Medal of Honor Recipientsrivate First Class LutherSkaggs, Jr.'s Medal of Honorcitation reads as follows: "For

conspicuous gallantry and intrepidityat the risk of his life above and beyondthe call of duty while serving as squadleader with a mortar section of a riflecompany in the 3d Battalion, 3d Ma-rines, 3d Marine Division, during ac-tion against enemy Japanese forces onthe Asan-Adelup beachhead, Guam,Marianas Islands, 21-22 July 1944.When the section leader became acasualty under a heavy mortar barrageshortly after landing, Private FirstClass Skaggs promptly assumed com-mand and led the section through in-tense fire for a distance of 200 yardsto a position from which to deliver ef-fective coverage of the assault on astrategic cliff. Valiantly defending thisvital position against strong enemycounterattacks during the night, Pri-vate First Class Skaggs was criticallywounded when a Japanese grenade

lodged in his foxhole and exploded,shattering the lower part of one leg.Quick to act, he applied an improvisedtourniquet and, while propped up inhis foxhole, gallantly returned the ene-my's fire with his rifle and handgrenades for a period of 8 hours, latercrawling unassisted to the rear to con-tinue the fight until the Japanese hadbeen annihilated. Uncomplaining andcalm throughout this critical period,Private First Class Skaggs served as aheroic example of courage and forti-tude to other wounded men and, by hiscourageous leadership and inspiringdevotion to duty, upheld the high tra-ditions of the United States navalservice:'

rivate First Class LeonardFoster Mason's Medal ofHonor citation reads as fol-

lows: "For conspicuous gallantry andintrepidity at the risk of his life aboveand beyond the call of duty as an au-tomatic rifleman serving with the Se-cond Battalion, Third Marines, ThirdMarine Division, in action against ene-my Japanese forces on the Asan-Adelup Beachhead, Guam, MarianasIslands, on 22 July 1944. Suddenlytaken under fire by two enemymachine guns not more than 15 yardsaway while clearing out hostile posi-tions holding up the advance of his pla-toon through a narrow gully, PrivateFirst Class Mason, alone and entirelyon his own initiative, climbed out ofthe gully and moved parallel to ittoward the rear of the enemy position.

Although fired upon immediately byhostile riflemen from a higher positionand wounded repeatedly in the armand shoulder, Private First Class Mas-on grimly pressed forward and hadjust reached his objective when hitagain by a burst of enemy machine-gun fire, causing a critical wound towhich he later succumbed. With vali-ant disregard for his own peril, hepersevered, clearing out the hostile po-sition, killing five Japanese, woundinganother and then rejoining his platoonto report the results of his action be-fore consenting to be evacuated. Hisexceptionally heroic act in the face ofalmost certain death enabled his pla-toon to accomplish its mission andreflects the highest credit upon PrivateFirst Class Mason and the UnitedStates naval service. He gallantly gavehis life for his country:'

Not until later that afternoon was the1st Battalion sent another doctor.

On the right of the landing waves,Major Bernard W. Green's 1st Battal-ion, 4th Marines, ran head-on intoa particularly critical hill mass (Hill40) near Bangi Point, which had beenthoroughly worked over by theNavy. Hill 40's unexpectedly heateddefense indicated that the Japaneserecognized its importance, com-manding the beaches where troops

and supplies were coming ashore. Ittook tanks and the support of the 3dBattalion to claim the position.

Before dark on W-Day, the 2d Bat-talion, 22d Marines, could see the 4thMarines across a deep gully. The lat-ter held a thin, twisted line extend-ing 1,600 yards from the beach toHarmon Road. The 22d Marines heldthe rest of a beachhead 4,500 yardslong and 2,000 yards deep.

At nightfall of W-Day, General

15

Shepherd summed up to GeneralGeiger: "Own casualties about 350.Enemy unknown. Critical shortagesof fuel and ammunition all types.Think we can handle it. Will con-tinue as planned tomorrow:'

Helping to ensure that the Marineswould stay on shore once they land-ed was a host of unheralded supporttroops who had been struggling sincedaylight to manage the flow of vitalsupplies to the beaches. Now, as W-

The Taking of Chonito Ridge

T he following is a dispatch written by MarineCombat Correspondent Private First Class CyrilJ. O'Brien in the field after the combat action he

describes in his story. It was released for publication in theUnited States sometime after the event (always after fami-lies were notified of the wounding or death of the Marinesmentioned.) This story is reprinted from the carbon copyof the file which he retained of the stories he filed fromthe Pacific

Guam July 24 (Delayed) —The first frontal attack on steepChonito Ridge was made one hour after the Marinelanding.

An infantry squad, led by Second Lieutenant James A.Gallo, 24, 172 Broadway, Haverstraw, N.Y., approachedto within ten yards of the tip. The crest bloomed withmachine gun fire. In the face of it the Marine company triedits first assault. The company was thrown back before ithad advanced forty yards.

For fifty hours the company remained on the nakedslope, trying again and again to storm the Jap entrench-ments hardly one hundred yards away. Battered almost toannihilation, the tenacious Marines finally saw anothercompany take the ridge from the rear.

Failing in the first rush the company had formed a flim-sy defense line not fifty yards from the enemy. Cover wasscant. Some Marines had only tufts of grass to shield them.The Japs were rolling grenades down the crest, and blast-ing the Marines with knee mortars from over the summit.

Under the cover of dusk the company commander leda second attack. As the Marines rose machine gun fireswept into them. The commander, and three Marinesreached the crest. The last fifty feet were almost vertical.The attackers grasped roots and dug their feet into the softearth to keep from falling down the incline.

The commander went over the ridge. He never cameback. The remaining three Marines were ripped by crossfire. One saved himself by jumping into an enemy fox hole.

Beaten again, the company retired to a small ravine, andremained there all night. One Marine, shot through bothlegs, was asking for morphine. Another's thigh was rippedby shell fragments. A PFC, his dry tongue swollen, triedto whisper the range of an enemy sniper.

At eleven in the morning of the 22d, with little morethan a third of their original number, the company rushedthe hillside again.

Lieutenant Gallo led an assault on the left flank of thehill, but he was thrown back. Sergeant Charles V. Bomar,33, 4002 Gulf St., Houston, Tex., with nine Marines at-tempted to take the right ground of the slope. Five werekilled as they left the ravine. The sergeant and three othersreached the top of the slope.

The Japs again rolled grenades down the incline. Oneexploded under the chest of a Marine nearby, blowing off

his head. Another grenade bounced off the helmet of thesergeant. It was a dud.

The Marines charged into the Jap entrenchment. The ser-geant killed a Jap machine gunner with the butt of his car-bine. The assistant gunner exploded a grenade against hisbody. The blast threw the Marines out of the hole. Theyjumped into vacated enemy foxholes. A lieutenant who hadcome to join them was shot between the eyes by a sniper.The sergeant killed the sniper with his carbine.

Unable to hold their positions, the sergeant and his com-panies returned to the shelter of the ravine. With the shat-tered remnants of the company they waited for nearlyanother 24 hours, until darting Marines on the top of theridge showed Chonito had been taken from the rear.

Field commanders soon came to appreciate the effectthese so-called "Joe Blow" stories had on the morale of theirmen. The stories were printed in hometown newspapers andwere clipped and sent to the troops in the Pacific who couldthen see that their efforts were being publicized and ap-preciated at home.

16

4

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)91176

A Japanese cave position on the reverse slope of Chonito Ridge bardment and enabled them to reoccupy prepared positionsoffered protection for the enemy from the prelanding bom- from which they could oppose the advance of the 3d Marines.

Day's darkness approached, the 4thAmmunition Company, a black Ma-rine unit, guarded the brigade's am-munition depot ashore. During theirsleepless night, these Marines killed14 demolition-laden infiltrators ap-proaching the dump.

Faulty communications delayedthe order to land the Army's 305thRegimental Combat Team (ColonelVincent J. Tanzola), elements of theassault force, for hours. Slated for amorning landing, the 2d Battalion ofLieutenant Colonel Robert D. Adairdid not get ashore until well afternightfall. As no amtracs were thenavailable, the soldiers had to walk infrom the reef. Some soldiers slippedunder water into sheliholes and hadto swim for their lives in a full tide.The rest of the 305th had arrived onthe beach, all wet, some seasick, by0600 on W plus-i.

Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga, com-manding officer of the 38th Regi-ment, from his command post onMount Alifan, had seen the Ameri-cans overwhelm his forces below.Desperate to strike back, he tele-phoned General Takashina at 1730 toget permission for an all-out assaultto drive the Marines into the sea. Hehad already ordered. his remainingunits to assemble for the counterat-tack. The 29th Division commanderwas not at first receptive. Losseswould be too high and the 38th Regi-ment would serve better defendingthe high ground and therebythreatening the American advance.Reluctantly, however, Takashinagave his permission, and ordered thesurvivors to fall back on MountAlifan if the attack failed, which hewas certain it would. Eventually

17

Colonel Suenaga was forced to sharethe general's pessimism, for heburned his regiment's colors to pre-vent their capture.

At the focal point of the enemy'sattack from the south, Hill 40, thebrunt of the fighting fell upon FirstLieutenant Martin J. "Stormy" Sex-ton's Company K, 3d Battalion, 4thMarines. The enemy's 3d Battalion,38th Regiment coming north fromreserve positions was still relativelyintact. In the face of Japanese as-saults, the company held, but justbarely. Sexton recalls LieutenantColonel Shapley's assessment of thenight's fighting: "If the Japanese hadbeen able to recapture Hill 40, theycould have kicked our asses off theAgat beaches:'

Major Anthony N. "Cold Steel"Walker, S-3 (operations officer) of the3d Battalion, recalled that the

C 1 el Atcu

Japanese, an estimated 750 men, hitthe company at about 2130, with themain effort coming to the left or eastof the hill. He remembered:

Finding a gap in our lines andoverrunning the machine gunwhich covered the gap the ene-my broke through and ad-vanced toward the beaches.Some elements turned to theirleft and struck Hill 40 from therear. K Company with about200 men fought them all nightlong from Hill 40 and a smallhill to the rear and northeast ofHill 40. When daylight came theMarines counterattacked withtwo squads from L Company

and two tanks . . . andclosed the gap. A number ofmen from Company K died thatnight but all 750 Japanese sold-iers were killed. The hillrepresents in miniature or sym-bolically the whole hard-foughtAmerican victory on Guam.

Along the rest of the Marine front,and in the reserve areas, the fightingwas hot and heavy as the rest of the38th attacked. Colonel Suenaga

pushed his troops to attack again andagain, in many cases only to see themmowed down in the light of Ameri-can flares. No novice to Japanese tac-tics, General Shepherd hadanticipated this first night's attackand was ready.

Enemy reconnaissance patrolswere numerous around 2130, tryingto draw fire and determine Marinepositions. Colonel Suenaga was outin front of the center thrust which be-gan at 2330 after a brisk mortar flur-ry on the right flank of the 4thMarines. The Japanese came on infull force, yelling, charging with theirrifles carried at high port, and throw-ing grenades. The Marines watchedthe dark shadows moving across theskyline under light of star shells fromthe ships. Men lined up hand gre-nades, watched, waited, and then re-acted. The Japanese were all around,attempting to bayonet Marines intheir foxholes. They even infiltrateddown to pack-howitzer positions inthe rear of the front lines. It was thesame for the 22d Marines. A wholecompany of Japanese closed to the vi-cinity of the regimental commandpost. The defense here was held

18

largely by a reconnaissance platoonheaded by Lieutenant Dennis Cha-vez, Jr., who personally killed five ofthe infiltrators at point blank rangewith a Thompson sub-machine gun.

Four enemy tanks in that same at-tack lumbered down Harmon Road.There they met a bazooka man fromthe 4th Marines, Private First ClassBruno Oribiletti. He knocked out thefirst two enemy tanks and MarineSherman tanks of Lieutenant JamesR. Williams' 4th Tank Company pla-toon finished off the rest. Oribilettiwas killed; he was posthumouslyawarded the Navy Cross for his brav-ery. Enemy troops of the 38th alsostumbled into the barely set upperimeter of the newly arrived 305thInfantry and paid heavily for it.

After one day and night of furiousbattle the 38th ceased to exit. ColonelSuenaga, wounded in the first night'scounterattack, continued to flail atthe Marines until he, too, was cutdown. Takashina ordered the shat-tered remnants of the regiment northto join the reserves he would need todefend the high ground around FonteRidge above the Asan-Adelup beach-head. The general would leave his

troops on Orote to fend for them-selves.

The two days of fierce fighting onthe left of the 3d Division's beach-head in the area that was nowdubbed Bundschu Ridge cost the 3dMarines 615 men killed, wounded,and missing. The 21st Marines in thecenter held up its advance on 22 Julyuntil the 3d Marines could get mov-ing, but the men in their exposed po-sitions along the top of the ridge,seized so rapidly on W-Day, werehammered by Japanese mortar fire,so much so that Colonel Butler

received permission to replace the 2dBattalion by the 1st, which had beenin division reserve. The 9th Marinesmet relatively little resistance as itoverran many abandoned Japanesepositions in its drive toward theformer American naval base at Pition the shore of Apra Harbor. The 3dBattalion, after a heavy barrage ofnaval gunfire and bombs, assaultedCabras Island in mid-afternoon,landing from LVTs to find its majorobstacle dense brambles withhundreds of mines.

General Turnage, assessing the sit-uation as he saw it on the eve of 22

iii!!,

- MTALIFAN

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FRONTLINE - W- DAYAGAT BEACHHEAD<' JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS

Only Approximate Form Lines ShownSCALE — YARDS

500 0 500

19

July reported to General Geiger:Enemy resistance increased

considerably today on Div leftand center. All Bn's of 3rd CT[combat team] have been com-mitted in continuous attacksince landing. 21st CT less 1 Bnin Div Res has been committedcontinuously with all units inassault. One of the assault Bn'sof 21st CT is being relieved online by Div Res Bn today. Form-er is approx 40 percent deplet-ed. Since further advance willcontinue to thin our lines it isnow apparent that an addition-al CT is needed. 9th CT is ful-ly committed to the capture ofPiti and Cabras. Accordingly itis urgently recommended thatan additional CT be attachedthis Div at the earliest practica-ble date.Turnage did not get the additional

regiment he sought. The night of Wplus 1 was relatively quiet in the 3dDivision's sector except for the 1stBattalion, 21st Marines, whichrepulsed a Japanese counterattackreplete with a preliminary mortarbarrage followed by a bayonetcharge.

On the 23d, III Amphibious CorpsCommander, General Geiger, wellaware that the majority of Japanesetroops had not yet been encountered,told the 3d Division that it was "es-sential that close contact between ad-jacent units be established by laterafternoon and maintained through-out the night" unless otherwisedirected. Despite the order to closeup and keep contact, the 3d Divisionwas spread too thinly to hold whatit had seized in that day's advance.When it halted to set up for the night,it was found that the distance be-tween units had widened. Whennight fell, the frontline troops essen-tially held strongpoints with gaps be-tween them covered by interlockingbands of fire.

The 3d Marines reached the highground of Bundschu Ridge on the

* -

all-out counterattack, just as the Ma-rines, north and south, were gettingready to drive to the force beachheadline (FBHL), the objective whichwould secure the high ground andlink up the two beachheads.

23d and searched out the remainingJapanese stragglers. It was obviousthat the enemy had withdrawn fromthe immediate area and equally plainthat the Japanese hadn't gone far.When patrols from the 21st Marinestried to link up with the 3d Marines,they were driven back by the fire ofcleverly hidden machine guns, all butimpossible to spot in the welter of un-dergrowth and rock-strewn ravines.All across the ridges that the Marinesheld, there were stretches of deadlyopen ground completely blanketedby enemy fire from still higher posi-tions. On the night of the 23d, the9th Marines made good progressmoving through more open territorywhich was dotted by hills, each ofwhich was a potential enemy bas-tion. A patrol sent south along theshoreline to contact the 1st Brigadetook fire from the hills to its left andran into an American artillery andnaval gunfire concentration directedat Orote's defenders. The patrol wasgiven permission to turn back.

On the 24th, the 3d and 21st Ma-rines finally made contact on theheights, but the linkup was illusory.There were no solid frontlines, onlystrongpoints. No one could be cer-tain that the Japanese had all beenaccounted for in the areas that hadbeen probed, attacked, and nowseemed secure. Every rifleman waswell aware that more of the same layahead; he could see his next objec-tives looming to the front, across the

Mount Tenjo Road, which crossedthe high ground that framed thebeachhead. Already the division hadsuffered more than 2,000 casualties,the majority in infantry units. Andyet the Japanese, who had lost asmany and more men in the northalone, were showing no signs ofabandoning their fierce defense.General Takashina was, in fact, hus-banding his forces, preparing for an

Since the American landings,Takashina had been bringing troopsinto the rugged hills along the MountTenjo Road, calling in his reservesfrom scattered positions all over theisland. By 25 July, he had more than5,000 men, principally of the 48th In-dependent Mixed Brigade and the10th Independent Mixed Regiment,assembled and ready to attack.

The fighting on the 25th was as in-tense as that on any day since thelanding. The 2d Battalion, 9th Ma-rines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.Cushman, Jr., who was to becomethe 25th Commandant of the MarineCorps in 1972), was attached to the3d Marines to bring a relatively in-tact unit into the fight for the Fonteheights and to give the badly battered

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87239

Mount Alifan looms over the men of the 4th Marines as they move through thefoothills to the attack. In the background, a plane being used for observation keepstrack of the front lines for controlling the fire of ships' guns and supporting artillery.

Prior to the anticipated American landing on 21 July 1944, LtGen Takeshi Takashi-na, right, commanding general of the 29th Infantry Division, inspects defenseson Agat Beach, with Col Tsunetaro Suenaga, who commanded the 38th Infantry.

20

ra

p

-4

a

'

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, a chance During the Japanese counterattack on the night of 21-22 July, this Japanese lightto rest and recoup. By nightfall, tank was destroyed at the Company B, 4th Marines, roadblock. Note the rubbleCushman's men had driven a salient of the ground thrown up by U. S. artillery, aerial, and ships' gunfire bombardments.

into the Japanese lines, seizing theMount Tenjo Road, 400 yards shortof the Fonte objective on the left and250 yards short on the right.

During the day's relentless and in-creasingly heavy firefights, the 2dand 3d Battalions of the 3d Marineshad blasted and burned their waythrough a barrier of enemy cavedefenses and linked up with Cush-man's outfit on the left. About 1900,Company C of the 9th Marinespulled back some 100 yards to a po-sition just forward of the road, giv-ing it better observation and field offire. Company F had reached and oc-cupied a rocky prominence some 150yards ahead of Companies G and E,in the center of the salient. It pulled

21

PENINSUL A

SOUTHERN BEACHHEAD22—24 JULY 944

POSFTIOHS AT 1800—22 IJULY0000 23 JULY

24 IJUt,.Y

YARDS

CONTOUR INTERL 100 FEET

MAGPO

APAcA

PELAGI

P

tnn ZDQO

In the aftermath of the Japanese counterattack, bodies of the attackers were strewn back a little for better defense, andon a hillside typical of the terrain over which much of the battle was fought. held. Thus the scene was set for the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 91435 pitched battle of Fonte Ridge, foughtat hand-grenade range and in whichcasualties on both sides were largelycaused by small arms fire at point-blank distances. It was in this actionthat leadership, doggedness, and or-ganizational skill under fire meritedthe award of the Medal of Honorto the Commanding Officer of Com-pany F, Captain Louis H. Wilson, Jr.,who became the 26th Commandantof the Marine Corps in 1976, follow-ing in the footsteps of his former bat-talion commander.

Captain Wilson was woundedthree times leading his own attacksin the intense crux of this Fonte ac-tion, and as his citation relates:'Fighting fiercely in hand-to-hand en-counters, he led his men in furiously

22

3D MARINE DIVISION PROGRESS22—26 JULY 1944

POSITIONS AT 1800o o 22 JULY

rmi 24 JULY• . . 26 JULY

2000

CONTOUR INTERVAL tOO FEET

8UNDSCHU RIC

ITO CLIFF

- P44;;—

4

ad

:14

waged battle for approximately 10hours, tenaciously holding his lineand repelling the fanatically renewedcounterthrusts until he succeeded incrushing the last efforts of the hard-pressed Japanese . . . :'

Captain Wilson organized and ledthe 17-man patrol which climbed theslope in the face of the same con-tinued enemy fire to seize the criti-cal high ground at Fonte and keep it.

A half century later, Colonel FraserE. West recalled the engagement atFonte as bitter, close, and brisk. Asa young officer, he commandedCompany C, and reinforced Wilson'sunit. West joined on Company F'sflank, then reconnoitered to spot ene-my positions and shared the night ina common CP with Captain Wilson.

In late afternoon of the 25th, a pla-toon of four tanks of Company C,3d Tank Battalion, had made its wayup to the Mount Tenjo Road andgone into position facing the mostevident Japanese strongpoints. At the

height of the battle by Wilson's andWest's companies to hold their posi-tions, First Lieutenant Wilcie A.O'Bannon, executive officer of Com-pany F, managed to get down slopefrom his exposed position and bringup two of these tanks. By use of tel-ephones mounted in the rear of thetanks to communicate with the Ma-rines inside, Lieutenant O'Bannonwas able to describe targets for thetankers, as he positioned them insupport of Wilson's and West's Ma-rines. West recalled the tanks cameup with a precious cargo of ammu-nition. He and volunteers stuffedgrenades in pockets, hung bandoleersover their shoulders, pocketed clips,carried grenade boxes on their shoul-ders, and delivered them all as theywould birthday presents along theline to Companies C and F and a re-maining platoon of Company E.Major West was also able to use atank radio circuit to call in naval gun-fire, and guarantee that the terrain

23

before him would be lit all night bystar shells and punished by high ex-plosive naval gunfire.

On the morning of 26 July, 600Japanese lay dead in front of the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines positions. Butthe battle was not over. General Tur-nage ordered the military crest of thereverse slope taken. There would beother Japanese counterattacks, fight-ing would again be hand-to-hand,but by 28 July, the capture of Fontewas in question no longer. Compa-nies E, F, and G took their objectiveson the crest. Lieutenant ColonelCushman's battalion in four murder-ous days had lost 62 men killed and179 wounded.

It was not any easier for the 21stMarines with its hard fighting in themorning of the 25th. Only bymidafternoon did that regiment clearthe front in the center of the line. The2d Battalion, 21st Marines, had todeal with a similar pocket of die-hards as that which had held up the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93106

Long Toms of Battery A, 7th 155mm Gun Battalion, III Corps 2 in the shadow of the mountain range secured by the 4th Ma-Artillery, were set up in the open 500 yards from White Beach rifles and the Army's 305th Infantry after heavy fighting.

General Robert E. Cushmans a 29-year-old lieutenantcolonel commanding the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, 3d

Marine Division, on Guam, Robert E.Cushman, Jr., was awarded the NavyCross for extraordinary heroism duringthe period 21 July to 30 August 1944.The medal citation states in part:

When his battalion was orderedto seize and hold a strongly or-ganized and defended enemystrong-point which had been hold-ing up the advance for some days,Lieutenant Colonel Cushmandirected the attacks of his battal-ion and the repulse of numerousJapanese counterattacks, fearless-ly exposing himself to heavyhostile rifle, machine gun andmortar fire in order to remain in

the front lines and obtain firsthand knowledge of the enemy sit-uation. Following three days of bit-ter fighting culminating in a heavyJapanese counterattack whichpushed back the flank of his bat-talion, he personally led a platooninto the gap and, placing it fordefense, repelled the hostile force.By his inspiring leadership,courage and devotion to duty, hecontributed materially to the suc-cess of the mission with the anni-hilation of one enemy battalionand the rout of another .

General Cushman became the 25thCommandant of the Marine Corps on 1January 1972. Interestingly enough, hewas succeeded four years later by Gener-al Louis H. Wilson, Jr., who command-

ed a company in Cushman's 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, on Guam.

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on Fonte.Holed up in commanding cave posi-tions in the eastern draw of the AsanRiver, just up from the beachhead,the Japanese were wiped out only af-ter repeated Marine attacks andclose-in fighting. The official histo-ry of the campaign noted that "everyfoot of ground that fell to LieutenantColonel [Eustace R.] Smoak's Ma-rines was paid for in heavy casual-ties, and every man available wasneeded in the assault

The 9th Marines under ColonelCraig made good progress on the25th from its morning jump-off andreached the day's objective, a linerunning generally along the course ofa local river (the Sasa) by 0915. The9th Marines had taken even moreground than was planned. GeneralTurnage was then able to repositionthe 9th Marines for the harder fight-ing on the beleaguered left. The 2dBattalion pulled out of position toreinforce the 3d Marines and the re-maining two battalions spread out alittle further in position.

The determined counterattack thathit the 3d Marines on the night of25-26 July was matched in intensity

all across the 3d Division's front. Itwasn't long before there were enemytroops roaming the rear areas as theyslipped around the Marineperimeters and dodged down streamvalleys and ravines leading to thebeaches.

Major Aplington, whose 1st Bat-talion, 3d Marines, now constitutedthe only division infantry reserve,held positions in the hills on the leftin what had been a relatively quietsector. Not for long, he recalled:

With the dark came heavyrain. Up on the line Marineshuddled under ponchos in theirwet foxholes trying to figure outthe meaning of the obvious ac-tivity on the part of the oppos-ing Japanese. Around midnightthere was enemy probing of thelines of the 21st [Marines], andslopping over into those of the9th [Marines]. . . . All was quietin our circle of hills and wereceived no notification whenthe probing increased in inten-sity or at 0400 when the enemyopened. . . his attack. . . . Myfirst inkling came at about 0430when my three companies on

24

the hills erupted into fire andcalled for mortar support. I

talked to the company com-manders and asked what wasgoing on to be told that therewere Japanese all around them

the Japanese had been close.Three of my dead had beenkilled by bayonet thrusts.

In the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,sector, Private Dale Fetzer, a dog han-dler assigned with his black LabradorRetriever alerted Company C. Thedog, Skipper, who had been asleepin front of his handler's foxhole sud-denly bolted upright, alerting Fetzer.Skipper's nose was pointed up anddirectly toward Mount Tenjo. "Getthe lieutenant!" called handler Fetzer,"They're coming:'

At about 0400, the Japanese troopspoured down the slopes in a frenziedbanzai attack. Japanese troops hadbeen sighted drinking during the af-ternoon in the higher hills, and someof these attackers appeared drunk.Marine artillery fire had immediatelydriven them to cover then, but theyapparently continued to prepare forthe attack.

In the area of the 21st Marines,

C aptam Louis Hugh Wilson,Jr.'s Medal of Honor citationreads as follows: "For con-

spicuous gallantry and intrepidity atthe risk of his life above and beyondthe call of duty as commanding officerof a rifle company attached to the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Di-vision, in action against enemyJapanese forces at Fonte Hill, Guam,25-26 July 1944. Ordered to take thatportion of the hill within his zone ofaction, Captain Wilson initiated his at-tack in midafternoon, pushed up therugged, open terrain against terrificmachine gun and rifle fire for 300 yardsand successfully captured the objective.Promptly assuming command of otherdisorganized units and motorizedequipment in addition to his own com-pany and one reinforcing platoon, heorganized his night defenses in the faceof continuous hostile fire and,although wounded three times duringthis 5-hour period, completed his dis-position of men and guns before retir-ing to the company command post formedical attention. Shortly thereafter,

when the enemy launched the first ofa series of savage counterattacks last-ing all night, he voluntarily rejoinedhis besieged units and repeatedly ex-posed himself to the merciless hail ofshrapnel and bullets, dashing 50 yardsinto the open on one occasion to res-cue a wounded Marine laying helplessbeyond the front lines. Fighting fiercelyin hand-to-hand encounters, he led hismen in furiously waged battle for ap-proximately 10 hours, tenaciouslyholding his line and repelling the fa-natically renewed counter-thrusts un-til he succeeded in crushing the lastefforts of the hard-pressed Japaneseearly the following morning. Then or-ganizing a 17-man patrol, he immedi-ately advanced upon a strategic slopeessential to the security of his positionand, boldly defying intense mortar,machine gun and rifle fire which struckdown 13 of his men, drove relentless-ly forward with the remnants of hispatrol to seize the vital ground. By hisindomitable leadership, daring combattactics, and valor in the face of over-whelming odds, Captain Wilson suc-

ceeded in capturing arid holding thestrategic high ground in his regimen-tal sector, thereby contributing essen-tially to the success of his regimentalmission and to the annihilation of 350Japanese troops. His inspiring conductthroughout the critical periods of thisdecisive action sustains and enhancesthe highest traditions of the UnitedStates naval service."

'Daring Tactics' Gave Capt Wilson Medal of Honor

along a low ridge not far from thecritical Mount Tenjo Road, the hu-man wave struck hard against the 3dBattalion and the Japanese actuallyseized a machine gun which wasquickly recaptured by the Marines.The 3d Division was holding a frontof some 9,000 yards at the time, andit was thinnest from the right of the21st Marines to the left of the 9thMarines. Much of that line was onlyoutposted. The 3d Battalion, 21stMarines, held throughout. Some ofthe raiders got through the weaklymanned gap between the battalions.They charged harum-scarum for thetanks, artillery, and ammunition andsupply dumps. The attack seemedscattered, however, and unorganized.The fighting was fierce, nonetheless,and it shattered the hastily erectedMarine roadblock between the bat-talions.

Some of the attackers got throughthe lines all along the front. A groupof about 50 reached the divisionhospital. Doctors evacuated the bad-ly wounded, but the walking wound-ed joined with cooks, bakers,stretcher bearers, and corpsmen toform the line that fought off the at-tackers. One of the patients, PrivateFirst Class Michael Ryan, "grabbedup the blanket covering me and ranout of the building without anotherstitch on." He had to run with awounded foot through crossfire toreach some safety.

Lieutenant Colonel George 0. VanOrden (3d Division infantry trainingofficer), on orders from General Tur-nage, assembled two companies ofthe 3d Pioneer Battalion to eliminatethis threat. In three hours the pi-oneers killed 33 of the assailants andlost three of their own men. The 3d

25

Medical Battalion had 20 of its menwounded, but only one patient washit and he was one of the defenders.

For many men in the furious andconfused melees that broke out allover the Marine positions, the ex-perience of Corporal Charles E.Moore of the 2d Platoon, CompanyE, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, wasn'tunique. His outfit held a positionabout a quarter mile from FontePlateau. He recalled:

We set up where a road madea sharp turn overlooking adraw. It was the last stand ofthe second platoon. There werethree attacks that night and bythe third there was nobody leftto fight, so they broke through.They came in droves throwinghand grenades and hacked upsome of our platoon. In the

morning, I had only ten roundsof ammunition left, half the clipfor my BAR. I was holdingthose rounds if I needed themto make a break for it. I had nochoice. Everybody was quiet,either dead or wounded. TheJapanese came in to take outtheir dead and wounded, andstepped on the edge of my fox-hole. I didn't breath. They weremilling around there until dawnthen they were gone.

As Lieutenant Colonel Cushman,evaluating the action later, said:

With the seizure of FonteHill, the capture of the beach-head was completed. In thelarge picture, the defeat of thelarge counterattack on the 26thby the many battalions of the3d Division who fought valiant-ly through the bloody nightfinished the Jap on Guam

What made the fightingfor Fonte important was the factthat [the advance to the northend of the island] could not takeplace until it was seized.

The enemy attack failed in thesouth also, and in the south it wasjust as much touch and go at times.The Japanese sailors on Orote werejust as determined as the soldiers atFonte to drive the Americans fromGuam.

The 22d Marines had driven upthe coast from Agat in a series of

hard-fought clashes with stubbornenemy defenders. The 4th Marineshad swept up the slopes of MountAlifan and secured the high groundoverlooking the beachhead. By the25th, the brigade was in line acrossthe mouth of Orote Peninsula facinga formidable defensive line in depth,anchored in swamps and low hil-locks, concealed by heavy under-

Sherman mediums from the 3d Tank Battalion lumber up the long incline fromthe Asan beachhead towards the scene of battle around Fonte and X-Ray Ridges.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93640

26

The Colt .45-Caliber M1911A1 Pistol

T he Colt M1911A1 pistol was standard issue toMany Marine officers, noncommissionedofficers, and specialists not armed with either the

Ml carbine or rifle during World War II. From 1911, thispistol served its Marine owners as well as members of theother U.S. services armed with it.

The first M1911 pistols were issued to the Marine Corpsin 1912, and shortly afterwards the Corps was able to fieldthis pistol exclusively. Although Colt manufactured morethan 55,000 pistols by the time the United States enteredWorld War 1, not enough were on hand to preclude arm-ing some units of the American Expeditionary Force withrevolvers. Subsequently, more than a half million M1911swere produced before 1926, when the M1911 was modi-fied and the revised pistol now dubbed the M1911A1.

These modifications included a shorter, and serrated,trigger; wider sights; a contoured handgrip; and a longergrip safety. Approximately 1.8 million of the newerM1911A1s were produced and the M1911s also were up-graded to meet these new specifications during World War

II. The advent of World War II also meant further changesfor the pistol. Among these was altering the finish fromthe common shiny blue-black to a dull gray, in the processcalled "Parkerization7 which was designed to give the pistola nonreflective matte surface. Wartime M1911A1s alsosported checkered plastic grips instead of molded rubber.

Colt could not keep up with wartime demand, and thefollowing firms were licensed to produce the M1911A1:Remington Arms Company, North American Arms Com-pany Limited, Remington-Rand Company, Ithaca GunCompany, Union Switch and Signal Company, and SingerSewing Machine Company. One curious note is that theRemington-Rand Company actually outproduced Colt dur-ing the wartime years by approximately 500,000 pistols.

During the war, in its table of equipment, a Marine di-vision rated 1,707 pistols, but the actual number it had wasin general substantially higher; a tribute to the popularityof the M1911A1. A number of Marine aviators, given theoption, chose the .45-caliber Colt over the .38-caliber Smith& Wesson "Victory" revolver.

— Second Lieutenant G. M. Anthony, USMC

growth, and bristling with automaticweapons.

The 77th Infantry Division hadtaken over the rest of the southernbeachhead, relieving the 4th Marinesof its patrolling duties to the southand in the hills to the west. The di-vision's artillery and a good part ofthe III Corps' big guns hammered theJapanese on Orote without letup. Justin case of enemy air attack, the beachdefenses from Agat to Bangi Pointwere manned by the 9th Defense Bat-talion. There were not too manyJapanese planes in the sky, and so theantiaircraft artillerymen could con-

centrate on firing across the waterinto the southern flank of the enemy'sOrote positions. On Cabras Island,the 14th Defense Battalion movedinto position where it could equallyprovide direct flanking fire on thepeninsula's northern coast and standready to elevate its guns to fire at ene-my planes in the skies above.

The 5,000 Japanese defenders onOrote took part in General Takashi-na's all-out counterattack and it be-gan in the early morning hours of 26July. The attackers stormed vigorous-ly out of the concealing mangroveswamp and the response was just as

27

spirited. Here, as in the north, therewas evidence that some of the attack-ers had fortified themselves with sakeand there were senseless actions byofficers who attacked the Marinetanks armed only with their samuraiswords. There were deadly andprofessional attacks as well, withMarines bayoneted in their foxholes.There was one attendant communi-cations breakdown obliging CaptainRobert Frank, commanding officer ofCompany L, 22d Marines, to remainon the front relaying artillery spotsto the regimental S-2 and thence tobrigade artillery.

War Dogs on GuamMarines made a point of getting them to the rear, to theveterinarian, as quickly as possible. In the liberation ofGuam, 20 dogs were wounded and 25 killed.

From the end of the campaign to the end of the war inthe Pacific, Guam served as a staging area for war dogs,of which 465 served in combat operations. Of the MarineCorps war dogs, 85 percent were Doberman Pinschers, andthe rest mainly German Shepherds.

At the end of the Pacific War, the Marine Corps had 510war dogs. Of this number, 491 were deprogrammed, aprocess that could take a year, and returned to their own-ers, given to their handlers, or returned to the Army, whichhad provided 41 to the Corps. Only four dogs could notbe returned to their masters because, even after extensiveretraining, they proved "incorrigible" and were consideredto be unsafe for civilian life.

n the late summer of 1942, the Marine Corpsdecided to experiment with the use of dogs in war,which may have been a new departure for the Corps,

but not a new idea in warfare. Since ancient times, dogshave served fighting men in various ways. The Romans,for instance, used heavy mastiffs with armored collars toattack the legs of their enemies, thus forcing them to low-er their shields.

On Guam, First Lieutenant William R. Putney com-manded the 1st Dog Platoon and was the veterinarian forall war dogs on Guam. First Lieutenant William T. Taylorcommanded the 2d Platoon. Both landed on the Asan-Adelup beach on Guam, while the 1st Platoon under Gun-nery Sergeant L. C. Christmore landed with the 1st Provi-sional Brigade at Agat.

Sixty dogs, 90 handlers, 10 NCO assistants, two war dogcorpsmen, and three kennelmen were distributed amongthe regimental and division headquarters of the 3d Ma-rine Division. Lieutenant Putney commanded the 36 han-dlers and 24 dogs out of division headquarters. Overall,some 350 war dogs served in the Guam operation.

Handlers were trained dog specialists and skilled scoutsas well. Man and dog searched out the enemy, awaited hiscoming, and caught him by surprise around the Marineperimeter or while on patrol. In addition, they foundsnipers, routed stragglers, searched out caves and pillbox-es, ran messages, and protected the Marines' foxholes asthey would private homes. The dogs ate, slept, walked, andotherwise lived with their masters.

The presence of dogs on the line could promise the Ma-rines there a night's sleep, for they alerted their handlerswhen the enemy came near.

Early on in the Guam operations, some dogs werewounded or killed by machine gun and rifle fire, and in-coming mortars were as devastating to the dogs as theywere to the Marines. When the dogs were wounded, the

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The artillery response was intenseand effective. The fire was "drawn incloser and closer toward our frontlines; 26,000 shells were thrown intothe pocket [of attackers] betweenmidnight and 3 a.m." The screamingattacks came at 1230, then again at0130, and at 0300. At daylight themuddy ground in front of the Ma-rine positions was slick with blood.More than 400 Japanese bodies weresprawled in the driving rain.

General Shepherd, secure in theknowledge that his frontline troops,4th Marines on the left, 22d Marineson the right, had withstood thenight's banzai attacks in good ord-er, directed an attack to be launchedat 0730. But first there would beanother artillery preparation. Atdaybreak it opened with the 77th In-fantry Division's 105s and 155s, thebrigade's 75s, the defense battalions90s, and whatever guns the 12th Ma-rines could spare. It was one of themore intense preparations of thecampaign. Major Charles L. Davis,S-3 of 77th Division Artillery,recalled how, on the request ofGeneral Shepherd, he had turned the

heavy 155mm battalion and two105mm battalions around to faceOrote to soften the Japanese posi-tions. The 155s and 105s batteredwell-prepared positions, and rippedthe covering, protection, andcamouflage from bunkers andtrenches. Pieces of men soon hung intrees. Marines saw that this firecounted and made it a point to returnto congratulate and thank the 77th'sartillery section leaders.

The advance, when it came, onlywent 100 yards before it was ad-dressed by a blistering front ofmachine gun and small arms fire.Enemy artillery fire came fallingalmost simultaneously with the ces-sation of American support,, leavingthe Marines to think the fire wasfrom their own guns, a favoriteJapanese ruse. For a moment there,the Japanese return fire on the 22dMarines disorganized its forwardmove. It was about 0815 before theattack was on again in full force,spearheaded by Marine and Armytanks.

Immediately to the front of the 22dMarines was the infernal mangrove

28

swamp from where the banzai attackhad been mounted the night before.It was still manned heavily byJapanese, was dense, and the onlymeans of penetrating it was by a200-yard-long corridor along theregimental boundary which was co-vered by Japanese enfilade fire andcould only be navigated with thecover of tanks. The armor gunnersand commanders directed their firejust over the head of prone Marinesand into the gunports of enemy pill-boxes. By 1245, Colonel Schneider'sregiment had worked its waythrough all bottlenecks past the man-grove swamps, destroying bunkerswith demolitions and flamethrowers.The 4th's assault battalions kept pacewith this advance, finding somewhateasier terrain but just as determineddefenders. By evening the brigadehad advanced 1,500 yards from itsjump-off line. Both regiments, weary,wary, and waiting, dug in with an all-around defense.

Again, there was a heavy pre-attack barrage on the 27th and theMarines were stopped again beforethey'd gone 100 yards. The 3d Bat-

Stretchers for wounded Marines lie scattered among the bod-ies of Japanese dead in the wake of the attack on the 3d Dlvi-

sion hospital the evening of 25-26 July. Doctors, corpsmen,and wounded Marines joined in the fight to repulse the enemy.