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Landowner Enfranchisement to

Promote Habitat Stewardship and

Access Agreements on Private Land in

British Columbia

Prepared for:

The Stewardship Incentives Steering Committee:

Nancy South (MOE)

Mike Badry (MOE)

Terry Dever (MAL)

Prepared by:

Jeff Morgan

Incentives Economist

Ministry of Environment

Fish and Wildlife Branch

August 22, 2005

Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft i

Executive Summary

In British Columbia, acceptable environmental practices and standards are established by

a host of statutes, regulations and bylaws and through the application of common law.

Yet only the Species at Risk Act (SARA) addresses the comprehensive protection of

wildlife habitats on private land. Comprehensive habitat protection on private land is not

legislated for wildlife species that are relatively abundant, even if they are highly valued

by society.

Thankfully, a variety of voluntary programs can be used to provide incentives for

stewardship on private land. Seven general incentive strategies are used in BC, including

stewardship agreements, subsidies, property acquisitions, compensation programs, cost

share programs, certification programs and lease agreement systems. These strategies

offer flexibility and precision (i.e. they can address particular issues or areas of concern),

are voluntary and can achieve environmental outcomes without disadvantaging

landowners.

Enfranchisement programs, not yet in use in BC, engender tripartite partnerships

involving government, landowners and users. Landowners provide stewardship and/or

public access concessions and receive payments (or privileges) in return for these

services. The government maintains policies and programs that enable landowners to

market wildlife-oriented recreation. Finally, recreationists pay landowners for services

rendered through government programs that operate on a ‘user-pay’ basis. All parties

participate in objective setting, implementation and monitoring processes. While

enfranchisement programs generate revenues through the marketing of wildlife viewing

or hunting opportunities, government surrenders no rights, pays no subsidies and

maintains its licensing and enforcement functions. All participants play a role in the

management of wildlife, or their habitats, and are held accountable by contractual

landowner agreements which clearly articulate benefits and responsibilities. Broad

societal interests in enfranchisement programs are protected through the involvement of

government and public advisory bodies.

Enfranchisement programs allow the public and private sectors to organize and

harmonise their objectives (social, economic and ecological), roles and responsibilities.

In essence, society becomes the lessee and its citizens form a broad collective with rules

common to all. For these reasons, landowner enfranchisement can be implemented in a

manner that greatly enhances the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation.

Landowner enfranchisement provides government with an opportunity to develop and

implement wildlife policy that recognises the interests of private landowners and the

wildlife sector. By engendering a cooperative approach to objective setting processes,

government can gain influence in the agricultural setting and garner the support of sector.

This can happen if government is prepared to recognise and tangibly reward landowners

for the stewardship they provide.

Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft ii

As their uptake is voluntary, enfranchisement programs must provide landowners with

financial alternatives that are more profitable than conventional alternatives. Workloads,

liability insurance and risks to livestock and property must be accounted for and

landowner opportunity costs must be understood.

Three broad enfranchisement programs are recommended:

1. A Depredation Program is recommended to address ungulate crop depredation issues

and to manage public access on private land. Participating landowners would be

obligated to tolerate specified crop loss levels and to provide access to hunters in

exchange for monetary incentives.

2. A Stewardship Program is recommended to promote landscape level ecological

planning and stewardship and establish public access opportunities on private land.

Participating landowners would be obligated to participate in the development and

execution of a habitat plan and to provide access to hunters in exchange for monetary

incentives. This program would be most appropriate in areas where highly desirable big

game species (e.g. bighorn sheep) could be used to generate revenues.

3. An expanded provincial Wildlife Viewing Program is recommended to promote

cooperative landowner, government and NGO commercial wildlife viewing ventures. In

return for cost-sharing infrastructure and marketing, government would gain

environmental concessions from landowners, promote economic development and

showcase BC’s commitment to the environment.

Enfranchisement programs rely on user-pay models that minimise government

expenditures. Beyond positive public access and stewardship outcomes, landowner

enfranchisement has the potential to increase regional economic opportunities and

generate government revenue through the sale of licences, LEH applications and through

royalties.

All potential programs should employ pilot projects as developmental vanguards. They

would provide the learning and consultation opportunities necessary to develop

relationships and efficient programs. Working groups would develop products and test

assumptions in a ‘real world’ environment in order to evaluate the feasibility of various

enfranchisement options.

Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft iii

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ I

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ III

1. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND SCOPE ............................................. 1

1.1. Landowner Enfranchisement and the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation ..... 2

2. ENVIRONMENTAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM ECONOMICS ........................ 3

3. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SETTING ................................................................ 5

3.1. The Environment ............................................................................................................................ 5

3.2. Wildlife Legislation and Property Rights ..................................................................................... 5

3.3. Private Land Stewardship Strategies in BC ................................................................................. 7

4. ENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF VARIOUS SECTORS AND

FIRST NATIONS .............................................................................................................. 7

4.1. The Agriculture Sector ................................................................................................................... 7

4.2. Conservation Organizations .......................................................................................................... 9

4.3. The Hunting Sector ...................................................................................................................... 10

4.4. First Nations .................................................................................................................................. 11

4.5. Government ................................................................................................................................... 11

5. THE UTILITY OF LANDOWNER ENFRANCHISEMENT IN BC ................ 12

5.1. A Need for Healthy Partnerships ................................................................................................ 12

5.2. Recommended Hunting Enfranchisement Programs and Revenue Models for BC ............... 14 5.2.1. A Depredation Program ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2.2. A Stewardship Program ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2.3. Revenue Models .............................................................................................................................. 15

5.3. A Public/Private Wildlife Viewing Partnership for BC ............................................................ 17 5.3.1. The Existing Wildlife Watch Program ............................................................................................. 17 5.3.2. An Expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program to Include Private Land .......................................... 18 5.3.3. Wildlife Viewing in the Context of BC’s Tourism Strategies ......................................................... 20

Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft iv

6. NEXT STEPS: PILOT PROCESSES ................................................................... 21

7. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 22

8. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 23

APPENDIX 1: LEASE ARRANGEMENTS AND PRESERVE HUNTING

EVALUATED AGAINST THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL FOR WILDLIFE

CONSERVATION .......................................................................................................... 25

APPENDIX 3: A REVIEW PRIVATE LAND STEWARDSHIP PROGRAMS AND

STRATEGIES IN BC ..................................................................................................... 27

APPENDIX 3: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WILDLIFE OUTSIDE OF BC AND A

DESCRIPTION OF SOME ENFRANCHISEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED

STATES ........................................................................................................................... 37

Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 1

1. Introduction, Background and Scope

Democracies invariably strive to balance the protection of individual property rights with

the protection of “the commons”. When private property coexists with publicly owned

and spatially dynamic natural resources, such as water and wildlife, statutes and common

law are often used to define property rights and establish environmental standards. Not

surprisingly, environmental legislation can create animosity, diminish co-operation and

be expensive to enforce. Further, the standards they establish are minimums and are

usually consistent with broad societal expectations only.

Thankfully, a variety of voluntary programs can be used to provide incentives for

stewardship on private land. Seven general incentive strategies are used in BC, including

stewardship agreements, subsidies, property acquisitions, compensation programs, cost

share programs, certification programs and lease agreement systems. These strategies

offer flexibility and precision (i.e. they can address particular issues or areas of concern),

are voluntary and can achieve environmental outcomes without disadvantaging

landowners.

Enfranchisement programs, not yet in use in BC, engender tripartite partnerships

involving government, landowners and users. Landowners provide stewardship and/or

public access concessions and receive payments (or privileges) in return for these

services. The government maintains policies and programs that enable landowners to

market wildlife-oriented recreation. Finally, recreationists pay landowners for services

rendered through government programs that operate on a ‘user-pay’ basis. All parties

participate in objective setting, implementation and monitoring processes. While

enfranchisement programs generate revenues through the marketing of wildlife viewing

or hunting opportunities, government surrenders no rights, pays no subsidies and

maintains its licensing and enforcement functions. All participants play a role in the

management of wildlife, or their habitats, and are held accountable by contractual

landowner agreements which clearly articulate benefits and responsibilities. Broad

societal interests in enfranchisement programs are protected through the involvement of

government and public advisory bodies.

Enfranchisement programs are an official approach that the public and private sectors can

use to organize their objectives, roles and responsibilities (Benson et al. 1999). They

enable government, user groups, and landowners to create and harmonise social,

economic and ecological objectives for private lands. In essence, society becomes the

lessee and its citizens form a broad collective with rules common to all.

Landowner enfranchisement programs are distinctly different from other types of

incentive programs because they generate self-sustaining revenues based on the quantity

and quality of environmental services rendered. These systems augment traditional

business opportunities and they do not rely on external funding commitments.


This report explores the potential for enfranchisement programs to encourage ecological

stewardship on private land in BC.

This report is intended to:

review and summarize policy, legislation, land use practices, and stakeholder

expectations within BC,

evaluate the applicability of landowner enfranchisement within the BC context , and

recommend the pursuit and development of promising landowner enfranchisement

programs for BC.

The term ‘environmental stewardship’ will be used throughout this report to describe

activities that are intended to maintain or recover naturally functioning ecosystems. For

the purposes of this report, stewardship occurs when; 1) a practice maintains a natural

ecological state, 2) a practice shifts processes or ecosystems toward a natural state, or 3) a

practice allows a natural state to be emulated.

1.1. Landowner Enfranchisement and the North American Model for Wildlife

Conservation

Landowner enfranchisement programs are highly varied however, they can be readily

compatible with the principles of the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation,

as described by Geist (2005 and 1995). This distinctly North American model for the

ownership and governance of wildlife is based on the following principles: 1) public

ownership of wildlife, 2) the elimination of markets for dead wildlife, 3) the allocation of

wildlife by law, 4) the killing of wildlife for legitimate purposes, 5) the recognition of

wildlife as an international resource, 6) scientifically based management decisions and 7)

the democracy of hunting opportunities. Through careful design, enfranchisement

programs can be consistent with all of the above principles and, as discussed below,

greatly bolster five of them.

The first principle, wildlife as a public trust resource, can be bolstered by

enfranchisement programs that acknowledge and affirm that wildlife ownership is

vested in government. Participating landowners are required to provide public

access to wildlife were it would not be assured otherwise. In effect, the wildlife is

repatriated and the public is able to enjoy enhanced recreational opportunities.

The third principle, the allocation of wildlife by law, can be bolstered by

enfranchisement programs if they acknowledge the public ownership of wildlife

and create opportunities for all members of society (in good standing) to legally

harvest wildlife on private lands. Such programs would be clearly articulated,

transparent, enforceable and responsive to a system of public oversight.

The fifth principle, wildlife as an international resource, can be bolstered by

enfranchisement programs that invite society to participate in the development of

economic, ecological and social objectives for private land. This allows

governments and society to manage internationally significant wildlife while

addressing important economic and social issues.


The sixth principle, science is the proper tool for discharge of wildlife policy, may

be bolstered by enfranchisement programs that establish scientifically based

objectives within adaptive and risk management frameworks that are designed to

promote economic and environmental sustainability. These systems rely on the

scientific and technical expertise of many disciplines to inform the objective

setting, field practices and monitoring phases of the habitat management cycle.

The seventh principle, the democracy if hunting, may be bolstered by

enfranchisement programs that bring wildlife and wildlife habitat on private land

under the influence of the governments. Citizens are able use of wildlife on

private land and, perhaps more importantly, they are able to participate in the

establishment of objectives and the execution of plans.

It must be recognised that, in the absence of enfranchisement programs, or other powerful

incentive programs, the BC public cannot freely recreate on private lands or participate in

the development of habitat objectives for private land. Landowner enfranchisement is a

process that creates recreation opportunities for the public on private lands and enables

government, user groups and the public to participate in the development of wildlife and

habitat objectives for private lands in exchange for time-bound landowner privileges. For

these reasons, landowner enfranchisement can be implemented in a manner that greatly

enhances the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation.

Despite their superficial similarities, lease arrangements and enfranchisement programs

are not alike. Lease arrangements are simple agreements between users and landowners

that enable the lessee to enjoy exclusive, or semi-exclusive, recreational opportunities on

private land. While private financial arrangements can motivate stewardship, these

agreements do not usually involve government or society and, as such, they do not allow

government to pursue important social, economic and ecological goals. Accordingly,

lease arrangements are contrary to many of the principles embodied by the North

American Model for Wildlife Conservation. For a more detailed discussion on this issue,

please refer to Appendix 1.

2. Environmental Incentive Program Economics

Environmental incentive programs reconcile landowner and societal interests in private

land management activities and outcomes. The public has interests in ecological services

and commodities that can be influenced by land uses and practices. Thus, incentive

programs address broad consumer-product relationships in the context of existing

property rights and provide inducements that promote specific land use practices.

Land ownership imparts and implies a specific set of property rights within social and

legal systems at various levels of governance. Rights in natural resources, such as water

or wildlife, are not usually tied to land ownership, thus, many resources with a variety of

owners (including the Crown) can coexist in time and space.

Property rights are redefined when governments create laws that regulate land use

practices on private land. Legislation, such as the provincial Water Act and the federal


Fisheries Act, serves to define the property rights and liabilities of landowners,

governments and citizens. One can ask “why are incentive programs an attractive

alternative to the restructuring of property rights through environmental legislation?” A

variety of factors influence the appeal of incentive programs. Governments may not

favour increased regulation for social, economic and political reasons or because of

administration and enforcement costs. Similar outcomes, with fewer negative

consequences, can sometimes be accomplished with incentive programs. Further,

incentive programs are flexible, discretionary and adaptive to changing circumstances.

Incentive programs can also be used to facilitate an orderly transition toward new

legal/property rights regimes by offsetting imposed costs.

As previously stated, a primary purpose of voluntary incentive programs is to make the

implementation of environmentally favourable practices more appealing to landowners.

This is achieved by reducing costs or increasing the returns associated with

environmentally favourable land-use practices. Costs can be divided into two general

categories; observed costs and opportunity costs.

Observed costs include the start-up capital costs that can impede transitions toward

environmentally favourable practices. Operational costs (often labour) and

administrative costs are other observed costs that can be increased by heightened

environmental expectations. Observed costs also include losses, such as property damage

and crop depredation, and elevated insurance costs.

Opportunity costs exist when the potential returns generated by a foregone financial

alternative are greater than the actual returns generated by the alternative selected.

Landowners bear opportunity costs when, willingly or unwillingly, they forgo

development or engage in less profitable practices. Opportunity costs can be temporary

or permanent. When land use decisions are long term, landowner’s may experience an

opportunity cost known as an ‘options value’ cost. This occurs when the landowner loses

his/her flexibility to exploit future financial opportunities.

Incentive programs can induce landowners to voluntarily elevate environmental standards

or outcomes by providing them with additional revenues, or by reducing costs (e.g.

taxes). Such programs must recognise all costs and ensure that the profit margins

associated with the favoured practice are attractive. In the absence of compelling social

or legal motivators, incentive program profit margins must be greater that those generated

by realistic alternatives. If not, the voluntary uptake of the program will be low.


3. The British Columbia Setting

3.1. The Environment

BC possesses tremendous biological diversity and wildlife values. While residents and

tourists alike cherish the province’s natural beauty, human activities often conflict with

ecological values. Ironically, the same physiographic and climatic factors that bless the

province also contribute to its resource management challenges. While only five percent

of the BC land base is privately owned, the province has not been settled evenly. Human

development is concentrated in hospitable valley bottoms, along coastlines or on arable

plateaus. As a result, rare and biologically rich habitats have been disproportionately

impacted.

Runka and Gale (2004) indicate that grasslands comprise approximately 1% of the

provincial land base. Of this, 40% is privately owned and much of the remainder is

tenured for a variety of land uses. More importantly, over 30% of the province’s

threatened and endangered species are associated with grassland ecosystems (Runka and

Gale 2004). Agriculture and domestic grazing are among the top seven threats to red

listed animals in BC (Anon. 2002).

Private land use also profoundly influences on the habitats of important recreational

wildlife species. It is conservatively estimated that at least 50% of the capable mule deer

winter range habitat in the Okanagan Timber Supply Area falls on private land (pers.

obs). The pattern recurs for elk, mule deer, white-tailed deer, and bighorn sheep habitats

in many parts of the province.

Significant improvements in environmental management may be gained by emphasizing

private land stewardship. While most of BC is Crown land, the private portion contains

habitats that are diverse and highly valuable to recreational species and to the majority of

the province’s species at risk. Programs that promote private land stewardship should

become management cornerstones that compliment existing provincial and federal policy

and legislation.

3.2. Wildlife Legislation and Property Rights

Provincial jurisdiction over wildlife, though not specifically addressed, is understood to

have been vested in the provinces by the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly entitled the

British North America Act) which, with some exceptions, gave the provinces control and

ownership of Crown lands (Donihee 2000). Though ostensibly owned by the sovereign,

wildlife ownership became vested in the provincial government unless transferred in

accordance with legislation.

Today, British Columbia’s Wildlife Act asserts provincial ownership of wildlife in

Section 2 where it states:

2 (1) Ownership in all wildlife in British Columbia is vested in the government.


In 1916, the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United

States of America was entered into. Subsequent legislation, the Migratory Birds

Convention Act 1994, brought migratory birds and their nests under federal authority.

Here again Crown ownership is established but it is vested in the federal government.

Individual rights to hunt wildlife, under provincial or federal authority, are established

through licences which are issued by those governments. Possession and ownership of

wildlife is then established through lawful capture. Most importantly, the right to hunt or

to possess wildlife is not tied to land ownership.

Landowners cannot grant hunting rights per se, however, the Trespass Act and common

law enable landowners to deny public access onto their land holdings. Further, British

Columbia’s Wildlife Act requires hunters to receive permission from landowners or

lessees before hunting over cultivated land or on Crown land that is subject to a grazing

lease while the land is occupied by livestock. Landowners may elect to benefit by leasing

access rights to individuals or groups.

While ownership rests with government, Section 5 of the Wildlife Act also asserts that the

province is not liable for death, personal injury or property damage caused by wildlife.

Thus landowners can find themselves in the position of having to accept losses to wildlife

without an offsetting obligation on the part of the Province to provide compensation.

In BC, acceptable environmental practices are established and enforced by a host of

statutes, regulations and bylaws and through the application of common law. However,

only the Species at Risk Act (SARA) addresses the comprehensive protection of wildlife

habitat on private lands.

The Species at Risk Act (SARA) contains provisions relating to the protection of the

residences or critical habitats of threatened or endangered species. Sections 58 and 61 of

SARA prohibit any person from destroying any part of the critical habitat of a listed

threatened or endangered species-even when this habitat is on private land. Section 61

addresses the protection of critical habitat for species that are not migratory birds or

aquatic or that do not reside on federal lands through an order by the Governor in

Council. Accordingly, this section is referred to as the “safety net” because here, SARA

raises the possibility of federal incursions into provincial jurisdiction. Thus, private land

habitats of species of risk may be protected by an uncertain SARA process.

The provincial Agriculture Land Commissions Act does not relate directly to the

management of wildlife habitat however, it has profound implications for wildlife habitat.

Under this act, the Commission has the authority to designate agricultural land and

establish it as an agricultural land reserve. The commission defines and authorizes

acceptable farm practices within the reserve and it must authorize subdivision of the

parcels or the creation of covenants within the reserve.


British Columbia’s Assessment Act is another provincial statute that can have profound

implications for the environment. This act and its regulations identify various

agricultural activities that allow land to receive ‘farm class’ status. Lands not committed

to “primary agriculture production” are classed as “residential” and higher tax rates are

then applied by local governments. While incentives for primary agriculture are

established, disincentives for ecological entrepreneurialism and preservation of ecological

values may be the corollary. As a practical matter however, it is unlikely that

stewardship actions would cause a change in land classification unless it precluded

primary agriculture activities from significant portions of a parcel.

3.3. Private Land Stewardship Strategies in BC

British Columbia has a compliment of government and ENGO stewardship programs that

is similar to that of other ‘Western’ democracies. These programs employ a variety of

stewardship strategies including stewardship agreements (including conservation

covenants), subsidies, property acquisition or leasing, compensation, cost share,

certification and access leases. Often these strategies meld and coexist within programs

and distinctions blur. For a description of many BC incentive programs please refer to

Appendix 2.

Cost share, subsidy and compensation strategies provide direct financial incentives or

compensation to landowners for stewardship concessions. These strategies rely on

external funding and are distinctly different than enfranchisement programs which

generate self-sustaining revenues. Access leasing can also generate direct and self-

sustaining revenues however, these arrangements are exclusive and do not invite the

public to participate in the establishment of objectives for the private land base.

4. Enfranchisement in the Context of Various Sectors and First Nations

4.1. The Agriculture Sector

Approximately 5% of British Columbian land base falls within the agricultural land

reserve and most of it is privately owned. Agricultural lands are concentrated in valley

bottoms and proximal to major waterways and wildlife movement corridors. This pattern

of development has disproportionately impacted habitats that are naturally scarce and

ecologically valuable. Over the last three decades societies environmental expectations

have increased and conservation has been achieved through legislation and stewardship

initiatives. Federal and provincial governments have signed national (Accord for the

Protection of Species at Risk) and international (Convention on Biological Diversity)

agreements and created new legislation (SARA). While the mechanics of legislation,

such as SARA, remain uncertain, it is clear that society and its governments are placing

increased pressure on landowners to co-operate in conservation.

Economic circumstances for many BC producers have also changed dramatically in

recent years. Bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) or the ‘mad cow crisis’ prompted

the US to close it border to Canadian beef from 2003 to 2005. Cattle prices dropped and

Statistics Canada and Agriculture and Agrifood Canada report that between 2002 and


2004 cash receipts within BC’s Cattle and Calf Commodity Group declined by 42%. The

circumstance has highlighted the need for BC cattlemen to diversify and reduce their

reliance on US markets and processing facilities. The industry can be expected to take a

dim view programs that reduce profits further, however, it will look favourably upon

stable stewardship programs that are structured to increase profits and enable

diversification. Paradoxically, the circumstance has created a niche for well thought out

environmental stewardship programs.

Dramatic ecological changes have also occurred in BC over the last decade. A recent

series of mild winters coupled with relatively conservative harvest regulations have

resulted in ungulate population increases. Serious wild ungulate crop depredation issues

now occur in all agricultural areas of the province including Vancouver Island, the Fraser

Valley, the Okanagan Valley, the Boundary Area, the Bulkley Valley and the Cariboo

and Peace regions. Waterfowl impacts have also increased in many areas of the province.

Reductions in agricultural productivity have highlighted a clash in sector and agency

objectives. The current conflict calls for a system that reconciles and harmonises the

objectives various sectors and, to the extent possible, mitigates conflict.

As stated previously, most wildlife species do not enjoy significant legal habitat

protection in BC. Thus, producers can resolve problem wildlife issues by simply

removing habitat or excluding wildlife from it. Producers can elect to seek compensation

from government or they can lobby for aggressive wildlife harvest rates.

The East Kootenay “homesteader” or resident elk dilemma serves to illustrate the

problem. The number of elk that occupy lower elevation habitats on year-round basis has

increased and individual losses to hay crops can exceed 30% (Zbeetnoff and McTavish

2004). In response, the agriculture sector has sought compensation or attempted to

mitigate or prevent depredation through a government cost share program. After

exploring reasonable alternatives, many producers resorted to the installation of game

proof fences. Over 11,000 acres of land, much of it classed as prime elk winter and

spring range, have been fenced off and the figure is projected to double in the next few

years (Zbeetnoff and McTavish 2004). Thus, elk and deer have been excluded from high

value habitats on private land and they face movement barriers. East Kootenay Producers

have also lobbied for aggressive, herd-reducing harvest strategies and government has

responded by increasing the antlerless elk authorizations administered through the

Limited Entry Hunt (LEH) system. Producers would welcome smaller resident elk

populations, however, this is likely to conflict with hunting sector objectives.

In an assessment of 12 ranches in the Caribou in 2003, the estimated value of hay lost to

mule deer was in excess of $388, 000.00 (Peter Fofonoff pers. com.). Average losses

exceeded $32, 000.00 per ranch. Government has responded with antlerless mule deer

LEH hunts but the ranching community maintains that the population is not in decline.

Similar problems with mule deer, white-tailed deer and elk occur in the Peace region

where hay and grain producers report serious depredation problems. In addition to

depredation, grain growers report decreased product value due to fecal contamination.


Producers throughout the province now complain that losses due to wildlife threaten the

viability of their businesses and they identify a policy bind that leaves them without

options. The Agriculture Land Commissions Act and the Assessment Act compel many

landowners to farm. At the same time, wildlife agencies often manage toward large

wildlife populations without commensurate obligations, as affirmed by the Wildlife Act,

to compensate landowners for property damage caused by wildlife. In essence, society

forces landowners within the ALR to farm while pursuing other objectives that reduce

agricultural profits. Where the protection of the commons involves a resource that is

essential, such contradictions may be necessary. However, agriculturalists point out that

1) hunting in BC is primarily a recreational pursuit, 2) it is enjoyed by a relatively small

percentage of the BC population, and 3) the demand for hunting opportunities can be met

on the Crown land base.

If frustrated by depressed markets and an unfavourable policy environment, landowners

are sometimes able to divest themselves of their holdings. The bovine spongiform

encephalitis (BSE) problem began in 2003. Runka and Gale (2004) report that the

number of exclusion applications to the Agriculture Land Reserve (ALR) Commission

increased by 27% between 2003 and 2004. These applications, if successful, free

landowners of ALR constraints and it is reasonable to speculate that some ranchers are

attempting to maintain cash flows through the subdivision and sale of land.

The BC Grasslands Commission has identified the subdivision of larger parcels as a

major threat to grassland ecosystems. Acreage or “ranchette” landscapes represent a

change in land use. They are more densely populated, more roaded and more intensively

used. Continual grazing by “hobby” livestock damages natural grasslands and renders

them vulnerable to the invasion of non-indigenous weeds. In addition, human activities

and disturbance can kill wildlife or cause habitat alienation. Finally, habitat

fragmentation can threaten the population viability of wide ranging species such as the

yellow badger.

In British Columbia, a prosperous, well managed and sustainable agriculture industry is

in the best interest of all natural resource sectors. While the province’s

agriculture/ranching sector continues to make significant stewardship concessions,

increased economic pressures have reduced its ability to absorb wildlife related losses.

Other programs and organizations have moved to support landowners and conserve

habitat, however, many landowners require more financially attractive options.

Landowner enfranchisement could be used to generate economic returns, promote

stewardship and add to BC’s existing array of private land wildlife management options.

The agriculture sector has indicated support for enfranchisement programs provided they

can maintain or enhance business opportunities and relationships with other stakeholder

groups.

4.2. Conservation Organizations

British Columbia has a rich history of environmental non-government organization

(ENGO) involvement. Most conservancy oriented ENGOs are guided by a philosophy of

holistic ecosystem management and they conserve habitats by holding lands in trust or


though stewardship agreements. Programs that emphasize the management of a single

species at the expense of the ecosystem would conflict with most ENGO programs at

operational and philosophical levels. In order to maximize opportunities for

collaboration with ENGO’s, enfranchisement programs should not encourage practices

that move lands away from natural processes. Ideally, incentive programs should restore

or emulate ecosystems or ecological function.

Most incentive programs readily blend conservation strategies in ways that are mutually

beneficial. Strategies, such as restrictive covenants, other stewardship agreements and

certification programs, commonly interact to create programs and plans that address the

needs of partner organizations. Where objectives align, there are opportunities to for

collaborative enfranchisement/ENGO ventures.

4.3. The Hunting Sector

British Columbia’s hunting sector, represented in part by the BC Wildlife Federation, has

retained core values that have successfully guided the management of hunting in North

America since 1930. The system is referred to as the North American Model for Wildlife

Conservation (Geist 2005) and it is comprised of the following principles; 1) public

ownership of fish and wildlife, 2) the elimination of markets for dead wildlife, 3) the

allocation of wildlife by law, 4) the killing of wildlife for legitimate purposes, 5) the

recognition of wildlife as an international resource, 6) scientifically based management

decisions and 7) the democracy of hunting opportunity (Geist 2005). BCWF

representatives are staunchly in support of the model. The BCWF has also indicated a

reluctance to make financial contributions to programs that do not focus on the

enhancement of hunting or fishing opportunities.

Landowner enfranchisement can maintain or bolster the North American model by using

economic incentives to provide the public with opportunities to influence recreation and

wildlife habitat objectives for private land. Provided the egalitarian principles of the

North American Model for Wildlife Conservation are upheld, the BCWF has indicated a

willingness to consider landowner enfranchisement programs.

Because of their commercial interests in wildlife, hunting guides, represented by the

Guide Outfitter Association of BC (GOABC), must be treated as separate entity within

the hunting fraternity. Not surprisingly, this organization supports the creation of

commercial opportunities associated with wildlife, however, it warns against the creation

of a new licence class that would threaten the integrity of their licences. The GOABC

maintains that the tools required to create commercial opportunities on private land are

already in place; namely guide outfitter licenses and certificates. The GOABC has

acknowledged that hunting opportunities on private land for both residents and non-

residents should be maintained and this would lend support to the concept of landowner

enfranchisement.

Some guide outfitters have suggested that programs reliant on mule deer, and even elk,

would not be able to generate the revenues sufficient to cover program costs. Further,

some are concerned that an increase in the supply of hunts could suppress prices and


lower profit margins. While the concern warrants further attention, in general, the

GOABC can be expected to favour programs that expand quality guiding opportunities

for its members.

4.4. First Nations

As confirmed by the BC Court of Appeal in its Delgamuukw Decision (1993) aboriginal

fishing and/or hunting rights continue to exist in British Columbia. The Supreme Court

of Canada’s Sparrow decision (1990) established that aboriginal rights to hunt or fish for

sustenance purposes must be given the first priority after conservation needs are met.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s Gladstone Decision confirmed that aboriginal rights to a

commercial use of a fish resource (in this case, herring spawn on kelp) exists when it can

be demonstrated that a commercial usage of the resource existed prior to European

contact and was integral to the distinctive culture of the First Nation in question.

When allocating wildlife harvests, statutory decision makers must recognize aboriginal

rights. Provincial policy (Anon. 1996) holds that “First Nations exercising their

aboriginal rights to hunt and fish for sustenance purposes have the first priority after

conservation needs are met.” This principle must be observed by landowner

enfranchisement pilots and programs.

4.5. Government

Enfranchisement programs can establish and harmonize social, economic, ecological

objectives and provide sound leadership and governance for the following reasons. First,

enfranchisement integrates social, economic and ecological objectives. Second,

enfranchisement links the private, operational objectives with broad strategic direction

provided by government and other organizations.

Third, enfranchisement programs would employ a consultative, scientific, adaptive and

‘results-based’ governance model. After considering options, landowners, user groups

and government (representing society) cooperate in the establishment of a series of

interlocking objectives for individual land holdings or consortia. These objectives, and

their indicators, would be clearly articulated in landowner agreements. Monitoring and

reporting procedures would then provide feedback and allow the agreement to be adapted

as information becomes available.

Fourth, enfranchisement programs would allow government to step away from its role as

regulator and assume a more proactive and positive role in the capacity of ‘partner’.

Synergies could be gained by combining the expertise and assets of other partners. The

‘power of cooperation’ could be harnessed by combining the talents of ecologists,

wildlife biologists, agrologists, economists and landowners. This, in turn, would create

new opportunities and allow public/private partnerships to establish objectives and

intensively mange smaller areas. This could diversify recreational opportunities in BC

and allow the Province to contemplate new economic opportunities. Special seniors,

youth or trophy hunts are examples of market stratification that could increase user

participation rates and generate higher licence fee revenues.


Fifth, landowner enfranchisement can promote environmental stewardship and create

economic opportunities without displacing traditional economies or those who participate

within them. Enfranchisement allows government, landowners and society to

cooperatively participate in wildlife recreation markets that are already established. As

stated by Benson, Ross and Steinbach (1999) “…willing buyers and sellers would be

brought together and assisted in becoming part of the conservation process”.

Accordingly, enfranchisement programs can further the pursuit of governments

environmental goals and objectives without a commensurate increase government

expenditures or a reduction in tax revenues. It may even be possible to increase

government revenues through increased sales of in hunting licences and LEH applications

or through increased royalty payments.

5. The Utility of Landowner Enfranchisement in BC

5.1. A Need for Healthy Partnerships

In BC, partnerships between landowners and society are imposed by the landscapes and

their ecologies, patterns of land ownership and economic and legal systems. Consider the

following:

1) Many populations of fish, game and rare and endangered species satisfy a portion

of their life requisites within valley bottom or coastal habitats that are likely to fall

under private ownership.

2) Private land in BC is not isolated, discrete or geographically concentrated. It

ramifies up and down the valley bottoms or along coast lines and as a result,

ecological and hydrologic interactions between Crown and private lands are

intimate and complex.

3) Landowners are not legally compelled to provide many environmental services or

products. If a landowner wishes to exclude wildlife, very often he/she is legally

entitled to do so. The public’s desire for many ecological services, therefore,

must be pursued through partnerships and contractual arrangements.

4) Private land practices can have profound impacts on public resources and vice

versa.

The optimal management of many provincial natural resources must involve mutually

satisfying private and public sector partnerships that also recognise First Nations

interests. While not a panacea, landowner enfranchisement has the potential to develop

partnerships, create alternate economic alternatives and generate revenues. British

Columbia employs many of the stewardship incentive programs, or strategies, used

elsewhere, however, all programs are limited by their ability to provide attractive

financial options to landowners and almost all rely on external funding commitments.

Further, many programs preclude traditional land uses without creating obvious economic

replacements. Enfranchisement programs can expand and diversify economic

opportunities while delivering important social and ecological objectives. They would

compliment existing stewardship programs, be guided by clear provincial policy and fit

within the bounds of all relevant legislation.


BC’s economic and legal systems often motivate landowners to act in ways that are

contrary to their interests and those of user groups, ENGOs and agencies. This has been

amply demonstrated in the East Kootenay where landowners have asserted their legal

rights and fenced elk and deer out of over 11, 000 hectares of valley bottom habitats so

far (Zbeetnoff and McTavish, 2004). Enfranchisement programs, not yet employed in

BC, have the potential to mitigate conflict by increasing recreation and economic

opportunities and creating drivers for the protection of wildlife and habitats.

Based on various societal values, enfranchisement programs in BC should be broadly

constrained by moral, legal and practical considerations. To meet with widespread

acceptance in BC, enfranchisement programs must:

recognise the contributions of landowners toward the stewardship of publicly

owned natural resources and tangibly reward them,

uphold the principles of publicly owned fish and wildlife. Ownership of all

wildlife is vested in the Province of British Columbia (or Canada) and all

allocations, seasons, restrictions and licenses for provincial species must continue

to be authorised by government,

promote the stewardship of the resources valued by participating user groups,

place a priority on the stewardship of riparian and grassland habitats and the

habitats of species at risk because they are; 1) highly valuable ecologically, 2)

limited in distribution, 3) concentrated on private land, 4) often in need of

restoration, and 5) highly responsive to treatments

maintain or enhance public access to fish and wildlife on private land,

promote ethical wildlife recreation activities. Programs that involve hunting, or

viewing opportunities, will do so with wild animals under natural and free ranging

conditions only. Landowners would not be permitted to influence the movements

of animals on their property other than through habitat enhancement,

maintain or enhance the quality and quantity of ecological values not directly

related to wildlife oriented recreation,

involve activities that fall under the authority of the Government of BC or that can

be authorised through agreements between the Government of BC and other

governments,

be consistent with other government programs and widely held public

expectations, and

recognise the aboriginal interests of First Nations.

The challenge is to create a legal and policy environment that enables the pursuit of

environmental or public access objectives while simultaneously creating attractive

financial opportunities for landowners.

For a description of wildlife property rights outside of BC and a discussion of

enfranchisement programs in the United States, please refer to Appendix 3.


5.2. Recommended Hunting Enfranchisement Programs and Revenue Models

for BC

Two hunting oriented enfranchisement models, ‘Depredation Programs’ and

‘Stewardship Programs’, are recommended for BC. Both programs must provide safe

and ethical hunting situations and government should encourage the formation of

landowner consortiums.

5.2.1. A Depredation Program

A depredation program is recommended to address ungulate crop depredation issues and

to manage public access on private land. Participating landowners would be obligated to

tolerate specified crop losses and to provide access to hunters in exchange for monetary

incentives.

Access program examples include Idaho’s Access Yes Program, Montana’s Block

Management Program and Colorado’s Walk-in Access Program. The Access Yes

Program generates revenues through licence lottery systems and that is available to

resident and non-resident hunters. The hunting opportunities accessed through this

system can occur on private or public land and are not directly linked to the private land

enrolled in the program. They are simply a means of generating the revenues required to

fund the program. The Block Management Program generates revenues through that sale

of licences, particularly the sale of non-resident licenses. Once again, these licenses do

not relate directly the lands enrolled in the program. They are simply a means to generate

revenues. The Walk-in Access Program generates revenues through the sale of

discretionary stamps that grant the purchaser access to private land enrolled in the

program. All systems use the revenues to reward participating landowners. In return,

landowners provide access to appropriately licensed resident and non-resident hunters on

an equal opportunity basis. These programs do not require landowners to change their

land use practices. Instead, they recognise and reward the landowner’s contributions

toward the health of wildlife populations and public recreation opportunities.

These programs uphold principles established for BC and they appear to require a

minimal investment on behalf of all potential partners. Accordingly, they could be

developed and in a relatively short period of time.

5.2.2. A Stewardship Program

A stewardship program is recommended to promote habitat management at the landscape

level and establish public access opportunities. Participating landowners would be

obligated to implement a stewardship plan, tolerate specified crop losses and provide

access to hunters in exchange for monetary incentives. Because stewardship activities

can be costly, a program of this nature would function best where high revenue species

(e.g. bighorn sheep) contribute to the hunting opportunities.

Examples of stewardship programs include Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife program

and Washington State’s Private Lands Wildlife Management Area Program (PLWMAP).


Both address public hunting opportunities and habitat stewardship on private lands. Big

game tags are divided between the resident hunters (issued through a state lottery) and the

landowner. The later is free to market his/her transferable tags and the revenues

generated provide the financial incentives for stewardship. At all times wildlife remains

the property of the state and all hunters must obtain the appropriate ‘state issued’ hunting

licences. The state and the landowners develop agreements and plans that establish

hunting seasons and stewardship objectives. Landowners execute their plans in a manner

consistent with the regulations, operating guidelines and the agreement. Compliance is

monitored by a state personnel and non-compliance can lead of the termination of the

landowner agreement.

These programs require higher levels of investment on behalf of all partners.

Landowners are required to develop and execute management plans that could address

disease management, reintroduction/recovery planning, wildlife and habitat inventories,

public information, human disturbance management and enforcement activities.

Government must administer a resident lottery system, assist in the development of

wildlife management plans and contracts and engage in (or oversee) monitoring

activities. User groups must be prepared to provide higher revenues to support programs

of this nature. In return, the government and user groups can negotiate higher levels of

stewardship.

Stewardship programs are consistent with the principles that of the North American

Model for Wildlife Conservation yet they are not without controversy. The Ranching for

Wildlife program has created a distinct landowner-guide class which has led to criticisms

of privatization. BC could choose to avoid such controversy by creating a stewardship

program that relies, in part, on landowner/guide outfitter cooperation. For example,

government could market the landowner’s portion of the annual allowable harvest and

pay for the services of an existing guide-outfitter. The recreational use revenues could

then be directed to the landowner. Alternatively, while ensuring resident hunter demand

is satisfied, enfranchisement programs could oversee direct financial agreements between

guide-outfitters and landowners.

Because the stewardship model requires an ecosystem-based approach to habitat

planning, most opportunities for implementation will occur in the BC interior and in the

Peace Region where large rural holdings are still somewhat numerous. In addition,

stewardship programs require higher revenues and, as such, they must involve hunting

opportunities for highly desired species such as elk, bighorn sheep, moose, and bison.

5.2.3. Revenue Models

All revenue generation models contemplated for BC must; 1) generate self-sustaining

revenues, 2) be consistent with the principles of the North American Model of Wildlife

Conservation, and 3) provide tangible financial benefits to landowners who participate on

a voluntary basis. While province/landowner agreements would be voluntary, they would

also be based on time-bound contracts that identify payments, stewardship and access

concessions, measures of success, monitoring regimes, penalties and renewal clauses.


Government participation in program administration and revenue generation is assumed,

however, various levels of involvement are possible.

Selected revenue models must create attractive financial options that motivate

landowners to provide hunter access, adhere to stewardship agreements or tolerate crop

depredation. All costs, including capital costs, operational costs, administrative costs,

property damage, crop depredation, and insurance costs must be factored in to the

remuneration package. Periodic renewals would be required to account for market

changes and shifting objectives.

Landowner costs can be considerable. In 2003, twelve ranches in the Chilcotin

experienced crop losses, due to depredation, that averaged over $32, 000.00 per ranch. In

the East Kootenays, compensation payments to individual hay producers in 02/03 and

03/04 often exceeded $10, 000.00. A depredation program would require incentive

revenues that range between $10, 000.00 to $100, 000.00 per ranch. Depending on the

planning and stewardship commitments, the figures could be larger for a stewardship

program.

Revenue models used in other North American jurisdictions include, license fee

surcharges, lotteries, access fees, guiding fees and auctions. They may rely on

governments, or sanctioned organizations, to manage the revenue generation and

landowner payment process. Alternatively, with government oversight, landowners may

receive payments directly from users. Finally, while many BC hunters would prefer to

restrict hunting opportunities to residents this would obligate the resident hunter to bare

all costs. Depending on the model selected, this could force unacceptable user fee or

license fee increases. In order to support the program, it may be desirable to allocate a

portion of allowable harvest on private land to non-resident users.

The creation of revenue generation models will lie at the heart of all programs and all

stakeholders should expect to dedicate considerable consultation efforts toward their

development. Several models are presented below for discussion purposes. They

warrant further scrutiny and direct input from the government, user groups and landowner

representatives will be sought. It is anticipated that the options that are eventually

adopted will be derivations and combinations of those presented in this document. The

revenue models that follow are intended to be generic and potentially applicable to both

the Depredation and Stewardship Programs.

A Surcharge System would generate revenues through the creation and sale of special

licences or licence surcharges. These licences would be purchased by hunters wishing to

participate in private land programs. Access to private land hunting opportunities would

be regulated but open to all individuals with the appropriate license. An Auction System

would generate revenues through a province wide government auction of highly desired

hunting opportunities on private land. Access to private land hunting opportunities would

be limited to the successful bidders. An Access Fee System would generate revenues

through access fees paid by hunters directly to the landowner or, alternatively, through a

government intermediary. Access to private land hunting opportunities would be limited


to those willing to pay the market price. A Lottery System would generate revenues

through government lotteries for highly desired hunting opportunities on private land.

Multiple entries/hunter for the same hunt could allow the system to generate higher

revenues than the regular LEH process. Access to private land hunting opportunities

would be limited to the lottery winners.

All of the above systems could accommodate a non-resident allocation. The numbers of

non-resident permits/hunts could be minimized and used to satisfy the established

monetary requirements for the program. Further, the revenue model applied to the non-

residents could differ from that used to manage the resident hunters. For example,

resident hunters could be managed through the existing LEH licensing system at existing

prices. The non-resident allocation could be managed through an Access Fee System.

This combination would generate revenues through the non-residents and minimize

resident costs. Depending on the revenue model selected, government revenues may be

generated through the sale of licences, LEH applications and/or royalties.

5.3. A Public/Private Wildlife Viewing Partnership for BC

5.3.1. The Existing Wildlife Watch Program

The Ministry of Environment sustains a wildlife viewing program entitled ‘Wildlife

Watch’. Its goals are to 1) ensure the activities of the program are consistent with the

well being of wildlife and its habitat, 2) promote and enhance opportunities to see and

enjoy wildlife, 3) support tourism and economic benefits associated with wildlife

viewing, and 4) promote increased public understanding and awareness of and support for

wildlife and its habitat needs.

The program’ objectives are:

to develop Wildlife Watch as a province-wide, partnership based program that has

a stable funding base and is largely self-sustaining,

to foster partnerships for the joint development, management and maintenance of

viewing opportunities and sites,

to ensure the planning and implementation of the viewing site system in BC

includes a mix of ecosystems and habitats, wildlife and other natural features,

to work with partners to increase the public’s awareness of viewing opportunities

while ensuring a proper code of wildlife viewing conduct is followed,

to support and participate in the development of appropriate commercial products

and tourism services that meet the needs of wildlife and wildlife viewing

participants,

to promote public awareness and knowledge of wildlife and ecosystems through

informational and educational materials,

to monitor and site use and impacts of use, and

to evaluate program effectiveness and determine the public’s viewing needs,

preferences and opinions.

The program conveys information through its website and through the distribution of

pamphlets and a guidebook. Regional and sub-regional pamphlets identify viewing sites,


species of interest, seasons, travel routes and directions. Loop routes, offering multiple

viewing destinations along scenic highways, are identified through these media and they

are popular. Most sites feature charismatic species and visits to them usually require little

physical effort. Currently, the vast majority of Wildlife Watch sites (557 are listed on the

wesbsite) occur on Crown lands or on lands leased or owned by ENGOs.

In addition to government programs, BC’s private tourist sector offers ecotourism

experiences that range from dog sled rides to whale watching tours. Approximately

2,250 businesses in BC offer nature-based activities and in 2001, just under 966, 000

tourists spent a total of 908.0 million dollars while at these businesses (Anon. 2004). The

total GDP impacts of commercial nature-based tourism are estimated at $782.9 million

(Anon. 2004).

5.3.2. An Expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program to Include Private Land

BC’s wildlife viewing industry must be considered a success. However, North American

demographics and the affluence of Asian and European tourists indicate that the industry

has potential for further growth still. In addition, several strategies to promote eco-

tourism remain untried or underutilized—especially where private lands are concerned.

In its 2002-2005 Business Plan (Anon. 2001) the Wildlife Watch Program lists support

for appropriate commercial viewing activities and partnerships that develop and maintain

interpretive centers as “ongoing program activities”. Further, program objectives include

the establishment of partnerships and the development of self-sustaining revenue streams.

Accordingly, private/public wildlife viewing partnerships represent an area of untapped

potential.

As discussed previously, private lands are often ecological hot spots and they lend

themselves to viewing. They host the majority of the provinces red and blue species,

contain high value ungulate winter ranges and often interface with lake, river and marine

environments. In addition, most private land is situated in the valley bottoms and along

popular travel routes. Landowners could enhance and market viewing opportunities from

vantage points and walkways on their properties. In addition, wildlife viewing

experiences could attract guests to existing businesses such as bed and breakfasts, cabins,

dude ranches and hotel/motels. Operators could offer an array of experiences ranging

from ‘continental breakfasts with humming birds’ and ‘horse back trips with burrowing

owls’ to ‘sleigh rides amongst the elk’!

Yet relatively few private landowners have developed wildlife viewing businesses.

Incredibly, many dude ranch brochures fail to mention wildlife! There are probably

several reasons for this. Private landowners may not be aware of the opportunities that

exist. In addition, individual private operators could face high start-up (infrastructure),

labour and marketing costs relative to the size of the business they could hope to grow.

The North Island Wildlife Viewing Network (NIWVN) is a pilot program that is

attempting to develop self sustaining revenue streams through commercial wildlife

viewing ventures and to provide economical justifications for conservation. The program

links over 30 government and Nature Trust (TNT) properties on Vancouver Island. This

program does include some leased properties and as such to a small extent, some

economic incentives for private land stewardship do exist.


Existing barriers in BC could be overcome by an expanded provincial viewing program

designed to promote co-operative landowner, government and NGO commercial

ventures. In doing so, government could hope to gain environmental concessions from

landowners, promote economic development and showcase BC’s commitment to the

environment. The recommended features of an expanded public/private wildlife viewing

program are listed below:

Government would communicate the business opportunities associated with

wildlife viewing. Many businesses, such as dude ranches, could increase their

appeal by insinuating existing wildlife viewing opportunities into marketing

strategies.

Landowners and any combination of government, NGO, and private operators

would partner and collectively market “wildlife routes”. These multi-member

wildlife viewing associations would cost share, cross promote and collaborate on

the marketing of ‘their’ multi-stop, multi-facility wildlife viewing loop. Further,

these same associations would develop and/or hire guide services to provide

professional and efficient services. It should be noted that MOE is not the only

potential government partner. Agencies and corporations, such as the Department

of Fisheries and Oceans, the Ministry of Forests and Range, BC Hydro and the

Ministry of Tourism, Sport and the Arts, have interpretive and visitor sites and are

potential partners. Other non-wildlife tourist offerings, such as winery-tours, hot

springs, heritage train rides, First Nation’s facilities, trail networks (hiking and

cycling), golf, skiing, dude ranches, fishing operations, museums and house

boating enterprises, would compliment, diversify and accentuate multi-day, multi-

stop tours.

Government would promote private land viewing sites and facilities on its web-

site and with highway signage at little extra cost. Better links and cross

referencing and wildlife information would also be provided on affiliate web-

sites. At present, BC Government Internet Standards (2001) do not generally

condone advertisements for organizations outside the BC government. For this

reason, the creation of a Wildlife Watch Society or a policy change may be

required.

Consistently formatted on-site information signs would be provided to

participating landowners. The signs would bear a prominent viewing program

logo and the logos of all partners. This ‘branding’ would increase the viewing

program’s profile and its recognition. In addition to providing site specific

information, the signs could identify and promote other viewing opportunities and

activities along the affiliated loop and throughout the province. In return for

signage and website advertising, government would expect stewardship

agreements that would address habitat management provisions and specify

guest services, facility standards and viewing protocols.


Where the cost of infrastructure, such as viewing platforms or boardwalks are

prohibitive, governments, NGOs, private tour operators and landowners would

cost share. In return for the government contribution, landowners would

enter into involved stewardship agreements or environmental covenants. NGO’s or private tour operators could contribute to the partnership by assuming

guide or facility management duties. Facilities and infrastructure would adhere to

government standards to enable certification, ensure safety and environmental

standards, cultivate name brand recognition and raise the government’s profile.

By combining private and public viewing destinations the existing Wildlife Watch

program would increase the densities of viewing sites along existing travel routes

and viewing loops. These “sectoral industry clusters” would allow new entries

into the market to benefit from infrastructure that is already developed (Anon.

2004). Increased densities will expand business/marketing opportunities, attract

tour operators and foster the creation of viewing associations. Further, the

program’s appeal to groups (e.g. school) less inclined to travel long distances

would be enhanced. Finally, increases in the number and diversity of sites along

routes would also increase customer options and allow the creation of customised

tour itineraries.

If government were to expand its Wildlife Watch Program and promote commercial

wildlife viewing on public and private lands, a first step would be the development of an

information package. It would identify: 1) the opportunities associated with the wildlife

viewing business, 2) the structure of the programs private public partnerships, 3) the

process for becoming a certified Wildlife Watch viewing site, and 4) the process for

creating or joining certified Wildlife Watch tour associations. Once established, the

program’s partner building activities would not rest solely on government’s shoulders.

Local ‘wildlife viewing associations’ could seek out additional private partners, provide

information, prepare agreements and monitor facility standards.

5.3.3. Wildlife Viewing in the Context of BC’s Tourism Strategies

The timing and philosophy of the proposed Wildlife Watch Program expansion is

consistent with the program’s original goals, broad government signals and the visions of

other agencies in the Pre-Olympic era. The Spirit of 2010 Tourism Strategy, developed

by the former Ministry of Small Business and Economic Development (MSBED),

envisions BC as a “…world-class, all-season destination of choice”. Its goal is to help

the province “…become globally competitive by growing investment in the tourism

sector and attracting more visitors”. The strategy identifies the Olympics as a catalyst for

tourism investments and growth in the entire province before and after 2010. It offers the

following recommendations:

Tourism BC and other provincial agencies, other governments, aboriginal and

non-aboriginal communities, industry and stakeholders need to work together to

further develop untapped or potentially lucrative emerging tourism markets, and

Efforts to increase industry investment will need to be co-ordinated with

government (federal, provincial, local) investment in tourism infrastructure and

the creation of an “open for business” investment climate.


The proposed expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program will also ‘dovetail’ neatly with

the MOE’s Parks and Protected Lands System – 2011 Business Plan (October 2004

Draft) which is also timed to take advantage of the marketing opportunities associated

with the 2010 The Olympic Games.

The document lists a number of objectives including:

the development of new and improved markets by ensuring the full range of front

and back country services are provided,

the provision of new and improved services through such future additions as

interpretation and education programs, and

an increase in user information through integrated marketing approaches

including linkages to the Tourism BC website, Tourism Information Centers,

Chambers of Commerce and schools.

The business plan also identifies the need to provide benefits “beyond the system’s

boundaries”. It recommends the development of partnerships with local communities,

Firsts Nations, [agency] partners and commercial recreation permittees. The report

further identifies that vital partnerships and shared stewardship are an effective way of

doing business with communities. The Parks and Protected Areas Branch (BC Parks)

could partner with the Wildlife Watch Program to increase ecologically sustainable

visitations to their Provincial Parks, Protected Areas, Ecological Reserves and

Conservation Lands. In return, BC Parks could provide leadership in facility, nature

interpretation and signage standards and branding initiatives.

Finally, an expanded Wildlife Watch program is consistent with the provincial

government’s focus for this session. In delivering the 2005 Speech From The Throne,

BC’s Lieutenant Governor, Iona Campagnolo, identified that BC’s "SuperNatural"

branding would be enhanced by government actions. She also stated that “Our parks and

resorts are a huge and growing draw for visitors the world over. Eco-tourism, marine

tourism and agri-tourism are all thriving, using nature as a showcase.”

Tourism was identified as a “cornerstone” of government's Asia-Pacific Gateway strategy

to create new jobs, investment and opportunity in every region. Canada's approved

destination status with China and the 2010 Olympics were identified as major

opportunities for the province’s tourism industry. A timely expansion of the Wildlife

Watch Program would allow BC to protect the environment, stimulate economic

development and, while building on its “Super Natural” branding, showcase its

environmental commitment on national and international stages.

6. Next Steps: Pilot Processes

All potential enfranchisement programs should employ pilot projects as developmental

vanguards. They will provide the learning and consultation opportunities necessary to

develop productive systems and address all relevant values and concerns. Through pilots,

participating landowners, agencies and stakeholders would develop products, such as

landowner agreements, habitat management plans, monitoring plans etc. and processes in


a ‘real world’ environment. In addition, revenue model assumptions must be tested with

real revenues and costs and administrative procedures must be developed. Pilots will also

test the existing legislation and possibly inform changes to the Wildlife Act. With all of

the above taken into consideration, the feasibility of various enfranchisement options

must be evaluated before government should commit to program development.

Pilot projects will also provide greater opportunities for consultation, communications

and relationship building with stakeholders. While consultation has its own costs,

program acceptance and uptake will not occur without it. Further, by providing a forum

for stakeholders to spell out their expectations, consultation will add efficiency by

quickly ruling out untenable options.

All pilots should involve the voluntary participation of landowners and should be

designed to compliment and interact with existing incentive programs in BC. Existing

BCAC council programs (Environmental Farm Plan and Agriculture Environment

Initiative Funds), government and ENGO programs provide excellent opportunities for

collaboration. As these programs become operational, government should strive to create

consistent standards that would lend themselves to a sanctioned certification program.

The heightened profile of species at risk creates opportunities to partner with the federal

government in the creation of an “endangered species recovery partner” label.

7. Conclusions

Over that last decade the Ministry of Environment has become a victim of it own success.

A series of mild winters coupled with relatively conservative harvest regulations have

resulted in increased numbers of wild ungulates, especially in agricultural areas. While

some may find the circumstance laudable, the Province has a diverse set of competing

obligations. Legislation, such as the Agriculture Land Commissions Act and the

Assessment Act compel landowners to farm, yet wildlife policy can dramatically impact

farm profits and threaten the viability of some agricultural sectors.

Producers in BC have faced challenging times recently and, generally, they have become

less tolerant of wildlife impacts. When left with few alternatives, producers are

sometimes forced to make choices that are contrary to the interests of other sectors and

even themselves! Sometimes they must simply choose between unattractive options and

make the best of a bad situation. Many outcomes, such as wildlife fencing, should be

viewed as the classic ‘lose-lose’ scenario. Fencing is costly and time consuming from the

perspective of the landowner. From the perspective of those in the wildlife sector, scarce

and highly valuable valley bottom habitats are alienated and fragmented. The scenario

repeats itself when landowners are forced to sell off land parcels to maintain cash flows

or to convert their operations from low to high intensity agriculture when they would

prefer to do otherwise. Finally, when satisfactory alternatives fail to materialize and

when widely accepted solutions are not developed, sectors often seek political solutions.

This pits sectors and agencies against one another and rarely results in stable, long-term

solutions that resolve conflict.


Landowner enfranchisement provides government with an opportunity to develop and

implement wildlife policy that recognises the interests of private landowners and the

wildlife sector. By engendering a cooperative approach to objective setting processes,

government can gain influence in the agricultural setting and enlist the support of the

sector. This can happen if government is prepared to develop programs that recognise

and tangibly reward landowners for the stewardship they provide.

Enfranchisement programs rely on a user-pay revenue models that minimise government

expenditures. Beyond improved habitat and wildlife population management, landowner

enfranchisement can increase regional recreation and economic opportunities and

generate government revenues through the sale of licences, LEH applications and

royalties.

8. References

Anonymous. 2002. Environmental Trends in British Columbia 2002. Water Land and Air

Protection, Victoria BC.

Anonymous. 2001. British Columbia Wildlife Watch: Provincial Viewing Program.

Ministry of Water Land and Air Protection and Federation of BC Naturalists.

Victoria, BC.

Anonymous. 2004. Economic Value of the Commercial Nature-Based Tourism Industry

in British Columbia. Tourism BC. Victoria BC.

Benson, Delwin L., Ross Shelton and Don W. Steinbach. 1999. Wildlife Stewardship and

Recreation on Private Lands. Texas A&M University Press, College Station.

Butcher, A. Allen, 1992. Democracy and Capitalism: Are they Critical Elements of a

Climax Human Culture? Website Essay at the “Progressive Living” Website

(www.progressiveliving.org)

Campbell, R. Wayne, Neil K. Dawe, Ian McTaggart-Cowan, John M. Cooper, Gary W.

Kaiser, Michael C.E. McNall. 1990. The Birds of British Columbia: Volume 1.

Royal British Columbia Museum, Victoria BC.

Demarchi, R.A., C.L. Hartwig and Donald A. Demarchi. 2000. Status of the Rocky

Mountain Sheep in British Columbia. BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and

Parks, Wildlife Branch. Victoria, BC. Wildlife Bulletin No. B-99.

Donihee, John. 2000. The Evolution of Wildlife Law in Canada. University of Calgary,

Candain Institute of Resources Law. Calgary Alberta.

Geist, Valerius. 1995. North American Policies of Wildlife Conservation in Geist and

McTaggart-Cowan, Wildlife Conservation Policy, Detselig Enterprises Ltd..

Calgary, Alberta. 77-129.

http://www.progressiveliving.org/


Geist, Valerius. 2005. The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation as a Means of

Creating Wealth, Protecting Public Health while Generating Biodiversity. In

Preparation.

Jenner, Matt. 2002. North Island Wildlife Viewing Network: Business Plan. Unpublished

Manuscript Prepared for the North Island Wildlife Viewing Network Steering

Committee.

McCay, Bonnie J. 1996. ‘Common and Private Concerns’ in Hanna, Susan, Folke, Carl

and Mäler , Karl-Göran (eds), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural

and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Island Press,

Washington DC. 111-126.

Meidinger, Del and Jim Pojar, 1991. Ecosystems of British Columbia. British Columbia

Ministry of Forests, Victoria BC.

Runka, G.G. and Stuart Gale. 2004. Establishing Strategic Directions: Mitigating the

Fragmentation and Development of BC’s Grasslands. Unpublished Manuscript

submitted to the Grasslands Conservation Council of British Columbia.

Zbeetnoff, Darrell M. and R. Bruce McTavish. 2004. BC Wildlife Damage

Compensation Pilot Project: Evaluation Report. Unpublished Manuscript

ubmitted to the BC Agriculture Council.


Appendix 1: Lease Arrangements and Preserve Hunting

Evaluated Against the North American Model for Wildlife

Conservation

Access lease arrangements for hunting do not usually involve government, or society, and

do not involve a sharing of rights and privileges. They are simple agreements between

users and landowners that take the form of access lease or access fee arrangements

(hereafter referred to collectively as ‘lease agreements’). The access that is acquired

enables the lessee to enjoy exclusive, or semi-exclusive, hunting opportunities on private

land. Such agreements do not usually address social objectives and they do not require

the public to scrutinise or participate in the development of economic or ecological

objectives. These systems can frustrate the attempts of government and society to

achieve important social, economic and ecological goals and they do satisfy several

important principles of the ‘North American Model for Wildlife Conservation’

established by Geist (2005). At least five of the seven principles can be compromised, or

threatened, by lease agreements.

The first principle, wildlife as a public trust resource, is threatened by lease

agreements and trespass laws because landowners can deny the public access to

their land and, by proxy, to wildlife. While the state may claim legal ownership

and continue to regulate harvests, seasons, etc., it could be argued that a de facto

private ownership is the result. Further, and based on this shift in control, the

public’s objectives for wildlife may well differ form those of the landowner.

Lessors may prefer high density populations and/or high proportions of trophy

animals while the public may prefer modest population densities and a natural

range of genetic diversity. Private interests are pitted against those of the public

and, owing to the mobility of wildlife, negative ecological consequences could

ramify well beyond the private land.

The third principle, the allocation of wildlife by law is an egalitarian concept that

acknowledges public ownership of wildlife and encourages public participation in

wildlife oriented activities. This allows all citizens to develop a vested interest in

wildlife and assume responsibility for the well being of habitats and ecosystems.

Lease agreements threaten this principle because they can pander to the elite and

exclude those of lesser means.

The fifth principle, wildlife as an international resource, may be compromised by

lease agreements because, as stated previously, lessors will have interests that

differ from those of society. Society’s interest in maintaining internationally

significant species and their habitats could readily conflict with those of the

landowner and this could impede the progress of wildlife management agencies,

at all levels.

The sixth principle, science is the proper tool for discharge of wildlife policy, can

be threatened by lease agreements because the lessor may not acknowledge public

policy and may pursue short term financial objectives in defiance or ignorance of

sound scientific and technical information. Disease transmission, overcrowding,


genetic contamination, and negative interspecies interactions or habitat impacts

are potential outcomes.

The seventh principle, democracy if hunting, is can be threatened because private

control of wildlife, especially on those lands most proximal to human population

centers, can inhibit the public from becoming a stakeholder and effectively

participating in the development of conservation and wildlife management policy

applicable to the private land base.

Despite the potential downsides of lease agreements, in the absence of alternatives, it is

likely many producers will enter into them as a means to increase revenues. Most

jurisdictions in North America report increases in the use of such arrangements and,

based on anecdotal evidence, BC does not appear to be an exception.

Preserve hunting violates the remaining two principles of the North American model.

First, these systems rely on captive, if not privately owned, trophy animals that can be

supplied by game farms. As such, canned hunts promote markets for dead wildlife parts

and products. This detracts from the second principle which is the elimination of such

markets. Second, enclosure hunts threaten the forth principle which is that wildlife must

be killed for legitimate purposes. As Geist (2005) notes, a consequence of this principle

is “enforced inefficiency” which increases the contributions of wildlife recreation to

economies and provides the impetus for conservation. While “fair chase” hunts are

advertised, the same advertisements often posts 100% success rates. This contradiction

highlights the efficiency of the canned, or reserve, big game hunts and suggests that profit

would be concentrated in the hands of a relative few within society.

Lease agreements in BC are not extremely different from the hunting preserves or

“canned hunts” popularized in Texas. In that state, as in BC, indigenous game on private

land continues to be public property. Thus, the major difference between lease

agreements in BC and fee hunting in Texas is the widespread use of enclosures. It should

also be noted that the erection of such enclosures is not illegal in BC. Other provinces

allow enclosure hunting and in Saskatchewan the ungulates behind the fence are privately

owned. The game farming of indigenous big game species is legal in Alberta and lobby

groups there continue to push for the legalization of cervid harvest preserves or CHPs.

The wisdom and morality of game farming and enclosure hunts has been persistently

debated in BC. Regardless of the eventual outcome, in the absence of attractive, if not

pre-emptive, alternatives, this lobby will continue to threaten the North American

Wildlife Conservation Model.

References:

Geist, Valerius. 2005. The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation as a Means of

Creating Wealth, Protecting Public Health while Generating Biodiversity. In

Preparation.


Appendix 3: A Review Private Land Stewardship Programs

and Strategies in BC

British Columbia has a compliment of government and ENGO stewardship programs that

is similar that of other ‘Western’ democracies. These programs employ one or more of

the following stewardship strategies: stewardship agreements (including conservation

covenants), subsidy, property acquisition or leasing, compensation, cost share,

certification and user based programs. Often these strategies meld and coexist within

programs and distinctions blur.

Stewardship Agreements

Stewardship agreements encompass a wide array of formal and informal agreements

between landowners and other parties. Short-term agreements are time bound and do not

affect land title. They include verbal agreements, management agreements, leases and

licences. These agreements assign rights and responsibilities and direct practices for

specified parcels of land.

Long-term stewardship agreements are permanent agreements that are attached to the title

of the land and bind all future owners to the conditions of the agreement. This includes

covenants, easements, and ‘profits à prendre.’ Easements are written access agreements.

Common law easements are legally attached to the land which benefits from the

easement. Profits à prendre are formal agreements between the landowner and another

person that allow that person to harvest specified resources from the land. These

agreements can only apply to resources that may be privately owned and attached to land

title.

Conservation covenants are voluntary, permanent agreements between landowners and

second parties that limit the property rights of the owner in favour of environmental

objectives. These agreements are attached to title and remain in place even when the land

is sold. Covenants, which can apply to all or a portion of a property, provide protection

for environmental values without an outright change in ownership. As such, covenants

are a relatively non-disruptive and low cost legal tool for the protection of environmental

values. Most often they specify what cannot happen in proximity to certain resource

values, hence the term ‘restrictive covenant’. The covenant is registered against title to

the property in the BC Land Title Office (Section 219 of the Land Title Act) and it is held

by the covenant holder. The holders of covenants can be government and non-

government organizations. Non-government covenant holders are often local

conservancies or land trusts or large conservancy groups. These groups monitor to

ensure compliance and, should there be a contravention, they are able to enforce the

covenant through provisions in the Act.

Landowners often have personal reasons for wanting to preserve ecological features on

their lands. Beyond these, there are some financial incentives for entering into

conservation covenants. Conservation organizations that are registered charities issue

income tax receipts for the value of the covenant. However, where property values have

risen, covenants are transactions that can trigger a capital gains tax which can potentially


exceed the tax reduction value of the receipt. In effect, the landowner is asked to pay

higher income tax in order to donate a covenant! If a property’s assessed value is

reduced by a covenant, lower municipal or regional property taxes could result. However,

here again, problems arise. As discussed previously, the discontinuance of agricultural

activities could bring about negative tax implications if the property is bumped out of the

“farm” class and into “residential” class.

Depending on the circumstances, tax incentives may not motivate landowners to enter

into covenants. Further, covenants limit the landowner options and decrease property

values. NGOs may elect to secure ecological protection through the purchase of

covenants. Economically, this compares favourably to the fee simple purchases,

especially when the ecological values are discrete or a minor component of the overall

property. Covenant purchases can also allow landowners to benefit more directly and

substantially. NGOs can elect to purchase entire properties and then resell them with

covenants attached. Where property values do not suffer from the imposition of a

covenant, it is possible to gain covenants at a minimal cost or at a profit!

From the perspective of the covenant holder, these agreements can be costly. By their

nature, these arrangement require the co-operation of the landowner and the holder must

accept the cost of monitoring to ensure that the agreement is upheld.

Covenants are commonly used in BC to protect and manage environmental values on

private land in BC. This management option is successful in protecting environmentally

sensitive or valuable habitats on properties where landowners are altruistically motivated

or where the covenant does not significantly reduce future options values or land values.

Because they can be precisely applied to certain activities in relation to highly valuable

habitats, environmental covenants can help to accomplish ecological objectives without

undue disruptions to land ownership or historical land use practices.

Subsidies

Environmental subsidies provide incentives to producers that incur opportunity costs

while managing toward environmental objectives. Very often landowners are asked to

forgo traditional practices in favour of others that provide higher levels of ecological

servicing. In many cases landowners are rewarded for passively allowing fields to lie

fallow or for allowing alternative cover to establish itself. Similarly, subsidy programs

reward landowners for switching to less profitable crops or management techniques. In

both cases the subsidy is intended to be an incentive that will counter opportunity costs.

A good example of subsidy program is the Agriculture and Agri-food Canada’s

Greencover Canada Program which is intended to help producers improve grassland-

management practices, protect water quality, reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and

enhance biodiversity and wildlife habitat. This national program focuses on:

converting environmentally sensitive land to perennial cover;

critical areas – managing agricultural land near water;

technical assistance – helping producers adopt beneficial management practices, and

shelterbelts – planting trees on agricultural land.


The land-conversion component provides technical advice and financial incentives to

registered landowners who convert environmentally sensitive land to perennial cover.

The landowners must agree to seed their land with approved perennial plants; and commit

to maintain the land under perennial cover for 10 years after the stand is declared

established.

The program is intended to convert marginally valuable agricultural lands that

traditionally have been producing annual crops or summer fallow. Greencover Canada

reviews proposals by assessing the proposed lands against a farmland-specific

environmental sensitivity index (ESI) that considers soil quality, air quality, landscape

drainage patterns, proximity to water, and contributions to wildlife habitat and

biodiversity. If the land has a high ESI, the proposal will garner a higher priority for

funding.

The program promotes conversions to long-lived perennial species, such as forage, shrubs

or trees and information on priority species is provided in the Greencover Canada Forage

Selection Guide. Successful applicants receive two one-time payments:

$20 per acre for the seeding or planting of tame species and signing a Contribution

and Land-Use Agreement, or $75 per acre for seeding native species and signing a

Contribution and Land-Use Agreement; and

$25 per acre after the perennial cover is established, and after Greencover Canada

inspects it and issues a Certificate of Stand Establishment.

The Contribution and Land-Use Agreement (a stewardship agreement) outlines the

landowner’s commitment to establish and maintain perennial cover on the land during the

term of the agreement.

Property Acquisition and Leasing

Conservation groups and governments often acquire properties or long term leases in

order to protect, enhance, manage or procure the environmental values found therein.

Land may be donated or ‘gifted’ to an agency or conservation group, with the donor

experiencing favourable tax implications. In other circumstances conservation groups

may elect to purchase lands or pay for long term leases. When considering purchases,

organizations usually weigh affordability against ecological values. Proximity to other

resources, infrastructure and ecological threats can also be serious considerations. Land

costs can often exceed the ability of any one organization to pay and when this happens

groups sometimes band together to purchase ecologically valuable lands.

Activities and practices on acquired properties are usually guided by management plans

which reflect the philosophy of the organization(s) involved. These plans strive to

balance environmental and human use objectives. While the use of such land is often

oriented toward education or nature appreciation, consumptive uses such as hunting and

fishing can also fit within management plans. Management plans may also allow for

industrial activities such as cattle grazing, farming or logging, providing they are


consistent with the objectives set for the property. Revenues generated by such activities

provide returns to the conservation group and are used to offset the cost of future work.

Property acquisition provides conservation groups with the maximum amount of

management certainty and it continues to be a popular vehicle for the protection of

environmental values. While this approach to conservation provides security and long

term assurances, it comes at a high cost. Beyond the gifting of properties, the market

value of private land in BC will continue to be a barrier to conservation acquisitions.

Compensation Programs

Compensation programs address observed costs that can be attributed to wildlife

depredation or predation. These programs have also been designed to address observed

and opportunity costs caused by environmental legislation or policy. Where landowner

and societal objectives conflict, these programs allow the landowners to recover their

costs or losses. In return, explicitly or implicitly, the landowner is expected to tolerate

the presence of ‘problem’ wildlife populations or comply with new legislation.

The British Columbia Agriculture Council (BCAC) administers funding for the BC Wild

Predator Loss Compensation Program. This BC wide pilot program has mitigation,

prevention and compensation components. The latter component provides compensation

to producers for verified predation losses. The funding for the compensation is

administered by MAFF’s business Risk Management Branch. The Prevention and

Mitigation Components involve the proactive management of predator populations and

the reactive management of problem predators respectively. These components are

funded by Agriculture Environment Initiative Program Funds which are discussed in

the Cost Share section that follows.

The BCAC is also delivering the Delta Forage Compensation, Mitigation, and Monitoring

Project. This project mitigates losses to waterfowl in the Lower Fraser River Delta

through the use of less palatable forage, lure crop and through habitat alterations

(levelling). Unavoidable losses to waterfowl are compensated. As with the predator

program, compensation is administered by MAFF’s business Risk Management Branch.

Mitigation activities are funded by Agriculture Environment Initiative Program Funds.

As previously discussed, high ungulate populations in conflict with East Kootenay

producers have prompted the BC government to create special Limited Entry Hunts

(LEHs). These hunts are intended to reduce elk numbers or dissuade them from

frequenting agricultural lands. To the extent that the program is intended to reduce the

producer’s costs (e.g. crop loss, labour and infrastructure costs) it could be considered a

‘compensation like’ incentive program. In theory, by limiting depredation and property

(fence) damage, the government and user groups could expect landowners to tolerate high

numbers of elk. However, few in the agriculture sector would accept this argument as

LEH hunts have been only moderately successful in displacing ungulates and reducing

their numbers. Depredation is most problematic in the Spring and Summer months

therefore, the displacement effect of the Fall hunt is limited. Further, despite the lure of

nutritious crops, elk quickly learn to avoid hunting pressure by becoming nocturnal or by


seeking alternate short term forage areas. Anything short of full compensation is not

likely to be considered an “incentive” within the agriculture community. In addition,

landowners must accept considerable inconvenience. They allow and coordinate hunter

access, address liability and accept some level of risk (associated with unethical hunter

behaviour).

Cost Share Programs

Cost share arrangements identify activities and works that serve multiple objectives (or

interests) and create financial partnerships that involve contributions from two or more

parties. Very often NGO’s or agencies work co-operatively with landowners to install

infrastructure that will enhance environmental values or reduce risks. Cooperating

landowners usually benefit through the installation of infrastructure that also serves

operational needs (such as a water control structure) and reduces legal liabilities. In

many cases the partner organization will purchase the necessary material, finance

installation activities and provide technical expertise. In return, landowners make

financial or ‘in-kind’ contributions that involve labour and/or the use of equipment.

Landowners can also bear opportunity and options value costs if the projects preclude

future uses. Cost share arrangements are often linked to stewardship agreements that can

specify management objectives, maintenance schedules and other landowner

responsibilities. There are many examples of cost share programs in BC.

Ducks Unlimited Canada (DU) has pioneered win/win cost share solutions to

environmental and operational challenges. Very often DU applies engineering and

biological expertise to hydrologic challenges. The water control infrastructures that often

result are designed to meet the landowner’s operational needs while simultaneously

producing ecological benefits.

The Habitat Stewardship Program is a federal government cost share program that is

centred on the protection and recovery of species at risk and is implemented by

Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Parks Canada Agency. This

program funds "stewards" for implementing activities that protect or conserve habitats for

species designated as nationally "at risk". These activities must take place on private

lands, provincial Crown lands, Aboriginal lands, or in aquatic and marine areas across

Canada. The program also fosters partnerships among organizations interested in the

recovery of species at risk. It supports organizations and individuals in their efforts to

meet the requirements of the National Recovery Program and the new Species at Risk

Act. This cost share program aims to achieve 2:1 leveraging on funds that it invests, so

that for every $1 provided by the HSP, $2 is raised by project recipients. As stated, this

leveraging can take the form of either financial or in-kind resources (volunteered labour,

products, or services).

The British Columbia Environmental Farm Plan Program is a major government

funded, environmental cost share and compensation program that operates in the

agricultural setting. The program is delivered by the BC Agriculture Council (BCAC)

and is a partnership involving the federal government’s Agriculture and Agri-food

Canada (AAFC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, the BC


ministries of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) and Water, Land and Air

Protection. The program’s stated vision is a sustainable agriculture industry in British

Columbia and its values are:

protection of the land;

enhancement of the effectiveness and competitiveness of farms and ranches; and

open and transparent communication, except where protection of confidentiality

is needed, and building partnerships.

The program’s aims and objectives are to:

Encourage farmers and ranchers to be better stewards of the land;

Ensure the future of the BC agricultural industry through the further

implementation of Beneficial Management Practices;

Foster partnerships with agencies;

Be a proactive process to help farmers and ranchers identify environmental

opportunities and risks on their own land;

Be confidential and voluntary;

Raise awareness of progress being made on the land;

Improve farm profitability;

Improve the public perception of agriculture;

Reduce conflicts between agriculture and environmental interest; and

Reduce wildlife impacts to agricultural lands.

These goals are achieved through a planning process that identifies environmental values

and liabilities on the farm (or farm consortium). The information is then used to develop

a priority ranking system that guides activities and works undertaken to manage

environmental values and risks. Further guidance is provided in a series of best

management practice (BMP) guidebooks. Funding is provided on a cost share basis and

spending caps limit the program’s spending on any given activity for each applicant.

Should applicants be able to attract further external funding, opportunities to ‘stack’

funding exist within specified limits. The program addresses a variety of environmental

issues and identifies 26 different activities or ‘codes’ that are eligible for funding. All

activities have direct or indirect fish and wildlife habitat implications. It should be noted

that the program will fund fencing projects to prevent wildlife related damage to stored

and standing crops.

The BCAC is the delivery agent, through its Environment Programs Committee, EFP

Coordinators, producer organizations and producers. Agriculture Environment

Stewardship Initiative funds delivered through the Investment Agriculture Foundation of

BC from AAFC were used to initiate the program. The BCMAFF supplies additional

resources, such as personnel and facilities.

The Agriculture Environment Partnership Initiative (AEPI) and Agriculture

Environment Stewardship Initiative (AESI) Funds are cost share initiatives that are

collectively referred to as Agriculture Environment Initiative Funds. These funds

were established to assist the agriculture industry in resolving key environmental issues

and wildlife agriculture conflicts while promoting ecological sustainability and


enhancing the viability of the industry. Projects that rely on these funding sources

typically address specific conflicts within defined geographic areas. The AEPI, was

developed provincially by Agriculture and Agri-food Canada and the BC Ministry of

Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and is funded through the Agri-food Futures Fund.

The AESI is a similar program that began as a national AAFC program. In the BC

context, it supplements the AEPI by funding on-farm capital expenditures or wildlife

damage compensation or mitigation projects.

These joint industry government agriculture environment initiatives are intended to assist

in the resolution of issues faced by government and industry such as:

Increased pressure on governments to enact new environmental regulations;

Greater public expectations regarding environmental stewardship on farms;

Greater economic impact from non-compliance;

Ongoing programs and research have identified actions that need to be taken;

Increased cost to farmers to achieve public benefits/expectations;

Limited ability of farmer to pass on increased costs for public good;

Long standing wildlife conflicts aggravated by wildlife adapting to agricultural crops;

Public expectation to have more wildlife for viewing or hunting; and

Fewer tools available to farmers to effectively control wildlife impacts

There are benefits to both farmers and the general public from resolution of the main

issues or constraints, such as:

Technological innovation;

Integrated pest management that can ensure continued and new access to markets;

Advances in sustainable production;

Cooperative enhancement of environmental values on farms;

Innovative ways to manage impacts of wildlife on agriculture;

Public awareness of agriculture’s positive contribution to the environment;

providing habitat,

new environmentally friendly farm practises,

potential for enhanced riparian areas, and

Farmers awareness of environmental goals and how they can contribute.

The above benefits cannot be achieved by the industry without the support and

involvement of industry organizations, private and public funds, and regulatory agencies.

Applications are generally submitted and/or supported by farm organizations or groups.

As with the EFP Program, the Agriculture Environment Funds are administered by the

BCAC which assists in the development project plans, monitors participant progress

and metes out costs share cash payments.

These programs fund several projects that are designed to address ungulate depredation

issues through compensation, mitigation or prevention (fencing). In general,

compensation is not deemed to be a cost effective solution in the long term because

underlying problems are not resolved. Understandably, attention has shifted to


mitigation and prevention activities. Mitigation activities could include lure cropping

on crown land and/or multi-stakeholder/agency ventures designed to manage wildlife

populations and their habitat use patterns. Prevention, by in large, involves the fencing

(game proof) of lands where depredation problems occur. Mitigation activities have

not been adopted on a widespread basis and have not resolved many of the ongoing

ungulate/crop loss issues within the province. As a result the producers have turned to

prevention, or the fencing-off of fields, to protect their crops and resolve the issue.

Ungulate fencing pilot projects have been undertaken in the East Kootenay, the

Okanagan Valley, the Creston Valley, the Christian Valley and on Southern Vancouver

Island. These pilots are in the process of winding down and in the future, preventative

fencing initiatives will be supported under the Environmental Farm Plan.

Another widespread project type that draws upon AEI cost share funding involves the

fencing of [hay] stack yards to exclude ungulates.

Certification Programs

Certification programs identify products (often with labels) and associate them with a

set of practices and standards that ensure product quality and/or external outcomes (e.g.

environmental standards). In an era of heightened consumer awareness and concerns,

participants can gain a marketing advantage by linking their products with ecologically

favorable practices or increased product quality.

Through the Agri-Food Choice and Quality Act and its regulations, the provincial

government can establish voluntary programs that allow producers to have their

practices or products certified. Indeed, it has done so by establishing the British

Columbia Certified Organic Program (COABC). The Certified Organic Association of

BC is designated as the provincial program administrator, and it works closely with

ministry staff in monitoring and promoting the program's credibility and acceptance in

the market place. The program’s administration activities are focused on auditing

member associations for compliance and administering the use of the program's official

mark. The COABC also carries out initiatives that support the growth of the organic

sector in the province.

Other certification programs can provide marketing advantages by appealing to

discerning consumers and niche markets. For example, The Land Conservancy (an

environmental NGO), has established a Conservation Partners Program that promotes

the protection of important habitats on privately owned agricultural lands by providing

market recognition and technical assistance to growers who participate in conservation on

their farm.

In return for their active involvement in habitat conservation, participants are rewarded

with a “conservation partners” label to place on their produce boxes and products. The

label is supplemented with information about the program that is provided to all levels of

the market.

http://www.conservancy.bc.ca/sectioncontent.php?sectionid=54&pageid=240


Participating producers become involved in conservation in one of several ways,

depending on the characteristics of their property and their interests. The program

promotes the protection, restoration and enhancement of important habitats. Landowner

commitments are defined in Partnership Agreements and they can consist of stewardship

agreements or longer-term agreements such as conservation covenants or transfer of title.

Where applicable, longer-term plans are prepared and they outline the stewardship

commitments for the property. Annual monitoring ensures the terms of the partnership

agreement are upheld, and helps all parties to evaluate their progress.

All private land conservation programs could potentially benefit through affiliations with

certification programs. They create low cost opportunities for existing programs to

provide financial incentives to landowners by enhancing their marketing power.

Access Lease Agreements

Several forms of access agreements are in use in BC. None are delivered by government.

They involve the provision of access and sporting opportunities to anglers, hunters and

other outdoors enthusiasts in return for fees. They can be lease agreements, access fee

agreements and commercial game clubs. Lease arrangements provide individuals or

groups with exclusive access rights to a defined area over a specified time frame. Access

fee arrangements provide individuals with nonexclusive access rights to a defined area

for specified time frames. Commercial game clubs can take the form of a lease or access

fee arrangements and involve the release of reared, non-indigenous upland birds for

hunting purposes. These landowner/user arrangements may be formally established

through written contracts and involve an exchange of money or they may be entirely

informal and involve a bartering of services. The use of access fee and leasing systems

by private landowners appears to be on the rise BC.

The leasing of waterfowl hunting sites in the Lower Mainland has long been practiced.

Such arrangements occur commonly where demand is high and where the supply of

quality hunting opportunities is low. However, within the Thompson/Nicola Region,

many of the larger ranches now charge an access fee to hunters and fishers (Mike Rose,

Doug Jury and Joe Gardner, pers. com. 2004). Reports from other regions such as the

Cariboo and the Peace suggest that the practice is growing there also. In the latter two

regions, guide outfitters have been known to secure exclusive access for their clients

through lease arrangements and this has frustrated resident hunters who are then “shut

out”. The move toward all three systems appears to be following US trends. Petersen

(1992) reported dramatic increases in leased access to hunters in Montana starting in the

early 80s. He attributed the phenomenon to several factors including increased game

numbers, decreased land values (e.g. depressed agricultural economy), increased

affluence and mobility of hunters and increased out-of-state awareness of hunting

opportunities. As many of these factors are applicable, a similar trend should is expected

in BC. Producers can hope to gain several advantages through financial arrangements

with user groups. In addition to augmenting their revenue streams in financially

challenging times, landowners can control access, develop relationships and limit the

risks that can be associated with irresponsible recreation.


The simple access lease systems currently employed in BC can provide some incentives

for habitat conservation and stewardship activities. However, the arrangements are

exclusive, potentially elitist and the lessors and lessees are not required to consult with

government or society when establishing and managing towards objectives. Accordingly,

lease arrangements are generally inconsistent with the North American Model for

Wildlife Conservation.


Appendix 3: Property Rights in Wildlife Outside of BC and a

Description of Some Enfranchisement Programs in the United

States

Europe

The general belief that European game animals are privately owned is not accurate. In

reality the property rights in wildlife and the system used to regulate hunting are highly

varied. Scottish wild game, such as red deer, is a common resource and owned by no

one until rendered into possession (rule of capture). However, landowners possess

hunting rights, and determine and regulate the harvest of animals on their lands.

Estates generate revenues through the provision of sport hunting, (“stalking” or

shooting”) opportunities. If deer populations exceed what is desired, animals are culled

and the meat becomes a commercial commodity. While the land owner, or consortia

(deer management groups), manages wildlife as a de facto private resource, a statutory

government agency known as the Deer Commission does have the right to cull animals

on private land if the population exceeds established targets.

The German hunting and game management model is renowned, though it has both

advocates and detractors. It is revered by some as an economically efficient model that

maximizes the value of wildlife and promotes stewardship. Most North American

hunters view it as elitist and economically inefficient because it caters only to a limited

subset of the overall population. As with other European countries, hunting rights

belong to the landowner or landowner co-operative and these rights can in turn be

leased out to third parties. Once harvested, wildlife is owned by the landowner and

may be sold at market. Hunting seasons, however, are set by the Federal government

and regulated under the Hunting Act.

In Norway, as with Scotland, the landowners own the hunting rights for their land and are

free to let the rights to others. However, wildlife is a national resource and the quotas and

hunting restrictions are set by the government. Landowners are given harvest quotas and

they benefit through the sale of hunting rights. Because Norway does not have a guide-

outfitter industry, the sale price of individual hunting rights does not normally exceed the

market value of the meat.

In Italy, wildlife is owned by the state which manages and regulates hunting

opportunities. Special hunting rights are not extended to landowners and private lands

may be used by ‘wandering hunters’ unless under cultivation or adequately fenced

(Cirelli 2002). Trade in wild animals (and by products) is forbidden.

Slovenia’s Law on Wildlife and Hunting identifies wildlife as a state owned resource, and

the state grants the right to hunt. Citizens wishing to hunt must be the members of a local

Hunting Clubs (Hunter Families). These clubs then lease hunting rights from the state.

Landowners are not able to sell hunting or even access rights to hunters.


European wildlife management and ownership systems are highly variable and complex.

Governments often control hunting regulations and licensing, however, the landowners in

many Western European countries enjoy de facto private property rights in wildlife.

While they may not own the wildlife (until captured) they are able to exclude access,

charge for hunting rights and make and execute population and habitat management

decisions.

User-based incentive systems are well established in the Europe where landowners are

able to sell hunting rights. This is especially true if landowners are also able to control

(or partner in) population and habitat management decisions. This, in conjunction with

the sale of game meat, can be lucrative and sufficient to motivate habitat management

concessions on private land. However, this system amounts to a private (or near private)

wildlife management system and is not consistent with traditional North American

wildlife conservation policy or the current thinking of most BC anglers and hunters.

Further, while the incentive to manage for game animals is evident, the system does not

necessarily encourage a holistic approach to the management of ecosystems.

Pakistan

Pakistan hosts several incentive based conservation initiatives that are based on tourism

(i.e. trophy) hunting. Like BC, this Asian country is topographically complex with

coastal and continental climates and these factors lead to a diversity of ecosystems. Male

markhor and urial (both bovids) bear magnificent horns and are highly valued trophy

species. Foreign hunters are willing to pay tens of thousand of dollars (US) for guide

services and the opportunity to shoot trophy males. Despite the value of these animals,

the herds suffered declines in the 20th

Century. Traditional domestic goat herding

practices reduced forage availability and increased disease transmission. In addition,

wildlife populations were hunted for trophies and meat in a largely unregulated (open

access) system which did not create conservation incentives. Individuals engaged in a

‘race to the bottom’ and populations persisted remote areas only.

The economic potential of tourist (trophy) hunting prompted NGOs, such as the World

Conservation Union (IUCN), to work with tribal chieftains, communities and Pakistani

governments to restructure local economies (Woodford 2004, Ahamad 2004, Awan

2004). They have created and managed a tourist hunting industry that distributes

revenues within communities and thereby creates conservation incentives. Rangers

police for poachers and monitor the herds and the levels of domestic grazing are starting

to be managed. These actions have resulted in greater levels of gainful employment and

wealth in local communities and increased wildlife populations.

While the Pakistani examples may not be directly applicable to BC, they provide

evidence that programs must secure resident and community co-operation in order to

affect conservation on communal or state lands

Africa


Wildlife property rights in Africa are highly varied. Very often wildlife has remained the

property of the state. In other countries, including Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa

and Namibia, wildlife on private land becomes de facto privately owned when the land is

enclosed by game proof fencing. In this circumstance, landowners are free to sell hunting

rights, trade in wildlife (as breeding stock or as meat) and set their own habitat and

population management objectives. Further, they are able to hunt on their lands without

purchasing a government licence. In unfenced areas wildlife belongs to, and is managed

by, the State (Cirelli 2002). In Burkino Faso, wildlife is the property of the state

however, (as with western Europe) hunting rights belong to the landowner. In Tanzania

wildlife (outside of parks) is property of the state which authorises and regulates all

harvesting (Singleton 2004).

The privatization of wildlife has led to some positive outcomes for conservation in

Africa. Landowners have shifted from traditional practices (grazing) to wildlife

recreation industries when they could hope to capture greater benefits (Muir-Leresche

and Nelson 2000). In many instances blended wildlife/cattle operations are the most

profitable. This has improved game and habitat management, motivated reintroductions

and reduced competition with domestic livestock. Further the system has engendered

ecosystem based approaches to habitat management by encouraging landowners to form

co-operatively managed conservancies as large as 840, 000 acres (Seasholes 2002). The

economic tradeoffs between wildlife versus traditional livestock operations are complex

and dependant on social, ecological, economic and political considerations. As with

Canada, much of Africa is marginally capable of supporting agriculture—even ranching

(Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000). These lands can often support rich wildlife

populations that can form the basis of lucrative and sustainable economies.

While a privatized wildlife management system may offer significant environmental

advantages, the systems are in direct conflict with North American principles of public

ownership. African examples would appear to lack lessons applicable to BC, however,

they demonstrate that where landowners are provided with financial incentives to change

their land use practices and actively manage wildlife habitats, they are willing to do so.

The model has led to reintroductions, species recovery, increased game populations and

an ecosystem based approach toward the management of habitats – along with improved

economic opportunities for residents.

Australia

Australia has experienced undesired environmental outcomes, such as salinisation, that

result from agricultural practices not suited to the land. In response, innovative trials to

investigate the commercial value of wildlife as an incentive to change land use practices

and restore habitats have been initiated by the Australian Government’s Rural Industries

Research and Development Corporation. The trials encourage conservation through

commercial uses (recreational and consumptive) of indigenous flora and fauna. The

premise being, if ecosystem services and products are valued as assets by landowners,

economic reasons to conserve and manage threatened ecosystems will emerge. If so,

more environmentally favourable and profitable land use practices may result.


The program is surprisingly similar to some of the African models discussed previously.

Landowners do not necessarily reject past practices. Instead they are provided with

opportunities to benefit financially through an integrated approach to the management of

natural resources and livestock or crops. Marketable products such as kangaroo hides

and meat could prove lucrative and justify reductions in grazing pressure (by cattle) or

reductions in the proportion of the land base under cultivation. Ecotourism and the

commercial use of a variety of other products such a “bush tucker”, plant products and

medicines is also promoted. Further, by restructuring businesses and economies around

natural ecosystems where possible, Australians stand to gain ecological services and

preserve biodiversity (Wilson 2004).

Some programs encourage Australian landowners to form wildlife management

conservancies that involve large scales foster ecosystem based management approaches.

Grazing rotations over larger areas allow plant communities to recover and maintain their

productivity and habitat values. Conservancies allow the resources to be pooled and

create economies of scale. These advantages can, in turn, stimulate new and more

sustainable economies.

Canadian Provinces

Other Canadian Provinces offer an array of private land incentive programs similar to that

of BC. However, many provinces provide opportunities for game farming that are far

more flexible. Alberta allows landowners to farm wild boar, bison, elk, white-tailed deer,

mule deer and moose. In addition to selling meat, these operators are allowed to sell live

animals and have found a market in Cervid Harvesting Preserves (CHPs). These

preserves are legal in Saskatchewan and Quebec and allow the release of game farmed,

indigenous animals into enclosures for the purposes of hunting. Currently harvest

preserves for wild boar and bison are legal in Alberta and the Alberta White-tail and

Mule Deer Association continues to lobby the provincial government to allow CHPs in

Alberta. The Association advocates for the private ownership of deer on large tracts of

fenced land that would be available to paying clients. The Association’s 2004 proposal

was rejected by the Alberta Government in however, it illustrates that many landowners

believe CHPs are legitimate and will exert pressure for its legalisation.

This pressure is not limited to provinces west of the Rockies. Requests for the expansion

of game farming opportunities in BC have been made to WLAP and MAFF (Mike Badry

pers. com.). Interest has declined over the last several years likely due to reports of

chronic wasting disease (CWD) found in elk and deer in Alberta, Saskatchewan and in

several USA states.

The United States of America

In the United States, authority for most big game species has been devolved to the

individual states and, as such, a variety of private land incentive programs have evolved.


This section focuses on the many state coordinated, landowner enfranchisement programs

that have evolved.

The mention of US style user-based incentive programs evokes images of fee hunting in

Texas where landowners can enclose their holdings with game proof fences and charge

for access. Furthermore, landowners can legally introduce exotic ungulate species and,

provided they are contained within fenced enclosures, they remain the property of the

land owner. Landowners invest in habitat management, watering and feeding

infrastructure and in client facilities. The suspiciously high success rates and enclosures

have given rise to the derisive term “canned hunts”.

Contrary to popular belief, indigenous wildlife in Texas is not privately owned. Hunters

must be licensed and abide by the harvest regulations of the state. However, this

distinction may be somewhat academic because game fencing gives landowners almost

complete control over wildlife. As with all systems, there are offsetting pros and cons to

the Texas example. The intensive management of exotic and indigenous ungulates may

be to the detriment of natural ecosystems. Fenced in hunts diminish the image of the

hunter and are not consistent with the philosophy of most BC hunters. While the system

does have significant shortcomings, it does encourage landowners to invest in habitat

management. The government has developed a Private Lands and Habitat Program that

provides technical assistance and encourages landowners to participate in wildlife

management associations and apply of ecosystem based approaches to the management

of wildlife populations and habitats. In addition, a Landowner Incentive Program is

offered by the state and it funds the enhancement of rare species habitat in return for

management agreements.

Nevada’s Elk Incentive Tag Program provides participating landowners with

transferable tags that may be marketed. The number of tags issued is based on the private

land’s area-based contribution to elk habitat within management units that are often

comprised of a combination of private land parcels and public land. As such, incentives

to manage habitats exist but they are muted by an averaging effect. Landowners are not

required to allow public hunting, improve habitats or prepare a management plan. When

enrolled in this program, landowners are not eligible for the state compensation program

that addresses crop depredation.

Oregon’s Landowner Preference Program allocates big game tags (one third of which

are transferable) to landowners who are then free to hunt on their lands or issue the

transferable hunting tags to paying clients. Public access concessions are not required.

Allocations are based on property size and they are relatively small. For example, a

parcel of 80, 000 acres would generate a landowner allocation of only 9 big game tags.

The program accommodates holdings as small as 40 acres and appears to be oriented

toward resolving landowner/wildlife conflicts rather than the promotion of stewardship.

A small stewardship incentive is provided by two additional tags that may be awarded to

the landowner if he/she commits to habitat improvements. In addition to this program,

the state funds projects that manage public access and create habitat improvements on

private lands through the appropriately named, Access and Habitat Program. It places a


priority on programs that address habitat improvements on a cost share basis or that

alleviate wildlife damage. The maintenance of public access on private land is viewed

favourably but not a requisite. Finally, the Wildlife and Habitat Conservation

Management Program provides landowners with property tax incentives to protect

habitats on their lands through wildlife habitat conservation and management plans.

Public use is not a requisite and there is no minimum property size.

California has developed a Private Land Management Program that allocates the entire

harvestable surplus that is generated on private land to the participating landowner. In

return, landowners must conduct inventories and submit and receive approval for a

management plan. Landowners receive state issued, ranch specific transferable hunting

permits, harvest limits and seasons. Wildlife is not privately owned and continues to be

the property of the state. As with Texas, the system does not provide free hunting

opportunities to residents. The system’s proponents argue that affordable hunts are

available to residents (Leal and Grewell 1999). Habitat stewardship assurances are

provided in the management plan, participating landowners are licensed for five year

periods and their properties are monitored annually to ensure the management plans are

executed.

Utah’s Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit Program places no direct expectations

on landowners for habitat stewardship. Participating landowners are allocated specific

transferable tags, special seasons and flexible bag limits. The resident allocation is

administered through a lottery system. Allocations are specified in management plans

which are approved by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. Properties must be at

least 10,000 acres to be eligible for the program. While the system does not require a

specific schedule of habitat improvements, the harvestable surplus (and therefore the

amount of tags issued) is a function of habitat quality and therefore, indirect incentives

exist for sound habitat management practices. In addition, while most CWMU

agreements are renewed annually, longer contracts are being considered for participants

who commit to habitat improvements.

New Mexico’s Landowner Sign Up System provides participating landowners with

transferable tags that may be sold. The number of landowner tags is based on the private

land’s contribution to occupied elk habitat within management regions that can be

comprised of both private public land. As such, incentives to manage habitats exist but

are muted by an averaging effect. Landowners are not required to improve habitats or

prepare a management plan however they are required to provide access to a limited

number of hunters (selected by lottery) who hunt for free.

Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife Program simultaneously addresses public access

opportunities and habitat stewardship on private lands. Annual allowable harvest rates

are determined for the enrolled ranches and previous/anticipated hunter success is then

used to calculate the number of tags. Tags are allocated to the landowner and the state,

the former being free to use his/her transferable tags, share them with friends, or market

them. The marketing opportunity generates revenues for the participating landowners

and is the program’s financial inducement. The state issues its tags to resident hunters


through a lottery system and the landowner is obligated to provide access to the lottery

winners. At all times wildlife remains the property of the state and all hunters must

obtain the appropriate state issued licences before hunting. The state and the landowners

co-operate in the establishment of hunting seasons that often segregate the public and

private hunters in time. Habitat stewardship is achieved through a co-operative

landowner and Division of Wildlife process that results in wildlife management plans.

These plans establish objectives and specify ways in which habitat values can be

improved. Landowners then execute their plans in a manner consistent with regulations,

and operating guidelines. In general, properties must be at least 12,000 acres to be

eligible for the program. The seasons and the allocation of public and private licences are

specified in co-operative, multi-year agreements (contracts). Participating ranches are

monitored by a state evaluation team to ensure compliance.

Colorado has also established a Walk-in Access Program that provides hunters with

access to private land in order to hunt small game, migratory birds and furbearers. The

state generates revenues through the sale of annual access permits. Once purchased, the

discretionary stamp is affixed to the hunter’s regular small game licence. The revenues

are then used to lease access rights for small game hunting from landowners. With

permission from landowners, hunters may pursue big game. Very often the private lands

enrolled are also enrolled in other programs that are esigned to promote stewardship such

as the Federal Conservation Reserve Program.

Washington State’s Private Lands Wildlife Management Area Program is very

consistent with Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife Program. In the Washington program

properties must be a minimum of 5000 acres. The Department of Fish and Wildlife has

initiated several other incentive programs that provide incentives for stewardship or

public access. The Hunter Access Management Program in state run and it coordinates

and manages hunter access onto private lands. This program manages hunter use in high

value bird hunting areas but does not provide financial incentives. The Waterfowl Cover

Crop and the Partnership for Pheasants programs do provide financial incentives to

landowners through the leasing of cover crops or pheasant habitats in return for public

access. In general, Washington State provides and array of programs that can be tailored

to suit a variety of circumstances.

Idaho’s Access Yes! Program and Montana’s Block Management Program have

developed hunter access programs that reward participating landowners with revenues

generated by the state licence lottery systems through hunting licence sales. In return,

landowners provide access to hunters through several systems. Some are unregulated

while others employ a hunter sign in/permission system. These programs do not require

landowners to change their land management practices and do not require lengthy

enrolment periods. The Idaho program issues annual and multi-year contracts depending

on landowner preference and the land’s habitat values. While these programs lack direct

habitat stewardship planning components, the lands must be of value to wildlife and

hunters in order to be eligible and thus, subtle stewardship incentives are at play. Further,

other private land habitat enhancement programs exist and can be combined to create

systems that address access and stewardship. For example, the Habitat Montana


Program uses hunting licence fee monies to lease valuable habitats or to acquire

easements (covenants) and to undertake enhancement works. Montana’s Upland Game

Bird Habitat Enhancement program provides cost share funding for habitat

enhancement on private lands that remain open for “reasonable” levels of public hunting.

References:

Benson, Delwin L., Ross Shelton and Don W. Steinbach. 1999. Wildlife Stewardship and

Recreation on Private Lands. Texas A&M University Press, College Station.

Cirelli, M.T. 2002. Legal Tends in Wildlife Management. Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations. Rome.

Muir_Leresche, Kay and Robert H. Nelson. 2000. Private Property Rights to Wildlife:

The Southern African Experiment. Website Essay at the Competitive Enterprise

nstitute Website (www.cei.org)

Seasholes, Brian. 2002, Private Conservation of Wildlife in Africa. Sixth Annual New

York State Conference on Private Property Rights. Albany, New York.

Wilson, George. 2004. Sustainable Wildlife Enterprises: Trials of the Commercial Value

of Wildlife as an Incentive to Restore On-Farm Habitat. Rural Industries esearch

and Development Corporation. Canberra, Australia.

http://www.cei.org/

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