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Lisa Cerasuolo Université de Montréal CERL09608707 Masters in political science : first year
Nunavut : Consensus Government In Canada
6300 Boul. Gouin Est Montreal, QC H1G 1C2 [email protected] 514.581.5288
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Even though thirteen years have passed since the creation of Nunavut, it still remains a
relatively unknown territory to most Canadians. The land north of the 60th parallel is, for many, a
land characterized by a vast inhospitable environment with pockets of sparsely populated
municipalities. That is indeed a fair description of the territory. But Nunavut is also a land with
one of the most unique political situations here in Canada. It is in reality, the first and only
experiment to this day of quasi aboriginal self-government in our federation. It is the only region
in our country that is made up predominantly of Aboriginal people: three quarters of
Nunavummiut are Inuit. And yet, Canadian political scientists have remained largely
uninterested in the political realities of this territory. Not only does Nunavut offer an example of
the flexibility and continuing saliency of British-style parliamentary democracy, it also provides
definitive proof that, while Euro-Canadian political culture is inherently different from
Aboriginal political culture, they are by no means mutually exclusive.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to build upon the previous literature by seeking to give
insight into the legislative behaviour of the MLAs of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly. As in
other studies before it, this work argues that despite presenting an exception to the rule here in
Canada, consensus government in Nunavut is nonetheless firmly entrenched within the
Westminster system of parliamentary democracy.
In order to so, we shall discuss the institutions of Nunavut, where we shall explore the
nature of consensus government within the Canadian context. An outline of the specifics of the
Nunavut mode of governance will then be provided. Finally, we shall look at the legislative
behaviour of its MLAs by reviewing the political culture within which it is rooted. More
importantly, as we argue throughout the work that Nunavut preserves the foundational
parliamentary principle of responsible government, a great deal of this work will be devoted to
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examining whether or not this is actually true. By embarking on a quantitative analysis of
Nunavut’s legislative behaviour, we can observe certain voting patterns, thereby proving
empirically, what has been said about consensus government.
Consensus Government in the Canadian Context
Why Consensus Government in Nunavut?
Building upon their experience in the Northwest Territories, there was an explicit desire
among the Inuit peoples to keep with consensus government. (see Henderson 2007, 114-15). As
was made evident by numerous Aboriginal MLAs, the greatest reason for which the Inuit have
eschewed the traditional Westminster system is its imposition by a colonial power against their
will. The MLAs interviewed during White’s research pointed to two principal objections to the
British model (White 1991, 506-7). Firstly, they are unwilling to recognize quite possibly the
most important aspect of this model: great concentration of power in the executive. As we will
see later, “[n]atives generally prefer that power be decentralized and widely shared(…)” (White
1991, 506). Secondly, like all Western liberal democracies, the Westminster model is a
representative one, aimed at representing individuals rather than collectivities. Here again,
however, Natives prefer a different approach. As a general rule, the interests and needs of the
group always trump those of the individuals. Government, then, is viewed as an institution for
direct representation. Moreover, political parties in themselves are perceived as creating artificial
divisions within the population and as “(…) engines of political acrimony, something that is seen
to be at odds with Aboriginal decisionmaking and is regarded as unwelcome in northern
politics”. (Henderson 2007, 114-5).
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Thus, it would seem at first glance that Inuit values and modes of governance are
completely at odds with a British parliamentary system. In this latter tradition, individuals vote to
form a representative government and power is highly concentrated in the person of the prime
minister and in cabinet. It is a system characterized as highly adversarial and confrontational and
is determined by a set of formal procedures composed of majoritarian decision-making rules.
Conversely, the Natives of the North prefer a consensual decision-making process involving
non-confrontation, teamwork, and cooperation. Decisions are based not on the needs of
individuals, but rather on those of the group as a whole. Nor is voting in itself a traditional Inuit
procedure.
That being said, the implementation of consensus government in Nunavut was largely
due to historical reasons. It would be false to claim that the Inuit demonstrated a wilful and
concerted effort at the time of its formation to specifically adopt consensus governance as the
framework for incorporating and promoting Inuit values and culture within northern politics.
Rather, giving credence to their much-extolled pragmatic characters, they merely adopted a
mode of governance with which they had lived for so many years in the NWT (White 2006, 19).
It can be said, however, that nowadays, consensus government can indeed be viewed as an
institution that has greatly integrated the Inuit way of thinking.
Therefore, if the principles of the consensus government so seem to be in conflict with
the precepts of the Westminster tradition, can one characterize the Legislative Assembly of
Nunavut as a true institution of British parliamentarism?
Still Part of The Westminster Tradition?
In his seminal article, Westminster in the Artic: The Adaptation of British
Parliamentarism in the Northwest Territories, Graham White argues that consensus government
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is but a distinct variation of the more traditional Westminster parliamentary model. He maintains
that consensus government in the British style still preserves its foundational convention of
responsible government. The concentration of power is upheld (although perhaps begrudgingly),
there is a clear division between ministers and regular members of the Assembly and underlying
constitutional precepts such as cabinet solidarity and ministerial responsibility are alive and well
in Nunavut.
Accordingly, can one truly speak of a consensus government in Nunavut? In discussing
the NWT, Gurston Dacks levied the criticism that the hybrid system found in the Great White
North is not really a consensus government, but rather simply a non-partisan government. He
rightly argues that the politics are not consensual in the sense that “a collective understanding
[is] reached by applying profoundly accepted shared values to an issue”. (Dacks 1990, 139) Nor
is Nunavut consensual in the way Arend Lijphart described consensus governance.1 Rather, as
Graham White has made the case, Nunavut more closely resembles a ‘deliberative democracy’.
(White 2006, 16) As its name implies, a deliberative democracy is one in which verbal
discussion is central to the process of decision-making. It is a highly participatory form of
governance where its members engage in deliberation in order to hash out problems or to reach
decisions.
As will be argued throughout this work, consensus government is a hybrid system, but
nonetheless one that firmly belongs to the British tradition. It does not stand as an anti-thesis to
Westminster-style democracy. Contrary to what has been deemed to be an exceedingly formal
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and rigid system, Nunavut demonstrates to what extent British parliamentarism can be flexible
and highly adaptable.
Specifics of Consensus Government
The Role of Political Parties Or Rather, Lack Thereof
As an organized collective enterprise composed of like-minded individuals, a political
party has the ultimate goal of controlling governmental decision-making or at the very least
trying to influence it. It is often assumed that all British-style systems must necessarily include
political parties. However, those who argue that such a system cannot function without parties
should remember that the key precepts of governance in Britain as in Canada were established
long before political parties were formed and cabinet was merely a collection of appointed
counsellors. Parties are indeed political features of the Westminster system but are by no means
constitutional ones. The question then becomes, how has Nunavut resisted the establishment of
political parties?
Political parties find their starting point in problems of collective action, that is, situations
in which different individuals may benefit from a particular concerted action. Rational choice
theory comes into play here. Without going into great detail, suffice it to say that every
independent legislator is led by her/his rational decisions that seek to maximize their interests,
thereby inevitably leading to a behavioural equilibrium among them.
According to John Aldrich, there are two ways to achieve a cooperative outcome.
(Aldrich 1995, 33) The first is to agree to cooperate during legislative sessions. He cites the
studies of Axelrod (1984), Hardin (1982) and Taylor (1976) that show that, on average, as long
as independent legislators continue to interact and as long as they deem future payoffs as
advantageous, it can indeed be rational to cooperate. Moreover, as is the case in Nunavut,
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cooperating can be viewed as politically valuable, in the sense that developing a reputation for
being cooperative can increase political capital and can aide in maximizing their preferred
outcomes. Theoretically, however, this type of behaviour can become problematic in repeated
play as any given outcome can be deemed a possible solution. As we shall see later on, much of
this problem is remedied by the institution of caucus as well as by the enforcement of cabinet
solidarity. A second way to cooperate is simply to agree to do so in advance. In order for any
agreement to be effective, it must be binding upon its partners. Again, institutional arrangements
are critical in determining the basis of commitment, and this, in either single or repeated actions.
Thus, a political party, as an endogenous institution, “(…)must be understood not only in
relation to the goals of the actors most consequential for parties, but also in relation to the
electoral, legislative and executive institutions of government (Aldrich 1995, 5). The institutional
mechanisms governing the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, as
well as the decision-making process itself all have an influence on the existence of political
parties within a democracy. What does this mean then for a non-partisan system like Nunavut? If
the main reason for forming a party is so that individuals can better maximize their interests
together rather than alone, why haven’t the people of Nunavut pushed for the creation of political
parties?
As Aldrich makes clear, just because politicians can form political parties doesn’t mean
that they will. (Aldrich 1995, 55) In fact, there may be other means at their disposal for achieving
their goals. This is where Nunavut’s unique historical and political landscape comes into play.
Apart from its common political heritage with the NWT, according to Graham White, Inuit
idealism and pragmatism also play a role in the rejection of parties. They are viewed as
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institutions which “perpetuate and accentuate social divisions” (White 1991, 503) and potentially
even as a threat to Inuit unity.
On a practical level, consensus government without political parties in Nunavut can be
said to function as a permanent minority government. Even without parties, cabinet still remains
the dominant force and cabinet solidarity is upheld. Like in all minority situations, the
government lacks a secure base within parliament. However, if one can rightly claim that cabinet
is lacking legislative support, so too does it not have to face an organized opposition. Indeed,
regular MLAs do not necessarily have a unifying ideology or political will. However, as we
shall see later, this does not mean that they are ineffectual members of the assembly.
The absence of political parties can, however, have a negative impact on its residents.
Parties provide substantive information to evaluate which particular policies and identity issues
will frame the political debate, thereby reducing information costs for the electorate. Hence,
without parties, the cost of political participation in Nunavut is very high: “(…) individuals
should be less able to identify issues and candidates, and less able to place political issues on a
meaningful spectrum.” (Henderson 2004, 140). Despite this, according to the 2004 Nunavut
Household survey, almost 60 percent of respondents agreed that parties did more to divide than
unite and a little under 80 percent claimed they were satisfied with the way their democracy
works. (Henderson 2007, 115). Thus, the people of Nunavut seem willing to bear the costs of a
non-partisan system.
Elections in Nunavut
With no political parties, all candidates who run for election do so as independents. The
implications for the electorate are twofold. Firstly, voters have almost no say in who will actually
make up the cabinet, as the premier and the cabinet are actually selected by secret ballot by all
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the elected MLAs before the first sitting of the House. Secondly, they cannot even show their
approval or disapproval of the government as a whole, as their vote simply relates to their
particular MLA. Henderson argues that this creates a form of gladiatorial politics, where it is not
so much one election that occurs but rather nineteen different ones, “each fought on different
issues and concerns” (Henderson 2007, 120). This means that elections have a tendency to be
focused on local or community issues (especially infrastructural issues) rather than on territorial
politics. (Widdowson & Howard 1999, 28; Henderson 2007, 120).
Legislative Behaviour
Political Culture
Only in the last few decades has a true pan-Inuit identity emerged. As in all projects of
state building, a society is afforded the opportunity to establish new political institutions that
better reflect their political culture and which alter a previous relationship between its citizens
and government. As in most societies, disagreement still exists over what are considered the
traditional Inuit values. Despite this, we can still determine a key set of values and practices that
have a measurable impact on the behaviour of an MLA. Recently, the concept of Inuit
Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) has emerged as a guiding force.
Alisa Henderson points to three main influences on the political culture of Nunavut. One
influence is that of the Canadian political system into which the Inuit have been integrated.
Another is the territorial culture of pre-division NWT. More importantly, however, the crucial
variation in Nunavut stems from the culture of its pre-contact and contact Inuit population
(Henderson 2007, 2).
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Indeed, their experience as small groups of nomadic hunter-gatherers has led them to
develop their own form of decision-making. The very survival of the group depended on the all-
out cooperation of its members. There is a clear preference for making decisions based on
reaching a consensus rather than voting, as they tend to rebuff majoritarian approaches. While
they will accept a strong leadership, it must be “(…) based on demonstrated competence rather
than on ascriptive characteristics and exercised on the understanding that leaders consult
extensively with their people and remain directly accountable to them” (White 2006, 16).
Beyond this, like most Aboriginal nations, the Inuit possess a holistic worldview of their society.
The Bathurst Mandate, first instituted in 1999, is a testament to this all-encompassing mindset.2
Thus, the dynamics within the legislature reflect this political culture. They must be
governed by non-confrontation and must ensure a certain level of harmony within the House.
Interestingly, MLAs regularly hold legislative sessions outside the capital in an effort to bring its
population closer to its representatives. Moreover, every year they actually pack up the whole
legislature (secretaries, clerks and all) and hold a parliamentary session in a community outside
of Iqaluit. Thereby, literally bringing government to the people.
Responsible Government
Before we begin a discussion on how Nunavut’s political institutions actually work, a
brief overview of the fundamental aspect of responsible government Westminster-style is
needed.
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There are four central principles that guide any parliamentary democracy. The first is
cabinet’s monopoly of executive power. Secondly, there is the confidence convention, whereby
the cabinet has the responsibility to maintain the confidence of the legislature, as it is
individually and collectively accountable to the elected House.
The third essential tenet is ministerial responsibility. In a general manner, one can say
there are three meanings to responsible government, whereby responsibility is akin to
accountability. As C.E.S. Franks (1987) explains, in the first sense, responsible government
refers to the reality that ministers and cabinet as a whole wield considerable power and, as such,
are responsible for its use. According to Marshall and Moodie (as seen in Sutherland 1991, 94),
it is a question of legal responsibility whereby ministers are responsible by law for the
management and direction of the government as they are assigned administrative functions of
various departments. Secondly, government is necessarily responsible to its people as it is
viewed as “a trustworthy steward of the nation’s affairs” (Franks 1987, 10). Furthermore,
ministers are responsible and accountable to Parliament itself as it is the source of the
government’s legitimacy and authority (Franks 1987, 10-12).
Lastly, we find the issue of cabinet solidarity whereby all ministers must uphold cabinet
decisions and government policy regardless of their personal views. Interestingly enough, this
convention has in actuality nothing to do with actual decision-making. Rather, it is a political
weapon afforded to the prime minister that developed over the years as a shield against the
monarch. It is a tool at her/his disposal to rein in the ministers of the cabinet to potentially
“obscure from parliament and the public the real source of decision making” (Crick 1966 as seen
in Thompson 1980, 35). It now remains to be seen whether Nunavut fulfills these four principal
concepts.
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Cabinet Without question, most students of northern politics are quick to assert that there
is indeed a level of solidarity between the members of cabinet, but that the premier does not
actually have the ability to enforce it. Because he cannot unilaterally remove ministers and there
is no party discipline to organize her/his cabinet, it seems that s/he cannot properly sanction
her/his ministers. The implication of this is twofold. On the one hand, it can thus be argued that
cabinet is merely a group of individuals operating independently of each other; a group which
lacks coherence and discipline, constantly preoccupied with log-rolling on capital projects
(White 2005, 61). On the other hand, the media has often criticized ministers for being reluctant
to bring up tough divisive issues that could potentially create discord, thereby increasing the
premier’s authority (OBrien 2003, 10). Either way, this reality makes all of cabinet highly
accountable to the legislature as their legitimacy truly comes from the legislature. Furthermore,
there is the formal procedure of the mid-term leadership review, where all MLAs must vote by
secret ballot to maintain confidence in the cabinet and premier. This is by no measure a mere
formality and is taken very seriously.3
Regular MLAs In any other Canadian legislature, the opposition votes according to party
lines, and, thus, often contrary to the executive. Whereas in a traditional Westminster system the
opposition is often rewarded if it votes against the executive, in a consensus system there is
actually little incentive to do so, as MLAs may have more of an opportunity to have their
opinions heard and be incorporated into government legislation. However, in his survey
conducted among MLAs of the NWT, White found that the ordinary members could be very
critical about their level of involvement within the legislative process, some going as far as to
say that consensus government was a sham (White 1991, 515). Despite this, in Nunavut, the
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decision was made to continue with this form of government. In true northern style, 20 out of 24
members agreed with the statement “whether it was the government or an ordinary member who
had the idea for a policy change, it doesn’t matter who gets the credit as long as it is a change for
the better” (White 1991, 516).
Another common characteristic of oppositions is “their relentless fault-finding and finger-
pointing and their objection to everything government does” (O’Brien 2003, 7). One just needs
to read the Hansard transcripts to see how conversation and discussion flow with relative ease in
the House. That being said, according to Kevin O’Brien, a one-time MLA himself, it is common
to hear regular MLAs complain that cabinet does not consult them as often as they would like. It
is claimed that bureaucrats receive more attention and that it is stingy with critical information
regarding policies. An even harsher critic is that it isn’t really interested in achieving consensus.
Thankfully, caucus exists to try at the very least to allay these criticisms.
Caucus There are in actuality two types of caucuses in Nunavut. The first is a regular
members’ caucus. It is by no means equivalent to a formal opposition; however, it does provide
its members with a venue to exchange ideas, information as well as offering the possibility of
coordinating strategies and planning. (White 2006, 13) The second, and more important caucus is
one that comprises all members of the legislature. This meeting that occurs at least once a week
when the House is sitting (and on occasion when it isn’t) is governed by its own unwritten
convention, that of caucus confidentiality. Every member, including the Speaker engage in what
O’Brien describes as a “genuine give and take”, where ministers are treated like ordinary MLAs.
(O’Brien 2003, 8) Decisions can be made within caucus and important and controversial policies
are debated and often even resolved within these meetings. The advantage to this is that once the
House is sitting, conflict is limited and voting often occurs more swiftly. The downside to this,
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however, is that the decision-making process is actually hidden from observers of the legislature.
In reality, these meetings are highly secretive and one only gets a glimpse of the members’
purview in the legislature.
Empirically Assessing Behaviour: Methodology
As previously mentioned, the purpose of this paper is to delve farther into the inner
workings of parliamentary democracy in Nunavut. Previous research has already done a
convincing job in demonstrating to what extent the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and its
government is fully rooted within the Westminster tradition. The intent here is to enrich this
discussion with a small quantitative analysis by looking at the voting patterns of the MLAs
within the legislature.
The simplest and most effective way of determining said patterns is by reviewing the
recorded votes found within the Hansard transcripts of the legislative sessions. This exercise is
based on all the Hansard transcripts available online on the website of the Nunavut legislature
and includes the first, second and third assemblies until March 1st, 2012. Out of 448 sittings
observed, there was in all 52 recorded votes. It must be noted, however, that this number can be
erroneous. Indeed, one transcript was written in Inuktitut and, as this writer is not fluent in this
language, it could not be counted in the research. Also, there were missing transcripts or broken
links for a total of 5 sittings. It must also be noted that included in the research is any recorded
vote that took place while the Committee of The Whole was in session.
For every recorded vote, a value of one was accorded to the MLA if he/she voted in
accordance with a motion or bill. For every MLA who voted against a measure, they were
attributed a score of 0. The results can be viewed in the Annex.
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Discussion of the Results
Overall, the results of this analysis seem to indeed confirm the previous research. We
shall begin by discussing the voting patterns of the ordinary MLAs. As is made evident by the
tables presented in the Annex, it is difficult to discern any type of formal coalition among the
non-ministerial members of the legislature. The issue upon which the members vote clearly bears
an impact on whatever type of alliance they can make. Unfortunately, the numbers themselves do
not really let us clue in on any type of specific voting pattern among them. In fact, they actually
give credence to a long-held criticism of Nunavut’s system. The critics that claim that the
decision-making process is somewhat secretive seem to be justified. Often, when recorded votes
are taken, not all MLAs necessarily take the chance to express their opinions at that particular
time. The main reason for this, as previously mentioned, is caucus. By the time voting occurs
within the House, most members already know where the others stand. Therefore, it becomes
difficult to discern on a realistic level the nature of the debate that takes place as well as the
actual decision-making process that occurs in a particular instance. That being said, as Graham
White has claimed, the ordinary members are not ineffectual: on average in the three assemblies,
the majority of them achieved a winning outcome 86.5 percent of the time.4
One can argue that so high a number seems to indicate that cabinet itself is very weak.
Fortunately, that is most definitely not the case. Interestingly enough, one third of all recorded
votes were unanimous among all MLAs of the legislature (32.7% to be exact). Furthermore,
90.6% of votes resulted in a preferred outcome for the cabinet.5
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But what about cabinet solidarity among ministers? Contrary to what some have deemed
a shoddy institution, it is now very clear that cabinet solidarity is indeed an entrenched
convention in Nunavut. Out of 52 recorded votes, cabinet voted together a total of 47 times,
meaning that ministers voted together 90.4% of the time. The most glaring example of a
minister gone rogue happened in the first legislative assembly. On February 27th, 2002 and again
on March 5th, 2002, there were two recorded votes where Premier Okalik actually voted against
his own cabinet. The government house leader at the time, MLA Ng, introduced a bill that had
the purpose of enriching the pension plans of MLAs. According to Nunatsiaq News, there were
great protests from Nunavummiut who demanded a better use of funds.6 Premier Okalik, along
with Minister Picco and MLA Tootoo were the only ones to vote against such a measure. After
this vote, no sanctions occurred. Presumably, it would have been untenable for the remaining
MLAs to depose MLA Okalik as premier over an issue such as government pension plans.
Adversely, one year later, on March 7th, 2003, the premier actually sought to remove MLA
Anawak from cabinet for publicly opposing cabinet’s decision to move the government’s
petroleum products division from Rankin Inlet to Baker Lake.7 The vote was put to the assembly
and his decision was upheld. Perhaps the reason for which there seems to be more dissension in
the first parliament is that it was effectively a period of transition. From 2003, onwards,
however, it has become clear that a Nunavut premier does indeed wield authority.
To sum up, while cabinet solidarity may not be a perfectly held tenet of parliamentary
democracy, it is now clearly evident that this is a key precept in the politics of Nunavut. Indeed,
there are occasions where ministers go rogue (see Annexes), but not as often as one expects.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I!_+23781)!`3(+43=!XQ*N4!4/?!?34!17!0+5.30!-3(4+7(!-:/(Y)!F8(/14+/O!F3C4)!"MM"=!!!!Z.11-[\\CCC=(8(/14+/O7(:+(3=5/\/05.+<34\(8(/<81M"M#MK\(3C4\(8(/<81\"M#MKa&=.19:]=!J!P3::)!b+9=!X^G/:+G!289-4!N(/C/G!@079!H*cdY)!F8(/14+/O!F3C4)!"MM#=!Z.11-[\\CCC=(8(/14+/O7(:+(3=5/\/05.+<34\(8(/<81M#M"&$\(3C4\(8(/<81\#M"&$aM&=.19:]=!
! &J!
Consensus Government: A Canadian Mode of Governance
To conclude, while Inuit political culture has most definitely had an impact on Nunavut’s
legislative and governmental approach, it is clear that its system is firmly placed within
Westminster tradition. While indeed a hybrid, it nonetheless upholds all aspects of responsible
government to a certain degree. The real modification to the traditional form is the absence of
political parties. However, given the size of the legislature as well as the political culture behind
this lack, one can claim that consensus is more easily achieved.
Furthermore, caucus brings a new level of cooperation into the decision-making process.
While subject to its own set of criticisms, it would be hard to argue that such an institution would
not be enviable in other legislatures. Indeed, at a time when political apathy and rejection are at a
height, attempts at increasing cooperation and harmony among political parties would surely be
welcomed.
Consensus government does in reality deviate from a fundamental feature of British
governance in that the premier is not solely responsible for the appointing and dismissing of
cabinet. However, as our analysis shows, that does not mean the premier is a weak actor. Rather
depending on party discipline to control his cabinet, the premier’s authority is “dependent on
skills at conciliating and facilitating” (White 1991, 505).
The mere existence of consensus government attests to the resiliency of the Westminster
system. Indeed, that Inuit culture has been mixed with British-style governance and has so far
flourished demonstrates to what extent this mode of governance is flexible and adaptable to
! &K!
various situations. Moreover, it also can be said to provide a model for incorporating Aboriginal
values into Canadian political institutions.
P+6:+7;0/-.?!
!
Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Print.
Franks, C.E.S. The Parliament of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Print.!
!
Henderson, Alisa. Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007. Print.
Henderson, Alisa. "Northern political culture?: Political behaviour in Nunavut." Études Inuit
Studies 28.1 (2004): 133-54. Érudit. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.
<http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/012643ar>.
Légaré, André. "Canada’s Experiment with Aboriginal Self-Determination in Nunavut From
Vision to Illusion." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15 (2008): 335-
67. Web. 23 Mar. 2012. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/33363690/Nunavut-from-vision-to-
illusion-by-Andre-Legare>.
O'Brien, Kevin. "Some Thoughts on Consensus Government in Nunavut." Canadian
Parliamentary Review 26.4 (2003): 6-10. Web. 18 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=60&art=26>.
Sutherland, S. L. "Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is Its
Own Problem." Canadian Journal of Political Science 24.1 Mar. : 91-120. JSTOR. Web.
2 Apr. 2012.
Thompson, Elaine. "The 'Washminster' mutation." Australian Journal of Political Science 15.2
! &L!
(1980): 32-40. Web. 26 Mar. 2012. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080.00323268008401755>.
White, Graham. Cabinets and First Ministers. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005. Print.
White, Graham. "Traditional aboriginal values in a Westminster parliament: The legislative
assembly of Nunavut." The Journal of Legislative Studies 12.1 Mar. (2006): 8-31. Web.
21 Mar. 2012. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080.13572330500483930a>.
!
White, Graham. "Westminster in the Arctic: The Adaptation of British Parliamentarism in the
Northwest Territories." Canadian Journal of Political Science 24.3 Sept. (1991): 499-
523.
JSTOR. Web. 21 Feb. 2012.
Widdowson, Frances, and Albert Howard. "Corruption North of 60." Institute for
Research on Public Polic. N.p., Jan. 1999. Web. 22 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jan99/widdowso.pdf>.
! "M!
ANNEX
! "&!
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