Eugene Lee Shijin 8785

Isabel Löfgren

Vanessa Ward

Ang Xin Wei

MA Design

Faculty of Design

LASALLE College of the Arts

10 November 2009

Being Cheena:

Rejuvenating the Ethnic Identity of Singaporean Chinese youths

1. Introduction - My Motivation

2. The Issue

3. Background of the Issue

4. Defining Singaporean Chinese youths

5. Defining Ethnic Identity and its Markers

6. Education System

7. Religion

8. Public Housing in Singapore

9. Design References

10. Strengths and Weaknesses of Resources

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1. Introduction – My Motivation

The embarkation and motivation to pursue the topic as a Masters in Design research paper

was catalyzed by a personal experience which occurred about a year ago. I had had ended a

relationship with a lady that I was romantically involved with for about three years, over

reasons that are non-relevant to the discussion presented here. The route to recovery from a

relationship that has ended is a very personal journey. However, it was her chosen path of

recovery that sparked off my research topic.

She was brought up in a typical traditional Singaporean Chinese family where by

traditional Chinese religion and ancestral worship (in this case, Taoism and shenism) is

practiced piously; paying respect through offerings made to gods, deities and ancestors on

specific days in the lunar calendar. Naturally, or rather traditionally, she would follow and

help out her parents in the preparatory work needed for bai shen (拜神 ) and observed the

practices herself.

After the relationship ended, she sought solace by attending Christian services and

within a very short period of time, converted to Christianity and fully abandoned the mindsets

and practices she grew up with and believing in. What struck me were the abruptness of her

switch in faith and ease of abandoning her past beliefs and practices, which were deeply

embedded in her since childhood.

Although I was also brought up in a typical traditional Singaporean Chinese family, I

am not a religious person but view the rituals and practices associated with traditional

Chinese religions (In Singapore, Buddhism and Taoism are religions that are regarded as

ethnically Chinese) as a part of my Chinese ethnicity. Therefore, her switch in faith and

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abandonment of all things associated to her previous traditional Chinese religion seems like a

bleaching of her ethnicity.

With that in mind, I sought to find out how she, with a toss of her hair, managed to

convince herself to give up the beliefs and practices that had shaped her as a Singaporean

Chinese since childhood. During the process of gathering information and material for

research, I came across the fact that the Singapore government had already foreseen such a

scenario when the Ministry of Community Development ‘took a rather unusual action to

commission a research team from the National University of Singapore (NUS) to do a

research project on “religion and religious revivalism in Singapore”’ (Choong 325) in 1987.

The research was coordinated by Assoc Prof Eddie CY Kuo, Head of the Sociology

Department.1 On Singapore’s National Day on 9 August 2008, the social phenomenon

resurfaced in the local newspaper, The Straits Times.

Taoism is losing believers as Chinese turn away from their parents’ faith.

Christianity is growing its flock . . . Chinese religions here, specifically

Taoism, have been trying to stem the bleed of believers from their ranks, but

their followers are still abandoning them for Christianity. (Mulchand A22)

The article was written as a special report for a study on religious conversions in

Singapore, which was commissioned by The Straits Times. The increasing rate of conversion

from Taoism to Christianity reflects a greater issue at hand, which poses deep concerns, 1. Other members include Assoc Prof Jon ST Quah, Acting Director of the Institute of

Policy Studies, and Dr Tong Chee Kiong, sub Dean and Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and

Social Sciences.

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especially to the Singaporean Chinese community. According to the findings of Prof Kuo’s

team of researchers,

the Christians and Christians converts are recognized as (1) younger in age,

(2) better educated, (3) of higher socio economic status in terms of occupation,

income and housing type, (4) those who have attended mission schools, (5)

those who have received an English-stream education, and (6) those who

speak English as the dominant home language. (327)

2. The Issue

This led to my strong belief that there is a prevalent erosion and loss of ethnic identity in

Singaporean Chinese youths. With this in mind, I set out to find other reasons that contribute

to this loss of “Chineseness” as well as the influences that define the Singaporean Chinese

ethnicity. The terms “ethnic identity” and “ethnicity” are used interchangeably here.

Although the two terms may have overlapping ideas and concepts, one should not assume

that ethnicity and identity are one and of the same definition. Ethnicity encompasses the idea

of being born into a certain ethnic group with no choice, while identity allows one to decide

on what typical traits to adopt to portray a particular persona based on one’s context and

needs.

The sources that were consulted consisted of reports from statistical data, literature

on socio-political topics, dissertations, related speeches made by political leaders and

professors, newspaper articles and online journals and discussion groups. As the topic of

Singaporean Chinese ethnic identity encompasses a wide range of focused academic subjects,

several authors have been cited. Among them, Ackermann, Suryadinata, Tong and Lee

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contributed the most in my understanding of the topic. While Ackermann’s book provided an

outsider’s view on a local issue, the books by Suryadinata and Lee provided valuable insights

from within. The quantitative support from Tong’s report provided the numbers to show the

prevalence of the issue. The diversity of resources that I have encountered during my

research provided an advantage of having view points from different strata of society;

political leaders, local and overseas academics, students and the public in general. This

provided a comparison of what Chinese ethnicity means from a top-down (government’s

imposition) and bottom-up (citizen’s construction) point of view; which is in consonance

with the debate between modernity (the universal) and post-modernity (the individual). The

ethnicity of the authors has also been noted and almost all of the resources consulted are

Singaporeans belonging to various ethnic groups. Only Ackermann and Gosling provides an

outsider’s view on the issue of losing Chinese ethnicity in Singapore, which is valuable to my

research as their contribution gives an omnipresent view on the issue being discussed;

minimising the effects of any subconscious biasness towards any particular view point.

3. Background of the Issue

In order to discuss the issue that will be explored in this essay, some historical background to

the Chinese community in Singapore and definitions of the key words that are being used

have to be set straight.

The forefathers of the majority of Singapore’s present Chinese community were

immigrants for the Southern parts of China, mainly Fujian and Guangdong provinces who

mostly set foot on Singapore in the mid and late 19 th century. They were identified by the

dialects brought with them, predominantly Hokkien, Teochew, Hainanese, Cantonese, Hakka,

Fuzhou, Henghua, Hokchia and Shanghainese. These China immigrants were known as the

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xin ke (新客 ) which literally translated meant “new guest”. There were also Chinese

immigrants who were born in Riau, Indonesia and Melaka (Malacca), Malaysia and as a part

of the “straits-born Chinese”, formed the Peranakans in Singapore later on. Generally, the

immigrants were lowly educated farmers, labourers and craftsmen and the majority worked

as coolies or manual labourers at the warehouses along the Singapore River (Ackermann 46,

MICA, “Early Immigrants”, Pan 201).

This first wave of Chinese sojourners had a mentality that one day they would be able

to return to their ancestral land. Singapore was a temporary harbour and shelter to them. They

held on to their individual dialect-cultural practices as there was no need to assimilate. After

mainland China turned communist in 1949 and Singapore gained independence in 1965, they

began to call Singapore their home and adopted local citizenship. Some Chinese men also

married the local women and intermarriages among different Chinese religions and dialect

groups took place. The children from this generation became the first Singapore-born

Chinese or Singaporean Chinese and they refer to themselves as hua ren (华人) or hua yi (华裔 ), which means “ethnic Chinese” and “ethnic descent” respectively (Suryadinata 2).

Although the Chinese Peranakans were of Chinese descent, they had ‘lost touch with China

in every respect’ (Pan 202) and were considered a unique class of their own, with an eclectic

mix of Chinese and Malay cultural practices. Despite being the minority within the Chinese

community, the Peranakans were much sought after by the British as they were

knowledgeable in the native ways and knew the English Language, which made them ‘useful

as intermediates between Europeans and local people, including Malays; and between them

and the new arrivals’ (Pan 202). At this point of time, the majority of the Chinese community

were still distinguishable by their spoken dialect. It was ‘after the establishment of the

Chinese Republic in 1949 that Mandarin replaced dialects as the medium of instruction’ (Pan

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206). The setting up of Chinese-language schools and English-language schools shrouds the

Chinese in another layer of differentiation; “Chinese-educated” Chinese and “English-

educated” Chinese. The idea of Mandarin-speaking Chinese families and English-speaking

Chinese families followed well into the 20th century and presently, according to Tan, this

divide has evolved into the heartlander and cosmopolitan divide; generalising heartlanders as

the “Chinese-educated” Chinese and the cosmopolitan as the “English-educated” Chinese

(122).

4. Defining Singaporean Chinese youths

At this juncture, after being provided with a general history of the Chinese immigrants of

Singapore, the boundaries of “Singaporean Chinese youths” can be defined. The

“Singaporean Chinese” that this discourse addresses from here on refers to both the Chinese-

educated and English-educated Chinese who were descendents of the first wave of Chinese

sojourners and managed to maintain their Chinese lineage; therefore not referring to the

Peranakans, Eurasians and Indian-Chinese. According to Ackermann (46-47), these racial

categories are further emphasised by the government through a child’s birth certificate and

identity card at the age of twelve (presently the age at which a child receives his or her

identity card has been raised to fifteen), which usually follows the classification of the father.

The child is ‘deeply aware of that he or she is a member of a “race”, speaks a particular

language, believes in a particular religion, and is simultaneously cognizant of others, who are

similar and dissimilar to him/her’ (qtd. in Ackermann 47). Although by categorising the

Singaporean Chinese in such a manner does not acknowledge the dialect groups within the

Chinese community in Singapore, in present times the majority of Singaporean Chinese

youths neither understand nor speak their own dialect fluently as before, owing to the

government’s successful efforts to unite the various dialect groups via the Speak Mandarin

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Campaign launched on 9 September 1979 by Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew (present

Minister Mentor Lee) (Lim, “Speak Mandarin Campaign”). However, in recent times when

China’s economy is booming and Singapore being a pragmatic nation, the promotion of

speaking fluent Mandarin carries political and economical undertones towards Singaporean

Chinese being able to converse fluently with their China counterparts during business

meetings and trade talks. This results in the present generation of bilingual Singaporean

Chinese youths, aged 15 to 29 years old (Ho and Chia 150).2 Under such descriptions, the

Singaporean Chinese youths that are being referred to here are (1) descendents of a Chinese-

Chinese lineage from the Chinese sojourners, and (2) aged 15 to 29 years old.

5. Defining Ethnic Identity and its Markers

Gosling feels that key terms like “ethnicity”, “culture”, “identity” and other associated terms

are hard to define accurately due to their numerous interpretations in various contexts. He

defines “identity” in the following way:

I use “identity” in a very limited but loose way, limiting it to the visible or

public use of common behaviour and symbols, and by no means include more

private values, psyche and self. Identity as used here is externally assigned and

recognised, and not identity as destiny. (14)

This idea of being given allocated a certain identity, which consists of a set of traits or

markers, instead of carving out a certain identity out by oneself is also being shared by

Ackermann’s respondents when an individual say, ‘They (the government) give us the

categories and we fill ourselves into it, you see?’ (65). Ackermann also notices that his 2. The age group of Singaporean youths is defined according to the National Youth

Council of Singapore.

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respondents would say that once one was born Chinese, is “Chinese by nature”, one would

live a Chinese and die a Chinese whether one liked it or not. There is a strong affiliation to

the Chinese identity which is moulded by the government. However, through Ackermann’s

conversation with his Chinese respondents, it seems that deep down, or at least within the

Chinese community, they differentiated themselves according to their dialect group. This

suggests that language serves as an important identity marker for the Singaporean Chinese

and that their individual dialects ‘provide(s) for identity in the true ethnic sense’ (65). The

importance of language as an identity marker is also emphasised by Minister Mentor Lee

Kwan Yew during his speech at the 10th anniversary fundraising dinner of the Chinese

Heritage Centre. He mentioned that ‘one of the attributes of being a Chinese is the ability to

speak Chinese’ (CHC 9). However, speaking Mandarin was a government policy imposed

onto the Chinese population to unite the sub-groups into one. The Speak Mandarin Campaign

which facilitated the policy contradicts the true Singaporean Chinese identity as it assumes

that the Singaporean Chinese community is a homogeneous group, which contradicts the

actual formation of the many sub-groups, characterised by their dialect. This opinion is also

supported by Lai Ah Eng. In his words:

Mandarin is a relatively recent phenomenon and its universal use in China and

elsewhere is partly a post-1979 development. In contrast, many Chinese

dialects are ancient, and, in this sense, can claim to be more “traditional” than

Mandarin. In Singapore, dialects also serve as the vehicles of cultural

preservation and transmission for the majority of the Chinese population until

the promotion of Mandarin in the 1980s. (152)

6. Education System

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Despite the fact that dialects retain more of the diversity and cultures of the Singaporean

Chinese, the promotion of speaking Mandarin was a success at that time. The majority of

Singaporean Chinese youths today are bilingual in English and Mandarin; with English

taking precedence over Mandarin. English, being the language used in Singapore’s education

system for teaching and the formal working language in Singapore’s society, threatens the

existence of Mandarin. Lee argues that due to the predominant use of English in education

and work, there is pragmatic need to master the language, at the expense of Mandarin. In

education, the Chinese language was ‘relegated to a “second language”’ (Lee 239) and

formed only one subject in schools. There is relatively very little time given to the teaching

the language. This results in a lower level of usage and mastery of the language. The

downplay on the learning of Chinese language in the education system, which plays a highly

important role in Singapore’s meritocratic society, affects the amount of importance and

value judgement on the language in the minds of the Singaporean Chinese. Although the

label of “second language” has been replaced by “mother tongue”, the stigma that Mandarin

is a secondary language, compared to English, remains. Despite the fact that among the

majority of Singaporean Chinese youths, many still converse in Mandarin, the relative

standard of the language compared to English has significantly declined. If language is one of

the markers of Singaporean Chinese identity, this would mean that Singaporean Chinese are

indeed, losing their “Chineseness”.

7. Religion

Religion is the other prominent identity marker that shows this loss of “Chineseness”. This is

supported by Ackermann saying that ‘religion has been mentioned several times now for

being an important identity marker’ (69). Clammer describes religion as ‘essentially ethnic in

nature’ (275). The bleed of followers away from traditional Chinese religions, which in this

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case shenism or bai shen (拜神 ) (also called Chinese Popular Religion in other works), is

prevalent in Tong’s report, published in 1988, on the trends in traditional Chinese religion in

Singapore, prepared for the Ministry of Community Development, as well as the research

findings of Prof Kuo and his research team, which Choong commented on. It may be that

Tong’s report formed part of the research that Prof Kuo and his team were working on and

finally published by the Ministry of Community Dvelopement under the title Religion and

Religious Revivalism in Singapore in 1988, which then Choong commented in 2002 with an

understanding of the milieu of his time. Despite the time difference of about twenty years

between the publication of these two sources, Tong and Choong consistently brought up that

there has had been a loss of shenism followers and reciprocally an increase in Christianity.

Choong further discussed the similar characteristics of the converts. They are identified as

‘(1) younger in age, (2) better educated, (3) of higher socioeconomic status in terms of

occupation, income and housing type, (4) those who have attended mission schools, (5) those

who have received an English-stream education, and (6) those who speak English as the

dominant home language’ (327). He contrasted the characteristics of the converts to that of

the Taoists in Singapore. ‘The Taoists here are practically all Chinese and they are typically

(1) older in age, (2) with relatively low levels of formal education, (3) dialect-speaking and

(4) of relatively lower socioeconomic status’ (328).

This provides the groundwork for Tong’s discussion on the “rationalisation” or

“intellectualisation” of religion (15). By definition, shenism is one of the Little Tradition,

whereby the practice; ‘carrying out of symbolic action or ritual’ (Pan 81), precedes ‘the

knowledge and interpretation of scripture’ (Pan 81). This is a contrast with canonical

Buddhism, which represents the Great Tradition. Shenism is one of the religions that the first

Chinese immigrants brought along with them. The religion provided spiritual strength and

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emotional solace for the immigrants, who were mainly illiterate, to endure the hardships of

daily life. While shenism answers the needs of the Singaporean Chinese in the past, it creates

conflict with the Singaporean Chinese now and in the future. The highly (English-medium)

educated Singaporean Chinese youth of today, who live very different lives from their

forefathers, will come to question the rituals on their purpose and rationality of the ritualistic

based shenism. This is due to the kind of education that these youths receive; one which

‘stresses rational inquiry’ (Tong 10) and the environment that they live in; ‘a society whose

institutions and value systems are becoming affected by Western ideas and lifestyles’ (Tong

10).

If the rate at which Singaporean Chinese youths are converting from their childhood

religions to Christianity increases and even stay constant, the number of people who continue

to hold on to their childhood religions as a reminder of their ethnic identity will one day be

reduced to a figure that threatens the delicate state of the country’s religious equilibrium. To

maintain this state of equilibrium, one should not come to the conclusion that the evangelistic

efforts of churches should tone down Instead, one should think that Taoism and shenism will

play catch up and devise ways to reconnect with its Chinese youths to keep the embedded

traits that define the Singaporean Chinese through religion alive so that Singapore will not

become a ‘“pseudo-Western” society’ (Lai 143) and maintain its cultural uniqueness. To

establish that reconnection with Singaporean Chinese youths, design can play a part in

attracting these youths back into discovering their ethnic roots and identity. This can be done

through redesigning the image of Singaporean Chinese ethnic identity; updating the way

Chinese temples look, which is ancient and dodgy to the Western-oriented aesthetic eye of

the Chinese youths, to an appearance that appeals to the Singaporean Chinese youths today.

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So far, language and religion are the more prominent identity markers of Singaporean

Chinese ethnicity. However, to the best interests of Singapore’s economy, the government

has shaped the education system to cater to the ongoing processes of westernisation so that its

citizens remain competitive in the global market. This has detrimental effects on the identity

markers, hindering the youths from tracing their roots and as a result, many elderly

Singaporean Chinese regard today’s youths as being “rootless”.

On the other hand, Singaporean Chinese youths tend to have a derogatory view

towards being Chinese. To them, being cheena (Malay for “China”, used as a colloquial slang

with negative connotation to mean “Chinese”) has a sense of backwardness; ‘lacking in taste,

sophistication and aesthetics, with a poor command of English, uncouth, materialistic,

uncultured and conservative’ (Lai 144). Being associated with such traits would be

contradictory to what the present Western-oriented Singaporean Chinese youths portray;

‘liberal and critical’ and ‘of a higher cultural status’ (Lai 144). Under such perceived

impressions, being sinicised in Singapore almost implies being ostracised by their peers, who

play important roles in the lives of a typical Singaporean Chinese youth in terms of social

identity. This deters Singaporean Chinese youths from discovering their roots and knowing

their ethnic identity. At present, being cheena and “modern” means moving in opposite

directions and for the highly educated Singaporean Chinese youths, who are pragmatic, the

rational direction to follow would be moving forwards and away from their roots and

“Chineseness”.

8. Public Housing in Singapore

Although in terms of the identity of a typical Singaporean Chinese youth, it seems like one

cannot belong to or fall under the category of being “modern” without giving up their

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“Chineseness”. This notion manifests itself in Singapore’s public housing. The Housing

Development Board (HDB) was set up in 1960 to provide a solution for Singapore’s housing

crisis then. The modernist architectural solution was a success in providing clean and safe

homes for 86% of its citizens. However, this also meant that homes looked homogenous,

which do not cater to the needs of individual ethnic groups in terms of religious practices.

The same utilitarian architectural solution is still used today as the most efficient method to

provide public housing in land scarce Singapore. Juxtaposed with today’s “modern” interior

styling, the traditional Chinese home altar is more of an eye sore (Fig. 1) instead of being the

focal point of the home, which was the case traditionally (Fig. 2).

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

The inability of the traditional Chinese home altar to adapt and update its appearance

to fit into the contemporary look of the typical public housing apartment is another factor that

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deters Singaporean Chinese youths, who posses a Western influenced aesthetic eye, from

embracing their ethnic identity.

Despite the rather pessimistic outlook on the current state of Singaporean Chinese

ethnic identity in the country, Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan have been able to

not just retain their traditional identity but have also managed to adopt traditional elements

and philosophies into their architecture, resulting in spaces that speak of the contemporary

but yet clearly display their ethnic identities.

9. Design References

Being in tandem with Lim and Tan and as part of my initial research on how design allows

traditional elements to be reinvigorated (30-31), reinvented (54-55) and reinterpreted (120-

121), the architectural elements of Taipei 101 located in Taiwan (Fig. 3), which is designed

by C.Y. Lee & Partners, and the Lotus Pond Hall of Honpukuji or Water Temple (Fig. 4)

located in Awaji Island, Japan, which is designed by Tadao Ando are being studied. At the

same time, literature by Arata Isozaki are also being read to understand how Japanese

architecture manage to update itself and keep up with current context, providing spatial

answers for the needs of today’s people.

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Fig. 3

Fig. 4

10. Strengths and weaknesses of resources

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Despite the variety of resources gathered, both in genre and author, the year in which some of

these sources were published are rather dated. A significant reason would be that the census

of population, which is conducted by the government, is only consolidated and released every

ten years since 1980 (Choong 325). Therefore, commentaries and analysis on the census by

analysts and academics can only take place every ten years. The state of Singaporean Chinese

ethnicity might have changed drastically in between the ten years time difference, affecting

the accuracy of the statistics and reports in response to the present state.

Another limitation of the resources gathered is that the characteristics of the typical

Singaporean Chinese youth have a heavy reliance on the assumption of stereotypes. The

establishing of stereotypes is useful in generalising a common mindset and behaviour of the

youths but it cannot address the wide spectrum of personality of the individual, which heavily

influences the decision of retaining their “Chineseness” or becoming “modern”.

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Image References

Fig. 1: Typical 3-room HDB flat with altar on the right that does not fit into the contemporary

design of the flat.

Source: http://www.godfreyhow.com/Default.aspx?href=%2flayout

%2fTemplate12%2flistItem.aspx%3fpid%3d4067%26pageid%3d0

Fig. 2: Traditional Peranakan shop house that shows the ancestral altar as the focal point of

the space.

Source: http://www.godfreyhow.com/Default.aspx?href=%2flayout

%2fTemplate12%2flistItem.aspx%3fpid%3d4132%26pageid%3d0

Fig. 3: Taipei 101.

Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/yhlee/145101783/

Fig. 4: Lotus Pond Hall of Honpukuji or Water Temple.

Source: http://www.irish-architecture.com/tesserae/000023/5_lge.html

Works Cited

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Ackermann, A. Ethnic Identity by Design or by Default?: A Comparative Study of

Multiculturalism in Singapore and Frankfurt am Main. Frankfurt: IKO - Verlag für

Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 1997. Print.

Chinese Heritage Centre (CHC). “Speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the Centre’s

10th Anniversary Fundraising Dinner.” CHC Bulletin: 10th Anniversary Special Issue

5(June-July). Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2005. Print.

Clammer, J. “Chinese Ethnicity and Political Culture in Singapore” In: Gosling, L.A. and

Lim, Y.C. (eds.). The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Volume 2 Identity, Culture and

Politics. Singapore: Maruzen Asia (1983): 266-284. Print.

Choong, C.S. “Religious Composition of the Chinese in Singapore: Some Comments on the

Census 2000.” In: Suryadinata, L. (ed.). Ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia:

A Dialogue between Tradition and Modernity. Singapore: Times Academic Press

(2002): 325-336. Print.

Gosling, L.A. “Changing Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia: An Introductory Review.” In:

Gosling, L.A. and Lim, Y.C. (eds.). The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Volume 2 Identity,

Culture and Politics. Singapore: Maruzen Asia (1983): 1-14. Print.

Ho, K.C. and Chia, W. YOUTH.sg: The State of Youth in Singapore 2006. Singapore:

National Youth Council, 2006. Print.

Lee 19

Lai, A.E. Meanings of Multiethnicity: A Case Study of Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in

Singapore. United States: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.

Lee, G.K. “Singapore Chinese Society in Transition.” In: Charney, M.W., Yeoh, S.A. and

Tong C.K. (eds.). Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational and Social

Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora. Singapore: Singapore University Press (2003):

229-251. Print.

Lim, S.W. and Tan, H.B. Contemporary Vernacular: Evoking traditions in Asian

Architecture. Singapore: Select Books Pte Ltd, 1998. Print.

Lim, S.Y. “Speak Mandarin Campaign.” Singapore: National Library Board. 1997. Web. 13

Oct. 2009.

Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA). “Early Immigrants.”

Singapore: Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA). 2009.

Web. 21 Oct. 2009.

Mulchand, A. “Religion: The Big Switch.” The Straits Times, (9 August 2008): A22. Print.

Pan, Lynn. (ed.). The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press, 1999. Print.

Suryadinata, L. (ed.). Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, 1997. Print.

Lee 20

Tan, K.B. “Reconceptualizing Chinese Identity: The Politics of Chineseness in Singapore

2002.” In: Suryadinata, L. (ed.). Ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia: A

Dialogue between Tradition and Modernity. Singapore: Times Academic Press

(2002): 325-336. Print.

Tong, C.K. Trends in Traditional Chinese Religion in Singapore. Singapore: National

University of Singapore, 1988. Print.

Lee 21