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DANIELE GALLO

L’EFFICACIA DIRETTA DEL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA

NEGLI ORDINAMENTI NAZIONALIEVOLUZIONE DI UNA DOTTRINA

ANCORA CONTROVERSA

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANOCENTRO DI ECCELLENZA JEAN MONNET

DANI

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Per Informazioni e Acquisti

Centri di documentazione e di distribuzione Giuffrè

01. Bruno nascimBene, massimo condinanzi (a cura di) – Giurisprudenza di diritto comunitario. Casi scelti, 2007.

02. Bruno nascimBene, Francesco rossi dal Pozzo (a cura di) – Il private enfor-cement delle norme sulla concorrenza, 2009.

03. chiara amalFitano – La procedura di “condanna” degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, 2012.

04. massimo condinanzi (a cura di) – Unione europea e Svizzera tra coopera-zione e integrazione, 2012.

5. ilaria anrò – L’adesione dell’Unione europea alla CEDU. L’evoluzione dei sistemi di tutela dei diritti fondamentali in Europa, 2015.

6. Paolo iannuccelli – La responsabilità delle imprese nel diritto della concorrenza dell’Unione europea e la direttiva 2014/104, 2015.

7. simone marinai – Perdita della cittadinanza e diritti fondamentali: profili internazionalistici ed europei, 2017.

8. alessandra lang – Il soggiorno del cittadino dell’Unione europea in Italia, 2017.

9. cecilia sanna – La libera circolazione delle persone fra Svizzera e Unione europea, 2017.

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANOCENTRO DI ECCELLENZA JEAN MONNET

Collana diretta da BRUNO NASCIMBENE

DANIELE GALLO

L’EFFICACIA DIRETTA DEL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA

NEGLI ORDINAMENTI NAZIONALIEVOLUZIONE DI UNA DOTTRINA

ANCORA CONTROVERSA

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANOCENTRO DI ECCELLENZA JEAN MONNET

Copyright Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, S.p.A. Milano - 2018

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ELSA MORANTE

INDICE

Premessa ............................................................................................................... XI

Introduzione e piano dell’indagine .................................................................... XIII

SEZIONE PRIMA

SIGNIFICATO E VIS EXPANSIVADELLA DOTTRINA VAN GEND & LOOS:

IL NESSO TRA EFFICACIA DIRETTA E CREAZIONE DI DIRITTI,OVVERO LA DIMENSIONE SOGGETTIVA

DELL’EFFETTO DIRETTO

CAPITOLO ILA SENTENZA VAN GEND & LOOS

E LA FORMAZIONE DELL’ORDINAMENTO COMUNITARIO:CENTRALITAv DELL’INDIVIDUO-SOGGETTO DI DIRITTOE AFFRANCAMENTO DAL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE

1. Gli argomenti formulati dalla societa ricorrente, riproposti dal giudiceremittente, affinati dalla Commissione, respinti dall’Avvocato gene-rale, accolti e rielaborati dalla Corte di giustizia .................................... 3

2. L’edificazione di un « ordinamento giuridico di nuovo genere nelcampo del diritto internazionale »: il common core dell’effetto diretto,tra interpretazione teleologica, primato, effettivita e uniformita ......... 15

3. Van Gend & Loos, letta alla luce di Costa, e l’autonomia del dirittoeuropeo: la sinergia tra effetto diretto e primato e la costituzione diun « proprio ordinamento giuridico, integrato nell’ordinamento giuri-dico degli Stati » ......................................................................................... 29

4. L’epoca pre-Van Gend & Loos e la contestualizzazione storico-giuri-dica della pronuncia: il contributo fornito dal Servizio giuridico del-l’Alta Autorita CECA, le intuizioni proto-federaliste dell’Avvocatogenerale Lagrange e la pregressa giurisprudenza della Corte di giusti-zia, tra evoluzione e rivoluzione ............................................................... 37

5. La costituzionalizzazione del diritto comunitario e (del ruolo) dellaCorte di giustizia quale non activist « actor of change »: Van Gend &Loos « pietra angolare » del sistema europeo e la reazione pretoriaalla prima (vera) crisi della politica d’integrazione ............................... 46

CAPITOLO IIIL CONTRIBUTO DEL PROCEDIMENTO PREGIUDIZIALE

ALLA TEORIA E PRATICA DELL’EFFETTO DIRETTOE LA COMUNITARIZZAZIONE DEI RAPPORTI TRA ORDINAMENTI

1. Presunzione dell’effetto diretto e articolo 267 TFUE ........................... 552. La Corte di giustizia interprete del diritto UE e (de facto) del diritto

nazionale: private enforcement del diritto UE, sindacato accentrato dilegittimita ed efficacia sostanziale erga omnes (di natura normativa)delle pronunce interpretative ................................................................... 65

3. La cristallizzazione monista della relazione tra diritto UE e diritti na-zionali .......................................................................................................... 82

CAPITOLO III« VALORE PRECETTIVO » E BINOMIO

DIRITTI-OBBLIGHI NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA UE:I PUNTI (RELATIVAMENTE) FERMI

1. Portata, estensione, presupposti e conseguenze dell’effetto diretto .... 892. Effetto diretto e diretta applicabilita: due nozioni concettualmente

distinte ma, alla prova dei fatti, coincidenti ............................................ 114

CAPITOLO IVLA SALVAGUARDIA DELLE GARANZIE INDIVIDUALI,

TRA DIRITTI UE E RIMEDI(PREVALENTEMENTE, MA NON SOLO) NAZIONALI

1. La relazione tra diritti e rimedi e l’indifferenza dell’ordinamento UEin merito alla qualificazione giuridica interna delle situazioni giuridi-che soggettive di origine europea ............................................................ 125

2. L’autonomia procedurale nazionale e i principi dell’effettivita e dellatutela giurisdizionale effettiva .................................................................. 132

3. L’effetto diretto quale naturale completamento dell’effettivita e la tu-tela giurisdizionale effettiva come corollario dell’effetto diretto ......... 142

4. (Segue): l’effettivita (Rewe)-limite all’autonomia procedurale comestrumento del principio della tutela giurisdizionale effettiva, l’affer-mazione del rimedio UE Francovich/Brasserie e l’effetto utile dell’ar-ticolo 4, par. 3 TUE .................................................................................... 147

CONSIDERAZIONI CONCLUSIVE (SEZIONE PRIMA)

La dottrina Van Gend & Loos: l’effetto diretto, inteso in senso soggettivocome conferimento di un diritto, quale motore d’integrazione ed ele-mento costitutivo ante litteram dei diritti fondamentali e della cittadi-nanza europea ............................................................................................ 155

INDICEVIII

SEZIONE SECONDA

OLTRE LA DOTTRINA VAN GEND & LOOS:NATURA POLISEMICA, MUTEVOLE, OGGETTIVA

DELL’EFFICACIA DIRETTAE SUOI RAPPORTI CON IL PRIMATO

CAPITOLO I

IL CARATTERE CANGIANTE DELL’EFFETTO DIRETTOE DEI SUOI PRESUPPOSTI

1. Gli aspetti controversi concernenti l’effetto diretto, oggi: oggetto,scopo e limiti di una nozione camaleontica ............................................ 163

2. (Segue): interpretazione evolutiva (estensiva) vs interpretazione ori-ginalista (restrittiva) nella giurisprudenza UE, tra effetto diretto sog-gettivo-sostitutivo ed effetto diretto oggettivo-oppositivo ................... 167

3. L’applicazione a la carte del test dell’effetto diretto .............................. 1774. (Segue): il problema delle norme UE di carattere programmatico e i

« principi » della Carta dei diritti fondamentali ..................................... 1855. (Segue): la centralita del requisito dell’incondizionatezza e l’(in)attua-

lita della verifica sui presupposti dell’effetto diretto ............................. 202

CAPITOLO II

L’EFFETTO DIRETTO OGGETTIVO DI TIPO OPPOSITIVO:L’ASSENZA DI UN NESSO CON IL CONFERIMENTO

DI DIRITTI INDIVIDUALI, TRA INVOCABILITAv ,GIUSTIZIABILITAv E APPLICABILITAv

NEL CASO DI SPECIE DI UNA NORMA UE

1. L’inquadramento della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia: l’invo-cabilite d’exclusion e l’applicazione del diritto UE come parametro dilegittimita del diritto nazionale ................................................................ 213

2. L’efficacia del diritto UE come sistema a cerchi concentrici e contigui,critica del riconoscimento dell’effetto soggettivo-sostitutivo qualeunica forma di effetto diretto e ratio dell’effetto diretto oggettivo-op-positivo ........................................................................................................ 233

3. Lacune normative e (possibile) mancata autosufficienza dell’effettodiretto oppositivo: quale spazio per l’effetto sostitutivo, l’interpreta-zione conforme e/o l’azione di responsabilita extracontrattuale stataleper violazione del diritto UE? .................................................................. 256

4. La complementarieta tra effetto diretto (anche e soprattutto di tipooppositivo) e responsabilita patrimoniale dello Stato: simmetrie, asim-metrie e i limiti dell’attribuzione (anche solo potenziale?) di un dirittoquale elemento costitutivo del rimedio Francovich ............................... 259

INDICE IX

CAPITOLO IIIEFFETTO DIRETTO E RAPPORTI ORIZZONTALI:

I PROFILI (ANCORA) PROBLEMATICI

1. Effetto diretto e relazioni interindividuali: perimetrazione dell’analisi .... 2752. La logica sottesa all’attribuzione di effetti diretti orizzontali alle

norme del TFUE, in particolare a quelle sulle liberta di circolazione . 2773. Il divieto di effetti diretti orizzontali delle direttive e le criticita della

giurisprudenza UE: le ragioni, le obiezioni e l’identificazione degliescamotages concepiti dalla Corte per il suo superamento ................... 290

4. (Segue): effetto diretto (verticale oppure orizzontale?) oppositivo, effettiincidentali/collaterali, rapporti triangolari e controversie tra privati ......... 303

5. (Segue): interpretazione conforme, “aggiramento” del divieto di ef-fetti diretti orizzontali, relazione con l’effetto diretto e i rischi diun’attivita ermeneutica troppo espansiva (e ultra vires?) ..................... 314

6. Principi generali e Carta dei diritti fondamentali: la dottrina Man-gold-Kucukdeveci-Dansk Industri (e l’ulteriore elusione del divieto dieffetti diretti orizzontali delle direttive) e oltre ..................................... 333

7. Il divieto di effetti diretti orizzontali delle decisioni rivolte agli Stati ela sua inapplicabilita alle decisioni prive di destinatari determinati .... 347

CAPITOLO IVIPERTROFIA DEL PRIMATO IN IPOTESI

DIVERSE DALL’EFFETTO DIRETTOE POSSIBILE DISSOCIAZIONE TRA NORMA UE

DIRETTAMENTE EFFICACE E OBBLIGO DI DISAPPLICAZIONE

1. Fondamento dell’obbligo di disapplicazione in assenza di una posi-zione giuridica di vantaggio in capo al singolo e ruolo del giudice na-zionale: la primazia del primato sull’effetto diretto ............................... 351

2. La questione dell’effetto verticale invertito, con riguardo (anche, manon solo) alle direttive: divieto assoluto o relativo? .............................. 361

3. Primato, effettivita, disapplicazione in malam partem e tangibilitadella res judicata: Lucchini e la sua progenie ......................................... 375

4. “Cannibalizzazione” del primato nei confronti dell’effetto diretto e mini-malismo argomentativo della Corte di giustizia nella saga Taricco ........... 394

CONSIDERAZIONI CONCLUSIVE (SEZIONE SECONDA)

Corte di giustizia, self-restraint, (in)certezza giuridica, presunzione dell’ef-fetto diretto e suo effetto (tuttora) utile ................................................. 419

Elenco dei casi citati, limitatamente alla giurisprudenza UE .......................... 431

Indice degli autori citati ....................................................................................... 451

English Summary ................................................................................................ 503

INDICEX

PREMESSA

Questo libro e stato scritto grazie alle ricerche svolte, innanzi-tutto, in Luiss, al Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, al quale va ilmio ringraziamento per il finanziamento ricevuto.

Ringrazio anche le seguenti istituzioni estere: l’UniversiteToulouse I Capitole, dove sono stato Professeur invite nel 2015;l’American University College of Law (Washington DC), dove sonostato e sono tuttora, dal 2016, Recurring Adjunct Professor of EULaw; l’Universite Pantheon Assas (Parigi), dove sono stato Profes-seur invite nel 2017.

Grazie ai colleghi e agli amici per il confronto, i commenti e iconsigli: Chiara Amalfitano, Giacomo Biagioni, Giacomo Di Fede-rico, Francois-Xavier Millet, Fernanda Nicola.

Il lavoro e aggiornato, quanto a normativa, giurisprudenza edottrina, al 31 dicembre 2017.

INTRODUZIONE E PIANO DELL’INDAGINE

La dottrina dell’effetto diretto e all’origine e al cuore dell’or-dinamento UE. Ragionare di effetto diretto significa indagare lanatura piu profonda, evolutiva e polisemica, del diritto europeo. Si-gnifica ricostruire, in termini teorici, il principio primus inter parestra tutti i principi costituzionali del diritto dell’Unione, tenutoconto della sua incidenza sull’intensita, la portata e l’estensionedella tutela delle situazioni giuridiche soggettive create dal dirittoprimario e dal diritto derivato a favore degli individui.

La cornice e quella dei rapporti, spesso dialettici anziche pu-ramente dialogici, tra ordinamento europeo e ordinamenti interni,nella consapevolezza che il processo d’integrazione ha nell’effettodiretto la sua ragion d’essere. L’efficacia diretta colloca, infatti, l’in-dividuo, con le sue prerogative, i suoi diritti, al centro dei trattati.Definisce, in questo senso, l’autonomia e l’originalita di un ordina-mento che, seppure ancora ancorato al diritto internazionale, se n’eaffrancato nei suoi elementi costitutivi.

In un tale quadro, la finalita ultima del lavoro e cogliere e in-quadrare giuridicamente gli aspetti evolutivi e controversi di unprincipio che nasce, si consolida e si trasforma grazie alla Corte digiustizia, attore imprescindibile e insostituibile nella concettualiz-zazione e sistematizzazione dell’efficacia diretta, cosı come deiprincipi del primato e dell’effettivita/effetto utile che con tale effi-cacia interagiscono. Un attore, oggi, tuttavia, il quale, differente-mente da quanto fatto in altre epoche, pare ispirarsi, perlomenoper quel che concerne la ricostruzione giuridica dell’effetto diretto,per un eccessivo self-restraint e minimalismo argomentativo.

L’effetto diretto, per come si presenta nella Sezione primadella presente ricerca, si riassume, innanzitutto, nella sentenza VanGend & Loos e nella dottrina che ne consegue. La prospettivascelta per studiarne gli elementi piu caratterizzanti e stata quellad’iniziare con l’offrire, nel Capitolo I, una rilettura, contestualiz-zata, anche sul piano storico, della causa Van Gend & Loos.

Esaminata la pronuncia Van Gend & Loos, ci si e soffermati,nel Capitolo II, sulla sinergia tra effetto diretto e procedimentopregiudiziale e sulla loro complementarieta. Una complementa-rieta che ha ispirato e continua a ispirare l’ordinamento UE anchee soprattutto grazie all’efficacia erga omnes delle sentenze pregiu-diziali interpretative e, in particolare, all’esercizio, de facto, daparte dei giudici UE, di un vero e proprio sindacato accentrato dilegittimita del diritto nazionale. Non solamente l’esercizio di unmonopolio interpretativo circa il diritto UE e, nel caso dei quesitipregiudiziali di validita, di un controllo di compatibilita del dirittoderivato con i trattati.

Il passaggio successivo e consistito nell’individuare, nel Capi-tolo III, i punti (relativamente) fermi della giurisprudenza UE sucondizioni e conseguenze dell’effetto diretto, nell’ambito della dot-trina Van Gend & Loos, sottolineando i mutamenti occorsi, neglianni, quanto a portata e confini di detta dottrina. In questo quadro,un’attenzione particolare e stata dedicata alla relazione che esistetra diretta efficacia e diretta applicabilita: due categorie concet-tualmente distinte ma, nella pratica, coincidenti.

L’indagine sull’effetto diretto, peraltro, non deve essere limi-tata ai profili sostanziali del diritto UE. Al contrario, la dottrinadell’efficacia diretta e stata lo strumento attraverso il quale laCorte di giustizia ha potuto erodere l’autonomia procedurale degliStati membri, allo scopo di rafforzare l’effettivita-effetto utile deldiritto UE e la sua tutela giurisdizionale effettiva. Da qui l’esigenzad’illustrare, nel Capitolo IV, le modalita e l’ampiezza di una tale in-trusione in ambiti un tempo riconducibili alla domestic jurisdictiondegli Stati.

L’effetto diretto non va ricondotto solamente al “modello VanGend & Loos”. Quel che lo connota non e sempre e comunque ilconferimento, immediato, di un diritto soggettivo o comunque diuna posizione giuridica, distinta dal diritto soggettivo, in capo agliindividui. Non e neanche per se il verificarsi di effetti sostitutivi,per cui la norma UE si sostituisce, appunto, alla norma interna.L’effetto diretto non e neppure sempre e comunque il risultato diun test che giudice europeo e giudice nazionale devono effettuare,centrato sui presupposti della chiarezza, della precisione e dell’in-condizionatezza. Quanto all’ordine di disapplicazione, peraltro,non puo essere dato per scontato che esso sia, oggi, sempre il pro-

INTRODUZIONE E PIANO DELL’INDAGINEXIV

dotto del primato insieme all’effetto diretto; in qualche caso, essosembra essere il risultato del solo primato, cioe della priorite deldiritto UE sul diritto interno.

Tutte queste problematiche sono trattate nella Sezione se-conda. Innanzitutto, si ricava dal Capitolo I che l’evanescenza deipresupposti dell’effetto diretto, cosı come l’applicazione — quandoc’e — a la carte e a geometria variabile, implicita o esplicita, di dettipresupposti, associata al progressivo assorbimento, nel ragiona-mento della Corte di giustizia, della chiarezza e della precisione nelrequisito dell’incondizionatezza, dimostrano l’andamento mute-vole e altalenante dell’approccio giurisprudenziale in subiecta ma-teria.

Successivamente, l’indagine si e concentrata sulla dimensioneoggettiva, anziche soggettiva, dell’effetto diretto, laddove disposi-zioni di diritto UE, invece di attribuire, in termini immediati, un di-ritto in capo al singolo, operano come parametro di legittimita deldiritto nazionale, con effetti oppositivi/di esclusione piuttosto chesostitutivi. Natura, portata, conseguenze e limiti di questa forma diefficacia diretta sono oggetto del Capitolo II, dedicato altresı al-l’esame dei rapporti tra detta efficacia e l’istituto dell’efficacia in-diretta.

Nel Capitolo III ci si e confrontati con la vexata quaestio del-l’effetto orizzontale del diritto UE, in particolare delle direttive,delle decisioni, dei principi generali e delle disposizioni della Cartadei diritti fondamentali. La giurisprudenza UE e poco chiara e, avolte, incoerente. In particolare, gli strumenti concepiti per aggi-rare il divieto di effetto diretto orizzontale delle direttive sollevanoparecchie, troppe criticita, sul piano della certezza del diritto e dellegittimo affidamento. Molte piu di quelle che questo divieto do-vrebbe, in teoria, mirare a risolvere o attenuare. Cio e particolar-mente evidente con riferimento agli effetti incidentali/collaterali/orizzontali delle direttive nei rapporti triangolari (o interindivi-duali), all’interpretazione conforme e alla dottrina Mangold/Kucukdeveci/Dansk Industri.

Nel Capitolo IV, infine, sono state individuate tre situazioniche sembrano contraddire la logica Simmenthal-Granital, per cui ladisapplicazione sarebbe connaturata soltanto a una norma UE di-rettamente efficace: effetto verticale invertito (in ipotesi diverse dadirettive); infiltrazione del diritto UE nel diritto processuale degli

INTRODUZIONE E PIANO DELL’INDAGINE XV

Stati membri, con la conseguente relativizzazione del principiodella res judicata (affare Lucchini e sua progenie); saga Taricco,dove l’obbligo di disapplicazione, per com’e stato condizionato e“riempito” in Taricco II, pare dipendere da una norma, qual e l’ar-ticolo 325, paragrafi 1 e 2, TFUE, priva di diretta efficacia, inquanto non incondizionata.

Considerazioni conclusive e di sintesi sono state formulate inentrambe le Sezioni. Considerazioni che riprendono e sviluppanole riflessioni qui solo accennate.

Due ultime precisazioni, volte a perimetrare l’oggetto e loscopo della ricerca. In primo luogo, esula dall’indagine il tema del-l’efficacia interna (nell’ordinamento UE e negli ordinamenti na-zionali) del diritto internazionale. In secondo luogo, essendo lachiave di lettura scelta quella del diritto UE, non e stata condottaun’analisi dettagliata della giurisprudenza interna, compresa quellacostituzionale, con riferimento a quelle ipotesi nelle quali i giudicinazionali devono applicare norme UE direttamente efficaci. In talesenso, sono stati effettuati prevalentemente dei richiami, nella mi-sura in cui interessino il fil rouge del presente studio.

INTRODUZIONE E PIANO DELL’INDAGINEXVI

ENGLISH SUMMARY

The direct effect of EU Law in national legal orders.The evolution of a still controversial doctrine.

I. The doctrine of direct effect is at the root and heart of theEU legal order. Thus, writing about direct effect means investigat-ing the fundamental essence of EU law. It means reconstructingthe theoretical foundations of the primus inter pares principle,which stands out among the other constitutional principles ofUnion law due to its impact on the level, scope and extent of theprotection of the rights created by primary and secondary EU lawin favour of individuals.

The wider context is that of the relationships between the EUlegal order and the domestic legal orders of the Member States(relationships that are often dialectical rather than purely dialogi-cal), keeping in mind that the process of European integration hasits raison d’etre in direct effect. Indeed, the doctrine of direct effectplaces individuals, and their rights, at the centre of the Treaties. Inthis sense, it determines the autonomy of a legal order that, al-though originating in international law, has distanced itself fromthe latter in its own constitutive elements. The originality of EUlaw lies precisely in its vocation to affect the legal position of indi-viduals who, rather than being third-party beneficiaries of the legalrelations existing between the State Parties that have signed andratified the Treaties, directly enjoy rights arising from the obliga-tions imposed on Member States by EU law.

Within this framework, the present book ultimately aims toshed light on and legally frame the evolving and controversial as-pects of a principle that, since its introduction, has undergone aprocess of consolidation and evolution thanks to the efforts of theCourt of Justice of the EU. Indeed, the CJEU has played an essen-tial, irreplaceable role in the conceptualization and systematizationnot only of direct effect, but also of two other principles that inter-act with it, namely primacy and effectiveness (effet utile).

As an example of judge-made law, the Van Gend & Loos doc-trine, like the other constitutional pillars of EU law (in particular,the principle of primacy), placed the CJEU, in its role as adjudica-tor of the rights and duties of individuals, at the centre of the trans-formation of EU law. First in Van Gend & Loos and then in rulingssuch as Reyners and Defrenne, the Court, by using direct effect asboth a basis for and a means to ensure the legal protection of indi-viduals, reacted to the ‘sovereigntist’ claims of States or the inac-tion of the EU’s ‘political’ institutions (especially the Council).With regard to the protection of rights, two other doctrines formu-lated mainly through case law represent further milestones in theevolution of the EU legal order: (i) the protection of fundamentalrights and of general principles connected with them, and (ii) theprinciple of effective judicial protection. Direct effect is a prereq-uisite for both. Kadi and Johnston are based on Van Gend & Loos,that is, on direct effect as the core principle underpinning EU au-tonomy. The same applies to the European citizenship, to the ex-tent that direct effect, together with the principle of effectiveness,allows the individual to enjoy a right of residence derived from Ar-ticle 20 TFEU, which « precludes national measures having the ef-fect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment ofthe substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status ascitizens of the Union » (Zambrano).

II. The concept of direct effect, in the sense given to theterm in Section I of this book, is epitomized, first of all, in the VanGend & Loos judgment and the doctrine derived from it. There-fore, as a necessary introduction to the analysis of the most distin-guishing aspects of direct effect, Chapter I provides a contextual-ized examination of the Van Gend & Loos case, including from ahistorical perspective. On the one hand, this Chapter shows thatthe ruling in Van Gend & Loos was the result of a development inthe case law which began even before the establishment of theEEC, that is, at the time of the ECSC, thanks to stimulus from theLegal Service of the ECSC High Authority and from AdvocateGeneral Lagrange. On the other hand, however, the ruling was alsorevolutionary, because here the CJEU identified for the first timethe defining characteristic of the European system, which it laterexplicitly reaffirmed in Costa: the centrality of the individual as a

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subject of law, more specifically as a holder of subjective/individualrights conferred by directly effective provisions of EU law.

After a discussion of the Van Gend & Loos judgment in Chap-ter I, Chapter II focuses on the synergic interplay of direct effectand the preliminary reference procedure and on the complementa-rity between the two. Indeed, this complementarity has been andcontinues to be a defining feature of EU law especially thanks tothe erga omnes effect of interpretative preliminary rulings. In par-ticular, through the interpretative preliminary reference mecha-nism, the CJEU does not only exercise a monopoly over the inter-pretation of EU law, but has also come to exercise, de facto, a cen-tralized judicial review of national legislation.

Using the preliminary reference procedure, the Court of Jus-tice has given substance to the doctrine of direct effect, broadeningit and reinforcing its legal significance. While not in itself new inthe context of international law, this doctrine has penetrated theEU legal order to such an extent that, today, there is actually apresumption of direct effect of EU law — a direct effect theorized,defined and ascertained by the Luxembourg Court rather than bynational courts. And therein lies the autopoietic function of EUjudges, as well as the monist theory that inspires them.

Section I continues with Chapter III, which deals with the EUcase law on the conditions and consequences of direct effect byidentifying its (relatively) constant tenets as well as by emphasizingthe changes that the scope and limits of the Van Gend & Loos doc-trine have undergone over time. In this regard, particular attentionis paid to the relationship between direct effect and direct applica-bility — two categories that, while conceptually distinct, coincide inpractice.

From that perspective, Chapter III points out that direct effect— understood in its subjective dimension as the creation of indi-vidual rights, with substitution effects insofar as EU law governsthe case at hand by replacing (‘disapplied’) national legislation —has been and continues to be the driving force of European inte-gration. This is because it gives concrete effect to EU law; becauseit ensures, at least in principle, its effectiveness-effet utile.The speci-ficity of the EU legal system consists in the ‘integrationist’ spirit ofthe rules and principles that make it up. Direct effect is the clearestmanifestation thereof. In short, Community integration means “in-

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tegration through law” (Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler) as wellas integration through rights. Thus, a “Community based on the ruleof law”, as it is described in the case of Les Verts and in Opinion 1/91on the Draft agreement between the Community and the countries ofthe European Free Trade Association relating to the creation of theEuropean Economic Area, implies the existence of a “Community ofrights”. Not only the rule of law but also, and above all, rights are cru-cial and essential factors in the building of Europe.

Any in-depth analysis of direct effect must necessarily addressboth the substantive and procedural aspects of EU law. Indeed, thedoctrine of direct effect has enabled the Court of Justice to erodethe procedural autonomy of the Member States, in order to en-hance the effectiveness of EU law and its effective judicial protec-tion. Therefore, Chapter IV discusses the nature and extent of theEU’s intrusion into areas that used to fall under the domestic juris-diction of States.

To sum up, the Van Gend & Loos doctrine is at the root ofCommunity, and now European Union, law, which in its first phasewas intended to safeguard the socio-economic rights of the indi-vidual as homo economicus/factor of production. Over time, thisaim gradually shifted to, and still is, the protection of the individualas such, that is, as a holder of rights derived not only from marketintegration norms, but also — and most importantly — from« policy integration norms » (de Witte), rights which may be en-forced before national courts, against the State or any other per-son, whether natural or legal. By putting the individual as a subjectof law and holder of rights at the centre of the Community legalsystem, the Court of Justice has strengthened the democratic di-mension (whatever people may say about it ...) of the Europeanintegration project.

III. What does it mean to say that direct effect, as the driv-ing force of European integration, is an evolving, many-sided, andpolysemic notion? It means that the concept of direct effect cannotbe reduced to the Van Gend & Loos judgment and the doctrinederived from it. Despite what is often stated or implied in the lit-erature, including textbooks, whether published in Italy or abroad,direct effect should not be understood in an originalist sense.

In this light, the jurisprudence of the CJEU does not seem

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provide sufficient legal certainty as to the content, scope, limits andconsequences of direct effect. In my opinion, it is vague, imprecise,unpredictable, often too minimalist and, at times, inconsistent —and this form of judicial self-restraint is as problematic as judicialactivism or, to use Cappelletti’s expression, « law-making judges ».When fundamental principles are at stake as primi inter pareswithin a legal order (principles from which other principles, sub-principles, rules of reason, etc. are derived, in a ‘cascade system’),judges should use their best efforts to understand legal institutionsand establish the relevant/applicable legal framework, so as to fillany gaps that may arise and avoid the risk of inconsistencies. More-over, ‘argumentative minimalism’ and lack of clarity, in particularwith regard to the constitutional principles of EU law, run the riskof undermining the spirit and purpose of the process of Europeanintegration, especially in a time like ours, when new forms of popu-lism, sovereigntism and anti-Europeanism are on the rise.

Section II of the book investigates some problematic aspectsof the concept of direct effect. Indeed, direct effect does not alwaysand necessarily mean that subjective rights are directly conferredon individuals. Nor does it entail, per se, substitution effects,whereby a norm of EU law replaces a provision of national law.

Moreover, direct effect is not always and necessarily the resultof a test that, based on the criteria of clarity, precision and uncon-ditional nature, must be employed by the CJEU and nationalcourts for determining whether a provision is directly effective. Inaddition, with regard to the obligation to disapply national legisla-tion, it cannot be taken for granted that, today, that obligation isalways a result of primacy and direct effect together; in some cases,it seems to be the result only of primacy — that is, of the priorite ofEU law over national law.

So, what are the most controversial aspects of direct effect —in terms of both theory and practice — as they emerge from thecase law of the Court of Justice? Section II identifies four major is-sues, each of which is dealt with in a separate chapter.

The first problematic issue concerns the requirements for di-rect effect, whose status and role are examined in Chapter I: clar-ity, precision and unconditional nature. In my opinion, clarity andprecision have now become redundant, whereas unconditional na-ture (i.e., the margin of discretion allowed to the Member States in

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the application of EU law) is the only real requirement for directeffect. If a provision is unconditional, it is necessarily also clear andprecise: unconditional nature encompasses clarity and precision.Thus, while a provision that is clear and precise may not necessar-ily be unconditional, a provision that is unconditional is alwaysclear and precise. How could a provision be unconditional (and,therefore, how could it not require additional implementing mea-sures and produce direct effects), if it were impossible to determinerights and obligations clearly and precisely? On the other hand, aprovision could clearly and precisely identify rights and obligationswithout being self-contained, in which case it would require addi-tional implementing measures.

In general, it is my impression that the Court has applied thethree above criteria vaguely and in a shifting evanescent manner asif following a variable geometry approach, and without any clearguiding principle. Sometimes it has applied the criteria, but withoutmaking any mention of direct effect (e.g., WWF; El Dridi). At othertimes, it has discussed direct effect but has made no reference tothe criteria (e.g., Verbond). In a large number of cases, the Courthas made no mention of either direct effect or the criteria (e.g.,Melki, on Article 267 TFUE; Akenberg Fransson, on Article 50 ofthe Charter; Bernaldez, on Directive 72/166 relating to insuranceagainst civil liability; and Unilever, on Directive 83/189 in the fieldof technical regulations).This leads to the conclusion that the inter-preter should adopt a presumptive approach to direct effect, reas-sess and relativize the importance of the aforesaid three criteria.The foregoing applies to the EU legal order as a whole, as is clearlyconfirmed by the jurisprudence of the CJEU on the general prin-ciples of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights —sources which, as far as I know, have never been the object of sys-tematic analysis in relation to the requirements for direct effect.

In case of doubts as to whether a provision of EU law is di-rectly effective, what actually matters is, I believe, to assess thebreadth of the margin of discretion allowed by EU law — that is,to assess whether the provision is unconditional. This assessmentshould only be made in cases where the authorities of the Stateconcerned (first of all national courts) have serious difficulties ininterpreting the provision, and in all cases where said authoritiesconsider the provision not to be directly effective. And the pre-

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sumption of direct effect in the absence of evidence to the contraryconsists precisely in this.

Chapter II shifts the focus from the subjective dimension ofdirect effect to its objective dimension. While the former entailsthe conferral of rights directly on individuals, the latter can be de-scribed as the capacity of a provision of EU law to serve as a pa-rameter of legality for national law, with exclusionary rather thansubstitution effects.

The topic revolves around the famous invocabilite d’exclusion,a concept originated in France and not very well known in otherEuropean countries. In a theoretical-reconstructive perspective,the crucial question is whether or not this invocability is a form ofdirect effect.

The CJEU seems to answer in the affirmative, especially (butnot only) in the rulings where it has shown particular reluctance toapply the criteria for direct effect, such as Becker or Fratelli Cos-tanzo. In Becker, for instance, the Court stated that, where the pro-visions of a directive appear to be unconditional, they may be re-lied upon « as against any national provision which is incompatiblewith the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights whichindividuals are able to assert against the State ». At the same time,however, the Court, as noted above, has often failed to examine di-rect effect and its essential components. According to several au-thors, including Simon, Winter, Wathelet, Dougan, Cannizzaro andAmadeo, exclusionary effect is not direct effect because — if I cor-rectly interpret their opinion — the provisions of EU law do notconfer any rights on the individual, and they do not replace na-tional legislation as the law governing the case. In short, the disap-plication produced by those provisions is not the result of directeffect in conjunction with primacy, but of primacy alone, which —let me add — may be regarded as a manifestation of the principleof effectiveness/effet utile of EU law.

I would like to argue in favour of a different reconstructionand understanding of EU case law and, more generally, of the doc-trine of direct effect. Let me take as examples the rulings in CIASecurity International, Unilever, and Kraijeveld. The first two casesconcerned a procedural rule relating to technical regulations andlaid down in a directive that the State had to comply with, whileKraijeveld concerned a procedural rule relating to environmental

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matters. It is absolutely clear that, in these cases, EU law does notdirectly confer any individual right, and it is equally clear that EUlaw produces only exclusionary effects, with the result of excludingnational law — in other words, there is no substitution effect, sinceEU law does not replace domestic legislation.

To sum up the key point made in Chapter II of this Section:what is distinctive about direct effect is not the capacity of a provi-sion of EU law to directly confer rights on individuals and to re-place a provision of national legislation as the law governing agiven case. Rather, the distinctive quality of direct effect lies in thefact that individuals derive an advantage from invoking a provisionof EU law, in the sense that, by invoking it, they protect their pre-rogatives, even where said provision does not directly confer uponthem any rights. In the absence of a direct conferral of rights, EUlaw serves as a parameter of legality for national law and, as such,has the effect of protecting the interests of individuals. Therefore,direct effect can have an objective dimension, with exclusionaryeffects: no right is directly conferred, and the invoked Union pro-vision or provisions lack the capacity to replace national rules.However, at the heart of the invoked provisions there is still an ad-vantage, a benefit that the individual — as noted above — derivesfrom the application of EU law. And it is the possible applicationof a EU law provision by national authorities, in particular thecourts, that makes it possible to define its legal “significance”, i.e.,its concrete nature, according to the meaning given to rights/inter-ests by Hart. There is no substitution effect, but we do have thedisapplication and self-sufficiency of national law, from which theprovisions conflicting with EU law are expunged.

Chapter III addresses the vexata quaestio of the horizontal ef-fect of EU law, especially directives, decisions, general principles,and the Charter. The EU case law in this area is unclear and some-times inconsistent. In particular, the tools designed to circumventthe prohibition of the horizontal direct effect of directives raisemany, too many problematic issues, in terms of legal certainty andlegitimate expectations — way more than the prohibition is sup-posed, in theory, to solve or mitigate. This is particularly clear inrespect of consistent interpretation, the incidental/collateral/horizontal effects of directives in triangular (or inter-individual)relationships, and the Mangold/Kucukdeveci/Dansk Industri doc-trine.

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Legal uncertainty also abounds as regards the provisions ofthe Charter — the « rights » as well as the « principles » recog-nized under Article 52(5) — and the general principles of EU law.The absence of reliable criteria as to the horizontal direct effects ofsources of law protecting fundamental rights is a serious issue andposes several risks. One is that the Member States, through theirsupreme/constitutional courts as interpreters of the national lawand protectors of the domestic legal system, will react to the gapsand silences in the EU case law by appropriating powers that, inmy opinion, belong to the Court of Justice.

Chapter IV focuses on the obligation to disapply and on thetense relationship between direct effect and primacy which under-lies it. Here, the main question is whether scholars and commenta-tors have correctly identified the legal basis of the obligation. Theprevailing view is that, in line with Simmenthal, the disapplicationof national law is the result of direct effect in conjunction with pri-macy: if directly effective, an EU provision imposes the obligationto disapply national law, that is, to give priority to EU law. But isthis really always the case?

Apparently not. Three cases can be identified that seem tocontradict the Simmenthal-Granital rationale that only a directlyeffective EU provision can trigger the obligation to disapply. First,inverse vertical effect, which has been prohibited in respect of di-rectives and criminal law, but never expressly prohibited, per se, inother areas. Second, the primacy of EU law over national proce-dural rules on res judicata, which has been asserted in a number ofrulings, from Lucchini, to Fallimento Olimpiclub, to Klausner Holz.And third, the Taricco affair, where the Court of Justice, first of allin Taricco I and then — with notable caveats — also in Taricco II,ordered the disapplication of Italian rules on the maximum limita-tion period for criminal offences, thus prejudicing the entitlementsof the individual and, in the opinion of the Italian ConstitutionalCourt, violating the (fundamental) principle of legality.

In particular, the Taricco affair seems to demonstrate that theaxiom whereby the obligation to disapply arises only where a normof EU law is directly effective is, in fact, no longer an axiom — andnot simply because, de facto, the Court can achieve the same result(and has indeed achieved it, since the Marleasing case) through theremedy of consistent interpretation. The above axiom no longer

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holds because there is no (substitution or exclusionary) direct ef-fect available in the case of Taricco, for two reasons. Firstly, Article325 TFUE does not satisfy the requirement of unconditional na-ture. Secondly, and most importantly, in Taricco, like in the case ofinverse vertical effect and in the EU case law on the scope andlimits of the res judicata, the disapplication of national law is inmalam partem, that is, it has the effect of depriving the individualof his rights, with the result of prejudicing his interests. Indeed, di-rect effect not only always corresponds to the conferral of a right(subjective, substitution direct effect, as in Van Gend & Loos), butit also consists at least in the conferral of an advantage, as arisingfrom the application of an EU provision that serves as a parameterof legality (objective, exclusionary direct effect). Where there is noadvantage — like, for instance, in Taricco and Lucchini — there isno direct effect. Only primacy. But there is an advantage in CIASecurity International, Unilever, Kraijeveld and other judgments,and that is why, in those cases, the obligation to disapply is the re-sult of primacy and direct effect.

IV. What I have written so far does in no way lead me to re-ject direct effect per se (Prechal), to regard it as a (short-lived) in-fant disease of EU law (Pescatore) or as something that, originallyconceived as the normal state of health of the law, was supposed tospur the process of integration, immunize the EU legal orderagainst future challenges, and then quietly disappear. Direct effectis not an obsolete concept. There is no reason to believe that directeffect, which is a category of thought before being a category of thelaw, and one intended to regulate the relationships between na-tional legal systems and EU law, should be abolished. The fact that,to date, there is a (relative) presumption of direct effect does notmean that this principle must be considered useless.

Direct effect ensures that the principles of the attribution ofpowers between the Member States and the EU, of subsidiarityand of loyal cooperation are not called into question by a general-ized, unrestrained use of the principle of primacy or by the result-ing disapplication of national law. Direct effect is a nexus, a synthe-sis between different legal traditions. It is a symptom and instru-ment of integration, a compass that helps the interpreters of thelaw to find their way among an indefinite, intricate cabala of vary-

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ing categories of substantive and procedural law. Direct effect con-tinues to be a fundamental principle, an essential doctrine capable,in its interaction with primacy, of shaping in federalist terms a le-gal order that, albeit juridically mature and unique in its kind, isnot a federal union. Not yet. Should the EU ever become a federalunion (something to be hoped for, but quite unlikely in the currentscenario), direct effect, as a filter and sine qua non for ensuring theeffective protection of individuals, will no longer be necessary.Only then will national courts have to handle EU law in the samewas as they handle domestic law and, therefore, apply EU provi-sions regardless of their nature in terms of direct effect.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize that direct effect, farfrom being a static concept, cannot be fully encompassed by theVan Gend & Loos doctrine. In order to make the evolving, irides-cent nature of direct effect explicit and grasp its scope and extent,a clarification and reinterpretation of the concept on the part ofthe Court of Justice is needed. And it would not be something un-precedented. Indeed, the EU judges — mutatis mutandis — haveprovided clarification on crucial concepts in a number of cases, in-cluding Keck (measures having equivalent effect), Kadi (the inter-action etween international law and EU law), and Zambrano (theexercise of citizenship rights). The real novelty would lie in thebreadth and depth of the systematization efforts of the Court,which would be dealing with the founding principle of the Euro-pean legal order (i.e., direct effect), rather than with just one of itsother components, however important these may be.

I am persuaded that only the CJEU can offer guidance on thematter to national authorities, since it has an interpretive mo-nopoly on the ifs, whens and hows of direct effect. The Courtshould take a similar approach to that adopted in other historicalperiods. In different key stages of the process of European integra-tion, the Court has authoritatively and somehow boldly taken ac-tion to perfect or re-launch that process, exercising the function at-tributed to it by the Treaties in the best possible way. This hap-pened especially when the central focus was the protection ofrights: among relevant cases, let it suffice to mention, in addition toa Keck, Kadi and Zambrano, Van Gend & Loos, Costa, Internatio-nale Handelsgesellschaft, Defrenne, Simmenthal, Keck, Les Verts,Factortame, Fratelli Costanzo, Francovich, Faccini Dori, Brasserie,

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Melki. Despite the complex issues raised by some of these rulings,the Court ‘took a stand’ on question that required a strong judicialreaction. It was not an instance of judicial activism, but, rather, anattempt to provide guidance on the application of EU law and, inmany cases, an authentic interpretation of matters addressed in itsprevious case law.

It is indispensable that the EU judges come to reassert theirconstitutional role and establish the ‘common core’ of the Euro-pean system, starting from the principles that created and shapedit, including direct effect. A more proactive role of the Luxem-bourg Court could certainly contribute, if not to overcoming, atleast to defusing the crisis of the European Union, especially sinceguidance from the Court is essential for ensuring legal certaintyand, therefore, the development of the EU legal order. All of thismust be done in order to achieve greater integration betweenStates and between legal systems, which is based, above all, ongreater integration between individuals. And in such integration akey role is played precisely by the enhancement of the protectionof rights, whose distinctive element is the useful, powerful principleof direct effect.

In Van Gend & Loos, the reasoning of the Court was inspiredby « une certaine idee d’Europe » (Pescatore) rather than by strictlytechnical arguments on points of law. The Court’s decision to inter-pret EU law in the sense of conferring rights on individuals was ul-timately a political choice, since it expressed the purposes and val-ues that, in the view of the Court, were to direct the process of Eu-ropean integration. The Court took on the role of a political actor.At the same time, thanks to its Van Gend & Loos case law and partof its subsequent jurisprudence, it managed to keep « Communitylaw out of the hands of politicians and bureaucrats and give it to thepeople » (Mancini and Keeling). Rather than embracing judicialactivism, it did what judicial power in its deepest meaning leads alljudges to do: « giving individuals access to the law » (Dawson). Theattitude of the Court of Justice, however, is not entirely compa-rable to that required of domestic law courts. In order for an inte-grated and superordinate system of rights to be strengthened, it isvital that the Court that established that system, rather than simplyacting as a « bouche qui pronunce les paroles de la loi » (Montes-quieu), performs a policy making function, embodying, on the ju-

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ridical level, a certain idea of law, economics and politics. In thislight, clarifying and rethinking direct effect — which means provid-ing sound interpretive criteria, ensuring legal certainty and extend-ing the individual guarantees connected with it — is one of thegreatest challenges that the Court of Justice has ever faced.

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