levinas and interfaith dialogue

LEVINAS AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

RYAN C. URBANO

University of San Carlos, Cebu City, The Philippines

For Levinas dialogue occurs when one is open to and receptive of the Other. He cautions, however, thatalthough dialogue impedes violence, it should not be pursued unilaterally or vigorously, because this canalso lead to violence. The abolition of violence, which is the goal at which dialogue aims, can instead turnviolent in the face of unrestrained persuasive discourse. Vigilance and caution must be maintained ifdialogue is not to lapse into hostility and aggression. It is important to respect differences andacknowledge insoluble problems in order to avoid animosity. Without recognition and respect, dialoguecan become adversarial and antagonistic.

1. INTERFAITH DIALOGUE AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE

In today’s globalizing world, religious diversity is a pressing issue not only in the academicdisciplines of philosophy, theology and sociology but also in the lives of persons who areuncomfortable with the many religions in their midst. Nowadays more than beforeinterfaith encounter is unavoidable, and interfaith dialogue has become an imperative.Michael Amaladoss captures this necessity thus:

Once we have recognized in other religions some action of God, dialogue with them becomes notonly an option, but a duty and a necessity. The other religions become allies to collaborate with andnot enemies to overcome. Dialogue with other religions is no longer an end in itself, nor a steptowards proclamation, but an integral element in the promotion of the Reign of God.1

The need for interfaith dialogue is spurred by the phenomenon of globalization that is nowsweeping the world.2 Globalization is not only an economic and political process that leadsto increasing linkages; it also involves intercultural awareness and exchanges that influencethe religious realm. As Anthony Giddens writes: ‘In a globalizing world, whereinformation and images are routinely transmitted across the globe, we are all regularlyin contact with others who think differently, and live differently, from ourselves.’3 He saysthat this cross-cultural contact is inevitable in today’s world, and there are two possibleresponses, specifically cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism. Proponents of cosmopoli-tanism ‘welcome and embrace this cultural complexity’, while those of fundamentalism‘find it disturbing and dangerous.’4 While cosmopolitanism takes globalization as anopportunity that promotes diversity and enhances freedom, fundamentalism sees it as athreat to one’s identity that drives one to vigorously defend tradition.

It may seem that globalization standardizes all aspects of human life, but Giddens notesthat such ‘cultural standardisation’ is not its chief outcome. Such uniformity is a ‘relativelysuperficial cultural veneer’; its ‘more profound effect . . . is to produce greater local culturaldiversity, not homogeneity.’5 In short, globalization brings greater awareness of thecultural differences not only within but also across geographical boundaries. If this is the

r 2010 The Author. The Heythrop Journalr 2010 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

HeyJ XLVIII (2010), pp. 1–14 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00635.xHeyJ LIII (2012), pp. 148–161

case, then the need for more open discussion and dialogue is of paramount importance,especially if fundamentalism, as Giddens describes it, is to be avoided.6

Today transnational migration, whether for economic or political reasons, bringspeople of different religions together. Through fast and easy access to communication andtravel, the encounter of religions becomes a more regular and everyday occurrence.7

People have become aware of other religions for a variety of reasons. There is the internetthat makes readily available information about religions, which have become a regularcourse offering in many educational institutions worldwide. Translations of theDhamapada, Dao De Jing, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, as well as the Torah, Bibleand Koran, abound on the shelves of almost all bookshops in the world. This remarkabletrend conveys the need for a conscious effort to discuss the true meaning of interfaithdialogue in order to avoid intolerance and violence.

For philosophy to gain relevance in these times, an urgent part of its task is to clarify thetrue nature of dialogue. ‘It is thus not out of the question, in our time,’ Emmanuel Levinasremarks, ‘to speak of a philosophy of dialogue and oppose it to the philosophical traditionof the unity of the I or the system, and self-sufficiency, and immanence.’8 Here Levinasrecognizes the enormous need to think about the meaning and practice of dialogue as ‘aresult of the trials of the twentieth century since the First World War.’9

The clash of religions could be one reason for violence. Such clashes have become sofrequent, there is no need to enumerate them here. Though religions are ‘the cause of somuch strife, war, and rivalry’, however, they could also serve as gateways for peace,mutual understanding, and justice.10

This article will discuss how Levinas’s ethical and religious philosophy can contribute tointerfaith dialogue. It does not offer either alternative principles or a systematic approachfor interfaith communication, nor does it provide specific guidelines on how this dialogueshould be carried out. Instead Levinas’s thought provides ‘conditions of possibility’ forsuch a faith encounter.11 Levinas’s ethics of responsibility provides a starting point forinterreligious dialogue.

2. THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

The meaning of interfaith dialogue must be explored before we explain the significance ofethics to interfaith dialogue. According to Paul F. Knitter, dialogue is ‘the exchange ofexperience and understanding between two or more partners with the intention that allpartners grow in experience.’12 This definition implies that dialogue is not a mere gathering ofpersons. Dialogue is rather a meeting of two or more participants with the intention ofcommunicating and sharing their experiences. The goals of dialogue, according to CatherineCornille, ‘range from simply fostering mutual understanding and tolerance, to promotingcollaboration and friendship, to serving the purpose of mutual transformation and growth.’13

Dialogue among people of different religious faiths is known as interreligious dialogue.Aasulv Lande describes it as ‘a conscious process, in which deliberate efforts towardunderstanding the religiously ‘other’ or ‘strange’ are implied.’ Land distinguishes it froman ‘interreligious encounter’, because the latter connotes a meeting of ‘people from variousreligious traditions . . . without a deliberate intention of interacting or learning from theother party.’ Moreover Land considers ‘reflections on religious encounters as part ofinterreligious dialogue’ because ‘the encounter has attained a conscious level withdeliberate efforts at understanding and relating to a counterpart.’14

2 RYAN C. URBANO LEVINAS AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE 149

The heart of interreligious dialogue, according to Francis Cardinal Arinze, is that it

is a meeting of heart and mind between followers of various religions. It is communication betweentwo believers at the religious level. It is a walking together towards truth and a working together inprojects of common concern. It is a religious partnership without hidden agendas or motives.15

Cardinal Arinze contends that interreligious dialogue should not be understood as mere‘mutual information’, ‘an academic study of religions’, or ‘mutual tolerance or peaceful co-existence between the followers of different religions’, and it should not seek to fuse manyreligions into one common religion. For him the participants of interreligious dialoguemust possess ‘such mental attitudes as respect, listening, sincerity, openness, andwillingness to receive and work with one another.’16

Michael Barnes makes a distinction between ‘interfaith’ and ‘interreligious’ dialogue;‘the former’, he says, ‘has inter-personal, the latter more inter-systemic, connotations.’17

However, in this article, ‘interfaith dialogue’ will be used interchangeably with inter-religious dialogue. The two are not totally different because they presuppose the face-to-face meeting which best exemplifies Levinas’s philosophy of ethical encounter.

3. THREE MAIN APPROACHES TO THE DIVERSITY OF RELIGIONS

As a background, three approaches to religious diversity will be discussed. These aredifferent ways of evaluating the claims of other religions. They deal with theepistemological issue of how an advocate of one religion confronts the truth-claims ofanother, as well as the moral issue of how to behave in relation to believers in anotherreligion. The three approaches are exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism.

Exclusivism is the view that there is only one true religion and that others are pseudo-religions. Salvation, deliverance from suffering and evil, contentment and other religiousgoals are to be found only in this one true religion.18 Proponents of exclusivism contendthat if one is to be saved, one must realize that truth and salvation can only be attainedthrough this one religion. This accounts for aggressive missionary effort to evangelizethose who have not yet ‘seen’ the truth.

An objection to the exclusivist view is that there are people who are faithful to theirreligion and who live according to its moral precepts. If they are not saved because they donot know the God of a purportedly true religion, it would be unjust for that God ‘tocondemn a person who has never heard or is unable to understand what is necessary forsalvation.’19 And ‘if God truly desired that all persons come to know, love, and worshiphim’, then he would not limit his revelation ‘to a particular time, way, person, community,or culture.’20 A loving and infinite God would find ways to send his message effectively todifferent people according to their cultural patterns and modes of perception. Anothercritique is that, since there are many exclusivist religions, it would be difficult to decidewhich religion one should adhere to. One’s choice could not be based on ‘the moral livesprescribed or lived, for the virtues and acts encouraged often do not greatly differ amongthe respective religions, and adherents of all faiths seem capable of living morallypraiseworthy lives.’21

Inclusivism, like exclusivism, is the view that there is one true religion. But unlikeexclusivism, other religions are viewed not as false but as lesser paths towards salvation.The adherents of this view claim that ‘salvation is at work throughout the world, whetherothers know it or not.’22 The path to salvation is accessible to other believers ‘only because

LEVINAS AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE 3150 RYAN C. URBANO

they meet certain criteria revealed in one true religion or are accounted righteous onaccount of a specific salvific act.’23

The inclusivist approach is criticized in that, if adherents of other religions can be savedbecause their religion and lifestyle meet certain requirements of the one true religion, thenmission, proclamation and even conversion become unnecessary.24 Believers in otherreligions could be allowed to continue living their own faith, since they can still be savedeven if they do not know or recognize the true religion.

Pluralism is the view that all religions, in spite of the various ways they respond to thedivine reality, are equally legitimate ways of attaining salvation. One popular proponent ofthis view is John Hick.25 Hick deploys Immanuel Kant’s distinctiond of noumenon andphenomenon to explain what he calls his ‘pluralistic hypothesis’. The divine reality is thenoumenon and thus unknowable. It is perceived and experienced by believers in theirrespective cultures. For Hick the different religions represent various ways of interpretingdivine reality, the authenticity of which can be evaluated on the basis of their power tochange their adherents from being self-centered to being other-centered. Hence, for Hickthere is no religion which can claim that it alone is the true path to salvation.

The pluralistic approach is problematic because it tends towards relativism andskepticism – relativism because, if the divine reality is unknowable, then all interpretationsand perceptions of it are equally valid and ‘there is no criterion for judging either truth orethical conduct.’26 Hick’s criterion for a genuine religion will evidently not work, for thereis no way of knowing what the divine reality requires. It also leads to skepticism becausethe impenetrability of the divine reality frustrates the conviction of followers of anyparticular religion.27

This article will not debate these different approaches to religious diversity. It will showinstead that these three approaches look at religions as asserting epistemological truthclaims which overlook the ethical dimension (in the Levinasian sense) of interfaithencounter. Interfaith dialogue cannot progress unless there is a way to make theparticipants in the dialogue trust one another. First and foremost, religion is not a set ofdogmas, creeds and rituals; religion is primarily a relationship resulting from an encounterwith God. For Levinas this encounter is ethically mediated by the relation of one person toanother. To pit religions against each other’s epistemological truth claims is to inciteanimosity, bigotry and, worse, violence. This is what this article will show as it proposes aLevinasian approach to religious diversity.

4. CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY FOR AN INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

In her article ‘Conditions for the Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue on God’, CatherineCornille lists the following features of a dialogue on God: 1) the possibility of knowingthe other, 2) openness and commitment, 3) recognition of the historical and culturalrelativity of all religious forms, 4) belief in the propositional force and the dynamic natureof truth, 5) belief in the common ground or goal of all religions, and 6) recognition of theother religion as a source of truth.28 Cornille thinks that ‘unless the other religion isregarded as a possible source of truth or revelation which might add to the existingunderstanding of ultimate reality, there will be little incentive for a properly theologicaldialogue.’29 Since dialogue is not a static but a dynamic activity, ‘the conditions fordialogue need not be fulfilled a priori but may come to realization in the process ofdialogue itself.’30


Knitter, in his widely acclaimed book No Other Name? A Critical Survey of ChristianAttitudes Towards the World Religions, summarizes the conditions for interreligiousdialogue in three important points: 1) Dialogue must be based on personal religiousexperience and firm truth claims, 2) Dialogue must be based on the recognition of thepossible truth in all religions; the ability to recognize this truth must be grounded in thehypothesis of a common ground and goal for all religions, and 3) Dialogue must be basedon openness to the possibility of genuine change/conversion.31

These conditions are no doubt worth pursuing and must even be observed withcommitment. They presuppose, however, knowledge and understanding not only of theother person but also of one’s own religious tradition and background. The aim of thisarticle is to show that the above-mentioned conditions proposed by both Cornille andKnitter, although necessary, are not sufficient. An ethical dimension in the Levinasiansense is needed for an interfaith dialogue to be possible. As Levinas says, ‘Only a beingwho is responsible for another being can enter into dialogue with it. Responsibility, in theetymological sense of the term, not the mere exchange of words, is what is meant bydialogue, and it is only in the former case that there is meeting.’32

Ethics for Levinas is inseparable from religion, such that unless the latter works withinthe matrix of ethical relationships, it will fail to be authentic. A religion grounded solely inabstruse dogmas and excessive rituals has no meaning, because this disregards the moralconcern and love due to the Other. This kind of religion turns the self’s attention awayfrom the Other, perhaps toward creeds and rituals which only distract from the care andresponsibility that the self should have for the Other. Without ethics, religion becomes anempty discourse and a meaningless ritual. Ethics is the very core and substance of religion.

‘Levinas’s analysis’, Michael Purcell writes, ‘offers a prolegomena or point of entry toany proper understanding of religion on the basis of phenomenological analysis.’33

Similarly, according to Jeffrey Kosky, ‘Levinas’s analysis of responsibility can be seen as adiscourse on religion that, at least in its intentions, holds forth without recourse to theauthority of any faith or religious tradition . . . . [The] religiosity met in Levinas’sphenomenology of responsibility is not an actual religion but the possibility ornonnoematic meaning of religion.’34 In other words, Levinas’s ethical philosophy opensup the religious dimension without making this dimension an object of systematic anddiscursive thinking, a privileged area, so it seems, of any religious tradition. Once religionbecomes an object of discursive thought, it becomes secularized and its transcendentalcharacter is lost.35

By religion, Levinas means the transcendental nature of the ethical relation. The Otheris transcendence. No real religion can be founded solely on immanence or the Same, forthis is but a masked atheism. The religion of immanence or the same, if such a descriptionbe allowed, is also a form of idolatry, a kind of fetishism of the ego that is absorbed in theexpansion of its freedom and sphere of influence. If religion is a religion of immanence ofthe ego, it then reduces other religions to itself, which is a form of intolerance and violence.This is an inclusivist type of religion, where other religions are absorbed and assimilatedinto its egoism. Such a religion is therefore inclined to reject other religions if it cannotincorporate them into its own identity. In this sense, religion becomes exclusivist. It tendsto engender a form of violence through the proselytization and persecution of those whohold other beliefs.

Levinas describes as primitive any religion which destroys the ethical relation. He says,‘Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the superiorform but the forever primitive form of religion.’36 Though it is not clear what this primitive


form of religion means exactly, it can be surmised that it is a religion that allows for humansacrifices. In contemporary times, this could take the form of a religion where religiousrules, dogmas and rituals are upheld even if this amounts to suppressing the rights andfreedoms of its members. It is therefore a kind of religious fundamentalism that seeks toconvert others at all costs.

If the mark of a true religion is its ethical component, however, then any religionfounded on an infinite responsibility for the Other excludes no religion. Instead it embracesand recognizes others as fellow believers and co-pilgrims on the path towards God. Afterall, no genuine religion is devoid of morality.37 What all religions have in common is anethical imperative that promotes the welfare not only of their own members but also ofother faiths. In cultivating this ethical dimension, any religion will not look at an-otherreligion as an enemy and threat to its own existence. This will allay any fear or suspicionthat one is out to crush the other. Instead, religions will look at each other as brothers, asfellow pilgrims, who are called and elected to be responsible for others and to respect eachother’s differences. Aloysius Pieris writes:

Phenomenologically, therefore, religions are so many alternative configurations of basic humanvalues. And as such, it is in their nature to provoke comparison and mutual criticism, confrontationand reciprocal correction, these being the intermediary stages between tolerance, with whichdialogue begins, and positive participation, in which dialogue should culminate.38

It cannot be denied that although Levinas develops a philosophy of the Other, his thoughtsare informed by the Jewish religion. Many of the ideas and concepts he employs arereminiscent of his Jewish background. This however does not diminish the validity andtruth of his philosophy. His abhorrence of anti-Semitism can be viewed as his attackagainst any philosophy, religion, ideology, and worldview that is anti-humanism. For himto be a Jew is to be authentically human. He is not thereby promoting his religion at theexpense and exclusion of others. His second major book Otherwise than Being or BeyondEssence is dedicated not only ‘to the memory of those who were closest among the sixmillion assassinated by the National Socialists’ but also to ‘the millions on millions of allconfessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism.’ As Richard Cohen remarks: ‘Levinas always links the moral dimension, theheight of the other person, to religion, in a broad nondenominational sense.’39

Every religion must be considered an Other, a face. This is so because its adherents arepersons. Levinas says that ‘the notion of the face . . . opens other perspectives.’40 If religionis considered in this way, that is, if it is seen from the perspective of a believer who is aperson, a human Other, the tendency towards fundamentalism, dogmatism and violencewithers. This is so because this way of understanding religion promotes an attitude ofopenness and sympathy, which helps a person see possibilities and alternatives not only inthe religion of others but also in his own. In being open to other religions, a personunderstands deeply the cultural world where the Other resides. It makes him see in abroader perspective why the other person behaves differently from himself. Through this,he will learn respect for the Other and even help to promote the Other’s freedom anddignity.

Interfaith dialogue will fail if it is construed mainly as a cognitive encounter where onemakes an effort only to know and understand the other’s religion. Knowledge, as Levinassays, tends to assimilate and dominate the Other. It ‘would thus be the relation of man toexteriority, the relation of the Same to the other, in which the Other finally finds itselfstripped of its alterity, in which it becomes interior to my knowledge, in which


transcendence makes itself immanence.’41 One cannot help but understand the otherperson’s religion through one’s cultural and religious categories. ‘All understanding, eventhe most noble attempt at understanding the other through categories belonging to his orher own tradition, is determined by the particular religious and cultural framework fromwhich one starts out.’42 Though this is inevitable, its influence on one’s thinking andadverse impact on the Other can be minimized if at the sensitive level of encounter ormeeting, one takes up the responsibility that the Other has placed on one’s shoulder. ForLevinas, before the person encounters the Other in knowledge, he is already burdened bythe responsibility to respect and uphold the Other’s welfare. Responsibility for the Otherprecedes the understanding of the Other. The ethical encounter comes first beforeunderstanding occurs. It is in the primordial encounter that genuine dialogue can occurand proceed.

At this point, it is relevant to elaborate on Levinas’s notion of dialogue. For him, ‘thephilosophy of dialogue is oriented toward a concept of the ethical (Begriff des Ethischen)that is separated from the tradition that derives the ethical (das Ethische) from knowledgeand from Reason as the faculty of the universal, and sees in the ethical a layer superposedupon being.’43 Dialogue for Levinas is an asymmetrical interpersonal relation. It meansthat the relation is one of inequality because the self is a servant to the other person who isconsidered a master. Being a servant means that the self is indebted to his master in termsof responsibility. Moreover this responsibility is infinite, and so the debt cannot be fullyrepaid. To set a limitation to this responsibility is to put the self over the Other, and thisbreaks the asymmetry of the ethical relation. For Levinas this responsibility constitutes thevery subjectivity of the self. Levinas gives credit to a fellow Jewish thinker, Martin Buber,for introducing the notion of dialogue in intersubjective relations. He says: ‘It is certainlythe irreducibility of the ‘‘I-Thou’’ relation of the Meeting, the irreducibility of the Meetingto any relation with the determinable and the objective, that remains Buber’s principalcontribution to Western thought.’44 Levinas thinks that it is in Buber’s thought that Beingacquires a new meaning. ‘The problems of knowledge and truth must thus be put inrelation to the event of meeting and dialogue.’45 In other words, Being and truth are nowconstrued as intersubjective and dialogical.

Buber asserts that authentic dialogue is an I-Thou relation. According to Levinas’sreading, Buber construes this relation as one where

the presence of an interlocutor to me cannot be reduced to the presence of an object that my gazedetermines and upon which it makes predicative judgments. Not that the interlocutor cannot beenvisaged thematically and become the support of my judgment, but then he or she is precisely nolonger the one I approach in dialogue, but the one I consider as a number within an aggregatewhole, useful for some technically realizable plan.46

This is a relation where the I treats the other person as a person, a You, and not as anobject. ‘It is precisely because the You is absolutely other than the I that there is, betweenthe one and the other, dialogue.’47 As Levinas explains further:

The statement that others do not appear to me as objects does not mean just that I do not take theother person as a thing under my power, a ‘something.’ It also asserts that the very relationoriginally established between myself and others, between myself and someone, cannot properly besaid to reside in an act of knowledge that, as such, is seizure and comprehension, the besiegement ofobjects.48


The I-Thou relation is therefore a relation of equality, of presence, where the selfacknowledges the presentation of the other as a self just like itself. Treating the otherindividual not as a person but as an object is what Buber calls an I-it relation.

In spite of the important place Levinas gives to Buber’s contribution to dialogue, hedisagrees with the understanding of dialogue as a relation of equality and reciprocity. Hisreason is that Buber’s I-Thou relation, although it recognizes the Other as a subject andnot as an object (in contrast to an I-it relation), is still a relation of equality which puts theself and the other person at the same level. This kind of relation is still mediated by Being,which emphasizes the Same, and obscures the otherness or difference of the other person.As Steven Smith explains, Levinas ‘rejects the subordination of relations with beings to arelation with Being, seeing in this ‘ontologism’ the expression of a tyrannical theoreticalattitude of ideal self-confirmation that has dominated Western philosophy.’49 Thefollowing passage shows Levinas’s reasoning:

To Buber, the Thou that the I solicits is already, in that appeal, heard as an I who says thou to me.The appeal to the Thou by the Iwould thus be, for the I, the institution of reciprocity, an equality orequity from the start. Whence the understanding of the I as I, and the possibility of an adequatethematization of the I. The idea of the I or of a Myself in general is immediately derived from therelation: a total reflection on myself would be possible and thus the elevation of the Myself to thelevel of the concept, to Subjectivity above the lived centrality of the I.50

What Levinas is trying to say is that Buber’s I-Thou relation, being a reciprocalrelationship, determines the identity and meaning of both I and Thou, thereby raising thisrelationship to the level of a concept. It should be noted that for Levinas, a concept isproduced by a subject thinking of an object; so Buber’s I-Thou relation betrays thesubjectivity of both the I and the Thou, since the relation is still mediated by a concept.‘The I and the You are not embraceable objectively, there is no and possible between them,they form no totality.’51 This is why for Levinas, when the I approaches the Thou, itapproaches the Thou as a responsible subject prior to the former’s speaking to the latter.‘In my own analyses’, Levinas remarks, ‘the approach to others is not originally in myspeaking out to the other, but in my responsibility for him or her. That is the originalethical relation.’52

Levinas further criticizes Buber by saying that the latter’s notion of dialogue isreminiscent of Husserl’s notion of the intentionality of consciousness. Levinas explains:

Does not the thought to which dialogue organically and primordially belongs, in Buber, remainwithin the element of consciousness? It has seemed to me essential to stress the irreducibility ofresponsibility towards others to the intentionality of consciousness, to a thought that knows, to athought closed to the transcendence of theOther, and ensuring, as knowledge, equality between theidea and ideatum: whether it be in a strict noetic-noematic parallel, or the adequation of its truth, orthe fullness of the intuition ‘fulfilling’ the goal of theMeinen [to mean], satisfying it as one satisfies aneed. The ethical relation to the Other person, the proximity, the responsibility for others is not asimple modulation of intentionality; it is the concrete modality in which there is produced a non-indifference of one to the other or of the same to theOther, that is, a relation from the Same to whatis out of all proportion with the Same, and is, in a sense, not of the ‘same kind.’53

In Buber’s dialogical thought, the self is now viewed as a relation and no longer as asubstance. ‘It can only exist as an ‘‘I’’ addressing itself to a ‘‘Thou’’, or grasping an ‘‘It’’.’54

But in claiming this, Buber reduces and incorporates the self into this relation even thoughhe tries to maintain the distance between the I and the Thou. As Levinas says, ‘Man is notmerely identifiable with the category of distance and meeting, he is a being sui generis.’55


As noted above, Levinas does not understand dialogue as a reciprocal relation. The Icannot demand from the Other the same responsibility; a greater responsibility is placedon the shoulder of the I. This responsibility is exclusive and non-transferable ‘as if myneighbor called me urgently and called none other than myself, as if I were the only oneconcerned.’56 Levinas further describes this responsibility as:

Gratuitous responsibility resembling that of hostage, and going as far as taking the other’s place,without requiring reciprocity. Foundation of the ideas of fraternity and expiation for the otherman. Here, then, contrary to Buber’s I-Thou, there is no initial equality.57

Equality and reciprocity as a condition and rule of dialogue reduce dialogue tomere objective discourse. When rigid rules and conditions for dialogue are set, dialoguetypically fails. These rules and conditions reflect the bias of one of the partnersin the dialogue. Even if the rules are set by a party other than the ones involvedin the dialogue, this already determines, in one way or another, the expected outcome orpurpose to be achieved. If genuine dialogue is to happen, it must be as spontaneous as itcan possibly be. The encounter cannot be forced and predetermined. It should be theethical encounter itself that animates the parties involved in such a dialogue. In otherwords, responsibility for the Other should dictate the direction and outcome of thedialogue.

To engage in an interfaith dialogue is to welcome the Other, and to receive the Other asa partner in dialogue is to put into question one’s freedom.58 By extension, it is also to putinto question one’s expression of faith.59 The self examines itself as to whether its stanceand comportment deprives the Other of the justice he or she deserves. Just as the self’sresponsibility for the Other constitutes its subjectivity, so does dialogue with the Othermakes the self more aware of its own subjectivity. It constitutes as well as enriches thissubjectivity. The consequences of dialogue are not, however, as important as the dialogueitself. Michael Barnes says that ‘the results of dialogue are less significant than thecontinuing and fundamentally ethical encounter which the practice of dialogue pro-motes.’60 The ‘ethical precedes doctrine, and does not worry about the dogmatic upsets itpresages.’61 To be worried about the possibility of overturning one’s doctrinal creedthrough the Other already forfeits one’s ethical responsibility for the Other. This worry isalready the work of the Same and not of the ethical subject who is subjected toresponsibility by the presence of the Other.

Religious institutions together with their cherished dogmas and beliefs are founded on akind of rationality that Levinas calls totality. If Levinas were to assess these institutions, hewould have nothing against them; he is wary only of the violence these institutions mayengender if their dogmas and beliefs are not grounded in an ethical relation. In interfaithdialogue these dogmas and beliefs should be examined and assessed in the presence ofother religions. The religious encounter, to apply Levinas’s thought, is first and foremostan ethical encounter. The original ethical relationship, according to Levinas, is peace, ‘theantecedent and non-allergic presence of the Other.’62 Proximity or the ethical encounterwith the Other, according to Levinas, ‘is communication, agreement, understanding, orpeace. Peace is incumbent on me in proximity, the neighbor cannot relieve me of it. Peacethen is under my responsibility.’63

It is through this peace encounter that real dialogue can begin. In other words, the keyidea in this dialogue is that one must be open to and be receptive of the Other as a partnerin dialogue with the hope that the dialogue will enrich the faith of both the participants.‘Faith’, Barnes writes, ‘is always ‘‘inter-faith’’, formed and practiced in relationship with


others.’64 Passivity, or one’s vulnerability to the ethical appeal of the Other, is Levinas’sterm for this receptiveness to the Other. The goal is not to convince, convert or evenimpose on the other what one believes. Rather, the aim is to respect the radical alterity ofthe Other. Only then can there be mutual understanding, mutual enrichment of eachother’s faith, and collaboration for noble causes such as the promotion of world peace andjustice, poverty eradication, environmental sustainability and protection, human rightsadvocacy and women’s empowerment. Respecting the otherness of the Other, according toBarnes, is ‘very persuasive and promising for the future of inter-faith relations, especiallywhere history and culture conspire to prevent rather than enable communication acrossthe divide.’65 This explains why Levinas strongly suggests that one’s cherished principles,beliefs and cultural presuppositions or prejudices must give way to responsibility for theOther. Levinas writes:

One must deliberately abstain from the convenience of ‘historical rights,’ ‘rights of enrootedness,’‘undeniable principles’ and ‘the inalienable human condition.’ One must refuse to be caught up inthe tangle of abstractions, whose principles are often evident, but whose dialectic, be it ever sorigorous, is murderous and criminal.66

For Levinas, all these must be given up in order to truly meet and encounter theOther. These principles and beliefs are egoistic and totalizing expressions that increasethe freedom and power of the Same and which are impediments to genuinedialogue.

Mediation in interfaith dialogue is successful only if no single religion dominates and ifit maintains respect for the difference and alterity of other religions. The mediation shouldnot result in a totality that encompasses and fuses the dialogue partners into ahomogeneity. Levinas says that the ‘mediation characteristic of Western philosophy ismeaningful only if it is not limited to reducing distances.’67 In an interfaith dialogue, theproximity of the participants must not be condensed in a kind of universalism thateliminates the particular and unique identity of the participants. Otherwise fundament-alism and violence set in. Could it also be that this fundamentalism and violence aremotivated by resentment because the other’s identity is not respected? Fundamentalismmay then be viewed as a reaction to an oppressive condition caused by the totalizingsystems of modernity; or it is a way of coping with and a defiance of the climate ofrelativism or uncertainty (skepticism) engendered by the postmodern condition. AsWilliam Raeper and Linda Smith explain:

Believers in an old-style world-view with its absolutes of right and wrong, God and the createdorder, find themselves in danger of being overwhelmed by uncertainty in the postmodern world.In a hurry to re-establish order out of the postmodern chaos, new converts to the fundamentalistway of being are inadvertently encouraging the further fragmentation of society by their verydefiance of it. For the embracing of the fundamentalist spirit entails the taking of fragmentation toits logical conclusion. One particular and specific fragment within a tradition is made the primaryfocus. It is then expanded into an all-encompassing ideology and world-view through which lifemaybe ordered afresh.68

Fundamentalism as an ideology precludes dialogue. This is so because ‘with certaintygiven a new and unshakeable foundation, the need to listen to and be in dialogue with thebeliefs of others is removed. In consequence, opportunities to understand and to developthe ability to empathize with others are diminished.’69

Levinas cautions that although dialogue aims at overcoming violence whenever thereare differences, disagreement cannot always be settled, and so should not be pursued


unilaterally and vigorously to the point of violence. The abolition of violence, which is thegoal at which the dialogue aims, can itself entail violence. As Levinas says:

There are oppositions between men that, at first blush, like so many others, to do no more than giverise to reflection and discussions, call for committees, conferences and institutions, to dispelviolence. One soon perceives that all the difficulties they contain can, in fact be overcome. All butone. And the last difficulty remains insoluble and annoying because, without realizing it and out ofpatience, the minds dealing with it turn toward violence and guile, speak of conversion andexpulsion, of using force and driving into the sea – of too bad about this or that or the other thing.After violent thoughts, pity is no more.70

For Levinas, ethics is ‘the search for a proximity beyond ideas exchanged, a proximity thatlasts even after dialogue has become impossible.’71 Ethics persists beyond dialogue becauseit is ‘maturity and patience for insoluble problems.’72 The objective of dialogue is not somuch the attainment of mutual agreement as the doing away with ‘proselytism andpropaganda, not in order to find some most-common-denominator platform, but becausethey have understood that in certain conflicts persuasion itself is violence andrepression.’73 It is for this reason that vigilance and caution must be maintained so thatdialogue does not lapse into violence. It is important ‘to recognize and name thoseinsoluble substances and keep them from exploding in violence, guile or politics, to keepwatch where conflicts tend to break out, a new religiosity and solidarity.’74

5. CONCLUSION

Totality will always tend to generate war and other forms of violence because it obviatesplurality and infinity. Any religion that implicitly or explicitly fosters totality betrays thereal meaning of religion which involves relating to God concretely as expressed in one’sresponsibility for the Other. What this article has shown is the importance of Levinas’sethical philosophy as a condition for the possibility of interfaith dialogue. Levinas neitherprovides the content of dialogue nor articulates its purpose and goal. What can be gleanedfrom his philosophy of intersubjectivity is the way dialogue is to be made possible and themanner in which it is to be conducted. He proposes an ethics of dialogue.

It appears that for Levinas, the purpose and outcome of dialogue are largely determinedby how it has been initiated and carried out. In the absence of ethical proximity, dialoguecannot begin. Respect for the radical alterity of the Other must be maintained andsustained lest the dialogue fail and the outcome become violent. Without such respectdialogue becomes adversarial and antagonistic, thereby giving way to animosity,antagonism, enmity and hatred. As Levinas says: ‘Dialogue is the non-indifference ofthe you to the I, a dis-interested sentiment certainly capable of degenerating into hatred,but a chance for what we must – perhaps with prudence – call love and resemblance inlove.’75

For Levinas, genuine dialogue is an ethical encounter rather than an objectivediscourse. The former preserves proximity without reducing the latter to a totalitymediated by knowledge. Levinas’s ‘insistence on ethical responsibility’, Barnes writes, ‘is adirect challenge both to the grosser forms of exclusivism and to the more subtle forms ofpatronising violence which seeks to encompass the other within a self-fulfilling totality.’76

Ethics goes beyond dialogue and keeps one alert and vigilant to the tendency of dialogue tolapse into violence due to persuasion and propaganda.


Levinas’s thinking offers a way towards infinity and transcendence, the hallmarks of atrue religion. What is striking in his thought, especially his religious philosophy, is that heoffers a conception of religion that promotes dialogue, peace, tolerance, brotherhood andservice to fellowmen. His thought is a dialogical philosophy that respects the absoluteotherness of the Other.

Notes

1 Michael Amaladoss, Walking Together: The Practice of Inter-Religious Dialogue (Anand, Gujarat, India:Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, 1992), p. 3.

2 Although it appears that globalization makes the encounter of different religions unavoidable, some scholarsclaim that this contact between and among religions is not really a recent event and that the study of a certain religioncould not be made in isolation from another religion or religions.Michael Peterson, et al, write: ‘Diversity and pluralityare bywords of the new society. Yet contact among believers in diverse religions is not a new phenomenon. None of themajor religions ever existed in complete isolation from other religions; their origins and development intertwine.Judaism developed its unique particularism amid numerous Semitic religions; Christianity grew out of Judaism; Islamdeveloped later in contact with both. Hinduism was an amalgam of the thoughts and practices of Aryan invaders and ofadherents of the Dravidic religion indigenous to India. Buddhism arose in reaction to Hindu ascetic culture anddeveloped in China through interaction with both Confucianism and Taoism. And what is true of the major religionsapplies even more to the sects or religions that grew out of them: Bahai out of Islam; Mormonism, Christian Scienceand Unitarianism from Christianity; Unificationism out of Korean Protestanism, Neo-Confucianism, and Buddhism;Sikhism out of Hinduism and Islam.’ Michael Peterson, et al. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to thePhilosophy of Religion, second edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 260.

3 Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives, new edition (London: ProfileBooks, 2002), pp. 4–5.

4 ibid., p. 5.5 ibid., p. xxiv.6 Giddens, in the same book, explains further what fundamentalism is. The term fundamentalism, he says, ‘dates

from the turn of the century, when it was used to refer to the beliefs of some Protestant sects in the US, particularlythose who rejected Darwin. Yet even in the late 1950’s there was no entry for the word ‘fundamentalism’ in the largeOxford English dictionary. It has come into common coinage only since the 1960s. . . . Fundamentalism is not the sameas either fanaticism or authoritarianism. Fundamentalists call for a return to basic scriptures or texts, supposed to beread in a literal manner, and they propose that the doctrines derived from such reading be applied to social, economicor political life. . . . Fundamentalism is beleaguered tradition. It is tradition defended in a traditional way – by referenceto ritual truth – in a globalising world that asks for reasons. Fundamentalism, therefore, has nothing to do with thecontexts of beliefs, religious or otherwise. What matters is how the truth of beliefs is defended or asserted. . . .Fundamentalism isn’t about what people believe, but like tradition more generally, about why they believe it and howthey justify it. . . . It has no time for ambiguity, multiple interpretation or multiple identity – it is the refusal of dialoguein a world whose peace and continuity depend on it.’ ibid., pp. 48–49.

7 Francis Cardinal Arinze, ‘The Church and Interreligious Dialogue’, Logos 4: (2001) p. 160. See also Leonardo N.Mercado, Inter-religious Explorations: The Challenge and Rewards of Inter-religious Dialogue (Manila: LogosPublications, Inc., 2004), p. 55.

8 Emmanuel Levinas,Of GodWho Comes toMind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, California: Stanford UniversityPress, 1998), p. 137.

9 ibid., 137.10 Gavin D’ Costa, ‘Postmodernity and Religious Plurality: is a Common Global Ethic Possible or Desirable?’ in

GrahamWard (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p. 132.11 Michael Barnes’ work Theology and The Dialogue of Religions (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge

University Press, 2002) has applied the thoughts of thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricouer and Michel deCerteau to the theology of religions, particularly to Christianity’s encounter of otherness in other religions. This article,however, differs from Barnes because it seeks a Levinasian paradigm to interfaith dialogue. Kant’s notion of‘conditions of possibility’, which refers to his a priori categories as necessary formal requirements for the appearance ofphenomena, will be analogously employed as an approach to interfaith dialogue. Barnes’ aim is different because, as hesays, he is ‘less concerned with explaining the ‘‘problem’’ of religious pluralism than with understanding the meaning ofthe providential mystery of otherness for the life of the Church and for its practice of faith. My aim is not to continue adebate which has long since ceased to be creative, but–more radically–to learn how to read the engagement of Christianfaith and the all-pervading context of otherness as revealing possible ‘‘seeds of the Word’’.’ (p. 15).

12 Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitutdes Toward the World Religions(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985), p. 207.

13 Catherine Cornille, ‘Conditions for the Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue onGod’ inWerner G. Jeanrond andAasulv Lande (eds.), The Concept of God in Global Dialogue (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005), p. 4.


14 Aasulv Lande, ‘Recent Developments in Interreligious Dialogue’ in Werner G. Jeanrond and Aasulv Lande(eds.), The Concept of God in Global Dialogue (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005), pp. 32–33.

15 Arinze, ‘The Church’, pp. 157–158.16 ibid.17 Michael Barnes, Theology, footnote 1, p. 3,18 Peterson, et al, Reason and Religious Belief, p. 262.19 ibid., 263.20 ibid., 264.21 ibid. See also Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, Divinity and Diversity: A Christian Affirmation of Religious Pluralism

(Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon press, 2003), p. 19.22 Suchocki, Divinity and Diversity, p. 19.23 Peterson, et al, Reason and Religious Belief, p. 270.24 ibid., p. 272.25 See, for example, John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven

and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 233–251.26 Suchocki, Divinity and Diversity, p. 20.27 Peterson, et al, Reason and Religious Belief, p. 269.28 Cornille, ‘Conditions’, pp. 3–18.29 ibid., p. 17.30 ibid., p. 11.31 Knitter, No Other Name?, pp. 207–213.32 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge’ in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader

(Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1989), p. 67.33 Michael Purcell, Levinas and Theology (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 58.34 Jeffrey Kosky, Levinas and The Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001),

p. xxi.35 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, p. 58.36 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press, 1969), p. 79.37 This is the aim of some thinkers like the German theologian Hans Kung. Kung thinks that in the global efforts to

resolve the conflicts, poverty and other serious problems that plagued the world, the role of the world’s religions hasoften been overlooked. He claims that if the world religions could come together and are able to see that they share acommon global ethic, then global problems could be effectively addressed. See, for example, his A Global Ethic forGlobal Politics and Economics (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1998).

38 Aloysius Pieris, Love Meets Wisdom: A Christian Experience of Buddhism (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books,1988), p. 17.

39 Richard A. Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1994), p. 187.

40 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 51.41 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 180.42 Cornille, ‘Conditions’, p. 6.43 Levinas, Of God, p. 149.44 Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, California: Stanford University

Press, 1993), p. 17.45 ibid., p. 15.46 ibid., pp. 14–15.47 Levinas, Of God, p. 146.48 Levinas, Outside the Subject, p. 40.49 Steven G. Smith, Appeal and Attitutde: Prospects for Ultimate Meaning (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana

University Press, 2005), p. 211.50 Levinas, Outside the Subject, p. 43.51 Levinas, Of God, p. 145.52 Levinas, Outside the Subject, pp. 43–44.53 ibid., pp. 45–46.54 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge’ in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader

(Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1989), p. 63.55 ibid., p. 74.56 Levinas, Outside the Subject, pp. 44.57 ibid.58 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 85.59 ‘In the case of ultimate reality, it is not faith itself that needs to be put into question but the rendering of this faith

in thought and expression.’ Cornille, ‘Conditions’, p. 9.60 Barnes, Theology, p. 71.


61 Emmanuel Levinas,Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (NewYork: Columbia University Press,1999), p. 80.

62 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 199.63 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 166–167.64 Barnes, Theology, p. 4.65 ibid., p. 97.66 Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, p. 88.67 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 44.68 William Raeper and Linda Smith, A Brief Guide to Ideas: Turning Points in the History of Human Thought,

revised edition (Oxford, England: Lion Publishing, 1997), p. 345.69 ibid.70 Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, p. 86.71 ibid., p. 87.72 ibid.73 ibid.74 ibid., pp. 87–88.75 Levinas, Of God, p. 147.76 Barnes, Theology, p. 95.


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