ler 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating lamp on 'b' train ... · subject: ler 94-011-00:on...

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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9410270370 DOC.DATE: 94/10/17 NOTARIZED: NOFACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATIONST MARTIN,J.T. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

DOCKET05000244

P

SUBJECT: LER 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating lamp on "B" trainsafeguards initiation cabinet failed. Caused by loss of 125VDC control power. Burned out indicating lamp & blown fusereplaced.W/941017 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR I ENCL i SIZE: lTITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

R

05000244

RECIPIENTID CODE/NAME

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YOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:PLEASE HELP US TO RFDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT'I'IIE DOCl'iIEiTCONTROLDESk. ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT. 504-20S3 ) TO FLIXIliATEO'OI:R XAXILZFROiIDISTRIBUTIONLIS'I'S I'OR l)OCl iIEi'I'S5'OL')Oi"I''L'I'.II)!

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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89-EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649.0001

ROBERTC MECRfOYVice PresidentCinna Nuclear Producrion

TELEPHONE

AREA CODE 716 546 2700

October 17, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDocument Control DeskAttn: Allen R. Johnson

PWR Project Directorate I-3Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: LER 94-011, Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes BlownFuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation ofEngineered Safety Features Actuation System for "B"Safeguards Logic Train ComponentsR.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDocket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item(a) (2) (i) (B), which requires a report of, "any operation orcondition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications", theattached Licensee Event Report LER 94-011 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours,

Robert C. Me edy

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion I475 Allendale RoadKing of Prussia, PA 19406

Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

svrQL ) ~

~gir7~ Z O~p>r> 4@~9410270370 941017PDR ADDCK 05000244S PDR

NRC FORH 366(5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104EXPIRES 5/31/95

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITHTHIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0

BR'ORWARDCOMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TOTHE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OFHANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) R.E ~ Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244

PAGE (3)1 OF 9

TITLE (4) Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes Blown Fuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation of EngineeredSafety Features Actuation System for "B" Safeguards Logic Train Components

MONTH DAY YEAR

EVENT DATE (5)

YEAR

LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL

NUHBER

REVISIONNUHBER

MONTH DAY YEAR

REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)DOCKET HUHBERFACILITY NAHE

09 17 94 94 --011-- 00 10 17 94FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUHBER

OPERATINGHODE (9)

POMER

LEVEL (10)

N

098

THIS REPORT IS SUBMIlTED PURSUANT

20.402(b)20.405(a )(l)(i)20.405(a)(1)(ii)20.405(a)(l)(iii)20.405(a)(1)(iv)20.405(a)(1)(v)

20.405(c)50.36(c)(1)

50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)

73.71(b)73.71(c)

50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(I)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)50.73(a)(2)(x)

OTHER

(Specify inAbstract belowand in Text,NRC Form 366A)

TO THE RE UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) ~

NAHE John T. St. Hartin - Director, Operating Experience TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(315) 524-4446

COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT HANUFACTURER

XOOO

REPORTABLETO NPRDS

CAUSE SYSTEM COHPONENT MANUFACTURERREPORTABLE

TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE). X NO

EXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with the reactor atapproximately 98% steady state power, an indicating lamp on the "B" trainsafeguards initiation cabinet failed in a manner that caused a shortcircuit that blew a 10 ampere fuse in the 125 VDC control power circuit.This disabled the automatic actuation of "B" train safeguards components.

Immediate corrective action was to replace the burned out indicating lampand blown fuse.

The underlying cause of the event was determined to be a shorting out ofthe low resistance leads that connect the indicating lamp base to the lampfilaments. This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code "B".

Corrective action to preclude repetition is outlined in Section V. B.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A(5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104EXP IRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITHTHIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TOTHE INFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH(HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3110-0104), OFFICE OFHANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear PowerPlant'OCKET

NUHBER (2)

05000244

LER NUHBER (6)YEAR E

94 -- 011--REVISION

00

PAGE (3)

2 OF 9

TEXT (tf more space is required, use additionat copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS

The plant was at approximately 98~ steady state reactor power withno major operational activities in progress. While making a routinetour of the Relay Room, a licensed reactor operator observed that anormally lit indicating lamp for "Safeguard DC Failure", on the"Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet, was extinguished. He notedthat another normally lit indicating lamp on this cabinet wasilluminated, and concluded that power was still available to thiscabinet. Since replacement of burned out light bulbs for theseindicating lamps is a normal responsibility of the licensedoperators, he made preparations to replace the lamp.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Event date and time.

0

September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Discovery date and time.li

September 17, 1994, 1346 EDST: Indicating lamp and fusesreplaced and "B" train of Engineered Safety FeaturesActuation System (ESFAS) components restored to operablestatus.

B. EVENT:

On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with thereactor at approximately 98% steady state reactor power, thelicensed reactor operator had returned to the Relay Room with anew indicating lamp for replacement of the burned out lamp. Ashe unscrewed the burned out lamp from the 'socket, he observed aflash. He also saw that the other indicating lamp (that had beenilluminated) was now extinguished. He immediately proceeded tothe Control Room.

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A(5.92)



APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITHTHIS IHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TOTHE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HAHAGEHEHT BRANCH(HNBB 7714), U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTIOH PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OFHANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDOCKET NUHBER (2)

YEAR

05000244 94

LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL

011

REVISION

00

PAGE (3)

3 OF 9

TEXT (tf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The Control Room operators were immediately made aware of theproblem when Main Control Board (MCB) Annunciator L-31,"Safeguard DC Failure", alarmed. The Control Room operatorsimmediately performed the appropriate actions of Alarm Responseprocedure AR-L-31, and also reviewed appropriate electricaldrawings to determine the effect on the plant. They concludedthat 125 VDC control power had been lost to a part of the"Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet.

Loss of this DC control power resulted in the disabling of the"B" safeguards logic train, which would prevent the automaticactuation of engineered safety features (ESF) components for the"B" safeguards logic train. However, the components remainedcapable of being manually operated by operator action at the MainControl Board or by local operator action in the field.The plant's Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed, and theControl Room operators did not locate an applicable specificationor Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) that had been exceeded.However, the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existedfor components which are actuated by ESFAS signals. The ShiftSupervisor then made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0 ',and directed that actions be initiated to place the plant in hotshutdown.

An Instrument and Control (IIC) technician responded to theannouncement of the event. The ISC technician and ShiftTechnical Advisor assisted the Control Room operators introubleshooting the event. Operations procedure P-ll,"Electrical Distribution Panel Reference Manual", was consulted,and the Control Room operators also referred to EquipmentRestoration procedure ER-ELEC.2, "Recovery From Loss of A or B DCBus", for guidance. It was determined'hat a 125 VDC 10 amperefuse (FUSIB1/SIBF1-P on the positive leg of the DC circuit) hadblown. This fuse caused the disabling of 125 VDC control powerto the "B" safeguards logic train.The burned out lamp was replaced, and the blown fuse (and theother 10 ampere fuse FUSIB1/SIBF2-N on the negative leg of the DCcircuit) was replaced. When the fuses were replaced, AnnunciatorL-31 cleared. The "B" train of ESFAS components was restored tooperable status at approximately 1346 EDST.

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A(5-92)




ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITHTHIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TOTHE IHFORHATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH(HHBB 7|'14), U-S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH,WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OFHANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1)


05000244YEAR

94 011 00

LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION

PAGE (3)

4 OF 9

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

C INOPERABLE STRUCTURES I COMPONENTS I OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TOTHE EVENT:

None

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

Train "B" ESFAS components would notactuation signals from approximatelySeptember 17, 1994. However, manualcomponents by Control Room operatorsand local operation of components in

have actuated from ESF1224 EDST to 1346 EDST on "

operation of individualat the Main Control Boardthe field was not affected.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was immediately apparent to the Control Room operatorsdue to receipt of Annunciator L-31, "Safeguard DC Failure".

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

The Control Room operators responded to Annunciator L-31 andperformed the actions of Alarm Response procedure AR-L-31. TheControl Room operators reviewed'he TS and did not locate anapplicable specification or LCO that had been exceeded. However,the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existed forcomponents which are actuated by ESFAS signals. The ShiftSupervisor made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0.1, anddirected that actions be initiated to place the plant in hotshutdown prior to 1924 EDST on September 17, 1994, as required byTS 3.0.1.

The Control Room operators consulted Operations procedure P-11for the effect of the blown fuse on the plant. EquipmentRestoration procedure ER-ELEC.2 was referred to for additionalguidance.

HRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A(5.92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONIISSION


APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 ~ 0104EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITHTHIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORHARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TOTHE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRAHCH(MHBB 7714), UPS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,llASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERHORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3140 0104), OFFICE OFMAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET llASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000244YEAR

94

LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL

-- 011--REVISION

00

PAGE (3)

5 OF 9

TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

When the cause of Annunciator L-31 was determined and correctiveactions to replace the fuse were in progress, the ShiftSupervisor discussed the situation with plant management. Adecision was made to continue to take appropriate actions toplace the plant in hot shutdown by 1924 EDST, but actualreduction of reactor power was deferred, pending the imminentreplacement of the fuses.

At approximately 1545 EDST on September 16, 1994, the ShiftSupervisor notified the NRC per 10CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iii) (D).

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The immediate cause of the disabling of the "B" safeguards logictrain from any ESF actuation signal was loss of 125 VDC controlpower due to a blown fuse in the 125 VDC control power circuit.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The intermediate cause of the blown fuse was a short circuit inthe burned out indicating lamp.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A(5.92)




ESTIMATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITHTHIS INFORMATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~

FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIHATE TOTHE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HAHAGEMENT BRANCH(MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION,WASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OFMANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6)

YEARSEQUEHTIAL REVISION

PAGE (3)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 94 011-- 00 6 OF 9


C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the short circuit in the burned outindicating lamp was the internal shorting out of the lowresistance leads that connect the lamp base to the lamp filament.This occurred when the licensed operator was removing the burnedout lamp from the socket. The low resistance caused increasedcurrent in the lamp, which resulted in sufficient current to blowthe 10 ampere fuse. This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code "B",Design, Manufacturing, Construction / Installation. This loss ofpower does not meet the NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline forMonitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear PowerPlants", definition of a "Maintenance Preventable FunctionalFailure".

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, LicenseeEvent Report System, item (a) (2) (i) (B), in 'that the disabling ofthe automatic actuation of ESF components for the "B" safeguardslogic train resulted in two HEPA filter units and associatedrecirculation fan coolers being inoperable, which is more thanallowed by the LCO for TS 3 '.2.2.a. This is a condition prohibitedby TS 3.3.2.2.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequencesand- implications of this event with the following results andconclusions:

o During this event, automatic actuation of ESF components for the"B" safeguards logic train was disabled. However, the componentswere still capable of being manually operated by operator actionat the Main Control Board and also locally in the field at theappropriate Motor Control Center and/or 480 Volt bus.


NRC FORH 366A(5-92)

.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH PROVED BY OHB NO. 3150 ~ 0104EXPIRES 5/3'I/95

ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITHTHIS IHFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TOTHE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OFHANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.


PAGE (3)DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6)REVISIONSEQUENTIALYEAR

pp 7 OF 905000244 94 -- 011--

FACILITY NAHE (1)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant


0 The ESFAS is intended to provide protection against the releaseof radioactive materials in the event of a loss of coolantaccident (LOCA) or secondary line break. The ESFAS providesactuation of the following functions (or components): safetyinjection (SI), containment (CNMT) isolation, CNMT spray,auxiliary feedwater (AFW), diesel generators, and main steam andmain feedwater isolation. The loss of'fuse FUSIBl/SIBF1-P causedthe loss of automatic actuation of the following items:

o SI train "B"

o CNMT spray train "B"

o CNMT isolation train "B"

0

0

o Main steam and main feedwater isolation (one of two channelsfor each isolation and/or bypass valve)

The "B" Emergency diesel generator (D/G) and "B" motor-driven AFWpump train would still actuate from signals such as undervoltageor low steam generator level. However, the loss of automaticactuation of SI train "B" prevented the "B" Emergency D/G and "B"motor-driven AFW pump train from starting due to an SI signal.

As shown above, the loss of fuse FUSIB1/SIBF1-P resulted in theloss of one multi-function train; however, the redundant trainwas available if an accident were to occur during theapproximately one and one half hours that the single train 'wasinoperable. The loss of a single train is considered in thedesign of the ESFAS, which utilizes independent trains andchannels for each function. This independence is maintained fromthe process sensors to the signal output relays and includes thechannel power supplies. Thus, no single failure can cause theloss of function.

0 The Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors(NUREG-1431) allows six hours to restore an inoperable channel tooperable status before requiring a plant shutdown. Entering TS3.0 ~ 1 is more conservative than following the requirements ofNUREG-1431, since the redundant trains were available to performtheir intended function.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health andsafety was assured at all times.

NRC FORH 366A (5 92)

NRC FORM 366A(5-92)



APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY IIITNTHIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0

MRS'ORHARDCOHHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TOTHE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH(HHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION,IIASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORKREDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OFHAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET IIASHIHGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1)


05000244YEAR

94 -- 011-- 00

LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION

PAGE (3)

8 OF 9


V. CORRECTIVE ACTION

A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:

o The burned out indicating lamp was replaced.

o The blown fuse (and associated negative fuse) were replaced.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

o Operations supervision notified all operations personnel notto change any indicating lamps on the cabinets in the RelayRoom. Operators are to submit a trouble report for IEC tochange the lamps.

o All 120 Volt indicating lamps on site are being replaced with155 Volt lamps. When a 120 Volt lamp requires replacement,it will be replaced with a 155 Volt lamp. This is intendedto increase the life of these lamps, and decrease thefrequency of replacement.

o NRC Information Notice 94-68, "Safety-Related EquipmentFailures Caused by Faulted Indicating Lamps", will beassessed as part of the Operational Assessment program.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

The burned out indicating lamp was a Sylvania incandescent lamp,Model 6S6 120V, with a design rating of 6 watts.


NRC FORH 366A(5-92)



APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150.0104EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITHTHIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEH ESTIHATE TOTHE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH(MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORKREDUCTION PROJECT (31/0-0104), OFFICE OFMANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 'WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000244 94 011 00

LER NUHBER (6

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISIONPAGE (3)

9 OF 9


B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with thefollowing results: No documentation of similar LER events withthe same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be iden-tified.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

This event of September 17, 1994 is similar to events describedin NRC Information Notice 94-68, which is dated September 27,1994, and was received by Rochester Gas 6 Electric on October 4,1994.


ler 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating lamp on 'b' train ... · subject: ler 94-011-00:on...

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