leo strauss on nietzz

7/21/2019 Leo Strauss on Nietzz

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Leo Strauss Zarathustra is most far-sighted, whereas inBeyond Good and Evilthe eye iscompelled to grasp clearly the nearest, the timely (the present), the around

us. This change of concern required in every respect, a!ove all also in the

form, the same ar!itrary turning away from the instincts out of which a

Zarathustra had !ecome possi!le" the graceful su!tlety as regards form, asregards intention, as regards the art of silence are in the foreground inBeyond Good and Evilwhich amounts to saying that these qualities are notin the foreground in the Zarathustra, to say nothing of #iet$sche%s other

!oo&s.' *n other words, inBeyond Good and Evil, in the only !oo& pu!lished !y#iet$sche, in the contemporary preface to which he presents himself as the

antagonist of +lato, he platoni$es as regards %the%%%form%% more thananywhere else. .% ,

' ccording to the preface to Beyond Good and Evil +lato%s fundamentalerror was his invention of the pure mind and of the good in itself. rom this ",premise one can easily !e led to /iotima%s conclusion that no human !eing iswise, !ut only the god.is0 human !eings can only strive for wisdom or

philosophi$e0 gods do not philosophi$e (Banquet 12e-12a). *n thepenultimate aphorism ofBeyond Good and Evilin which #iet$sche delineates the genius of the heart-a super-Socrates who is in fact the god

/ionysos-#iet$sche divulges after the proper preparation the novelty,

suspect perhaps especially among philosophers, that gods too philosophi$e.3et /iotima is not Socrates nor +lato, and +lato could well have thought

that gods philosophi$e (ef.Sophist145!6-5, Theaetetus 464d 4-1). ndwhen in the ultimate aphorism ofBeyond Good and Evil#iet$sche under

lines the fundamental difference !etween written and painted thoughts

and thoughts in their original form, we cannot help !eing reminded of what+lato saysor intimates regarding the wea&ness of thelogos"and regarding

the unsaya!le and a fortiori unwrita!le character of the truth (Ep. 7**

4c-d, 1e-a)" the purity of the mind as+lato conceives ofit, does not

necessarily esta!lish the strength of the logos.

'S Beyond Good and Evil has the su!title +relude to a philosophy of the

future. The !oo& is meant to prepare, not indeed the philosophy of the

future, the true philosophy, !ut a new &ind of philosophy !y li!erating the

mind from the pre8udice of the philosophers, i.e. of the philosophers ofthe past (and the present). t the same time or !y this very fact the !oo& ismeant to !e a specimen of the philosophy of the future. The first chapter(9f the pre8udices of the philosophers) is followed !y a chapter entitledThe free mind. The free minds in #iet$sche%s sense are free from the

pre8udice of the philosophy of the past !ut they are riot yet philosophers ofthe future0 they are the heralds and precursors of the philosophy of thefuture (aph. ). Itis hard to say how the distinction !etween the free mindsand the philosophers of the future is to !e understood: are the free minds !y

#ote on the +lan of #iet$sche%sBeyond Good and Evil

[1] Beyond Good and Evilalways seemed to me to !e the most !eautiful of#iet$sche%s !oo&s. This impression could !e thought to !e contradicted !yhis8udgement, for he wasinclined to !elieve that hisZarathustra isthe most

profound !oo& that e;ists in r. #iet$sche. #ow #iet$sche personallypreferred, not Beyond Good and Evil!ut hisa!n o #orningand hisGay

Science to all his other !oo&s precisely !ecause these two !oo&s are his

most personal !oo&s (letter to ?arl ?nort$ of@une 14, 4AAA). s the very

term personal, ultimately derivative from the


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any chance freer than the.philosophers of the future? do they possess anopenness which is possible only during the transitional period between the

philosophy of the past and the philosophy of the future? Be this as it may,philosophy is surely the primary theme of Beyond Good and Evil, theobious theme of the first two chapters.

!"# $he boo% consists of nine chapters. $he third chapter is deoted to

religion. $he heading of the fourth chapter &'(ayings and Interludes') does

not indicate a sub*ect matter+ that chapter is distinguished from all other

chapters by the fact that it consists eclusielyof short aphorisms. $he last

fie chapters are deoted to morals and politics. $he boo% as a wholeconsists then of two main parts which are separated from one another by

about -/ '(ayings and Interludes'+ the first of the two parts is deoted

chiefly to philosophy and religion and the second chiefly to morals andpolitics. Philosophy and religion, it seems, belong together0belong moreclosely together than philosophy and the city. &1f. 2egel3s distinction be4tween the absolute and the ob*ectie mind.) $he fundamental alternatie isthat of the rule of philosophy oer religion or the rule of religion oerphilosophy+ it is not, as it was for Plato or Aristotle, that of the philosophicand the political life+ for Niet5sche, as distinguished from the classics,

politics belongs from the outset to a lower plane than either philosophy orreligion. In the preface he intimates that his precursor par ecellence is

not a statesman nor een a philosopher but the homo religiosus Pascal &cf.

aph.67).&8) Niet5sche says ery little about religion in thefirst two chapters. 9ne

could say that he spea%s there on religion only in a single aphorism whichhappens to be the shortest &/8). $hat aphorism is a %ind of corollary to the

immediately preceding one in which he sets forth in the most straightfor4

ward and unambiguous manner that is compatible with his intention, the

particular character of his fundamental proposition according to which life is

will to power or seen from within the world is willto power and nothing else.

$he willto power ta%es the place which the eros0the striing for 'the goodin itself30occupies in Plato3s thought. But theerosis not 'the pure mind'(der reine Geist). :hateer may be the relation between the eros and the

pure mind according to Plato, in Niet5sche3s thought the will to power ta%es

the place of both eros and the pure mind. Accordingly philosophi5ingbecomes a mode or modification of the will to power; it is the most spiritualider geistigste)willto power+ it consists in prescribing to nature what or howit ought to be &aph. od is dead. $he world in itself, the

'thing0in0itself,' 'nature' &aph.


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intransigent intellectual probity and the most bewitching playfulness hisreasons, i.e. the problematic, tentative, tempting, hypothetical character of

his proposition. Itcould seem that he does not know more of the will to

power as the fundamental reality than what he says here. Almost im

mediately before, in the central aphorism of the second chapter !"#$, he had

drawn our attention to the fundamental distinction between the world which

is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of

appearance or fiction !the interpretations$ and the true world !the te%t$.&hat he seems to aim at is the abolition of that fundamental distinction theworld aswillto power is both the world of anyconcern to us and the world initself. Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of thewill to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an

interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all

other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of thepossibility of any 'categories.'

!($ After having tempted some ofhis readers !cr. aph. ")$ with the doctrine ofthe willto power Niet*sche makes them raise the +uestion as to whether thatdoctrine does not assert, to speak popularly, that od is refuted but thedevil isnot. -e replies 'n the contrary/ n the contary, my friends/ And,

to the devil, what forces you to speak popularly0' 1he doctrine of the willto

power2the whole doctrine of Beyond Good andEvil-is in a manner avindication of od. !3f. aph. 45)and 6(5, as well asGenealogy of Morals,Preface Nr. 7.$2

!4)8 1he third chapter is entitled 'Das religiose &esen'9 it is not entitled 'Das&esen der :eligion,' one of the reasons for this being that the essence ofreligion, that whichis common to all religions, is not or should not be of any

concern to us. 1he chapter considers religion with a view to the human soul

and its boundaries, to the whole history of the soul hitherto and its yetine%hausted possibilities; Niet*sche does not deal with unknown possibilities, although or because he deals with religion hitherto and the religion ofthe future. Aphorisms #


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the Nothing. He anticipates in other words that the better among thecontemporary atheists willcome to know what they are doing=-vthe stonemay remind !s o" Ana#agoras$ deb!nking o" the s!n-% that they will cometo reali&e that there is something in"initely more terrible% depressing anddegrading in the o""ingthan thefoeda religio orl'in/ame:the possibility% nay%the "act that h!man li"e is !tterly meaningless and 'ackings!pport% that itlasts only "or a min!te which is preceded and "ollowed by an in"inite timed!ring which the h!man race was not and will not be. ()". the beginning o"*n tr!th and lie in an e#tra-moral sense.+ ,hese religio!s atheists% this

new breed o" atheists cannot be deceptively and deceivingly appeased aspeople like Engels by the prospect o" a most glorio!s "!t!re% o" the realm o"

"reedom% which will indeed be terminated by the annihilation o" the h!man

race and therewith o" all meaning b!t which will last "or a very long

time-"or a millenni!m or more-% "or "ort!nately we "indo!rselves still on

the ascending branch o" h!man history (. Engels% Ludwig Feuerbachund der Ausgang der deutschen klassischen Philosophies: the realm o" "reedom% destined to perish% necessarily contains within itsel" the seeds o" itsannihilation and willthere"ore% whileit lasts% abo!nd in contradictions asm!ch as any earlier age.

/01+ Niet&sche does not mean to sacri"ice2od "or the sake o" the Nothing% "orwhile recogni&ing the deadly tr!th that 2od died he aims at trans"orming it

into a li"e-inspiring one or rather to discover in the depth o" the deadly tr!th

its opposite. 3acri"icing 2od "or the sake o" the Nothing wo!ld be ane#treme "orm o" world-denial or o" pessimism. 4!t Niet&sche% prompted by

some enigmatic desire% has tried "or a long time to penetrate pessimism to

its depth and in partic!lar to "ree it "rom the del!sion o" morality which in a

way contradicts its world-denying tendency. He th!s has grasped a moreworld-denying way o" thinking than that o" any previo!s pessimist. 5et a

man who has taken this road has perhaps witho!t intending to do this

opened his eyes to the opposite ideal-to the ideal belonging to the religiono" the "!t!re. It goes witho!t saying that what in some other men wasperhaps the case was a "act in Niet&sche$s tho!ght and li"e. ,he adorationo" the Nothing proves to be the indispensable transition "rom every kind o"world-denial to the most !nbo!nded 5es6 the eternal 5es-saying to everything that was and is. 4y saying 5es to everything that was and is Niet&sche

may seem to reveal himsel" as radically antirevol!tionary or conservativebeyond the wildest wishes o" all other conservatives% who all say No to some

o" the things that were or are. 7emembering Niet&sche$s strict!res againstideals and idealists we are reminded o" 2oethe$s words to Eckermann(November 89% 0:89+ according to which everything idea-like(;edes [de-elle) is serviceable "or revol!tionary p!rposes. 4e this as it may% Andthis% Niet&sche concl!des his s!ggestion regarding eternal repetition o"what was and is% wo!ld not be circulusvitiosus deus!As this concl!ding

ambig!o!s

"orm o" the theological aphorism occ!rring in the "irst two chapters (1?+

where Niet&sche brings o!t the "act that in a manner the doctrine o" the willto power is a vindication o" 2od% i" a decidedly non-theistic vindication o"

G~. ./09+ 4!t now we are con"ronted with the "act that the vindication @" 2od I3

only the inversion o" the sacri"icingo" 2od to st!pidity% to the @othmg% or at

.any rate pres!pposes that sacri"icing. @hat is@t@hats!dde@ly% I" @"ter.alongpreparation% divini&es the Nothing Is It the willing o" eternity wlch gives to

the world or restores to it% its worth which the world-denymg ways o"

thinking had denied it Is it the willing o" eternity that makes atheism

religio!s Is beloved eternity divine merely beca!se it is beloved Ifwewere

to say that it m!st be in itsel" lovab@e%in orderBo d@serve to be lo@ed% wc!ldwe not become g!ilty o" a relapse mto Platomsm% into the teaching o" the

good in itsel" 4!t can we avoid s!ch a relapse altogeth@r or the eteralto which Niet&sche says 5es% is not the stone% the st!pidity% t@e @oth@ngwhich even i" eternal or sempiternal cannot aro!se an enth!siastic% li"e

inspiring 5es. ,he trans"ormation " the worl@-de@ying [email protected]"t@inking intothe opposite ideal is connected Ciththe reah&at@on @r dlvm@tlon t@aB t@estone% the st!pidity or the Nothing to which 2od I3being sacn"iced% I310Its

in te ll igi bl e ch ar ac te r t he w ill t o p owe r ( c" . a ph. 1 +. . %["#) ,here is an important ingredient% not to say the nerve% " Niet&sche s

theology o" which I have not spoken and shall not s@eak sIn@eI @ave noaccess to it. It has been worthily treated by arl 7einhardt In his essay

Niet&sche$s lage der Ariadne $%ermiichtnis derAntike& 2ottingen 0F>%10>-111G see also a remark o" 7einhardt at the end o" his e!logy o" Calter .

*tto% ib 1?F+.- ./0D0 Itis possible b!t not likely that the 3ayings and Interl!des o" which the

% "o!rth chapter consists% possesses no order% that there is no rhyme or re@sonto their selection and se

onesel"% o" being "or onesel"% o" preserving onesel" (c". aph. 90+. Accr@

ingly knowledge cannot be% or cannot be good% "or its own sakeG It.I3;!sti"iable only as sel"-knowledge6 being onesel" means being honest $6It.honesel"% going the way to one$s own ideal. ,his seems to have atheisticimplications. ,here occ!r in the chapter nine re"erences to 2odG only oe o"them points to Niet&sche$s own theology (0>+. ,here occ!r@only a sl@glere"erence to nat!re (08+. Instead we are con"ronted .by mne [email protected] to woman and man. 3!rely the knower whom Niet&sche has m mindhas not% like ant% the starred heaven above himsel". As a conse


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has a high morality, a morality beyond good and evil and in particularbeyond puritanism and asceticism. Precisely because he is concerned withthe freedom of his mind, he must imprison his heart (!, "#!$. %reedom of

one&s mind is not possible without a dash of stupidity ('$. elf)*nowledge is

not only verydifficult but impossible to achieve+ man could not live withperfect self)*nowledge (#)", -", '$.)

/"0 1he fifth chapter)the central chapter)is the only one whose heading

(21oward the natural history of morality2$ refers to nature. 3ould nature be

the theme of this chapter or even of the whole second part of the boo*4/"'5 Nature)to say nothing of 2naturalists,2 2physics2 and 2physiology26had been mentioned more than once in the first four chapters. 7et us cast a

glance at the most important or stri*ing of those mentions. In discussingandre8ecting the toic imperative 2to live according to nature2 Niet9sche ma*es

a distinction between nature and life ('+ d.'$, 8ust as on another occasion

he ma*es a distinction between nature and 2us2 (human beings$ ($. 1heopposite of life is death which is or may be no less natural than life. 1heopposite of the natural is the unnatural: the artificial, the domesticated, themisbegotten (;$, the anti)natural (",oth

ocrates and Plato are guided by, or follow, not only reason but instinct as

well+ the instinct is more fundamental than reason. >y e?plicitly ta*ing the

side of instinct against reason Niet9sche tacitly agrees with Bousseau (cf.Natural Right and History ; n.$. Instinct is, to say the least, a*in to

nature) to that which one may e?pel with a hayfor* but will neverthelessalways come bac* (cf. aph. ;+cf. the italici9ed heading of aph. -, the firstof the four italici9ed headings in chapter four$. e are entitled to surmise

that the fundamental instinct is the will to power and not, say, the urge

toward self)preservation (d. aph. "-$.hat we ventured to call Niet9sche&sreligiosity, is also an instinct (aph.


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that originally, in pre-historic times, that instinct was acquired (cf. Geneal-ogy of Morals II. !hile it was "ery powerful throughout history, it has

#ecome simply predominant in contemporary Europe where it destroys at

least the good conscience of those who command and are independent and

where it successfullyclaims to #e the only true morality. $ore precisely, in

its earlier, healthy form it implied already that the sole standard of goodness

is utility for the herd, i.e. for the common good% independence, superiority,inequality were esteemed to the e&tent to which they were thought to #e

su#ser"ient to the common good and indispensa#le for it, and not for their

own sa'e. he common good was understood as the good of a particularsociety or tri#e% it demanded therefore hostility to the tri#e)s e&ternal and

internal enemies and in particular to the criminals. !hen the herd morality

draws its ultimate consequences as it does in contemporary Europe, it ta'es

the side of the "ery criminals and #ecomes afraid of inflictingpunishment% it

is satisfied with ma'ing the criminals harmless% #y a#olishing the only

remaining ground of fear, the morality of timidity would reach its comple*tion and thus ma'e itself superfluous (cf. aph. +. imidity and the a#oli*tion of fear are ustified #y the identification of goodness with indiscriminate

compassion.

./0 Prior to the "ictory of the democratic mo"ement to which, as Niet1sche

understands it, also the anarchists and socialists #elong, moralities other andhigher than the herd morality were at least 'nown. 2e mentions with high

praise Napoleon and, a#o"e all, Alci#iades and 3aesar. 2e could not ha"eshown his freedom from the herd morality more te4linglythan #y mention*ing in one #reath 3aesar and Alci#iades. 3aesar could #e said to ha"eperformed a great, historic function for 5ome and to ha"e dedicated himself

to that function-to ha"e #een, as it were, a functionary of 5oman history,

#ut for Alci#iades Athens was no more than the pedestal, e&changea#le if

need #e with 6parta or Persia, for his own glory or greatness. Niet1sche

opposes men of such a nature to men of the opposite nature (aph. 788-/99.

In the rest of the chapter he spea's no longer of nature. Instead #e e&pressesthe "iew that man must #e counted literally among the #rutes (aph. /9/. 2eappeals from the "ictorious herd morality of contemporary Europe to the

superior morality of leaders (Filhrer).he leaders who can counteract the

degradation of man whichhas led to the autonomy of the herd, can howe"ernot #e merely men #orn to rule li'eNapoleon, Alci#iades and 3aesar. hey

must #e philosophers, new philosophers, a new 'ind of philosophers andcommanders, the philosophers of the future. $ere 3aesars, howe"er great,willnot suffice, for the new philosophers must teach man the future of manas his will, as dependent on a human will in order to put an end to thegruesome rule of nonsense and chance which was hitherto regarded as:history:; the true history-as distinguished from the mere pre-history, touse a $ar&ian distinction-requires the su#ugation of chance, of nature

(Genealogy7 7 . n. / #ymen of the highest spirituality t ofthe greatest reason. %he 6


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gives a hint regarding the connection between the demand for wholly new

philosophers and eternal return; the philosophers of the future, he says,

must be able to endure the weight of the responsibility for the future of man.e had originally published his suggestion regarding eternal return under

the heading "Das grosste Schwergewicht" (Gay Science aph. !"#$.%&'$ (rom the desideration of the new philosophers Niet)sche is naturally led

to passing *udgement on the contemporary philosophers, a sorry lot, who

are not philosophers in a serious and proper sense but professors of philoso+

phy, philosophic laborers or, as they came to call themselves after Niet)+sches death, men who -do philosophy. tthey are in the best case, i.e. onlyin rare cases, scholars or scientists, i.e, competent and honest specialists

who of right ought to be subservient to philosophy or handmaidens to

philosophy. he chapter devoted to this /ind of man is entitled "WirGelehrten";it is the only one in whose title the first person of the personal

pronoun is used0 Niet)sche wishes to emphasi)e the fact that apart from

being a precursor of the philosophers of the future, he belongs to the

scholars and not, for instance, to the poets or thehomines religiosi. heemancipation of the scholars or scientists from philosophy is according to

him only a part of the democratic movement, i.e. of the emancipation of the

low from subordination to the high. he things which we have observed in

the &1th century regarding the sciences of man confirm Niet)sches di+

agnosis.2&3$ he plebeian character of the contemporary scholar or scientist is due to

the fact that he has no reverence for himself and this in itsturn is due to hislac/ of self, to his self4forgetting, the necessary conse5uence or cause of his

ob*ectivity; hence he is no longer -nature- or -natural-; he can only be

-genuine- or -authentic.- 6riginally, one can say with some e7aggeration,

the natural and the genuine were the same %cf. Plato, Laws8"&c'4d#, 999d:48; ousseau, Du Contrat Social I. 3 end and II. 9, third paragraph$;

Niet)sche prepares decisively the replacement of the natural by the authen+tic. hat he does this and why he does this will perhaps become clear fromthe following consideration. e is concerned more immediately with the

classical scholars and historians than with the natural scientists %cf. aph.

&13$. istorical study had come to be closer to philosophy and therefore also

a greater danger to it than natural science. his in turn wasa conse5uence ofwhat one may call the historici)ation of philosophy, the alleged reali)ationthat truth is a function of time %historical epoch$ or that every philosophybelongs to a definite time and place %country$. istory ta/es the place ofnature as a conse5uence of the fact that the natural44e.g. the natural giftswhich enable a man to become a philosopher4is no longer understood asgiven but as the ac5uisition of former generations %aph. !; cf. Dawn ofMor ningaph. :"1$. istoricism is the child of the peculiarly modern tend+ency to understand everything in terms of its genesis, of its human produc4

tion0 nature furnishes only the almost worthless materials as in themselves

%


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202 A P PEN D I X

complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified (aph. 20!"

standin# on the summit" nay" $ein# the summit" the philosopher has acosmic responsi$ility. %ut &our 'irtues& are not the 'irtues of the phi

losopher of the future. )he concession which Niet*sche ma+es to the menwho are &only moral& does not pre'ent him from treatin# $oth the rei#nin#

moral teachin#s (altruism" the identification of #oodness with compassion"

utilitarianism! as well as their criti,ue $y moralists as tri'ial" not to say with

contempt- the superior morality whichflowsfrom that criti,ue or whichis its

presupposition does not $elon# to &our 'irtues. &)he rei#nin# moralities areunaware of the pro$lematic character of morality as such and this is due to

their insufficient awareness of the 'ariety of moralities (cf. aph. /!" tothese moralists1 lac+ of historical sense. )he historical sense is&our& 'irtue"

e'en &our #reat 'irtue.& It is a no'el phenomenon" not older than the thcentury. It is an am$i#uous phenomenon. Its root is a lac+of self3sufficiencyof ple$ian Europe" orit expresses the self3criticism of modernity" its lon#in#fo somethin# different" for somethin# past or alien. As a conse,uence"&measure is forei#n to us- we are titillated $y the infinite and unmeasured&-hence we are half3$ar$arians. It would seem that thisdefect" the re'erse side

of our #reat 'irtue" points to a way of thin+in# and li'in# that transcends

historicism" to a pea+ hi#her than all earlier pea+s. )he discussion of the

historical sense (aph. 22425! is surrounded $y a discussion of compassion

(aph.222 and 226!7 the historical sense mediates in a manner $etween theple$ian morality which $oasts of its compassion with those who ha'e $eenne#lected $y nature (aph. 2! and which is $ent on the a$olition of all

sufferin#" and the opposite morality which #oes to#ether with awareness of

the #reat thin#s man owesto sufferin# (aph. 226!. )he next aphorism (22!is

the only one in the chapter with an italici*ed headin# (&8e immoralists&!7

we immoralists are &men of duty&- &our& immoralism is our 'irtue. &9ur'irtue which alone is left to us& ispro$ity" intellectual pro$ity- it is" one maysay" the positi'e or re'erse side of our immoralism. Pro$ity includes andcompletes &our #reat 'irtue of the historical sense.& :et pro$ity is an endrather than a $e#innin#- it points to the past rather than to the future- it isnotthe 'irtue characteristic of the philosophers of the future- it must $e sup

ported" modified" fortified $y &our most delicate" most dis#uised" most

spiritual will to power& which is directed toward the future. ;urely ourpro$ity must not $e permitted to $ecome the #round or o$ject of our pride"for this would lead us $ac+ to moralism (and to theism!.

(


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analysis all thought depends on something unteachable "deep down," on aundamental stupidity! the natue o the indi#idual, the indi#idual natue,not e#ident and uni#esally #alid insights, it seems, is the gound o all

wothwhile undestanding o $nowledge %aph& 2'(! c& aph& )*& +hee is an

ode o an$ o the natues! at the summit o the hieachy is the complementay man& -is supemacy is shown by the act that he sol#es thehighest, the most diicult poblem& As we ha#e obse#ed, o Niet.schenatue has become a poblem and yet he cannot do without natue& Natue,we may say, has become a poblem owing to the act that man is con/ueing

natue and thee ae no assignable limits to that con/uest& As a conse/uence, people ha#e come to thin$ o abolishing sueing and ine/uality&

et sueing and ine/uality ae the pee/uisites o human geatness %aph&

2'1, ad 25,3*3itheto sueing and ine/uality ha#e been ta$en o ganted,as gi#en, as Imposed on man& -enceoth, they must be willed& +hat is to

say, the guesome ule o nonsense and chance, natue, the act that almost

all men ae agments, cipples and guesome accidents, the whole pesentand past is itsel a agment, a iddle, a guesome accident unless it iswilled

as a bidge to the utue %c& Zarathustra, 6 7edemption*& 8hile pa#ing

the way o the complementay man, one must at the same time say un

boun3ed y3s to the agments and cipples& Natue, the etenity o natue,owes Itsbeing to a postulation, to an act o the willto powe on the pat o

the highest natue&

9':( At the end o the se#enth chapte Niet.sche discusses "woman and man"%c& aph& 2';*& +he appaently clumsytansition to that subemany moe than any othe pato non7ussian Euope has moe o a pospect o a utue than, say, ?anceo England %aph& 240,25(,255! c& -eine ed& Elste I@ 5(0*& 6ne could ind

that Niet.sche stesses in his chapte on peoples and athelands moe the

deects o contempoay >emany than he #itues1 it is not so diicult to

ee ones heat om a #ictoious atheland as om a beaten one %aph& 4(*&he t3get o hisciti/ue hee isnot >eman philosophy but >eman music,i&e& 7ichad 8agne& Boe pecisely, Euopean nobility e#eals itsel as thewo$ and in#ention o ?ance, wheeas Euopean commonness, the plebianism o the moden ideas, is the wo$ and in#ention o England %aph&25'*&

9')( Niet.sche thus pepaes the last chapte which he entitled "Was istvor-nehm?" "@onehm" dies om "noble" because it is insepaable om

e=taction, oigin, bith (Dawn of Morning, aph& (CC! >oethe WilhelmMeister's ehr!ahre #iimtli$he Wer%e, +empellassi$e, II );)) andDi$htung und Wahrheit, @ol& 2, ed. $it. 4445*& Feing the last chapte o a

pelude to a philosophy o the utue, it shows the %a* philosophy o the

utue as elected in the medium o conduct, o lie! thus elected thephilosophy o the utue e#eals itsel as the philosophy o the utue& +he#itues o the philosophe o the utue die om the Platonic #itues1Niet.sche eplaces tempeance and

leo strauss on nietzz

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