Inland Steel: Paternalism to GlobalismEvolution of the Organization of Maintenance

Work at a U.S. Basic Steel FacilityBy Mike Olszanski

Paper for L515 Work RestructuringIndiana University Northwest

Fall, 2007

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Thesis

This analysis of an Indiana Harbor, Indiana integrated basic steel mill aims

to shed light on the evolution of the organization (and reorganization) of work in

the U.S. steel industry over the last century. From a family run, single plant

operation to a cog in the global wheel of trans-national steel giant Arcelor/Mittal,

the Inland Steel facility on Lake Michigan has seen the implementation of many if

not most of the various theories of work organization over the one hundred plus

years of its operation. As a union shop from its earliest days, the Inland mill was

the home of the largest, most independent and one of the most militant locals in

the United Steelworkers of America (USWA, now the USW) Local 1010—often

called “The Red Local.”1 Though Inland was in some ways unique—a one-plant,

family-run operation with an independent, militant Local Union adversary for

many years, it is in many ways typical of the large vertically-integrated basic steel

operation that dominated U.S., and for many years world steel production during

the 20th century.

My analysis here utilizes the perspective gained in 33 years experience as a

maintenance electrician at Inland steel and 20+ years as a union activist. I have

focused on the work I have done and know best at Inland—maintenance. I was an

electrician (Motor Inspector, Technician, later Inspector) in the #3 Cold Strip Mill

for 31 consecutive years, from 1966 to 1998. From 1970 until 1998, I also served

as an elected local union representative in various capacities, including Griever

Steward, Executive Board (12 years) Vice President and President. I was also

chair of the first Environmental Committee at Local 1010 and an elected delegate

to every biennial USWA Constitutional Convention from 1976 until the local

stopped electing delegates in the early 1990’s.

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I witnessed the end of the era of the internal labor market at Inland, and

several stages of the reorganization of the work force. Changes in the maintenance

department mirrored to some extent the work changes implemented throughout the

mill, and the industry, and furnish specific examples of work restructuring at

Inland.

Work restructuring produced dramatic productivity gains at Inland Steel,

specifically in the 1980’s and 1990’s. A central fact emerging from this research is

that while steel capacity, production and sales rose, peaked and then leveled off

around 1980, the number of workers producing steel at this facility dropped to less

than ¼ of its former number.

As this analysis will show, Local 1010, from the organizing days of the

1930's a militant, independent minded and left led local, was brought into line by

USWA leadership in the 1950’s cold war red purge, experienced a brief resurgence

as a leader of the Fight Back in the mid 1960’s and again in the 1970’s and 1980’s,

but since 1988 was once again brought under the control of a largely

collaborationist USW International leadership, which has lacked the ideology or

the will to contest management’s drive to downsize the workforce and intensify the

work. Thus a factor of some consequence in the rationalization, or what might

more accurately be called destruction of the work force at the mill considered here

is the union response, or more accurately lack of response to management’s

restructuring of work. By accepting without challenge the principles of

downsizing the workforce through "attrition" and reorganizing work through the

"team" concept, the union assured a dwindling membership in basic steel and a

consequent reduction in its own power.

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In addition, the abrogation by the steel companies of the earlier wages/productivity

bargain meant the stagnation of real wages in basic steel, though productivity

increased several fold from the 1950's to the 1990's. And with the rejection of any

kind of working class ideology, shorter hours as an antidote to unemployment was

swept aside as an important goal in collective bargaining. Thus the huge

productivity gains in steel in this country of the past half century were largely

gobbled up by hungry capitalists, rather than being distributed in any meaningful

way among the workers who produced them.2

While work restructuring has accelerated in today’s “global” economy, the

basis for management attempts to wring more surplus value out of the workers is

as old as capitalism itself, and strategies employed by today’s capitalists hark back

to the days of Adam Smith, and certainly were understood by Karl Marx and V.I.

Lenin, as well as more recent political economists like Harry Braverman. That

union leaders knew, or should have known that much of this was coming fifty

years ago goes without saying. That their self-imprisonment within the ideological

orthodoxy of capitalism as an “end of history” prevented an effective response to

capital’s newly aggressive global neo-liberal assault on workers is understood by a

few serious observers like Braverman, Alan Howard and others. How many

workers and local leaders understand how and why restructuring has been and

continues to be done is impossible to know. One can only work to raise

consciousness whenever and in whatever manner is possible.

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History , Philosophy, Myth

On October 30th 1893, a year after Andrew Carnegie and his henchman Frick

had beaten the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AA) at the

infamous Homestead Steel Strike, Inland Steel Company was incorporated.

Perhaps encouraged and emboldened by the crushing defeat of the AA in

Pennsylvania, Inland founder Joseph Block put up the initial investment, and

Joseph E. Porter was the company’s first president. Block, who had amassed his

initial capital in the used railroad equipment business, installed old steam boilers

and a well-used engine from the defunct Chicago Steel Works at its new Chicago

Heights, Illinois Plant and Inland began converting scrap steel rails into farm

implements the following year—the same year the City of East Chicago, Indiana

was chartered. The Heights plant employed 300.

In 1901, the Lake Michigan Land Company, in order to stimulate local

business, gave Inland 50 acres in East Chicago, Indiana to build a steel mill. By

1902, the sprawling Indiana Harbor Works on Lake Michigan was pouring steel

ingots, and in 1907 “Madeline” #1 blast furnace (named after Joe Block’s

daughter) poured the first pig iron in Indiana.3 Rather than pay construction

workers on the blast furnace the prevailing wage, Inland built them a bunkhouse

and hired a cook. Paternalism started early at Inland. By World War I (1918)

Inland employed over 5,000, had produced a million tons of steel and was worth

$57 million.4 Unique among U.S. steel mills, Inland would remain a Block family

controlled company with one huge integrated basic steel mill at East Chicago and

continue the old frugal habit of buying used and obsolete equipment for its mills on

the cheap, for a hundred years. Also unique in its sales approach, Inland cultivated

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small, specialty customers largely overlooked by the giants U.S. Steel, Bethlehem

and the others, and boasted for many years that no order was too small

to fill in an expedited manner. Inland’s loyal customer base would reciprocate,

seeing it through the depression of the 1930’s in fine shape.

Advocates of management science and the nascent human relations school

of personnel management, the paternalistic Blocks were employing corporate

welfare plans early on. A company doctor and on site emergency room tended to

mill casualties from 1908 and Inland instituted its own safety department,

awarding gold watches for safety suggestions. There was a Company relief and

insurance plan and a company picnic was instituted in 1910, the Inland Fellowship

Club to “assist the unemployed” in 1914, a Christmas bonus in 1915 and a profit

sharing and pension plan in 1919. U.S. Steel, employing welfare capitalism under

the so-called “American Plan”—designed to keep out unions—had established

company paid pensions for its employees in 1911.5 Inland built employee housing

as early as 1906, and the 100 home Sunnyside subdivision for supervisors in 1920.6

Jack Morris and other Inland historians have argued that the Block family’s Jewish

religion motivated them to treat their employees well, but I can find no evidence

that working conditions at Inland were at any time superior to those at its

competitors.7 In fact, when I sat on the 1977 Local 1010 negotiating committee, I

found that Inland employees were well behind Bethlehem, U.S Steel and others in

terms of local working conditions. Employees of Inland’s competitors for years

enjoyed pay for apprentices time in school, personal tools paid for by the company,

and larger overtime meal tickets. Thus 1977 contract negotiations, and the

revelations of Inland’s penny-pinching management considerably eroded the myth

of Inland as a better or more compassionate employer than the rest. Years later,

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when I interviewed fellow maintenance employees, they were split on the question

of whether the workers had it better when the Blocks ran Inland.

In any event, paternalism apparently did not satisfy the exploited and

overworked employees of Inland Steel. The AFL’s AA organized Lodge 56 at

Inland prior to the 1919 steel strike. To try to break the strike, organized by

William Z. Foster of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) William Z. Foster

Inland brought in Mexicans from the Texas border area. The strike was lost and

the Lodge survived but was weak and ineffective. Inland launched an Employee

Representation Plan (ERP) or Company Union, but in June 1936 AA members and

the majority of the hourly workers joined the Congress on Industrial Organization

(CIO) newly formed Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC) becoming

SWOC Lodge 1010. At Lodge1010 “All members were organizers’” as Bill

Young put it.8 Forty years later union veteran Young described the feeling at

1010 when SWOC launched the first strike for union recognition against “Little

Steel” including Inland: “…after years of meeting secretly in the basement of an

undertaker…the day of salvation came…when we walked out of the mill.”9

In 1926, the harbor Works was electrified, under the direction of electrical

engineer Wilfred Sykes, who was made president in 1941. In 1928, Cleveland

financier Cyrus Eaton tried to combine Inland and Youngstown Sheet & Tube to

challenge the corporate dominance of U.S. Steel. The deal failed.10

In 1935, Inland broke a then standing rule among steelmakers by

"integrating downward"—acquiring Joseph T. Ryerson & Son steel service center

which stocked, warehoused and sold steel products. Quick delivery of small orders

made Inland/Ryerson the supplier of choice for small customers, who kept Inland

afloat during the great depression of the 1930's, when other steel producers

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foundered.11 Inland in fact invested millions in new hot and cold rolling sheet

mills during the 1930's, including new 76" and 44" hot strip mills, 72" and 44" cold

strip mills, annealing and pickling facilities. The expansion and modernization was

directed by Sykes, who anticipated the "lean and mean" concept of work

organization by 50 years: "I like breaking in a new plant in a depression," he said.

"There's nothing like it to whip your organization into shape."12 During the

depression years the Blocks claimed that "Every effort was made to provide

employment for as many of our men as possible," though wages were cut 10% in

1931. The jointly funded "Good Fellowship Club" helped laid-off Inlanders "in

distress," thus establishing the long-lasting myth of the extended Inland "family."13

By December of 1941, Inland was producing 3.5 million tons per year of raw steel

with 14,000 employees.

With the onset of World War II, the U.S. government built two 1,200 ton

Blast Furnaces (Madeline A & B) and two coke batteries on Inland property—

owned by the Federal Government but operated by Inland. This was to increase

steelmaking capacity to feed the Allied production of war materiel—particularly

tanks built across the canal at the Cast Armour plant. After the war these were

turned over to Inland free and clear. Inland also acquired the Cast Armour plant,

which became Inland Plant #4. A kind of corporate welfare was thus exploited by

Inland management to profit greatly from WWII.14

It was 1946—after the war—before Inland replaced wheelbarrows with

mechanized payloaders and forklifts and Inland still utilized steam engines until

1958, according to Morris.15 Though Michael Tennebaum, later an Inland

president, had patents on the phenomenally more efficient and productive basic

oxygen furnace (BOF)16 steelmaking process in the 1950's, Inland built the last

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open hearth furnace in the country in the 1950's—once again employing obsolete

technology in the face of the global modernization of steelmaking. It was during

the 1950's and 1960's that the Japanese industrial dynamo would build its huge

modern steel mills and begin to outstrip U.S productivity by leaps and bounds.

Inland's first BOF was completed in 1966, its second in 1973. The "heat" (batch) of

steel that took six or eight hours to make in an open hearth, is produced in 50

minutes in a BOF. Its first continuous caster started up in 1972, well behind most

of the industry. Number 3 Open Hearth shop would close in 1986, one of the last in

the country, featured in the Jean Shepard film, “The Phantom of the Open Hearth.17

1978-1979 were banner years as Inland produced 8.6 million tons and

shipped 6.2 million in a year, while employment peaked at over 25,000 at the

Harbor Works. But management was already complaining about Japanese

steelworkers' productivity beating ours by a large margin. While Inland would

finally begin to modernize, it would be intensification of work that would drive the

turn around of those statistics in the 1980’s and 1990’s.

In 1980, Inland built the largest blast furnace in the world, #7, on 750 acres

of Lake Michigan land fill. Using slag and waste from steelmaking, thrifty Inland

had extended its property far out into Lake Michigan, creating its own land for

expansion. In September of 1996, #7 set a North American iron production record,

pouring nearly 308,000 tons for the month. It produced 3.7 million tons of iron in

1997. With state-of-the-art technology as well as economy of scale, it would

produce enormously more iron with fewer workers than any of the older blast

furnaces still in operation—9,500 tons per day, or as much in an hour as Madeline

#1 produced in a day. The department’s union workers, led by leftist griever Joe

Frantz would file grievances and launch a publicity campaign to try to win an

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incentive rate increase that might at least distribute a little of the gains to the

workers. Ironically, in a couple of years, Joe left Inland when he, and several

hundred more electricians were laid off.18

Part of the myth of the extended Inland "family" persisted for many years,

especially among management—types, though the passing of top management

from the hands of the Blocks to those of professional head-hunters like the golden-

parachutist Sandy Nelson, and the purging of management and supervisory ranks

in the “Organizing for Excellence” (OE) manpower reduction campaign of the

1980’s disabused most supervisors of their illusions about their place in the Inland

“family.” The revocation by management of ISC Procedure No. 151.1, which

contained a “salaried employment continuity provision——a promise of job

security ‘in the wake of the Accelerating Total Quality (ATQ) work—reduction

initiative.’” of the 1990’s—sent new shock waves through the ranks of supervision.

Explaining that “Employment continuity isn’t consistent with that requirement [to

cut costs] because no possibility can be overlooked if Inland is to achieve world—

class performance levels,”19 Inland renewed its commitment to downsizing the

ranks of supervision while dramatically illustrating the worthlessness of its

promises. From a peak of nearly 19,000 in 1979, Local 1010’s membership would

fall to under 9,000 before the end of the 1990’s.20

In 1996 Inland Steel Industries Chairman Bob Darnall cited the importance

of Inland people in assuring the company’s success, and lauded us for

improvements in performance, while in the same breath he warned of more

downsizing, saying “the company has to look at all the options, including reduction

of the workforce.”21 It had been different under the Blocks, or at least it had

seemed so, according to 32 year Inland veteran Electrical Technician Greg Saboff:

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The Christmas parties and picnics. As a child I remember going to those and looking forward to working at Inland Steel. For our family it was: Number 1, the U.SA; Number 2, Inland; Number 3, wife and children --in that order. When I started I had that family feeling about it, instead of that cold, cruel industrial complex that it is today. The Blocks, or whoever was running their P.R. did that.22

Thirty year electrical inspector Ernest Hardin agreed:

There was a humanitarian trait about the Blocks which is no longer here. These days, they piss in your face and try to tell you its rain,23

Also in agreement was Steve Ruschak, Electrical Technician with 38 years service:

“The Blocks believed in a little bit of employer-to-employee loyalty.”24 By 1996,

Inland’s philosophy according to 27 year mechanic Art Lorenzen was to

“demoralize and eliminate workers.”25 “They apply true Taylorism,” said 25 year

mechanical Inspector Marty Popagain, “…decentralize and demoralize. They

appear to have no long term goals—everything is short term.”26 Janitor Efus

Zeman, who’d been at Inland over forty years claimed the philosophy at Inland

hadn’t changed: “ Nothing’s new, here. It’s always been the almighty dollar. They

never cared about the people.” 27

The work culture at Inland had clearly changed by the 1980’s. Charlie Page,

with whom I worked for twenty years, retired at age 49, with thirty years service.

“I’d have stayed longer,” he told me on his last day, “but it just isn’t any fun any

more.” 28

“I just hate coming to work any more,” is the way 27 year Electrician Jack

Tauber put it, “every day they’re changing things—for the worse.” Jack has a

special reason to resent Inland’s cost cutting philosophy. In 1983, management

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notified 222 bargaining unit (union) employees, who had already scheduled their

once in five years thirteen weeks vacation (arguably the best benefit The USWA

ever negotiated) that they had recalculated their entitlement date, and they would

not in fact qualify for their thirteen week vacation. Jack was one of them. He had

already made plans and bought tickets for the best vacation of his life. He never

got it. In 1983 contract negotiations, Inland demanded and got wage and benefit

concessions from the USWA, for the first time in history. The thirteen week

vacation was one of them.29 That same year, steelmaking capacity at Harbor

Works was cut 30% (about 2.7 million tons/year) by shutting down older

equipment. But the remaining 6.3 million tons per year would be more fully

utilized, and the IN Tek and IN Kote joint ventures starting in 1989 would add

back 1.5 million tons/year of very high value-added sheet and galvanized strip

steel, made with incredibly small crews of workers utilizing the very latest

technology. 30

As was mentioned Inland employed 25,460 in 1979, of whom almost 19,000

were members of (USWA) Local 1010—the largest local in steel. By 1993, they

had cut the workforce in half, and were shipping 4.8 million tons of higher value

specialty steels, with greatly improved "prime yield" and much less waste.31 In

1995, Inland shut down the 100 year old 100” Plate Mill, and shipped it off to a

museum. The relic had run continuously all those years, with only brief downtime

to replace the huge manila ropes that coupled it’s ancient wound rotor electric

motor to the mill. A main duty of the Motor Room Tender (electrician) assigned to

the mill for all of those years was to pour 50 pound bags of potash into a huge “slip

tank” filled with a potash & water solution that functioned as an enormous resistor

controlling the speed of the 1890’s vintage AC motor.

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And as CEO Bob Darnell said in 1996, the work force cuts were far from

over. Through its maintenance program, “IMPACT” recommended by consultants

Fluor Daniels, who charged Inland millions to apply Taylorist time study methods

to maintenance mechanics and electricians, Inland hoped that “…through attrition

the company can reduce its craft workforce” still further, “to levels that are

competitive with other steelmakers.”32

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Work Organization at Inland Steel: 1940’s to 1980’sAn integrated basic steel mill like Inland brings in iron ore, limestone and

coal at one end, and ships finished steel plate, structural shapes, cold rolled

(sometimes galvanized or tin-plated) strip, and other specialized steel products out

the other end. In Inland’s case, as in Ford’s, vertical integration extended beyond

iron and steelmaking proper, as the Blocks acquired a fleet of Lake Michigan

shipping vessels, its own iron ore mines in Minnesota, and coal mines in Southern

Illinois. Inland Ryerson in Chicago warehoused and shipped finished steel

products.

At the Harbor Works, between 25 and 31 Departments, from the Coke Plants

and Blast furnaces where iron was produced, to the Open Hearths (later more

efficient Basic Oxygen Furnaces) where it was turned into steel, to the Electric

Furnace and Structural (Bar and Shape) Rolling Mills, to the Hot Rolling and Cold

Rolling Sheet Mills where the steel was finished were manned by employees

whose seniority rights were for many years tied to their departments.33 Within

departments, seniority sequences tied workers to a craft or production job ladder.

This departmental seniority was used effectively by management to maintain both

a racial and a sexual division of labor in the company. In order to transfer from

one department to another, an employee would forfeit any sequence and

departmental seniority she34 had accrued, and basically have to start at the bottom

of the sequence seniority ladder. This discriminatory seniority system was

codified in the Collective Bargaining Agreements negotiated with the USWA. 35 It

was well known that the hot, dirty departments like the coke ovens were manned

primarily by African Americans, the track gangs were mostly Mexicans, and the

relatively clean finishing mills were almost all white. When white women were

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hired during World war II, most of them went to the Tin Mill—a fairly decent

department, relatively.

When I first hired at Inland's Blast Furnace in 1963, the electrical sequence

consisted of Helper, Motor Inspector 2nd Class, Motor Inspector Standard and

Leader. One learned the craft on the job, and promotions were basically by

sequence seniority. The Helper job, which consisted largely of changing light bulbs

and repairing light fixtures throughout the department, was also known as Lamp

Trimmer, a throwback to the days of kerosene lanterns. An apprenticeship was

established in the mid 1960's, with Inland and the USWA not in agreement over

testing for promotion. Training for apprentices would be largely financed by the

Federal Government through the Manpower Development and Training Act of

1962 (MDTA). Once again, Inland management proved itself not above taking

government assistance, even in times when profits were good. 36

The #3 Cold Strip Electrical sequence, where I worked from 1966 until I

retired, employed Motor Inspector Standards (MI’s, job class 18) Mill Electrical

Control Operators (MECO’s, job class 20) and Electrical Technicians (ET’s, job

class 24). The apprenticeship agreed to with the USWA in the mid-1960’s added

seven more steps to the electrical craft, Vocational Motor Inspector (VMI) VII

through I (7 through 1) with lesser job classes and lesser pay. VMI’s were required

to complete 2 years (four semesters) of the Purdue/Inland Electrical Training

program, where classes were run at Purdue University Calumet Campus mornings

and evenings to allow for swing shifts. The program was modeled on Purdue’s

Electrical Engineering Technology (EET) major, and gave the apprentices

practically the equivalent of an Associate’s Degree in EET. As mentioned,

government funding helped pay the bill. In addition to maintaining a passing grade

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at Purdue, VMI’s took a step test every six months in order to promote to the next

level. A third year of the Purdue/Inland program, concentrating in electronics, was

added for training of MECO’s and Technicians, who were promoted based on

written tests, seniority, and openings.

An expansion was underway in #3 Cold Strip Mill in the mid 1960's,

including a new Temper Mill, hot dip Galvanize Line, Shear Line, Recoil Line and

Anneal. The electrical sequence doubled in size to keep pace. In practice, when I

hired into the department in 1966, Technicians were long service employees with

the most training, experience and ability, and acted as “crew leaders.” They seldom

left the motor room (electrical control house), issuing line-ups to the MECO’s,

MI’s and VMI’s and answering trouble calls only of the most technical nature

when called to assist the others. MECO’s were, in an older parlance “Motor Room

Tenders” who also stayed in the motor rooms watching the operation of electrical

equipment unless called to assist the MI’s and VMI’s. VMI’s were sent to answer

trouble calls first, and called for help from MI’s when they needed it. From

climbing long flights of stairs to service overhead cranes, to searching for broken

wires in slimy, muck-filled basements, VMI’s did the nasty work. Though the

newest and usually youngest employees got the dirtiest, hardest jobs, we could

always look forward to promotions, and with them, higher wages and easier,

cleaner (though technically more challenging) work. “Seniority,” as I once told a

new-hire, “looks better and better the longer you stay in the mill.” Part of the

implicit “bargain” offered Electricians (as well as other crafts and production

workers) by Inland in these years was, do the hard, dirty work for low pay now,

learn the craft, and you will be rewarded in your later years. Technicians typically

stayed well past the 30 year retirement age, many well past 40 years service.

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Inland’s Internal Job Market

Driving into work at Inland on Cline Avenue sometime in the late 1980’s, I

was stunned by a billboard, declaring something like, “Join Inland Steel: A Job For

Life.” The advertisement was stunning because by that time it was an anachronism

—something from out of the forties or fifties or sixties. Inland implemented its

internal job market before the first contract was signed with the union. By the time

I went to work in the mill in 1963, the implied bargain described by Stone, Kerr, et

al was a tradition: lifetime job security and a pension in return for thirty years or

more of loyalty to the company.37 The bargain was in fact codified in the

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Inland (and in fact all the basic

steel companies) and the USWA. Pay grades were based on a job ladder clearly

spelled out in a Manual of Job Descriptions and Classifications mutually agreed

upon by the company and the union. Seniority promotional sequences assured that

over and above consideration of various qualifications like education, training

and/or ability, length of service was the primary determining factor in moving up

on the job. During my 33 years at Inland, I saw the Company strive to erode the

primacy of length of service, and the union struggle—albeit sometimes half-

heartedly—to maintain it. The bargain with the employees had at some point in

time become increasingly seen by management as an unwanted and unneeded

burden in its drive to become more competitive in a global steel market. And

Inland’s bargain with the USWA—increasing productivity and industrial peace for

union recognition and increasing wages and benefits—was increasingly seen as

unnecessary as the union, and the labor movement of the USA got smaller and

weaker. By the 1980’s, when some out-of-touch publicist had the out-of-date

recruiting billboard erected, Inland was “rationalizing” “downsizing” seeking wage

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concessions from the union for the first time since the inception of collective

bargaining, and certainly not hiring except perhaps some electricians needed to

replace those few too many let go in its overambitious and overreaching drive to

achieve absolute minimum maintenance crew size. The apprenticeship plan was

terminated in 1983. They had cut the maintenance work force a bit too deeply, and

needed to hire from the street perhaps a hundred or so. A similarly out-of-touch

publisher lauded Inland Steel as one of the 100 best employers to work for in 1984,

when downsizing was eliminating supervision as well as bargaining unit (union)

jobs at an ever-increasing rate.38

Incentive pay plans, based on tonnage produced by a unit (an individual

rolling mill, furnace, or department) were negotiated with the union, beginning in

the 1940’s. Three full time local union officers dealt specifically with the

adjustment and enforcement of job descriptions and classifications, base rates and

incentives throughout the Harbor Works. The Job Description and Classification

Manual was a long and detailed document. It spelled out in minute detail the

specific criteria, such as training, education, physical difficulty, environmental

factors like heat, etc., that were used to determine the pay grade attached to a job,

and it relative position on the job ladder. More radical union members and officers

of the local over the years—myself included—insisted the incentive plans had

always benefited the company more than the employees, though the union

struggled to police the incentive plans and minimize company abuses. Impasses

over incentive disputes sometimes resulted in “frozen” plans, sometimes to the

benefit of certain groups of employees, more often to the detriment of other

groups. While operating personnel were on “direct” incentive plans, with higher

rates, maintenance people, because our work did not directly influence output

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tonnage, were on “indirect” plans at considerably lower rates. The #3 Cold Strip

Maintenance employees (electrical and mechanical) were on an incentive plan that

had been frozen at around 10% (a very low rate, relative to that paid to production

and other maintenance employees) for the 31 years I worked there, due to an

unresolved dispute with the union. Such a low percentage rate, especially when

frozen, no longer functioned in any meaningful way to motivate maintenance

workers.

Inland always had its share of “rate busters” and “speed kings”. Attempts to

cut crews on high incentive production units often induced soldiering on the part of

many employees, but rate busters divided groups and prevented organized slow

downs from being effective. Of course slow-downs and work stoppages of any

kind have been expressly forbidden in all USWA contracts from the 1940’s on, and

union representatives are responsible contractually to take affirmative action to

prevent such job actions. From the 1970’s on the company cut crews relentlessly.

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Union Response: 1010, The Red Local

From its birth in SWOC days, Lodge (later Local) 1010 was organized and

largely led by leftists—primarily old Socialist Party, Trotskyist, and Communist

Party followers. As Needleman points out, it was “During these years of contract

limbo, Local 1010 gained its reputation as the most militant local, ‘the red local,’

the anti-international local.”39 The local acquired the tag “the red local” early on,

and it stuck throughout the 40’s and 50’s. This meant a constant tension between

the local and USWA District 31 and International leadership. It also meant that if

there was to be a fight-back against the increasingly dramatic speed up, job

intensification, automation and job elimination practiced by the U.S. steel industry,

much of it would be centered at Inland steel, where the battle lines were drawn

between management and the red local.

Both before and after the USWA negotiated contracts with Inland,

workers and rank & file local union leaders employed direct shop floor action

to settle issues. During the 1940’s Philip Nyden describes an ethos in which,

“The men thought nothing of stopping work and letting gondolas full of

molten metal hang in mid air. In these situations, the rapidly approaching

danger that [the molten metal would solidify and] production would be

interrupted …acted as a time clock forcing the company to bargain with the

workers [and settle departmental grievances].”40 Yale scholar Will

Tanzman, quoting Nyden, describes this strategy as “ ‘instant strike

bargaining’ negotiating with the threat of instant, small scale wildcat

strikes.”41

But in 1947, the USWA under Murray and District 31 Director Joe

Germano put an end to wildcats at Inland. When Tin Mill workers struck

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over grievances, in violation of the contractual no-strike pledge, Inland fired

them all, with the full concurrence of the USWA International. The cold war

and the USWA’s purge of militants and “reds” was underway. From 1953 to

1964, conservative administrations brought 1010 firmly into the International

leadership’s camp, and the Local’s independence and militancy were

brought in check. 42 Nationally, the USWA would call strikes repeatedly

during the 1950’s to gain wage and benefit increases including defined benefit

pensions and medical insurance, but Local 1010 and the rest of the union’s

locals and rank & file members would serve mainly as foot soldiers, with

little input into the strategies employed or the long-term goals sought by the

union. The last industry-wide strike in steel, in 1959, staved off company

attempts to eliminate Article 2 Section 2 of the Inland CBA (2-B in the U.S.

Steel Contract) that protected local working conditions or “past practice.”

This language was later weakened, and in any event proved to be ineffective

in protecting crew sizes and preventing the combination and elimination of

jobs.

In the Blast Furnace in the 1960’s supporters of 1010 president and

accused Communist John Sargent, head of the Rank & File Caucus at 1010,

jokingly called each other “comrade” in the face of severe red-baiting of

Sargent and the Rank & File. Opponents advised me to steer clear of the

“commies.” A 1965 Local 1010 contract negotiating committee headed by

president Sargent and Grievance Chair Jim Balanoff refused to sign the CBA

approved by the USWA International. It went into effect just the same.43

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By 1971, I had joined the Rank & File Caucus, then led by Grievance Chair

Jim Balanoff. I was elected to the Local 1010 Executive Board in 1976, when

Balanoff’s Rank& File swept the election. The Balanoff administration

effectively ended the second nearly ten year collaboration between 1010

administrations, the USWA International, and Inland. The 1977 contract

negotiations, which for the first time included a right to strike (on local issues only)

went down to the wire, including a strike authorization vote. Negotiated by a

largely neophyte but militant 1010 committee including Jim Robinson, Mike Mezo

and James Ross, the Local Agreement signed in 1977 was printed in a separate

booklet and distributed to every Local Union member. It contained significant,

though essentially non-monetary improvements in local working conditions.

Inland, as well as USWA International domination, was once again being

challenged by Local 1010’s leadership.

When Balanoff was elected Director of District 31, Vice President Bill

Andrews became the first African American president of the local. Inexperienced

but quick to learn, Andrews at first enjoyed the strong support and advice of

Balanoff, as well as a cadre of experienced and militant trade unionists.

During these years, there was little concern that Inland would “move”—you

don’t just pick up a blast furnace and move it to Mexico or Taiwan. And since

Inland had only one huge basic steel facility, they could not make money if it were

shut down. Therefore, the USWA and Local 1010 were in a relatively powerful

position vis-à-vis Inland. Unfortunately, the International USWA leadership did

nothing to exploit Inland’s vulnerability while it had the chance. Local 1010’s

Rank & File leadership behaved relatively aggressively, but was severely limited

due to the USWA’s exclusive right to approve all agreements.44

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In the mid 1980’s Rank & File steering committee members Cliff Mezo,

Mike Mezo and Jim Robinson, citing what they said was a drift to the right of

president Bill Andrews, split off from the caucus, forming a new “Steelworkers”

Caucus.45 While they vehemently denied it, the split was seen by the members as

largely racial, their motivation largely opportunistic, at least by those who stayed

with the Rank & File. I was elected Vice President in 1985. When President Bill

Andrews resigned to take a staff job with the USWA International in 1987, I took

over as local union president, as well as Chair of the Rank & File Caucus.

Within a week of taking office as president of Local 1010 in 1987, I was

called by Inland’s second in command in Labor Relations (I’ll call him Bill) who

wanted to “get better acquainted, and bring [me] up to speed, on his vision of the

team relationship" which the company and union were supposedly cultivating.

Within five minutes he was offering to fly me and “three or four of your guys” up

to Michigan in the company jet for the weekend. I declined. Within three months

he was offering a week in Japan at company expense. Dead set against the use of

union office for personal gain, and especially the cooptation it engendered, I turned

that one down too. This individual was unbelievably hypocritical. When a

grievance committeeman was suspended for alleged “insubordination” while

discussing a grievance with his foreman, I asked for an expedited hearing to clear

up the matter, which was causing an already overloaded grievance procedure to

grind to a halt, waiting to see whether in fact Inland could fire a union

representative for contractual union activities. “Bill” refused, saying normal

procedures (which could take months) ought to suffice in this case. In the same

conversation——nearly in the same breath— he asked me to attend a “team”

meeting with an Inland customer. Amazed in spite of myself at this outrageous

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doubletalk, I took nearly a minute to regain my composure. I then responded by

suspending all joint committee meetings until the union rep was back to work.

“Gee, I’m sorry you feel that way,” or some such idiocy was “Bill’s” reply.

“Bill” had been known by union representatives throughout his years with labor

relations as less than honest. His word was not to be trusted. With Bill, you were

advised to get it in writing, and check the fine print. His nick-name was “snake.”

Shaking his hand made you feel like washing yours afterward. When the top job in

Labor Relations opened up in the early 1990s, Inland management had an

opportunity to demonstrate the sincerity of its efforts to build a cooperative

relationship with the union. Bob Castle, whose qualifications for the job were

equal or superior to “Bills” (most felt he was the best arbitration lawyer Inland

ever had) was also highly respected by all who knew him as a man of unquestioned

honesty and integrity. His word is his bond. “Bill” got the job, sending the loud

and clear message that Inland’s idea of cooperation was really cooptation and

chiseling . Castle subsequently left Inland for a lower paying job with a competitor.

No one who had any dealings with Inland Labor Relations could fail to recognize

the message top management was sending to the union. It resounds throughout the

harbor works to this day.

Inland’s version of company union cooperation and participation teams was

called “Gainsharing,” and included bonus money to grease the wheels. I was dead

set against it, and had made my views clear from the beginning. I became president

just as the first departmental Gainsharing plan was coming up for a vote in the

Coke Plant. My good friend James Ross, Coke Plant griever was supporting the

plan, and expressed to me his view that the workers could “take the money and

run,” without conceding anything the company wanted in return. I tried to talk him

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out of it, expressing my view that such “team” efforts were anathema to the union,

and would weaken and perhaps destroy it. We knocked heads on the issue, and the

vote came down against it—by a razor thin margin of less than one vote. I had

insisted on a 2/3 vote if I were to approve it, since the secret ballot included

supervisors and non-union clerks as well as union members. At least no

gainsharing plan would be implemented on my watch.

In 1988, Inland approached the union and requested negotiations be opened

on a proposal for fundamental work rule changes in what they said would be a new

bar mill in Plant #4. Threatening to shut down The 10", 21" and 28" Mills, #2

Bloomer and the Main Roll Shop, management offered to invest $70 to $100

million in a state-of-the art Shape Products Division to produce "world class"

structural and automotive steel. They wanted three things the local and the

members felt we could not give them: A re-opening of the contract before it had

expired, a separate and significantly different contract for the new Shape Products

department, and concessions on work rules, job combinations and eliminations,

seniority and wages. They wanted a "skill-based" job reorganization featuring

Operator/Repairman. Reaching consensus among all the union representatives of

the affected departments, along with a nearly unanimous vote of the members from

the affected departments, we refused to negotiate. A couple of months into his

term, my successor, Mike Mezo reversed this position and approved a new

agreement for Shape Products that installed work rule changes designed to

combine and eliminate more jobs. The new investment went in at Plant #4.46

Losing a close 1988 election to Mezo, I was challenged for chair of the

Rank & File Caucus, which I held on to for a couple of years, handing it off to

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Rudy Schneider in 1991 when he ran for 1010 President. Within 2 years, the Rank

& File caucus virtually dissolved. It had fallen victim to a combination of racial

divisions, lack of an influx of “new blood” (no new hiring for ten years) frustration

and lack of leadership, for which I must assume some of the blame.47

With the demise of the Rank & File Caucus, I believe it is fair to say that

Local 1010’s leadership took a turn another to the right. Without a loyal

opposition, the Mezo “Steelworkers” Caucus has elected many of the top officers

with little and sometimes no opposition for the past 19 years, and has raised no

public objection to the USW International’s strategy of appeasement and

collaboration.48 Former 1010 Rank & Filer Jim Robinson now heads USW District

7 (formerly District 31) and has been anything but critical of USW leadership.

When crew cutting came to #3 Cold Strip Electrical in the 1990’s I was once

again a griever steward and filed grievances. But the consensus among officers of

the Local 1010 grievance committee, as well as the USWA staff representative,

was that any CBA provisions protecting crew size had been long since eroded,

and/or rendered ineffective by arbitration awards.

Today for the first time in its history, downsized to one quarter of its former

membership, demoralized, dominated by the USW International, disabused of any

sense of its own power and stripped of its militant leadership, Local 1010 must

deal with a truly global corporation, instead of the one-plant, family-owned

company which was Inland Steel. Certainly, even the small degree of

independence from the USW International exercised by 1010 in the 1970’s and

1980’s is no longer an option. Whatever bargaining strategy with Arcelor/Mittal is

adopted, neither the Local 1010 rank and file, nor its leaders are apt to have much

of a say in it.

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I/N Tek and I/N Kote: Inland’s Capital MovesInland reorganized as Inland Steel Industries, Inc., a holding company for

Inland Steel Company and Inland Steel Services, in order to separate the profitable

service-center from a (then) lagging steel producing operation, in May of 1986. It

cut steelmaking capacity by 30% by shuttering unprofitable facilities that year, but

simultaneously paved the way for a joint venture with Nippon Steel of Japan to

build I/N Tek, a continuous cold rolling mill in the corn fields near New Carlyle,

Indiana that would add back 1.5 million tons of finished steel capacity. The

Andrews administration of Local 1010, as well as USWA District 31 Director Jack

Parton campaigned publicly for the new plant to be built on available land at the

Harbor Works, but Inland and its new Japanese partner sought a fresh start at the

rural greenfield site, some distance from the influence of the Union and its

experienced members. Like RCA moving from Camden to the rural south,

management sought to move at least part of its capital to a union-free

environment.49 The USWA succeeded in wringing an agreement out of Inland

stipulating that the facility would open as a union shop, and Harbor Works

employees would be considered for jobs there—if they could pass a battery of

tests, including psychological “attitude” tests designed to weed out those who

would not make good “team players.” In fact, of course, union activists or those

with strong union ideals would find it difficult to get hired at I/N Tek. Combining

five formerly separate operations into one, the innovative facility replaced the old

“batch” method of rolling and treating steel with a “continuous” process that never

stops. I/N Tek could finish steel that had taken 12 days at the Harbor Works in

under an hour, with far fewer workers. A second joint venture with Nippon, I/N

Kote was launched in 1989. I/N Kote consists of two galvanizing lines next door to

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I/N Tek, to apply the zinc coating to its cold rolled steel strip. 50 The new facilities

employed the latest labor-saving robotics, including Automatic Guided Vehicles

(AGV’s) which carry steel coils from one area to another without human control.51

Together they represent a nearly one billion dollar investment (1990 dollars).

Both facilities were organized from the ground up as Japanese-style work

units utilizing self-directed work teams (I/N Tek calls them “Self-Managed

Teams”) “skill-based” job descriptions and classes and a structure quite similar to

the one employed at Indiana's Subaru/Isuzu as described by Laurie Graham.52 A

harbinger of things to come for Inland and the basic steel industry as a whole, I/N

Tek and I/N Kote introduced a compressed set of job descriptions and pay grades,

and sought to blur the distinction between bargaining unit (union) and supervisory

employees. By picking the “right” employees (“team players”) from Harbor

Works applicants, and farm kids who had never seen the inside of a steel mill

before, I/N Tek and I/N Kote were able to implement the new work organization

and culture with minimal resistance. Team players reaped rewards that could

include an expense-paid trip to Japan to study Nippon’s methods in the home

country.53 Several #3 Cold Strip Electricians I worked with for a number of years

transferred to the new facilities, and to a person they uniformly raved about the

wonderful new cooperative work atmosphere there. When talking about work, they

became so animated and exuberant, some of us who still worked at the Harbor

were prompted to ask what they put in the water at New Carlyle, or what they were

smoking. One union activist mechanic I knew well got his transfer by answering

questions as he suspected the “team-oriented” interviewers would like. He

subsequently kept his mouth shut and his head down at the new facility. Together,

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I/N Tek and I/N Kote employ under 500, but produce around 1.5 million tons per

year of finished sheet.54

Maintenance Work Restructuring: the 1990’sHiring into Inland’s Blast Furnace department in 1963, I worked at Inland

Steel’s #3 Cold Strip Mill Electrical Maintenance Department for thirty-one

consecutive years. I retired in February, 1999, just before Inland was acquired by

ISPAT. The mill was then purchased by Mittal, which acquired all the local basic

steel mills (ISPAT/Inland, Bethlehem, LTV) except U.S. Steel and National-

Midwest. During the 1960’s I completed an apprenticeship training program

holding the jobs of Vocational Motor Inspector (VMI) VII through I, then Motor

Inspector Standard (the standard journeyman job in the craft). I subsequently

advanced to Mill Electrical Control Operator (MECO) an above craft rated job

acquired though seniority and a test, then Electrical Technician (ET) the sequential

leader job also acquired by seniority and a test. The Purdue/Inland EET training

program I had attended for 3 years closed its doors in 1986, along with the

apprenticeship program.

I worked my last two years (1997-1998) as an Electrical Inspector. This job

was a straight day job that I finally got after threatening to file a grievance. Trying

to dissuade me from the job, a supervisor told me I would have to learn computers.

“You’ll just have to train me,” I told him. The job, which Inland argued was only

an “assignment” had been created, along with the new job of Planner, about ten

years earlier. These jobs, created as part of Inland’s Japanese-inspired Inspection

and Planning Method of Maintenance program, were originally assigned, in clear

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violation of the contract, to supervision’s favorites without regard to seniority or

even job rank. The creation of these desirable jobs and assignment on the basis of

favoritism was in itself a powerful form of hierarchical control. These positions

were added, without increasing the total number of maintenance electricians, by

cutting the crews actually assigned to answer trouble calls, repair and maintain the

equipment—a use of technical control to redesign the jobs to get more output per

worker. As a result of numerous similar grievances, Inland finally agreed to assign

electricians to the job based on seniority and passing a test.55 The new crop of

inspectors and planners with whom I came in included many loyal union brothers

(no sisters) who had nothing but contempt and ridicule for “team” propaganda.

We gave management no end of grief.

One response to the assignment of inspectors and planners to write job

plans breaking down complex maintenance and repair procedures into elementary

steps which might be performed by semi-skilled workers (clearly an application of

the detailed division of labor), came from a fellow Inspector, who has never taken

a Labor Studies class, or any college that I know of. He remarked, “Why, this ain’t

nothin’ but that old Taylorism they invented a hundred years ago!” 56 In light of the

changes in the organization of maintenance work at Inland, it is clear that

Taylorist ideas remained alive and well in the mill, but like the swine flu virus,

have adapted by changing form just sufficiently to temporarily overcome the

resistance which continuously develops among the workers and our union to such

job cutting and intensification schemes. One hoped the workers’ immune system

could keep up with the disease spreading tactics of management. Unfortunately it

has not.

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Over the years Inland, like other U.S. industrial firms, applied numerous

schemes based on the so-called Japanese management style, which changed or

attempted to change the organization of work. While management stressed the

need to improve product quality as a major goal of the programs, they made no

secret of the fact that increased productivity was an equally important goal,

repeatedly citing the bogey of highly productive foreign competitors who were

beating U.S. firms in the marketplace. Since productivity is easily translated into

output per worker hour, and speed-up and job eliminations are an obvious way to

achieve increased productivity, management’s goal of producing more steel with

fewer workers through work intensification has always been transparent.

In the case of Inland’s so-called Inspection and Planning Method of

Maintenance, it was impossible for management to disguise for very long the fact

that new bargaining unit jobs—Inspectors and Planners—would be created at the

expense of other maintenance jobs, resulting in immediate crew size reduction of

the call crews. After a couple of years, as crews were cut even further it became

obvious that a long term goal was to reduce maintenance crews to the absolute

minimum. In cutting call crews, management finally revealed that they would

even accept some increased delay time (time a production unit is down for

unexpected repairs) resulting from cutting crews to the bone.

Motor inspectors, MECO’s and Technicians soon became aware of extra

duties added to their jobs—more forms to fill out. The pace of work obviously

increased as three person crews (later two person crews) were expected to

complete as much work as four did in the past. Those still answering calls tended

to see the Inspectors and Planners chosen by management to sit in the office or

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newly purchased trailers instead of helping with trouble calls, as partly to blame

for their increased work load.

Wages and pay scales stayed the same, so there was no sharing of increased

productivity gains. The new jobs were cleaner, less physical office jobs, but there

were few of them and they were subject to closer direct control by supervision

than the jobs out on the floor.

Forms of control I observed in my last months at Inland included:

Attempts to apply the detailed division of labor to the electrical sequence.

The planning function formally carried out by the electricians ourselves was

removed and placed in the office in the form of planners, hand-picked and

assigned the task of planning and assigning each job and furnishing step by step

instructions for its completion by the work crew. In conjunction with the planner,

the inspector was responsible for writing job procedures intended to break each

job down into its most basic components, using the experience we had gained over

a lifetime of craft work.

Verbal orders were replaced more and more with written, specific line-ups

which specified in greater and greater detail exactly how each job should be done,

and even how long it should take.

New time sheets for electricians were devised and introduced on which each

electrician must account for time spent on each job to the tenth of an hour. Written

and signed reports were also required of each electrician, specifying in detail

exactly what was done on each job and shift.

In implementing this Japanese-style “inspection-maintenance’ program,

Inland management relied heavily on propaganda to promote “team spirit” and

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attempt to get us to identify our interests as workers with those of the company in

terms of working more efficiently, “smarter,” faster, and ultimately eliminating the

jobs of our co-workers.

Close supervision, or micro-management, with a higher than previous ratio

of bosses to electricians was used to keep a close eye on our every move. Bosses

started to turn up at the lunch table just in time for the end of the traditional lunch

break, to make sure no one lingered beyond our twenty minute lunch period, as

well as near quitting time, to make sure no one hit the showers early, even though

it was impossible to leave the plant early as a swipe card system had been

implemented which timed in and out times to the second. Some supervisors

excluded inspectors and planners from this close scrutiny to reinforce divisions

between them and the rest of the crew; others tried to apply an even tougher

standard of time accountability to these privileged workers. (Direct or simple

control).

Divide and rule strategies were implemented. Workers were assigned to

work with others than their known friends, putting together people who didn’t get

along well in an effort to defeat “soldiering” and consequent control by the crew

of the work pace.

As always, an occasional foreman job was offered to bargaining unit

employees who kissed up to the bosses, and openings were rumored far in advance

to encourage competition for these jobs. In my experience, foremen promoted

from the ranks were the worst, probably because they had sold out their solidarity

and loyalty to the group for personal gain, thus compromising their integrity. They

also knew all the tricks, most having used them to great effect as union employees.

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For as long as I worked at Inland the company continuously battled the

union on the issue of testing, attempting to use subjective rather than objective

(multiple choice, true/false, etc.) tests, in order to be able to pick and promote

favorites. In this highly technical field, it was a constant struggle to ensure that

fairness was used in the selection and promotion of VMI's (apprentices) MI's

MECO's, Technicians, Inspectors and Planners. Until the Federal Court ordered

Consent Decree—and at Inland a special plant-wide seniority agreement

negotiated by the Balanoff administration—forced the racial integration of the

crafts and departments, sequence seniority was used to keep the crafts more or less

private clubs over which management exercised extra control. Even after these

improvements, it was a constant struggle to ensure opportunities in the craft for

women and minorities. Racism and sexism were constantly used to divide and rule

in the crafts.

Finally, in the late 1990’s, Inland hired a consultant firm to do a time study

of electrical and mechanical jobs—something few imagined possible in modern

times. For weeks, our every move was monitored, timed and entered into a hand-

held computer in order to determine our efficiency and “dead time” between jobs

and calls. One of the immediate results was across-the-board crew size reductions

in electrical and mechanical sequences, which the union was still contesting with

little success when I retired in 1998. With no response from either local or

international leadership, workers on the shop floor were disorganized and divided

in our response to the newest and almost ludicrous management application of

Taylorism. Many thought of themselves as resisting by acting as usual—rushing to

answer calls and making repairs as quickly as possible so they could return to the

motor room to sit and have coffee. This was, of course, precisely the “dead time”

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management sought to measure—and eliminate—so many workers unwittingly

assisted management in cutting crew size.

Impacts on the two categories specified by the USW’s Charlie Richardson

(Working Conditions and Union Strength)57 created by Inland’s Inspection Method

of Maintenance Program are as follows:

Working Conditions

Performance evaluation criteria for maintenance electricians under the new

system was codified and monitored closely by requiring detailed reports which

were archived in a central computer and compared to the performance of all

maintenance personnel plant wide.

New technology (computers) were used to standardize, codify, simplify,

quantify and keep track of jobs formally planned and carried out by skilled

electricians with little or no direct supervision.

A major long term goal of management was obviously to deskill as many

maintenance and repair procedures as possible, enabling them to lower entry level

skill requirements or and/or use non craft personnel to do these jobs. While

management insisted this program would result in improved quality of

maintenance, the use of fewer highly skilled craft people would seem to invite a

lowering of the quality of work performed.

As mentioned above, the selection of Inspectors and Planners, their training

and qualification has been closely controlled by management, with the clear aim of

undermining seniority, and with it, union solidarity. The local union’s belated

contesting of selection and training procedures had only limited success. Training

for the new jobs was largely determined, organized and controlled by management,

and included a great deal of the kind of team training described by Richardson in

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“Employee Involvement; Watching Out for the Tricks and Traps.” Absent any

local union representation, trainees were placed in situations which tended to

prevent “Acting Like a Union” strategies from being employed, though some of us

who accidentally found ourselves in this team training certainly did our best to

promote union solidarity and identification in the face of the management strategy

of encouraging the “we (Inlanders) are all in this together” philosophy with it’s

resultant undermining of union identification and solidarity. On the first day of a

two week long training session, I told the group the cautionary tale about the

“cowboy and the snake” warning fellow union members of the dangers of joining

management’s team. For the rest of training, we (union members) continuously

referred to our team as the “Cowboys” as opposed to the “Snakes” of management.

The variety of tasks performed by individual workers was reduced, by

removing as much as possible of the brain work to the office, to be done by the

newly-trained team of Inspectors and Planners.

With smaller crews and trouble calls increasingly answered by one instead

of two or more electricians, social interaction among the workers is severely

curtailed. Often today, Maintenance Technician—Electrical (MTE’s) are alone in

the plant, as Technicians used to be on Christmas midnight “fire watch” turns,

with only telephone contact with other maintenance people.

Health and safety concerns abound, with electricians increasingly working

alone, even on highly dangerous jobs, and less skilled workers assigned to do work

for which they have inadequate training, skill and experience.

Sub-contracting of maintenance work, while in theory limited under the

CBA, has become more attractive to management as maintenance jobs are

deskilled.

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Union Strength

The overall number of union members, as well as union jobs as a percentage

of the total workforce was reduced as maintenance jobs were cut.

Management continues to increase contracting out and out-sourcing of

repair and maintenance work.

Management can certainly use the archived job procedures contributed by

skilled, experienced electricians to make it easier to keep the operation going

without us—as in the case of a strike or work slowdown.

This program increased the proportion of critical skills falling outside the

bargaining unit, and the potential for using unskilled or semiskilled contract, non-

union personnel is therefore increased.

Some new skills (Inspection and Planning) were created inside the

bargaining unit. The USW must try to maintain and/or increase union control over

these highly skilled jobs.

As mentioned, training for the new skills, as controlled by management, has

tended to undermine the seniority system. This appears to have been a major goal

in management’s use of training, along with promoting “team spirit” and

consequently undermining union solidarity.

Control over how work is done was to some extent taken off the shop floor,

as was mentioned. If management achieves its goal of winning over Inspectors

and Planners to the company “team,” it will also effectively take this control out of

the hands of the bargaining unit.

Social interaction among union workers was increasingly curtailed by this

program, with workers more and more isolated from each other during work hours.

This was exacerbated by the overall reduction of the workforce throughout the

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mill, since there are fewer and fewer workers to be able to interact and the work

stations are farther and farther apart.

Jurisdiction, between departmental maintenance and the plant wide Mobile

Maintenance “bull gang” was greatly impacted by the program, which farmed out

more and more work to the bull gang.

Production employees are impacted by this program as management

increasingly pushes to have routine repairs and maintenance performed by

operating personnel. The operator/repairman concept is now firmly entrenched.

The maintenance work changes implemented by Inland Steel at my

workplace in the 1990’s, while ostensibly aimed at improving the quality and

efficiency of work, served to eliminate jobs, undermine union strength and

solidarity, increase management control and ultimately improve Inland Steel’s

bottom line, at the expense of the workers. They encountered little resistance from

either the USW International or the now relatively passive Local 1010 leadership.

Concentrating on high value-added steel products and quality improvement

in the production process, Inland’s “yield of prime steel” rose from 79.8% in 1996

to 83.7% in 1997. Each percentage point of gain in yield translates to about $15

million of increased profit.58 Steel production and shipments rose in the 1990’s, as

did profitability, along with labor productivity at Inland.

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Thus “downsized,” “lean and mean,” and “rationalized,” Inland became an

attractive property and was purchased by Ispat Internation N.V. (based in the

Netherlands) in 1998. As Ispat Inland Inc., the company eliminated nearly 20%

more of its workforce by 2002, to 7,800 employees, and Local 1010’s membership

dwindled proportionately. By then it was the sixth-largest integrated steel producer

in the United States, producing about 5 percent of the nation’s steel.

On October 25, 2004, Ispat Inland became part of a new, merged company,

Mittal Steel:

The deal announced by Ispat Inland on Monday has billionaire steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal first combining his two international companies, Ispat Inland and LNM Holdings. The merged company, called Mittal Steel Co., will then buy ISG for $4.5 billion in cash and stock.59

  By 2005, the membership of USW Local 1010 stood at just 4000. Add to

this another 400 or so at I/N Tek and I/N Coat, and you have a figure lower than

what it was when SWOC Local 1010 was organized, during the Great Depression

of the 1930's.60 The November, 2005 contract at Mittal Indiana Harbor West 1010

reduced job classifications from more than 30 to just 5, as it had at all other Mittal

USA facilities. "The new agreements that were negotiated by the union and our

competitors contain many new approaches to how work is organized and managed

that are expected to improve productivity and labor costs," said William P.

Boehler, Ispat Inland's director of industrial relations, in 2004. "Attempting to

adapt these changes to our situation takes a good deal of time and discussion."61

They managed. New job classifications are much broader and cover a wide range

of duties. The phrase I learned as an eighteen year old new hire in 1963, “It’s not

39

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my job,” has little or no meaning anymore. To a large extent, every job is every

employee’s job.

In the electrical department, the jobs of Motor Inspector Standard (MI),

Motor Inspector Weldor, Mill Electrical Control Operator (MECO), Electrical

Technican, (ET) and the separate sequence job of Instrument Control Technician

were combined into one new single job classification, Maintenance Technician—

Electrical (MTE) at Labor Grade 4.62 With no apprenticeship or training program,

the company hires trained electricians as it needs them.

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Arcelor/Mittal: Inland Absorbed

In October of 2004, Tycoon Lakshmi N. Mittal’s $4.5 billion purchase of

International Steel Group (ISG) absorbed the former ISPAT/Inland.

In June of 2006, Mittal merged with Arcelor, becoming the world’s largest steel

company, producing 49 million tons (about 10% of world steel production) with 61

plants in 23 countries, employing 318,000 workers. The steel business is very

good these days, with Mittal Steel netting $3.5 billion in income on revenue of

$28.1 billion in 2005. But Mittal is hardly satisfied. According to the Interrnational

Metalworkers Federation (IMF) Mittal announced 26,000 job eliminations in

existing plants in 2006 and have displayed, particularly in Eastern Europe and

Ireland, “…a lack of respect of agreements and an obsession with cost reductions,

employee reductions and [further] increases in productivity.”63

Listed only as “USA, Indiana Harbor East and West” (which includes

both Inland and the old Youngstown/ LTV plant on the other side of the Indiana

Harbor Ship Canal) the old Inland Steel plant has completely lost its identity within

the enormous global Arcelor/Mittal corporate structure. 64

As of 2007, the old Inland #3 Cold Strip Mill (West) is completely shut

down, and people I used to work with there describe it as a ghost town. Next door,

the slightly newer Inland #3 Cold Strip (East) still operates, with a much smaller

crew. It is clear that an on-going process of rationalization continues, with

Arcelor/Mittal management shuttering its least productive facilities, shifting

production to the most productive, and continuing the process of down-sizing the

workforce. But, like the Block family and subsequent Inland Steel management

Lakshmi Mittal tries to instill the myth of a paternalistic, caring management that

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looks out for the workers—in particular their safety and health and wants to

cooperate with their union "partners" in improving the lot of their workers. He

states:

Arcelor Mittal sets Health and Safety above all other priorities andis committed to achieving the highest standards for our employees. We have instilled a strong safety culture at every level of the company that is supported by a robust set of safety standards. We are pleased and encouraged in joining our trade unions in Achieving our joint vision to be the safest steel company in the world. One of our first joint initiatives since the merger of Arcelor and Mittal was the undertaking of a global safety and health day on March 6, 2007 wherein management and trade unions from around the world simultaneously committed to achieving our safety and health goals.65

Yet a 2004 move to terminate Inland widow's pensions hurt the new owner's

image on the eve of his acquisition. Mass demonstrations at the Harbor Works and

a tough stance on the issue forced the company to back down.66

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USW67 International ResponseThe USWA granted wage and benefit cuts in 1983 contract negotiations and

a wage freeze in 1986, throughout the industry. In the U.S. steel industry as a

whole, output per steelworker nearly tripled from 1987 to 2005, according to

Bureau of Labor Statistics figures.68 During that period the USWA failed to secure

a significant share of the increased profits flowing from this enormous productivity

improvement for its members, either in the form of real hourly wage increases or a

shorter work week. The strategy of collaborating with steel management in an

attempt to restrict steel imports, criticized by Howard, was a stop-gap measure at

best, and did not address the effects management’s push for job-cutting and work

intensification.

There has been no strike activity of any kind by the United Steelworkers

(USW) or Local 1010 at Inland since 1959. That is to say, in 2009, it will have

been fifty years since strike action was taken at the Indiana Harbor Works.

The former USWA, now known as the United Steel, Paper and Forestry,

Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers

International Union (USW), Amicus and the Transportation & General Workers

Union (T&GWU) of the United Kingdom announced in Ottawa April 18, 2007 the

start of “…a formal process to prepare the ground for the creation of the first

Trans-Atlantic trade union:”

 At a ceremony held in Ottawa at the USW’s Canadian National Policy Congress, representatives of the three unions signed an accord to set up a merger exploration committee which will be tasked with laying down a foundation for a legal merger within one year.  The new union would represent more than 3.4 million members in the US, Canada, UK and Ireland. It would be the world’s biggest union and would be expected to attract other union organizations throughout the world into membership.

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During the exploration process, the unions will engage in coordinated campaigning and common approaches to collective bargaining with multinational companies. This agreement follows a strategic alliance signed between Amicus and the USW two years ago. Amicus and the T&GWU will join together as one union with two million members after May 1, 2007 that will be based in London and called “Unite.” 69

"Global capital requires a Global response," states the founding statement of Unite.70

This is clearly the most important undertaking of the USW in a number of

years. Initially, one hoped that U.S. union leaders, collaborating with their

ostensibly more progressive and militant European counterparts would listen more

than talk, and learn the lessons a class-conscious labor movement had to teach. The

prestigious American Bar Association calls the merger "…the first truly global

union and…the largest concentration of union power in a generation."71

In November 2006 the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC),

representing 168 million workers in 153 countries, was formed in Vienna. As Alan

Howard of Dissent Magazine put it,

…fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union and well into the third decade of corporate-driven globalization, the international trade union movement was reorganized to eliminate its debilitating cold war political divisions and to enhance coordination across industrial lines made obsolete by globalization.

The founding was “…hailed as historic by the few dozen people who

follow these things, which it may well be, though you probably missed the

coverage in your local newspaper.”72 But the ITUC’s unclear ideology or

connection to the IMF raises doubts. Since the AFL and CIO effectively ended

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global union organizing by their withdrawal from the then huge and powerful

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) during the cold war, real labor

globalism has been off the table.73 The new initiatives find a European trade union

bureaucracy little better equipped than the North Americans to face off against

ascendant trans-national capital bent on aggressive implementation of a neoliberal

agenda, which “seeks to apply in Europe the labor discipline it gets away with in

the United States.”74

A September 16-18, 2007 “IMF Global Arcelor Mittal Meeting” in Montreal

was attended by no less than 5 USW Local 1010 delegates, in addition to District 7

Director Jim Robinson, USW president Leo Gerard and 33 other U.S. delegates.

On the Agenda were heavy hitters from the International Metalworkers' Federation

(IMF) the USW as well as Arcelor/Mittal management. Among other issues

discussed, the delegates stressed the continuing reliance on "team" concepts to

solve workers' problems. As a USW press release put it:

The world's largest steel company Arcelor Mittal and trade unions representing its employees from over 20 countries today announced a new and innovative approach to Health and Safety concerns in the company. Meeting in Montreal at the International Metalworkers' Federation's first world conference of Arcelor Mittal and its tradeunions, the company and the unions committed themselves to a joint programme of education and training to raise health and safety standards throughout the company.75

The "new and innovative approach" lauded here sounds a lot like the same

old joint company union participation teams of the 1980's—a bankrupt strategy

that has done the labor movement irreparable harm. The IMF and the USW

jointly hosted the global conference. Trade unions from the following countries

took part in the company/union meeting: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,

45

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Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Italy, Liberia, Luxemburg, Macedonia,

Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago,

United Kingdom, United States of America.

The sketchy information available at this time suggests the gathering was

primarily by and for unions, with at least part of the purpose being to strategize

approaches to dealing with Arcelor/Mittal management. But the presence of a

number of Mittal management representatives on the agenda implies that it was

also an attempt to do a company union partnership conference at the same time.

The confused message is typical of the U.S. business union approach taken by the

USW in the past. Leo Gerard puts it this way:

The size and scope of the company [Arcelor/Mittal] means that as unions we have to develop a global strategy. …the ultimate aim must be two fold, first a successful company that provides job security for its workers and second, recognition of the valuable role that unions play. Future challenges such as overcapacity in the steel industry and the threat of a race to the bottom are real issues that can only be dealt with at theinternational level.76

And only, should we add, by collaboration with Mittal management?77

The official statement of the IMF conference: “We recognize that a

successful company provides job security,” draws into question the class-conscious

character of the IMF, as well as the new global alliance. Howard suggests the U.S.

union bureaucracy is “ideologically exhausted.”78 Does this characterization apply

to the Europeans, as well?

46

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Olszanski

L515 Bibliography

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor, Indiana, Chicago Heights, Illinois. September 1, 1965.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works, August 1, 1974.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1977.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1980.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1983.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1986.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1990.

Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor Works. August 1, 1993.

AGREEMENT between International Steel Group, Inc. and the United Steelworkers of America, AFL - CIO – CLC December 15, 2002

Agreement Between Mittal Steel USA and the United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial, and Service Workers International Union, November13, 2005.

Allen, David. Editor. “End of Employment Continuity a Necessary Step.” In The Inland Steelmaker, Volume 42, Number 30, July 26, 1996. Front Page.

Allen, David. Editor. “Four Key Efforts Hold Profit Potential.” In The Inland Steelmaker, Volume 42, Number 36, September 6, 1996. Front Page.

Olszanski

American Bar Association (ABA). Agenda for 2007 Fall Meeting.http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall07/agenda_corpfinance.html

Arcelor/Mittal “Fact Book” available online at: http://www.arcelormittal.com/rls/data/pages/476/ArcelorMittal_Factbook2006_EN.pdf

Benman, Keith. “Steel shakeout imminent Locals prepare for mega-merger.” NWI Times.com October 26, 2004. http://uswa1010.org/info/articles/times10-26-04.htm

Beverage, William. Full Employment in a Free society. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1944.

Braverman, Harry (1998) Labor and Monopoly Capital, the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.

CBS Reports: Inside the Union T.V. Documentary. Produced by Irv Drasnin. New York: CBS News. 1978.

Cowie, Jefferson (1999) Capital Moves: RCA’s 70 year Quest for Cheap Labor. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fisher, Douglas A. Steel Serves the Nation, 1901-1951, The Fifty Year Story of United States Steel. New York: United States Steel Corporation. 1951

Graham, Laurie. (1995) On the Line at Suburu-Isuzu. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

Graham, Laurie. (1997) “Permanent Temporaries” in Research in the Sociology of Work, the Globalization of Work. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. Editor Randy Hodson.

Guzzo, Maria. "USW holding a mixed bag in contract negotiations:

OlszanskiMittal units 'amicable' despite little progress." American Metal Market, July 7, 2005. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_26-3_113/ai_n14812284

Hardin, Ernest. Interview with author. October 31, 1996.

Howard, Allen (2007) “the Future of Global Unions: Is Solidarity Still Forever?”In Dissent, Fall 2007. http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=942.

Inland Steel Industries, 1997 Operations Review and Business Highlights. http://www.prnewswire.com/cnoc/IADops.html

Johnston, Rob. “Mittal: A Global Giant” in Metal World. No. 4 2006. pp. 18-22.

Lane, James B and Olszanski, Mike.“Steelworkers Fight Back: Inland’s Local 1010 and the Sadlowski/Balanoff campaigns, Rank and File Insurgency in the Calumet Region During the 1970’s” Steel Shavings, Volume 30, 2000. Gary, Indiana: Indiana University Northwest.

Levering, Robert, et al. (1984) The 100 Best Companies to Work For in America. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing

Llorente, Renzo. (1998). “Marx’s Critique of the Division of Labor: A Reconstruction and Defense” in Nature, Society and Thought: A Journal of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Volume 11, No. 4. Erwin Marquit, Ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.Pp. 459-469.

Lenin, V.I. (1916) “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” in Collected Works Volume 22.

Local 1010, USWA “A History of Local 1010” at USWA 1010 Website: http://www.uswa1010.org/history/1010history.htm

Lorenzen, Art. Interview with author. November 6, 1996.

Luerssen, Frank W. CEO Inland Steel Industries. “Making the Joint Venture Work” letter to the editor in New York Times, February 4, 1990. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?

Olszanskires=9C0CE5D81E38F937A35751C0A966958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print.

Marx, Karl. (1867) Capital Volumes I & II. [1967] New York: International Publishers.

Morris, Jack H., Inland Steel Industries. Inland Steel at 100, Beginning a Second century of Progress. Chicago: Inland Steel Industries. 1993.

Needleman, Ruth. Black Freedom Fighters in Steel. New York: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Nyden, Philip W. Steelworkers Rank & File. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers. 1984.

Olszanski, Mike. "President's Report," in Local 1010 Steelworker at Inland Steel Company, Volume 4 No. 2, February, 1988, P. 2.

Olszanski, Mike. "We Will Not Negotiate!!! Summary of 'Shape Products' Proposal Presented to the Union," in Local 1010 Steelworker at Inland Steel Company, Volume 4 No. 2, February, 1988,

Olszanski, Mike. The 1010 Rank & File in SWOC/USWA Strikes: A Social Movement Becomes a Bureaucracy, Research paper for L580 Strikes Class Indiana University, Spring, 2004 at Calumet Regional Archives

Page, Charles. Conversation with author on his last day at Inland. 1986.

Parker, Mike (1985) Inside the Circle: A Union Guide to QWL. Boston: South End Press.

Popagain, Martin T. Interview with author. Novemebr 6, 1996.

Richardson, Charlie “Employee Involvement; Watching Out for Tricks and Traps.” And “Draft Code for Union Members in Joint Programs.” In Reader, L315 Organization of Work. Indiana University Northwest. Spring, 2001.

Robertson, Scott. "Ispat, USW talks stall; union balks at 'extreme positions"

Olszanski American Metal Market,  July 20, 2004 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_29-2_112/ai_n6130705

Ruschak, Steve. Interview with author. November 5, 1996.

Saboff, Greg. Interview with author. Novemebr 5, 1996

Smith, Adam (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books. 1986 edition

Stone, Katherine (2004) From Widgets to Digits: Employment RegulationFor the Changing Workplace, Cambridge University Press.

Tauber, Jack. Interview with author. November 12, 1996.

United Steelworkers of America, Constitution of International Union United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC, Adopted at Atlantic City New Jersey, 1982

United Steelworkers of America, Department of Education. Then & Now, The Road Between. Pittsburg: USWA, 1986.

United Steelworkers of America. Proceedings of the Ninth Constitutional Convention. September, 1958.

United Steelworkers of America. Proceedings of the Tenth Constitutional Convention. September, 1960.

United Steelworkers of America. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Constitutional Convention. September, 1968.

United Steelworkers Of America Webpage. “USW, Amicus Take First Steps Toward Global Super Union”http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/4034.php

USW. The USW and Amicus-T&G: Exploring a Global Union for the 21st Century, ("Ottawa Accord" statement of unity) .http://www.usw.ca/program/adminlinks/docs/Amicus=USW2.pdf

OlszanskiUSW news release: "Steel giant and unions commit to innovative health and safety program" MONTREAL, Sept. 17 /CNW Telbec/ http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/September2007/17/c9353.html

Zeman, Efus. Interview with author. February 2, 1996

Olszanski

Inland Steel Production and Workforce Data1

Tons/Year (Millions) Employees

Union Workers2 Capacity Ton/Yr

1910 0.3 2,600 2,0001917 1 5,594 4,0001918 1 5,500 4,0001929 2 7,393 5,5001935 2 7,000 5,000 41938 2 9,000 7,000

1 Data obtained from various sources, primarily Inland Steel publications and newspaper and journal reports. In some reports, steel production is reported as "tons produced" in some as "tons shipped." I have tried to use the lower figure, "tons shipped" or an approximation thereof extrapolated from known data. "Capacity," obviously a somewhat higher figure, is shown where available. 2 Approximate bargaining unit until 1936. Figures for 1958-1990 based on USWA Constitutional Convention Proceedings are accurate to within less than 250.1

For a basic, non-political history of the Local, see Local 1010, USWA “A History of Local 1010” at USWA 1010 Website: http://www.uswa1010.org/history/1010history.htm. For a more detailed, if admittedly politically slanted history of 1010, see my paper: Mike Olszanski, The 1010 Rank & File in SWOC/USWA Strikes: A Social Movement Becomes a Bureaucracy, Research paper for L580 Strikes Class Indiana University, Spring, 2004 at Calumet Regional Archives. Also see, Lane, James B and Mike Olszanski,“Steelworkers Fight Back: Inland’s Local 1010 and the Sadlowski/Balanoff campaigns, Rank and File Insurgency in the Calumet Region During the 1970’s” Steel Shavings, Volume 30, 2000. Gary, Indiana: Indiana University Northwest. Also see, Phillip Nyden, Steelworkers Rank & File. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers. 1984.

2 In the 1940's British Economist William Beveridge laid down the basic equation for the distribution of productivity gains among workers, which he assumed was good for the nation and its economy as a whole. Based on the assumption that full employment at decent wages was a necessary and desirable goal in a free society, Beveridge argued that at least part of the increased productivity to be expected in a technologically advancing economy should be distributed to the workers in the form of shorter hours of work, and/or increased purchasing power (higher real wages). The alternative to shorter hours would be an increase in unemployment., which was bound to create and exacerbate all sorts of social ills. Beverage argued for "…a distribution of wealth [that] will keep consumption level with the rising production made possible by new equipment [and work organization?] and …a fairer distribution of leisure, so that leisure replaces unemployment." were goals of a free society. See William Beverage, Full Employment in a Free society, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1944. pp. 101, 130, 159. Unfortunately, the leaders of the U.S. labor movement never adopted this kind of social-democratic ideology as part of their collective bargaining strategy, as did the British and European trade union movements.In fairness, the USWA negotiated an extended vacation plan in the 1960's that provided the senior 50% of employees 13 weeks vacation every 5th year, and the junior 50% 5 weeks every 5th year. This no doubt provided many jobs as employees were hired to fill vacation vacancies, though this job creation was offset greatly by the use of (often forced) overtime to fill the vacancies. The plan was terminated in the 1980's as part of the concessions granted by the USWA to Inland and the other steel companies.

3 Within my first week at Inland in September of 1963, I spent a sweltering afternoon shoveling dirt and debris off the top landing of #1 Blast Furnace—my introduction to the world of iron and steel making.

4 Jack H. Morris,. Inland Steel at 100, Beginning a Second Century of Progress. Chicago: Inland Steel Industries. 1993. pp. 17-19. In 2006, the Indiana Harbor Works employed roughly the same number of workers employed in 1918, but produced 5 times as much steel, of much higher quality and value.

5 Douglas A. Fisher, Steel Serves the Nation, 1901-1951, The Fifty Year Story of United States Steel, New York: United States Steel Corporation, 1951 pp. 88-89. See also Katherine Stone, (2004) From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation For the Changing Workplace, Cambridge University Press. p 43-44. According to Stone, “The purpose of these programs was to discourage turnover, promote a spirit of cooperation, and reduce shop floor opposition.” I am unable to find details of either the Inland or USS pension plans from this period, but the USWA struck the steel companies in 1949 to establish contractual pension plans for the bargaining unit. Local 1010 was out

Olszanski1939 2.1 10,000 8,0001941 3.5 14,000 9,0001943 3.6 15,000 12,4001945 3.5 15,000 12,5001950 3.5 16,200 14,0001958 3.5 18,000 15,5001960 4 19,500 17,0001968 4.8 20,300 17,0001972 5 20,500 17,3001974 6.1 22,000 18,0001976 5.6 22,000 18,000

for 42 days, as once again the recalcitrant Inland Steel was among the last to settle. See United Steelworkers of America, Department of Education. Then & Now, The Road Between. Pittsburg: USWA, 1986. For more on”Red”Local 1010 strike activity, see Mike Olszanski, The 1010 Rank & File in SWOC/USWA Strikes: A Social Movement Becomes a Bureaucracy, Research paper for L580 Strikes Class Indiana University, Spring, 2004 copy on file at Indiana University Northwest Archives.

6 Morris, p 24

7 Morris, p 67. See also Robert Levering, et al. The 100 Best companies to Work for in America. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1984, Pp. 149-151. Levering’s praise of Inland management is boundless: “The most compassionate of the big steel companies,” he calls them, and “...the last company to be organized by the steelworkers union, because its labor practices were so good.” Levering also claims Inland “..was one of the first companies… in America to adopt the 8 hour day,” and “…the first steel company to have a pension plan (1920),” and “…a nondiscriminatory employer in the 1930’s”

8Bill Young, quoted in Ruth Needleman, Black Freedom Fighters in Steel. New York: Cornell University Press,

2003. p 42

9See “CBS Reports: Inside the Union” 10Jack Morris, p 36.

11Ibid, p. 35.

12Ibid, p. 31.

13Ibid, p. 30.

14Ibid, p. 32.

15Ibid, p. 43.

16 U.S. steel calls them Basic Oxygen Process (BOP) Shops.

17Ibid, p 43.

18 Dave Allen, editor, “No. 7 sets North American iron record”, The Inland Steelmaker, Vol. 42, No. 41, October 11, 1996, front page. See also, Inland Steel Industries, 1997 Operations Review and Business Highlights. @ http://www.prnewswire.com/cnoc/IADops.html See also, Morris, p. 19.19 Dave Allen, editor, “End of Employment Continuity a Necessary Step”, The Inland Steelmaker, Vol. 42, No. 36, Sept. 6, 1996, front page.

20 See attached table and graphs. Figures on tonnage shipped were assembled from a variety of sources, including Inland’s own reports, Morris, press reports, journals, etc., as did figures on total employment. Figures on the number

Olszanski1978 6.2 25,000 18,5001979 6.1 25,460 19,0001980 5.9 24,000 18,600 91982 3.9 21,000 15,5001984 4 18,000 16,0001986 4.5 17,300 12,500 6.51987 4 16,800 12,2001988 4 16,400 12,0001989 3.9 14,400 11,5001990 3.9 14,000 11,0001991 4 13,000 10,500

of union members at Inland come from multiple sources as well, but primarily from the United Steelworkers of America. Proceedings of the Ninth Constitutional Convention. September, 1958, and subsequent Proceedings up to 1990. Minimal interpolation and extrapolation yielded the figures shown. They are deliberately conservative—that is to say errors would tend to be in the direction of understating tonnage and overstating numbers of union members.

21 Ibid.

22 Greg Saboff, interview with Mike Olszanski, October 31, l996.

23 Ernest Hardin, interview with Mike Olszanski, Nov. 5, 1996

24 Steve Ruschak, interview with Mike Olszanski, Nov. 5, 1996

25 Art Lorenzen, , interview with Mike Olszanski 1996

26 Martin T. Popagain, , interview with Mike Olszanski 1996

27 Efus E. Zeman, interviews with Mike Olszanski 1996, 2005

28 Charles Page, interview with Mike Olszanski,1986

29 Jack Tauber, interview with Mike Olszanski 11/12/96

30 Morris, p. 63.

31 In 1968 Inland produced 4.8 million tons of steel with 20,300 employees. By 1993 they were matching that production with half the workforce. –Jack Morris, page 64.

32 Dave Allen, editor, “4 Key Efforts Hold Profit Potential,” The Inland steelmaker, Vol. 42, No 30, July 26, 1996, front page.

33 When I hired in, there were 25 departments at Inland’s Indiana Harbor Works, each represented by a Grievance Committeman. This number rose to a high of 31 departments around 1980, and fell to 17 by the mid 1990’s, as departments were closed and work “rationalized.” See, Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America, Indiana Harbor Works (also known as the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 1965, also 1980 and 1993. Grievance Committeemen were elected by the union members of their respective departments, as were Assistant Grievance Committeemen (1 for each department) and Stewards (1 for each 250 employees in a department).

34 Actually, very few women were employed in the bargaining unit, except during World War II and the Vietnam War.

35 See Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor, Indiana, Chicago Heights, Illinois. September 1, 1965 and subsequent CBA's until 1977.

36 See Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United Steelworkers of America Indiana Harbor, Indiana, Chicago Heights, Illinois. September 1, 1965. pp. 166-171

Olszanski1992 4.1 12,000 10,0001993 4.8 10,000 8,0001994 5.2 9,800 7,6001995 5.1 9,600 7,4001997 5.3 9,400 7,2001999 5.3 9,000 6,8002002 5.1 7,800 5,6002003 5 7,000 5,0002004 5 6,500 4,5002005 5.1 6,000 4,2002006 5.1 6,000 4,200

2011 3,200 10

37 See Katherine Stone, (2004) From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation For the Changing Workplace, Cambridge University Press. pp. 51-63

38 Robert Levering, et al., The 100 Best Companies to Work For in America, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing. 1984. pp. 149-151

39Ruth Needleman, Black Freedom Fighters in Steel. New York: Cornell University Press, 2003. p 45

40 Philip W. Nyden, Steelworkers Rank & File. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey

Publishers. 1984 p 24

41 Will Tanzman, “A Working Class Version of the New Left: The Rank and File Movement in the United Steelworkers and the Ed Sadlowski Campaign,” Senior essay, Draft of manuscript, Yale University, April 2004, p 13

42 See Mike Olszanski, The 1010 Rank & File in SWOC/USWA Strikes: A Social Movement Becomes a Bureaucracy, Research paper for L580 Strikes Class Indiana University, Spring, 2004, pp. 24-26. Cited there are interviews with Joe Gyurko, Mary Hopper and Ann Geba, as well as Staughton Lynd, Rank & File page 72 and Zivich, documenting the 1947 Tin Mill firings.

43 United Steelworkers of America, Constitution of International Union United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC, Adopted at Atlantic City New Jersey, 1982 Article XVII Contracts Section 1. p 94.

44 As Nyden states (p. 36) “At the 1950 USWA convention, the International Leadership was made the ‘sole contracting party’ in all collective bargaining agreements,” This severely curtailed the local autonomy formerly exercised by Local 1010's leaders and rank and file. See also, United Steelworkers of America, Constitution of International Union United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC, Adopted at Atlantic City New Jersey, 1982 Article XVII Contracts Section 1. p 94.

45 Jim Robinson’s remark to me, as I remember it was, “Andrews is going to sell out,” [to the company].Since there was at that time no evidence that I could see of any collaboration with management on the part of Bill Andrews, I asked Robinson in reply if he had a crystal ball. I also argued strongly that the Mezo-Robinson defection would split the local down the middle, along racial lines, and might indeed push Andrews to the right. I am now convinced that is to a large degree precisely what happened.

Olszanski

Inland Indiana Harbor Works Employment,Bargaining Unit

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

46 See Mike Olszanski, "We Will Not Negotiate!!! Summary of 'Shape Products' Proposal Presented to the Union," in Local 1010 Steelworker at Inland Steel Company, Volume 4

No. 2, February, 1988, Front page. Also see Olszanski, Mike. "President's Report," in Local 1010 Steelworker at Inland Steel Company, Volume 4 No. 2, February, 1988, P. 2. One argument I used in connection with the Shape Products demands was that Inland sought to finance it's $70 million dollar investment in this new facility with concessions by the union members.

47 For an examination of the Rank & File “Fight Back” at USWA Local 1010 and District 31 from 1970-1990, see James B Lane and Mike Olszanski, “Steelworkers Fight Back: Inland’s Local 1010 and the Sadlowski/Balanoff campaigns, Rank and File Insurgency in the Calumet Region During the 1970’s” Steel Shavings, Volume 30, 2000, Gary, Indiana: Indiana University Northwest.

48 This assessment of USW strategy may seem harsh, and it must be born in mind that more recent leadership of the International Union has inherited a worsening situation in terms of the power relationship between the union and the now global corporation. It has been argued that the purges of the 1940’s and 1950’s and turn to the right begun by Murray and his cohorts in the CIO, started a downward spiral in the USWA and the U.S. labor movement as a whole from which neither has as yet been able to recover.

49 See Jefferson Cowie (1999) Capital Moves: RCA’s 70 year Quest for Cheap Labor. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

50 See “Inland Steel Industries” at: http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Inland-Steel-Industries-Inc-Company-History.html.

51 See “I/N Kote and I/N Tek AGV” at the Jervis B. Webb Company website for a detailed desription of these robotic vehicles: http://www.jervisbwebb.com/CaseStudies/inkote_intek_AGV.aspx?csid=151.

52 See Laurie Graham (1995) On the Line at Suburu-Isuzu. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Olszanski

Inland Indiana Harbor Works Steel Production in Million Tons/Year

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

53 See Frank W. Luerssen, CEO Inland Steel Industries, “Making the Joint Venture Work” letter to the editor in New York Times, February 4, 1990. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE5D81E38F937A35751C0A966958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print.

54 Maria Guzzo, "USW holding a mixed bag in contract negotiations: Mittal units 'amicable' despite little progress." American Metal Market, July 7, 2005. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_26-3_113/ai_n14812284

55 These assigned jobs were not reclassified, since management argued they were merely assignments, not new job descriptions. Those “assigned” were paid at the rate of the job classification (MECO or ET) which they had attained prior to being assigned to the Inspector or Planner jobs. Since the job content was clearly very different from that of the MECO or ET jobs, it was clear from the outset that calling these jobs “assignments” was merely a management tactic designed to circumvent the CBA and in particular the Manual of Job Descriptions and Classifications.

56Martin T. Popagain, interview with Mike Olszanski 1996

57See Charlie Richardson, “Employee Involvement; Watching Out for Tricks and Traps.” And “Draft Code for Union Members in Joint Programs.” In Reader, L315 Organization of Work. Indiana University Northwest. Spring, 2001.

58 Inland Steel Industries, 1997 Operating Review and Business Highlights http://www.prnewswire.com/cnoc/IADops.html59 Keith Benman, “Steel shakeout imminent Locals prepare for mega-merger.” NWI Times.com http://uswa1010.org/info/articles/times10-26-04.htm

60 This is compared with nearly 19,000 1010 members at Inland in the 1960’s and 1970’s. So the Harbor Works now produces about the same amount of steel, with less than 25% of the workers. Some striking conclusions can be drawn from this enormous productivity increase. Assuming that even half of it was shared with the workers, that could have meant a doubling of real wages. Or, the hours of work per week might have been halved (at no reduction in pay) thus reducing the number of jobs lost. In fact, there was no increase in real wages, nor any decrease in hours for those working, in that period. Instead, all of this huge productivity increase went into the coffers of the owners of the Harbor Works.

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Olszanski

61 William Bohler, quoted by Scott Robertson in "Ispat, USW talks stall; union balks at 'extreme positions" American Metal Market,  July 20, 2004 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_29-2_112/ai_n6130705

62 See Agreement Between Mittal Steel USA and the United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial, and Service Workers International Union, November13, 2005.Full text available at: http://uswa1010.org/

63 Rob Johnston, “Mittal: A Global Giant” in Metal World, No. 4 2006, pp. 18-22.

64 Arcelor/Mittal “Fact Book” available online at: http://www.arcelormittal.com/rls/data/pages/476/ArcelorMittal_Factbook2006_EN.pdf

65 USW news release: "Steel giant and unions commit to innovative health and safety program" MONTREAL, Sept. 17 /CNW Telbec/ http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/September2007/17/c9353.html

66 Andrea Holecek, " Ispat Inland restores widows' pensions" NWI Times. Wednesday, September 15, 2004 http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2004/09/15/news/top_news/cddb69947fc1cdae86256f0f007fc5af.txt

67 The United Steelworkers of America (USWA) has changed its name recently to the The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW) and now " represents working and retired members throughout the United States and Canada in just about every sector of the North American economy. From metals and mining and manufacturing, to health care and various services in both the public and private sectors. Established as the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) in 1936 to coordinate the massive drive to organize the North American steel industry, the organization grew to become the United Steelworkers on May 22, 1942. The Aluminum Workers of America joined the Steelworkers on June 30, 1944. The following unions have also merged into the USW: International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (1967); United Stone and Allied Product Workers (1971); District 50, Allied and Technical Workers (1972); Upholsterers International Union of North America (1985); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers (1995); Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (1996); Canadian Division of the Transportation Communications International Union (1999); American Flint Glass Workers Union (2003); Industrial, Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (2004); Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (2005)."Source: http://unionworkers.com/labor_union/usw/usw_local_union_1010.php

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Endnotes

68 Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://www.bls.gov/lpc/home.htm#publications

69 United Steelworkers (USW) Website. “USW, Amicus Take First Steps Toward Global Super Union” April 18, 2007. http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/4034.php

70 The USW and Amicus-T&G: Exploring a Global Union for the 21st Century, ("Ottawa Accord" statement of unity) .http://www.usw.ca/program/adminlinks/docs/Amicus=USW2.pdf

71 American Bar Association (ABA). Agenda for 2007 Fall Meeting.http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall07/agenda_corpfinance.html

72Allen Howard, (2007) “The Future of Global Unions: Is Solidarity Still Forever?”In Dissent, Fall 2007. http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=942

73 Internationalism—the union goal of building a global federation of unions and union members with which to confront multi-national and trans-national capital reached a high point in 1945 with the creation by the British and Soviet labor movements and the CIO of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at a conference in London. By 1949, the CIO and USWA president Philip Murray had denounced the WFTU as Communist dominated, and created the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) dominated by business unionists. See Elenore H. Binkley, Reflections on the Labor Movement of the USA, New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1983 pp. 221-225. See also Mike Olszanski, AIFLD to ACILS: New Labor Foreign Policy or Old Wine in New Bottles? Term Paper For L580 Comparative Labor Movements, Indiana University Northwest, Spring 2005

74 Ibid, p. 6.

75 USW news release: "Steel giant and unions commit to innovative health and safety program" MONTREAL, Sept. 17 /CNW Telbec/ http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/September2007/17/c9353.html

76 Leo Gerard, quoted by Rob Johnston, “Mittal: A Global Giant” in Metal World, No. 4 2006, page 21.

77 The word "collaboration" has had several connotations, some negative and some positive, in different contexts. For class-conscious trade unionists, "class collaboration" has a connotation nearly as negative as that assigned by the World War II French resistance fighters to French men and women who collaborated with the Nazis during the occupation. This is the sense in which I use it. The USWA's first president, Phillip Murray on the other hand, co-authored Organized Labor and Production in 1940 in which he emphasized the necessity of “more mature labor-management relations” which he said should eventually replace strikes with “labor-management collaboration for greater gross productivity…” See Murray quoted in I.W. Abel, Collective Bargaining Labor Relations in Steel: Then and Now.New York : Columbia

University Press. 1976. p 55

78 Allen Howard, p. 10.