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Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S.

Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to

Other Alternatives

Dean Wilkening

American Physical Society “Nuclear Workshop,” George

Washington University, November 1-2, 2013

Boost-Phase BMD Findings

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• Boost-phase missile defense, while technically possible in principle, is impractical for the foreseeable future – Whether kinetic or directed energy – Whether land, sea, air or space-based – Largely due to short intercept ranges that require basing over or

near hostile territory • Spaced-based interceptors remove the geographic constraint,

but are prohibitively expensive due to the required constellation size

• Recommendation: Do not fund further development of boost-phase missile defense systems – Some R&D is OK

Basis for Boost-Phase BMD Findings • Timelines are short (60-300 seconds)

– Hence, terrestrial BMD platforms must be close to the intercept point and, therefore, potentially vulnerable to enemy action

• Warhead could be intact after intercept, leading to a nuclear detonation

– Kinetic kill could hit the warhead but not directed energy

• A few exceptions: 1. Very long-burn liquid ICBMs 2. Threat trajectory passes over/near the boost-phase defense site 3. Airborne boost-phase defense after the opponent’s air defense has been

suppressed 4. CBW submunitions released shortly after the boost phase

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Kinematics of Boost-Phase Engagements

• NB: Boosting target is accelerating (discontinuously at staging events)

– KV must have greater DV and lateral acceleration capability

– Midcourse KVs perform poorly as BPI

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-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

0 50 100 150 200

Acce

lera

tion

(g's

)

Time (sec)

3-stage Solid-Propellant ICBM (180 sec boost )

Interceptor launch

Last intercept time

End of boost phase

Range Shortfall: North Korean Liquid ICBM

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0 sec

4 sec

10

8 sec

1 sec

3 sec

2 sec

6 sec

5 sec

1214

Boost-Phase Engagement of North Korean Liquid-Propellant ICBMs

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4.5 km/sec interceptor

6.0 km/sec interceptor

Boost-Phase Engagement of North Korean Solid-Propellant ICBMs

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200 km

300 km

400 km

500 km

600 km

Boston Chicago Denver Alaska

4.5 km/sec interceptor

6.0 km/sec interceptor

Terrestrial Boost-Phase Interceptors

• Must be located close to, or over, hostile territory – Hence, potentially vulnerable to enemy perimeter defenses – North Korea is the easy case because it is a small country

surrounded by water – Iran is more difficult – No capability against Russia, China or any state with SLBMs

• KEI cannot fly fast enough (>6 km/sec) to overcome this limitation – Faster surface-based interceptors face technical challenges

• ABI cannot fly fast enough (>4.5 km/sec) to overcome this limitation – Stealth does not allow ABI to loiter for hours over hostile territory if

sophisticated air defenses exist (e.g., S-300 SAMs)

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Space-Based Boost-Phase Interceptors

• 650-700 space-based interceptors to defend against liquid ICBMs

– P>0.90 that two 5.0 km/sec SBI within range (30 sec decision time)

– ~$300B 20-year LCC • Approx. 10 times the cost of any other

concept

• ~1,900 space-based interceptors to defend against solid ICBMs

– P>0.90 that two 5.0 km/sec SBI within range (30 sec decision time)

• Limitations: – Can’t intercept shorter-range missiles – Vulnerable to salvo launch & ASAT

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Directed Energy for Boost-Phase BMD • Lasers can rupture propellant tanks if sufficient energy deposited • Speed of light compensates for limited interceptor time of flight,

but… – Atmospheric turbulence and diffraction (l/D) reduce beam irradiance at range – Dwell time required to deposit sufficient energy (material, absorption)

• ABL (Megawatt class COIL laser on a 747) – Significant advances in beam pointing, adaptive optics, and continuing

advances in high energy lasers but… – Lethal ranges <200 km (solid ICBMs) and <400 km (liquid ICBMs)

• Shorter lethal range against shorter-range missiles • Hence, must operate close to or over hostile airspace

– 7 A/C required to maintain two on orbit; costly logistics for COIL laser – Vulnerable to simple countermeasures (e.g., missile rotation) – Hence, not operationally or militarily viable as a boost-phase defense – Concur with 2010 decision to convert ABL to a test bed

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Non-Boost Phase BMD Findings • Midcourse defense is the only practical option for defending

national territories – Time is on the side of the defense – But, requires midcourse discrimination – Terminal defense can only defend high value or small area targets

• Concurrent observations using X-band radar and optical sensors (esp. onboard the kill vehicle) provide the best opportunity for effective discrimination against states like North Korea and Iran when combined with a shoot-look-shoot (SLS) firing doctrine – Recommend reinstituting an aggressive discrimination R&D

program focusing on synergies between radar and optical sensors • Greater exploitation of optical and radar data from flight tests

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Regional Missile Defense Systems • Aegis SM-3 Block IA, IB, IIA • Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) • Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 • Sensors

– SPY-1 Aegis radar – TPY-2/FBX – Airborne Infrared System (ABIRS)

• Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

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Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

Aegis Missile Defense System

KKV IR Target Image

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Standard Missile 3 Evolution

Current US Regional Missile Defense Plans

• European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – Forward-based TPY-2 radar in Turkey – Aegis BMD System (SM-3 interceptor)

• Phase 1: Block IA on ships by 2011 • Phase 2: Block IB at Devesalu, Romania by 2015 • Phase 3: Block IIA at Redzikowo, Poland by 2018 • Phase 4: Block IIB by 2020

– ABIRS, SPY-1D, TPY-2 for missile tracking • Phased Adaptive Approach in East Asia: US-

Japanese BMD Cooperation – Forward-based TPY-2 radars in Japan – Aegis BMD System (SM-3 interceptor)

• 4 Konga-class Japanese destroyers – SM-3 Block IA & IB interceptors

• SM-3 IIA jointly developed by US and Japan

Regional Missile Tracking Sensors FBX/ TPY-2

ABIR

Aegis SPY1-D

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EPAA Radars: SPY-1D + TPY-2

Aegis SPY-1D FBX

4,000 km IRBM

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Aegis SPY-1D

EPAA Phase II : SPY-1D + FBX + ABIRS

FBX

ABIRS (300ºK)

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EPAA Stand Alone Kinematic Coverage

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Defended Area

Devesalu SM-3 site

Defended Area

EPAA “Launch on Remote” Kinematic Coverage

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Devesalu SM-3 site

Defended Area

EPAA “Engage on Remote” Kinematic Coverage

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Devesalu SM-3 site

Regional BMD Findings • The Aegis SM-3, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),

and PAC-3 systems can provide adequate coverage for U.S. forces overseas and U.S. friends and allies – Assumes launch-on-remote (LOR) or engage-on-remote (EOR)

operation • Phases I-III of the EPAA can provide limited defense for NATO

from only 2-3 sites – Turkey requires additional (THAAD) sites – Complete SLS coverage will require additional sites

• Phase IV of the EPAA cannot provide effective defense of CONUS with a 21” SM-3 interceptor (i.e., the SM-3 IIB interceptor) launched from Poland

• Coverage of Israel and other countries in the Middle East will require additional PAC-3, THAAD, and/or SM-3 sites

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EPAA Phase III Kinematic Coverage of Europe (Min. Energy IRBM Trajectories; Engage on Remote)

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3.0

3.5 4.0

4.5

3.0 3.5 4.0

4.5

Aegis SM-3 Kinematic Coverage of Japan (Min. Energy No Dong Trajectories; LOR/EOR)

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LOR Coverage

EOR Coverage 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5

Assumed No Dong Max. Range

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Phase IV EOR Kinematic Coverage of CONUS (Min. Energy Iranian Solid ICBM; Polish Launch Site)

4.5 km/s 5.0 km/s

Assumed Iranian ICBM Max. Range

5.5 km/s

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EPAA Phase IV Defense of CONUS (Iranian Solid-Propellant ICBM-Central Iran to CONUS)

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Lofted

Min. Energy

Depressed

4.3 km/sec interceptor

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Phase IV EOR Kinematic Coverage of CONUS (Lofted Iranian Solid ICBM; 5.0 km/sec Interceptor)

Assumed Iranian ICBM Max. Range

35º Reentry

40º Reentry

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Regional BMD Recommendations • Continue funding Aegis SM-3, THAAD, and PAC-3

with emphasis on sensor and shooter integration to enable launch-on-remote and engage-on-remote

• Sensors – Continue to deploy regional X-band radars (e.g., TPY-2) – Invest in airborne optical sensors (ABIRS?)

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The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System

• Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) – 30 currently deployed – DOD recently increased this to 44

• Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) • Sensors

– Upgraded Early-Warning Radar (UEWR) – Cobra Dane – SBX – PTSS

• Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

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Ground-Based Interceptor Approx. half of the flight tests to date have ended in failure

Boeing GBI EKV

Homeland Defense Sensors

FBX/TPY-2

SBX

BMEWS PAVE PAWS

Cobra Dane

Current GMD Sensor Architecture

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Fylingdales UEWR

Thule UEWR

Clear UEWR

Beale UEWR Cape Cod UEWR

SBX

Cobra Dane

GMD System Findings • The current GMD system, if it works as designed,

should be effective against first generation North Korean ICBMs

• But, the GMD system has inherent limitations: – Designed based on limited objectives (early-generation North

Korean ICBMs, few in number, limited countermeasures) – High value placed on getting some defense fielded quickly,

even if not fully tested • The PTSS system does not appear to be cost effective

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Current GMD Coverage Against North Korea

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Current GMD Coverage Against Iran

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GMD System Recommendations

• An evolutionary approach to CONUS defense: – New GBI booster stack based on KEI technology (70 sec

boost time) – New EKV with larger optics and continuous high-bandwidth

communication link to the C2BMC (e.g., using X-band radar) – Approximately 4-6 new X-band radars (based on “stacked

TPY-2 concept”) – A new GBI site located on the east coast to provide SLS

against possible future Iranian ICBMs • Defense of Hawaii

– Aegis ashore with SM-3 IIA and launch on remote – THAAD underlay(?)

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Block II GBI

• 2-stage interceptor based on KEI boosters • ~6.0 km/sec speed • 70 sec boost time • 805 kg payload

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New EKV

• LWIR detection range ~2,000 km – 30 cm optics

• Max flight time ~1,100 sec • DV ~600 m/sec • 106.5 kg wet mass • 3.3 - 4.0 g lateral acceleration • Continuous communication with

C2BMC

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The Stacked TPY-2 Arrays (GBX)

4 .7 m

4 .7 m

9 .0m

Stacked TPY-2 tracking range ~3,000 km

Proposed X-band Radar Architecture

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Fylingdales GBX

Thule GBX

Clear GBX

Grand Forks GBX

Cape Cod GBX

Sensor Cost Comparison

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East Coast Interceptor Site Coverage Against Iran

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GMD Coverage Against Iran with an East Coast Interceptor Site

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Midcourse Discrimination • X-band radar in conjunction with optical observations

(especially from the seeker aboard the KV), combined with a SLS firing doctrine provides the best chance for staying ahead of the discrimination problem against states like North Korea and Iran

• Note: – Many different types of decoys and countermeasures – Decoys are more difficult to deploy than to conceptualize – Discrimination effectiveness will change with time – No discrimination technique is perfect – Some level of discrimination is required (and has been

demonstrated) even without intentional decoys

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X-band Range-Doppler Imaging

0.1

1

10

100

1000

1 10

Spec

tral

Rad

ianc

e (W

/cm

2 /sr/m

icro

n)

Wavelength (microns)

Temperature ( K)

600

500

400

350

300

250

200

20 30 4053 7

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Measuring Temperature using Blackbody Radiation

So What’s the Answer on Discrimination?

• It depends on: – Technical sophistication of offense vs. defense (Who is the opponent?)

• Sophistication of countermeasures: sensor performance vs. target signatures • Rhetorical argument: If a state can build an ICBM, then it can develop

countermeasures that render defense ineffective – ICBMs involve mechanical and chemical engineering – Discrimination involves radar and optical signatures & signal processing

– Intelligence each side has about the other – Level of (flight) testing

• Conclusions: 1. There is no countermeasure against which an effective defense cannot be

designed, and 2. There is no defense against which an effective countermeasure cannot be

designed 3. X-band radar in conjunction with optical observations (especially from the

seeker aboard the KV), combined with a SLS firing doctrine provides the best chance for staying ahead of the discrimination problem against states like North Korea and Iran

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Summary • Boost-Phase defense is not cost-effective compared to

midcourse defense options • Regional midcourse missile defense architectures look good,

except for sensor support • Homeland missile defense needs work

– New 2-stage GBI with 70 sec boost time – New EKV with long-range (~2,000 km) seeker – New X-band sensor architecture (4-6 GBX with 3,000 km range) – Continuous communication between EKV and C2BMC – Shoot-look-shoot firing doctrine

• X-band radar in conjunction with optical observations (especially from the seeker aboard the KV), combined with a SLS firing doctrine provides the best chance for staying ahead of the discrimination problem against states like North Korea and Iran

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