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Morality, durkheim, and sociobiologyMary Maxwell aa University of AdelaidePublished online: 04 Jun 2010.

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MORALITY, DURKHEIM, AND SOCIOBIOLOGYby

Mary MaxwellUniversity of Adelaide

For a century there have been disputes about wheth-er morality should take precedence over science orscience should take precedence over morality: theonly way to put an end to this antagonism is tomake of morality itself a science.

Emile DurkheimInaugural Lecture at Bordeaux, 1887.

I argue in this paper that Durkheim anticipated the sociobi-ological theory of the origin of morality, and that Durkheim'smuch-neglected idea of the remoralisation of modern society isgiven a surprising new boost by sociobiology (I).

I - DURKHEIM'S PROBLEM : MORALITY

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was a philosopher before hehelped to found the discipline of sociology, and he maintaineda lifelong concern with the problem of morality. His biographerGeorges Davy said in 1920 "Morality was the centre and the endof his work" (Davy, 1920:71 in Lukes, 1973:95). A recent defi-nition of the word 'morality' is offered by the philosopher AlanGewirth:

"A morality is a set of categorically obligatory require-ments for action that are addressed at least in part toevery actual or prospective agent, and that areconcerned with furthering the interests ... of personsother than or in addition to the agent (1978:1).*

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Durkheim wanted to account for the two main features ofmorality alluded to in this definition, namely, the obligatory orimperative nature of moral feeling, and the fact that moralityworks for the good of society rather than for the self-interest ofthe individual. He was not satisfied by Kant's notion that thesense of duty existed a priori - he wanted to explain it. In hischronological explanation of the emergence of human society,in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (1912), Durkheimarrived at a solution to both problems of morality. Thissolution, as I shall explain below, had the important effect ofexplaining the autonomy of the social realm and the forcewhich it exerts on the individual - which are, of course, amongsociology's major concerns.

Thomas Hobbes had famously set out a chronology inwhich a pre- social individual existed first, and in which societywas formed later as a rational covenant, a means by which self-ish individuals agreed to restrain themselves in order to gainsecurity (1887). Durkheim fortunately avoided the strategy ofimagining a pre-social individual. He claimed, instead, thatfrom the beginning humans created society as a sort of 'force'over the individual. In The Elementary Forms he showed thatthis happened through the creation of religion, although heemphasised that religion does not necessarily require 'God'. InL'Individualisme et les intellectuels, Durkheim stated, 'Once agoal is pursued by a whole people, it acquires, as a result of thisunanimous adherence, a sort of moral supremacy which raises itfar above private goals and thereby gives it a religious charac-ter* (1898:11, in Giddens, 1972:23). That is, social goals aremore or less the same as moral goals, and these are, perforce,sacred. The way in which this connects the individual to societyin a kind of emotional union has been described as follows byGiddens, paraphrasing Durkheim:

T h e individual member of the collectivity derives hisreligiosity from the manner in which the sacred forceis created ... The sentiment of the divine is evoked incollective ceremonial, during which, as a result of theintense emotionality and involvement which is gener-ated, the individual feels himself swamped by action ofan entity superior to himself. Although this forceemanates from the collective assembly, it only realises

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itself through the consciousness of the individual, whofeels it to be both transcendent over him and yet imman-ent within him. (emphasis added) (1972:25)."

In other words, the group creates external representations of the'social good'. As I shall claim below, this scenario finds supportin sociobiological theory.

II - SOCIOBIOLOGY'S PROBLEM : ALTRUISM

I know of no sociobiologist who set out deliberately toexplain the phenomenon of human morality as Durkheim did,yet I believe that sociobiology has inadvertently provided themost convincing solution to the problem. Let me sketch thebasic theory of animal altruism and then show its implicationsfor human morality. When Charles Darwin published On theOrigin of Species in 1859, he emphasized the evolution of selfishand self- protective traits. These, he said, came about becausethey conferred some adaptive advantage on the individual.Darwin was well aware, also, that cooperative traits existed insome species such as bees, but he could not explain their evolu-tion. Any behaviour in which an animal helps his neighbourmore than himself would seem to be a behaviour that wouldlose out in evolution. That is, it is to be expected that carriersof traits for altruism should not survive long enough to reprod-uce progeny with similar traits. Thus, the mystery of social lifepuzzled Darwin, and also engaged the attention of many biol-ogists in the twentieth century.

Hamilton's Solution.A few biologists, such as R.A. Fisher (1932) and J.B.S.

Haldane (1955) seem to have been on the right track of explain-ing how altruistic traits could be inherited. However, themystery was not finally solved until 1964 when William D.Hamilton, a graduate student at University College, London,published a paper entitled The Genetical Theory of SocialBehaviour'. In it he proposed that the striking degree of cooper-ation of altruism found in insect societies could be explained bythe fact that most members of an ant colony or beehive are ofunusually close genetic relationship to one another. Normally,the individuals of sexually-reproducing species, such asmammals, have at most a 50% genetic similarity to one anoth-

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er. That is, an individual shares 50% of the genes of his closestkin - parent, offspring, and siblings - and shares less withothers, such as 25% with a nephew or 12 1/2% with a cousin.In the Hymenopteran insects, however, (ants, bees, wasps) apeculiar mode of reproduction, known as haplodiploidy, causesindividuals to share 75% of their sibling's genes. Thus a femalebee is genetically more closely related to her siblings than to herown offspring. The result of this oddity is the famous altruismof bees: some workers are 'slavishly devoted' to helping others,who happen to be their siblings. Hamilton wrote:

"Consider a species where the female consecutivelyprovisions and oviposits in cell after cell so that she isstill at work when the first of her female offspring ...leaves the nest and mates. Our principle tells us thateven if this new adult had a nest ready constructedand vacant for her use, she would prefer ... returningto the mother's and provisioning a cell for the rearingof an extra sister to provisioning a cell for a daughterof her own." (1964:28).

These words have huge implications for social science. Atfirst glance, one may fail to see any relevance here for humansociety. For one thing, humans do not have haplodiploidreproduction. For another, human altruism is far moreconscious and freely-chosen than that of insects. But, to contin-ue with the story of Hamilton's discovery, he found, in essence,that an individual may help anyone whose survival will causeher genes to be included in subsequent generations. In the caseof a bee, this means helping her sisters, or, in some sense, help-ing the whole colony, since the colony-members are almost allsisters. Hamilton's radical contribution differs from classicalDarwinian theory in which an individual's 'fitness' is calculatedby how many direct descendants it leaves. For Hamilton andlater sociobiologists, the thing to measure is the proliferation ofgenes for a given trait. Ego's genes, or at least copies of Ego'sgenes may appear both in direct descendants and in collateraldescendants. The significance of this - for all species, includinghumans - is that altruism is possible among a fairly wide kingroup, not just between parent and offspring. Hence, in short,social life is biologically possible.

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Hamilton's theory is known as the theory of 'inclusivefitness' - meaning the calculation of how many of Ego's genesare included in future generations. John Maynard Smith refers tothis type of evolution as 'kin selection'. (1964:1145). Whereas theterm 'natural selection' implies that evolution 'selects' individ-uals with adaptive traits, kin selection implies that a wholefamily can be" selected. Thus if a family practices altruismamong its members, such as food-sharing or combined defense,this behaviour may put the family at an adaptive advantagecompared to families which do not practice altruism. Thus,Darwin's puzzle has been solved: altruism is an adaptive traitthat can be inherited.

Wilson's Sociobiology. E.O. Wilson was among the first to notethe importance of Hamilton's discovery of inclusive fitness, andits explanation for the evolution of social behaviour. Hedescribed it as "a numerical exercise that anyone could do inthree minutes on the back of an envelope* but one "that proba-bly would otherwise have escaped me all my life". (1985:478)Luckily it did not escape him all his life. Having readHamilton's article in 1965, Wilson produced the Insect Societiesin 1971 and then, in 1975, Sociobiology: the New Synthesis. Thelatter book pieces together information about the altruistichabits of hundreds of species from corals and sponges up toprimates and human. With this book, the comparative study ofthe social behaviour of species, including humans, was givenfirm theoretical grounding. It showed how social structure, thepatterns of social organization reproduced every generation, isultimately guided by genes - particularly the genes for altruisticbehaviour. Wilson defines sociobiology as 'the systematic studyof the biological basis of all social behaviour' (1980:4). Thisstudy has concentrated mainly on animal societies, but there isno reason to suppose that the human species is exempt fromsome genetic control of its social structure.

Reciprocal Altruism. Besides the theory of inclusive fitness,which is based on kin altruism, the other major building blockof human sociobiology is the theory of reciprocal altruism.George C. Williams first put forth this idea in 1966 and in 1971Robert Trivers published the key article: 'The evolution ofreciprocal altruism'. Trivers further elaborated this idea in his

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book, Social Evolution (1985). The theory of reciprocal altruismholds that the tendency to be altruistic - even to non-relatives -can evolve genetically, so long as it benefits the altruist. If, bygiving aid to a fellow creature today, the animal can extract aidfrom that individual later, the aid-giving behaviour may beadaptive. There has been some objection to the biologists' useof the word altruism here to mean a sort of disguised selfish-ness. 'Altruism' in common parlance means an act performedon behalf of another at a net cost to oneself, whereas Triversuses the word to mean an act performed on behalf of another atan eventual net gain for oneself. This is not a sloppy usage,however. It is the crux of the biological discovery: cooperativeor helpful social behaviour is made possible by the fact that itcarries a hidden benefit. When 1 say 'made possible', I meanthat it was able to evolve by natural selection. The hidden bene-fit of kin altruism, as we saw, was that it helps one's genes infuture generations. The hidden benefit of reciprocal altruism isthat it helps Ego on a subsequent occasion. Pure altruismcould never have evolved: it is 'un-Darwinian'.

Reciprocal altruism is fairly rare in Nature. It can comeabout only where certain conditions are met. First, the animalsmust be of sufficient intelligence to recognize each other indi-vidually and to remember favours performed. Second, they mustlive in proximity to one another for a sufficiently long time toreap repayment of the favour. Third, pairs of animals must be'able to render roughly equivalent benefits to each other atroughly equivalent costs*. (Trivers, 1971:37). Reciprocal altruismhas been recorded in several species. Male baboons help oneanother in fighting off a rival (Packer, 1979); similar behaviourin chimpanzees reaches the level of coalition- formation, asFrans de Waal has described in his fascinating book, Chimpan-zee Politics (1982). Dolphins and whales also appear to performservices such as swimming along under a sick individual to pushit up to the surface for air; presumably the individual who ishelped will later be pressed into the service of its helpers.(Connor and Norris, 1982). Even bats have been shown to carryout reciprocal altruism (Wilkinson, 1984). Since bats are lessintelligent than primates or whales, their altruistic behaviour iseasier to see as an 'instinctive' trait, requiring no consciouscalculation of benefit.

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Triver's Theory of the Moral Emotions. One particular aspect ofTrivers' work contains the key to understanding the phenome-non of human morality. He hypothesizes that the moralemotions, such as guilt, gratitude, sympathy, and righteousanger, evolved by natural selection as mechanisms for the moni-toring of reciprocal altruism. That is, they are physiologicalguides for the enforcement of reciprocity. A crucial observationTrivers makes is that cheating is bound to evolve in any situ-ation where altruism abounds. A subtle cheater can take advan-tage in altruistic exchanges by not giving his fair share; hencecheating is adaptive and will proliferate. It seems that everyhuman individual is potentially both an altruist and a cheater;the moral emotions very likely evolved to keep these two behav-iours in balance. Thus, for example, righteous anger is used toinhibit cheating, sympathy is used to encourage acts of altruism(Trivers, 1985:386-389). The combination of the various moralemotions add up to what we call conscience, or sense of rightand wrong.

As mentioned above, chimpanzees can engage in one-to-onereciprocal altruism, but they do not have an elaborate systemlike ours, involving the motivational forces of guilt, sympathy,or gratitude. The result of having a generalised system ofaltruism like ours is that the acts of social cooperation and aidcan go far beyond one-to-one exchanges. Humans haveinvented cultural systems of morality which allow a person toperform altruism for any of his fellows: the rewards and punish-ments are administered by society as a whole. That is, the inter-nal system for monitoring reciprocity becomes projected intocultural rules. As Durkheim suggested, the group externalizesthe rules, calls them sacred, and then feels compelled to obey.

Genes and Culture. . Let me try to make a rough distinctionbetween the proportions of human morality that are attributableto genes and to culture, respectively. Do humans have a 'moralnature?' I believe we do not have a nature that propels us prin-cipally or exclusively into either selfish or unselfish behaviour.Being mammals we have plenty of drives for self-preservationand competitiveness, but being social mammals we also haveconsiderable propensity for acting altruistically (especiallytoward kin and toward partners in reciprocity). Yet we have a

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'moral nature' insofar as possession of the moral emotionsmakes us attuned to moral relationships and conscious of thegood or bad behaviour of ourselves and others. It is rare tomeet a person who does not have a 'moral nature' in this senseof the word.

Nevertheless, it is culture that has produced the actual storeof human beliefs and practices of morality - for example, laws,regulations, myths, sanctions, and customs of cooperation.These behaviours are not genetically controlled, although theyfit very well onto our genetic base, that is, our 'moral nature' asjust described. Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox were among thefirst sociologists to point out that many cultural practices owetheir universality to a stable human 'biogrammar' (1971).Charles J. Lumsden and E.O. Wilson have tried to show thelink between genes and culture - in other words to show whyculture fits so well onto the biogrammar. The link they find isthe human mind, or more particularly the evolved mechanismsof the brain. The brain evolved at the same time that culturewas evolving, thus the brain is keyed in to culture. (1981:53-98)The child's brain, rather than being a blank slate, is more like atemplate to which certain learned things will readily attach. Inthe case of moral learning, George Edgin Pugh hypothesisesthat social rules seep down into brain and become like instincts(1977:29-35). As a result, it is always hard to tell which of ourmoral habits are instinctive and which are learned. My guess isthat they are virtually all learned. I repeat: the instinctive partof human morality is the emotional sensitivity to the categoriesof right and wrong, not the particular rules.

Alexander's Approach. Another entomologist-sociobiologist whohas contributed vitally toward the theory of the evolution ofmorality is Richard Alexander. He discussed this topic m vari-ous publications (1979, 1982, Alexander and Tinkle, 1968) andhas developed the most sustained treatment of the subject todate in his book, The Biology of Moral Systems (1987). Theapproach of Alexander and his anthropology colleagues (seeChagnon and Irons, 1979) is like that of George C. Williams(1966) and Richard Dawkins (1976): it interprets social behav-iour from the point of view of 'the selfish gene' that is, thegene's single-minded goal of proliferating itself in future gener-

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ations. Thus, irrespective of the explanations that people maygive for their actions, Alexander postulates that most moti-vation really has to do with reproduction. He is not referring tothe reproductive act, per se, but to inclusive fitness. Accordingly,Alexander interprets all moral behaviour with an eye to what itgains for Ego's long-term genetic advantage. Of interest to soci-ologists is Alexander's drastic statement that nepotism and reci-procity are virtually all that are needed to explain human socialstructure (1987:153). In sum, he believes that the hidden'intentions' of the genes, not the conscious intentions ofhumans, suffice to explain most of the behaviour and insti-tutions we see around us. I believe that Alexander overstatesthe genetic factor - but not nearly by so great a degree as socialscientists understate the genetic factor.

Alexander is also associated with another theory of theevolution of morality, one which he shares with Arthur Keith(1948) and Robert Bigelow (1969, 1972), and which was adumb-rated by Darwin (1871:199). This theory holds that highlyaltruistic or cooperative behaviour evolved as a result of compe-tition and conflict between human groups. Obviously, a groupthat is able to demand loyalty from its members would be well-equipped to attack other groups, or to resist the attack of othergroups. Alexander writes:

T h e rules of morality and law alike seem not to bedesigned explicitly to allow people to live in harmonywithin societies, but to enable societies to be suffi-ciently united to deter their enemies. Within-societyharmony is the means not the end." (1987:174)

The gist of this theory is that many of the traits known to socialpsychologists as 'in-group' and 'out-group' behaviours can beeasily explained if group selection occurred in human evolution.Group selection means that an entire group, possessing a gene-pool for, say, traits of loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice, wouldhave been 'selected' over groups not having those traits. Groupselection, however, is controversial in evolutionary biology (SeeSober, 1984). I believe the proponents of this theory are proba-bly right, but it is outside the scope of this paper to pursue theargument. I refer the reader to Alexander (1979:220-233), Bige-low (1972:1-12), to the Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism (Reynolds,

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Falger, and Vine 1987), and on a related issue, to Pierre vanden Berghe's The Ethnic Phenomenon, 1981.

Ill - PARALLELS BETWEEN DURKHEIM AND THE SOCIO-BIOLOGISTS

Before proceeding to Part IV in which I shall discuss thesignificance of Durkheim's moral theory for the modern age, letme list three areas which show a consonance between his ideasand those of the sociobiologists.

First, they both start with the same problem, namely, howcan we account simultaneously for the obvious fact of individ-ual egoism and the equally obvious reality of social life? Durk-heim responded to the problem in several ways. He rejected theclaim of the utilitarians and the classical economists that indi-viduals acting in their self-interest would produce society. Rath-er, he insisted that even in the modern secular age it is a moralunderstanding (not the Invisible Hand of the marketplace) thatholds society together. As Bellah observes, what is essential forDurkheim in organic solidarity is not contract but the moralbasis of contract (1973:xxv) - the social system of mutual expec-tation that the rules will be followed. This obviously accordswith the sociobiological interpretation. As for the origin ofmorality, as noted earlier, Durkheim believed that it was social-ly created in conjunction with religion but that religion itselfsymbolically substituted 'God' for 'society': the feeling thatsomething is sacred is an emotional response to the fact thatsomething is important for society. When actions "are orientedtowards a higher end ... the morality which is recognized inthem must derive from a higher source". (Durkheim, 1924:73 inLukes, 1973:415).

Sociobiologists account for the problem of simultaneousegoism and sociality with a scheme not unlike Durkheim's. Theyconclude that society is not an arrangement in which pureegoists rationally choose to follow rules in order to get thebenefit of social life (as in the Hobbesian social contract). Rath-er, there are inclinations within the individual to do certainthings which produce social structure; these inclinationscompromise the Ego's pure egoism. But how did they get'inside' him? They got inside him by genetic inheritance.According to kin selection theory, as we saw, Ego carries traits

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which are not there to serve his personal interests but the inter-ests of his genes. These genes, metaphorically speaking, 'want'to be included in future generations, even if that means helpingrelatives. A revolution within Darwinian theory has beenbrought about by the realization that the level of selection inevolution is not always the individual. There is a higher level,the family, and a lower level, the gene.

The second sociobiological explanation as to how socialbehaviour 'gets inside' the individual relies on the idea thatconscience or moral sensitivity evolved as a means of monitor-ing reciprocal altruism. Then, once conscience existed, culturewas able to develop a whole system of moral rules. Societypresents the child with these rules as the only 'normal' way tobehave, and channels his learning with threats of disapproval orpunishment. In short, the individual internalizes society's wish-es. A second area in which the sociobiologist's observationsparallel those of Durkheim is in the explanation of 'moralanguish'. E.O. Wilson notes that the human brain:

"knows, or more precisely it has been programmed toperform as if it knows, that its underlying genes willbe proliferated maximally only if it orchestrates behav-ioural responses that bring into play an efficientmixture of personal survival, reproduction, andaltruism. Consequently (the limbic system) taxes theconscious mind with ambivalences ... love joins hate;aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on- in blends designed not to promote the happiness andsurvival of the individual, but to favor the maximumtransmission of the controlling genes" (1980:3-4).

This is wonderfully like what Durkheim wrote in 1914 in hisessay 'The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Condi-tions'.

"Our inner life has something that is like a doublecentre of gravity ... there is a true antagonism between(individuality and otherness). ... We cannot pursuemoral ends without causing a split within ourselves,without offending the instincts and penchants that arethe most deeply rooted in our bodies. There is nomoral act that does not imply a sacrifice... How can

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we belong entirely to ourselves and entirely to othersat one and the same time? ... Our joys can never bepure; there is always some pain mixed with them"(1960, in Bellah 1973:152-154)

Durkheim's solution to this dualism is that'(our) passions and egoistic tendencies derive from ourindividual constitutions, while our rational activity isdependent on social causes. ... The rules of moralityare norms that have been elaborated by society; theobligatory character with which they are marked isnothing but the authority of society." (1960, in Bellah1973:162).

T h e painful character of dualism, he says, demonstrates thatsociety is not a spontaneous development of the individual.'Society has its own nature, and, consequently, its requirementsare different ... Because society surpasses us, it obliges us tofrom (our) nature - a departure that does not take place withoutcausing more or less painful tensions" (1960, in Bellah1973:162-163).

Thirdly, I point to the parallel between the Keith-Bigelow-Alexander hypothesis concerning morality as a group-behaviourphenomenon, and Durkheim's explanation of 'the secondelement of morality' (his first element is discipline). Durkheimbelieved the second element to consist of "the individual'sattachment to a group of which he is a member" (1961:64). Likethe sociobiologists, he notes the importance of "crises that acti-vate people's feelings of identity with the group". (1961:68)

"For example, wars, in quickening the sense of patriot-ism, subordinate preoccupation with the self. Theimage of the threatened fatherland occupies a place inone's consciousness that it does not have in peacetime; consequently, the bond between individual and-society is strengthened ... Members of the confessionalminorities are always more tightly knit groups becauseof the opposition to them which they must combat.Also, a given denomination will have fewer suicides ina country where it is in a minority ..." (1961:68-69).

Finally, I might mention, though I have only briefly alludedto the gene-culture theory of Lumsden and Wilson, that theirwork is remarkably Durkheimian. Lumsden and Wilson's theory

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goes a long way toward accounting for the mechanism by whichthe social personality is infused into the individual. Theydemonstrate the probable evolutionary, neurophysiological basesfor what Durkheim called 'collective representations'. (SeeMaxwell, l984:Chap. 9).

In sum, there is hardly any aspect of the sociobiologicaltheory of morality that was not anticipated by Durkheim. Need-less to say, he lacked knowledge of human evolution, as such.The science of genetics began only in 1900, and was not synthe-sised with Darwinian theory until the 1930's; moreover Durk-heim died seven years before Raymond Dart found the firstimportant fossil skull of Australopithecus, the creature transi-tional between apes and the genus Homo. (Reader, 1982:80-99)Much less could Durkheim have given the slightest thought tothe item over which Hamilton 'cracked the code' of socialbehaviour, namely the genetic altruism of Hymenopteraninsects. Still, in contrast to countless thinkers who have wildlymis-guessed what morality is all about. Durkheim seems to havegot it almost exactly right.

IV - REMORALISATION IN THE MODERN AGE

I now come to that part of Durkheim's work which has todo not with the ancient origins of morality, but with the role ofmorality in the modern age. It was, after all, to the nineteenth-century problem of moral breakdown that Durkheim devotedhis first book, The Division of Labour in Society (1893); and'anomie' was the theme of Suicide (1897). As Lewis Coser notes,we must see Durkheim's response in contrast to that of otherwriters of the age who attempted to come to grips with theIndustrial Revolution. On the one hand, Spencer and Mainerejoiced in the "gradual decline of social regulation and theemergence of unfettered individualism*. On the other hand,Marx saw that the modern style of work 'alienated humanbeings from the products of their labour" (Durkheim,1984:ix-xiv). Durkheim disagreed with Spencer that the loss ofsocial regulation would be something to rejoice about; in anycase he did not think this observation of Spencer's was accurate.As for Marx's worry about alienation, Durkheim held that thisphenomenon was only temporary: it could be dealt with by a

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'remoralisation of industry'. Durkheim's own theory of theorganization of modern society is original and very valuable.Its major themes concern moral individualism and justice, thequestion of maladjustment, and the rational use of morality. Ishall briefly outline these here.

Moral Individualism and Justice. As Anthony Giddens pointsout, T h e main sociological problem with which Durkheim wasconcerned in all of his major works (was) the theory of moralauthority*. (1971:478). Durkheim located the moral authority ofthe modern system at least in part in the idea of 'moral individu-alism'. He saw that the development of the individual had comeabout over time. "It is only by historical forces that we candiscover what makes up man, since it is only in the course ofhistory that he is formed" (1960, in Bellah, 1973:150). Paradoxi-cally, the idea of individualism, far from being an expression ofman's natural egoism, is a collective idea - for which themodern individual is beholden to society. Moreover, moral indi-vidualism, or as Durkheim called it, 'the cult of the individual'is, "founded upon sentiments of sympathy for human suffering(and) a desire for equality and for justice" (Giddens, 1971:481)."It involves not the glorification of self-interest but of thewelfare of others" (1971:481).

Continuity in the transition from traditional to modernsociety can be found, Giddens notes, "in the necessary persist-ence of moral ideals and codes of conduct which order thefunctioning of society" (1972:12). So what Durkheim saw in thenineteenth century was not the emancipation of the individualfrom all moral bonds, but simply a new type of moral bonding.This new type was attributable to the division of labour itself."The division of labour gives rise to rules ensuring peaceful andregular cooperation between the functions that have beendivided up". (1984:338) The term 'organic solidarity' whichDurkheim used to describe the bonds of modern society was abiological reference to the way in which the parts of the bodyfunction interdependently. He noted

"If the division of labour produces solidarity, it is notonly because it makes each individual an agent ofexchange, to use the language of the economists. It isbecause it creates between men a whole system of

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rights and duties joining them in a lasting way to oneanother.' (1984:337-338)

Here then is the crucial point: the cohesion of modern society isbased on a moral understanding among people. That under-standing contains both the ideal of moral individualism (forexample, the value of freedom and the value of fulfilling one'sspecial talents) and an acceptance of justice as the correct regu-lator of social interaction. For Durkheim, the source of moralauthority in modern times, as I read it, lies in the legitimationwhich the practice of social justice confers on individualism.Unlike the Natural Rights theorists, such as Locke, who saw theright to freedom and pursuit of happiness as contained intrin-sically within the individual's own nature, Durkheim impliesthat we are entitled to rights because we extend them to others.Individualism is moral because it applies to all: we have to careabout everyone's dignity and worth, not just our own (2).

It seems that once humans had an advanced, complex socialorganisation, an appropriate moral code had to be found. Justas in traditional society myths sprang up to explain the individ-ual's obligations and adherence to group norms, so too inmodern society myths of justice and equality sprang up. AsDurkheim shows, such beliefs are thought to be indisputablytrue, even sacred. An interesting point about the modern moralcode of individualism-and-justice is that it has no real compet-itors: we can speculate that this is the only 'logical' moral codefor modern people. Granted, one major ideology, liberalism,stresses individualism over justice, while the other, socialism,stress justice over individualism, but these two more or lessexhaust the 'respectable' possibilities of the twentieth century. Isuggest that the narrowness of choices reflects our evolutionarymake-up, namely, we are prone to set up equitable systems (3).

Maladjustment and the Rational Use of Morality. The secondimportant contribution which Durkheim makes to an under-standing of the role of morality in the modern age concerns aninterpretation of modern times as a temporary period of malad-justment. The reason why it is temporary is that morality canbecome better organized and more rational. Durkheim wantedmore economic and moral regulation of the factors which haveresulted from the division of labour, such as more careful delin-

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eation of the obligations and relationships among the parts. InLe Socialisme, he noted:

"In the most advanced societies of present-day Europe,production appears to be unrelated to consumptionneeds, ... industrial centralisation seems to have givenbirth to enterprises too large for society to ignore ...[It places the worker] in a state of inferiority whichprevents him from concluding equitable contracts'(1928:169 in Giddens 1972:13-14).

Carmen Sirianni notes of the Division of Labour, "theconclusion of the entire work is that 'more justice' is thesolution to the crisis in the division of labour". (1984:454).Some of the specific suggestions Durkheim made seem unsuit-able today. For example he advocated the formation of 'corpo-rations', somewhat like medieval guilds, to guide therelationship among occupations. However what is important ishis general idea that we can actively create morality. In 'Laconception sociale de la religion', in 1914, he wrote

"The old ideals and the divinities which incarnatethem are dying because they no longer respond suffi-ciently to the new aspirations of our day; and the newideals which are necessary to orient our life are not yetborn. Thus we find ourselves in an intermediate peri-od, a period of moral cold." (1914, in Bellah,I973:xlvii).

Yet, he assures us, there is a 'warmth' in the depths of societyof new moral ideas seeking to come forth. These aspirations andagitations will "one day or another reach a clearer self-consciousness and translate themselves into definite formulasaround which men will rally" (1914, in Bellah, I973:xlvii).Although primitive society may have created its morality uncon-sciously, Durkheim sees no reason why this cannot be doneconsciously. The closing paragraph of The Division of Labourstates:

"In short, our first duty at the present time is to fash-ion a morality for ourselves. It can arise only of itsown volition, gradually, and under the pressure ofinternal causes that render it necessary. Whatreflection can and must do is prescribe the goal thatmust be attained." (1984:340)

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Durkheim was willing to give this role to the state. The divi-sion of labour 'must be infused with moral centres and thesemust be under the general moral guidance of the state*.(Giddens, 1971:481) Durkheim often referred to the state as thebrain of society which gives direction to inchoate forces, in'Leçons de sociologie', he wrote "the state ... is and must be acentre of new and original ideas which must put the society in aposition to conduct itself with greater intelligence than when itis swayed merely by diffuse sentiments working on it".(1950:109-111 in Giddens 1972:21)

I believe that the relative lack of attention paid toDurkheim's ideas on the rational remoralisation of society, mayhave to do with his uncritical faith in the state. Much of poli-tical science and sociology in the twentieth century has identi-fied the state as the cause of, rather than the solution to,society's woes, and the experience of totalitarianism has notdone much to suggest that state officials can be entrusted withthe 'moral guidance' of society. In fact, though, the democraticstate has been the focus for the articulation of social policy, andthe welfare state is the main allocator of economic justice today.In any case, Durkheim's theory of the rational organization ofmorality need not depend on the state: 'remoralisation' could bein the hands of religious leaders or any other interested socialgroup.

Snciobiology and Rational Morality. As outlined earlier, thereare parallels between Durkheim's theory of the origin andnature of morality, and that of sociobiology. I believe thatDurkheim's view of the role of morality in the modern age is alsoone that finds support in sociobiology. Three major points ofThe Division of Labour were summarised above: 1. Social cohe-sion in modern society, that is, organic solidarity, depends onthe presence of moral authority; 2. 'Justice' is the social morali-ty invented by free, modern persons: it demands respect for thewelfare of all individuals; 3. In times of maladjustment, moralitycan become more rational in order to give direction to sociallife. The reasons why a sociobiologist can endorse these are asfollows. First, since we evolved with a strong attachment tomoral authority, it is likely that we would not have shed therelevant psychological traits in the modern age. (Indeed our

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susceptibility to fanaticism may be evidence of this, even thoughwe pride ourselves on being critical of authority.) Second, givena society which divides its labour and has complex systems ofexchange and given our evolved sense of monitoring reciprocity,justice seems to be the most likely system for our cultures todevelop: there are no obvious alternatives.

Third, the sociobiologist would predict the inevitability ofmaladjustments: we evolved in a very simple environment, butmany of our cultural institutions have their own dynamics (forexample the dynamics of technology, of bureaucracy, or of capi-talism) which complicate human social organisation. In times ofmaladjustment why should not morality 'come to the fore' as aguiding system, since its principal function is to channel therelationships among individuals?

If I were asked to name the one most exciting 'scientificdiscovery' of this century, it would be the sociobiologicaldiscovery of the nature of morality. If I were asked to name theone most profound implication of this discovery, it would be -as Durkheim anticipated - that the moral organization ofmodern society is the self-conscious task of responsible individ-uals. Ethical 'answers' need not be sought in any realm ofabstract truth: humans have always created their own moralsystems and will, I presume, be required to continue to do so.Giddens laments that more than a half-century after Durkheim'sdeath 'his analysis of the division of labour and the concept ofmoral authority and individual freedom which he built on it'have not* been fully exploited on a level commensurate withthe subtlety and imagination of their creator* (1971:513). Isubmit that the work of such sociobiologists as Hamilton,Trivers, Wilson, and Alexander may - albeit unwittingly - giveDurkheim's brilliant analysis a new lease of life.

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NOTES

1. I thank Joseph Lopreato for giving me this happy assign-ment. I am indebted to Giddens' 1972 book for the ideaof remoralisation. I thank Eva Etzioni-Halevy forcomments.

2. Henry Shue shows how rights must be correlated withduties in his book (1980) Basic Rights (Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press).

3. In On Human Nature, E.O. Wilson (1978) proposes thatuniversal human rights are a 'mammalian imperative'(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 199).

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