On The Meaning of AlienationAuthor(s): Melvin SeemanSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, No. 6 (Dec., 1959), pp. 783-791Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2088565Accessed: 18/10/2010 11:26

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ON THE MEANING OF ALIENATION *

MELVIN SEEMAN

University of California, Los Angeles

The problem of alienation is a pervasive theme in the classics of sociology, and the concept has a prominent place in contemporary work. This paper seeks to accomplish two tasks: to present an organized view of the uses that have been made of this concept; and to provide an approach that ties the historical interest in alienation to the modern empirical effort. Five alternative meanings of alienation are identified: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. The derivation of these meanings from traditional sociological analysis is sketched, and the necessity for making the indicated distinctions is specified. In each case, an effort is made to provide a viable research formulation of these five alternatives.

At the present time, in all the social sciences, the various synonyms of alien- ation have a foremost place in studies of human relations. Investigations of the 'unattached,' the 'marginal,' the 'obsessive,' the 'normless,' and the 'iso- lated' individual all testify to the cen- tral place occupied by the hypothesis of alienation in contemporary social science.

So writes Robert Nisbet in The Quest for Community; 1 and there would seem to be little doubt that his estimate is cor-

rect. In one form or another, the concept of alienation dominates both the contemporary literature and the history of sociological thought. It is a central theme in the classics of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; and in contemporary work, the consequences that have been said to flow from the fact of alienation have been diverse, indeed.

Ethnic prejudice, for example, has been described as a response to alienation-as an ideology which makes an incomprehensible world intelligible by imposing upon that world a simplified and categorical "answer system" (for example, the Jews cause inter- national war).2 In his examination of the

persuasion process in the Kate Smith bond drive, Merton emphasizes the significance of pervasive distrust: "The very same society that produces this sense of alienation and estrangement generates in many a craving for reassurance, an acute need to believe, a flight into faith" 3-in this case, faith in the sincerity of the persuader. In short, the idea of alienation is a popular vehicle for virtu- ally every kind of analysis, from the pre- diction of voting behavior to the search for The Sane Society.4 This inclusiveness, in both its historical and its contemporary im- port, is expressed in Erich Kahler's remark: "The history of man could very well be written as a history of the alienation of man." 5

A concept that is so central in sociological work, and so clearly laden with value im- plications, demands special clarity. There are, it seems to me, five basic ways in which the concept of alienation has been used. The purpose of this paper is to examine these logically distinguishable usages, and to pro- pose what seems a workable view of these five meanings of alienation. Thus, the task is a dual one: to make more organized sense of one of the great traditions in socio- logical thought; and to make the traditional interest in alienation more amenable to sharp empirical statement.*

783

* This paper is based in part on work done while the author was in attendance at the Behavioral Sciences Conference at the University of New Mexico, in the summer of 1958. The conference was supported by the Behavioral Sciences Division, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, under contract AF 49(638)-33. The work on alienation was carried out in close conjunction with Julian B. Rotter and Shephard Liverant of The Ohio State University. I gratefully acknowledge their very considerable help, while absolving them of any commitment to the viewpoints herein expressed.

1New York: Oxford, 1953, p. 15. 2 T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Person-

ality, New York: Harper, 1950, pp. 617 ff.

3R. K. Merton, Mass Persuasion, New York: Harper, 1946, p. 143.

4 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, New York: Rinehart, 1955.

5 The Tower and the Abyss, New York: Braziller, 1957, p. 43.

*An effort in this direction is reported by John P. Clark in "Measuring Alienation Within a Social System," pp. 849-852 of this issue of the Review. -The Editor.

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I propose, in what follows, to treat aliena- tion from the personal standpoint of the actor-that is, alienation is here taken from the social-psychological point of view. Pre- sumably, a task for subsequent experimental or analytical research is to determine (a) the social conditions that produce these five variants of alienation, or (b) their behavioral consequences. In each of the five instances, I begin with a review of where and how that usage is found in traditional sociological thought; subsequently, in each case, I seek a more researchable statement of meaning. In these latter statements, I focus chiefly upon the ideas of expectation and value."

POWERLESSNESS

The first of these uses refers to alienation in the sense of powerlessness. This is the notion of alienation as it originated in the Marxian view of the worker's condition in capitalist society: the worker is alienated to the extent that the prerogative and means of decision are expropriated by the ruling entrepreneurs. Marx, to be sure, was inter- ested in other alienative aspects of the indus- trial system; indeed, one might say that his interest in the powerlessness of the worker flowed from his interest in the consequences of such alienation in the work place-for example, the alienation of man from man, and the degradation of men into commodi- ties.

In Weber's work, we find an extension beyond the industrial sphere of the Marxian notion of powerlessness. Of this extension, Gerth and Mills remark:

Marx's emphasis upon the wage worker as being 'separated' from the means of produc- tion becomes, in Weber's perspective, merely one special case of a universal trend. The modern soldier is equally 'separated' from the means of violence; the scientist from the means of enquiry, and the civil servant from the means of administration.7

The idea of alienation as powerlessness is, perhaps, the most frequent usage in current literature. The contributors to Gouldner's volume on leadership, for example, make heavy use of this idea; as does the work of C. Wright Mills-and, I suppose, any analy- sis of the human condition that takes the Marxist tradition with any seriousness. This variant of alienation can be conceived as the expectancy or probability held by the indi- vidual that his own behavior cannot deter- mine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks.

Let us be clear about what this conception does and does not imply. First, it is a dis- tinctly social-psychological view. It does not treat powerlessness from the standpoint of the objective conditions in society; but this does not mean that these conditions need be ignored in research dealing with this variety of alienation. These objective conditions are relevant, for example, in determining the degree of realism involved in the individual's response to his situation. The objective fea- tures of the situations are to be handled like any other situational aspect of behavior-to be analyzed, measured, ignored, experiment- ally controlled or varied, as the research question demands.

Second, this construction of "powerless- ness"2 clearly departs from the Marxian tradition by removing the critical, polemic element in the idea of alienation. Likewise, this version of powerlessness does not take into account, as a definitional matter, the frustration an individual may feel as a con- sequence of the discrepancy between the control he may expect and the degree of control that he desires-that is, it takes no direct account of the value of control to the person.

In this version of alienation, then, the individual's expectancy for control of events is clearly distinguished from (a) the objec- tive situation of powerlessness as some ob- server sees it, (b) the observer's judgment of that situation against some ethical stand- ard, and (c) the individual's sense of a dis- crepancy between his expectations for con- trol and his desire for control.

The issues in the philosophy of science, or in the history of science, on which these distinctions and decisions touch can not be debated here. Two remarks must suffice: (1)

6 The concepts of expectancy and reward, or re- inforcement value, are the central elements in J. B. Rotter's "social learning theory"; see Social Learning and Clinical Psychology, New York: Prentice Hall, 1954. My discussion seeks to cast the various mean- ings of alienation in a form that is roughly consistent with this theory, though not formally expressed in terms of it.

7 H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber:, Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford, 1946, p. 50.

ALIENATION 785

In any given research, any or all of the elements discussed above-expectancies, ob- jective conditions, deviation from a moral standard, deviation from the actor's stand- ards-may well be involved, and I see little profit in arguing about which is "really" alienation so long as what is going on at each point in the effort is clear. I have chosen to focus on expectancies since I believe that this is consistent with what follows, while it avoids building ethical or adjustmental fea- tures into the concept. (2) I do not think that the expectancy usage is as radical a departure from the Marxian legacy as it may appear. No one would deny the editorial character of the Marxian judgment, but it was a judgment about a state of affairs- the elimination of individual freedom and control. My version of alienation refers to the counterpart, in the individual's expecta- tions, of that state of affairs.

Finally, the use of powerlessness as an ex- pectancy means that this version of aliena- tion is very closely related to the notion (de- veloped by Rotter) of "internal versus ex- ternal control of reinforcements." The latter construct refers to the individual's sense of personal control over the reinforcement situ- ation, as contrasted with his view that the occurrence of reinforcements is dependent upon external conditions, such as chance, luck, or the manipulation of others. The con- gruence in these formulations leaves the way open for the development of a closer bond between two languages of analysis-that of learning theory and that of alienation-that have long histories in psychology and soci- ology. But the congruence also poses a prob- lem-the problem of recognizing that these two constructs, though intimately related, are not generally used to understand the same things.8

In the case of alienation, I would limit the applicability of the concept to expectancies that have to do with the individual's sense of influence over socio-political events (control over the political system, the industrial econ- omy, international affairs, and the like). Ac- cordingly, I would initially limit the appli- cability of this first meaning of alienation to the arena for which the concept was origi- nally intended, namely, the depiction of man's relation to the larger social order. Whether or not such an operational concept of alienation is related to expectancies for control in more intimate need areas (for example, love and affection; status-recogni- tion) is a matter for empirical determina- tion. The need for the restriction lies in the following convictions: First, the concept of alienation, initially, should not be so global as to make the generality of powerlessness a matter of fiat rather than fact. Second, the concept should not be dangerously close to merely an index of personality adjustment -equivalent, that is, to a statement that the individual is maladjusted in the sense that he has a generally low expectation that he can, through his own behavior, achieve any of the personal rewards he seeks.9

8 Cf. W. H. James and J. B. Rotter, "Partial and One Hundred Percent Reinforcement under Chance and Skill Conditions," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55 (May, 1958), pp. 397-403. Rotter and his students have shown that the distinction between internal and external control (a distinction which is also cast in expectancy terms) has an impor- tant bearing on learning theory. The propositions in that theory, they argue, are based too exclusively on experimental studies which simulate conditions of "external control," where the subject "is likely to perceive reinforcements as being beyond his con- trol and primarily contingent upon external condi- tions" (p. 397). Compare this use of what is es-

sentially a notion of powerlessness with, for example, Norman Podheretz's discussion of the "Beat Genera- tion": "Being apathetic about the Cold War is to admit that you have a sense of utter helplessness in the face of forces apparently beyond the control of man." "Where is the Beat Generation Going?" Esquire, 50 (December, 1958), p. 148.

9 It seems best, in regard to the adjustment ques- tion, to follow Gwynn Nettler's view. He points out that the concepts of alienation and anomie should not "be equated, as they so often are, with personal disorganization defined as intrapersonal goallessness, or lack of 'internal coherence' . . . [their] bearing on emotional sickness must be independently in- vestigated." "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review, 22 (December, 1957), p. 672. For a contrasting view, see Nathan Glazer's "The Alienation of Modern Man," Commentary, 3 (April, 1947), p. 380, in which he comments: "If we ap- proach alienation in this way, it becomes less a description of a single specific symptom than an omnibus of psychological disturbances having a sim- ilar root cause-in this case, modern social organ- ization."

With regard to the question of the generality of powerlessness, I assume that high or low expectancies for the control of outcomes through one's own behavior will (a) vary with the behavior involved- e.g., control over academic achievement or grades, as against control over unemployment; and (b) will be differentially realistic in different areas (it is one

786 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

MEANINGLESSNESS

A second major usage of the alienation concept may be summarized under the idea of meaninglessness. The clearest contempo- rary examples of this usage are found in Adorno's treatment of prejudice; in Can- tril's The Psychology of Social Movements, in which the "search for meaning" is used as part of the interpretive scheme in analyz- ing such diverse phenomena as lynchings, the Father Divine movement, and German fas- cism; and in Hoffer's portrait of the "true believer" as one who finds, and needs to find, in the doctrines of a mass movement "a master key to all the world's problems." 10

This variant of alienation is involved in Mannheim's description of the increase of "functional rationality" and the concomitant decline of "substantial rationality." Mann- heim argues that as society increasingly or- ganizes its members with reference to the most efficient realization of ends (that is, as functional rationality increases), there is a parallel decline in the "capacity to act in- telligently in a given situation on the basis of one's own insight into the interrelations of events." '

This second type of alienation, then, refers to the individual's sense of understanding the events in which he is engaged. We may speak of high alienation, in the meaninglessness usage, when the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe-when the individ- ual's minimal standards for clarity in deci- sion-making are not met. Thus, the post-war German situation described by Adorno was " meaningless" in the sense that the individ- ual could not choose with confidence among alternative explanations of the inflationary disasters of the time (and, it is argued, sub-

stituted the "Jews" as a simplified solution for this unclarity). In Mannheim's depiction, the individual cannot choose appropriately among alternative interpretations (cannot "act intelligently" or "with insight") be- cause the increase in functional rationality, with its emphasis on specialization and pro- duction, makes such choice impossible.

It would seem, for the present at least, a matter of no consequence what the beliefs in question are. They may, as in the above in- stance, be simply descriptive beliefs (inter- pretations); or they may be beliefs involv- ing moral standards (norms for behavior). In either case, the individual's choice among alternative beliefs has low "confidence lim- its": he cannot predict with confidence the consequences of acting on a given belief. One might operationalize this aspect of alienation by focusing upon the fact that it is character- ized by a low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of be- havior can be made. Put more simply, where the first meaning of alienation refers to the sensed ability to control outcomes, this sec- ond meaning refers essentially to the sensed ability to predict behavioral outcomes.

This second version of alienation is logi- cally independent of the first, for, under some circumstances, expectancies for per- sonal control of events may not coincide with the understanding of these events, as in the popular depiction of the alienation of the intellectual. Still, there are obvious connections between these two forms of alienation: in some important degree, the view that one lives in an intelligible world may be a prerequisite to expectancies for control; and the unintelligibility of complex affairs is presumably conducive to the de-

thing to feel powerless with regard to war and quite another, presumably, to feel powerless in making friends). My chief point is that these are matters that can be empirically rather than con- ceptually solved; we should not, therefore, build either "generality" or "adjustment" into our concept of alienation. This same view is applied in the discus- sion of the other four types of alienation.

10 See, respectively, Adorno et al., op. cit.; Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements, New York: Wiley, 1941; and Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New York: Harper, 1950, p. 90.

11 Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940, p.59.

12 C. Wright Mills' description reflects this view: "The intellectual who remains free may continue to learn more and more about modern society, but he finds the centers of political initiative less and less accessible. . . . He comes to feel helpless in the fundamental sense that he cannot control what he is able to foresee." White Collar, New York: Oxford, 1951, p. 157. The same distinction is found in F. L. Strodtbeck's empirical comparison of Italian and Jewish values affecting mobility: "For the Jew, there was always the expectation that every- thing could be understood, if perhaps not con- trolled." "Family Interaction, Values and Achieve- ment," in D. C. McClelland et al., Talent and Society, New York: Van Nostrand, 1958, p. 155.

ALIENATION 787

velopment of high expectancies for external control (that is, high powerlessness).13

NORMLESSNESS

The third variant of the alienation theme is derived from Durkheim's description of "anomie," and refers to a condition of normlessness. In the traditional usage, anomie denotes a situation in which the so- cial norms regulating individual conduct have broken down or are no longer effective as rules for behavior. As noted above, Mer- ton emphasizes this kind of rulelessness in his interpretation of the importance of the "sincerity" theme in Kate Smith's war bond drive:

The emphasis on this theme reflects a social disorder-"anomie" is the sociological term- in which common values have been sub- merged in the welter of private interests seek- ing satisfaction by virtually any means which are effective. Drawn from a highly competi- tive, segmented urban society, our informants live in a climate of reciprocal distrust which, to say the least, is not conducive to stable human relationships. . . . The very same so- ciety that produces this sense of alienation and estrangement generates in many a craving for reassurance. ...14

Elsewhere, in his well-known paper "Social Structure and Anomie," Merton describes the "adaptations" (the kinds of conformity and deviance) that may occur where the dis- ciplining effect of collective standards has been weakened. He takes as his case in point the situation in which culturally prescribed goals (in America, the emphasis upon suc- cess goals) are not congruent with the avail- able means for their attainment. In such a situation, he argues, anomie or normlessness will develop to the extent that "the techni- cally most effective procedure, whether cul- turally legitimate or not, becomes typically preferred to institutionally prescribed con- duct." 15

Merton's comments on this kind of anomic situation serve to renew the discussion of the expectancy constructs developed above-the idea of meaninglessness, and the idea of powerlessness or internal-external control. For Merton notes, first, that the anomic situ- ation leads to low predictability in behavior, and second, that the anomic situation may well lead to the belief in luck:

Whatever the sentiments of the reader con- cerning the moral desirability of coordinating the goals-and-means phases of the social struc- ture, it is clear that imperfect coordination of the two leads to anomie. Insofar as one of the most general functions of the social structure is to provide a basis for predictability and regularity of social behavior, it becomes in- creasingly limited in effectiveness as these elements of the social structure become dis- sociated.... The victims of this contradiction between the cultural emphasis on pecuniary ambition and the social bars to full opportu- nity are not always aware of the structural sources of their thwarted aspirations. To be sure, they are typically aware of a discrepancy between individual worth and social rewards. But they do not necessarily see how this comes about. Those who do find its source in the social structure may become alienated from that structure and become ready candi- dates for Adaptation V [rebellion]. But others, and this appears to include the great majority, may attribute their difficulties to more mystical and less sociological sources. . . . in such a society [a society suffering from anomie] people tend to put stress on mys- ticism: the workings of Fortune, Chance, Luck.16

It is clear that the general idea of anomie is both an integral part of the alienation literature, and that it bears upon our expect- ancy notions. What is not so clear is the matter of how precisely to conceptualize the events to which "anomie" is intended to point. Unfortunately, the idea of normless- ness has been over-extended to include a wide variety of both social conditions and psychic states: personal disorganization, cul- tural breakdown, reciprocal distrust, and so on.

Those who employ the anomie version of alienation are chiefly concerned with the elaboration of the "means" emphasis in so- ciety-for example, the loss of commonly held standards and consequent individual- ism, or the development of instrumental, manipulative attitudes. This interest repre-

13 Thorstein Veblen argues the same point, in his own inimitable style, in a discussion of "The Belief in Luck": ".... the extra-causal propensity or agent has a very high utility as a recourse in perplexity" [providing the individual] "a means of escape from the difficulty of accounting for phenomena in terms of causal sequences." The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York: Macmillan, 1899; Modern Library Edition, 1934, p. 386.

14 Merton, op. cit., p. 143. 15 R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc-

ture, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949, p. 128. '6Ibid., pp. 148-149, 138.

788 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

sents our third variant of alienation, the key idea of which, again, may be cast in terms of expectancies. Following Merton's lead, the anomic situation, from the individ- ual point of view, may be defined as one in which there is a high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals. This third meaning of alienation is logically independent of the two versions discussed above. Expectancies concerning un- approved means, presumably, can vary inde- pendently of the individual's expectancy that his own behavior will determine his success in reaching a goal (what I have called 'powerlessness") or his belief that he oper- ates in an intellectually comprehensible world ("meaninglessness"). Such a view of anomie, to be sure, narrows the evocative character of the concept, but it provides a more likely way of developing its research potential. This view, I believe, makes pos- sible the discovery of the extent to which such expectancies are held, the conditions for their development, and their consequences either for the individual or for a given social system (for example, the generation of wide- spread distrust).

The foregoing discussion implies that the means and goals in question have to do with such relatively broad social demands as the demand for success or for political ends. However, in his interesting essay, "Aliena- tion from Interaction," Erving Goffman pre- sents a more or less parallel illustration in which the focus is on the smallest of social systems, the simple conversation:

If we take conjoint spontaneous involve- ment in a topic of conversation as a point of reference, we shall find that alienation from it is common indeed. Conjoint involvement ap- pears to be a fragile thing, with standard points of weakness and decay, a precarious unsteady state that is likely at any time to lead the individual into some form of aliena- tion. Since we are dealing with obligatory in- volvement, forms of alienation will constitute misbehavior of a kind that can be called mis- involvement.l7

Goffman describes four such "mis-involve- ments" (for example, being too self-conscious in interaction), and concludes: "By looking at the ways in which individuals can be thrown out of step with the sociable moment,

perhaps we can learn something about the way in which he can become alienated from things that take much more of his time." 18

In speaking of "misbehavior" or "mis-in- volvement," Goffman is treating the problem of alienation in terms not far removed from the anomic feature I have described, that is, the expectancy for socially unapproved be- havior. His analysis of the social microcosm in these terms calls attention once more to the fact that the five variants of alienation discussed here can be applied to as broad or as narrow a range of social behavior as seems useful.

ISOLATION

The fourth type of alienation refers to isolation. This usage is most common in de- scriptions of the intellectual role, where writers refer to the detachment of the intel- lectual from popular cultural standards- one who, in Nettler's language, has become estranged from his society and the culture it carries."9 Clearly, this usage does not refer to isolation as a lack of "social adjustment" -of the warmth, security, or intensity of an individual's social contacts.

In the present context, in which we seek to maintain a consistent focus on the indi- vidual's expectations or values, this brand of alienation may be usefully defined in terms of reward values: The alienated in the isola- tion sense are those who, like the intellectual,

17 Human Relations, 10 (February, 1957), p. 49 (italics added).

18 Ibid., p. 59. Obviously, the distinction (discussed above under "powerlessness") between objective condition and individual expectancy applies in the case of anomie. For a recent treatment of this point, see R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957 (revised edition), pp. 161-194. It is clear that Srole's well- known anomie scale refers to individual experience (and that it embodies a heavy adjustment com- ponent). It is not so clear how the metaphorical language of "normative breakdown" and "structural strain" associated with the conception of anomie as a social condition is to be made empirically useful. It may be further noted that the idea of rulelessness has often been used to refer to situations in which norms are unclear as well as to those in which norms lose their regulative force. I focused on the latter case in this section; but the former aspect of anomie is contained in the idea of "meaningless- ness." The idea of meaninglessness, as defined above, surely includes situations involving uncertainty re- sulting from obscurity of rules, the absence of clear criteria for resolving ambiguities, and the like.

19 Nettler, op. cit., p. 672.

ALIENATION 789

assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society. This, in effect, is the definition of alienation in Nettler's scale, for as a measure of "apartness from society" the scale con- sists (largely though not exclusively) of items that reflect the individual's degree of commitment to popular culture. Included, for example, is the question "Do you read Reader's Digest?", a magazine that was se- lected "as a symbol of popular magazine appeal and folkish thoughtways."20

The "isolation" version of alienation clearly carries a meaning different from the three versions discussed above. Still, these alternative meanings can be profitably ap- plied in conjunction with one another in the analysis of a given state of affairs. Thus, Merton's paper on social structure and anomie makes use of both "normlessness" and "isolation" in depicting the adaptations that individuals may make to the situation in which goals and means are not well coordi- nated. One of these adaptations-that of the "innovator"-is the prototype of alienation in the sense of normlessness, in which the individual innovates culturally disapproved means to achieve the goals in question. But another adjustment pattern-that of "rebel- lion"-more closely approximates what I have called "isolation." "This adaptation [rebellion] leads men outside the environing social structure to envisage and seek to bring

into being a new, that is to say, a greatly modified, social structure. It presupposes alienation from reigning goals and stand- ards." 21

SELF-ESTRANGEMENT

The final variant distinguishable in the literature is alienation in the sense of self- estrangement. The most extended treatment of this version of alienation is found in The Sane Society, where Fromm writes:

In the following analysis I have chosen the concept of alienation as the central point from which I am going to develop the analy- sis of the contemporary social character.... By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, es- tranged from himself.22

In much the same way, C. Wright Mills com- ments: "In the normal course of her work, because her personality becomes the instru- ment of an alien purpose, the salesgirl be- comes self-alienated;" and, later, "Men are estranged from one another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the other, and in time a full circle is made: One makes an instrument of himself and is estranged from It also." 23

There are two interesting features of this popular doctrine of alienation as self-es- trangement. The first of these is the fact that where the usage does not overlap with the other four meanings (and it often does), it is difficult to specify what the alienation is from. To speak of "alienation from the self" is after all simply a metaphor, in a way that "alienation from popular culture," for example, need not be. The latter can be

20 Ibid., p. 675. A scale to measure social isolation (as well as powerlessness and meaninglessness) has been developed by Dean, but the meanings are not the same as those given here; the "social isolation" measure, for example, deals with the individual's friendship status. (See Dwight Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy," Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1956.) It seems to me now, however, that this is not a very useful meaning, for two reasons. First, it comes very close to being a state- ment of either social adjustment or of simple differences in associational styles (i.e., some people are sociable and some are not), and as such seems irrelevant to the root historical notion of alienation. Second, the crucial part of this "social isolation" component in alienation-what Nisbet, for example, calls the "unattached" or the "isolated"-is better captured for analytical purposes, I believe, in the ideas of meaninglessness, normlessness, or isolation, as defined in expectancy or reward terms. That is to say, what remains, after sheer sociability is removed, is the kind of tenuousness of social ties that may be described as value uniqueness (isolation), deviation from approved means (normlessness), or the like.

21 Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," op. cit., pp. 144-145. Merton is describing a radical estrange- ment from societal values (often typified in the case of the intellectual)-i.e., the alienation is from reigning central features of the society, and what is sought is a "greatly" modified society. Presumably, the "isolation" mode of alienation, like the other versions, can be applied on the intimate or the grand scale, as noted above in the discussion of Goffman's analysis. Clearly, the person who rejects certain commonly held values in a given society, but who values the society's tolerance for such dif- ferences, is expressing a fundamental commitment to societal values and in this degree he is not alienated in the isolation sense.

22Fromm, op. cit., pp. 110, 120. 23 Mills, op. cit., pp. 184, 188.

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reasonably specified, as I have tried to do above; but what is intended when Fromm, Mills, Hoffer, and the others speak of self- estrangement?

Apparently, what is being postulated here is some ideal human condition from which the individual is estranged. This is, perhaps, clearest in Fromm's treatment, for example, in his description of production and con- sumption excesses in capitalist society: "The human way of acquiring would be to make an effort qualitatively commensurate with what I acquire. . . . But our craving for consumption has lost all connection with the real needs of man."24 To be self-alienated, in the final analysis, means to be something less than one might ideally be if the circum- stances in society were otherwise-to be in- secure, given to appearances, conformist. Riesman's discussion of other-direction falls within this meaning of alienation; for what is at stake is that the child learns "that nothing in his character, no possession he owns, no inheritance of name or talent, no work he has done, is valued for itself, but only for its effect on others.... 25

Riesman's comment brings us to the sec- ond feature of special interest in the idea of self-alienation. I have noted that this idea invokes some explicit or implicit human ideal. And I have implied that such com- parisons of modern man with some idealized human condition should be viewed simply as rhetorical appeals to nature-an important rhetoric for some purposes, though not very useful in the non-analytical form it generally takes. But Riesman's assertion contains, it seems to me, one of the key elements of this rhetoric-one, indeed, that not only reflects the original interest of Marx in alienation but also one that may be specifiable in a language consistent with our other uses of alienation.

I refer to that aspect of self-alienation which is generally characterized as the loss of intrinsic meaning or pride in work, a loss which Marx and others have held to be an essential feature of modern alienation. This notion of the loss of intrinsically meaningful satisfactions is embodied in a number of ways in current discussions of alienation. Glazer, for example, contrasts the alienated society with simpler societies characterized by "spontaneous acts of work and play which were their own reward." 26

Although this meaning of alienation is difficult to specify, the basic idea contained in the rhetoric of self-estrangement-the idea of intrinsically meaningful activity-can, perhaps, be recast into more manageable so- cial learning terms. One way to state such a meaning is to see alienation as the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anti- cipated future rewards, that is, upon rewards that lie outside the activity itself. In these terms, the worker who works merely for his salary, the housewife who cooks simply to get it over with, or the other-directed type who acts "only for its effect on others"-all these (at different levels, again) are instances of self-estrangement. In this view, what has been called self-estrangement refers essen- tially to the inability of the individual to find self-rewarding-or in Dewey's phrase, self-consummatory-activities that engage him.27

24 Fromm, op. cit., pp. 131, 134 (italics in original).

25 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 49. Although the idea of self-estrangement, when used in the alienation literature, usually carries the notion of a generally applicable human standard, it is sometimes the individual's standard that is at issue: to be alienated in this sense is to be aware of a discrepancy between one's ideal self and one's actual self-image.

26 Glazer, op. cit., p. 379. 27 The difficulty of providing intrinsically satisfy-

ing work in industrial society, of course, has been the subject of extensive comment; see, for example, Daniel Bell, Work and Its Discontents, Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. A similar idea has been applied by Tumin to the definition of creativity: "I would follow Dewey's lead and view 'creativity' as the esthetic experience, which is distinguished from other experiences by the fact that it is self-consummatory in nature. This is to say, the esthetic experience is enjoyed for the actions which define and constitute the experience, whatever it may be, rather than for its instrumental results or social accompaniments in the form of social relations with others." Melvin M. Tumin, "Obstacles to Creativity," Etc.: A Review of General Semantics, 11 (Summer, 1954), p. 261. For a more psychological view of the problem of "intrinsically" governed behavior, see S. Koch, "Be- havior as 'Intrinsically' Regulated: Work Notes Toward a Pre-Theory of Phenomena Called 'Moti- vational,"' in M. R. Jones, editor, Nebraska Symn- posium on Motivation, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956, pp. 42-87.

"BUREAUCRACY" AND "RATIONALITY" 791

CONCLUSION

I am aware that there are unclarities and difficulties of considerable importance in these five varieties of alienation (especially, I believe, in the attempted solution of "self- estrangement" and the idea of "meaningless- ness"). But I have attempted, first, to dis- tinguish the meanings that have been given to alienation, and second, to work toward a more useful conception of each of these meanings.

It may seem, at first reading, that the language employed-the language of expec- tations and rewards-is somewhat strange, if not misguided. But I would urge that the language is more traditional than it may seem. Nathan Glazer certainly is well within

that tradition when, in a summary essay on alienation, he speaks of our modern ".

sense of the splitting asunder of what was once together, the breaking of the seamless mold in which values, behavior, and expecta- tions were once cast into interlocking forms." 28 These same three concepts-re- ward value, behavior, and expectancy-are key elements in the theory that underlies the present characterization of alienation. Per- haps, on closer inspection, the reader will find only that initial strangeness which is often experienced when we translate what was sentimentally understood into a secular question.

28 Glazer, op. cit., p. 378 (italics added).

"BUREAUCRACY" AND "RATIONALITY" IN WEBER'S ORGANIZATION THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

STANLEY H. UDY, JR.

Yale University

Seven of Max Weber's ideal-typical specifications for "rational bureaucracy" are reformulated as a system of three "bureaucratic" and four "rational" variables. It is proposed that (a) bureaucratic variables are positively associated; (b) rational variables are positively associated; but that (c) rational variables are negatively associated with bureaucratic variables. This hypothesis is supported by a comparative analysis of 150 formal organizations in 150 non- industrial societies, using data largely from the Human Relations Area Files. Implications of the findings are explored for, first, the use of the concept "informal organization;" and, second, the development of a general organizational model. Such a model is proposed in outline and illustrated from the descriptive industrial sociological literature.

AX WEBER'S "split personality" as sociologist, on the one hand, and transcendental idealist historian, on

the other, has from time to time occasioned comment in the literature.' This duality of posture in Weber's work appears in particu- lar to have had some rather interesting con- sequences for the lines along which contem- porary organization theory has developed. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss some of these consequences, together with certain problems to which they lead, and to explore a possible solution to these problems through a small empirical study.

The dual nature of Weber's approach is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in his use of ideal types in the analysis of administra- tive structure. From a sociological point of view, his specifications for the "rational bu- reaucracy" superficially resemble the cate- gories of a model. Yet on closer scrutiny they prove to be alleged concrete attributes, rather than variables or categories in a clas- sificatory scheme. And, indeed, from a transcendental idealist point of view, Weber himself treats ideal types as substantive conclusions rather than methodological tools. In this sense, his specifications for the "ra- tional bureaucracy" represent not so much a system of analytical categories as they do an attempt to capture the "spirit" of contem-

1 See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, Glencoe: Free Press, 1949, pp. 601-610.