lecture 9
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Lecture 9. The Demise of Sino-Soviet Alliance. Accumulated Tension. Feb. 1956, CPSU 20 th Congress Criticizing Stalin and his personality cult without consult Beijing in advance. Mao ’ s Reaction. Mid-March to early April 1956, a series of meetings - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Lecture 9
The Demise of Sino-Soviet Alliance
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Accumulated Tension
Feb. 1956, CPSU 20th Congress Criticizing Stalin and his personality
cult without consult Beijing in advance
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Mao’s Reaction Mid-March to early April 1956, a
series of meetings Mao: “exposed the problems”, “made
a mess” Stalin’s mistakes during the Chinese
Communist revolution: Wang Ming’s policy; Chinese Civil War;
Sino-Soviet Treaty; Korean War.
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Mao’s Evaluation on Stalin
A “great Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leader”;
“70-30 ratio” methodology – achievements should account for 70% of Stalin’s career & mistakes for only 30%
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Why did Mao defend Stalin?
Defending CCP’s own experience of building socialism in China;
Learning to establish a highly centralized economic planning system;
Accelerating China’s economic development;
Consolidating his leadership.
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Mao’s Meeting with Soviet Ambassador (March 31, 1956)
Proper tone for criticizing Stalin; Warning Khrushchev not to repeat the
same mistake, hoping a new pattern of Sino-Soviet relations;
Greater voice on questions concerning not only bilateral relations, but international Communist movement.
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Beijing’s management of thePolish & Hungarian crisis (Late 1956)
Both crises resulting from Soviet “big-power chauvinism”;
Polish Crisis ---- anti-Soviet; Hungarian Crisis ---- anti-Communist.
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Chinese Leaders’ Reflection on Soviet’s Behavior
Summer of 1957, anti-rightist movement ;
Criticizing Zhou Enlai’s viewpoint of balanced economic development;
Zhou’s comments on Soviet according to his Soviet, Poland & Hungary visit from Jan. 7 to 18, 1957.
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Divergence between Mao & Khrushchev
Mao: Should not be frightened by nuclear war started by imperialists;
Khrushchev: necessity & possibility of “peaceful coexistence” with Western imperialist countries.
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From Tension to Crisis
China’s domestic situation: Great Leap Forward; Zhou Enlai’s self-criticism;
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Soviet’s Comments on the Great Leap Forward
Khrushchev and his colleague were confused;
Thousands of Soviet advisers issued warnings;
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2 Important Events: Long-wave radio transmission center &
a receiving station:Mao: China would pay all the expenses &
would retain exclusive ownership of the station.
A joint submarine flotilla:Mao: not interested in creating a Sino-
Soviet “military cooperative”.
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Khrushchev’s China Trip(July 31 – Aug. 3, 1958)
Khrushchev’s explanation; Mao’s reaction: “big-power
chauvinism” did exist in the Soviet’s attitude toward China;
Results: Agreement-signing, but Sino-Soviet psychological rift persisted & intensified.
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1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis:Shelling Jinmen (Quemoy)
At the end of July 1958, Beijing decided to begin large-scale shelling of Jinmen without informing Khrushchev;
Aug. 23, began shelling; Early Sept., Gromyko visited Beijing, Mao:
attracting world’s attention to the Taiwan question & to divert US strength from other part of the world (Esp. the Middle East).
Sept. 8, Soviet issued a statement to show its solidarity with the Chinese.
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China’s Situation in 1959:
Negative effects of The Great Leap Forward; March, anti-Chinese & anti-communist
rebellion in Tibet; June, Soviet cannot provide Beijing with
atomic prototype & technical data for producing the bomb according to US-Soviet Geneva negotiation;
July, Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai’s “anti-party plot”;
Aug. Sino-India border conflict.
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Khrushchev’s Speech at China’s National Day Banquet (1959)
40-minute speech; Emphasizing the “Camp David” spirit; Hoping to contribute to the relaxation
of tensions between East & West; Unwise to use military means to test
the stability of the capitalist system. Mao’s reflection: Khrushchev’s speech
meant to insult him & revolutionary China.
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Sino-Soviet Vitriolic Debate(Sept. 30 – Oct. 4, 1959)
K. delivered Eisenhower’s request on releasing 5 American POWs;
Taiwan Issue; Sino-India border conflict; Tibet Rebellion; About Peng Dehuai’s criticism.
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K.’s Speech at Vladivostokon Oct. 6, 1959
“brotherly solidarity” between Moscow & Beijing as a cornerstone for world peace.
“it was unwise to behave like a bellicose cock & to long for war.”
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Breakdown
July 1960, K. recalled all Soviet experts from China and drastically reduced material & military aid to Beijing;
Disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap Forward;
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Events:
1962, Mao initiated Sino-Soviet polemic debate;
Wang Jiaxiang & “3 reconciliation & 1 reduction”;
Nov. 1964, Zhou’s Moscow trip; Prelude of “Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution”.