marcelo neves. from legal pluralism to social miscellany

From Legal Pluralism to SocialMiscellany: The Problemof the Lack of Identity of the LegalSphere(s) in Peripheral Modernityand its Implications for Latin America

Marcelo Neves*

Drawing on systems theory, this article offers a criticism of the conventional un-derstanding of legal pluralism in Latin America. It argues that in the context ofLatin American peripheral modernity, the application of the European and NorthAmerican legal pluralist model is a mistake. Pluralism implies an identity-au-tonomy of spheres of extra-state legality in the face of the legalism of the state legalordering. The problem of peripheral modernity resides, rather, in the entanglement ofcodes and criteria from several social fields, impeding the construction of state legal-ity itself. This situation is best captured by the concept of legal and social miscellany.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of the modern nation-state, in contrast with feudal pluralism andin line with the imperial position of the Church, implies a claim of exclusiv-ity of each state legal ordering over its respective delimited territorial space.It is under these circumstances that the classic concept of state sovereigntywas constructed as the supreme and unquestionable political power andlegal order in a certain area. The existence of any other politico-legal or-dering organized or coordinated apart from the state therefore becomesinconceivable within the space where state law is in effect. State sover-eignty attempts to, on the one hand, eliminate the particularities of localfeudal orders in favor of the free trade of the market; on the other hand, itresists the supremacy of the papal power. Internally, every legal orderwhich is constructed in an “extra-state” manner comes to be conceived ofas subordinated to the instructions of state political power, only achieving

* University of Flensburg, Germany.

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legal validity through positive state law and thus intimately being charac-terized as a subsystem of such. Externally, there is a developing theory thatinterstate relations occur in a “state of nature” (see for example Hobbes1992:149; Locke 1980:13-14), excluding the possibility of an internationallegal order organized above the state level.

Legal pluralism arises precisely as a response to the state’s claim toexclusivity. It builds the conception of a concomitance of legal orders in thesame space-time and therefore denies the state’s claim to “omnipotence.”Hence, although it has a claim to scientificity, it has “a quite indispensibleideological burden: the revolt against statism, against the centralization ofpower and against the growth of state functions” (Bobbio 1977a:25.; seealso 1977b:91). Nevertheless, the pluralist positions will assume the mostdiverse perspectives, such that one cannot speak of a single “pluralism.”Evidently, this is not the place for an analysis of the different schools ofpluralism. It is however possible to delineate four basic tendencies of legalpluralism: 1) institutionalist pluralism in opposition to formalist monism; 2)anthropological pluralism in contrast to metropolitan imperialism; 3) socio-logical pluralism in contrast to state legalism; 4) postmodern pluralism.

PLURALIST PERSPECTIVES

One of the most relevant conflicts in the general theory of law was estab-lished in the first half of the century and was between Germanic formalistmonism and the institutionalist pluralism that was primarily developed inItaly. The discussion had well-defined epistemological grounds. The mo-nists argued for fundamental norms, which resulted in the unity of thelegal system. The notion of the absolute predominance of the state legalordering did not necessarily develop at this time. The question of the pri-macy of “international” law or “national” law depends, for Kelsen, on apreviously accepted “ideological” alternative that is considered “legally”irrelevant (Kelsen 1960:333-45; 1979a:448-62; 1979b:156-73). Even Verdrossbarely admitted the primacy of the international order, characterizing thesovereignty of the state as “relative,” based on a moderated monism thatdistinguishes internal validity from the international validity of Interna-tional Public Law (Verdross 1957:69s). Furthermore, though not “statists,”the entire notion of the Pure Theory of Law comes from the unity of thelegal order, which can only be comprehensible on an epistemological levelby tracing back to a (single) presupposed fundamental norm (see for ex-ample Kelsen 1960:200ff.; Bobbio 1960:51ff.).1

1 In later qualifying the fundamental norm as fictitious, Kelsen will deny it the role of hypothesis

127FROM LEGAL PLURALISM TO SOCIAL MISCELLANY

Institutionalist pluralism denies the supra-infra arrangement betweenthe legal order of the state and non-state orders, and defends the thesisthat these are coordinated orderings (see, among others, Anzilotti 1964:51-63; Romano 1975:83-84; Triepel, 1966:9-27). In this line of thought, legalspheres are differentiated by their themes or by whom they are address-ing, not only in what is referred to as the relationship between interna-tional and “national” legal orders, but also in the relationship between ex-tra-state orderings which act in the internal realm of the state. In contrastwith the formal inter-normative connection that is the basis of monism, inthe final analysis the plural orders distinguish themselves by their specificspheres of influence, concomitant in the same space. They therefore re-spond to the unilateralism of the formal unity of the starting points withthe unilateralism of the material plurality of inter-subjective relationships,without acknowledging that formal unity and material plurality are notmutually exclusive. This, however, is not the line of discussion that directlyinterests us in the present context.

Another form of the manifestation of legal pluralism that is less de-bated among jurists is that which developed in the anthropology of colo-nial relations, in opposition to the imperial claim to “modern” law originat-ing in the metropolis and established in the colony. The pluralism ofprimitive or native traditional orders is thereby affirmed to be alreadyconsolidated in the face of the colonial or post-colonial legal ordering (seeBenda-Beckmann 1979; Heidelberg 1968; Trubek 1972:16ff.). In this con-text, one seeks to analyze the complementary and conflictive relations es-tablished between different systems and also to criticize the ethnocentricmodel of the “civilized” colonizer.

But it is in sociology of law that pluralism takes a position of promi-nence. The discipline itself is initially confused with the pluralist approachto law (Bobbio 1977b:91; also see Carbonier 1976:12-16). The thematic dis-cussion focuses on the plurality of “sources” of the social production oflaw, which are much broader than those of the state. An anti-legalism wasthereby developed in opposition to the exclusivist claim of positive statelaw. It aims to recognize the autonomy of other legal spheres in the face ofthe state. The legal pluralism of a sociological origin is undeniably ideo-logically linked in a contradictory fashion to radical liberalism and liberatorysocialism (Bobbio 1977b:91). The distrust of state power and legality asmechanisms of social emancipation leads to a discourse that overestimatesthe “legal force” of extra-state “legal spheres.” Empirically, the autonomy

(1979c:206ff.).

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and regular functioning of the state order within its respective territorialspace is not denied. It is maintained that the state is inter-related withother autonomous “legal fields,” which it tends to stifle through the legal-ist position of the official operators of law. Therefore, legalism is attackedas a type of state legal hypertrophy, to the detriment of the construction ofautonomous legal spheres in the bosom of “civil society.”

In the Euro-North American tradition of the sociology of law, legalalternativism arises as a product of pluralism.2 Similarly, it affirms the ex-istence of other spheres of legality that clearly distinguish themselves fromthe state. The self-reproducing capacity of positive state law is not denied.Its identity and operational autonomy are presupposed. Hence, there is nodiscussion of whether positivity, and legality specifically, exist. On the con-trary, the state’s legalizing legalism is critiqued for not responding ad-equately to society’s expectations. The “alternative legal forms” arise pre-cisely as a reaction to problems of hetero-reference, or to the adequacy ofpositive state law in the event of the excess of legalizing legalism. As such,it does not deal with the lack of access to legal mechanisms, but rather tooptions contrary to those mechanisms.

The most recent tendency of legal pluralism is developed in the realmof postmodern theories of law. It arises from the denial of the possibility ofthe universalization or generalization of legal discourse in the space ofpostmodernity. The lack of unifying paradigms concerning legal questionsleads to a “legal culture of uncertainty” regarding the resolution of con-flicts (Ladeur 1985:423; see also 1990, 1991, 1992). This is where the notionof thematic legal rationality, which is constructed through “local dogmat-ics,” comes from. In this context, law is presented as a driving mechanismof the “autonomy of context” (Teubner and Willke 1984.; see also Teubner1982, 1988, 1989:81ff.) or as a guide to the “relational networks” betweenthematic systems of action, without acting indecisively in the establishmentof limits to the development and reproduction of the same (Ladeur 1990).

The pluralist tendency in legal postmodernism takes on very specificforms in the distinction—formulated by Teubner—between autopoietic law,semi-autonomous law and socially diffuse law (see Teubner 1989:49ff., es-pecially the provocative table on page 50; 1987a:106ff. – the same table onpage 108 -, 1987b:432ff.). This originates from the notion that autopoieticlegal systems are constituted by the inter-connections between systemiccomponents: knowledge, legal procedures (process), legal acts (element),

2 With regard to this, see Blankenburg, Klausa and Rottleuthner (orgs.), 1980; specifically onalternatives to judicial procedure, Nader, 1980; Cappelletti and Garth 1981:14-20.


legal norms (structure) and legal dogma (identity). In the case of semi-autonomous law, there is a self-referential aspect to the respective systemiccomponents that does not, however, emerge from the hyper-cyclical unionbetween them. Or rather, there is the self-referential (re)production of le-gal acts among themselves, of procedures among themselves, or argumentsand dogmatic propositions among themselves, but these different systemiccomponents do not become intertwined in an autopoietic hyper-cycle. Fi-nally, we have socially diffuse law, in which the systemic components areproduced without legal differentiation, or rather, simply as conflict (pro-cess), action (element), social norms (structure) and worldview (identity).In distinguishing these three types of constitution and (re)production ofcomponents of the legal system, Teubner is taken to the following dilemma:in dealing with the very realm of validity, how does one resolve conflictsbetween the three different systemic types of law? He responds with theconcept of inter-systemic collision law (Teubner 1989:123ff.), which includeseven “the conflict between the state legal order and plural quasi-legal socialorders” (Teubner 1989:135-38). Nevertheless, the question remains: does in-ter-systemic collision law constitute an autopoietic system, a semi-autono-mous legal order, or socially diffuse law? If it is treated as one of the lattertwo forms, strictly speaking there would be no autopoietic law. If on thecontrary it was characterized as autopoietic law, there would not exactlybe semi-autonomous or socially diffuse law.3

Ladeur’s pluralism seems more coherent with the postmodern para-digm. It emerges from the constitutive character of disorder for “reflection”(abwägung) as a legal paradigm (Ladeur 1983:478). Nevertheless, he maintainsthe concept of autopoiesis. It is situationally interpreted as coming from the“growing heterogeneity and differentiation of the arenas of social and admin-istrative action” (Ladeur 1986:273), demanding a situational-thematic applica-tion of law (“reflection”) (Ladeur 1983:472; see also 1984: esp. 205ff.); it isnot denied: the autopoietic reproduction is realized in terms of a “locallogic” for the dogma. There would hardly be a pluralization of autopoiesis.

FROM LEGAL PLURALISM TO SOCIAL MISCELLANY

All of the lines of legal pluralism had their origins and developed in aEuro-continental and Anglo-American context. Its reception in the Latin

3 Later, in dealing with the collision between discursive fields, Teubner formulates the questionin a different way: he starts from the concept of re-entry (Spencer Brown 1971:56ff. and 69ff.)to assert that the law or discourse of collision is inserted into the respective legal spheres whichfind themselves in collision (1996:907ff.).

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American countries constituted one more version of the difficulty to achievea suitable re-reading and reconstruction of the models elaborated in the“core countries” by the theories of law pointing toward an analysis of thelegal reality of the “peripheral countries.”

Taking into account here specifically legal sociological and postmo-dernist pluralism, it seems a serious mistake to apply them in an unre-stricted manner to the Latin American reality. Let us start from the follow-ing hypothesis: in the reality of the affluent Western countries, pluralismpresupposes a self-reproduction that is operationally consistent with posi-tive state law. This [pluralism] would construct its own identity as a fieldof autonomous legality. As a counter weight to this, diffuse social struc-tures would arise with a thematic congruence of normative expectations.These plural orders would construct their own identity that clearly differen-tiates them from “official law.” Although the inter-penetrations and inter-ference between the positive state order and diffusely constructed lawsare not denied, the obstructive and destructive entanglement between thesefields of legality is greater than imagined.

It is precisely this problem of the obstructive and destructive en-tanglement between state legality and “socially diffuse laws” that impedesthe reception of the Euro-North American pluralist model into the legalsituation of Latin America. On the plane of legal concretion, in our realityas typically “peripheral” countries, the operational borders of the field ofpositive state law are not delineated in the face of supposed areas of extra-state legality. The mutually destructive relations mean operational indis-tinctness of the different spheres of legality. Hence, there emerges a miscel-lany of legal codes and criteria.

However, the question becomes more complicated when we considerthe different social systems, especially the economy and power. It has beenobserved that the codes and criteria of possession and power act signifi-cantly as “intra-structural” conditions or environments of reproduction ofthe legal system. Rather, they act as obstructive and destructive injunctionsagainst the process of autonomous production and the identity construc-tion of law(s). It is because of this that there is an insufficient operationaldisentanglement of the economic, political and legal spheres, among oth-ers, such that the situation is no longer simply one of legal miscellany, butprimarily as a social miscellany of codes and criteria of conduct. In order tobetter comprehend the problem, therefore, I propose a characterization,albeit brief, of “peripheral modernity” as “negative modernity.”


PERIPHERAL MODERNITY AS NEGATIVE MODERNITY

When I attempt to distinguish the legal problems of “peripheral moder-nity” from those in which “core (or postmodern) modernity” is involved, Ido not use the simplifying, ideologizing form of the “core-peripheral” modelfrom the exploitation theories of the 1960s and 1970s (Neves 1992a:72ff.,1991:158s.). I refer back to this dichotomy mainly to emphasize that it dealswith one and the same world society,4 not with traditional societies versusmodern societies, as if the differentiated levels of social development werea matter of “before and after.” I depart from the contention that the adventof modern society is closely linked to profound economic inequality in in-ter-regional development (see for example Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979),bringing significant consequences in the reproduction of all social systems,principally the political and legal (Luhmann 1986b:168). It is clear that thisdeals closely with the concepts of ideal types in the Weberian sense which—as “conceptual utopias”—are never found in a pure form in social reality,serving rather as a framework for its interpretation with unilateral empha-sis on certain elements which are more relevant to this approach (Weber1988:190s.). I am not, however, unaware of the fact that today’s world so-ciety is multifaceted and allows for the application of the “core and periph-ery” framework on several levels (see for example Galtung 1972:35ff.;Wallerstein 1979:50ff.; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979:158; Senghaas 1974:21).Neither should one be unaware of the fact that the recent developments inworld society point in the direction of a mobility in the positions of coreand periphery (Luhmann 1998:377 or 2000:224), and one can also observetendencies toward a paradoxical peripheralization of the core (Neves1998:153ff.). It therefore seems to me that the distinction between coremodernity and peripheral modernity is analytically fruitful to the extentthat—defined as a social complexity and a disappearance of a material ethicwhich is valid for all spheres of action as characteristics of modernity—itstates that, in certain state-delimited regions (peripheral countries), therewas never any sufficient realization of an autonomous system in accor-dance with the principle of functional differentiation, nor even the creationof an inter-subjective autonomous sphere founded on an institutional gen-eralization of citizenship, characteristics (at least apparently) of other state-organized regions (core countries) (see for example Neves 1992a:16s. and

4 On modern society as “world society,” see Luhmann 1975, 1993:571s., 1997:145-71; Luhmannand De Giorgi 1992:45-54; Heintz 1982. From another perspective, Wallerstein (1979:47ff.)speaks of capitalism as a “world system.” For a critique of this last concept, see Luhmann1997:158ff.

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75-81, 1991). The existence of different degrees of functional differentia-tion demanded by social complexity, and with regard to the construction ofcitizenship as a requisite for the disappearance of the pre-modern hierar-chic-material ethic, does not invalidate the analytical potential of the con-cepts of core modernity and peripheral modernity, but rather points totheir role as a structure of the cognitive selection of social theory.5 Thesewarnings aside, peripheral modernity can be characterized as “negativemodernity,” based as much on the systemic perspective as on the modelwith an ethical-procedural claim.

According to systems theory, modern society is the result of socialhyper-complication linked to the functional differentiation of the spheresof action and living. It would thus imply the disappearance of the moralcontents effective for all communications connections and the emergenceof operationally autonomous social systems, reproduced based on theirown codes and criteria, although conditioned by their surrounding envi-ronment (autopoiesis) (see above all Luhmann 1987b). In peripheral mo-dernity, the social hyper-complexification and the transcendence of “mor-alism” as a basis for hierarchical differentiation, were not followed by theconstruction of social systems that, although interpenetrating and even in-terfering, could construct themselves autonomously in their specific topos.This puts us before a destructured and destructuring complexity. This leadsto social problems which are much more complicated than those which char-acterize the “core modernity” countries. The relations between the “fields”of action assume self-destructive and hetero-destructive forms whose con-sequences we all well know. Hence, modernity is not construed positively,as the triumph over tradition through the emergence of autonomous sys-tems of action, but rather negatively as a de-aggregating hyper-complexification of traditional hierarchical moralism.

According to the ethical-procedural notion proposed by Habermas,modernity comes from the evolution of the moral conscience in the sense ofa transcendence of pre-conventional and conventional structures and theadvent of a post-conventional ethic (Habermas 1982a:12ff., 1983:127ff.). Thismeans a clear differentiation between system and “life world,”6 which, asthe space of intermediation for “rational means-ends action” (instrumental

5 Moreover, it seems to me theoretically irresponsible to be unaware of—in the name of the label“globalization” and the idea of a borderless modern world—the enormous differences in socialand legal reproduction in the countries of Latin America, Africa, most of Asia and part of Eu-rope, especially Eastern Europe, in relation to those of the developed democracies of WesternEurope and North America.

6 This differentiation is defined by Habermas, 1982bII:229ff., as a process of social evolution.


and strategic), is also the horizon of “communicative action” oriented inthe search for inter-subjective understanding.7 In this perspective, moder-nity positively demands the construction of a “public sphere” (Öffentlichkeit),a democratic topos which is discursively autonomous with relation to thesystemic “media” of “power” and “money.” This “normative” claim, de-spite finding indications of “core modernity,” does not seem to find theleast basis in social relations of “peripheral modernity.” Here, modernity isnegatively construed as the disaggregation of the conventional (and eventhe pre-conventional) moral conscience, without producing a structuring ofa post-conventional moral conscience and much less the autonomy of a “pub-lic sphere.”

The same is true if we start from the fragmentary concept of post-modernity, for even in this construction the peripheral countries have anegative sense. The principle theories of post-modernity developed as acounter-weight to generalized systemic rationality and universal reason—the notion of thematic rationality. Such a situation would imply inter-con-nections of (de)constructive uncertainties between thematic systems ofcommunication (Ladeur 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992). In the case of peripheral(post)modernity, the inter-relations between the fields of action tend un-predictably toward obstructive and destructive entanglements.

Consequently, we do not attempt to take from the miscellany of so-cial codes or criteria manifested in the modern peripheral countries, aninterpretation of contemporary society such as proposed by Bruno Latourin his book, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes (1997). Latour starts from anenlightenment conception of modernity to show that such a concept is in-adequate for a comprehension of modern society. Working with the notionof “networks,” he emphasizes the mixture of nature, culture and power(1997:10ff.). In this way, he also rejects the disentanglement of law, powerand knowledge to which Lefort refers in his reconstruction of human rightsas a dimension of democratic invention (Lefort 1981:64). The fact is thatLatour scorns notions of differentiation and autonomy within domains of

7 In this regard, see, in different phases of development of the “theory of communicative action,”Habermas 1969:62-65, 1973:9ff., 1982bI: esp. 384ff.,1982bII:182ff., 1986, 1988a:68ff. WhenI refer to the system as an intermediation space with regard to goal-rational action, I am notunaware of the fact that, in the Habermasian model, the systemic plane and the sphere ofaction are clearly distinguished, having a meaning based on the notion of systemic rationality:“Changes in the state of a self-regulated system can be understood as quasi-actions, as if asubject’s capacity for action were manifested in them” (Habermas 1982a:261). Yet it is undeni-able that, in Habermas’ work, the notion of system is closely linked to the goal-seeking rational-ity and, therefore, the concepts of instrumental and strategic action (see for example 1969:63-65, 1982a:261, 1986:578s.)—while a conception of the “life world”—are intimately associatedwith communicative action (see for example, 1982bII: esp. 182, 1986: esp. 593).

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communication because he is working from a mistaken conception of thespheres of action. Yet when he speaks of operative autonomy, he is not un-aware of the inter-penetrations, structural linkages, irritations and inter-ference between different social systems. It is unacceptable to also be un-aware of the inter-linkages that strengthen heterogeneity or plurality incommunicative fields. Still, what we attempt to point out, in contrast withLatour, is that which—for a problem which is internal to modernity—ap-pears crucial in certain regions of the earthly globe: the increase in socialcomplexity and the dissolution of traditional pre-modern moralism with-out a sufficient differentiation or autonomy of the spheres of action. In thiscontext, we need not speak of “networks,” “mixtures” or hybrids in Latour’ssense, but rather of destructive entanglements.

THE LACK OF AUTONOMY-IDENTITY OF THE LEGALSPHERE(S) IN LATIN AMERICAN PERIPHERAL MODERNITY

This situation of social miscellany implies difficulties in the identity con-struction of sphere(s) of legality, which directly results in the lack of au-tonomy of the respective social connection(s) of action. Before treating theproblem of Latin American peripheral modernity, I will briefly consider thethree paradigmatic models of the autonomy of law: systemic, ethical-pro-cedural and postmodern.

The question of the autonomy of law has been treated in the mostradical way by systems theory. In this perspective, the positivity of law isdefined as “self-determining” of law, that is, the operational autonomy ofthe legal system in relation to its “environmental” determinations (Luhmann1988, 1983b, 1985, 1981a:419ff., 1993:38ff.; Neves 1992a:34ff.). It thereforereconstructs the concept of “autopoiesis,” originally from biological theory(Maturana and Varela 1980:73ff., 1987: esp. 55-60; Maturana 1982: esp. 141s.,157ff., 279s.),8 and affirms that positive (modern) law reproduces itself pri-marily in accordance with its own criteria and codes of preference (legal/illegal) (Luhmann 1986a, 1993:165ff.). Hence in relation to other differenti-ated social systems, here one does not deal with autarchy, (quasi-) environ-mental privation (Luhmann 1983a:69; Teubner 1982:20). Law is seen as “a

8 Regarding the sociological reconstruction, see above all Luhmann 1987b; Haferkamp andSchmid (orgs.) 1987; Baecker et al. (orgs.) 1987: esp. 394ff.; Teubner and Febrajo (orgs.)1992.For a critique of the social scientific reception of the concept of autopoiesis, Bühl 1989, withspecial reference to the Luhmannian paradigm (229ff.); and for a more embracing perspectiveon Luhmann’s systems theory, Krawietz and Welker (orgs.) 1992. For a critical reading basedon the discourse theory, Habermas 1988b:426ff., 1988a:30s. Defining autopoiesis as an ideo-logically conservative paradigm, Zolo 1986. In another context, see. Neves1992b.


closed normative system, but cognitively open” (Luhmann 1983b:139). Atthe same time that positive law factors in self-reference through concepts,it constructs its hetero-reference through the assimilation of interests(Luhmann 1990a:10; 1993:393ff.). The self-referential closure, the normativityfor the legal system, does not in itself constitute the finality of the system,but rather a condition of aperture (Luhmann 1993:76, 1987b:606, 1997:68).

In this context, the legal system can assimilate—in accordance withits own criteria—the environmental factors, without being directly influ-enced by those factors. The legal validity of normative expectations is notimmediately determined by economic interests, political criteria, ethicalrepresentations, nor even scientific propositions (Luhmann 1990b:593s. and663s., 1985:17); it depends on selective processes of conceptual filtrationfrom within the legal system.9

Especially on this point, there emerge divergences between Luh-mann’s theory of positivity and the ethical-procedural conception of lawproposed by Habermas. For Luhmann, positivity is inherent not merely inthe suppression of immediate determinations of law by political interests,wills and criteria of “owners of power,” but also in the moral neutraliza-tion of the legal system. Habermas recognizes that the borders betweenlaw and morality exist, considering that the unregulated procedural ratio-nality of moral discourse is incomplete, and that it is lacking the existenceof a third element (Unbeteiligte) charged with deciding questions among theparts (Habermas 1992:565). Yet, although he does not deny the autonomyof the legal system, he attributes to it an ethical basis: “A legal systemacquires autonomy not merely for itself. It is autonomous only to the ex-tent that institutionalized procedures for legislation or jurisdiction guaran-tee the impartial formation of judgment and will, and in this way providesan ethical-procedural rationality with equal entry to law and politics. Thereis no legal autonomy without real democracy” (Habermas 1987:16; alongthese lines, see also 1992: esp. 571ff.). In this sense, he maintains that posi-tivism does not mean the elimination of founding problems of justification,but rather the dislocation of such problems (Habermas 1982bII:354). Thisimplies private autonomy in connection with public autonomy, meaningthat human rights and a people’s sovereignty reciprocally presuppose oneanother (Habermas 1992:111ff.).

9 “External developments,” Teubner (1982:21) emphasizes, “are neither ignored nor directlyconverted (in accordance with the ‘stimulus-response’ model) into internal effects, but ratherfiltered and adapted to the legal structures, according to their own criteria of selectivity.” In thissense, the same author warns that “Autonomy of law refers to the circularity of its self-repro-duction and not to its causal independence from its environment” (1989:47). Hence, it is not

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Postmodern theories will also not distance themselves from the legalsystem’s demand for autonomy. They therefore seek to make the autopoiesisof law compatible with other systems—part of society (Teubner 1988:46ff.,1989:88ff.). Or, as I mentioned above, they argue for an autopoietic plural-ity (Ladeur). In this last conception, in place of a systemic rationality origi-nating from a congruent generalization of normative expectations (Luhmann1987a:94-106), a legal rationality would result from the thematic congru-ence of normative expectations.

The transplanting of any of these conceptions of the autonomy of lawto Latin American peripheral modernity is, in an empirical perspective, sus-ceptible to critiques and restrictions. In this context, while autonomy canbe considered as a “normative,” “systemic” or “thematic” demand, it can-not be affirmed on the plane of normative-legal concretization.

In what I said with respect to the ethical-procedural theory, I alreadyobserved (see item 4) that the disaggregation of the primitive pre-conven-tional ethic did not, in peripheral modernity, lead to the construction anddevelopment of a post-conventional moral conscience. That is why the le-gal system’s founding ethic of non-transferability (indisponibilidade) andimpartiality—at odds with its systemic instrumentality (Habermas 1992:583 ff., 1987)—finds no space in the inter-subjective relations of law. Thetendency is toward the political instrumentalization of law, either throughthe casuistic mutation of normative structures—primarily during autho-rized periods—or through the interplay of obstructive individualistic in-terests in the process of normative concretization. In this context, privateautonomy (“human rights”) and public autonomy (“popular sovereignty”)–although generally declared in the constitutional text—are rejected throughthe mechanisms of political destructuring in the process whereby the Con-stitution is made a concrete reality.

In the same way, the Luhmannian autopoietic model of legal reality isnon-transferable to Latin American peripheral modernity. The political andeconomic codes’ individualistic suppositions on legal questions make theconstruction of the legal system’s identity impossible. In the place ofautopoiesis is the alopoiesis of law (Neves 1992b, 1992a: esp. 81ff. and 182ff.,1991:163s., 1994a:113ff.). This means that no sphere of legality emerges whichis, according to its own criteria and in a congruently generalized way, ca-pable of recycling the influences gleaned from its economic and politicalcontext, such as “good relations.” The entanglement of legal code(s) withother social codes acts self-destructively and hetero-destructively. The prob-

about causal isolation (Luhmann 1997:68 and 94, 1995a:15, 1993:43s., 1991:13).


lem does not primarily reside in the lack of a cognitive aperture (hetero-reference or adaptation), but rather in the insufficient operational closing(self-reference), which complicates the construction of the legal system’svery identity. If this identity can eventually be seen on the structural planeof normative texts, it is gradually destroyed during a process of legal con-cretization.10 As such, to a great extent, a congruent generalization of nor-mative expectations is not constructed based on constitutional and legaltexts. That is why the very distinction between legal and illegal is sociallyobscured, due to the lack of institutionalization (consensus) or identifica-tion in the sense of norms.11 The most serious consequence of this is de-structive uncertainty in conflict of interest relations.

The last recourse is to affirm the autonomy/identity of legal spheresof action in the postmodern perspective of law. Nevertheless, in this caselegal rationality is pre-supposedly based on the thematic congruence ofnormative expectations, as well as on the de(constructive) compatibility ofdissent between local systems of action. It is precisely this self-destructiveincongruence of normative expectations and the hetero-destructive incom-patibilities of dissent between fields of action that impede the constructionof identity in the legal sphere(s) of legality in Latin American peripheralmodernity. In this sense, the entanglements between the legal domain andother spheres of communication, which become problematic in the LatinAmerican social context, are not postmodern “entanglements”(Verflechtugen) in Wolfgang Welsch’s sense, as this last concept points to-ward an inter-linkage which strengthens discursive heterogeneity and,therefore, toward the identity of the respective discourses involved (Welsch1996: esp. 48, 434s., 754ff.). The ambivalence surrounding entanglementsand plurality in Welsch’s conceptual paradigm is the expression of a “trans-versal reason” which is in this respect oriented toward heterogeneity andemphasizes dissent (Welsch 1996: esp. 937, 1991:179s). In the legal realm,one can speak of a transversal justice, which imports a sensitive law intodiscursive heterogeneity. On the other hand, the entanglements betweenlaw and other spheres of communication in peripheral modernity are self-destructive and hetero-destructive entanglements, affecting autonomy/identity

10 The Kelsenian concept of the self-production of law (1960: esp. 73, 228 and 283) belongs tothe hierarchical structural plane of the normative-legal ordering. Therefore, in contrast to whatOst (1986:141-44) proposes, it must not be linked to the autopoietic paradigm, which refersprimarily to the operational dimension and the circularity of the reproduction of law. This is whythe first can be abstractly transported to different states, while the second demands certainconcrete social conditions.

11 The institutionalization and identification of meaning, aside from normatization, are defined byLuhmann, 1987a:94ff., as mechanisms of the generalization of law.

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of the respective discourses and, in this way, damaging discursive hetero-geneity. In this context, there is a social and legal melting pot which does notmerely imply the structural uncertainty of positive modern law—an impor-tant factor in legal development—but rather an enormous destructive un-certainty with relation to the normative expectations in a super-complexsociety.

THE ERRORS OF PLURALISM IN ITS APPROACHTO LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL REALITY

In the context of Latin American peripheral modernity, it seems to me thatthe application of the European and North American legal pluralist modelis a mistake. As I observed above, pluralism implies an identity-autonomyof spheres of extra-state legality in the face of the legalism of the state legalordering. This means the existence of legal orders constructed in reactionto a legal system which, with a claim to generality, rigidly reproduces itselfwithout sufficiently corresponding to the expectations and interests of cer-tain spaces of inter-subjective, legally relevant relations. The problem ofperipheral modernity resides, rather, in the entanglement of codes and cri-teria from several social fields, impeding the construction of state legalityitself.

Yet the pluralist approach continues to fascinate students of the LatinAmerican legal reality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, one of the pioneeringand paradigmatic authors in studying the situation of conflict and interestresolution, argues from typically pluralist conceptions: the anthropologi-cal, the alternative sociological, and the postmodern.

Anthropological pluralism is utilized when, in spite of the recogni-tion of differences, the existing pluralism in the relationship between primi-tive or traditional native law(s) and the modern law of the colonizer ispositively compared with the relationship between the state legal orderand the models of conflict resolution developed by the slum dwellers(favelados) (Sousa Santos 1988:58). The fact that the process of colonizationalready encounters stable and rigidly consolidated structures operating inthe regulation of conduct and in the assertion of normative expectationshas gone unnoticed. The respective primitive or traditional orders—evi-dently with a strong tenor of moralization—as a rule affirm the strongidentity in the presence of “modern” law imposed by the metropolis, withconflicts arising primarily from the natives’ rejection of their integrationinto the order imposed by the metropolis and, hence, of renunciation oftheir identity. In the example of the slum dwellers’ order, the construction


and development of extra-state mechanisms of conflict and interest resolu-tion or neutralization, imports unstable and diffuse ways of reacting to thelack of access to the benefits and advantages of the state legal system, whichis incapable of generalization to the point of including the entire popula-tion. That is why, in the relation between the codes and criteria of therespective orders, discursive entanglements emerge which, while able toexpress both conflicting and conciliatory relations, constitute mechanismswhich are symptomatic of the insufficient identity of the respective spheresof action.

Sousa Santos’ position is even more emphatic in linking certain ex-amples of alternative pluralism of social phenomena that he researched inBrazil in the 1970s with tendencies toward romanticizing: 1) in direct rela-tion to the low degree of “institutionalization” (differentiation) of the legalfunction and with a limited availability of coercive means, the unofficiallaw of the favelas has a broader rhetorical space than that of state law(1988:43-61); 2) the first is an “accessible,” “participatory” and “consen-sual” law (1977:96ff.); 3) it is comparable to Soviet law and other revolu-tionary experiences, defined as alternatives to official bourgeois law(1988:77), and offers “great potential for the revolutionary use” of law:“alternative legality” for the exploited classes (1977:103). In synthesis, heasserts that social processes of legal pluralism develop as an “alternative”to legalism (1977:89ff., 1988:25).12

The indisputable fact that within Latin American peripheral moder-nity, many “social units” diffusely prescribe different legal codes13 doesnot, strictly speaking, imply pluralist alternatives to the legalist functioningof state law, but rather unstable and diffuse mechanisms in reaction to theabsence of law. This is not, properly speaking, about the construction of athematic legal identity in the face of the dissatisfaction with the rigidity ofthe consistent reproduction of the identity of the legal system to whichthere is access. In the example of the slum dwellers’ associations in largeLatin American cities, one of the diffuse and unstable “survival strategies”is developed14 in the legal field. It is true that such strategies act as an“ethical-social discourse” (Sousa Santos 1988:25). Yet, although lacking rigidsystemic limits to the utilization of discursive media, it does not seem to

12 I would like to emphasize that I in no way intend to imply that these advances in the alternativelaw movement developed primarily in the early 1990s in Brazil. The variety of approaches andtendencies would require a more specific study. For a panorama, see Arruda Jr. (org.) 1991,1992.

13 Sousa Santos (1980:116) uses the expression “possessive privatization of law.”14 With respect to this notion, see Rabanal 1990: esp. 152ff., counter-posing it to the autonomy

of personality (Evers 1987).

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me that one can from there necessarily infer that these strategies dispose ofa greater rhetorical space. In the first place, it should be observed that theeconomic codes (possession) and political codes (power) act directly, that isto say, without the filters of an autonomous legal discourse on the mecha-nisms of conflict resolution. It is also fitting to consider that the “survivalstrategies” presuppose situations of individuals’ pressing needs and, hence,“barely differentiated personalities with weak ego-structures and limita-tions in the linguistic code and symbolizational ability” (Rabanal 1990:30),15

evidently hampering the broadening of the discursive resources of convic-tion and persuasion.16 Finally, one cannot be unaware of the empirical stud-ies on the use of violence: the “rhetorical procedures” of housing associa-tions are linked to the coercive media of “gangs” and the problem iscomplicated to the extent that the illegal activity of the police is mixed withthe interplay of marginal violence (see for example, Junqueira and Rodrigues1988: esp. 134ff. and 137ff.). In synthesis, contrary to the pluralist alterna-tive to legalism, it is rather an entanglement between the absence of legal-ity and the “survival strategies” of the legal field. Rabanal, in a psycho-social perspective, interprets the problem as coming from “a fundamentalcontradiction: the violation of legality with the goal of achieving legality”(1990:20). It does not seem to me that this integrationist consciousness nec-essarily exists in the realm of “survival strategies.” Yet it is possible toaffirm that they only construct and broaden themselves due to the lack of alegality which includes a generalization of positive law.

Later, Sousa Santos plunges into the post-modernist wave, distanc-ing himself from the revolutionary pluralism of the 1970s. “Interlegality”and pluralism come to be conceived as two “key concepts” in a postmoderntheory of law (1987:297s.). Yet it is evident that, in the context of LatinAmerican peripheral modernity, one cannot speak of legal pluralism in thepostmodern sense, as it lacks not merely self-referential linkages, but alsothe placement of thematically developed legal communications. This is theconfusion of diffusely constructed and applied legal codes, but also of theentanglements of these with the codes of power, economy, family, friend-ship and “good relations.” That is why the supposed legal rationality ofpost-modernity, which promotes (de)constructive uncertainty, is not trans-posed to the miscellany of social fields that are developed among us. Hence,

15 Nevertheless, Rabanal emphasizes that such a “postulate” can lead to “superficial generaliza-tions” if not revised “within a frame of reference of a critical discussion on society” and if it doesnot take into consideration the respective individuals’ biographical information (1990:30).

16 On the distinction between conviction (“universal audience”) and persuasion (“private audi-ence”), see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988:34ff.


in a context of “marginalizations” and privileges, the models of conflictresolution or neutralization produce an extreme, destructive insecurity, themaintenance of which is contradictorily linked with the conservation ofprivileges and, hence, is above all prejudicial for the socially “deficient.”For this reason, in such conditions of lack of identity and autonomy in thesphere(s) of legality, “legal pluralism as an alternative to legalism,” “the-matic legal rationality,” among others, can be transformed into ideologicalexpressions or myths which lead rather to errors in the explication andtranscendence of the problem (Neves, 1992a:102s., 165s., 191).17

BETWEEN SUB-INTEGRATION AND SUPER-INTEGRATION:CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

One of the most problematic variables in the difficulty of the identity con-struction of the sphere(s) of legality in Latin American peripheral moder-nity is the generalization of relations of sub-integration and super-integra-tion. In this case, inclusion is not realized as simultaneous access to anddependence on positive law (for more on this subject, see Neves 1994b,1992a:94ff. and 155ff.).18

On the side of the sub-integrated, concrete relations are generalizedin which they do not have access to the benefits of the legal ordering, butdepend on their uncertain prescriptions. Hence, the sub-citizens are notexcluded. Nevertheless, they lack the real conditions to exercise their con-stitutionally declared fundamental rights, and are not liberated from thedemands and responsibilities imposed by the coercive state apparatus, radi-cally subjecting them to its punitive structures. Fundamental rights do notperform any relevant role on the horizon of action and existence, not evenwith regard to identification of the meaning of the respective constitutionalnorms. For the sub-integrated, the constitutional apparatuses have relevancealmost exclusively in their restrictive effects on liberties. And this mattersfor the legal system as a whole: the members of the “marginalized” popu-

17 I would like to point out here that in the core article of this issue of Beyond Law, Mauricio Garcíaand César Rodriguez, who are linked to the paradigm of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, con-struct a more complex model with regard to the “plurality, instrumental inefficacy andauthoritarianism” trichotomy as characteristic of the legal field (in Bourdieu’s sense of the term)in Latin America, preferring, more cautiously, the expression “legal plurality” to the term “legalpluralism.” It should also be noted that, in his previous publications, even Sousa Santos (1995)without a doubt presents a more complex model of the social theory of law, distancing himselfto a certain extent from some of the simplifications found in his first works.

18 In the utilization of concepts of sub-integration and super-integration, I am joined by Müller1997:47ff. (esp. 49ff.), 2001: esp. 78s.; Brunkhorst 2000:265ff., 2001:618, 2002:125ff. and165ff. See also O’Donnell 1999:312 and 332, footnote 47.

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lar classes (the majority of the population) are integrated into the system—strictly speaking—as debtors, accused, denounced, defendants, condemned,etc., not as rights-holders, creditors or actors. Hence, in the constitutionalfield, the problem of sub-integration gains a special meaning, in that theoffenses to the fundamental rights of the members of the popular classesare mainly practiced in the framework of the repressive activity of the stateapparatus.19

The sub-integration of the masses is inseparable from the super-inte-gration of privileged groups which, mainly with the support of the statebureaucracy, develop their actions to obstruct the reproduction of law. It istrue that the super-citizens regularly utilize the democratic constitutionaltext—in principle, ever since it became favorable to their interests and/orfor the protection of the “social order.” Nonetheless, the constitution tendsto be put aside as soon as it imposes limits on their sphere of political andeconomic action. It does not, therefore, act as a horizon of legal-politicalaction and existence for the “owners of power,” but rather as an offer that,in agreement with the eventual constellation of interests, will be used, un-used or abused by them. That being the case, the guarantee of impunity isone of the characteristic traits of super-citizenship.20

The so-called principle of constitutional non-identification (Krüger1966:178-85; Hollerbach 1969:52-57),21 which is closely linked to the prin-ciple of the non-transferability of law and the impartiality of the state oflaw (Habermas 1987, 1992:583ff.), is absent in the context of relations ofsub-integration and super-integration into the constitutional system (cf.Neves 1992a:53ff. and 95ff.). To a certain extent, the constitution is onlyconcretized if the interests of privileged groups are not compromised. Con-

19 In these circumstances, the normative notion of “sensitive inclusion of differences” (Habermas1996: 172-75) loses any contextual reference whatsoever.

20 It is clear that there is no “absolutely super-integrated.” However, there are individuals whogenerally find themselves on the privileged pole of relations of super-integration and sub-inte-gration. This is because they can orient their expectations and direct their actions relying onthe high probability of their impunity. In this sense, O’Donnell (1999:312) writes: “In Latin Americathere is a long tradition of ignoring the law or, when acknowledging it, of twisting it in favor ofthe powerful and for the repression or containment of the weak. When a shady businessmanrecently said in Argentina, ‘To be powerful is to have [legal] impunity,’ he expressed a presum-ably widespread feeling that, first, to voluntarily follow the law is something that only idiots doand, second, that to be subject to the law is not to be the carrier of enforceable rights butrather a sure signal of social weakness.”

21 Luhmann (1993:96) adds a restriction to this principle, arguing that the non-identity of theConstitution means an option for the values of pluralism. However, when one speaks of the“non-identity principle,” it is only as an attempt to deny the exclusive link between the constitu-tion and a totalitarian effort or a dominant social group, of which the constitution is a mereinstrument. It is not an attempt to deny that the constitution has any worth whatsoever.


stitutionality against the interests of the super-citizen “is not advisable,”“is environmentally inadequate.” (One should not deduce a simplisticscheme from this, because legal conflicts also occur between super-citizenson the constitutional plane, which not infrequently are resolved in accor-dance with “fundamental law.” But if the status quo is threatened, they tendtowards conciliatory formulas that “break” or “hollow out” the constitu-tion. Social reforms within the “constitutional order” are frequently char-acterized as subversive, in that they so blatantly involve the abolition ofprivileges and/or the eventual introduction of measures that are favorableto the sub-citizenry. Behind the formal non-identification of the statutoryconstitutional text, one finds the identity of constitutional reality with theprivileged groups and classes, such that the institutionalization of funda-mental rights is structurally distorted. The normative action and existenceof the sub-citizenry and the super-citizenry bring about the implosion ofthe constitution as the basic order of legal communication.22 In these condi-tions, the constitution does not act as a mechanism of the operational au-tonomy of law, but is deformed during the concretizing process by thestrength of the super-position of private political injunctions and concreteeconomic interests.

This puts us in the face of symbolic constitutionalization (Neves 1994a,1992a:61ff. and 104ff.).23 The insufficient normative concretion of the con-

22 Note that I prefer the terms “sub-citizen” and “super-citizen” to the expressions “first, secondand third class citizen” (Velho 1980:362; Weffort 1981:141-44), which can lead to the mistakenidea that only the sub-integrated are lacking in citizenship. On the other hand, the conceptualdistinction which I propose, while analogous, is explicitly differentiated from the anthropologi-cal concepts of sub-citizen and super-citizen which DaMatta (1991:100) refers to, associatingthe first with a lawless “street” space and the second with the sphere of domestic (“the universeof the house”) privileges (“rights without obligations”). It seems to me an anthropological ex-cess to link, in the Brazilian reality, the domestic space of the sub-integrated (“marginalized”) tothe notion of privileges, and be ignorant of the fact that the “street world” can be constructedin the privileged space of the super-integrated.In a different perspective, starting primarily from dependence (obligations, responsibilities) ratherthan access (rights, actions, etc.) as two aspects of the concept of inclusion, Luhmann(1993:584s., 1997:631ff., 1995b:259s.) affirms that the “sector of exclusion” [ Inklusionsbereich]is super-integrated (because more dependent), whereas inclusion allows for less integration.However, as formulated, sub-integration and super-integration imply an insufficient inclusion,whether due to lack of access or of dependence, respectively. That is why both sub-citizensand super-citizens are lacking in citizenship.

23 Here we are not strictly dealing with the concept of “symbolic efficacy” (or violence) in Bourdieu’ssense (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970:13-84; Bourdieu 1971:298ff. and 1982: esp. 97-161,1989: esp. 48ff. and 552ff.), to which García and Rodríguez are to a certain extent connectedin their article in this issue, as that concept has a holistic claim in the broad social explanation,remaining very vague for a specific and differentiated explanation of the problem of “symbolicconstitutionalization,” particularly in the Latin American context. This is not the opportunity toenter once again into this conceptual discussion (see Neves 1994a: esp.12-14, 24ff. and 129ff.).

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stitutional text is linked to its predominantly politico-ideological functionas the discursive expression of a certain image of the state and the “ownersof power.” The normative-legal inefficacy of constitutional devices of “lib-erty,” “equality” and “participation” conjoin with the symbolic function ofconstitutionalist discourse, occulting the close relationship between the statestructure and the maintenance of relations of sub-integration and super-integration.24

THE MYTH OF FUNCTIONALITY

One of the most misguided ideological simplifications in confronting thelegal problems of Latin American peripheral modernity is based on thedictum ubi societas ibi jus, and asserts that the respective national legal sys-tems function because they exist. On the one hand, this represents a naivefunctionalism that confuses functionality with existence. It does not realizethat the existence of normative structures does not mean that they exercisethe corresponding functions.25 On the other hand, it is based on a simpli-fied model of society, according to which function is a totalizing relation,linearly comprising each sphere’s references to itself, to the whole, and tothe other spheres of society. It does not consider that what is “functional”in a certain perspective or for certain sectors might not be so in other per-spectives or sectors. In this way, it displays unfamiliarity with social com-plexity, with all its complicating consequences for an understanding of society.

Even in the realm of the most recent systems theory, in spite of astrong influence of North American functionalism, the tendency towardfunctionalist simplification prevails.26 This is because it does not departfrom the social system in the singular, as in that model, which results in theillusory analogy between society and a clock. Luhmann works with thenotion of social systems (plural) that are reproduced by codes of prefer-ence and different programs, emphasizing the question of inter-systemicconflicts and the lack of a central super-ordering system, from which theremight emerge a unitary paradigm of conduct orientation. That is why hewill not limit himself to the notion of “function,” which implies a relation ofsub-systems with the global social system. He works with the concept of

24 Making reference to our work (Neves 1998), Habermas (1999:229) emphasizes that, in thesecircumstances, “the immaculate letter of the constitutional text is not a sign of a symbolic clos-ing of a legal order imposed in a highly selective manner.”

25 However, from another perspective, Bobbio (1977b: esp. 66) also warns of this tendency.26 To a certain extent, Habermas (1971:142s.) recognizes this by linking Luhmann in a certain

way to the critical social theory which privileges Marx and, as such, affirms his definitive sepa-ration from Parsons.


“provision” with regard to the relationship of one system-part with an-other system-part. And, finally, he confronts the problem of “reflection,”the relation of systems with themselves, emphasizing the problem of au-thority and identity (Luhmann, 1982:54ff.; id. and Schorr 1988:34ff.). Thisseems to me the most fruitful line of study of the autonomy of spheres ofcommunication within systems theory—not the functional line, which losesever more ground in the discussion of the systemic model.

Hence, the diversity of systemic relations (function, installation andreflection) and the complexity of social variables, makes it possible for some-thing that is considered function from a sphere of action and expectationsto be evaluated as dysfunctional or non-functional in other fields of actionand existence and vice-versa. Regarding normative-legal structures, theirgeneralized non-functionality can eventually be “useful” for other spheresof social communication (economic, political, religious, etc.), and even beconsidered functional for society based on other connections of conductand expectations. It is in this sense that the generalized inefficacy of theconstitutional approaches referring to “equality,” “liberty,” “participation”—while implying constitutional normative-legal non-functionality—are com-patible with the politico-ideological function of constitutional discourse.And in the case of symbolic constitutionalization, it can be observed that,the greater the inefficacy of the constitution in terms of its normative-legalfunction, the more intense its politico-ideological function becomes. This isbecause, in this case, one can speak of the “super-exploitations” of law bypolitics (Neves 1994a:132).

If we consider, however, that in contemporary super-complex soci-ety, in view of the contradictory variety of interests and expectations, theself-reference of social systems is inextricably linked to the inclusion of theentire population in the provision of each of these,27 the specific functional-ity is also damaged when there is no generalized dependence on, and ac-cess to, the respective system. Here we are not concerned with super-inte-grating access and super-integrating dependence—destructive of

27 Regarding this, see Luhmann 1981b:26s., 35, 118, which at the time insisted that inclusionwas a distinctive characteristic of modern society. Later, Luhmann (1993:582ff., 1995b,1997:169s. and 618-34) reviewed his position relative to this question, recognizing that is alsoa structural problem of modern society. Moreover, he asserts that the “inclusion/exclusion” dif-ference functions as a “type of meta-code, which mediates all other codes” (1993:583; cf.1997:632). Yet if that is true, it seems hard to continue to assert that modern society is primarilybased on the principle of functional differentiation and that the “system/environment” differ-ence is intra-societally the main difference. To be in agreement with the proposition that “inclu-sion/exclusion” acts as a meta-code which mediates all other codes, in our understanding it isimportant to admit that society is differentiated primarily in accordance with this “meta-differ-ence.” In this sense, see Stichweh 1997:132.

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autonomy/identity in the corresponding sphere of action—but rather ofgeneralized integration into access/dependence. With respect to law, there-fore, its specific function in the “congruent generalization of normative ex-pectations,” becomes untenable in the simple reasoning of the amplificationof “exclusionary” relations of super-integration and sub-integration intoits normative structures. In this way, the more the normative expectationsbecome diffuse and incongruent within the constitutional legal model, thelower the degree of functionality of the respective normative structures.The same is true in the postmodern approach: the functionality of the frag-mentary spheres of legality presuppose the thematic congruence of norma-tive expectations in that regard. It is precisely this congruence that is lack-ing in the Latin American social miscellany.

It seems to me more fruitful to analyze the problem primarily fromthe notion of autonomy or identity, rather than a notion based on the con-cept of function. The reciprocal barrier in the modern peripheral fields ofaction is an intractable obstacle to its inclusive functionality. In the case ofthe legal system, the obstructive and destructive injunction of power, money,family, friendship, “good relations,” etc. – linked to relations of sub-inte-gration and super-integration—impedes the satisfactory fulfillment of its func-tion of generalized or thematic congruence of normative expectations by hin-dering the consistent construction of the identity of the spheres of legality.

TOWARD OVERCOMING THE “MONISM VS. PLURALISM”DILEMMA

Amongst the pluralist models’ empirical errors of interpretation of the LatinAmerican legal reality is the “monism vs. pluralism” dilemma; the beliefthat unity and plurality are necessarily mutually exclusive. This is based ondistorted valuations of the role of law in modern society.

On the one hand, the monists fail to understand that the contradic-tory diversity of expectations and norms is not compatible with a center oflegal production that is hermeneutically closed to social demands. Such astructure would only make sense in a poorly differentiated social structurethat was characterized by a unity of effort, interest and expectation. Nev-ertheless, in such a context, law is not constructed as an autonomous sphereof normative action and existence, where unity comes directly from theglobalizing politico-moral structure and is considered hierarchically supremeand immediately valid in all spaces of social action and existence.

On the other hand, the pluralists do not draw the obvious theoreticalconsequences from concepts such as “structural coupling,” “inter-systemic


collision law” and “compatibility of dissent between thematic spheres oflegality,” leaving them to be interpreted as mechanisms which constructplurality out of unity. They are unaware of the fact that these deal withunitary structures that act as the necessary condition for legal plurality. Thenon-existence of these unitary mechanisms of inter-mediation between le-gal spheres does not mean pluralism with regard to the identity-autonomyof local legal logic, but rather of a super-complex society with relationshipsthat are self-destructive and hetero-destructive of spaces of normative liv-ing and action.

Strictly speaking, law in modern society, marked by the contradic-tory diversity of expectations and interests (complexity), only constructsits identity-autonomy insofar as it involves unity and plurality. This is notsimply a rational-normative postulate, in the sense of “unity of reason inthe multiplicity of its voices” (Habermas 1988a:153ff.),28 but rather prima-rily an empirical-functional imperative. Running away from the thematicnormativities that result from the fragmentation of interests and valuesmeans a lack of efficacy and social validity for modern law. Systemically,we can speak of inadequate hetero-reference. At the same time, the ab-sence of unitary and generalized procedures and structures of congruenceof spaces of legal normativity implies a complete lack of identity-autonomyof a legal field. We can therefore speak of a breakdown of systematic self-reference mechanisms that is destructive of the normative fabric and be-yond the control of generalized legal procedures and structures.

As we have seen, one can affirm that the unity of modern law isfound on the plane of the “legal/illegal” binary code, whereas plurality ismanifested in the realm of programs and criteria. Systemic unity is assuredto the extent that the “legal/illegal” code of preference is reproduced in ageneralized manner, without particularistic restrictions that exclude or privi-lege individuals or groups. This means the concrete realization of the prin-ciple of legality, not in the static or closed sense which traditional legalismattributes to it, but rather as a “normatively egalitarian” mechanism of in-tegration into law. Hence, in implying an inclusive generalization of the“legal/illegal” code, the identity/autonomy of the legal system becomesinextricable from the notion of citizenship. This too takes place on the planeof a supposed world law based on the semantics of human rights (see forexample Luhmann 1993:574ff.). In turn, the programs and criteria of thelegal system, in order to adapt to the fragmentary complexity of the mod-

28 Specifically with relation to law, the Habermasian reading of the unity/plurality link follows fromthe connection between people’s sovereignty and human rights (1992:112ff.).

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ern, must be conscious of the contradictory plurality of individual and groupnormative expectations. Only the totalitarian (or authoritarian) illusion isinsensitive to the diversity of interests and values in contemporary society.Only a re-reading of democratic pluralism from within the legal system—emphasizing the thematic fragmentation of programs and normative crite-ria—is capable of making an adequate hetero-reference to law viable intoday’s global society.

In sum: the generalized unity of the “legal/illegal” code (® legality,citizenship) and the plurality of programs and normative criteria (® legaldemocratization) are indispensable conditions of identity/autonomy andfunctionality in the legal system of modern society.

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