c) Offensive language in a public place – mens rea – offender intoxicated – whether prosecution required to prove voluntary conduct

HELD: The words "shall not conduct himself or herself" require at least that there should be a voluntaryactbythepersoncharged.Accordingly,inachargeofoffensiveconduct,theprosecutionisrequiredtoprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthatthepersonchargedhadvoluntarilyengagedintheconductcomplainedof.Suchvoluntarinessmaybenegativedbytheeffectsofintoxication.

Per Yeldham J:"... It should be said at the outset that no question concerning the onus of proof arises, nor is it relevanttoconsidertheprinciplewhichhasdevelopedthatanhonestandreasonablemistakeoffactwould be a ground of exculpation in cases in which actual knowledge is not required as an element

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYof an offence: see He Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553andthecasesthereinreferredto.Theargumentbeforemeand,Iapprehend,beforethemagistrate,turneduponthewell-knownpassageinthejudgmentofWrightJinSherras v De Rutzen (1895)1QB918at921;11TLR369,namely:

" ... There is a presumption that mens rea,anevilintention,oraknowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheact,isanessentialingredientineveryoffence;butthatpresumptionisliabletobedisplacedeitherbythewordsofthestatutecreatingtheoffenceorbythesubject-matterwithwhichitdeals, and both must be considered."

In He Kaw Teh's case,BrennanJ (at566)said thatsuchstatementhasnotbeendoubted.HisHonourexpressedagreementwithwhatLordGoddardCJsaidinBrend v Wood (1946)62TLR462at463;(1946)176LT306,that:

" ... It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea asaconstituentpartofacrime,theCourtshouldnotfindamanguiltyofanoffence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind."

BrennanJsaidthat:

"...Itisnowfirmlyestablishedthatmens rea isanessentialelementineverystatutoryoffenceunless,having regard to the languageof thestatuteand to its subject-matter it is excludedexpressly or by necessary implication ... Earlier doubts as to the existence of the presumption or astoitsstrength...havenowbeenremoved."

Sherras v De Rutzen has been considered and applied on many occasions by courts of high authority. The principle is not in doubt, but its application in any particular case frequently raises questions of considerabledifficulty.InR v Turnbull [1943]NSWStRp56;(1943)44SR(NSW)108;61WN(NSW)70,JordanCJemphasisedthattheruleofthecommonlawthatanactisnotcriminalunlessitisthe product of a guilty mind is just as applicable to acts which are criminal because prohibited by statute as to those which are offences at common law, and it can only be excluded expressly or by necessaryimplication.HisHonouremphasisedthatmens rea hastwoelements:(1)mind;(2)whichisguilty,andthefirstisalwaysessential.Hesaid(at109):

"...Apersonisneverregardedascriminallyliableforanactwhich,althoughphysicallytheactof his body, was done while his mind was in so abnormal a state that it cannot be regarded as hisactatall,eghewassleep-walkingorsoyoung,orsoinsane,astobeincapableofknowingthat he was acting or the nature or quality of his act."

HisHonourobservedthatitwasalsonecessary,assuminghismindtobesufficientlynormaltobecapableofcriminalresponsibility,thatthepersonchargedshouldbeshowntohaveknowledgethathe was doing the criminal act charged against him. Amongst the more important cases of recent years dealing with the question of statutory offences and the requirement of mens rea are Lim Chin Aik v R[1962]UKPC34;(1963)AC160;[1963]1AllER223;(1963)2WLR42;Iannella v French [1968]HCA14;(1968)119CLR84;[1968]ALR385;41ALJR389whereatCLR93-94,BarwickCJ,speakingofthepresumptionmentionedbyWrightJsaid:"...itisnotapresumptionlightlytobe displaced"; R v Warner (1969)2AC256;[1968]2AllER356;(1968)52CrAppR373;[1968]2WLR1303;Sweet v Parsley [1969]UKHL1;(1970)AC132;[1969]1AllER347;53CrAppR221;[1969]2WLR470;R v Vlahos (1975)2NSWLR580;Holt v Cameron (1979)22SASR321;(1980)27ALR311;(1979)38FLR226;(1979)1ACrimR402(andonappealsub nom Cameron v Holt [1980]HCA5;(1980)142CLR342;28ALR490;54ALJR202);Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Yee Chin Tao (1985)AC1at12-13;[1984]2AllER503;[1984]3WLR437;[1984]CrimLR479;(1984)80CrAppR194;[1985]LRC(Crim)439;andPhipps v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1986)4NSWLR444at449-451.

Muchhasbeenwrittenastowhatismeantbytheelusiveconceptofmens rea. In He Kaw Teh's case,GibbsCJdescribeditas"ambiguousandimprecise".Thediscussion(at530-531and569-570)isinstructive:seealsoPhipps v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (at449-450)andGillies,Criminal Law (1985)Ch3at39et seq.Bothcounselinthepresentappealsoughttoplacerelianceupon the appearance of the word "wilfully" in other sections of the Offences in Public Places Act – eg s7,"wilfullyprevent",s8ands9,"wilfullydamage",s10,"wilfullymark".ButIdonotregardtheuseof that expression in other sections as being any reliable indicator: see R v Turnbull (at112;73);Lim Chin Aik's case (at173,176);Iannella v French(at93);Sweet v Parsley (at149).NordoItakethetermsofsubs(2)asbeinganindicatorthatnomentalelementisnecessaryintheoffenceforwhichsubs(1)provides.Idonotregardtheprovisionofadefenceof"reasonableexcuse"asbeinganindicationthattheCrownneednotprovetheappropriatementalelement,whateveritmightbe.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYAnonusisplaceduponthepersonchargedtoproveonabalanceofprobabilitiesthathehadareasonableexcuseforactinginthemannercomplainedof.Reasonableexcuseplainlyhasabroaderscopethanamereabsenceofintent;seeperDawsonJinHe Kaw Teh's case (at595).

Inmyopinionthewords"shallnotconducthimselforherself"ins5(1)requireatleastthatthereshouldbeavoluntaryactbythepersoncharged.Inthepresentcasethemagistrate'sattentionwasdirectedonlytothequestionofwhethertheappellantwascapableofforminganintentiontobehaveoffensively,anissuewhichheresolvedinherfavouralthoughholdingthatitwasirrelevant.Suchafindingnecessarilyinvolvesthatattherelevanttimetheappellantdidnotvoluntarilyengageintheconduct which was held to constitute the offence. In my opinion the Offences in Public Places Act, s5,doesatleastrequiretheCrowntoprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthatthepersonchargedhadvoluntarilyengagedintheconductcomplainedof.

The offence created is truly criminal in nature; and clearly causes a stigma to attach to any person convictedofit.Thepenalty,whilstnotheavy,isnotinsubstantial,atleasttomanyofthepeoplewhowouldbecaughtbythesection'sprovisions;andIdonotregardthesubjectmatteroftheoffenceas being really within the matter said, in cases such as Sweet v Parsley (at163),tobeoneinvolving"potentialdangertopublichealth,safetyormorals,inwhichcitizenshaveachoicewhethertheyparticipateornot".Thefactthattheintoxicationinthepresentcasewasself-inducedisnotrelevant:R v O'Connor[1980]HCA17;(1980)146CLR64;(1980)29ALR449;(1980)54ALJR349;(1980)4ACrimR348.Inthatcase(at80)BarwickCJsaid:

"In Ryan's case ([1967]HCA2; (1967)121CLR205; [1967]ALR577; (1967)40ALJR488) Iattempted a summary statement of the principle that in all crime, including statutory offences, theactchargedmusthavebeendonevoluntarily,ieaccompaniedbythewilltodoit.IfindnoneedtoqualifywhatIthenwrote.Istatedtheprincipleaswithoutqualification."

SeealsoBrennanJinHe Kaw Teh's case (at569-571)andR v Martin (at218;89).Gillies,Criminal Law (at36),saysthat"theonlymentalelementinanoffenceofstrictliabilityisthatassociatedwiththevoluntaryperformanceoftheconductcomprisingitsactus reus". It follows that, because ins5theexpression"shallnotconducthimselforherself",involvesatleastproofthattheactionscomplainedofwerevoluntary,theappellantwasentitledtobeacquitteduponthischargeasshewas on the charge of common assault. Thus her appeal must succeed. I answer the question asked inthestatedcaseintheaffirmative.PursuanttotheJustices Act 1902,s106,Iquashtheconvictionanddismissthechargeofoffensiveconduct.Iordertherespondenttopaythecostsoftheappellant.Questionansweredinaffirmative.Convictionquashed."

PerYeldhamJinJeffs v Graham(1987)8NSWLR292;28ACrimR211;MC50/1987,3April1987.

(d) Overloading motor vehicle – whether honest and reasonable belief is a defence

HELD: Ordernisiabsolute.Failuretocomplywiths35(5)oftheMotor Car Act1958imposesastrictliabilityuponadriver.The defence of honest and reasonable mistake is not open. Proudman v Dayman[1941]HCA28;(1941)67CLR536,discussed.

Per Young CJ:"...Howthen is it tobedecidedwhether thedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistake is tobeavailableinacasesuchasthepresent?Theansweristobefoundinthetermsofthestatute:seethediscussionbyWillsJinR v Tolson [1886-90]AllER26;9WR709; (1889)23QBD168atpp172-176.The nature of the matters with which the Motor Car Act is concerned is peculiarly public safety. The notoriousdangersoftravelonmodernhighwaysandthenecessityforstrictcontrolofthehandlingofmotorvehiclesonthosehighwayssuggestthatifevertheintentiontobeimputedtoParliamentis to impose strict responsibility, it is likely to be in statutes dealing with the control and handling ofmotorvehicles.

IhaveendeavouredtoshowthatthepurposesofthepartoftheMotor Car Act inwhichs35(5)isfound are public safety and protection of the use of the roads. In matters of public safety it is not difficult to imputean intentionto the legislatureto imposestrictresponsibility:Provincial Motor Cab Co Ltd v Dunning(1909)2KB599;Green v Burnett; James & Son Ltd v Smee [1955]1KB78;[1955]1QB78atpp93-4;[1954]3AllER273;(1954)3WLR631.AndIthinkthatinviewofthenotorious problems faced by authorities concerned today with the maintenance of highways used byheavytransportitisalsonotdifficulttoimputeanintentiontothelegislaturetoimposestrictresponsibility for adherence to limitations of the weight to be carried. Some of those problems can be discernedfromastudyofthetransportcasesintheHighCourtculminatinginArmstrong v Victoria (No.2) [1957]HCA55;(1957)99CLR28.Ialsothinkthatthehistoryofthelegislationwhichhas

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYbeensetoutbyMcInerneyJinhisreasonswhichIhavehadtheadvantageofreadingsupportstheconclusion that the legislature intended to impose strict responsibility.

TheconclusionthatIwouldreachfromaconsiderationofthegeneralprovisionsofthestatuteisreinforcedbyaconsiderationofthelanguageofs35(5)althoughofcourseitstopsshortofexpresslynegativingthedefenceofmistake.Thefactthatthemaximumpenaltyisnotparticularlyheavyalsoassistsinthisconclusion.Theprovisionfortheadditionalpenaltyandtheprovisoexpresslyconferringupon the Court a discretion not to impose the additional penalty in certain circumstances strongly suggests that the legislature intended to exclude the defence of honest and reasonable mistake as a ground of exculpation from the offence.

NotwithstandingtheseconclusionsIhavebeentroubledbythefactthatthedefendant'svehiclewascarryingacontainerandthatitmightbethoughtthattherewaslittlethatthedefendantcouldhavedonetobringhimselfwithinthelaw.IsthisacaseofthekindreferredtobythePrivyCouncilinLim Chin Aik v R (1963)AC160atp174;[1963]1AllER223;(1963)2WLR42whereLordEvershedfortheBoardsaidthatitwasnotenoughmerelytoshowthatthestatutewasonedealingwithagravesocialevil?Isitacasewhereitwouldbeabsurdtosupposethatthelegislatureintendedtoexposean innocent carrier who could not be aware of the true facts to a penalty: see Maher v Musson [1934]HCA64;(1934)52CLR100;[1935]ALR80;89P7perEvattandMcTiernanJJatp109?

Ihaveultimatelycometotheconclusionthattheputtingofthedefendantunderstrictliabilityisnecessary for the enforcement of the statute. In such a case the exclusion of the defence of honest andreasonablemistakeinevitablymeansthatindividualsarecalleduponsotoconducttheiraffairsthatthegeneralwelfareisnotprejudicedandtothatextenttherightsoftheindividualaresubjectedtothecommongood.Ithinkthattheclassofpersonincludedins35(5)showsthatthelegislatureregards the legislation as being of that character and therefore intends that the defence of honest andreasonablemistakeshouldbeexcluded.Itmaybethattheowner,forinstance,willhavetoimprovehisbusinessmethodsortakesomeotheractiontoensurethattheprovisionsofapermitareobeyed,butIseenoreasonwhythisshouldnotbedone.Itmaybemoredifficultforthedriver.ButitisnotacaselikeMaher v Musson where the breach arose from antecedent breaches of the lawgenerallybyotherpersons:see52CLRatp106perDixonJ.

WewerepressedwithsomedecisionsoftheFullCourtofSouthAustralia.ThesehavebeenexaminedinthereasonspreparedbySouthwellJwhichIhavehadtheadvantageofreading.IwishonlytorefertothejudgmentofBrayCJinKain & Shelton Pty Ltd v McDonald (1971)1SASR39andtothepassagequotedbyMcInerneyJinhisreasons.Thepassagehasconsiderableforcebut,ifImaysayso with respect, a statute must be construed against the whole background of the law which includes the principles by which the question whether the presumption that honest and reasonable mistake providesadefencehasbeenexcludedistobedetermined.ForverymanyyearsnowtheCourtshavehadtograpplewiththisproblembutIdetectnoreadyassumptionthatParliamentintendstoexcludethedefence.ItisonlyafterprolongedconsiderationthatIhavereachedtheconclusionthatit is to be excluded in the present case.

Itfollowsthattheordernisishouldbemadeabsolute.HavingregardtothefactthattheMagistratewasoftheopinionthatthedefendantbelievedonreasonablegroundsthatthevehicleandloadwerenotoverweight,IagreeinthesuggestionmadebyMcInerneyJthatinsteadofsendingtheinformationbacktotheMagistrateweshouldourselvesconvicttherespondentandimposeanominalpenalty."

PerYoungCJinWelsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173;MC11/1983,13December1982.

Per McInerney J:"...MrUrensubmittedthatinthefirstinstancethematterwasoneofinterpretationofthestatute.IndevelopingthissubmissionMrUrencontendedthatthecourtshavelookedfirst,atthecategoryoftheoffenceitselfandsecondlyatothercircumstanceswhichthecourtshaveconsideredtobesuchastosupporttheconclusionthattheoffencewasoneofstrictliability.Basically,thecasesinwhichthisconstructionhasbeenadoptedhavebeen(MrUrensubmitted)casesof"regulatoryoffence"toadopt the term used by ProfessorHoward in his book Strict Liability(1963)atp1.ProfessorHowardadoptsthistermbecause,ashesubmits,thetypeofoffencereferredtoisusuallypartofalegislativescheme for the administration or regulation of society. Sayre, in a celebrated article entitled Public Welfare Offences(1933)33Columbia Law Review51atp73classifiedregulatoryoffencesintothefollowing categories:

(1)illegalsalesofintoxicatingliquor;(2)salesofimpureoradulteratedfoodordrugs;(3)salesofmisbrandedarticles;(4)violationsofanti-narcoticacts;

9

PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(5)criminalnuisances: (a)annoyancesorinjuriestothepublichealth,safety,reposeorcomfort; (b)obstructionsofhighways;(6)violationsoftrafficregulations;(7)violationsofmotorvehiclelaws;(8) violations of general police regulations passed for the safety, health orwell-being of thecommunity.

InmyopinionthetruerulegoverningthismatteristhatstatedbyO'BryanJinMcCrae v Downey [1947]VicLawRp25;(1947)VLR194atpp202-3;[1947]ALR157,asfollows:

"From these authorities I take the rule to be that honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if true, would take the defendant outside the defence charged, is a good answer to a statutory offence, unless the language used clearly excludes that defence, or unless, although thelanguageleavesthematterindoubt,theobjectandscopeoftheenactment,thenatureoftheduty imposed, or other considerations arising from the subject matter of the legislation, make itprobablethatthelegislativeauthorityintendedtoimposeadutyofabsoluteresponsibility..."

... In Lim Aik's Case (1963)AC160atp174;[1963]1AllER223;(1963)2WLR42LordEvershed,deliveringthejudgmentoftheBoardofthePrivyCouncilsaid:

"ButitisnotenoughintheirLordships'opinionmerelytolabelastatuteasonedealingwithagravesocialevilandfromthattoinferthatstrictliabilitywasintended.Itispertinentalsotoenquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulations.Thatmeanstheremustbesomethinghecandodirectlyorindirectly,bysupervisionorinspection,byimprovementofhisbusinessmethodsorbyexaltingthosewhomhemaybeexpectedtoinfluenceorcontrol,whichwillpromotetheobservationsoftheregulations.Unlessthis is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature imposedstrictliabilitymerelyinordertofindalucklessvictim."

PerMcInerneyJinWelsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173;MC11/1983,13December1982.

(e) Mens rea – statutory offence – evasion of taxi-cab fare – exculpatory provisions available – whether mens rea a necessary ingredient of offence

Per Finlay J:"...ThegeneralprinciplesofthecommonlawgoverningcriminalresponsibilitywerereferredtoinHe Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553byGibbsCJatCLRp621asfollows:

"TherelevantprincipleisstatedinSherras v De Rutzen [1895]1QB918at921;11TLR369asfollows:

'Thereisapresumptionthatmens rea,anevilintention,oraknowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheact, isanessential ingredient ineveryoffence;butthatpresumptionis liabletobedisplaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject matter with whichitdeals,andbothmustbeconsidered'."

TheChiefJusticeobservedatCLRp622:

"Theruleisnotalwayseasytoapply.Itsapplicationpresentstwodifficulties–first,indecidingwhethertheParliamentintendedthattheforbiddenconductshouldbepunishableevenintheabsence of some blameworthy state of mind and secondly, if it is held that mens rea is an element oftheoffence,indecidingexactlywhatmentalstateisimportedbythatvagueexpression."

MasonJagreedwiththereasonsinthejudgmentoftheChiefJustice.WilsonJalsousedthesamestartingpointfromwhathecalled"ThemuchquotedstatementofWrightJ"referredtoabove.BrennanJreferredtothesamepassagestating,"Thatstatementhasnotbeendoubted"andwentontosay:

"RecentlyinGammon Ltd v AG of Hong Kong [1985]AC1;[1984]2AllER503;[1984]3WLR437;[1984]CrimLR479;(1984)80CrAppR194;[1985]LRC(Crim)439,LordScarmandeliveringthejudgmentoftheJudicialCommitteestatedfivepropositions(atp14):

'(1)Thereisapresumptionoflawthatmens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a criminal offence;

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(2)thepresumptionisparticularlystrongwheretheoffenceis"trulycriminal"incharacter;

(3)thepresumptionappliestostatutoryoffences,and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute;(myemphasis);

(4)theonlysituationinwhichthepresumptioncanbedisplacediswherethestatuteisconcernedwith an issue of social concern, and public safety is such an issue;

(5)evenwhereastatuteisconcernedwithsuchanissue,thepresumptionofmens rea stands unlessitcanalsobeshownthatthecreationofstrictliabilitywillbeeffectivetopromotetheobjectsofthestatutebyencouraginggreatervigilancetopreventthecommissionoftheprohibitedact'."

DawsonJatp650said:

"Rules of constructionmust giveway to actual expressions of legislative intent but almostinvariablyinthecontextsuchindicationsastherearerequireguiltyintentasaningredientofanoffenceratherthanthecontrary.Wheresomewordsuchas'knowingly'or'wilfully'isusedinthedescriptionofanoffencethereisnodifficultyinconcludingthatguiltyintentisrequired.Howevertheabsenceofwordssuchastheseevenifthewordsappearinthedescriptionofoffencescreated elsewhere in the enactment does not mean that an offence is intended to be absolute."

...Havingregardtothewordsoftheregulationsandthenatureoftheoffenceinmyviewtheinformantinthesubjectcasewasnotrequiredtoprovethattheplaintiffhadanevilintention.Inotherwordsthe presumption of mens rea as an essential ingredient of the offence charged was in this case displaced. I do not see the learned magistrate as doing any more than acknowledging this when he said "that this is an absolute offence, there is no mens rea appropriate to the case"."

PerFinlayJ(NSWSupremeCourt)inWalsh v SchubergMC55/1986,6September1985.

(f) Prohibited import – producing customs statement with untrue particular – import placed in luggage by unknown person – whether defence of "wrongful act of a stranger" available – whether offence absolute or strict liability

C.waschargedwithimportingprohibitedimportsnamely,2spring-bladedknivesandproducingtoaCustomsofficerastatementwhichwasuntrueinaparticularnamely,thathisbaggagedidnotcontainspring-bladedknives.C.pleadednotguilty.Hegaveevidencetotheeffectthatoneofhisfriendshadplacedtheknivesinhisluggageasapracticaljoke.TheMagistrateacceptedthisevidenceanddismissedbothcharges.Inrespectofthechargeconcerningtheuntruestatement,theMagistratetooktheviewthatthedefenceofthe"wrongfulactofastranger"wasavailabletoC.Onappeal—

HELD: Appealallowed.Dismissalinrespectoftheuntruestatementchargesetasideandconvictionrecorded.HavingregardtothefactthattheCustoms Act1901(Cth)isarevenueActinthats234deals,inpart,withevasionofthepaymentofdutyandtheneedforthetravellerandimportertomakeatruedisclosureatalltimestoCustomsofficials,theoffenceprovidedforunders234(1)(e)isnot an offence of strict liability but an absolute offence and accordingly, the defence of "act of a stranger"isnotavailable.

Per O'Loughlin J:"...Ireturn,therefore,tothefirstargumentadvancedbyMrFairbankwhich,asittranspired,wastheargumentuponwhichhemoststronglyrelied.HecommencedbysayingthattherearethreecategoriesofoffencestobeconsideredandmomentarilyIwillabbreviatethembydescribingthemas "mens rea","strictliability"and"absoluteliability".InsupportofthisclassificationhereferredtothejudgmentsofGibbsCJandDawsonJinHe Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.ReferringtothereasonsofDicksonJ,whodeliveredthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtofCanadainReg v Sault Ste. Marie [1978]2SCR1299;3CR(3d)30,GibbsCJsaid,atp210,thatDicksonJheldthatoffencescouldbeclassifiedintothreecategoriesasfollows:-

"1.Offencesinwhichmens rea,consistingofsomepositivestateofmindsuchasintent,knowledge,orrecklessness,mustbeprovedbytheprosecutioneitherasaninferencefromthenatureoftheactcommitted,orbyadditionalevidence.

2.Offencesinwhichthereisnonecessityfortheprosecutiontoprovetheexistenceofmens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie importstheoffence,leavingitopentotheaccusedtoavoidliabilitybyprovingthathetookallreasonablecare.Thisinvolvesconsiderationofwhat

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYareasonablemanwouldhavedoneinthecircumstances.Thedefencewillbeavailableiftheaccusedreasonablybelievedinamistakensetoffactswhich,iftrue,wouldrendertheactoromissioninnocent,orifhetookallreasonablestepstoavoidtheparticularevent.Theseoffencesmay properly be called offences of strict liability.

3.Offencesofabsoluteliabilitywhereitisnotopentotheaccusedtoexculpatehimselfbyshowingthat he was free of fault."

DawsonJ,atp252,recognizedthesethreecategorieswhenhesaid:–

"In relation to the offence of importing narcotic goods into Australia, the question which arises iswhether theprosecutionhas toproveanymental stateaccompanying the importation. Inother words, the question is whether mens rea isaningredientoftheoffencetobeprovedbytheprosecution. If it is not, the further question arises whether the offence is one of strict liability which,whilstnotrequiringtheprosecutiontoprovemens rea in order to make out a case, allows the accused to raise honest and reasonable mistake by way of exculpation. To that extent a mental element is imported into an offence of strict liability short of requiring proof of mens rea bytheprosecution.Themistakemustinvolveabeliefinastateofaffairswhich,iftrue,wouldmake the act of the accused innocent. If the statute in neither of these ways requires any mental state to accompany the importation, then the offence is an absolute one and is complete once theprohibitedactofimportationisproved.Offencesofstrictorabsoluteliabilityarecreaturesofstatute.Theterms'strictliability'and'absoluteliability'arenotalwaysusedpreciselyandsometimesinterchangeably,butusedasIhaveusedthem,theyareaconvenientwayofdrawingthedistinctiontowhichIhavereferred."

... Applying the terminology used in He Kaw Teh's case, the passage should read:

"S111shouldbeconstruedascreatinganoffenceofabsolute liability which does not, in law, accommodate a Proudman v Dayman type defence."

... [I]twouldseemtomethatonemusthaveregardtothefactthattheCustoms Act isarevenueactinthats234,inpart,dealswithevasionofthepaymentsofdutyandelsewheredealswiththeneedforthetravellerortheimportertomake,andfillout,atruedisclosureatalltimetocustomsofficials–toassume,thereby,theresponsibilityofmakingcertainthatfacts(ofwhichcustomsofficialshavenoknowledgeorhavenomeansofobtainingknowledge)areproperlypresentedtotheauthorities.

Viewed in this manner, and notwithstanding that from time to time hardship may be created, I havecometotheconclusionthattheoffenceforwhichprovisionismadeins234(1)(e)oftheActisan absolute offence and that the learned stipendiary magistrate was therefore incorrect in holding thatthedefenceof"actofastranger"wasavailabletotherespondent.Inmyopinion,therefore,theappeal must be allowed.

Iaccordinglysetasidetheorderofdismissalwithrespecttocount1inthecomplaintandinlieuthereofIrecordaconviction.ItfollowsthatImustalsoallowtheappealforthepurposesofsettingasidethelearnedstipendiarymagistrate'sorderastocosts."

PerO'LoughlinJinLanham v Coles[1986]40SASR390;82FLR216;21ACrimR340;MC21/1986,27March1986.

(g) Income tax – fail to furnish return – accountant engaged by taxpayer – notice sent to accountant – return not furnished by accountant – taxpayer unaware of notice – charge laid against taxpayer – whether mens rea or honest mistake of fact apply

1.Havingregardtothesubject-matteroftheTaxation Administration Act1953('Act'),theobjectofs8Canditslanguage,bothmens rea and honest and reasonable mistake of fact are excluded by necessary implication.

2.Whereataxpayer'saddressforservicewascareofanaccountant,andtheaccountantfailedtocomplywitharequirementtofurnishthereturn,thetaxpayerwasdeemedtohavereceivedthenotice, and the questions of his intention, knowledge and mens reawereallirrelevanttowhetherthetaxpayerhadcommittedanoffenceunders8CoftheAct.

Per Bollen J:"...MrKavanaghfortheappellantsaidthattheoffencewasabsolute,morethanstrict,butabsolute.That is to say he was submitting that intention, knowledge and mens reawereirrelevant.Ihavethought about all the authorities to which I was referred. Much has been written about mens rea in

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYstatutory offences. Much has been written about the "defence" of honest and reasonable mistake. I think that, in this day and age, the less said by a single judge about the topic in general the better. I attempttoconfinemyselftosayingnomorethanIbelievetobenecessarytodecidethiscase.InHe Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553BrennanJsaidatCLR566:

"Itisnowfirmlyestablishedthatmens reaisanessentialelementineverystatutoryoffenceunless,havingregardtothelanguageofthestatuteandtoitssubject-matter,itisexcludedexpresslyor by necessary implication."

Irespectfullythinkthatthisiscompletelycorrectandwell-supportedbyauthority.Itakeitasmytext. I add a reference to Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985]AC1;[1984]2AllER503;[1984]3WLR437;[1984]CrimLR479;(1984)80CrAppR194;[1985]LRC(Crim)439.TheJudicialCommitteetothePrivyCouncilineffectsaidthatthepresumptionthatmens rea was an essential ingredient of a statutory offence could be displaced by clear words and by necessary implication where the statute creating the offence dealt with an issue of social concern providedthatstrictliabilitywouldbeeffectivetopromotetheobjectsofthestatute.

We can easily understand the object of the Taxation Administration Act. More pointedly the object of s8Cistocompelcompliancewiththingslawfullyrequiredoftaxpayerspursuanttoataxationlaw.It is a section intended to promote and facilitate the assessment and collection of the right amount ofincometaxfromtaxpayers.TheCommissionermusthavequiteextensivepowerstoenablehimandhisofficerssotoassessandcollect.Itis,ofcourse,averyunattractiveideathatanypersoncanbeconvictedwithouthisorherhavinganyintentiontobreaktherelevantlaworeventotakeachanceaboutbreakingit.Butsometimesitmusthappen.

Road trafficoffencesandoffencesunder the legislation toprovide for the sale ofunadulteratedfood are examples. The interest of the community demands that in some class of statutory offence absoluteliabilityshouldattachtopeoplewhoaresubjectivelyinnocent.Thatisnecessaryfortheoperation of the legislation which in turn is seen by the legislature to be for the good of the general populace.Therobustmindinitiallyfightsagainstpenaltieswithoutguiltyintention.Butintheendit must be resigned to some areas, perhaps correctly called social issues, in which such penalties must regretfully obtain.

Section8Cdoesnotexpresslysaythatmens rea and honest and reasonable mistake are excluded butIthinkthatconsiderationofthesubject-matteroftheAct,ortheobjectofs8Candofitslanguageshows that both mens rea and honest and reasonable mistake are excluded by necessary implication. Ithinkthesubject-matterofthelegislationandtheobjectofs8Ccryoutthathewhohasreceivedanoticeathisaddressforservicemustcomplywithittotheextentthatheiscapableofdoingso.Intention, knowledge and mens rea areallirrelevant."

PerBollenJ(SupremeCourtofSouthAustralia)inAmbrose v Edmonds-Wilson (1988)48SASR514;92FLR429;9ATR1217;(1988)88ATC4,173;MC53/1989,12February1988.

(h) Environment Protection offence – whether absolute offence – whether defence of reasonable precautions available

1.HavingregardtothepurposeandintentoftheEnvironment Protection Act1970('Act'), thelanguageusedins39oftheActandnotwithstandingtheseverepenaltyprovidedforabreachofit,s39imposesabsoluteliabilityuponanoffender,andadefenceofreasonableprecautionsisnotavailable. Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris[1987]NTSC20;(1987)46NTR1;(1987)87FLR36;(1987)27ACrimR342; He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553;and Welsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;(1983)2VR173,referredto.

2.Anemployerisresponsibleforabreachoftheprovisionsofs39oftheAct,notwithstandingthatthe doing of the act leading to the pollution was delegated to a person who was an independent contractor. Goodes v General Motors Holdens' Pty Ltd[1970]VicSC330;[1972]VicRp42;(1972)VR386;27LGRA287,applied.

3.Inviewofthedeemingprovisionsins63(2)oftheAct,oncetheelementsoftheoffenceareestablished, the occupier bears the onus of establishing that the cause of the pollution was

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYunrelated to any commercial or industrial undertaking. Window v The Phosphate Co-operative Co of Australia Ltd[1983]VicRp88;(1983)2VR287,distinguished.

Per Nathan J:"...Inordertoconsiderthisquestion,itisnecessarytoanalysethecharacterofs39.Doesitcreatean offence of which mens rea is an element, or is it one of absolute liability, or, is it in that "halfway house"ofstrictliability,asdescribedbyAscheJinChiou Yaou Fa v Morris [1987]NTSC20;(1987)46NTR1;(1987)87FLR36;(1987)27ACrimR342,wherethedefencemaybeapplicable.

TheHighCourtwascalledupontoconsiderthesevariouscategoriesofoffencesinHe Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.

... TheHighCourtrecognizedatripartitecategorizationofstatutoryoffences,sofarasthementalingredientnecessaryforconvictionwasconcerned.TheyareconvenientlysummarizedbyAscheJin Chiou Yaou Fa's Case asfollows(p19):

"(i)thatmens rea applies in full;

(ii)thattheoffenceisoneofstrictliabilitysothattheprosecutiondoesnothavetorebutmens reainprovingtheactus reus;butiftheevidenceraisesalikelihoodofhonestandreasonablemistake the prosecution must rebut that beyond reasonable doubt;

(iii)thattheoffencecreatesabsoluteliability."

I consider that a defence of taking all reasonable care and diligence is within the scope of the concept ofhonestandreasonablemistakeandshouldbeavailabletooffencescarryingstrictliability.Thisbeingso,ifs39isanoffenceofstrictliability,theMagistratewouldhavebeenentitled,(subjecttosatisfactoryevidencebeingavailable),todismissthechargeagainstR.L.Ishouldaddhere,thatalthough the term "defence" has been used by me and in other authorities when discussing honest andreasonablemistake,theaccusedhasanevidentiaryonusonlytodischarge,soastoraiseadefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeorreasonableandpropercareanddiligence.Oncetheevidentiaryonusisdischargedbytheaccused,itisthenrequiredtobedisplacedbytheprosecutionbeyond reasonable doubt.

AfurtherdifficultywiththeEnglishauthoritiesinthisareaisthattheyhavenotdeveloped,tothesame extent and clarity, the tripartite categorization of criminal offences as was adopted in Teh's Case andaccordingly,theterms"strictliability"and"absoluteliability"havetendedtobeusedbythe English authorities interchangeably.

ReturningtoTeh's Case and Chiou Yaou Fa's Case, both pointed out the prima facie presumption that mens rea is an element of any criminal offence, and that the onus rests on the prosecution at all times to establish that element beyond reasonable doubt. A court requires good grounds for movingawayfromsuchapresumption.Furthertothisproposition,asstatedbyAscheJinChiou Yaou Fa's Case (p22):

"If,however,mens rea canbeshowntohavebeendisplaced,itdoesnotfollowthatthecourtshouldleaptotheoppositeextremeofabsoluteliability.Ratherthepresumption,ifmens rea is displaced, should be of strict liability unless the words of a statute are so clear and unambiguous as to admit of no other construction."

GibbsJinTeh's Case considered four matters in assessing whether the presumption of mens rea wasdisplaced(pp528-530),namely:

1.Thelanguageofthesectioncreatingtheoffence;2. The subject matter of the statute;3. The consequences for the community of an offence;4.Potentialconsequencesforanaccused,ifconvicted.

Similarly,BrennanJapproachedtheissueofmens rea thus(atp576):

"Principally, by reference to the language of the statute and its subject matter. From those sources, themischiefatwhichthestatuteisaimedisderived,andthepurposeofthestatuteisperceived.The purposeofthestatuteisthesurestguideofthelegislature's intention as to the mental state to be implied." (myemphasis)

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYFurther assistance, and also from a Court which binds me, is the Full Court decision of Welsh v Donnelly [1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173.AprovisionoftheMotor Car Act1958(s35(5))madeitanoffencetooverloadatraileraboveaxleweightsofstatedlevels.TheCourtunanimouslyheldthattheprovisionimposedstrictliabilityalthoughthattermwasusedsynonymouslywithabsoluteliabilitywhichistobeunderstoodinviewofthefactitwasdecidedpriortoTeh's Case.

ThisActrecites"anypersonshallnotcause"pollution.Itwouldbedifficulttoframelanguageinmoreabsoluteandembraciveterms.Thephraseechoescommandmentsgivenelsewhereandisjustasexplicit.IfindthetermsoftheActimposeabsoluteliability.

...Ins39oftheAct,theseverityofthepenaltyisoneindicewhichcanbeusedtoassesswhethertheoffenceisoneofstrictorabsoluteliability.Section39(5)oftheActprovidesforamaximumpenaltyofnotmorethan100penaltyunits($10,000),andinthecaseofacontinuingoffence,adailypenaltyofnotmorethan40penaltyunitseachdaytheoffencecontinuesafterconviction.Atfirstblush,thismaybeviewedasquiteaseverefinancialpenaltyandthussuggestacategorizationofstrictliabilityisappropriate.ButasGibbsJindicated,thepotentialpenaltyneedstobeassessedinthecontextoftheconsequenceforthecommunityoftheoffence.Thatobservation,whichIfindcompelling,bringsmetoreflectuponthepotentialdamagethatmaybeincurredbythereleaseofpollutants into waters, the potential hazard to health that may result, and the social costs which maybeincurredbyfailingtodisposeofpollutantsinasafemanner.Viewedfromthatperspectivethepenaltiesarenotoppressive.

...ExaminingtheActasawholeandthepurposeitisdesignedtoserve,Iconcludeitisdirectedatpenalizing all those persons in control of potential pollutants who allow, whether by design, neglect orsheerinadvertence,theescapeofthosepollutantsintotheenvironmentwhichthencausedamage.The legislaturehasdeliberatelyusedtheword"cause"andhasavoidedusing languagesuchas"knowinglycause"or"negligentlycause"(pollution)whichwouldhavebeenexpected,iftheintentionhad been to create an offence of merely strict and not absolute liability. This is a strong indication that absolute liability was intended.

I am further drawn to this conclusion after considering the subject matter of the Act. It is primarily concerned with pollution of the air or water, both are in the nature of common property, as distinct frompropertyheldinprivatehands.Theusualconstraintswhichpreventpersonsfromintrudinguponthepropertyrightsofothers(e.g.actionsintrespassornuisance)arenoteffectiveincreatingaregimewhichprotectsthegeneralenvironment.TheActissocialregulatorylegislationdesignedtoprotecttheenvironment.Pollutionoftheenvironmentusuallyresultsinaburdenandcosttothecommunity.TheActpenalisesthosewhohave"caused"pollutionand,therebybroughtadetrimenttothecommunityasawhole.Basedontheseconclusions,theMagistrateerredinlawinfindingthatR.L.hadadefenceundertheAct,inthatittookreasonableprecautionstopreventthepollution.Section39createsoffencesofabsoluteliability.Ishouldadd, if it is foundR.L.tookreasonableprecautionstopreventpollution,itmaybearelevantconsiderationastopenalty."

PerNathanJinAllen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd & Anor [1989]VicRp27;[1989]VR323;[1988]VicSC354;MC03/1989,12July1988.

(i) Weights and measures – certain goods found to be under weight stated on package – defences available to employer – whether inconsistency between defence – whether mens rea ingredient of offence

Mens reaisnotanessentialingredientofanoffenceagainsts82LoftheWeights and Measures Act 1958. He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,indiciaofGibbsCJ,applied.

Per Vincent J:"...EnglishandAustralianCourtshavegenerallypropoundedthedoctrinethatsaveinexceptionalcases, statutory offences require proof of a guilty mind or mens rea, the precise nature of which mayvaryfromstatutetostatute.NotonlymusttheintentionofParliamentastowhethermens rea is an element of a statutory offence be gleaned from the language, subject matter, and purpose of the particular enactment concerned, but, if mens rea issuchanelement,thespecificnatureofthatwhichisrequiredtojustifyaconvictionmustbeobtainedfromthesamesource.

In He Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553wheretheHighCourtwascalledupontoconsiderwhether this presumptionhadbeendisplacedby s233B(1) of theCommonwealthCustoms Act. GibbsCJatpp528-530referredtoseveralindiciawhichwererelevanttothisquestionofstatutoryinterpretation, namely:

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(i)thelanguageofthesectioncreatingtheoffence;(ii)thesubjectmatterofthestatute;(iii)theconsequencesforthecommunityofanoffence;(iv)potentialconsequencesforanaccusedifconvicted;(v)whetherstrictliabilitywouldassistintheenforcementoftheregulations.

Heconcludedthatalthoughtheseindicatorsdidnotallpointinthesamedirection,theviewthatParliamentdidnotintendthattheoffencedefinedinpar.(b)shouldbeanabsoluteonewasclearlyopen and thus the presumption of mens rea remained. Unlike the legislation which arose for considerationinthatcase,thereareinmyviewnoconflictingindiciaorfactorswhichcouldtendtomaketheinterpretationoftherelevantsectionsoftheWeights and Measures Act complicated or difficultinsofarasanintentiontodisplacethepresumptionisconcerned.

EachofthematterstowhichthelearnedChiefJusticereferredpointsdirectlyagainstthenecessityfor establishment of mens rea beforeliabilityunders82Lisproved.ThispropositioninmyopinionisalmostselfevidentandIdonotthereforeproposetodealwiththemseriatim.Inanyeventwiththeexceptionofthepotentialconsequencesforanaccusedifconvicted,whichinthiscaseinvolvestheimpositionofasmallmonetarypenalty,Ihavealreadydealtwitheachoftheothermattersindifferent contexts. ..."

PerVincentJinVaux v SE Dickins Pty Ltd [1989]VicSC101;MC11/1989,16March1989.

(j) Motor traffic – speeding – mens rea – whether strict liability imposed

Having regard to the subjectmatter and character of Reg 1001 of theRoad Safety (Traffic) Regulations 1988concerningtheoffenceofdrivingamotorvehicleatanexcessivespeed,itisclear that strict responsibility is imposed for a speeding infringement and accordingly, the defence of honest and reasonable mistake as a ground of exculpation is precluded.

Per Brooking J:"... These speed limits are imposed by the regulations in the interests of road safety. This must beapparent toallwithouthavingregardto thetitleof theregulations, theRoad Safety (Traffic) Regulations 1988,orthetitleoftheActunderwhichtheyaremade,theRoad Safety Act 1986,ortotheobjectsoftheActandregulationsasstatedins1oftheActandclause102oftheregulations.Ifeveronemightexpectanintentiontoimposestrictresponsibility,itwouldbeinrelationtothisoffenceofdrivingamotorvehicleatanexcessivespeed.(ComparewhatwassaidbytheChiefJusticein Welsh v Donnelly [1983]VicRp79;(1983)2VR173atp177,andwhatwassaidinthesamecasebySouthwellJatpp199-200,whereHisHonourcitedapassagefromFranklin v Stacey (1981)27SASR490concerningthesubordinationofinterestsofindividualstotheinterestofthepublicinviewofthepurposeandpolicyofthestatute,theMotor Vehicles Act, as securing the public welfare andpromotingsafetyofthepublic).

Speedingmotorcarshavebecomedreadfulenginesofdestruction.Thecosttothecommunityintermsofdeathandinjuryandeconomiclosshasbeenenormous.Iwouldexpectaprovisionofthiskindtorequiredriverstokeepwithintheapplicablespeedlimitattheirperil.Ifthedefenceofhonestand reasonable belief were applicable, then mistakes could be of two kinds. There could be a mistake of fact, the fact bearing on whether one was in a speed zone, and there could be a mistake of fact astothespeedatwhichthevehiclewastravelling.Ithinkthattheintentionhereisthatmotoristsshallattheirperilbeawareoftheapplicablespeedlimit,andshallthenattheirperilsogoverntheir speed as to keep within it. I do not think that they can be heard to say, except in mitigation, thatabadlyparkedpantechniconobscuredaspeedrestrictionsignfromtheirview,orthatapowerfailureatnightledthemtobelievethattherewasnoprovisionforstreetlightingalongtheroad,orthattheybelievedtheirfaultyspeedometertobeworkingproperly,asinHearn v McCann (1982)29SASR448;(1982)5ACrimR368,orthatforanyotherreasontheybelievedtheywerenotbreakingthespeedlimit.Humaningenuityandhumannaturebeingwhattheyare,Ishouldnotexpectthelaw to recognize mistake as a defence to a charge of this kind. That defence was rejected by Zelling JinthespeedingcasetowhichMrMonteithveryproperlyreferredus,Hearn v McCann (supra).

Aconvictionforspeedingcarriesnostigma;perhapsitshould,butitdoesnot.Thissummaryoffencecarriesamaximumpenaltyofonly$500.Licencecancellationandsuspensionaredealtwithbys28of the Road Safety Act 1986.Alicencecancellationorsuspensionmaybearheavilyonthedefendant,butintheoverallschemeofthings,alicencecancellationorsuspension,irksomethoughitmaybe,mayberegardedastowardsthebottomendofthescaleofcriminalpunishment.Inmyview,theground of the order nisi has been made out and the order nisi should be made absolute with costs, includingcostsreserved,andtheorderbelowshouldbesetaside...."

PerBrookingJ(KayeandMurphyJJagreeing)inKearon v Grant[1991]VicRp25;[1991]1VR321;(1990)11MVR377;MC25/1990,21June1990.

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY(k) Exceeding speed limit – defence of honest and reasonable mistake

Per Macaulay J:"... Honest and reasonable mistake68.MrAgar’sthirdfundamentalcomplaintwasthatthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeshouldbeavailablefortheoffencewithwhichhewascharged,atleastincircumstanceswheretheallegedspeediswithinthe“grey”areaofthevehicle’sspeedometererrortolerance.

69.Inthiscasetheallegedspeedof75kphwaswithinplusorminus10percentof70kph–althoughInotethattheactualspeedindicatedbytheGatsometerwas78kph,justoutsidethe10percentrange.Bethatasitmay,MrAgarsoughttodistinguishthedecisionoftheappealdivisionofthisCourt in Kearon v Grant [1991]VicRp25;[1991]1VR321;(1990)11MVR377becausethatcaseconcernedanallegationofgrosslyexcessivespeedwhereashiscasedoesnot.

70.InKearon BrookingJ,withwhomKayeandMurphyJJagreed,saidatVR323–

... I think it clear that the defence, as I shall call it, of honest and reasonable belief is not open onachargeunderthisregulationofexceedingthespeedlimit.Inmyview,thesubjectmatterand character of this regulation are such as to make it likely that the exclusion of this defence was intended.

These speed limits are imposed by the regulations in the interests of road safety. This must be apparent toallwithouthavingregardto the titleof theregulations, theRoad Safety (Traffic) Regulations1988,orthetitleoftheActunderwhichtheyaremade,theRoad Safety Act1986,ortotheobjectsoftheActandregulationsasstatedins1oftheActandcl102oftheregulations.Ifeveronemightexpectanintentiontoimposestrictresponsibility,itwouldbeinrelationtothisoffenceofdrivingamotorvehicleatanexcessivespeed.....

Speedingmotorcarshavebecomedreadfulenginesofdestruction.Thecosttothecommunityintermsofdeathandinjuryandeconomiclosshasbeenenormous.Iwouldexpectaprovisionofthiskindtorequiredriverstokeepwithintheapplicablespeedlimitattheirperil.Ifthedefenceof honest and reasonable belief were applicable, then mistakes could be of two kinds. There could be a mistake of fact, the fact bearing on whether one was in a speed zone, and there could be amistakeoffactastothespeedatwhichthevehiclewastravelling.Ithinkthattheintentionhere is that motorists shall at their peril be aware of the applicable speed limit, and shall then at theirperilsogoverntheirspeedastokeepwithinit.Idonotthinkthattheycanbeheardtosay,except in mitigation, that a badly parked pantechnicon obscured a speed restriction sign from theirview,orthatapowerfailureatnightledthemtobelievethattherewasnoprovisionforstreetlightingalongtheroad,orthattheybelievedtheirfaultyspeedometertobeworkingproperly,asin Hearn v McCann(1982)29SASR448;(1982)5ACrimR368,orthatforanyotherreasontheybelievedtheywerenotbreakingthespeedlimit.Humaningenuityandhumannaturebeingwhatthey are, I should not expect the law to recognise mistake as a defence to a charge of this kind.

71.TherehavebeennootheriterationsofthepurposesandobjectsoftheRoad Safety Act to suggest thatanypurposedifferentfromthatconsideredbyBrookingJshouldbeinferred.TheforceofhisHonour’sreasoningstillapplies–sodoestheauthorityofthedecision.

72.MrAgarincorrectlyassumedthattheoffencewithwhichthedriverinKearon was charged was, bydefinition,anoffenceinvolvingspeedofatleast25kphinexcessofthespeedlimit.Hemisappliesthedefinedterm“excessivespeedinfringement”ins3oftheRoad Safety Act to the circumstances of thatcase.Itonlyhasrelevancetomandatorysuspensionunders28(1)(a).InKearonthedriverwaschargedunderreg.1001(1)(c)oftheRoad Safety (Traffic) Regulations1988withexceedingthespeedindicatedonaspeedrestrictionsigninaspeedzone.Thedegreebywhichthedriverexceededthespeed limit played no part in the reasoning of the Court.

73.Indeed,inmyview,itwouldmakenosenseatall,havingregardtothereasoningbehindtheconclusion that the offence was one of strict liability, to pay any attention to whether the alleged speed exceeded the speed limit by a few or by many kilometres per hour. Much public attention hasbeendrawntotheself-evidentfactthatexceedingaspeedlimitbyjustafewnotchescancauseinjuryasreadilyasdrivingatspeedswellabovealimit.

74.IntheCountyCourtMrAgarappearstohavearguedthatKearon was wrong because it did not takeintoaccountthereasoningoftheHighCourtinHe Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.Thatargument featured less in the submissions before me, the focus being upon the asserted ground for distinguishing Kearon from the present as already discussed. To the extent Mr Agar still relies upon an error in failing to apply He Kaw Teh instead of Kearon,Ihavebeenunabletodiscernanybasisforfindinganerror.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY75.Inconclusion,hisHonourwasnotinerrorindecliningtoaffordtoMrAgarthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeoffact(assumingforpresentpurposesthatsuchadefencemighthavebeenmadeoutonthefactsofthecase)."

PerMacaulayJinAgar v Dolheguy & Anor[2010]VSC506;(2010)246FLR179;MC50/2010,11November2010.

(l) Failing to stop/render assistance/report to police – categorisation of offences – whether involving strict liability

1.Forthepurposeofconsideringcriminalintent,statutoryoffencesfallintothreecategories.

(1)Prosecutionmustprovemens rea as an essential ingredient of the offence (2)Prosecutionmustnegativeevidenceofthedefendant’shonestandreasonablebelief(3)Absoluteoffencesoronesofstrictliability.

2.Theprovisionsofs61(1)oftheRoad Safety Act1986('Act')donotcreateabsoluteoffencesnorimposestrictliability.Thatis,s61(1)doesnotcreateCategory3offences.

3.Havingregardtotherelativeseriousnessoftheoffencesandothermatters,s61offencesdonotfallwithinCategory2offencesinvolvingthedefenceofhonestandreasonablebelief.Section61requiresthattheappropriatementalelementbeprovedbytheprosecutionasanessentialingredient of the offence.

4.Toestablishanoffenceunders61(b)or(e)oftheActitmustbeprovedthattherewasactualknowledgeonthepartofthedriverthatanaccidenthadoccurredandthatapersonwasinjured.Whereadriverknewhehadbeeninacollisionbutdidnotknowhehadhitaperson,amagistratewasinerrorinfindingprovedchargeslaidpursuanttos61(1)(b)and(e)oftheAct.

5. In relation to a charge under s61(1)(a) of the Act, the prosecutionmust show therewasappreciabledamagetopropertyotherthanthedefendant’smotorvehicle.

Per Teague J:"... IturntothefirstquestionposedintheorderoftheMaster,astowhetherthelearnedmagistrateerredindecidingthats61(1)oftheRoad Safety Act created an absolute offence. He Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553istheleadingcasedealingwiththecategorisationofstatutoryoffencesforthepurposeofconsideringcriminalintent.Asaverygeneralproposition,itispossibletosaythatsuchoffencesfallintothreecategories.Tononeofthosecategoriesitiseasytogiveasatisfactorylabel.Thefirstcategorycoversoffencesinwhichthereisanoriginalobligationontheprosecutiontoprovemens rea as an essential ingredient of the offence.

Thesecondcategoryhascommonlybeenreferredtoascoveringthemiddleground.Itrelatestooffences where mens rea willbepresumedtobepresentunlessanduntilsomeevidenceisadvancedby the defendant that he had an honest belief in facts which would make his act lawful, and some evidenceorbasisforthinkingthatitwasonreasonablegrounds,inwhichcircumstancestheonusisontheprosecutiontodisprovehonestbeliefonreasonablegroundsbeyondreasonabledoubt.Thethirdcategoryisalsonoteasytogivealabelto,asitapparentfromtworelativelyrecentdecisionsofthe Victorian Full Court in Welsh v Donnelly [1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173,andKearon v Grant [1991]VicRp25;[1991]1VR321;(1990)11MVR377.Ineachcasethecourtheldthatastatutoryprovisioncreatinganoffencewasintendedtocreateanoffenceinthethirdcategoryandnotanoffence in the middle ground.

... In the light of what was said in those cases, I am not disposed myself to adopt “absolute offence” asalabeltoidentifyanoffenceinthethirdcategory.However,Iamsatisfiedthatitwasinthatsense that the label was used by the learned magistrate. All six of the cases to which I am about to referinvolvedprosecutionsbasedonlegislativeprovisionsintermscomparabletobutnotthesameass61.Allsixwerecitedtothelearnedmagistrate.Thereisnotinanyofthosecases,orinanycasetowhichIwasreferredinargument,supportforthepropositionthatsuchaprovisionshouldbe taken to create an “absolute offence”, or, to use a different expression, to impose strict liability.

... In Harding v Price [1948]1KB695; [1948]1AllER283,theaccusedwasacquittedonappealofachargeoffailingtoreportanaccident,hebeingadriverwhowasfoundtohavebeenunawarethatanaccidenthadoccurred.LordGoddardCJreferredtothegeneralrulethatamanshouldnot be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind, and to the

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYexception to that rule where a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime by making an absolute prohibition against the doing of some act, andtothequalificationtotheexceptionthat,evenwherethestatuteimposeswhatisapparentlyanabsolute prohibition, an absence of guilty knowledge may in some cases be a defence.

... Although those six cases were cited to the learned magistrate, he decided, without elaborating otherthantosaythatherejectedthedefencearguments,thats61(1)createdanabsoluteoffence.Iamsatisfiedthatheerred.

... From what was said in He Kaw Teh, I am satisfied that,when addressing the issue of theappropriateclassificationofanoffencecreatedbyastatutoryprovision,Ishouldhaveregardto,atleast, the proper construction of the section, the mischief which the section is designed to remedy, the context in which the section stands in the statute, the subject matter of the statute itself, and whether putting the defendant under absolute liability would assist in the enforcement of the statute.

Therecanonlybealimitedbenefittobegainedbyexaminingthedifferentcircumstancesinwhichcourtshavegoneaboutthisexercisewithotherstatutoryprovisions.That limitedbenefit lies inbecoming better acquainted with the process. The process resulted in a full mens rea classificationin He Kaw Teh as to an offence under the Customs Act of importing heroin. In Welsh and Kearon, thetwoVictoriancasesIearlierreferredto,theanalysisresultedintheclassificationoftheoffencebeing considered as one of strict liability. Welsh was decided before He Kaw Teh. Kearon was decided after, but without reference to He Kaw Teh.

... Notwithoutreservation,Ihaveconcludedthatoffencesunders61aretobegivenafullmens rea classification,thatisthattheyaretobetreatedasrequiringtheappropriatementalelementtobeprovedasanessentialingredientoftheoffence...."

PerTeagueJinRobinson v Fisher[1993]VicSC455;MC13/1994,31August1993.

(m) Drink/driving – whether offence under s49(1)(f) of Road Safety Act 1986 is one of strict liability

The legislature has established an increasingly strict regimewith respect to drink/drivingoffences designed to protect the community. There would seem to be little doubt that the offence establishedbys49(1)(f)oftheRoad Safety Act1986(‘Act’)istoberegardedasoneofstrictliability.Accordingly,thedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeisnotavailablewithrespecttotheoffenceestablishedbys49(1)(f)oftheAct. Welsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173,applied.

Per Vincent J:"... Counsel for the appellant relied upon statements of principle in a large number of cases, in support of this proposition. These included the following: R v Jones [1995]QB235;[1995]3AllER139;[1995]2WLR64;Butler v Loneragan(1994)19MVR361;(1994)74ACrimR259,NSWSupremeCourt,16/6/94;Hawthorne (Department of Health) v Morcam Pty Ltd[1985]TASRp10;(1992)29NSWLR120;65ACrimR227;Edwards v Macrae(1991)14MVR193;L v F(1985)21ACrimR55;[1985]TasR112;(1985)3MVR120,Tas.SupremeCourt,24/9/85;Harmer v Grace, ex parte Harmer[1980]QdR395;Boucher v GJ Coles & Co Ltd(1974)9SASR495;(1974)32LGRA87;Mayer v Marchant(1973)5SASR567;(1973)30LGRA246.

SomereliancewasalsoplaceduponpronouncementsofprinciplebytheHighCourtinHe Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,andJiminez v R[1992]HCA14;(1992)173CLR572;106ALR162;66ALJR292;15MVR289;59ACrimR308.

Among the Victorian cases to which reference was made were: Fitzgerald v Howey[1995]VicSC427;(1996)24MVR369,VictorianSupremeCourt,EamesJ,10/8/95);Robinson v Fisher[1993]VicSC455;[1993]ACLRep.130VIC201;Pilkington v Elliot & Anor [1991]VicSC510(unreported,VictorianSupremeCourt,ColdreyJ,27/9/91);Kearon v Grant[1991]VicRp25;[1991]1VR321;(1990)11MVR377;Meeking v Crisp & Anor[1989]VicRp65;[1989]VR740;(1989)9MVR1;Kidd v Reeves [1972]VicSC61;[1972]VicRp64;[1972]VR563;Barker v Burke[1970]VicRp111;[1970]VR884.

Theseauthorities,emanatingfromdifferentjurisdictionsandconcernedwithavarietyofpiecesoflegislation, contain statements emphasising the fundamental importance in the attribution of criminal responsibilityoftheexistenceofwhatmightbedescribedasasufficientlyculpablestateofmind.TheundoubtedlycorrectviewisrepeatedlyexpressedthatCourtsshouldbeveryreluctanttoadoptinterpretationsofstatutoryprovisionswhichcouldhavetheeffectofholdingcriminallyresponsibleanindividualwhohasactedinthehonestandreasonablebeliefthathisorherconductwaslawful.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY... On its proper construction, the argument proceeded, s49(1)(f) falls into the line of offencesconsidered by Welsh v Donnelly(supra)(overloadedvehicles);Kearon v Grant(supra)(speeding);andPilkington v Elliot(supra)(drivingunregisteredvehicle).Acknowledgingtheforceoftheargumentsadvancedonbehalfoftheappellant,Iamoftheopinionthatthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeisnotavailablewithrespecttotheoffenceestablishedbys49(1)(f)oftheRoad Safety Act1986.

I do not think that it is necessary to set out the history of this section or the structure within which itiscontained.Itissufficient,Ithink,tostatethatovertheyearsthelegislaturehasestablishedanincreasinglystrictregimewithrespecttodrinkdrivingoffencesdesignedtoprotectthecommunity.There would seem to be little doubt that, at least since the decision in Welsh v Donnelly, and consistent withthisapproach,s49(1)(f)hasbeenregardedasoneofstrictliability.AlthoughtheprovisionhasbeenthesubjectofrepeatedexaminationinthisCourtoveranumberofyears,thereisnowheretobe found, as I understand the situation, any pronouncement or indication in any of many judgments handed down, that this is not the case. For good or ill, the position is, in my opinion, fairly clear. I do not consider that the Magistrate fell into error in deciding as he did. ..."

PerVincentJinSkase v Holmes & Anor[1995]VicSC555;MC03/1996,11October1995.

(n) Use of unregistered vehicle – whether offence of strict liability

Thecourtshaveconsideredanumberof factors indeterminingwhetheranoffence isoneofstrictliability.Theseincludefirstly,thatthepenaltyimposedismonetary;secondly,thatthereisnostigmaattachingtoaconviction;andthirdly,thatthedefendantisabletocomplywiththeprovisionwithrelativeease.Allofthesefeaturesadheretos7oftheRoad Safety Act1986('Act').Thewordsofs7simplyprohibitapersonowningamotorvehicleortrailerwhichisusedonahighwayandisunregistered.Onitsfacetheclearandconciselanguageinwhichtheprovisionis couched, togetherwith its objective form, clearly indicate a legislative intention to imposestrictliabilityupontheownerofanunregisteredvehicleusedonahighway.Havingregardtothepurpose,wordingandcharacteristicsofs7,honestandreasonablemistakeisnotadefencetoachargeunders7(1)(b)oftheAct.

Per Coldrey J:"... I should interpolate that the question of whether mens rea is a requisite ingredient of an offence (oftendesignatedbysuchtermsas"knowingly"or"wilfully"inthedescriptionofanoffence)shouldnotbeconfusedwiththequestionastowhetherthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistake(touseacompendiousdescription)isagroundofexculpation.(SeeforexampleKain & Shelton Pty Ltd v McDonald(1971)1SASR39atp40;Welsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;(1983)2VR173at177;Proudman v Dayman [1941]HCA28;(1941)67CLR536atp540.)Thecasesindicatethatwhilstpositiveknowledgeorintentmaynotbeanecessaryingredientofanoffenceanhonestandreasonablemistake of fact may, nonetheless, be a ground for exculpation.

The imprecise ambit of the concept of mens rea isadvertedtobyGibbsCJinHe Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523atp533;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.AfteranexaminationofsuchcasesasR v Tolson[1886-90]AllER26;(1889)23QBD168;9WR709;Bank of New South Wales v Piper(1897)AC383;Maher v Musson [1934]HCA64;52CLR100;[1935]ALR80;89P7;Thomas v R[1937]HCA83;(1937)59CLR279;[1938]ALR37andProudman v Dayman(ibid)hestated:

"These cases establish that if it is held that guilty knowledge is not an ingredient of an offence, it does not follow that the offence is an absolute one. A middle course, between imposing absolute liability and requiring proof of guilty knowledge or intention, is to hold that an accused person will not be guilty if he acted under an honest and reasonable mistake as to the existence of facts, which,iftrue,wouldhavemadehisactinnocent."

HavingmadethatgeneralstatementtheChiefJusticeposedanumberofquestionsoneofwhichwas whether

"theabsenceofanhonestandreasonablebeliefintheexistenceoffactswhichwouldhavemadethe act innocent is a form of mens rea or whether, on the other hand, an honest and reasonable mistake affords the accused a defence only when he is charged with an offence of which mens rea is not an element."

UltimatelytheChiefJusticeremarked:(atp534)

"It may be that little turns on the question whether honest and reasonable mistake should be regardedasaspecialdefenceavailableonlyincasesnotrequiringmens rea, or as something the

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYabsence of which constitutes mens rea.Thematterislargelyoneofwords.Oneitherviewthewords of the statute and the nature of the offence must be considered in deciding what mental stateisrequired,andwhetheranobjectivetestofreasonablenessistobeappliedtogetherwiththesubjectivetestofwhethertherewasamistakenbelief."

It is now beyond argument that where the defence relied upon is honest and reasonable mistake there is no burden cast upon the accused of establishing such a defence on the balance of probabilities. ThepropositionisputsuccinctlybyDawsonJinHe Kaw TehatCLRp593–

"Thegoverningprinciplemustbethatwhichappliesgenerallyinthecriminallaw.Thereisnoonusupontheaccusedtoprovehonestandreasonablemistakeuponthebalanceofprobabilities.Theprosecutionmustprovehisguiltandtheaccusedisnotboundtoestablishhisinnocence.Itissufficientforhimtoraiseadoubtabouthisguiltandthismaybedone,iftheoffenceisnotoneof absolute liability, by raising the question of honest and reasonable mistake. If the prosecution at the end of the case has failed to dispel the doubt then the accused must be acquitted."

(SeealsoKidd v Reeves[1972]VicRp64;(1972)VR563;Mayer v Marchant(1973)5SASR567;(1973)30LGRA246andR v Strawbridge(1970)NZLR909).

InthispassageDawsonJreferstooffencesofabsoluteliability.Thistermisusedinterchangeablywith that of strict liability. What then are the criteria to be applied in determining whether an offence isoneofabsoluteorstrictliability?InHe Kaw TehDawsonJremarked:(atp594)

"Attemptshavebeenmadetocategorizethoseoffenceswhichhavebeenregardedasabsolute,but the result is only helpful in a broad sense and the recognized categories cannot be regarded asexhaustive. It isgenerallyaccepted thatstatuteswhichcreateoffences for thepurposeofregulatingsocialorindustrialconditionsortoprotecttherevenue,particularlyifthepenaltyis monetary and not too large, may more easily be regarded as imposing absolute liability. This approach may be displaced if to regard an offence as one of absolute liability could not promote theobjectofthelegislationbymakingpeoplegoverntheirconductaccordingly:seeLim Chin Aik v R(1963)AC160;[1963]1AllER223;(1963)2WLR42.Conductprohibitedbylegislationwhichis of a regulatory nature is sometimes said not to be criminal in any real sense, the prohibition beingimposedinthepublicinterestratherthanasacondemnationofindividualbehaviour.Ontheotherhand,ifaprohibitionisdirectedatagravesocialevil,theabsolutenatureoftheoffencemaymorereadilybeseen,particularlyifproofofintentwouldbedifficultandwouldrepresentareal impediment to the successful prosecution of offenders."

... The issue between the parties was whether this offence attracted absolute liability or whether the respondentscouldavailthemselvesofthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistake.Insubmittingthattheinstantoffencewasoneofabsoluteliability,MrRadford,whoappearedonbehalfoftheappellant, referred me to the article of Professor Sayre entitled Public Welfare Offence (1933)33ColumbiaLR55whichidentifiesanumberofcategoriesofoffencesattractingthedoctrineofstrictliability. These are, illegal sales of intoxicating liquor; sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; salesofmisbrandedarticles;violationsofanti-narcoticActs;criminalnuisances;violationsoftrafficregulations;violationsofmotorvehiclelawsandviolationsofgeneralpoliceregulationspassedforthesafety,healthorwell-beingofthecommunity.

ItmusthoweverberecognisedthatthecategoriesofoffencessaidbyProfessorSayretoattracttheprincipleofstrictliabilitycoverabroadspectrumandmustbeconsideredbythecourts,notonlyinthelightofthepurportedpurposesofindividualstatutes,butalsohavingregardtothespecificscope of individual sectionswithin such statutes.MrRadford contended that theRoad Safety Act1986hadasitspurposepublichealthandsafetyandconsequentlythelegislaturehadeitherexpressly or implicitly excluded a defence of honest and reasonable mistake in the public interest. HereferredtoWelsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;(1983)2VR173whereatp177YoungCJreferredto the predecessor to the Road Safety Act in these terms:

"The nature of the matters with which the Motor Car Act is concerned is peculiarly public safety. ThenotoriousdangersoftravelonmodernhighwaysandthenecessityforstrictcontrolofthehandlingofmotorvehiclesonthosehighwayssuggestthatifevertheintentiontobeimputedtoParliament is to impose strict responsibility, it is likely to be in statutes dealing with the control andhandlingofmotorvehicles."

... Thewordsofs7simplyprohibitapersonowningamotorvehicleortrailerwhichisusedonahighwayandisunregistered.Onitsfacetheclearandconciselanguageinwhichtheprovisioniscouched,togetherwithitsobjectiveform,clearlyindicate,inmyview,alegislativeintentiontoimposestrictliabilityupontheownerofanunregisteredvehicleusedonahighway.Arethere,however,anyotherindiciawhichwouldsupportor,indeederode,suchaconclusion?

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY... Accordinglyhavingconsideredthepurpose,wordingandcharacteristicsofthesectionIamoftheviewthathonestandreasonablemistakeisnotadefencetoachargeunders7(1)(b)oftheRoad Safety Act. It follows from this conclusion that it was not open to the Magistrate to hold that there wasareasonabledoubtfoundeduponthedischargebythedefendantsoftheevidentiaryonuscastupon them of raising the issue of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. ..."

PerColdreyJinPilkington v Elliott & Anor[1991]VicSC510;MC20/1997,27September1991.

(o) Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals offence – whether offence one of absolute or strict liability – principles to be applied in classifying offence

There is a legal presumption that mens reaisanessentialingredientineveryoffence.However,this presumption can be displaced. In He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,theHighCourtset out the criteria to be applied by a court in determining whether the presumption of mens rea has been displaced as follows:1.Thefirstcriterionisconsiderationofthewordsofthestatute.Havingregardtos40oftheAgricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Act('Act')itwasclearlyintendedtocreateanoffencetowhichabsoluteliabilityattachedonthebasisthat—(a)wordssuchas"knowinglycaused"arenotused;(b)theprohibitionisonanotherwiselawfulactivity;(c)theinsertionofaspecificdefenceins40(2)oftheActdoesnotcontemplatestrictliability.

2. The second criterion is consideration of the subject matter of the statute. The Act is concerned ultimatelywiththeprotectionofpublichealthandtheenvironment.WhilstthissubjectmatterisimportantitcontrastsmarkedlywiththelegislationwhichwasconsideredbytheHighCourtinHe Kaw Teh. Whilst a breach of the Act is socially important and serious it could not be regarded as an offence which is truly criminal.

(3)The third criterion is whether subjecting the defendant to absolute liability will assist in the observanceofthestatute.ThemeasurestakenbyW.werenotsufficienttodemonstrateadequateobservanceoftherequirementsofs40(1)(a)oftheAct.MorecouldhavebeendonebyW.suchasinvestigatingthenatureoftheadjoiningcroptoensurethatdamagedidnotoccur.

(4)Thefourthcriterionisconsiderationofthepurposeofthelegislationandthepenaltiesimposed.Section40(1)(a)oftheActhasbeenenactedtoregulatepotentialrisktopublichealthandtheenvironment fromaerialspraying. It isastatutewhichfallswithinthecategoryof legislationintroducedforthepurposeofregulatingsocialconditionsandpublicsafety.Therelevantpenaltyis monetary and moderately sized.

(5)Havingregardtothesecriteria,themagistratewascorrectinfindingthats40(1)(a)oftheActwasaprovisiontowhichabsoluteliabilityapplied.

Per Warren J:"... 9.InHe Kaw Teh theHighCourtreferredtothefactthatthecourtshavesetdowncriteriatobeapplied in determining whether the presumption of mens reahasbeendisplaced.Thefirstcriterionisconsiderationofthewordsofthestatutecreatingtheoffence(seeGibbsCJandMasonJ529;BrennanJ567;DawsonJ594).Thesecondcriterionisconsiderationofthesubjectmatterofthestatute(seeGibbsCJandMasonJ529;DawsonJ594).Thethirdcriterioniswhethersubjectingthedefendanttoabsoluteliabilitywillassistinthepromotionofobservanceoftherelevantstatute(seeGibbsCJandMasonJ530;BrennanJ567).Thefourthcriterionisthatwhereastatutecreatesan offence for the purpose of regulating social conditions and public safety and where the penalty attached to a statutory offence is monetary and moderately sized, the statute is more easily regarded asimposingabsoluteliability(seeBrennanJ567;DawsonJ595).

10.TheHighCourtobservedthattheexpression"mens rea"isambiguous,imprecise,difficulttodefinebutcanmeanvoluntariness,knowledgeofallthefactsconstitutingthenecessaryingredientsoftherelevantdefence,knowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheact,intenttocausethewrongfulnessandevenrecklessnessinsomecases(seeGibbsCJandMasonJ530-531;Brennan,J568-70).InHe Kaw TehtheHighCourtobserved,further,thatanhonestandreasonablemistakeoffactwillbea ground of exculpation in cases in which actual knowledge is not a necessary element of an offence (seeGibbsCJandMasonJ532;BrennanJ574).Ultimately,theHighCourtinHe Kaw Teh was concernedwiththegraveconductofheroinimportation.Inapplyingtheprinciplestobeextractedfromthecase,theHighCourtheldthatmens rea was required.

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY... 35. Finally, whilst AllenvUnited Carpet Mills Pty Ltd & Anor [1988]VicSC354;[1989]VicRp27;[1989]VR323was concerned with different legislation to that before me it is an authority of some assistance.Nevertheless,ananalysisoftheauthorities,inparticularHe Kaw TehrevealsthateachstatutemustbeconstruedinaccordancewiththecriterialaiddownbytheHighCourtbeforethenatureoftheliabilitytobeattachedtotherelevantstatutoryoffencecanbedetermined.

...39.TurningtotheapplicationoftheprinciplesinHe Kaw Teh,s40(1)(a)oftheActisasectionthatdoes not expressly require mens rea. The subject matter of the Act is the protection of public health andtheenvironment.Therewerefurtherstepsthattheappellantmighthavetakentoensurethatnoinjuriouseffectswerecausedbyaerialdrift.Accordingly,themagistratewascorrectinfindingthats40(1)(a)oftheAgricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Actwasaprovisiontowhichabsolute liability applied. It follows that the appeal will be dismissed."

PerWarrenJinWilson v Gahan[1999]VSC72;MC12/1999,18March1999.

(p) Importing an ozone depleting substance without a licence – whether such offence involves absolute or strict liability

Section13(1)oftheOzone Protection Act 1989(Cth)(‘Act’)providesthatapersonmustnotimportanHCFCunlessthepersonholdsacontrolledsubstanceslicence.Withoutbeinglicensed,SP/Limportedanumberofcylindersofagaswhichrequired thenecessary licence.SP/Lactedon thebasisofadvertisingbyacompetitor.ThemagistratefoundthattheoffencewasoneofstrictliabilitybutruledthatSP/L’sbeliefwasnotreasonablygroundedandfoundthechargeproved.Uponappeal—

HELD: Appeal dismissed.1. Itwasopento themagistrate toconclude thatSP/L’sbeliefwasnotreasonablygroundedandfindthatthedefenceofhonestandreasonablebeliefhadbeennegativedbytheprosecutionbeyond reasonable doubt.

2. Obiter. The legal presumption that mens reaisanessentialingredientineveryseriousoffencemay be displaced by the words of the statute creating the offence or the subject matter with which it is concerned. The Act falls into the category of public safety legislation that is intended to protect allAustralians.ThepotentialrisktopublichealthandtheenvironmentarisingfromuncontrolledimportationofHCFCsisself-evident.Otherrelevantfactorsincludethelanguageofs13(1),themonetarypenaltyandthelicensingprocedurepointingtoaregulatoryoffence.Havingregardtoallofthesefactors,theoffencecreatedbys13(1)oftheActisanabsoluteliabilityoffence.

Per Hedigan J:"... 4. Thoseissuesincludedconsiderationofthequestionastowhethertheoffencecreatedbys13(1)was one of absolute liability, or one in respect of which mens rea was an element and whether or notitwasanoffenceinrespectofstrictliability(alesserliabilitythanabsoluteliability)asidentifiedin Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris [1987]NTSC20;(1987)46NTR1;(1987)87FLR36;(1987)27ACrimR342and,morecritically,inHe Kaw Teh v R [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553(hereinaftercalledTeh).Itwillbenecessary,inviewofsubmissionsmadetomebycounseltoreferlatertoTeh but it might be saidwithoutmuchdisputethatinthatcase(acaseofachargeofpossessionofaprohibitedimport,heroin)theHighCourtrecognisedatripartitecategorisationofstatutoryoffences,baseduponthementalingredientnecessary.ThesewereanalysedbyAscheJinChoi Yaou Fa and summarised in this way, as cases in which

"(1)Mens rea applies in full;

(2)theoffencemightbeoneofstrictliabilitysothattheprosecutiondoesnothavetorebutmens rea inprovingtheactus reus but,iftheevidenceraisesalikelihoodofhonestandreasonablemistake, the prosecution must rebut that beyond reasonable doubt; and

(3)thattheoffencecreatesabsoluteliability.”

It is not in dispute the charges may be such that mens rea in the strict sense is not an element e.g. Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd & Anor [1988]VicSC354;[1989]VicRp27;(1989)VR323wherechargeswerelaidunders39(1)oftheEnvironment Protection Act 1970ineffectforbiddingpollutionofwatersundertheAct.NathanJinthatcase,concludedthats39(1)oftheEnvironment Protection Act created the offence of absolute liability to which a defence of honest and reasonable mistake wasnotavailable.

...Bothpartiesacceptedthatstrictliabilitywastherebeingusedinthecontextofaliabilitywhichwas not absolute liability, that is, liability regardless of absence of knowledge or mens rea.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY...24.TherewereanumberofargumentsadvancedbeforemeontheissueofwhetherornottheMagistratewasinerrorinconcludingthattheoffencecreatedbys13(1)oftheActwasoneofabsoluteliability, that is, not requiring proof of any intent or mens rea. The legal presumption that mens rea is anessentialingredientineveryseriousoffencemaybedisplacedbythewordsofthestatutecreatingthe offence or the subject matter with which it is concerned. In Teh theHighCourtconsideredthecriteria that had to be applied in order to determine whether the presumption of mens rea had been displaced.Theseare(1)thewordsofthestatute;(2)thesubjectmatterofthestatute;(3)whethertheimpositionofabsoluteliabilitywouldassistintheenforcementandobservanceoftherelevantstatuteanditsobjects;and(4)thatinthecasewheretheoffenceisregulatory(thatisforthepurposeof regulatingsocialconditionsor topromoteandmaintain thepublicsafety)and thepenalty ismonetary and moderately sized, the statute is more easily construed as imposing absolute liability.

... 32. There are many reported cases wherein social regulatory legislation prohibiting conduct in mattersofpublichealth,environmentalorpublicsafetyhavebeencharacterizedasabsoluteliabilityoffences. I refer to Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd (supra) (waterpollution),Welsh v Donnelly [1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173,FullCourtoftheSupremeCourtofVictoria(exceedingmaximumweightinatrailer);Franklin v Stacey (1981)27SASR490(drivinganunregisteredanduninsuredmotorvehicle);Kearon v Grant [1991]VicRp25;[1991]1VR321;(1990)11MVR377(exceedingaspeedlimit);andAmbrose v Edmonds-Wilson (1988)48SASR514;(1988)92FLR429;(1988)19ATR1217(failuretofurnishataxreturn).

33. All of these matters are powerful considerations pointing to the characterisation of this offence as an absolute liability offence. In my judgment, although it is not necessary for the decision on thisappeal,Iamoftheopinionthattheoffencecreatedbys13(1)isanabsoluteliabilityoffence."

PerHediganJ inSelectrix Pty Ltd v Humphrys [2001]VSC45;159FLR348;MC38/2001,1March2001.

(q) Failing to produce a valid ticket upon request – reason for failing to produce ticket

Per Nettle J:"... 46.MsBatrouneycontendedotherwise.Shesubmittedthatitshouldbeenoughtosatisfytherequirementsofs221(2)(a)oftheTransport Act1983thatatravellerhasanintentiontopurchaseaticketonboard.Butinmyviewthatcannotberight.Itistantamounttosayingthatmens rea is a necessaryingredientoftheoffencecreatedbys221(4)orthat,evenifmens rea is to be presumed, theoffencepermitsofadefenceofhonestandreasonablemistake.Neitherviewisacceptable.

47.Grantedthatthereisapresumptionthatmens reaisanessentialingredientofeveryoffence,the presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute that creates the offence or by the subject matter with which it deals, or both: Sherras v DeRutzen[1895]1QB918atp921;11TLR369;He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523at528;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.Thusitisgenerallyacceptedthatstatutes which create offences for the purposes of regulating social or industrial conditions or to protecttherevenue,particularlyifthepenaltyismonetaryandnottoolarge,maymorereadilyberegarded as imposing absolute liability.

48.Further,andalthoughinthecaseofcommonlawoffencesandsomestatutoryoffences,itmaybe a defence to show an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make the act charged an innocent act, that will not apply if the purpose of the statute is to make an act an offence regardless of intent.

49.Agreatdealhasbeenwrittenuponthesubjectofstrictliabilityandabsoluteliabilityoffencesandquitealotofitisrepetitive:See,aswellasHe Kaw Teh, supra, Welsh v Donnelly[1983]VicRp79;[1983]2VR173at178and186,andtheauthoritiestherecited;Allen v United Carpet Mills Ltd [1988]VicSC354;[1989]VicRp27;[1989]VR323at327-329;Griffin & Elliot v Marsh122ALR552;(1994)34NSWLR104;(1994)28ATR355;Hawthorne (Department of Health) v Morcam Pty Ltd(1992)29NSWLR120;65ACrimR227;Leask v The Commonwealth [1996]HCA29;(1996)187CLR579at598;(1996)140ALR1;(1996)70ALJR995;(1996)18LegRep2;35ATR91;Llandilo Staircases Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales(2001)104IR204;R v Scott(1996)131FLR137;(1936)137ALR347;Selectrix Pty Ltd v Humphrys[2001]VSC45;(2001)159FLR348;Tomazin v Ward,6/97,SCWA,1117/93.ItisunnecessaryandundesirablethatIaddtothatrepetitionbyfurtherextensiveobservationsofmyown.Giventheclaritywithwhichthepreceptshavenowbeenestablishedbythecases,Iconfinemyselftothis:thatwhetherthematterisapproachedviathelanguage of the section, the subject matter of the statute, the consequences for society of an offence ortheconsequencesofconvictionforanaccused,Iseenoroomins221(4)foradefenceofhonestorreasonablemistake.Thepurposeofthestatuteisevidentlytomotivatepeopletoensurethattheybuyaticket.Thatobjectiveislikelytobefrustratedifmistakeisallowedtoexcuse.

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY50.Iaddforthesakeofcompletenessthatthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakehasalsobeen said in some of the authorities to embrace a defence of due diligence and, in turn, that due diligenceforthatpurposeisconstitutedoftakingallreasonablecaretoavoidtheeventthesubjectof charge: See R v Sault Ste Marie[1978]2SCR1299at1325-1326;3CR(3d)30;He Kaw Teh, supra at 533; Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd, supraat327;cfAustralian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority(1992)29NSWLR497;(1992)66ACrimR134;(1992)79LGERA158NSWCCA,18December1992.Butevenallowingthatsuchadefenceisinsomesensesometimesavailable,Ithinkitclearthatthereisnoroomforitinthepresentcontext.Parliamenthasgonetoconsiderablelengthsins221(2)indescribingwithprecisionthedefenceswhichwillbeallowed.ItisnottobesupposedthatParliamentalsointendedtoallowforsomethinglargerandlesswelldefined.

51.Thehistoryofthelegislationbearsthatout.Section221derivesfroms31oftheRailways Act 1958,asamendedbys2oftheRailways (Offences) Act1969and,beforethat,s31oftheRailways Offences Act1928(whichre-enactedwithoutchanges31oftheRailways Act1915).Initsoriginalform,s31oftheRailways Actwasdirectedtotheintentionalevasionofpaymentofafareandthusintenttoevadepaymentwasanessentialelementoftheoffencewhichs31created.Theamendmentsmade in1969,however, removedthenecessity for intent,andmadetheoffenceoneofstrictorabsoluteliability,subjectonlytoadefenceforatravellerwhoprovedthatheintendedtoobtainaticketvalidinrespectofthejourneyinquestionandthathetookallreasonablestepstoobtainsuch a ticket. When the Railways (Offences) Bill was read a second time, the Minister explained that thechangeswereindeedintendedtoovercometheneedtoproveintent,andthustoaidconviction,andthatthedefenceoftakingallreasonablestepswasbeingincludedtocoverthepositionofthosepassengers – whom he described as a small percentage of total passengers – who board a train at a stationwherethebookingofficeisnotopen.

52.Ashasbeenseen,s221oftheTransport Act1983eschewedtherequirementforapassengertoprovethatheorshehadtheintentofpurchasingaticket,butitmaintainstheessentialstructureofthe strict liability offence created by the Railways (Offences) Act and it adds as essential elements of the statutory defence both that reasonable efforts to purchase a ticket be made prior to commencing the journey and that there be no reasonable opportunity to purchase a ticket on board. ..."

PerNettleJinMounsey v Lafayette[2002]VSC342;(2002)37MVR256;MC26/2002,6September2002.

(r) Poisoning of native trees in contravention of statutory planning controls – whether mens rea an element of the offence

DCwastheowneroflandonwhich33nativetreeswerepoisonedcontrarytotwosetsofprovisionscontainedinaPlanningSchemerelatingtoprotectionofnativevegetationgenerallyandspecifically.AfterachargewaslaidagainstDCallegingabreachofs126ofthePlanning and Environment Act 1987('Act'),theMagistraterejectedsubmissionsthattheprosecutionwasrequiredtoprovethatDCcommittedapositiveactinbreachoftheplanningschemeorthatthebreachoccurredwiththeknowledgeofDC.TheMagistrateconvictedDCandimposedanaggregatepenaltyof$40,000.Uponappeal—

HELD: Appeal dismissed. The Magistrate was correct to reject both submissions.1.The Magistrate was correct to conclude that it was not necessary for the prosecution to establish eitherthattheownercausedthepoisoningtooccur,orthatitknewofthebehaviourbreachingthe scheme.

2.Thelanguageandstatutorycontextofthesectionsupportedthisview;therewasanabsenceoflanguageins126suggestingthecontrary;thesubjectmatterofthestatutewastheregulationoflanduseinthepublicinterest,includingtheconservationofnativevegetationandthemaintenanceofecologicalprocessesandgeneticdiversity;thatsubjectmatterwasproperlycharacterisableasregulatoryandinvolvingmattersofpublicinterestofakindinwhichstatutoryoffenceshavebeenrecognised which did not require proof of mens rea; the imposition of liability without proof of mens reawoulddirectlyrespondtodifficultiesofproofotherwiseinherentineffectiveenforcementoftheplanning scheme, would impose a burden upon owners in circumstances where owners ordinarily haveacapacitytomanagewhatoccursontheirland,andwouldhaveageneraldeterrenteffect;and,lastly,neitherthegravityoftheoffence,northepenaltyapplicable,supportedtheviewthatParliament intended mens rea be a necessary element of the offence. He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,discussed.

Per Osborn J:"... The subject matter of the statute

25

PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY21.Thepurposeoftheempoweringlegislationandofthenativevegetationcontrolsisoneofthepublic interest and social seriousness: Cf Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd [1989]VicRp27;[1989]VR323,perNathanJ;andWilson v Gahan[1999]VSC72perWarrenJ,asshethenwas.InDirector General of Department of Land and Water Conservation v Greentree [2003]NSWCCA31; (2003)131LGERA234;(2003)140ACrimR25,theNewSouthWalesCourtofAppealstatedofbroadlyanalogousprovisions:

Thefocusoftheseobjectsistheprotection,maintenanceandenhancementofnativevegetation.TheActisintendedtopreventactivitiesthatdestroyorharmnativevegetationandtopromoteactivitiesthatenhanceit.Suchobjectssuggestthatsectionslikesection21(2)whichareincludedtoachievethoseobjectsshouldberead,intheabsenceoflanguagetocontraryeffect,asimposingstrict liability.

22. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that mens rea was not an element of the offence charged unders21(2)of theNative Vegetation Conservation Act1997 (NSW),whichwasexpressed inthefollowing terms:

Apersonmustnotclearnativevegetationonanylandexceptinaccordancewith:(a)adevelopmentconsentthatisinforce;or(b)anativevegetationcodeofpractice.

23.Section126itselfraisesbroaderissuesofproperandorderlyplanningthanprovisionssolelyconcernedwithnativevegetation.ItrelatestotheenforcementoftheP&EActasawholeandoftheplanningschemeasawhole.Nevertheless,thenativevegetationcontrolsexemplifycontrolswhichareofvaluetothecommunityasawholeandgobeyondseekingtopreserveandenhancethevalueof a particular site for its own sake.

24.Conversely,s126isnotconcernedwithoffencesofagravelycriminalkind,inrespectofwhichitmight be expected that Parliament intended mens rea to be an element: Cf He Kaw Teh [1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523perGibbsCJ,535;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59.ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553.

25. Further, legislation of the type in issue is properly to be regarded as regulatory in nature. As the Magistrateobserved,whenoffencesarecreatedtoregulatesocialorindustrialconditions,planning,theenvironment,orpublicsafety,theyaremoreeasilyregardedasimposingstrictorabsoluteliability.

The utility of displacing the presumption of mens rea26. First, landuse legislation governing environmental protection and conservation of naturalresources, in particular, has been held to impose situational liability in a number of other instances, includingtheNewSouthWalescasescitedbytheMagistrate:Environment Protection Authority v Werris Creek Coal Pty Ltd; Environment Protection Authority v Holley [2009]NSWLEC124;Barbara Filipowski v Vopak Terminals Sydney Pty Ltd [2006]NSWLEC104.Theutilityofthisapproachhasbeen widely accepted.

27.Secondly,whereastheidentityofthoseinvolvedintheactofpoisoningtreesmaybedifficulttoprove,itseffectswillnotbe.Manyotherpotentialbreachesoftheplanningscheme,suchasthedemolitionofprotectedbuildings,removaloftopsoilandthecarryingoutofearthworks,mayinvolvesimilarpracticalrealities.Thereisaplainandobviousutilityinmakingsuchprovisionsenforceableagainsttheownerofland,whowillnormallyhaveadegreeofongoingcontroloverhisorherlandandtheactivitywhichoccursuponit.Conversely,ifthesectionweretobereadasregulatingonlyactsinbreachoftheschemewhichcouldbepositivelyproventohavebeenundertakenbyaparticularindividualorindividuals,itsutilitywouldbemateriallyimpaired:CftheobservationsofViscountDilhorne in Alphacell v Woodward [1972]UKHL4;(1972)AC824,839;[1972]2AllER475;[1972]2WLR1320(acaseofindustrialpollutionofariver).

28.HerHonourdidnoterrinholdingaspartofherreasonsthatownersoflandareinapositiontotakestepstoimprovethecontrolwhichtheyexerciseovertheactivitythatoccursontheirland(whenastatutorycontrolsuchasthatwhichisinissueisimplemented).Thisistheordinarycorollaryofownership.

29.ThecurrentprovisionsoftheP&EActwereprecededbys49(1)oftheTown and Country Planning Act1961,whichprovided:

AnypersonwhocontravenesorfailstocomplywithanyprovisionofthisActorofanyinterimdevelopmentorderorplanningschemeoranyconditionofapermitundersuchanorderorschemeandtheownerofanylandinrelationtowhichanysuchcontraventionorfailureoccursshall, without prejudice to any other consequences which arise under this Act by reason of

26

MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYsuchcontraventionorfailure,beguiltyofanoffenceagainstthisActandseverallyliabletoapenaltyofnotmorethanOnehundredpoundsand,wherethecontraventionorfailureisofacontinuingnature,toafurtherpenaltyofnotmorethanTenpoundsforeverydayduringwhichthecontraventionorfailurecontinuesafterconviction.

Thisprovisionwasthebasisoftheprosecutionagainsttheownerformingpartofthesubjectmatterof Davey v Brightlite Nominees Pty Ltd [1984]VicRp76;[1984]VR957;(1984)56LGRA274.Ithasbeenalongstandinglegislativepolicytoimposeliabilityforcompliancewithplanninglegislationupon landowners.

30.Inturn,thegeneraldeterrenteffectofs126willbemateriallyenhancedifitisgiventheconstructionfor which the council contends.

The nature of the penalty31.Thefactthatthelegislationprovidesforpenaltybywayoffineonly,andnotbyimprisonment,alsotendstosupporttheconclusionthatParliamentintendeds126(2)toimposestrictorabsoluteliabilityuponanownerbywayofastatusoffence.Conversely,whereanoffenceprovidesforimprisonment,thatwilltendtofavourthecontraryconclusion.

32. The submissions made on behalf of DC by reference to He Kew Teh aremisconceived.Theeffectoftheschemeofthesectionisnotnecessarilydraconian.Iftheownerestablishesbypositiveevidenceonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthatheorshehadnoknowledgeoftheoffendingconduct,then that fact will go strongly to penalty. In other words, the fact that the prosecution need not proveknowledgeonthepartoftheownertoestablishtheoffencedoesnotmeanthatpositiveproofofabsenceofknowledgewillnotbearontheoutcome,includingthequestionwhetheraconvictionshould be recorded.

Conclusion as to mens rea 33.Fortheabovereasons,theMagistratewascorrecttoconcludethatitwasnotnecessaryfortheprosecution to establish either that the owner caused the poisoning to occur, or that it knew of the behaviourbreachingthescheme.

34.Insummary,thelanguageandstatutorycontextofthesectionsupportthisview;thereisanabsenceoflanguageins126suggestingthecontrary;thesubjectmatterofthestatuteistheregulationoflanduseinthepublicinterest,includingtheconservationofnativevegetationandthemaintenanceof ecological processes and genetic diversity; that subjectmatter is properly characterisable asregulatoryandinvolvingmattersofpublicinterestofakindinwhichstatutoryoffenceshavebeenrecognised which do not require proof of mens rea; the imposition of liability without proof of mens reawilldirectlyrespondtodifficultiesofproofotherwiseinherentineffectiveenforcementoftheplanning scheme, will impose a burden upon owners in circumstances where owners ordinarily haveacapacitytomanagewhatoccursontheirland,andwillhaveageneraldeterrenteffect;and,lastly,neitherthegravityoftheoffence,northepenaltyapplicable,supporttheviewthatParliamentintended mens rea be a necessary element of the offence. ..."

PerOsbornJinDC Consolidated Investments Pty Ltd v Maroondah City Council[2011]VSC634;MC47/2011,8December2011.

(s) Whether voluntariness an element of the offence – application of principle of legality to interpretation of statutory offences, including driving offences

HELD: Appeal allowed.Orders of the judge quashed.Remitted to the judge for hearing anddetermination according to law.1.Ontheauthorities,itisabasicandfundamentalprincipleofthecommonlawthatapersoniscriminallyresponsibleonlyfortheirconsciousandvoluntaryacts.Theprosecutionmustthereforeestablish beyond reasonable doubt that the act constituting the alleged crime was done in the exerciseoftheaccused’swilltoact.Asthereisanevidentiarypresumptionofvoluntariness,itisnotusuallynecessaryfortheprosecutiontosupplyexpressproofofthiselement.Butwheretheissueislegitimatelyraised,theprosecutionmustprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthattheaccused’sactswereconsciousandvoluntary.Thesegeneralprinciplesapplyequallytostatutoryoffences,includingdrivingoffences,subjecttocontraryprovision. Ryan v R [1967]HCA2; (1967)121CLR205;[1967]ALR577;40ALJR488;and R v O'Connor[1980]HCA17; (1980)146CLR64;(1980)29ALR449;(1980)4ACrimR348;(1980)54ALJR349,applied. 2.Theprovisionsofs56(2) of the Road Safety Act1986('Act')donotexpresslyabrogatetheprinciple

27

PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYofvoluntariness.Nordotheprovisionsimplicitlyabrogatethatprinciple.Thereisnothinginthelanguage of s56(2),thecontextofthesectionorthelegislationasawholeorthelegislativepurposetosuggestunmistakablyandunambiguouslythattheprovisionsshouldbeinterpretedsoastoabrogate the principle. In s56(2),theword‘allow’isaverbmeaning‘permit’.Theperson‘mustallow’thesampletobetaken,whichcompelsthemactivelytopermitthesampletobetaken.Theactivestepofallowing,inthesenseofpermitting,asampletobetakencanonlybetakenbysomeoneactingconsciouslyandvoluntarily.Theirintentionisnotrelevant,buttheiractsmustbeconsciousandvoluntary. Meertens v Falkenberg(1981)92LSJS202, Supreme Court of South Australia – Full Court, KingCJ,SangsterandLegoeJJ,13March1981,followed.

3. Itisanelementoftheoffencespecifiedins56(2) of the Act that the accused consciously and voluntarilyrefusedtoallowthetakingofthesample.Wherethematterisnotlegitimatelyinissue,theprosecutionmayprovethatelementbyrelyingontheevidentiarypresumptionofvoluntariness.Where the matter is legitimately an issue, as it was in the present case, the prosecution was requiredtoprovetheelementontheevidencebeyondreasonabledoubt.Thetrialjudgeerredinlaw on the face of the record in deciding otherwise. R v Carter [1959]VicRp19;[1959]VR105;[1959]ALR335, followed.

PerBellJ:"... 40.On theseauthorities, it isabasicand fundamentalprincipleof thecommon law thatapersoniscriminallyresponsibleonlyfortheirconsciousandvoluntaryacts.Theprosecutionmusttherefore establish beyond reasonable doubt that the act constituting the alleged crime was done in theexerciseoftheaccused’swilltoact.Asthereisanevidentiarypresumptionofvoluntariness,itisnotusuallynecessaryfortheprosecutiontosupplyexpressproofofthiselement.Butwheretheissueislegitimatelyraised,theprosecutionmustprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthattheaccused’sactswereconsciousandvoluntary.Thesegeneralprinciplesapplyequally tostatutoryoffences,includingdrivingoffences,subjecttocontraryprovision.

PerBellJinDover v Doyle [2012]VSC117;(2012)34VR295;MC08/2012,29March2012.

(t) Use of unregistered motor vehicle – referral to Magistrates’ Court – during hearing certificate tendered to the court – certificate did not contain all prescribed particulars – whether absolute liability offence

1.Obiter: In relation to the criteria for determining whether the defence of honest and reasonable mistakeoffactisavailable,thefirstcriterionisconsiderationofthewordsofthestatutecreatingthe offence; the second criterion is consideration of the subject matter of the statute. The third criterion is whether subjecting the defendant to absolute liability will assist in the promotion of observanceoftherelevantstatute.Thefourthcriterionisthatwhereastatutecreatesanoffencefor the purpose of regulating social conditions and public safety and where the penalty attached to a statutory offence is monetary and moderately sized, the statute is more easily regarded as imposing absolute liability. He Kaw Teh v R[1985]HCA43;(1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,applied.

2.Inrelationtothefirstcriterion,thelanguageofs7oftheRoad Safety Act1986('Act')asawholestronglyindicatedthatanoffenceagainsts7(1)(a)wasoneofabsoluteliability.

3. In relation to the second criterion, the Act wasconcernedwithroaduse,registrationofvehiclesand trailers and licensing. Issues of public safety will often arise which indicated that the subject matteroftheoffencewasamatterofsocialseriousnessbutdidnotinvolvegravemoralfaultandwas not criminal in any real sense.

4. The third criterionwaswhether absolute liabilitywould assist in the observance of thestatute.Thefactthatthelegislaturehadchosentopenalisedriverswhomaynothaveownedthevehicletheyweredrivingindicatedalegislativeintenttocastawideandeffectivenet.Topenalisedriversaswellasownersindicatedthatthepurposeofs7(1)oftheAct as a whole was tokeepasmanyunregistered(andpotentiallyunsafe)vehiclesaspossibleofftheroads.Thatpurposewasfurtheredbyanabsoluteliabilityoffencefordriversaswellasowners.Theabsenceofanhonestandreasonablemistakedefenceshouldhaveencourageddriverswhohaddoubtsabouttheregistrationofavehicletorefusetodrivethevehiclewithoutsomeobjectiveproofof

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYitsregistration.Ontheotherhand,ifthedefencewereavailable,theprosecutionoftheoffencecouldhavebecomeverydifficult.

5. In relation to the fourth criterion, there was no doubt that the object which the Act was designed toachievewastosecurethepublicwelfareandtopromotethesafetyofthepublic.Thelegislaturemusthavebeentakentohavesubordinatedtheinterestsofindividualstotheinterestsofthepublicandtohaveintendedthatanyhardshipresultingtoanindividualbytheapplicationoftheordinaryruleofinterpretingastatutoryprovisioninaccordancewithitsnaturalandliteralmeaning, and by the imposition of strict liability for infringement of the particular section, was togivewaytothepublicinterest.Ifnocurrentregistrationlabelwasaffixed,theprudentcoursewasnottodrivethevehicle.Further,themonetarypenaltywasamoderateoneandnostigmaattachedtoaconvictionforthisregulatoryoffence.Finally,noprisonsentencewasprescribedfor the offence.

6.Havingregardtothesematters,anoffenceagainsts7(1)(a)oftheActwasanoffenceofabsoluteliabilityforwhichthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakewasnotavailable. Pilkington v Elliott[1991]VicSC510;MC20/1997,followed.

Per Cavanough J:"...80.MrTsolacisreliesonPilkington v Elliot [1991]VicSC510,unreported,SupremeCourtofVictoria,ColdreyJ,27September1991, which concerned a charge under s7(1)(b)of theRSAofowninganunregisteredvehicleusedonahighway.MrTsolacisreliesparticularlyonthefollowingpassageinthejudgmentofColdreyJ:

The words of s7simplyprohibitapersonowningamotorvehicleortrailerwhichisusedonahighwayandisunregistered.Onitsfacetheclearandconciselanguageinwhichtheprovisioniscouched,togetherwithitsobjectiveform,clearlyindicate,inmyview,alegislativeintentiontoimposestrictliabilityupontheownerofanunregisteredvehicleusedonahighway.

81.MrTsolacissubmits thatColdreyJ foundthatanoffenceunders7(1)(b) is a “strict liability offence”andthat,therefore,thedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeoffactisavailable.Hesubmitsthat,byanalogy,thedefenceisalsoavailableforanoffenceofusinganunregisteredvehiclecontrary to s7(1)(a).

82.MrTsolacis’submissionisplainlymisconceived.AsColdreyJhimselfnoted,theterms“strictliability” and “absolute liability” are oftenused interchangeably. In the passage quoted above,ColdreyJwassaying,ineffect,thattheoffencecreatedbys7(1)(b) was one of absolute liability. This isobvious,becauseColdreyJwentontosaythat‘honestandreasonablemistakeisnotadefenceto a charge under s7(1)(b)’; and because it was common ground that there was no requirement to provemens rea in the ordinary sense of intent or guilty knowledge.

...85. Infindingthat theoffenceofowninganunregisteredvehicleusedonahighwaywasnotsubjecttothedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistake,ColdreyJreferredtocertainadditionalauthoritiesandtookintoaccountseveralfactors.HisHonourobservedthatitwasbeyondargumentthattheRSAisconcernedwithpublicsafety.Thisweakenedthepresumptionthatthedefencewasavailable.ColdreyJalsofoundtheoffenceins7(1)(b)tobea‘regulatoryoffence’,punishablebyamonetarypenalty.HisHonournotedthatnostigmaattachedtoaconviction;thatadefendantwasabletocomplywiththesubsectionwithrelativeease;andthattheownerofavehicleisinauniquepositiontoensurethatitisregistered.HisHonouralsoobservedthatabsoluteliabilitywouldassistenforcement of the subsection, as car owners would usually be in a position to ensure that their practicespromotedtheobservanceofthesubsection.

86.AlthoughColdreyJacknowledgedthattheimpositionofabsoluteliabilitycouldcreatehardshipinsomecases(forexample,ifanunregisteredvehiclewasstolenanddrivenonahighway),suchinjusticescouldbeavoidedbythesensibleexerciseofprosecutorialdiscretionandbythecourt’sabilitytodismissanychargeastrifling.

87.MrTsolacishasnotsubmitted intermsthatthe judgmentofColdreyJ inPilkington v Elliot waswrong.However,havingregardtoMrTsolacis’unrepresentedstatus,Ihaveconsideredthatquestion.IwouldonlybejustifiedindecliningtotreatPilkington v Elliot as correctly decided if I wassatisfiedthatitwas“clearlywrong”:Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007]VSC337; [2007]17VR100(BellJ)at105[21]-[24]andcasestherecited;Engbretson v Bartlett [2007]VSC163(BellJ)at[63];(2007)16VR417;(2007)172ACrimR304.Iamfarfrombeingsosatisfied.Indeed,inmyview,hisHonour’sconclusionwascorrect,forthereasonshisHonourgave.Inotethatthejudgmenthasstoodunchallengedforsome20yearsnow.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY...91.Inmyview,theoverwhelmingweightofauthorityinthisCourtcompelsmetoholdthatthedecisionofColdreyJinPilkington v Elliot was and remains correct in law. I propose to follow it.

...95.AlthoughsomeofMrTsolacis’submissionshavesomeforce,intheendIamnotsatisfiedthattheyleadtotheconclusionthatthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeisavailableforan offence against s7(1)(a)oftheRSA.

... 110.Irecognise,asdidColdreyJinPilkington v ElliotandWaltersJinFranklin v Stacey (1981)27SASR490,thatanyoffenceofabsoluteliabilitymaygiverisetoanunjustsituationinsomecases.Nevertheless,IconcurwiththecommentsofWaltersJthat,inmattersofpublicsafety,andparticularly road safety, it is not surprising that the legislature would choose to subordinate the interestsofindividualstothepublicinterest.IalsoechothecommentofColdreyJthatanyinjusticecanbeavoidedbythesensibleexerciseofeitherprosecutorialorsentencingdiscretion.Intheabsenceofthedefectinthecertificate,thisverycasewouldhavepresentedanexample.

111.Forallofthosereasons,itismyviewthatanoffenceagainsts7(1)(a)oftheRSAisanoffenceofabsoluteliabilityforwhichthedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakeisnotavailable...."

PerCavanoughJinTsolacis v McKinnon[2012]VSC627;MC01/2013,21December2012.

(u) Whether intention of accused to commit an indecent act in presence of child known to be underage was an element of offence – whether honest and reasonable mistake as to age was a defence

1.Whether intention or knowledge apply to elements of a statutory offence turns on the interpretationoftheprovisioninquestion.Whetherhonestandreasonablemistakeoffactisadefence also raises a question of statutory interpretation. According to the applicable principles, thereisaninterpretativepresumptionthatintentionandknowledgemustbeprovedinrespectof all of the elements or, if not that, then honest and reasonable mistake is a defence, subject to Parliament’splaincontraryintention.Whenconsideringwhetherthatplaincontraryintentionis indicated, the court examines the subject matter and the purpose of the legislation, the terms of the legislation and whether criminal liability without intention or knowledge, or honest and reasonablemistakeasadefence,wouldpromoteobservanceofthelegislativescheme.

2. After examining these matters, the trial judge was correct in deciding that, in respect of the age ingredient, intention and knowledge were not elements of the offence and honest and reasonable mistake was not a defence. The purposes of s47(1) of the Crimes Act1958aretoprotectchildrenundertheageof16yearsfromexposuretoindecentactsandtodeterpotentialoffendersfromengaging insuchacts inplaceswherechildrenmightbe.Thepurposeof theprovision isasmuchtoprotectchildrenfromthemselvesasitistoprotectthemfromothers.Thosepurposesandpromotingobservanceofthelegislativescheme(amongotherthings)plainlyindicatethatParliament intended the offence to be one of absolute liability in relation to the age ingredient. Persons who commit indecent acts in places where children might be do so at their own peril.

3. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took into account that it is possible for potential offenders totakereasonableprecautionstoavoidcriminalliability.Ontheinterpretationwhichwasplainlyintended by Parliament, it was not possible to offend against s47(1)byaccident.Tobeconvicted,theaccusedmusthaveintendedtocommitanindecentact.Potentialoffenderscanavoidliabilitybynotcommittingsuchactsinplaceswherechildrenmightbe.Sointerpreted,theprovisionimposes onpersons an obligation to take greater thanusual care to avoid criminal liability.Parliament has deliberately imposed that obligation to take greater than usual care in order to protectchildrenfromothersandalsotoprotectchildrenfromthemselves.ThisinterpretationaccordsnotjustwithParliament’splainintentionbutalsowithdecisionsoftheFullCourtoftheSupremeCourtinrelationtosimilarstatutoryprovisions.

Per Bell J:"... ‘Absolute’ and ‘strict’ liability offences12.Thequestioniswhethers47(1) of the Crimes Actrequirestheprosecutiontoproveagainstanaccused person that he or she had a guilty mind in respect of the age of the complainant, that is, that the accused intentionally committed the indecent act knowing that the complainant was under theageof16years.Theseconddefendantcontendsthat,asthetrialjudgeheld,theoffencerequiresno such proof and is wholly established if the accused intentionally committed the act which was indecent, whether or not he or she knew that the complainant was under that age. In the catalogue of offences, that would make the offence in s47(1)an‘absoluteliability’offence:He Kaw Teh v The

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYQueen [1985]HCA43; (1985)157CLR523,590;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553(DawsonJ).

13.Theplaintiffcontendsthatproofofaguiltymindisrequiredor,ifnotthat,thenhonestandreasonablemistakeastoageisadefence.Hereweareusingtheterm‘defence’notinthepuretechnicalsensebutinthatloosesensewhichisconvenientlyusedtodescribeanhonestandreasonablebeliefbytheaccusedinastateofaffairswhich,iftrue,wouldtaketheaccused’sact‘outsidetheoperationoftheenactment’andbe‘agroundofexculpation’.Thatwouldmaketheoffenceins47(1)a‘strictliability’offence:CTM v The Queen [2008]HCA25; (2008)236CLR440,446[6];(2008)247ALR1;(2008)185ACrimR188;(2008)82ALJR978(GleesonCJ,Gummow,CrennanandKiefelJJ).

14.Theanswertothisquestiondependsontheproperinterpretationoftheprovisionsofs47 as towhichageneralpresumptionappliesinfavourofintentionandknowledgebeinganelementofthe offence or, if not, mistake being a defence. The question is whether the presumption has been displaced.Theanswerisnotfreefromdifficulty.

15.Itisconvenienttoaddressthequestionunderthreeheadings.NowIwillconsidertheprinciplesgoverningthegeneralpresumptionofinterpretation,wherethereismuchtofindinsupportoftheplaintiff’scase.NextIwillconsidertheVictorianlegislationhistorically,andpreviousdecisionsoftheFullCourtofthiscourt,wherethereismuchtofindagainsttheplaintiff’scase.LaterIwillapplythegeneralprinciplestotheinterpretationoftheprovisionsofs47, on which the determination of the question in issue depends.

General presumption of interpretation 16.ThegeneralpresumptionwasstatedintheHighCourtofAustraliaintheearliestdaysoffederationbyGriffithCJinHardgrave v The King [1906]HCA47; (1906)4CLR232;13ALR206:

The general rule is that a person is not criminally responsible for an act which is done independently of the exercise of his will or by accident. It is also a general rule that a person who does an act underareasonablemisapprehensionoffactisnotcriminallyresponsibleforitevenifthefactswhichhebelieveddidnotexist.

17.Thisstatementofthepresumptionreflectedthecommonlaw,whichhadbeenauthoritativelystatedintheUnitedKingdomseveralyearsearlierbyWrightJinSherras v De Rutzen [1895]1QB918;11TLR369.

There is a presumption that mens rea,anevilintention,oraknowledgeofthewrongfulnessoftheact,isanessentialingredientineveryoffence;butthatpresumptionisliabletobedisplacedeitherbythewordsofthestatutecreatingtheoffenceorbythesubject-matterwithwhichitdeals, and both must be considered.

18.WrightJwentontospecifythreeclassesofcaseinwhichthepresumptionmightbedisplaced:

(i)actswhich‘arenotcriminalinanyrealsense,butareactswhichinthepublicinterestareprohibitedunderapenalty’;(ii)actswhichare‘publicnuisances’;and(iii)‘casesinwhich,althoughtheproceedingiscriminalinform,itisreallyonlyasummarymodeofenforcingacivilright’.

Intheplaintiff’ssubmission,thepresentcasefallsintononeofthesecategoriesandweareheredealing with an example of a true statutory crime. I accept that submission. Indeed the crime is a serious one.

20.SoitisunderstandablethatinProudman v Dayman [1941]HCA28; (1941)67CLR536, Dixon Jdescribedthepresumptionas‘butaweakone’.However,reflectingtheeverincreasingnumberofstatutoryoffences,morestringentattentionhasrecentlybeengiventothepresumptionbythecourts.For example, in He Kaw Teh v The Queen [1985]HCA43; (1985)157CLR523;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553,GibbsCJemphasisedthatinterpretationofstatutoryoffencesinaccordancewiththepresumptionwasrequiredby‘thegeneralprinciplesofthecommonlawwhichgoverncriminalresponsibility’.Similarly,inthemorerecentcase of CTM v The Queen [2008]HCA25; (2008)236CLR440;(2008)247ALR1;(2008)82ALJR978;(2008)185ACrimR188,GleesonCJ,Gummow,CrennanandKiefelJJsaidthepresumptioninvolved ‘abasic legalprincipleofcriminalresponsibilitywhichinformsourunderstanding,andinterpretation,of thecriminal law’.Theplaintiffpresentedhiscase inthecontextof thisrecentemphasis on the application of the presumption.

21.Therationaleofthepresumptionisthatitisrepugnanttobasicandlong-acceptednotionsof

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYcriminal responsibility to hold a person to be guilty of a crime without some element of mental fault, such as intention or knowledge.

22.IntheemphaticwordsofHayneJinCTM (supra):

To read a statute which creates a statutory offence that forms part of the general criminal law as subject to the general principles according to which the criminal law is administered does no morethanreflectthefactthat‘[s]ocietyandthelawhavemovedawayfromtheprimitiveresponseof punishment for the actus reusalone’.Itavoidswhathasbeencalled‘thepublicscandalofconvictingonaseriouschargepersonswhoareinnowayblameworthy’.And‘[i]tisnowfirmlyestablished that mens reaisanessentialelementineverystatutoryoffenceunless,havingregardto the language of the statute and to its subject matter, it is excluded expressly or by necessary implication’.

...96. Inconclusion, thehistoryofVictoria’ssexoffences legislationandthepreviousdecisionsof the Full Court of this court suggest that it was the plain intention of Parliament that intention orknowledgeinrespectofthecomplainant’sagewasnotrequiredtoproveachargeofoffendingagainsts47(1)of1958Act,andmistakeastoagewasnottobeadefence.However,thepreviousdecisionsoftheFullCourtprecededthedecisionoftheHighCourtinthenowleadingauthorityofHe Kaw Teh.ThetestsenunciatedbytheHighCourtinthatcase(andappliedinCTM)requirethecourttoexaminethequestionbyreferencetotheprovisionswhichareinissue,takingintoaccountparticular considerations. To that task I now turn.

...106.AccordingtheauthoritieswhichIhavediscussed,thereisapresumptionofinterpretationthat intention or knowledge is an ingredient of all of the elements of the offence in s47(1) or, if not that, then honest and reasonable mistake as to age is a defence, unless Parliament has plainly revealedacontraryintentionexpresslyorbynecessaryimplication.Indeterminingwhetherthatcontraryintentionisplainlyrevealed,itisnecessarytoexaminethesubjectmatterandpurposeofthe legislation creating the offence, the terms of the legislation and whether criminal liability without intention or knowledge, or honest and reasonable mistake of age as a defence, would promote the observanceofthelegislativescheme.

...122.Itisclearthats47(1)doesnotcreateanabsoluteliabilityoffenceineveryrespect.Tooffendagainstthatprovision,apersonmust‘wilfully’commitanindecentactwithorinthepresenceofachild.Theword ‘wilfully’ conveys thesense that theactmustbecommitted intentionallyandknowingly.Thisrequirementforintentionandknowledgeclearlyappliestothe‘indecent’natureofthe act. The accused must commit the act intentionally and knowingly in that respect. The accused cannotbeconvictediftheactwascommittedaccidentally.Thequestionis,doestheword‘wilfully’also apply to the age of the child such that intention and knowledge in respect of that age is an ingredient of the offence or that mistake as to age is a defence.

123.Thefactthats47doesnotcreateanabsoluteliabilityoffenceinallrespectsassiststheplaintiff’scase to a certain extent in relation to the age ingredient. The act must be committed intentionally andknowinglyinrelationtotheindecencyingredient.IfParliament’sreasoningwasconsistent,asis natural to think, the intention would more likely be that the act must be committed with intention and knowledge in relation to the age ingredient as well.

124.However,itdoesnotautomaticallyfollowfromthepresenceofoneelementofanoffencerequiringintentionandknowledgethattheotherelementsoftheoffencehavethesamerequirement.ThatprinciplewasstatedbyBlackCJinChief of the General Staff v Stuart [1995]FCA1746;(1995)58FCR299;(1995)133ALR513;84ACrimR529:

Indeterminingwhetherinaprovisionsuchass44thepresumptionhasbeendisplaced,andtowhat extent it has been displaced, I see no reason why different elements of an offence should necessarily be treated in the same way: see He Kaw Teh [1985]HCA43; (1985)157CLR523, 568;(1985)60ALR449;(1985)59ALJR620;(1985)15ACrimR203;[1986]LRC(Crim)553(BrennanJ)....Althoughitisconvenienttobeabletoclassifyanoffenceinitsentiretyasoneof‘strict’or‘absolute’liability,thetaskisoneofconstructionanditisbynomeansinevitablethatthe application of the same principles of construction should produce the same result with respect to each ingredient in an offence: (1995)58FCR299,305;(1995)133ALR513;84ACrimR529.

...148.Thesubjectmatterofs47(1)istheoffenceofcommittinganindecentactinthepresenceofachildundertheageof16years.Thecardinalpurposesoftheprovisionareprotectingchildrenfromsuchacts,whichincludesprotectingchildrenfromthemselves,anddeterringpotentialoffenders.Imposingonpotentialoffendersadutyofgreatervigilancetoavoidliabilityisconsistentwiththenatureoftheoffenceandthepurposeoftheprovision:fortheeffectiveprotectionofchildrenfromindecentactswhichchildrenmay in their immaturityseekout, theprovisionrequirespotential

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MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITYoffenderstodomorethanusuallyrequiredtoavoidexposingchildrentosuchacts.Absoluteliabilitypromotestheobservanceoftheprovisioninthisway.Strictliabilitywoulddosotoasignificantlylesserextent.Theforceofthisconsiderationisnotasgreatinthecaseofchildoffenderswhothemselvesmaylackdecision-makingmaturity.Butthemaintargetoftheprovisionistheadultoffenderfromwhom children need protection most.

Presumption displaced 149.Thesubjectmatterandpurposeofthelegislation,thetermsofthelegislationandpromotingobservanceofthelegislativeschemeplainlyindicatebynecessaryimplicationthattheinterpretativepresumptionhasbeendisplacedandthatParliamentintendedthecrimeins47(1)tobeoneofabsoluteliabilityinrespectoftheageingredient.Incasesnotinvolvingconsentascoveredbys47(2),honestandreasonablemistakeofageisnotavailableasadefenceandthejudgewascorrecttosoconclude.Theplaintiff’sapplicationforjudicialreviewofhisconvictionsandsentencesonthechargesrelatingtothefirstandsecondcomplainantswillbedismissed."

PerBellJinAzadzoi v County Court of Victoria & Kara Roden[2013]VSC161;MC24/2013,12April2013.

(v) Probationary driver failed to display P plate – whether honest and reasonable mistake as to presence of P plate relevant to proof of offence.

S.,whowasemployedasatowtruckdriver,wasaholderofaprobationarydriverlicenceatthetimeandthathistowtruckdidnothaveaPplatedisplayedfacingoutfromthefront.S.wasissuedwithaninfringementnoticewhichwascontestedbyS.attheMagistrates'Courtwherehewasconvictedoftheoffenceandfined$152plusstatutorycostsof$73.30.UponappealtotheCountyCourt,thejudgetooktheviewthattheProudman v Dayman defencewasavailableontheevidenceastowhetherS.hadanhonestlyandreasonablyheldbeliefthataPplatewasaffixedtothefrontofhisvehicle.Asaresult,theinformationwasdismissed.Uponappeal—

HELD: County Court decision set aside and remitted to the County Court for hearing and determination according to law.1. Theissueaspresentedontheoriginatingmotionwaswhethertheoffencecreatedbyreg55(1)oftheRSDRshouldbeclassifiedasoneofabsoluteliability,orstrictliabilitywherethedefenceofhonestandreasonablemistakewasavailable.

2. It is a principle at common law that an honest and reasonable, but mistaken belief in a set of factswhichiftheyexistedwouldhavemadethedefendantinnocent,providesagroundofexculpation.Theevidentiaryonusofraisingthegroundisonthedefendant.Oncethatoccurs,thelegalonusliesontheprosecutiontoprovebeyondreasonabledoubttheabsenceofanhonestandreasonablebelief.

3. ThecontextualframeworkandcontentoftheRoadSafetyActandRSDRismultifactorialbuthaspublicsafetyandroadsafetyatitscore.ThesafetyofthepublicisservedbyachievingtheobjectivethatprobationarydriversbesubjecttoahighlyregulatedschemeinwhichpoliceandotherroadusersareabletoidentifyaprobationarydriverthroughthedisplayofPplates.

4. Reg55(1)hasanimportantroletoplayaspartofthewiderscheme.Consideredinthatlight,theoffenceunderconsiderationwaslessreadilydistinguishablefromoffencesinvolvingexcessivespeed,drinkdrivingandthelike.

5. Themischieftowhichreg55(1)isdirectedisriskydrivingbehaviourbyyoungand/orinexperienceddrivers.Itspurposeisregulatoryandassistsauthoritiesinenforcingtherestrictionsplacedonprobationarydrivers,vizpt 2div6,byprovidingpoliceandotherroadusersameansofeasilyidentifyingprobationarydrivers.

6. Thepublicsafetypurposeoftheregulation,wheninterpretedaspartofthegraduatedlicensingschemeasawhole,wasrelevanttoconcludingthatreg55(1)isintendedtoimposeabsoluteliability.

7. AcceptingthesoundnessofthereasoninginWelshvDonnelly,thedistinguishingfeaturesofreg55(1)arerelativelyslight.Theyappeartoturnontheabsenceofaspecificstatutoryprovisoordefenceandthe fact that the mischief at which the regulation is aimed may be seen as less directly connected to a road safetypurpose.ButinlightoftheanalysisthattheRoadSafetyActandRSDRpromulgateaschemeforprobationarylicensinginwhichpublicsafetyisenhancedthroughtheinterplayofinterconnectedprovisions,reg55(1)neverthelessplaysanimportantroleinachievingthatpurpose.Theapplicationofthiscriteriontendsinfavouroftheimpositionofabsoluteliabilityforbreachofreg55(1).

8. Thepracticalrealitiesoftherequirementposedbyreg55(1)leadonetoconcludethatthecommissionoftheoffenceislargelyavoidablebyaconscientiousprobationarydriver,andthatpragmatismdictatesthattheinterestsoftheindividualbesubjugatedtothewelfareofthepublicasawholeifthegraduatedlicensingschemeistooperateeffectively.

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PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR-MENS REA/STRICT LIABILITY/ABSOLUTE LIABILITY9. Itwasconcludedthatanhonestandreasonable,butmistaken,beliefthataPplatewasdisplayedfacingoutfromthevehiclewasnotrelevanttoproofoftheoffencecreatedbyreg55(1)oftheRSDR.Inotherwords, absolute liability applied to that element of the offence.

Per Jane Dixon J:"111. AcceptingthesoundnessofthereasoninginWelsh v Donnelly, the distinguishing features ofreg55(1)arerelativelyslight.Theyappeartoturnontheabsenceofaspecificstatutoryprovisoor defence and the fact that the mischief at which the regulation is aimed may be seen as less directlyconnectedtoaroadsafetypurpose.ButinlightofmyanalysisthattheRSAandRSDR promulgate a scheme for probationary licensing in which public safety is enhanced through the interplayofinterconnectedprovisions,reg55(1)neverthelessplaysanimportantroleinachievingthat purpose.

112. Theapplicationofthiscriteriontendsinfavouroftheimpositionofabsoluteliabilityforbreachofreg55(1)....

119. Nevertheless, the Full Court inWelsh v Donnelly had in mind that the common law presumption of mens rea was weaker for a regulatory offence under the Motor Car Act1958, in contrast to an offence of a truly criminal character, and that the legislature must be taken to havesubordinatedtheinterestsofindividualstothewiderpublicinlightofthesubjectmatterandobjectsofthelegislation.Icandetectnobasisinprincipletoformadifferentviewabouttheregulation I am asked to construe. It is quite apparent, as submitted by the plaintiff, that the offence under consideration is regulatory in nature, and not truly criminal, carrying a modest penalty,noriskofgaol,andnosignificantstigma.Thesefactorspointinfavourofabsoluteliabilitywhen considered in combination with the other matters already discussed.

Conclusion 120. Fortheabovereasons,inanswertotheissueinthisproceedingidentifiedat[19],Iconcludethat an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a P plate is displayed facing out from thevehicleisnotrelevanttoproofoftheoffencecreatedbyreg55(1)oftheRSDR.Inotherwords,absolute liability applies to that element of the offence. ...PerJaneDixonJinDPP v Stanojlovic[2017]VSC540;MC47/2017,12September2017.________________________________________________________________________________________________

Patrick Street LL B, Dip Crim18 September 2017