manuel delanda - a new philosophy of society

7/30/2019 Manuel DeLanda - A New Philosophy of Society

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/manuel-delanda-a-new-philosophy-of-society 1/27

Also Avaliable f rom C o n t i n u u m

Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy - Manuel DeLanda

A NEW PHILOSOPHY OFSOCIETYAssemblage Theory and Social ComplexityManuel DeLanda

- ~ontinuum



\

Continuum

The Tower Building11 York Road

London, SEl 7NX

www.continuumbooks.com

(C:) Manuel DeLanda 2006

80 Maiden Lane

Suite 70 4New York, NY 10038

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

an y form or by an y means, electronic or mechanical. including photocopying,recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission

in writing from th e publishers.

Manuel De Landa has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,to be identified as Author of this work.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0-8264-8170-1 (hardback) 0-8264-9169-3 (paperback)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Typeset by BookEns Ltd, Royston, Herts.Printed an d bound in Great Britain by Ashford Colour Press Ltd,Gosport. Hampshire

Contents

Introduction

Assemblages against Totalities 8

2 Assemblages against Essences 26

Persons an d Networks 47

1 Organizations an d Governments 68

5 Cities an d Nations 94

Index 141

v



Introduction

The purpose of this book is to introduce a novel approach to socialontology. Like an y other ontological investigation it con cerns itself withthe question of what kinds of entities we can legitimately commitourselves to assert exist. The ontological stance taken here hastraditionally been labelled 'realist': a stance usually defined by acommitment to th e mind-independent existence of reality. In the caseof social ontology, however, this definition must be qualified becausemost social entities, from small communities to large nation-states, wo uld

disappear altogether if human minds ceased to exist. In this sense socialentities are clearly no t mind-independent. Hence, a realist approach tosocial ontology must assert the autonomy of social entities from th emnceptions we have of them. To say that social entiti es have a reality thatis conception-independent is simply to assert that the theories, modelsan d classifications we use to study them ma y be objectively wrong, thatis, that they may fail to capture th e real history an d internal dynamics ofthose entities.

There are, however, important cases in which the very models an d

classifications social scientists use affect the behaviour of th e entitiesheing studied. Political or medical classifications using categories like'female refugee' or 'hyperactive child', for example, ma y interact with thepeople being classified if they become aware of th e fact that they areheing so classified. In the first case, a woman fleeing terrible conditions inher home country may become aware of th e criteria to classify 'femalerefugees' used by the country to which she wants to emigrate, an dchange he r behaviour to fit that criteria. In this case, an ontological

1



A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY



46

linguistic with the ontological assumption that only th e contents ofexperience really exist, this position leads directly to a form of social

essentialism. In th e following chapters, as I perform a detailed analysis ofsocial assemblages at progressively larger spatial scales, these dangersmust be kept in mind, particularly at the outset as I attempt to explain

ho w individual persons emerge from the interaction of subpersonalcomponents, only some of which will turn out to be linguistic.

3

Persons and Networks

Although persons are not the smallest analytical unit that social scienceca n study - actions by persons such as individual economic transactionsca n be used as units of analysis - they are the smallest-scale socialassemblage considered here. I t is true that persons emerge from th einteraction of subpersonal components, an d that some of thesecomponents may justifiably be called th e smallest social entities. Nothingvery important depends on settling this question. All we need is a point ofdeparture for a bottom-up ontological model, and the persona l scale willprovide a convenient one. On the other hand, it must be stated at th e

outset that the goal cannot be to settle all the philosophical questionsregarding subjectivity or consciousness: questions that will probablycontinue to puzzle philosophers for a long time to come. All that is

needed is a plausible model of th e subject which meets th e constraints ofassemblage theory, that is, a model in which the subject emerges asrelations of exteriority are established among th e contents of experience.A good candidate for such a model, as Deleuze himself argued long ago,ca n be found in the philosophical school known as empiricism.

The empiricist tradition is mostly remembered for its epistemologicalclaims, in particular, th e claim that all knowledge, including verbalknowledge, ca n ultimately be reduced to sense impressions. Or what

amounts to th e same thing, that sense experience is th e foundation of allknowledge. Bu t Deleuze discovered in the work of David Humesomething much more interesting than such a dated foundationalepistemology: a model of th e genesis of subjectivity that can serve as an

alternative to the dominant on e based on the thesis of th e linguisticality

47

manuel delanda - a new philosophy of society

Documents