krasnoff - kant and constructivism

7/22/2019 Krasnoff - Kant and Constructivism

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H ow Kan t i anisC ons t ruc tiv ism ?b y La r ry Krasnof f , Char les ton/SouthCaro l ina

Constructivism is said to be a new possibi l i ty in ethical and po l i tical theory , apossibi l i ty t ha t is said to have its originsin Kant ' spractical p h i lo so p hy .l B utsinceJohn Rawls in t roduced the term in his 1980 Dew ey Lectures, there has been littleagreement ab o u t vvhat constructivism even means. If it is exemplified by Rawls 'theory of justice, w h a t features of tha t theory m ake it constructivist? Is construc-tivist s imply a synonym for Kant ian , or isc onst ruct ivisma par t icular ,and par-t icular ly controversial ,I n terpre ta t ion of Kant ' s pract ical ph i losoph y?I nwhat sense,if any , was Kant a constructivist?Most of the discussions of constructivism in the secondary l i terature begin byregrett ing that nei ther Rawlsnor any o neeise has providedclear answers to thesequestions.2 The present paper seeks to remedy this lack, but I must caution at theoutset that decisive answ ersare almost certainlyunavai lab le here. Prov iding themwould require st ipulat ing which of the many competing senses of constructivismshould count s ad ef inition. Since this sort of st ipulat ion could have l i t t leeffect, Ipropose insteadsimplyto sort out the literature on co nstructivism for some p ossibledefinit ions. What will emerge is not what constructivism must mean, b ut somemore coherent picturesof w h a t it might mean. Having sketched these pictures, w ecan then turn to the question of whether Kant should count s a constructivist.The paper has six sections. In the first two, I suggest that constructivism hasbeen understood in two impor tant ways . On the first construal, constructivismis1 John R awls, Kan tian Constructivism inMoral Theory, Journal of Philosophy (1980),

pp. 515575(hereafter simply K C). LectureI I I o fP oliticalLiheralism (Columbia UniversityPress, 1993; hereafter PL) is a revised version of the Dewey Lectures.I n this paper I discuss only constructivism in moral and pol it ical theory, avoiding anydiscussion of constructivism in mathematics. Rawls has generally resisted connecting thetwo, but PLdoes attempt a very brief discussion; see pp. 102103. None of the otheraccounts of moral and p olitical construc tivism tha t I will be discussing here even m entionsconstructivism in mathematics.Sometimes co nstructivism isused to describe what is more commo nly called social con-structionism : the viewthat scientific, ethical or other bel iefsare the products of socializa-tion rather than any sortof reasoning.This idea does have some relation to the ideasthatI will be discussing, and I try to suggest the connection in section II.2 SeeBrian Barry ,Theories ofJustice (Univers i tyofCalifornia Press, 1991),p .266, and DavidBrink , Moral Realism and the Foundations of thics (Camb ridge Unive rsity Press, 1989),p. 305 f . Raw ls himself notes the variety of senses of constructivism in the l i terature in PL,p p . 9091n. Most of the works Rawls cites in this footnote are discussed in the presentpape r and its footnotes.

Kant-Studien90. Jahrg., S.385-409 Walter de Gruyter 1999ISSN0022-8877

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386 Larry Kra sno f fa type o f normative theory that emphasizes a constructive procedure like th eor iginalposition.On thesecondconstrual, however, constructivismis aview abouthow normative theories are to be jus t i f ied a c laim that such just if icat ion is ul t i -matelypractical rather than theoretical. Only the first conception o fconstructivismhas been ful ly endorsed by Rawls himself though his theory does seem to i m p l yth e second conception s well. In the third section of thepaper, Inote th e ways inwhich both conceptions have been taken to imply alternatives to moral realism,despiteRawls'warnings against this.In thefourth section,I try to show that theseconceptions of constructivism (and of its meta-ethical consequences) are distinct,though they may be related under akind o fpublicity condition that Rawls does infact accept. Finally in thelasttwo sectionsof thepaper,Isuggestthat Kant's moraland political theories correspond to the two conceptions ofconstructivism in on lyaweak way, because Kant accepts Rawls'publicity condition in onlya weak way.In all ofthis Iwillemphasize clarification over positive argumentation.Though m yown views will occasionally and necessarily emerge, my aim here is not to arguefor or againstanyversionofconstructivism,butsimplyto explain what such argu-mentsare likelyto beabout. This is amodest goal,perhaps,but it isalsoone thathas yet to bereached in the literature.

In the Dewey Lectures Rawls comes closest to a definition when he writes thatconst ruct ivism specifies a particular conception of the person s an element in areasonable procedure ofconstruction, theoutcomeof whichdetermines the contentof the cfirst principlesofjustice.'3Threefeaturesof this claim seem crucial.First, there is the emphasis on aSubstantive conception of the person. Rawlsrepeatedlycontrasts constructivism with rational intuitionism,aviewhe attributesto such diverse figures s Plato,Leibniz, Sidgwick and G. E.Moore.4 This view,says Rawls, requires only a sparse viewof the person sknower; a rational intu-i t ionistholdsthatwe canhave access to an objective moral order that exists inde-pendently of anyview about human agency o r about th e socialrole o f morality. Inother words, no specifically moral or practical interests are bu i l t into the rationalintuitionist's conceptionof theperson.Onthis view,we areableto approach moral-ity and apprehend its truths f rom th e outside, s detached observers. B y contrast,constructivism requires that we specify a thick, practical conception of the persons an agent, laden with practical interests and goals. For instance, Rawls' ownversion of constructivism specifies a conception of persons s both rational and3 Rawls, KC, p.516.4 SeeRawls,KC, pp.557-560; ThemesinKant'sMoralPhilosophy, inEckartFrster (ed.),

nt s Transcendental Deductions (Stanford UniversityPress, 1989), pp.95-98 and PLpp.91 92.



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H ow K a n t i a n is Const ruc t iv ism? 387reasonable, s possess ing both a part icular conception of the good and a sense ofjus t ice . 5

Second, thereis the appea l to a p a r t i cu la r p roce du re by w h ich the specifiedper-sons cons t ruc t m o r a lor poli t ical principles .I t a k ethe key idea hereto beth a t thec o n s t r uc t i ve procedure mus t do some real work that takes us beyond the specifiedconcept ion of the person. To u n de rs t a n d th i s p o in t , i m a g i n ea theory that e m p h a -sized a p ar t ic u la r concept ion of the person, say,s au ton om ous . One could thenhold the v iew tha t m ora l i ty was abou t prom ot ing those condi t ions un der whichpersons could develop, m a i n ta in and exerc ise the i r au tonom y. Such aview, howeverplaus ible ,wouldnot be cons t ruc t iv is t .To get to cons t ruc t iv ismwe h a v eto specifya procedure or m echan ism in which the au ton om ous persons themselves selec tedthe pr inc iples or ins t i tu t ions tha t would count s m ora l ly just if ied. C on s t ru c t iv -ism is thus not abou t prom ot ing or rea l iz ing a conception of the person, bu tabout us ing tha t concept ion , in Rawls' terms, s a n element of a procedurein w hich persons c ons t ru c t a m ora l or pol it ica l doct r ine . To the concept ion ofthe person there mus t be added a par t icu la r procedure of cons t ruc t ion , a n d thisprocedure mus t take us beyond the conception of the person to the conten t ofthe theory.

Finally, thereis the c la im thatthe outcomeof theprocedureis to be regarded smo r a l l y just if ied; indeed, the cla im of cons t ruc t iv ism is th a t w h a t is mora l ly jus t i -fied is jus t whatever is constructed in the procedure. In the Dewey Lectures Rawlsovers ta tes this poin t by sayin g, Apart from the procedure of con s t ruc t in g the pr in-ciples of jus t ice, there are no moralfacts. 6 This is an overs ta tement because thereare clearly moral considerat ions that suppor t Rawls' conception of the person sr a t i o n a l and reasonable, s well s his design of the original position s acon-s t ruc t ive procedure. It could not be that these mora l fac ts are constructed by theor iginal position.7 Indeed, the thought tha t the cons t ruc t ive procedure genera tesmoral ly justified outcomes dem an ds tha t we defend the pr iv i lege tha t th is pa r t icu la rprocedure enjoys. Such a defensewill obviously require normative premises, but i tsp o i n t ispreciselyt o defend the cons t ruc t ive procedure s u n iq u e l y suited for m o r a lor pol i t ica l del ibera t ion . For Rawls , noth ing should count s a j u s t poli t ical prin-ciple un less we could show tha t i t wo uld be chosen in the origin al posi t ion. Theoriginal posi t ion is intended s the sole framework for publ ic del ibera t ion aboutjus t ice. As Rawls la ter puts i t , ra ther tha n sayin g tha t m ora l fac ts a re con s t ruc ted,we shouldsayth a t a cons t ruc t iv is t procedure provides pr inc iplesand precepts thatspecify whi h facts a bout persons , ins t i tu t ion s , and a c t ions , and theworldgenerally,a re re le v a n t i n m ora l de l ib e ra t ion .Those n o r m s specify w h i c h facts are to ount sreasons. 85 Seeespecial lyPL, pp.48-54.6 KC, p.519.7 Rawls ha s m a d e this poin t several t imes since KC. See Themes, pp. 99, 101 102 and PL,

pp.103-104, 109, 121-125.8 Rawls, Themes, p.101.



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388 Larry Krasnof fP u t t i ng these three ideas together, we could say that constructivism is the view

that just i f ied ethical or poli t ical principles are simply those that would be chosenor agreed to by a specified set of person s un der a specified set of con dit ions. Onthis under s tand ing , ithasbeen suggested,con st ruc tiv ism can bedescribed s a kindof hypothet ica l procedural i sm.9 This is the view of constructivism that has beenproposed by Brian Barry, and that Rawls seems recently to have endorsed.10 AsBarry has also noted, this view tends to ident i fy const ruc t iv ismwith contrac tar ian-ism. Non e of theclassical propo nen ts of the doctr ine of the social contract saw thecontract s an y sort o f actual agreement; all unders tood it swhat hum an beingswo uld hav e agreed to if un derstoo d their Situatio n in the right way (i. e. if theythought of themselves in a suitably characterized state of nature). So in this sensethe classical social contract theorists were all hypothetical proceduralists an d henceconstructivists . And Rawls ' theory is constructivist in the sense that it is a versionof social contract theory.One advantage o f this Interpretat ion isthat it can make sense o fRawls'Sugges-tion that there could be var iant forms o f constructivism.11 If constructivism holds

that what isgood or rightiswhat w ould bechosen bycertain person s u n der certaincondi t ions , we can get different versions o f constructivism if we specify di fferentsorts o f persons choosing under dif ferent condi t ions . Barry offers a n u m b e r of fa-milir opt ions: we can specify a set of isolated individuals motivated only by self-interest (Hobbes), a set of identical individuals motivated by self-interest but situ-ated behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls), or perhaps a set of actual individualsmotivated not by self- interest but by reaching an agreement that all can accept(versionsof which have been proposed byHabermas,Scanion and Barry h imsel f) .12The question would then be which of these hypothetical procedures, i f any,cancapture what occurs in moral and poli t ical reasoning.

One disadvantage of this Interpretat ion, however, isthat it fails to specify anyn ew meaning fo r const ruc t iv ism. If constructivism is merely social con tract theory9 See Steven Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, Toward F in de Siede Ethics: SomeTrends, Philosophical eview 101(1992),pp.139-140. The term hypothetical procedur-alism is theirs, but they specifically in t roduce it to descr ibe Barry 's un ders tan dingo fcon-structivism (seethe next footnote) .10 SeeBarry, Theories of Justice pp.264-271, especially p.268: Constructivism in gene-ral, I shall say,the do ctr ine that wh at wou ld be agreed on in so me specified Situatio nconsti tutes just ice. Rawls ' endorsement of Barry's usage comes in PL, pp. 9 0 9 1n.; heclaims that of all the writers who have discussed constructivism, only Barry and T. M.Scanion understand i t in the sense that he (Rawls) does. (Scanion does no t use theterm constructivism; the essay o f Scanlon's to which Rawls refers speaks on l y .o f contractar ianism. I note th e connect ion between contractar ianism and Barry's sense

o f const ruct ivism below). Rawls ' footnote c lear ly implies that Ronald Dworkin's an dDavid Brink's under s tand ings o f cons t ruc t iv i sma re n ot his;this wi l l becom e imp ortan tfor my discussion in sections IIIV.11 SeeRawls ,KC, p.515.12 SeeBarry, Theories of Justice pp. 269271.



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How K a n t i a n isC o n s t r u c t iv i s m ? 389s conceived n o t o n l y b y R a w l s b u t also b y H o b b e s a n d L ocke , wha t if a n y t h i n gisg a i ne d b y i n t r o d u c i n g th i s nevv t e r m ? In what sense d id R a w l s (or at least some ofhis readers ) t h i n k tha t cons t r uc t iv i s mw a s a n e w a n d d is t inc t poss ib i l i t y ine th ica lan d p o l i t i c a l t h e o ry? To unders tand th is we have to turn to a second sense ofco ns t ru c t i v i s m , o ne t h a t is d is t inc t f rom h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c ed u r a l i sm .

A n o t h e r w a y o f ca p t u r i ng t h e d is t inc t iveness o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s mis toe m p h a s iz eth e ide a tha t e th ica l t r u t hs a r e ma de , no t f o un d . Th is though t ca n be t ra ce d ba ckb e y o n d the De we y L e c tu r e sto R o n a l d D w o r k i n ' s i n f l u e n t i a l reviewo f Theory ofJustice that appeared in 1973, an essay that m a y w e l l h a v e p r o m p t e d R a w l s t obegin us ing the te r m con s t r uc t iv i s m. 1 3 But the f e a t u r e o f R a wls ' the o r y tha tD w o r k i n iden t i f ies s con s truct ive is no t , s it is for B a r r y ,t he o r ig in a l p os i tion .Wha t in te r e s t s Dwor k in is R a wls ' me thod o f reflective e q u i l i b r i u m : the idea thatw e move ba ck a n d f o r t h b et w e e n p a r t i c u l a r i n t u i t i o n sa n d genera l p r inc ip les , d is-carding bits and pieces of each u n t i l we have a r r ived a t the mos t coherent theory ,the the o r y tha t be st s hows how our p a r t i cu la r in tu i t ion s ca n be su b su m ed u n d e rgeneral pr inciples . For D w o r k i n , the method of re f lec t ive equ i l ib r ium represents adecisive br e a k wi th t r a d i t iona l mor a l a nd p o l i t i ca l the o r iz ing .D w o r k i n cal ls R a w l s' m ethod a cons truct ive m o d e l of theorizing, and he seeksto dis t inguishit f r om the more t radi t iona l v iew, which hecallsthe natural mode l .O n the n a t u r a l m o d e l, o u r p a r t i cu la r in tu i t ions a bou t just ice a re treated s evidenceof a more genera l mora l t ru th ; the task of the theoris t is to find th is t ru th . O n thecons truct ive mode l , bycon tras t, the role of the theoris t is not to discover the t r u thabo ut jus t ice , bu t to specify the genera l and pub l ic ly a r t icu lable concep t ion of jus -tice that best coheres with o u r p a r t i cu la r in tu i t ions . Dwor k in i l lus t r a te s this con-trast wi th a somewhat pecul ia r analogy.14 T he na tu r a l mode l , he suggests, sees thetheorist like a na tu r a l h i s to r i a n conf r on t ing a pile of old bones; her task is to usethe ev idence of the few ava i lab le bones to recon s truct the ent i re an im al s it t ru lywa s . The constructive theoris t , however , treats the ava i lable bones s if she were asculp tor ; the task is to create the mos t a t t rac t ive animal shape she can. With th isa wkwa r d a na logy Dwor k in p l a ce s g r e a t we igh t on the though t tha t a theory ofjust ice like R a w l s ' is supposed to p l a y a p rac t ica l ra ther than a theore t ica l or ex-13 Justice and Rights, in Taking Rights Seriously (Ha rvard Unive rs i ty Press, 1977),p p . 150205, especia l ly pp . 159168. This essay first appeared in the University of

Chicago aw Review in 1973. Rawls' footno te in PL (pp .9091) notes t h a t D w o r k i nwas the f i r s t to describe Theory of Justice s cons t ruc tive , though Ra w ls addsthat Dworkin's sense o f cons t ruc t iv ism di f fers f rom h is o w n . Just h o w i t di f fers R a w l sdoes not say.14 D w o r k i n , JusticeandRights, p. 160.



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390 Larry Krasnoff tp lana tory role.15 Rather than explain ing why we have the par t icular moral an dpolitical convict ions thatwehave,or why we ought to haveothers,a constructivetheory at tempts to su mm arize our convict ions in a way tha t can b e public ly s tatedandunderstood.16The general theory thus serves sa publ ic f ramework for moraland polit ical just if icat ion: citizens and legislators can appeal to its logic when criti-cizingo rdefending specific policies. Sucha framework thus guides public discussionan d reduces the potent ia l fo r social confl jct .Clearly Dw ork in is th ink ingno t jus t o fRawls' theory o f just ice but also of hisown theory of judicialpractice. On Dw orkin 's view, judges are no t s imply observingw ha t the law saysand then report ing how it applies to the case at hand. Such aview does not, fo r Dworkin, capture what occurs in hard cases where judges areno t o bvio us ly guided by the letter of a Statute of by the intentio ns of its legislators.In such cases Dworkinholds that judges shou ld (and do) Interpret the law by fo r-mulat inggen eral mo ral an d p olit ical principlesthatwouldbest just i fy the part icularprovis ionsof the Statute.17 It does not matter that the Statutedoes not state thegeneral principles; nor does it matter that the principles would lead to part icularresults that were never intended (or even that were explicitly opposed) by the au-thors of the Statute.The judge's role is not to discover the principles but to con-struct themso that the law can appear in apublicly just if iablelight.15 The analogyis awkward becauseit impliesa contrast between truth and art that is sup-posed to be clear but most assuredly is not. Dworkin says that the sculptor 's Job is tocarve the animal that best fits a pile o f bones. Clearly the sculptor is not supposed towo rry abo ut whether the an ima l she creates really existed. But does this mean thatshe isfree from th e constrain t o f t ru th?She isstill required to create an animal . What doesthismean? Does it have to resemblean an imal that does exist?In what way?Could th e workbe criticized becauseno such animalcould really exist? What do weeven mean by couldhere? Presum ably the requiremen t of anim ali ty places some constrain t of correspondenceto reality on the sculpto r. Yet is verydifficult to say what the requiremententails. The best(i.e.m os t aestheticallys atisfying) sculpturemight well succeed by self-consciously refusingor mocking this truth requirement,a t least in a selective way.Even if we somehow managed to resolve these issues in the aestheticcontext,we would

still be left with the question of whether any of this could be applied to the practicalcontext of public just if ication. Dworkin's analogy is supposed to go like this: jus t s th esculptor is concerned not with truth but with art, so the constructivist is concerned notwith t ru th but with creating the best f ramework fo r public just i f icat ion.But what does the best mean here? The simplest?T he most likely to reduce social conflict? Now, orover the long term? The one that can be invoked by the largest set of citizens? Manyanswers are possible here, and it seems difficult to choose amo n g them, and to see howth e analogy with art helps guide this choice.For a different criticism of Dworkin's analogy, see Barry, Theories of Justicepp.275-282.16 SeeDw orkin , Just iceand Rights, , p. 163.17 This view has been defended invarious guises throug hou t all of Dworkin's writings. Re-centlyDw ork in has called his view law sintegrity; see es peciallyLaw s Empire (HarvardUniversi ty Press, 1986), chapters6 and 7. And he has even more recently argued that itimplies a moral reading of theAm erican con st i tu t ion ;s eePreedom s Law (Harvard Un i -versity Press,1995).



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How Kan t i an isCo ns t ruc t iv i sm? 391This view of j udic ia l Interpretat ion again places great weight on the pract ical

role t ha t theory-cons truct ion can play. A s Dworkin emphasizes, j udic ia l behaviorin hard cases is not dictated solely by theoret ical constraints that dictate how Stat-utes are to be unders tood. Hard cases are precisely those in which the statute smeaning has run out . T he j u d g e can proceed only because she takes on the pract icaltask of a t tempt ing to publ ic ly jus t i fy the law. This featu re of Dw orkin s theory hasbeen intensely crit icized: m a n y have argued th at judges in hard cases ought to inter-pret S tatutes extremely n arrow ly, thus d eferring to de mo crat icall y elected legisla-tors.18 For our purposes the key p o i n t is t ha t wha t is at s take in this debate is thepract ical role that ju dg es should play. Aga inst h is critics, D w o rk i n is a rgu ing tha tfo r the law to be understood s authori tat ive, judges must Interpret it s subsuma-ble under a set of publ icly a r t icu lab le m o ra l and poli t ical principles.

If w e had such a set of principles, Dw orkin is suggest ing, we wo uld hav e achieveda Rawls i an reflective e qu i l ib rium between established legal no r ms and our basicmoral jud gme nts . Indeed, Dw orkin s account is m e a n t to explain w hy Rawls couldunderstand reflect ive equi librium s a goal of norm ative theorizing. Once this equi-l ibrium was achieved, D work in t akes Rawls to be saying, w e w ould have everyth ingw eneeded for legal and political purposes: a shared framework for publ ic justifica-tion. A nd beyond these practical purposes, there is nothing more we can ask f romour theorizing. O n this view, i f a theory can perform th e practical task of subsumingour part icular convict ions under a scheine of general principles, no further questionof t ruth need arise.19 Construct ivism in Dw orkin s sense, then, is the thesis thatthe sole task of mora l and political theory is to p rovide a publ ic f ramework forjustification.

W e could put this point in two d i fferent ways. On the one h and , w e could saythat Con struct ivism seeks to perform just this pract ical task, leaving th e theoreticalquestion of truth aside. This seems to be the force of Dw orkin s original analogy.If the sculptor can m a k e an a t t ract ive animal out of the bones, it does not mat terwhether th e bones really belonged to such an an ima l though th e natural historianis perfectly free to investigate this further question. On this view, Constructivism isagnostic in theory, caring only about practice. But, on the p ther hand, if we can soeasily leave theory aside, if we hold that practice is the only relevant test, are wenot committed to the claim that this test is what de termines the t ruth of a mora lor po li t ical theory? If we accept this furthe r claim, we could say that Con struct ivismis the view that the truth of such a theory is determined solely by its abi l i ty toperform the pract ical task. On the first const rua l , the construct ivist is n eu t ra l abou tquestions of realism in ethics; she leaves these questions aside to pursue a practical18 S eemost notor ious ly Robert Bork, The Tetnpting of America The olitical Sedttction ofthe Law (M acmi l l an ,1990). There are, of course , m any ques t ions abo ut how wewou ld go

about interpret ing Statutes narrowly,19 There are, once aga in , many unanswered ques t ions about what i t wou ld mean for a t heoryto perform this pract ical task. Seenote 15 above.



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392 Larry Krasno f f

task . On the second construal, however, the constructivist's ignoring o fthese ques-t ions commits her to a kind of ant i - real i sm.Rawls ' recent wri tings have stressed the first con strual; s pecifically, Raw ls hasargued for a merely political l iberalism that Swings free of all contested meta-ethical an d metaphysicalissues.20 But it iseasy to see why many cri tics havetakenthis claim to imply a metaphysical stance, and hence the second construal. Just shis exclusion of religiousconceptions of the good from the poli tical conception ofjust ice hardly seems neutra l in the struggle between secularism an d religion, soRawls' bracketing ofdebates over moral realism hardly seems neutral toward thew or ry that moral claims lack force and objectivi ty without realist grounding. I t i sfo r this reason that many have come to understand constructivism s a fo rm o fanti-realism (or atleast a rejection o f realism) in mora l and political theory. In fact,both sensesof constructivism have been taken to imply alternatives to anti-realism.Most notably, David Brinkhas defined constructivism in Dworkin 's sense s a kindof anti-realism, while Ronald Milo has defended constructivism s hypotheticalproceduralism sano n-reali s t alternative in meta-ethics. I willbriefly examine each20 See Justice s Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public ffair s 14,pp. 223251; and PL, especially such passages s pp. 11 15 , 9498 .Rawls has not been fully clear about the connections between constructivism s hypo-thetical proceduralism and anti-realism, even where the latter is understood simply s the

bracketingof al lquest ions o f moral t ru th in favor o fDworkin's project o fpractical justifi-cat ion. In KC and Themes in Kant ' s Moral Philosophy Rawls described constructivismin Barry's proceduralist sense; though he stressed th e contras t with rat ional in tui t ionism,he made no reference to quest ions o f moral realism. Justices Fairness declared Rawls 'in ten t ion to leavequest ionso frealism aside,but i t did no t take up thetopico f constructiv-ism. From these texts it made sense to assume that Rawls ian construct iv ism w as s implyBarry's procedural ism, an d that Rawls ' agnosticism about metaphysics an d moral realismw as another matter.In PL, however, at pp. 9497 and 113 114, Rawls does emphasize the connectionsbetween the two views. For the first time, the ignoring (not, allegedly, the rejection) ofrealism is includeds one of the features that d is t inguishes construct iv ism f rom rat ionalin tui t ion ism.B utthis passage ishard to square with th e impor tan t f oo tno te on pp . 9091,in which Rawls conspicuouslyrefuses to endorse Dworkin 's and Brink 's accounts of con-structivism an d declares that only Barry (and Scanion) unders tand construct iv ism s hedoes. But for Barry, Hobbes counts s a constructivist , because he grounds moral laws in(self-interested) individual choice. And s Iwill argue in section IV ,Hobbes' project is notsolely one o fp ubl ic practical jus t i f icat ion,and hisaccoun t m aylook very m u c h like m ora lrealism in the contemporary sense.What can we make of all of this? I would saythat Rawls himself is committed to bothf o rms of cons truct iv ism, to bo th hypothet ical procedural ism an d to the bracketing of m oralrealism in favor o f pu blic theory-co ns truction. But he has generally applied the term con-s t ruct iv ism only to the first view, perhaps because he has not been certain about theconnect ions between the two views. I give my own account of the ways in which theviews are and are not connected in sectionIV . In a sense, this account will explain Rawl s 'uncertainty, for I will argue that whiie there is no necessity conn ection between the twoviews, there is aconnec t ion under a certain unders tandingo f theorizing that Rawls in factaccepts.



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H o v v K a n t i a n i s C o n s t ru c t i v i sm ? 3 9 3o f t h c s c v i e w s n o t to e v a l u a t c t h c c l a i m t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i m p l i c s a m e t a -e t h i c a l v i c w , b u t i n s t c a d t o c o n f i r m t h a t s u ch m c t a - e t h i c a l i n t e r p r c t a t i o n s c o n f o r mt o m y d i s t i n c t i o n b c t w c c n t w o f o r m s o f c o n s t ru c t i v i s m .

Fo r B r i n k , c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i n c t h i c s i s t h c v i e w t h a t m o r a l f a c t s o r t r u t h s arec o n s t i t u t e d b y o u r c v i d c n c c f o r t h c m .2 1 This t c r m i n o l o g y i s v c r y d i f f c r c n t f r o mR a w l s ' o r D w o r k i n ' s , a n d t o u n d c r s t a n d i t w c s h o u l d b c g i n w i t h B r i n k ' s o w n a c -c o u n t o f m o r a l r c a l i s m . L i k c R i c h a r d o y d a n d P e t er R a i l t o n , B r i n k a r g u e s t h a tm o r a l t h e o r i e s c a n b e t r u e i n t h e s a m e w a y t h a t s c i c n t i f i c t h e o r i e s a r e t r u e : t h e ya r e n a t u r a l i s t i ce x p l a n a t i o n s , i n t h i s c a s c o f h u m a n b e h a v i o r .2 2 I n t h e m o r a l c a s e ,w h a t n e e d s t o b e c x p l a i n c d i s o u r h a v i n g c e r ta i n m o r a l be l ie fs a n d p r a c t i c e s , a n dfo r B r i n k t h i s i s e x p l a i n c d b y t h c v i e w t h a t t h c s c b e l i e f s a n d p r a c t i c e s c o n t r i b u t e t ot h e e v o l u t i o n a r y s ucce s s a n d f l o u r i s h i n g o f h u m a n b c in g s . T h is v i e w i s r e a l i s t b e -c a u s e t h c c l a i m s a b o u t e v o l u t i o n a r y su c c ess a n d f l o u r i s h i n g a r e t a k e n t o b e t r u e n om a t t e r w h a t h u m a n b e i n g s h a p p e n t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e m . T h e c l a im sa r e i n d e p e n d e n to f o u r b e li e fs a b o u t t h e m ; w h a t i s best fo r h u m a n b e i n g s i s s i m p l y a n a t u r a l f a c t ,l i k e t h e m o t i o n s o f t h e p l a n e t s o r t h e l a w s o f t h e r m o d y n a m i c s . O u r m o r a l b e l i e f sa r e t h u s o n l y t h e evidence f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g n a t u r a l fa c ts . F o r B r i n k , a m o r a lt h c o r y i s r e a l i s t i f i t h o l d s n o t o n l y (1)t h a t t h e r e a r e m o r a l t r u t h s b u t a l s o (2)t h a tt h e s e t r u t h s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r e v i d e n c e fo r t h e m . B u t s i n c e t h i s e v i d e n c e i sp r e c i s e l y o u r m o r a l b e l i e fs , ( 2 ) i s r e a l l y t h e c l a i m t h a t m o r a l t r u t h s a r e i n d e p e n d e n to f o u r m o r a l b e l i e f s .2 3

A c o n s t r u c t i v i s t , fo r B r i n k , a t t e m p t s t o h o l d (1)w h i l e d e n y i n g (2 ).That i s , c o n -s t r u c t i v i s m i s t h e v i e w t h a t m o r a l c l a i m s a d m i t o f t r u t h , b u t t h a t t h e i r t r u t h i s n o ti n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r m o r a l b e l i e f s . I n s t e a d , t h e i r t r u t h i s c o n s t i tu t e d b y t h o s e be l i e f s :a m o r a l t h e o r y i s a n a t t e m p t to s u m m a r i z e t h o s e b e l i e f s i n a n e s p e c i a l l y c o h e r e n tw a y .This i s o f c o u r s e w h a t D w o r k i n a n d R a w l s a r e t r y i n g t o d o i n o r g a n i z i n g o u rm o r a l c o m m i t m e n t s i n t o a r ec o g n iz ed s ch em e o f p u b l i c j u s t i fi c a t i o n . A g a i n , R a w l sa n d D w o r k i n a r e o f f i c i a l l y c o m m i t t e d o n l y t o s h o w i n g h o w m o r a l c l a i m s m i g h t b ej u s t i f i e d f o r p u b l i c , p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s . T h e s e n s e i n w h i c h t h e y m i g h t b e t r u e i s21 S ee B r i n k ,Moral Kealism and the Foundations of Ethics e s p e c i a l l y p p . 1422, 3 3 3 5 ,13914 3, 303321. The expl ic i t d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i s g i v en o n p p . 1920.B r i n k ' s a c c o u n t c l o se ly f o l lo w s R i c h a r d B o y d , H o w t o B e a M o r a l R e a l i st , i n G c o f f r e yS a y r e - M c C o r d (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism ( C o r n e l l U n i v c r s i ty Press, 1988).22 B r i n k ,Moral Realism and the Foundations ofEthics C h a p t e r 8;B o y d , H o w to e aM o r a lR e a l i s t ; P e te r R a i l t o n , M o r a l R e a l i s m , Philosophical eview 9 5 (1986), p p .163 207.23 O n e m i g h t o b j e c t t h a t t h i s t a l k o f e v i d e n c eu n f a i r l y b i a s e s t h e d e ba t e a b o u t m o r a l r e a l i s mt o w a r d B r i n k ' s siele, by a l r e a d y a s s u m i n g t h c l a n g u a g eo f s c i e n c e . L a t e r i n t h i s se c t io n Id i s c u s s R o n a l d M i l o ' s o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f e v i d c n c e - i n d c p e n d c n c e d o e s n o t s e r v ce v e n B r i n k ' s o w n p u r p o s e s .



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394 Lar ry K r a sno f f

s i m p l y left fo r others t o explain. B u t since Brink does n o t think jus t i f ica t ioncan be so ea s i ly separated f r om truth, an d since he sees that neither Dworkino r R a w l s ha s any interest in assimilatingmoral t o s c ien t i f ic explanation, heconc lude s that constructivism in Rawls' an d Dworkin's sense is a kind o f anti-rea l i sm in ethics.It shouldbe c lear by now that fo rBrink, constructivismi s essentiallya coherencet heory o f truth applied t o ou r moral beliefs.24 Hence there is a sense in whichBrink s definition o f constructivism is m u c h wider than Dworkin's. Fo r Dworkin,thegoal ofcoherence istied to thespecific practical p ro j ec t ofcreating a basis forpub l i c j u s t i f i c a t i on . Bu t one can be a coherence theorist without endorsing thispa r t i cu l a r project. Perhaps a Standard o f public jus t i f i ca t ion is already there, an dthetaskof thetheoristis tounmaskitspretensionto begroundedin an independentm o r a lreality,or toreveal thatourmoral beliefs haveanideological function.Thereis n o guaranteethat w e wi l l have j us t i f i ed o ur moral beliefs when w e understandho w they cohere. Perhaps w e wil l f ind the basis fo r their coherence disturbing an duna t t rac t ive .Brink clearly wants to linkRawls' and Dworkin's constructivism tow h a t is morecommonly called social constructionism : the viewthat moral andpol i t ica l (and perhaps scientific) beliefs a re mere artifacts o f socialization, serving(on the most f ami l i r accounts) the interests of some privilegedclass or group.25This skeptical conclusion, however, is a l ien to Dworkin and Rawls (and certainlytoKants well).It is certainlyn o t required by the rejection o f the claim that moralbel iefs r e fe r t o an independent moral reality. Hence in what followsI willbe leavingi t , andBrink's wider definitiono f constructivism, aside.

While Brink f inds an t i - rea l i sm in the second sense o f constructivism, in Dwor-kin's project o f public justification, Ronald Milo f inds it in the first sense o f con-s t ruc t iv ism, inBarry's hypothetical proceduralism.Though Milo notes that Rawlshasresistedanym e ta - e th ica lclaims,heargues that theDewey Lecturesdosuggestacoherent andattractive meta-ethical view: contractarianconstructivism. 26Moraltruths, Milo suggests,aresimply truthsabout whatnormsandStandards hypothet-icalcontractors would have reason to choose for an ideal socialorder. 27Thusw h e nRawls' hypothetical contractors choose their principles ofjustice, there is nof u r the r question about whether these principlesaretrue: their being chosen iswhatm a k e s or constitutes their truth. Moral truth isconstructed bypersons, not foundinnature.24 This point isnoted byRonald Milo, ContractarianConstructivism, Journal ofPhilosophy 112(4), Ap r i l 1995, p. 193 n.25 Br ink calls Dworkin an d Rawls nonrelativist constructivists;s relativist constructiv-ists Br inkcitesa numbero f (notvery recent) sociologists an d a n thropo log i s t s whose views

bear important resemblances to contemporary social constructionism. Se e Brink,MoralRealism and the Foundation of Ethics p. 20.26 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, Journal of hilosophy 112(4), April 1995,pp.181-204.27 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, p. 186.



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How Ka n t ia n is Construc t iv ism? 395Milo ishesitant to cal l this view ant i-realis t ; instead he sees it s analternative

to both the realismofBrink, Boydan d Railton and the ant i-realism ofnon-cogniti-vis ts who hold that alleged moral facts a re nothing more than reflections of thejudger's af fec t ive /conat ive reactions tononmoral states of affai rs . 2 8 Contractarianconst ruc t iv ism holds that there is a fact of the matter about what thehypotheticalcontractors would choose; their judgmentsare not merely subjective. Indeed, ourcurrent moral judgmentsm a y b e wrong about what the hypothetical contractorsw p u l dchoose; inthis sense moral truthsa reindependentof the evidence providedby ou r current moral beliefs.29 Thus contractarian constructivism counts s realisteven in Brink's sense. Bu t s Milo rightly notes, something seems lost here, sincethe choices of the hypothetical contractors are not natural facts of the sort thatBrink's scientificrealism seeks to identify. Here Milo argues that Brink's defini t ionof realism s evidence-independence seems more confus ing than helpful. Even a crude subjec t iv ism that defines the good in terms of the objects ofindividualdesire might count s realist inthis sense, because what an yindividual desires is an objectively determinable matter, independent of her or our current moral be-liefs.3 0

To capture the sense in which contractarian constructivism and this crude sub-jectivism are not realist, Milo suggeststhenotionofstance dependence. Atruth orfact isstance dependent just incaseitconsists in theinstantiation ofsomepropertythat exists only ifsome thing or state of affairs ismadeth e object of anintentional28 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, p. 190.29 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, p. 190. This claim to objectivity,grounded in theideali tyof the contractors, does raisethequestionof how we are supposed to characterize

thebeliefs, motivationsand choicesof the contractors without compromisingtheobjectiv-it yof the conception. Milo agreesthatthisis the mostpressing objectionto acontractariantheory of anykind: thatno normatively neutral description of thecontractors and theircircumstanceis sufficient tomakeit seemp laus iblethataparticularset ofmoral principleswould be agreed on by them (p.196). Milo responds in the following way: though thecharacterization of the contractorscan neverbe completelynormatively neutral, it can avoidbegginganycontroversi lmoralquestions (p.197).Thatis, s long s one ormoresets of hypothetical contractors can be shown to choose certain central and agreed-uponmoral norms, contractarian constructivism hasdone its J ob ofexplainingthe basis of mo-rality. A meta-ethical theory, Milo suggests, should not try to settle controversial moralissues; rather it should show how core moral notions can be understood s true. If acontractariancan do that without providingherhypothetical contractors with beliefs thatpre judgecontroversial moral issues, then n o more isrequired. Milo freely admits that thismodel assumes rather than proves the truth of the core moral notions. But, he argues,ameta-ethicaltheory's J obis toprovidenot aproof of the truthof theparadigmatic moralpr inc ip les bu t rather a way of explaining what their truth a n d objec t iv i ty might b ethoughtto consist in (pp.201202).

Wh a t ev er one thinks of this reply, m y vvorry here is somewhat different : if there a rem a n ywaysofcharacterizingth e naturea n d choices of theideal contractors, there m a y b ea way of explainingt he choices of the contractors that counts s realist in both Brink'sand Milo's ow n senses. Idiscuss this possibil i ty in section IVbelow.30 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, pp. 190191.



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396 La r ry Krasno f fpsychologica lstate astance), suchs a belief o r aconativeo r affect ive attitude. 31On this de f in i t ion , crude subjectivism is stance dependent because its definition o fg o o dn e s sdepends on thedesires o f individual agents. Contractarian constructivismisalso stance dependent because itsdefinition o f goodness depends on the beliefsan d consequent choices of the hypothetical contractors. B u tBrink'smoral realismis stance independent, because its c la ims about human evolutionary success arei n de p e n de n t o f a n y person's attitude toward thoseclaims.32

If Milo is right s I think he is) that the notion o f stance-dependence can behelpfully substitutedfo rBrink's notion o f evidence-dependence, we can su mma r i z ethe possible conn ec tions between constructivism an d anti-realism in the followingway.Constructivismin the first, hypothetical proceduralist sense suggests anti-real-is m becauseit suggests Milo's claim that moral truths are nothing more than thechosen principlesofhypothetical persons. Constructivismin thesecond, Dworkin-ia n sense suggests anti-realism because it suggests the claim that Brink wants tooppose, that moral truthsarenothing more than certain moral beliefs arranged ina suitably coherent way. Bothof these views about moral truth are clearly stancede p e n de n t and thus, if not anti-realist, at least opposed to realismin either a Pla-tonicor contemporary scientific sense. Again , I take no view here about whetherthese inferences f rom the two forms o fconstructivism to anti-realism are jus t i f ied .M y concern is simply to show that they re inferences; despite their often verydifferent terminology, these meta-e thical understandings o f constructivism do n o tu n d e r m i n e m y claim that constructivism has been understood in two importantways .

At thispoint,however, wemust ask:are the two understandingsofconstructiv-is m really so distinct? So far I have stressed th e differences between them. On eemphasizes a methodological device in normative ethics: the use of hypotheticalprocedures for constructing moralor political principles.The other emphasizesaviewabout ho wnormative theories are just i f ied: by constructing apublicly shared31 Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, p. 192.32 This conclusion mayseem odd, since Brink's favored candidate for a realist moral theoryis utilitarianism. Utilitarianismwould seem to be stance dependent, because it proceedsf rom the desires or preferences of individuals. So how could it be realist? Hasn't Milogotten Brink wrong here?

Herewe must remember that Brink favorswhathe calls objective utilitarianism, whichproceeds fromour rationalized or ideal preferences, and then explains theseintermsof anaturalistic, evolutionary account ofhuman f l ou r i s h ing . What we would (really) prefer iss implywhat would objectively cause human beingsto f lour i sh froman evolutionary stand-point,and thiscan beanalyzedin astance-dependentway.Or so ItakeBrinkto be saying.Ifhe is not saying something likethis,it ishard to see how utilitarianism could be realistat all.



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How K a n t i n n i s C o n s t r u c ti v i sm ? 3 97F r a m e w o r k fo r o u r m o r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s . T h e t w o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s f o c u so n d i f f e r e n t f c a t u r c s o f R a w l s t h e o r y o f j us t i ce . T h e f i rst c o n c e n t r a t e s on th e o r i g i -n a l p o s i t i o n , w h i l e t h e s eco n d Stresses th e m c t h o d o f ref lect ive e q u i l i b r i u m a n d t h edes i r e for a m e r e l y p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t io n o f j us t i ce . B u t i f b o t h t h es e v i e w s h a v e b e e nt a k e n t o i m p l y a n t i - r e a l i s m , w e m u s t c n t e r t a i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e t w o c o n c e p -t i o n s a r e n o t u l l y s e p a r a b l e .

W e c a n s h a r p e n t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y b y s u g g e s t i n g t h a t c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m o r h y p o t h e t i -ca l p r o c e d u r a l i s m m i g h t b e a n e spec i a l ly a t t r a c t i v e m e t h o d for a t h e o r y t h a t t a k e so n D w o r k in s p r a c t i c a l t a s k o f p u b l i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f o u r t h e o r y i s s u ppo s ed tom a k e s ense o f c i t i z e n s c o n v i c t i o n s i n a m a n n e r t h a t t h e y c a n a c c e p t a n d e m p l o y i np u b l i c d iscuss ion , w o u l d i t no t m a k e se n se to r e p r e s e n t th e p r i n c i p l e s f a v o r e d b yth e t h e o r y s chosen by the c i t i z e n s t h e m s e l v e s ? A n d , converse ly , i f we h o l d t h a tj us t i f i ed p r i n c i p l e s a r e j u s t t h ose t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s w o u l d f reely cho o s e , i sn t th eg e n e r a l a n d p u b l ic a c c e p t a n c e o f p r i n c i p le s th e b es t s ig n t h a t t h ey a re j u s t i f i e d? A n di sn t a l l o f t h i s c o n s is te n t w i t h a n a n t i - r e a l i s m t h a t h o ld s t h a t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s h a v en o t r u t h o u t s i d e o f the ch o i ces ( an d th e b e l i e fs t h a t p r o m p t th e cho ices o f i n d i v i d -uals? T h e n o r m a t i v e t he o r y, th e m e t h o d o f j u s t if i c a t i o n a n d t h e c l a i m s a b o u t t r u t hseem to s t a n d o r fal l t o g e t h e r .

In f ac t I t h i n k t h i s a r g u m e n t is m i s t a k e n ; if it succeeds , i t does so on l y u n d e rspecific, co n t i n g en t co n d i t i o n s . I t m i g h t b e that t h e b es t pu b l i c j us t i f i ca t ion o f asocie ty s co nv ic t ions w a s o n e t h a t d es c r i b ed th e c i t i z en s s ch o o s in g t h e i r o w n p r i n -c i p les . B u t i t m i g h t a l so b e t h e case t h a t a s o c ie t y s co n v i c t i o n s w er e b es t s u m m a-r i z ed b y a t h eo r y t h a t h e l d t h a t t h o s e p r i n c i p l es c a m e f rom G o d o r f rom n a t u r e .Such a t h e o r y m i g h t h a v e m o r e c o n n e c t i on t o c i t i zens ac t u a l v i ew s , a n d m i g h ta l so s t r i k e t h o se c i t iz en s s h a v i n g m o r e o b j e c t i v e fo r ce . O n e m i g h t o b j ec t t h a tu n d e r s t a n d i n g th e a p p e a l o f Go d - o r n a t u r e - c e n t e r e d t heor ies in t h i s i n s t r u m e n t a lw a y w o u l d i t s e l f d i m i n i s h t h e i r p l au s i b i l i ty : i f w e ap pea l t o Go d o n l y t o g u a r a n t e ep u b l i c co n s en s u s, can w e r ea l l y b e s a i d to b e l i ev e i n Go d an y m o r e? B u t th i s o b j ec -t i o n p r es u m es t h a t t he c i t izens o f such a society, o r ev en i ts m o r a l theorists, w o u l du n d er s t an d t h e i r t h eo r e t i ca l co n v i c t i o n s i n t h i s i n s t r u m en t a l w ay . Ev en i f D w o r k i nis r i gh t that m o r a l t h eo r y a l w ay s s e r v es to p u b l i c l y s u m m a r i z e t he co n v i c t i o n s o f asociety, that does no t c h a nge t h e f ac t t h a t w i t h i n a par t i cu lar soc ie ty , c i t i zens a n dtheorists m a y u n d e r s t an d t h em s e l v es an d t h e i r t h eo r i z i n g i n v e r y d i f f e r en t m an n e r s .T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n Dworkin s p r ac t i ca l j u s t i f i ca t i o n a n d c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s mcould h o l d o n l y u n d e r co n d i t i o n s o f w i d e pu b l i c i t y , i n w h i c h theoris ts a n d c i t i zensa l i k e c a m e to u n d e r s t an d t h eo r i z i n g i n t h e p r ac t i ca l o r i n s t r u m e n t a l w a y . Pe r h a p sou r society i s one in w h i ch s u ch w i d e pu b l i c i t y o b t a i n s : i n d eed R a w l s a n d D w o r k i nseem to t h i n k that i t is , and h e nc e t hey b u i ld strong pu b l i c i t y r eq u i r em en t s i n t othe i r theor i es . These r eq u i r em en t s a re necessary because b o t h R a w l s a n d D w o r k i nt a k e t hemselves t o b e r e spo n d i n g to a co n d i t i o n o f w i d e sp r e a d m o r a l p l u r a l i s m a n ddisagreement , i n which c i t i zens of a l l k inds , hav ing los t fa i th i n or pub l i c access toa s ing le , ex te rna l ly grou nd ed m oral i ty , need to a f f i rm th e t h e or y - c ons t r uc t i on s



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398 L a r r y K r a s n o f fthe i r o w n . B ut t h i s c o n d i t i o n ( a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g )o f mora l p lu ra l i sm is h a r d l y anecessa ry o n e .Focusing on the publici ty condit ion can also show why the move f rom merelypract ica l jus t i f ica t ion to ant i - rea l i sm is jus t s prob lemat ic . It is cer ta in ly poss ib leto ho ld tha t the search fo r m o r a l t r u t h is very different fro m the process o f publ icj u s t i f i ca t ion , an d even that publicly jus t if ied norms might themselves b e very dif-fe ren t f r om object ive moral t ru ths . Leo Strauss , most notor ious ly , argued that p u b -lic mo ra l i ty r equ i re s r e lig ious o r rnythologica l backing, a backing that phi loso phersor theor is ts kno w to be a sham . Strauss held a c lass ical ly real is t accoun t of hum anna ture , and he argued tha t mo ral t ru ths were ob ject ively der ivable f rom this a c-coun t . But he also argued that s uch t ru ths were ava i lab le on ly to very few, and tha ta very di f ferent method w as required fo r pub l ic ju s t i f ica t ion . N o t surprisingly,Strauss was a vehem ent Opponen to f publ ic i ty requirements . B ut evenRawls' Pub-licity requirement does not extend to the question of m o r a l truth, at least in hisrecen t wr i t ings .Fo r Rawls , publ ic i tyis required only for a polit ical conception o fjustice, a n d different persons a re free to settle the question o f moral t ru th with inthei r var ious comprehens ivedoctrines.33 A comprehensive l iberal , for Rawls, willhold the pub l ic , l iberal concept ion of ju s t ice to be the t ru eone; she m a y well, likeMilo, invokeana n t i-orn o n - rea l is t conception ofmo ra l t ru th to suppor t th is c la im.B ut a t rad i t ion al re l igious bel iever wil l mo re l ikely hold a real is t accoun t of mo ralt ru th , and regard the publ ic , pol i t ical jus t i f ica t ion not s t rue , but s merely apractical ( though mora l ly just i f ied) accommodation to the condi t ions of modernplu ra l i sm. Like Strauss , the Rawls ian re l igious c i t izen wil l sharply separate thecon ten t o fmo ra l t ru th f r om the con ten t o fpub l ic mo ral i ty .This Separat ion o ftruthf r om pub l icjust i f icat ion is no t jus t permitted but even required by Rawls' idea o fover lapping consensus .

Ih ave a rgued tha t th e in fe rencef ro m cons truct ivis tjus t i f ica t ion to con t rac ta r ian -i sm, or to an t i - real ism , seems to require outs ide suppor t in the form of a publ ic i tyrequirement . But the inference in the other direct ion seems even more problematic .Even i f one holds t h a t just i f ied ethical principles a re ones tha t w o u l d be freelychosen , the manner in which th is free choice is made seems open to a s tronglyreal is t In te rpre ta t ion tha t Swings free o f a ny pro jec to fpub l ic ju s t i f ica t ion .Hobbes,fo r ins tance , represented h is laws o f na tu re ( the t rue mora l philosophy ) s j u s tw h a t p r u d e n tin div iduals wo uld choose in h is s ta te o fnature.34 Yet he also thoughtthat what made these choices prudent was that they were conducive to the well-being (or at least to the self-preservat ion) of human beings . Hobbes der ived theseconclus ionsa b o u t well-being from what he took to be a scientific a c c o u n t o f h u m a nnature.35 This account , and the conclus ions about wel l -beingthat supposedly fol-33 SeePL, pp.125-129.34 Hobbes,Leviathan (ed.M.Oakeshott, Collier, 1962),P a r t l, chapter14-15 pp. 103-124.35 SeeHobbes' c h a r t of the sciences in Par tI, chapter 9 of Leviathan pp.70-71 in whichethics isd ef i nedsa b ranc h of physics.



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H ow K a n t i a n is Const ruc t iv ism? 399low from i t , a re mean t to be s t rongly objective: they are supposed to be t r u e n omat ter what people happen to t h i n kofHobbes' ac c o un t . That m a n y rel igiousbe-lievers rejec ted h is accoun t of human na ture d id not and should not have d issuadedHobbes: he thou ght h is conc lus ions ab ou t mo r a l i t ya n d i t s r e la t i o n to h u m a n n a t u r ewere t rue nonetheless . Of course , Hobbes hoped tha t h is accou n t w o u ld be pub l ic lyc o n v in c in g , t h a t i t w o u l d do s o m e t hi n gto p reven t p o l i t i c a l up h ea va la n d civi l war .B u t thecontent and t ru th of h is theory can be separa ted from th is prac t ica l a im.

T u r n i n g to the quest ion of rea l i sm, one might object t h a t Hobbes r id iculed thea n c i e n t n ot ion of an objec t ive h ighestgood, and tha t he expl ic i t ly re la t iv ized thenot ion of the good to the objects o f i n d i v i d u a lchoice.36 These objects of choiceare in t u rn d ep en d en t on the beliefs a n d desires of the i n d i v i d u a l s .All of th is mightseem grounds for reject ing the idea of Hobbes s a moral real ist , s ince the gooddoes depend on in d iv id u a l beliefs. Bu t this is m isleading, since for Hobbes themor good is specifically concerned w i th sel f -preserva t ion , and sel f -preserva t ionc a n be unders tood and measured wi thout reference to anyone's bel iefs . A moralrequi rement i s onethat if fol lowed would lead to the cont inued existence of humanbeings. In this sense Hobbes has st rong aff in i t ies wi th con temporary moral rea l i s t slike B r i n k , wh o un d ers t an d m o ra l i t y s g ro un d ed i n scient i f ic c la ims about theevolu t ionary success and f lour ishing of human beings. I t i s impor tan t here not toident i fy const ruc t iv is t an t i - rea l i sm wi th the modern reject ion of a Pla ton ic objec tof thegood s inconsistent with a sc ient i f ic ontology. Hobbes played a key role inthat reject ion, but he nonetheless understood ethics s grounded in scientif icallyredeemable c la ims. His c o n t rac t a r i an i sm may seem to p o i n t t o ward Milo's an t i -real ism, but his scient i f ic aspirat ions bring him closer to Brink's realism.3736 Hobbes,Leviathan P a r t I,chapter6, pp. 4755.37 This suggests thatMilo's idea l con t rac ta r ian ism may not guaran tee s tance-dependence andhencean a l t e r n a t iv eto rea l ism.As I noted above (note 29), thereare ma n y c o mp et in g w a y s

to charac ter ize the ideal contractors. What makes them idea l ly su i ted to choose?One cananswer th is quest ion in a waythat presumes a realist a c c o u n t : we select these con t rac torsbecause of thei r ins igh t in to human evolu t ionary f lour ish ing . That would reduce Milo'ssupposedly const ruc t ive con t rac ta r ian ism to Brink's o b jec t iv e u t i l i t a r i a n i sm , w h ic h is sup-posed to be real ist or s tance independent (seenote32). Milo h imsel f no tes tha t the idea lobserver versionof u t i l i t a r i a n i smhasclosepara l le lsto his own view ( Contractarian Co n -s t ruc t iv ism , pp . 191 192). But if we equip the ideal observer with the sort of scientif icknowledge tha t Br ink invokes,it ishardto see how the ideal observer theorydoesnot endin real ism. Something l ike this, I th ink , is also t r u e of Hobbes' view, if one Stresses hisscientific asp i ra t ions .

This suggests a more genera l observa t ion about the rela t ion between con temporaryA m e r i c a n mora l rea l ism and the emp i r i c i s t t r a d i t io n of Hobbes a n d Hume. T he l a t t e rt rad i t io n has of ten been unders tood s the ma in example of no n-co gni t i v ism . But nei therHobbes nor H um e s im ply decla red mora l beliefs to b e n o n - r t io n a l a t t i t u d es a n d left i t a tthat. They went on to explain how these beliefs o r a t t i t u d es f u n c t io n ed i n so c ia l life. Whenthese c la im s abou t soc ia l life a re u n d er s to o d s n a t u r a l i s t i c e x pl a n a t i o n s , s is w h o l l yconsis ten t wi thHobbes' a n dHume'sscient i f ic aspirat ions, these supposed n on -c og n i t i v i s t sc o me o u t v e r y c lo se to B r in k 's c o n tem p o r a r y m o r a l r ea l i sm. Is H u m e a m o r a l sen setheorist,or a u t i l i t a r i a n ? Is he a skep t ic , o r a na tura l is t?These d i s t i n c t i on s may no t be so sharp,a n d these quest ions may no t be so helpful .



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400 Lar ry K ras nof f ;l con clude that co ns truct ivism s con tractar ianism and cons truct ivisms the pro-

ject of public justification are two distinct theses, and th at neither is equ ivalen t toanti-realism.The second senseofco nstructivism does no t followfrom th e first, andth e first follows from the second onlyander a strong publicity con dition. Focusingon this publicity condit ion,how ever,will turn out to beessential to unders tandingwhe ther K an t can coun t s a con structivist in either of these contem po rary senses.It is to this topic that I now turn .

vDoes K ant holdtheviewthatmora lo rpolitical principlesarejus t thosethat wouldemerge from a hypothetical procedure? I will begin with Kant's moral philosophy,sinceit is there that K an tfamously offers the categorical imperatives atest for themorali tyof our actions. In an imp or tan t essay, Themes in K ant's M oral Philosophy,Rawls does attempt to Interpret the categorical imperative (hereafter simply the CI)sacon structive pro cedurein thesense outlinedinsectionI.38Closely follow ingthepassageIquoted from th eDew ey Lectures, Ra wls writesthat an essential featureofK ant 's m oral con structivism is that thefirstprinciples o f right and jus tice are seen sspecified by a procedure of construction (theC l-procedure)the fo rm and structure ofwhich mirrors o ur free moral personality s both ra t ional an dreasonable. 39Hereare all the elements of co ns tructivism inRawls 'and Barry's sense: the Su bstan tive con -ception of theperson, th eprocedureo fconstruction,and theclaimthatthe ou tcome

oftheprocedure delimitsthecontent o fmo rality.Still,K ant 's theory fits uneasily with all three of these features of constructivism.It seems misleadingto saythat fo r Kant moral principles would bethosechosen bya specified set of persons. First, the CI does no t produce moral principles; insteadit serves s a negative check on the specific principles or maxims that individualsbring to it. AsBarbara Herm an points out in her reply toRawls' essay, since max-im s can vary widely with the specific situations of persons, there seems no reasonto assume that th e categorical imperative will produce a un i f o rm set of principlesor duties for a society.40 Allthat is required is that all individuals apply th e pro-38 Seenote4 above.39 Rawls, Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy, p. 97.40 Barbara Herm an, Justification and Objectivity: Comments on Rawls and Allison, in

Frster, Kant s Transcendental Deductions,pp. 131 141, especially pp. 138 141.Herman herseif does not take this to be an objection against Rawls' Interpretation ofK a n t s a constructivist. Perhaps this isbecause she understands constructivism in an idio-syncratic way. Herman's book The Practice of Moral Judgment (Harvard University Press,1993) contains few references to constructivism, but it does at one pointdeclare (p. 215and 215 n .)that K ant ian cons t ruct ivism is the claim that form al ra t ional constraints [can]be or consti tute a conception of value Herman's emphasis is on the way that the CIstructures all our deliberations, enabling us to arrive at or construct what she calls a unif ied deliberative field (p .182) in which moral an d prudential concerns come to beintegrated into a complete conception of our individualgood. At p.182n. Herman citesRawls' Themes in Kant ' s Moral Philosophy, emph asizing not the explicit account of



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H ow K a n t i a n is C on s t ruc t i v i sm ? 401cedure in a consc ien t ious way, that they make the r e q u i r e m e n t of un iversa l i zab i l i tya n essen t ia l co ns t r a in t in the i r de l ibera t ion s . Second, the CI does not requ i re anysort o f hypothet ica l choice . Rather than asking what pr inc ip les a se t of personswould choose, Kant asks whether a l l persons could ch oose th e p a r t i cu la r m ax imt h a t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l hopes to fo l low. As Onora O Nei l l ha s em phas ized,w h a t is at issue here is not hypothet ica l agreement , but possible agreement.41 A n d ,finally, s O Neill has a l s o e mp h as ize d , the poss ib le agreement is not t h a t of a setof h y p o th e t i ca l i n d iv id u a l s , b u t th a t o f the ac tu a l i n d i v i d u a l s of this world.42 Thecategor ical im perat ive asks whether we can im agin e the un iversal iza t ion of ourm a x i m in our wo rld. So i t seem s Stran ge to say tha t the Cl-procedure employs ap a r t i c u l a r concept ion of the person. C le a r ly ou r commi tme n t to e mp loy in g th eprocedure requ i res that we are the sort of persons that are w i l li n g andableto applythe CI despite our potent ial ly opposing desires . But there is no need to assume th isconception of ourselves during the applicat ion of the procedure i tself . The CI isnot a procedure in which specif ically described ind ivid ua lschoose in a specif icallydescribed way.

All o f this suggests that the CI S tands a t some d is tance f rom a Rawls ian hypothet-ical procedure. Rather than describing a par t icu lar concept ion of the person, theC I asks us to i m a g i n e a c t u a l i n d i v i d u a l s in the ac tual wor ld . Rather than askingthese indiv idualsto m a k e a hypothetical choice, the CI asks us wh e th e r it w o u l dbe possible for them to act on a c e r t a i n m a x i m . And r a ther than producing a setof shared principles or duties , the CI provides on ly a shared method for evaluat ingi n d i v i dua l max ims . He n ce Kant s m o r a l philosophy does not con f o rm toanyof thethree features of construct iv ism specif ied by Rawls .

This conclus ion sounds harsh , and to a ce r ta in exten t it is u nfa i r . L ike the origi-nal pos i t ion , the CI i s a formal tes t for evaluat ing maxims, and i t i s meant toserve s the un ique source of m o r a l j us t i f i ca t ion . But if this is enough to get us tocon s t ruc t iv ism , then i t i s hard to see that cons t ruc t iv ism descr ibes an yth ing verydis t inct ive in moral theory. Almost any theory that w as concerned w i th jus t i f ica t ion( inc luding u t i l i t a r i an i s m and the v ag u e au ton omy -b as e d th e ory I imag in e d in secti-on I) wou ld meet th is S tandard: i t would expla in how e th ical c la im s could be jus t i -fied, and thus i t wou ld prov ide a form al S tandard for evalu at in g indiv idua l agents

construct ivism but the pr ior discussion (pp.9 0 9 5 ) i n which Rawls a rgues that K a n t ia nagents a r r iveat progressively more complete concept ions of the good.If t h i s i s cons t ruc t iv i sm, i t i s cer t a in ly Kant i an . Herman m a y be overly opt im is t ic a b o u tthe uni ty of the seif and i ts del iberat ive field, but she is cer tainly r ight that fo r Kant theCI is meant to s t ructure al l our del iberat ions. St i l l , Herman s def in i t ion o f con s t ruc t iv i smha s l i t t le contact w i th Rawls expl ic i t d iscussions or w i th the o ther accounts I have beencons ider ing here. The idea of agent s c o n s t r u c t i n g .thei r ow n complete concept ions of the

g oo d m ay b e a p r o m i s i n g on e , b u t i n c u r r en t t e rm s H er m an s u n d er s t an d i n g o f c o n s t r u c t i v -ism r emains id iosyncra t i c .41 O n o r a O Neill, onstructions of Reason ( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989), essays 6an d 11. 42 O Neil l , Constructions of Reason p. 217.



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402 Larry Krasnoff ,i n i n d i v i d u a lcircumstances.If it could not do these things, th etheory could hardlyclaim to understandm o r a l jus t i f ica t ion a tall.A n yStandardo f ju st i f ica t ion is con-structive in that it supplies th e warrant f or individual claims. I t seems unh e l p fu lto use the term constructivism to ident i fy thisfeatureof atheory.43

The CI is not, then, a constructive procedure in the sense that Rawls needs.However, I do thinka case can be made that the CI is a constmcted procedure,i. e. that it isderived from a kind of construction. I f this case can be made out,then Kant 's moral philosophy ca n approach constructivism in the R a w l s B a r r ysense. I have presented this argument in f l l detail elsewhere; here I can provideonly a sketch.44In th e first chapter of the Grundlegung Kant derives the CI from an analysisofthe motive of duty.45He argues that an agent committed to do what is right couldact on one and only one principle or law: act only on maxims that could be univer-salized. Bu t why isthis so?Kant's explicit arguments rest on a rejection ofprinciplesthat are based on particular desires. Actions done out of duty are uncond i t iona l ly lnecessary. They are absolutely required byreason an d thus just i f ied in the fl lestsense.Butdesire-basedprinciples cannot be required in this sense: they are relevantonly f oragents havingtheparticular desires, a n d thus onlycon t ingent ly just i f iable.So th eprinciple ofduty cannot bebased on anyspecific desire. From this negativea r g u m e n tKant concludes that the principle of duty can only be the CI, the Formulaof Universal Law. B u t this inference seems unsupported an d perhaps unjust i f ied:couldn't there be other principles that do not depend on specific desires?46 Howcan weshow that the CI is the uniquelyjust i f ied rational principle?43 Interestingly, however, Rawlsdid use the term constructive in this extremely weak wayin A Theory of Justice.(I am indebted to OnoraO'Neill f or pointing this out.) He under-

stood anormative theory s constructiveif it provided a clearprocedure tosettledisputes.On this view, both just icesfairnessand utilitarianism are constructive, while pluralisticandintuitionist viewsare not, sincethelatterdo not teilus how to settle conflictsbetweenf u n d a m e n t a l values.

My own view isthat any definition of constructivism under which utilitarianism countss constructivist is misleading, and too weak to be of real explanatory use. For in theut i l i t ar ian calculus,the imagined totality ofagents do not construct anything.Theysimplychoose s they normally would, s separate individuals, and we then allow the sum ofthese collective choices to count s the Standardof moral justification.Our justificationisconstructed, but it is not constructed by the totality ofagents.Rather it isconstructed bythe individual moral agent imagining what the totality of agents would choose. But anymoral agent employing any Standardofjustificationis constructing the justification f o rparticular claims. So we are back to the thought that constructivism issimply a view inwhich some positive Standard of justification is advanced. I take the fact that Rawls hasabandoned this usage from A Theory of Justice to beevidence that he would agree withm y claimthat this sense ofconstructivism is too weak to be help fu l .44 What Kind of Law Can This Be?Kant's Derivations of the Categorical Imperative?,u n p u b l i sh ed manuscript.A semphasized inChristine M. Korsgaard, Kant'sAnalysisof Obligation: The Argumentof Foundations l, TheMonist 72 (1989),pp.311 340.46 Thattherearesuch principleshasbeen argued byboth Allen Wood, Kanton the Rational-ity ofMorals, Proceedings of the Ottawa Congress on Kant in theAnglo-American and



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H ow K a n t i a n i s C o n s t r u c t i v i s m ? 403T o i l l t h i s gap i n K a n t s t h i n k i n g I h a v e p r o p o se d t h e fo l lo w i ng a r g u m e n t . S u p -

p o se t h a t w e s eek a p r i n c i p l e t h a t c o u l d c a r r y u n c o n d i t i o n a l n e c e ss it y ,s t h e p r i n -c i p le o f d u t y i s s u p p o s e d to do. S u c h a p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be j u s t i f i ed fo r a l l a g e n t sin a l l c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,i n t h e w a y t h a t o u r d e s i r e - b a s e d p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o t . Supposealso t h a t w e c a n n o t f i n d a n y p r i n c i p l e t h a t w e c a n j u s t i fy in t h i s wa y . Y e t w e s t i l lh o p e fo r s u c h a p r i n c i p l e : w e st i l l believe t h a t t h e r e o u g h t to be a p r i n c i p l e t h a tc a r r i e s t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l n e c e ss it y i m p l i c it i n o u r idea o f d u t y s u n c o n d i t i o n a lm o r a l O b l i g a t i o n . If w e w a n t to express o u r c o m m i t m e n t to t h i s i d e a , w e c a n d oso o n l y b y a c t i n g o n t h o se p r i n c i p l e s t h a t we do h a v e r e a so n to ac t on (ou r des i re-based p r i n c i p l e s) i n a w a y t h a t h o l d s o p e n t h e po ss i b i l i t y t h a t t h e se p r i n c i p l e s m i g htbe j u s t i f ie d t o a l l a g e n t s . I c a n n o t a s su r e su c h j u s t i f ic a t i o n mysel f (I c a n n o t d em a n dt h a t o t h e r s a c t o n m y d e si r e -b a s e d p r i n c i p l e s ) ,bu t I do k n o w t h a t s u c h j u s t i f i c a t i o nis i m p o s s i b l e i f a l l a g e n t s c a n n o t a c t o n m y p r i n c i p l e s . Thus i f I w a n t to expressm y c o m m i tm e n t to the idea o f a f u l l y j u s t i f i ed p r i n c i p l e , I can do so j u s t by a c t i n gonly in w a y s t h a t c a n b e m a d e i n t o u n i v e r s a l l a w .

Th e k e y f e a t u r e o f t h i s r e a d i n g i s t h a t t h e C I is not the sole r a t i o n a l l y j ust i f iedp r i n c i p l e , b u t r a t h e r t h e u n i q u e p r a c t i c a l e xp r e ss i on o f a g e n t s c o m m i t t e d t o t h eidea o f r a t i o n a l l y j us t i f ied p r i n c i p l e s . O n t h i s v i e w, t he C I i s j u s t that p r i n c i p l e t h a ta g e n t s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e i d e a o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l m o r a l O b l i g a t i o n would choose toact on. In th is sense the CI is the p r o d u c t o f a c o n s t r u c t i o n : i t is chosen by a c e r t a i nsort o f person , an d th a t cho ice provides the con ten t fo r m ora l i ty . S t i l l, there i s nop r o c e d u r e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n h e r e t h a t p l a y s a role i n e v e r yd a y m o r a l a r g u m e n t . T h eC I i t se l f p l ays tha t everyday role, a n d b y t h e t i m e t h e C I a p p e a r s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o nh a s a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d . I n s o f a r s o r d i n a r y m o r a l r ea s o n er s s t a n d a r d l y a r e t a u g h tand u n d e r s t a n d how to a p p l y the CI, the c o n s t r u c t i v e a r g u m e n t w i l l be of l i t t lep r a c t i c a l u s e.That a r g u m e n t is for the ph i losophica l ly inc l ined, those who w a n t tou n d e r s t a n d t h e se n se i n wh i c h m o r a l i t y a n d t h e C I a r e r a t i o n a l l yj u s t i f i ed. O r d i n a r ym o r a l a g e n ts a r e n o t t r o u b l e d b y s k e p ti c i sm a b o u t m o r a l i t y, K a n t t h i n k s , a n d t h u sthey d o n o t n e ed c o n s t r u c t i v i s m . S o a l t h o u g h K a n t m i g h t b e r e a d s a k i n d o fc o n s t r u c t i v i s t , h e does n o t offer a n y sort o f h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e d u r e t h a t g u i d e so r d i n a r y m o r a l t h i n k i n g in the sense that Rawls or ig ina l pos i t ion is m ea n t to do.The i r r e l e v a n c e of the c o n s t r u c t i o n to o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g a l so s u g g es ts t h a t K a n t stheory wi l l hav e l i tt l e to do w i t h the second sense of c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , wi t h Dwo r k i n sprac t ica l t ask of p u b l i c j u s t i fi c a t i o n .Bu t b e fo r e t u r n i n g to th is topic, I wi l l conc ludeth is sec t ion by sugges t ing how the a na lys is I ha ve g iven m ight be ex tended to K an t spol i t ical philosophy.

On c e a g a i n , K a n t s p o l i ti c a l p h i l o s o p h y m i g h t seem a c lear example of con-s t r u c t i v i s m i n the R a w l s B a r ry s ense , since K an t explic i t ly inv okes the soc ia l con -t r a c t s a test fo r po l i t i ca l jus t ice . But , in close a n a l o g y w i t h h is m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ,K a n t regards the c o n t r a c t not s a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e d u r e that d e te r m i n e s j u s t i c e ,

Continental Traditions (Universi ty of Ottawa Press, 1976) a n d H e n r y Al l i son, K ant s T he-ory of Freedom ( C a m b r i d g e Un ivers i ty Press, 1990), pp. 205206.



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404 Lar ry Kr as nof fbut radier s a negative check against possible injustice. Rather than saying thatjustice is what all individuals w o uld agree to , Kant again ho lds that no principle isj u s t unless a ll individuals could agree to it.47 And , somewhat no to r ious ly , Kan tdoes not explainhow we should de te rmine wha t canno t be agreed to. His accoun tof the content of the agreement is meageror non-exis ten t compared to Hobbes'o r Locke's. In fact contemporary cons t ruct ivisms l ike Rawls' an d H a b e r m a s ' canbe unders tood s attempts to fill this gap in Kant's political philosophy. Rawls'or iginal posit ion and Habermas' practical discourse are m e a n t to prov ide Kan t i ancitizens with Substan tive guidan ce fo r their thinking about justice. O ur agreeing topolit ical principles is no w defined in terms o f agreement in the hypotheticalcontext.An d since Kant does not specify any hypothetical context to Supplementthe bareideaofpossible agreement ,it seems difficult to describe Kant's political philosophys constructivist inRawls' an d Barry ' s cont ractar ian sense . A t bes t Kan tmight.bea failed constructivist ,one who invoked the social contract but did not spell oufitste rmsin the waythat Rawlsand H a b e r m a s try to do.Elsewhere I have defended Kant 's poli t ical philosophy f rom this implicit chargeof emptinessby suggestingthat when Kant speaksof lawsthat c a n n o t be agreed toby all, he means for us to check o ur pol i t ica l norms o r social policies against arobust ideal o f political citizenship.48 Kant repeatedly Stresses that laws must becapableo fpublicitys o that theymay becriticized by citizens who owe no allegianceto any established authority. Implicit hereis an ideal of political agency: thenotionthat it is possible fo r ordinary cit izens to speak o ut agains t un jus t authori ty in away that will affect that authority.49 This ideal m ay seldom be realized in ourworld, but it must be possible if publicity is to be of value. Hence the possibilityo f political agency provides the content for Kant ' s appeal to the social contract:alaw could not be agreed to by all if it (perhaps together with other policies) deniesa n y o n ethe right or ability to be a political agent, to engage in mean ingfu l publ iccriticism. Therole o f this principle o f publicity is to provide a formal, l iberal Stan-dard o f justice, o n e that can be affirmed by all citizens regardless o f their ends,their conception sof thegood.For allthatisaffirmed in this conception is a certainideal of cit izenship, of poli t ical participation.

Whether such a fo rma l l iberalism can serve s a Stan dard of justice is no t m yconcern here. For now what matters is the way in which this Kant ian principle o fpublicity, like the CI, can be seen s a constructed (rather than a constructive)procedure. That is, we can saythat the principleof publicityis an a n s w e r to the47 K a n t , On the O ld Sa ying : That Ma y Be True in Theory , Bu t It Will Never Wo rk in

Practice, 304. This an d all subseq uent references to K an trefer to the edition of the Prus-sianAcademy.48 Formal Liberalism and the Justice of Publicity, Proceedings of the Eighth InternationalKant Congress March 1995, pp.61-69.49 This not ion o f Kant ian polit ical agency is developed in What Is Enlightenm ent? and inthe second section o f The Conflict of Paculties.See my The Fact o f Politics: History andTeleology in Kant , European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1994), pp.22-40.



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H ow K a n t i a n isC o n s t ru c t i v i s m ? 405q ue s t io n : w h a t p r i nc i p l e could a s e t of i nd i v i d u a l s w i t h p o t en t i a l ly different endschoose s a S t a n d a r d of p u b l i crule?Since these i n div idu als could n o t a p p ea l to thev a l u e of their ends, they could only choose a pr inc ip le tha t invoked thei r e q ua lS t a n d i n g to par t i c ipa te in pol i t i ca l life.5 0 A s w i t h K a n t ' s m o r a l philosophy, th isc o ns t r u c t i o n is not m e a n t to be c o n t i nu a l l y r epea t ed in ordin ary pol i ti ca l d i scourse.U n l i k e R a w l s ' o r i g i na l p o s i t i o n or H a b er ma s ' i d ea of a prac t i ca l d i scourse, thepr inc ip le of publ ic i ty i s no t a hyp othe t ica l choice Si tu a t io n in whic h ord in ary c i ti -zens wi l l place or im ag ine them selves . The S ubs ta nt iv e wo rk of Kan t 's pol i ti ca lph i losophy isdone not by the cons t ruc t ive p rocedure of the soc ia l cont rac t , but bythe con s t ruc ted ideas of publ ic i ty and possib le pol i t i ca l agency. It is to these la tterideas tha t ord inary c i t i zens ough t to appeal .

To s u m m a r i z e : K a n t is not a hypothet ica l p rocedura l i s t in the sense that Rawlsa n d Bar ry emphas ize. Nonetheless Kant does hold that m o r a l a n d pol i t ical pr in-ciples a re cons t ruc ted. Rather than spec i fy inga hypothet ica l set of persons, K an t 'sc o ns t r u c t i o ns S t a r t from the bare idea of u n i v e r s a l i t y ,o f a g r e e m e n t by all( a c t u a l )persons . Genera t ing p r inc ip les tha t would be agreed to by a l l may be too grea t atask, given ou r widely d ispara te ends . But we c an say t h a t a person w h o w a s c o m -m i t te d to expressing her c o m m i t m e n t to the idea of such pr inc iples in her ac t ionswould obey the CI. A nd we ca n s a y t h a t a person w ho held that her g o v e r n m e n tshould be c o m m i t t e d to the idea of such pr inc iples would employ the pr inc iple ofpubl ic i ty s a S t a nd a r d of pol i t ical c r i t ic ism.Here it is c r u c i a l to r ememb er K a n t ' semp h a s i s on poss ib le r a ther than hypothet ica l agreement . Once aga in , a cons t ruc-t ivis t in the strict R a w l s B a r r y sense holds that m o r a l a n d pol i t ical pr inc iples a rethosethat ahypothet ica l set ofpersons w ould accep t. K an t , bycontrast holds thatan y set of persons commi t ted to the idea of pr inc iples that a ll wo uld accept w ou ld(a nd do) employ possible agreement s thei r mora l a n d pol i t ical pr inc iples. Ratherthan spec i fy ing a cons t ruc t ive p rocedure fo r everyday use, Kant suppl ies a n a r gu -m e n t that seeks to cons t ruc t the principles we already use in m o r a l and pol i t icallife.5 150 This comes close to H a b e r m a s ' view, and indeed it is closer to Habermas than i t is to

Rawls. Bu tthere a re i m p o r t a n t differences betweenH a b e r m a s ' viewa n d m i n e .Form e, theideal of polit ical cit izenship means the abi l i tyto publicly cr i t ic ize exist ing au thor i ty .ForHabermas, this ideal impliesn ot j u s t the abi l i ty top a r t i c ip a tebu t a lso ac tua l par t ic ipa t ionin publ ic discuss ion a i m ed a t reaching agreement . His conception of political speech isdialogicalwhi lem i n eisim p era t iva l .How to choose betweent he m ?Ifavor m yviewbecausei t arisesfrom ou r actu a l pol i tica l Si tua t ion:we are a l ready governedby remotean d poten-t ially indifferent author i t ies , and for their rule to be justified w e m u s t be able to public lycriticize th em. H a b e r m a s ' view, by contrast, requir es us to i m a g i ne ou rselves (and then tocreate) an idealized context of discuss ion a imed a t consensus .He thus needs to m o t i v a t ethis context (why m ustw e publicly discuss?) and to show tha t it isn e i ther imposs iblyidealn or over ly dependent on our existingabili t ies and powers. Most of the fami l ir cri t ic ismsof H a b e r m a s focus on the difficulty of establishing all of this . For my own cri t ic isms, seem y Forma l Liberalism and the Jus t iceofPublici ty, especiallypp .63-65.51 This account comes closest to that of Onora O'Neill ; see her onstructions of Reasonespecially essays l, 2 and 11. But al though O'Neill uses the termc o ns t r u c ti v i sm , sheneverdefines i t in any explicit way.She also does n ot spell o u t , s I have t r ied to do, the way in



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406 Larry KrasnoffV

l suggested above that K ant s methods do not con form to D workin s constructivemodel of moral and political theorizing s publ ic justification. For Dworkin , s wesw, the task of a theory is to summarize the particular convictions of a society ina way tha t provides a com m on and easily accessible Stand ard of justificatio n. ForKant , by contrast, such a S tandard is a lready available to ordinary moral reasoners,w ho are already committed to the idea of duty and to its implicit principle, the CI.Clearly this does not mean that an o rdin ary person speaks of maxims, imperatives,au tonomy and all the rest of Kan t s technical terms. Wh at K an t mean s is that sucha person is already committed to the practice that these technical terms describe.Of course, Dworkin could say the same thing abouthis own theory, since he takeshimself merely to be sum m arizing the actua l convictions o f o rdinary ci t izens (orperhaps just ordinary lawyers and judges). B ut Dwo rkin s sum ma ry is mean t tooffer a new Standard o f justification, one tha t is u n k n o w n and thus un avai lableprior to the S tatem en t of the theory. Kan t refuses any such claim. A fter deriving theC I in the first chapter of the Grundlegung, Kan t writes:, The ordinary reason ofmankind also agrees with this completely in its practical judgment and always hasthe aforesaid principle before it s eyes. 52 This reference to j udgm ent shows tha tthe C I is me ant to su m ma rize no t ju st what o rdin ary mo ral reasoners believe, buthow they already justify what they believe. Fo r Kant ordinary moral reason alreadyhas all the theory it needs.53

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krasnoff - kant and constructivism

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