lecture 12: 10/11/04 negotiating strategy
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Lecture 12: 10/11/04 Negotiating Strategy. Persuasion & Influence Cultural Differences in Neg. Behavior Other Determinants. Persuasion: Outline. Automaticity: Issues of awareness and equilibrium. Examples: Mindfulness Reciprocation as strategy - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Lecture 12: 10/11/04Negotiating Strategy
1. Persuasion & Influence
2. Cultural Differences in Neg. Behavior
3. Other Determinants
Persuasion: Outline • Automaticity: Issues of awareness and
equilibrium.
• Examples:– Mindfulness– Reciprocation as strategy
• My work on the Evolution of Altruism and reciprocation; where do these preferences and norms come from?
– Will talk more about this latter…
Judgmental Heuristics• Expensive = Good Ivy League education expensive, so
education must be top notch. • Experts = Knowledge Captainitis
• Controlled Response – Only when person has both desire and ability, else click, whirr.
Reciprocal Rule• Reciprocation in Societal Exchanges
• Overpowering?
• Uninvited Debts – As good as Invited?
• Unequal Exchanges
• In Negotiations - Reciprocal Concessions– rejection then retreat:– remember Consistency Results suggest acceptance then
increase. When to do each (can things be combined?)
• Defense?
Culture, Blame & Attribution • False Consensus & Naïve Realism
revisited.
• South vs. North- Nisbett et. al. work
• East vs. West- Kitayama et. al.
• Rich vs. Poor (the Illusion of control.)• Economic Position and in/out-group
– Jews, Chinese & Copts• Ultimatum Games in Other Cultures.
Gurin (1978) Findings• Personal control is related to socioeconomic
status
• External control ideology is related to race and political orientation
• When looking at particular groups researchers found that:– People of higher status felt more in control of their
lives; and– Self-identified [African-Americans] and liberals felt
that the System controlled their lives
barrier
actor
receiver
tray
toolfood
Experimental Setup:
Training & Solo Conditions
w. barrier
Condition 1 Condition 2
Condition 3 & 4 Condition 5
no barrier
Intentionality?
First GameA Simple Reciprocation Game
Experiment 1 tests for: (i) Contingent cooperation (ii) Recognition of reputationSetup: trained vs untrained actors
S1S2 S1S2
SH: 100% Altruist JG: 100% Defector
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1 2 3 4
Session
Freq
uenc
y of
Pul
ls
Pulls for Alt.Pulls for Def.
Selfish AltruismReciprocation Game 3:
Experiment 3 tests for:Recognition of byproduct altruism,or “selfish” altruism
S1S2 S1S2
Pulling with a "Selfish" Partner
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9
1
Selfish Partner w. Selfish
Freq
uenc
y of
Pul
ls
Play with HumansReciprocation Game 4:
Experiment 4 tests for:Recognition of unintentionalaltruism, when a human pulls.
S1S2 S1S2
human
Pulling for the Human Compared to Pulling for the Defector
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1 2 3 4
Session
Freq
uenc
y of
Pul
ls
Pulls for Alt.Pulls for Def.Pulls with human
Pulling for the Human Compared to Pulling for the Defector
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 2 3 4
Session
Freq
uenc
y of
Pul
ls
Pulls for Def.Pulls with human
New Experiment:3 Year Old Kids
Next Time• Wrap-up, think about the good and the bad; what
should be expanded.
• Readings for Next Time:– Ekman: Lying and Nonverbal Behavior, (How to tell
when someone is lying)– Ekman: Lying and Deception– Raiffa: Ch. 25, Ethical and Moral Issues.
• Optional:– Ekman: Facial Expressions