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  • Len HearndenManager Safety, Operations & Infrastructure Europe2.2 Volcanic AshEyjafjallajokull EruptionAirlines dealing with crisis - the IATA role

  • Severe eruption 14 AprilAirspace closed 15 - 21 AprilUS$1.8 billion in losses10 million passengers strandedCargo trade halted

    Eyjafjallajokull Erupts

  • IATAs Crisis Center: re-open airspace Information to membersLiaison with European governments, EC

    IATAs lobbying role: Special ICAO Council meetingUK NATS, ECTL, EASA, EC and manufacturers

    IATAs tactical role: 24/7 supportEurocontrol CFMU

    IATAs Actions

  • Airlines all have operations control centres although they do vary in size and tehcnical capabilities

    This one is actually American Airlines in Dallas which is well equippedSome will also have TV news available such as CNN

    Pictured here is the Eurocontrol team during the volcanic crisis

  • No Fly Zone = red 18.4.2010No Fly Zone = black 19.5.2010Improvement over time

  • Volcano Ash Advisory Centers

  • Delegate operational decisions to airlines/pilots Move toward approach used by rest-of-worldDevelop better volcanic ash operational proceduresThis is already done when it comes to major thunderstorm activity which is more dangerous

    What needs to be done?EU Transport Ministerial meeting 24 June Airlines wanted agreement for option 2 but it was not forthcoming

  • Accelerate Single European Sky (SES) implementationNot just the 2012 targets ICAO procedures/guidance/coordination neededDevise procedure to measure ash concentration Determine safety levels in volcanic ash contaminated airspace So long as decision-making rests with governmentsInvolve airlines in airspace decisionsSupplement VACC model w/ data from test flights and pilot/maintenance reports Refine and harmonize various VAACs models

    What needs to be done?

  • *Collaboration is KEY ICAOStatesState Aviation OrganisationsCIVIL / MilitaryEuropean CommissionAirspace UsersService providersAerospace industryStandardisation-BodiesResearch and development organisations


    *On 14 April the Volcano E-15 erupts in Iceland and the ash cloud quickly spreads over European airspace.What happened next and the impact on our industryNot just in Europe but across the globe.Europe was un-prepared for this new crisisThe notification procedures were in place and worked well but the determination of which airspace was unsafe proved difficult and caused problemsI was stranded in Africa at a significant cost to the airline**IATAs Crisis Center: activated on Apr 16th- - 22nd , primary goal: Re-open airspace Developed an action plan to get the airspace re-openedEnsured a constant flow of information to our membersCoordination with regulators, ICAO, Eurocontrol and CANSO IATAs Lobbying role: ongoing IATA made a presentation to the ICAO Council at the global level Director General met with Ministers, ECTL, letter to EC etc.Lobbying Campaign with airlines and together with AEA to regulators, ANSPs, EASA, manufacturers etc.in Europe to accept different ash concentration zonesLook at another information sources (VAAC model-WSI, TLS) and use actual data from test flights flights which are planned not randomShift responsibility to operator/pilot IATAs Tactical role: 24/7 Support 22.4-25.5.IATA/airline person positioned at Eurocontrol-CFMU-facilitated conf calls and relayed airlines need to ECTLSupport to US carriers, eg. AA coordination amongst service providers, or Change the chart format to introduce different flight levels from deep to 5000ft Long-haul carriers needed focecast extended to 12 hours instead of 6 hours, **We also influenced the development of the layout of the ash chartsThis slide shows the development of the chart and gradually reopened airspace for use how industry was able to gradually get the size of closed airspace reduced.Left chart: 16.April 2010: Based on this information from the London VAAC the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) and States made the decision on closing or limiting closed or limited use of airspace use.Everything what appeared within the red (up to FL 200) or green zone (FL 200-FL350) was declared as NO Fly ZoneEach State was responsible for its own decision to close/open airspace, creating considerable confusion for air carriers.As of 19.April 2010 during the EC Ministers videoconference an agreement was found to establish 3 zones: (implemented 20.4.)No Fly zone: black, 2. A zone with small ash concentration where members states may impose certain flight restrictions,3. Third zone: without any restrictionIATA accepted this decision at that time because this was the only way to get the the a/c back in the skyRight chart: 17/18 May: UK NATS, BA, CAA developed the UK MET model, shows three different zones based on predicted ash concentrations with the introduction of a Time Limited Zone, shown in gray.Aircraft are allowed to operate in the gray zone, for a limited time.The UK NATS agreed to this procedure, and other CAAs are in various states of approvalIATA worked with AEA to develop common procedures for endorsement by EASA and subsequently by ICAO to fly through the Time Limited ZoneIATA considered this as an interim step to gain more flexibility to operate in European airspace, our strategyis to push for the Rest of the world system (US-system) where operational decisions are delegated to airlines

    The Problem: Engine Manufacturers have established operational limits relating to the No Fly Zone but have not fully defined operations within the Time Limited Zone thereby negating the flexibility of airlines operating in these Grey areas The existing ICAO guidance does not include procedures for utilizing airspace or operational limits of aircraft based on levels of concentration of the plume.There are no specific definitions of ash concentrations for a VAAC, and the London VAAC initially used a very conservative (i.e., very low concentration) level of forecast ash.

    *The London VAAC Center is one of the 9 Volcano centers. All centers do not use the same models. *Together with airline OPS experts we have developed a lessons learned docChange the decision making process in Europe: Airlines were not involved when the airspace was closed mid April.Move toward global (rest of the world) approach in which airlines/pilots decide when and where to fly based on the best qualified informationDevelop better Volcanic Ash operational procedures A lack of specific, globally harmonized risk-based standards for safe levels of ash concentration resulted in conservative airspace restrictionsThe London VAAC model is based on theoretical science and does not reflect reality, it may have been the best they could do at the time but now we have real experience to work with. 3. A European Crisis Contingency Center would resolve many issues includingEurope did not have a unified solution how to handle a European crisisEC agreed to implement Crisis Center and network manager by year endIATAs crisis cell will be linked with the CCC**4. The Single European Sky needs to be implemented NOW! Giovanni mentioned it alreadyThe EC Ministers committed to expedite implementation of FABs, implementation of a network manager adoption of performance scheme before summer 2010Both are good steps but what is really needed is the full implementation of the European Single SkyEASA competence for ATM before 2012, etc

    5. ICAO procedures/guidance/coordination neededICAO Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) needed toImprove the science to define an operationally oriented approach to volcanic ash Work with a/c and engine manufacturers to develop operational procedures, guidelines and establish clear limits



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