kazakhstan - centre for law and democracy2010/07/11 · +1 902 431-3688 kazakhstan: draft law on...

Kazakhstan

Comments on the Draft Law of Kazakhstan on Information Access

August 2011

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Kazakhstan: Draft Law on Information Access

The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy

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Introduction TheseCommentscontainananalysisbytheCentreforLawandDemocracy(CLD)ofthe Draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Information Access (draft Law).1Work on the draft Law began in 2010, when members of the Mazhilis of theParliament of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan’s legislature) set up a working group todevelop a law to enable public access to information. An initial version, based onsimilarlegislationfromRussiaandKyrgyzstan,wassubsequentlyamendedtotakeintoaccountfeedback.Atthemoment,workonthedraftLawhasbeensuspendedpendingagovernment reviewcurrently scheduled for2012.This interval isbeingused to work on improving the draft Law, as well as to coordinate how thelegislativeframeworkwillimpactotherlegislation. Anyeffort topromotegreater transparency isapositivestep,andCLDverymuchwelcomestheinitiativebythegovernmentoftheRepublicofKazakhstantoadoptarighttoinformationlaw.TherehavebeeneffortsinthisdirectionformanyyearsinKazakhstan,andwehopethatthisonewillfinallyresultintheadoptionofastrongrighttoinformationlaw.ThedraftLawhasmanypositiveaspects, includingextremelyambitiousproactivepublication requirements that, if implemented, would place a duty on publicauthorities to ensure that large amounts of information aremadepublic. The lawalsoincludeswell‐writtenandeffectiverequestingprocedures,anddeservescreditforitsbroadapplicability.At thesametime, therearesomemajorweaknesseswiththedraftLawthatcouldlargelyunderminetherighttoinformation.Themostseriousproblemisthelackofanycentralisedagencywithresponsibilityforoverseeingimplementationofthelawandhearing complaints regarding claims of public authorities failing to live up totheir disclosure obligations.Without ameaningful system of oversight, there is arisk that strong aspects of the law will not deliver the openness they otherwisemight.ThedraftLaw’sproposedsolutiontothis,namelytoallowindividualuserstosueincourt fordamagesfordenialsofaccessto information, isnotareplacementforapropersystemofadministrativeoversight.The regime of exceptions in the draft Law is also problematical inasmuch as it isveryoverbroadandallowssecrecyprovisionsinotherlaws,andevenclassificationof information, tooverride the rightof access.ThedraftLawalso fails to createaclearpresumptioninfavourofaccesstoallinformationheldbypublicauthorities.

1 These Comments are based on an unofficial translation of the draft Law into English. CLD regrets any errors based on translation.



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TheseCommentsbyCLDhighlightthewaysinwhichthedraftLawfailstoconformtointernationalstandardsandbetterinternationalpractice.WehopethatitwillbeusefulforthegovernmentofKazakhstanandotherlocalstakeholdersinamendingthedraftLawtobringitmorecloselyintolinewithinternationalstandards.Inthisway, the adoption of this legislation could help promote real and substantialaccountabilityamongpublicauthorities.

1. Right of Access An important indicatorofa strong right to information law is theway inwhich itdefines the right to access information. Access to all information held by publicbodies, subject only to a limited regime of exceptions, is a right, and a right toinformationlawshouldrecognisethatitisfacilitatingthisrightratherthanmerelygrantingaprivilege.Article 1(1)(1) of thedraft Lawdefines the right to information as “the right of auser of information to receive and distribute information freely.” This idea isrestatedinArticle5(1),whichstates:“Thestateguaranteestoeveryonetherighttoobtainanddistributefreelyinformationbyanymeansnotprohibitedbylaw.”Thesearepositive statements,but they fail tomake it clear that everyonehasa right toaccess all information held by public authorities, subject only to legitimatelyexemptedinformation.Article4 enumerates anumberofprincipleswhichunderlieKazakhstan’s right toinformation law, including transparency,publicity, thereliabilityand timelinessofaccess, and ensuring responsibility for any breaches of the right to information.ThesearesupplementedbythestatementinArticle6(1)oftherightsofinformationusers. Once again, these are positive statements. At the same time, they could beimproved by calling for a broad interpretation of the right to information.Furthermore,Article6(2)setsoutvariousobligationsofinformationusers,suchasto respect the rights of others and to “follow duties in the sphere of informationaccess: according to other laws.” This is unnecessary, inasmuch as these laws arealreadylegallybinding,anditmightexertachillingeffectonthemakingofrequestsforinformation.

Recommendations:

The law should create a presumption that all information held by publicauthoritiesshouldbesubjecttodisclosure,unlessitfallswithinthescopeofanarrowregimeofexceptions,assetoutinthelaw.

Thelawshouldincludeastatementcallingforabroadinterpretationoftherighttoinformation.

Article6(2)shouldbedeleted.



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2. Scope In order to be effective as a tool of government accountability, the right toinformation should apply broadly to all public authorities. This should include allbranches of central, regional and local government, as well as the judiciary, thelegislature, state‐owned enterprises, and any other constitutional or statutorybodies.Privatecompaniesshouldalsobesubject to informationdisclosurerules iftheyperformapublicfunctionorarearecipientofpublicfunds,totheextentofthefunctionorfunding.TheLawissomewhatambiguousindefiningwhichorgansofgovernmentareorarenotsubjecttoitsprovisions.Article7(1)(1)includes“statebodiesandinstitutionsoflocal governing”. Read broadly, this could include the entire executive, legislativeand judicial branches in addition to local and regional governments, but it ispossible that this will be understood more narrowly, for instance to exclude thelegislative and judicial branches of government. Article 7(1)(2) refers to “quasi‐public”bodies.Itisunclearwhatthisconstitutesand,inparticular,whetherornotthiscoversstate‐ownedenterprisesandotherconstitutionalorstatutorybodies.ItmayalsobenotedthatthedraftLawgoesfurtherthanmanyrighttoinformationlaws inasmuch as it also applies to market players that hold a dominant ormonopolistic position, as well as bodies that hold ecological information orinformation on “extraordinary situations”, such as disasters (Articles 7(1)(4) and(2)).Better internationalpracticealsomandates that a right to information lawshouldapplytoallformsofstoredinformation.Article1(1)(2)definesinformationasanyphysicalorelectronicdocumentarymaterialcreatedorheldbyanapplicablebody.Although this definition appears to be sufficiently broad, the wording of Article26(2)–whichallowsofficials to refuse todisclosestaff reports,memosandothertypesofinformation“thatdonotbelongtodocumentaryinformation”–istroublingsince it implies that “documentary information” excludes certain categories ofdocuments or information. If so, this is not in line with international standards.Whole categories of information cannot justifiably be excluded from the ambit ofright to information legislation; they should be covered subject to the regime ofexceptions.Article1(1)(2)isalsoproblematicalinasmuchasitdefinesinformationasmaterial which the laws of Kazakhstan do not restrict access. Such limitationsshouldbedealtwiththroughtheregimeofexceptionsratherthanatthedefinitionalstage of the law, as this will result in more appropriately limited withholding ofinformation.



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Arighttoinformationlawshouldapplytoeveryone,includingforeignnationalsandlegal persons, rather than just citizens. The draft Law establishes this throughArticle1(1)(4).

Recommendations:

The ambiguities in Article 7 should be resolved by specifically listing allorgansandbranchesofgovernment,state‐ownedenterprises,statutoryandconstitutional bodies, and private bodies that perform a public function assubjectsofthelaw.

Article26(2)shouldbedeleted. Thedefinitionof“Information”underArticle1(1)(2)shouldbeamendedto

make it clear that it coversall recorded formsof information, regardlessoftheforminwhichtheyarerecorded.

The words “access to which is not restricted by laws of the Republic ofKazakhstan”shouldbedeletedfromArticle1(1)(2).

3. Proactive Publication ThedraftLawcontainsfairlyextensiveproactivepublicationrequirements.Article13 requires all public authorities to publish certain information online, includingdescriptions of their structure, physical contact info, organisational purpose andhistory, and details of laws, regulations and procedural rules which govern theirconduct. Article 13 also requires them to publish descriptions of whateverinformation and access services they provide, alongwith copies of statistical andanalyticalreportsrelatingtotheiractivities.Thereisalsoarequirementtopublishdetails of any tenders or bids the organisation has offered or received, includingrecruitmentprocedures.Article13requiresallof this informationtobepublishedonlineinbothRussianandKazakhandtobeupdatedregularly.There is a danger that if information is only published online, itmight not reachsegmentsof thepopulationwhichdonothave Internetaccess.However, thedraftLawaddressesthisproblembyrequiringallpublicbodiestosetupcentreswheremembersof thepublic canaccesspublished information freeof charge.Article14further provides that various State bodies are free to expand the range ofinformationthatistobeproactivelypublished.This is a broad approach to proactive publication, and one of the more positiveaspects of the draft Law. However, by the same token, these obligations willpresumablybequiteonerous formanypublicauthorities inKazakhstan.To try tolimit the pressure on these authorities, consideration should be given to buildingintothelawasystemwhichallowsthemtoreachthefullproactivepublicationgoalsoveraperiodoftime,suchasfiveyears.



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Articles19‐22requiresomemeetingsofpublicauthoritiestobeopentothepublic,andsetsoutproceduresformembersofthepublicwhowishtoattend.Thistypeofprovision is not normally foundwithin informationdisclosure legislation, but is awelcomeprovision.

Recommendation:

ConsiderationshouldbegiventobuildingintothedraftLawasystemsothatpublic authorities are given a period of time to meet their full proactivepublicationrequirements.

4. Requesting Procedures Toensureproperandefficientimplementation,internationalstandardsrequirethatright to information legislation include comprehensive rules that structure andstreamline the requesting process. First and foremost, this means that the lawshould establish clear and simple procedures relating to how requests are to befiled.ThedraftLawaddressesthisinseveraldifferentprovisions.Article23requiresthatrequests be directed to an individual who is competent to disclose the relevantinformation,andthatrequestsmustincludethenameoftherequesteraswellasameansofcontactingthem.Article6(1)(8)explicitlyprotectsrequestersfromhavingto state the reason underlying their request. Both of these provisions meetinternational best practices, though the requirement to submit requests to adesignated officer necessitates the effective implementation ofArticle 9(2),whichrequiresthatsuchofficersbeappointed,andArticle13(1)(3),whichrequirespublicauthorities to adequately publicise information regarding their structure. Article1(1)(7),whichallowsrequeststobefiledinwriting,orally,electronicallyorthroughanyothermethodofcommunicationisalsoadmirablyflexible.However, there is a danger that these effective procedural safeguards could beundermined by Article 3(2), which allows alternate procedures to be followed ifsuch different procedures are foreseen by the laws of Kazakhstan. This touchesupon a recurring problem in the draft Law, which is its failure to trump otherlegislationdealingwithsecrecyandinformationdisclosure.Therighttoinformationlaw should establish minimum standards regarding access to information, whichshouldnotbepermittedtobeloweredthroughotherlaws.Anotherimportantproceduralruleconcernstheresponsibilitiesofstaffwhoreceiveinformationrequests.Theseofficersshouldbeunderadutytoassistrequestersto



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formulaterequests,includingbycontactingthemincasetheirrequestsarefoundtobeundulyvague,broadorconfusing.Theonlymentionofanythingalongtheselinesin the draft Law is in Article 24(5), which grants public authorities the right tocontact requesters in order to clarify requests. This is problematic because itstructures the clarification process as a right of the information holder when itshould properly be understood as a right of the requester and a duty upon theinformation holder. The legislation should also emphasise the duty to provideassistance in cases where the requester is disabled, illiterate or otherwise hasspecialneeds.Otherwise, thedraftLawsetsoutclearandeffectiverules forhowofficialsshouldrespond to information requests, including the need to provide an immediatewritten receipt (Article 23(3)), the requirement to comply with requesterspreferences regarding the form in which access to information is to be provided(Article25(1))andtheneedtotransferrequestspromptlytoanappropriateagencyin the event that the initial recipient is not in possession of the requestedinformation(Article24(4)).Oneparticularly striking aspect of thedraft Law is thequick turnaround time forprocessingrequests.Article24(2)requiresauthoritiestorespondtorequestswithinfiveworkingdays,whichmaybeextendedoncebyamaximumoffivemoreworkingdaysuponnotificationbeingprovidedto therequester.This isanextremelyshortmaximumtimeforprocessingrequests.Whiletheintentionbehindthisislaudable,aresponseperiodoffiveworkingdaysrunstheriskofbeingimpracticallyshortandcouldleadtoasituationwherepublicauthorities,outofnecessity,regularlybreachthetimelimitestablishedbythelaw.Considerationshouldbegiventowhetherornot this timeframe is workable. However, it should be clear that the timeframestated in the law is a maximum and that public authorities should responds torequestsassoonaspossible.Inlinewithinternationalbestpractices,Article24(4)allows foranexpeditedprocessing time for48hourswherean individual’s lifeorsafetydependsontheinformation.AnotherpositiveaspectofthedraftlawisArticle27,whichcontainsclearrulesonfees,includingtherulethatitisfreetofilerequests,andthatstateinstitutionsmustprovide information free of charge. For private or “quasi‐public” institutions, thefirst 50 pages must be provided free and the remainder can be charged to therequester at cost. These standards are progressive and in line with internationalbestpractices.ThedraftLawrequirespublicauthoritiestoprovidereasonswhenrefusingrequests(Article25(5)).Betterpractice isalsotorequirethemtonotifyrequestersof theiroptionsforlaunchinganappealagainsttherefusal.



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Recommendations:

Article3(2)shouldbedeleted. Article24(5)shouldberephrasedsothatitclearthatpublicauthoritieshave

a duty to assist requesters, rather than a right to do so. Specific mentionshouldbemadehereofthedutytoassistrequesterswithspecialneeds.

Considerationshouldbegiventoprovidingforlongermaximumtimeframesforrespondingtoinformationrequests,forexampleoftendays.Itshouldbemadeclearthatthisisamaximumandthatrequestsshouldbeprocessedassoonaspossible.

Consideration should be given to requiring public authorities to notifyrequestersoftheirrighttoappealwhenarequestisrefused.

5. Exceptions and Refusals OneofthemainweaknessesofthedraftLawisthatitestablishesanundulybroadregime of exceptions to the right to access information. International standardsrequirethatallexceptionsbenarrow,basedonlegitimateinterestsandharmtested.AlmostnoneoftheexceptionsinthedraftLawmeettheseinternationalstandards.Article 5(3) sets out the rules for exceptions. It is not clear whether these areintendedtobecumulative,sothatallfouroftheconditionsmustapplybeforeaccessto informationmaybe limited, or individual, so that accessmaybe refusedwhenonlyoneoftheseconditionsapply.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,weassumethattherules are cumulative. We note, however, that if they are not, then the regime ofexceptionsisextremelyproblematical.Article5(3)statesthataccessmayberefusedbasedonotherlaws(seealsoArticle1(1)(2)). Article 5(3)(1) sets out the grounds uponwhich accessmay be refused,which are “to protect constitutional structure, public order, human rights andfreedoms, public health andmorals, as well as to avert disclosure of informationwithlimitedaccess”.Article5(3)(2)appearstobeaformofharmtest,statingthataccesstoinformationmayberefused“toexcludeconditionsforseriousdamagesofinterests protected by laws”. Article 5(3)(3) appears to set out a public interestoverride,allowingforaccesstoberefusedonlywherethedamagetotheprotectedinterest fromdisclosure isgreaterthanthebenefits intermsof thepublic interest(presumablyofdisclosure).Finally,Article5(3)(4)requiresrestrictionstobe“validandreasoned”.Themainproblemwiththisapproachisthatratherthandefiningtheexceptionsinacomprehensivemanner in the right to information law, it relies on other laws todefinetheexceptions.Asweunderstandthisapproach, therules inArticle5(3)of



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thedraftLawrepresentanattempt toplaceconditionson theexceptions in theseotherlaws.Thisapproachislaudable,butthereareanumberofproblemswithit.First,secrecyrulesinotherlawscanbeexpectedtobevastlyoverbroad.Thisisbecausemanyofthese laws will have been passed some time ago and they are not based on thepresumption of openness found in the draft Law. While the conditions found inArticle 5(3) of the draft Lawwill help tomoderate some of these problems, it isunlikelytheywillbeabletoaddressallofthem.Second,wearenotsurethatthisapproachislegallyeffective.Itisnormalforrightto information laws to override other laws, to the extent of any inconsistency(indeed, this is common in other laws too). But attempting to retrofit generalamendments to other laws as appears to be the aim of Article 5(3) is ratherdifferent. This would not work effectively in many legal systems, although wecannotsayspecificallywhetheritmightworkinKazakhstan.Ataminimum,itwillcreateanenormousburdenof interpretationonthoseseekingtoapplythelaw,astheywouldneed to attempt to apply theArticle 5(3) conditions to rules found inotherlaws.Instead,werecommend that thedraftLaw includeaproper regimeofexceptions,whereby it defines all of the interests to be protected, alongwith the harm to beavoided. This is the approach taken in the vastmajority of the approximately 90nationalright to information laws found incountriesaroundtheworld,and ithasproventobeaneffectiveandworkableapproach.TherearealsosomeproblemswiththerulessetoutinArticle5(3).Itisnotvalidtorefuse to disclose information in order to protect the constitutional structure,human rights and freedoms, and public morals (see Article 5(3)(1)). There is animportantdifferencebetweenthereasonswhichmaylegitimatelyformthebasisforarestrictiononfreedomofexpression,andthosewhichmaylegitimatelyserveasalimitationon theright to information.An importantconsiderationhere is that therighttoinformationrelatestoinformationheldbypublicbodies.Whileincitementto revolt against the constitutional ordermay legitimately be banned, there is noanalogousriskrelatingtoinformationheldbypublicauthorities.Inotherwords,itis simply not possible that disclosing information held by public authorities willpose a risk to the constitutional order (or at least this should not be the case ifpublicauthoritiesaredoingtheirjobsproperly).Thesameappliestohumanrightsandpublicmorals.Better practice is also to include a sunset clause in the regime of exceptions,whereby exempt information must be released after a particular period of time(usually15or20years),althoughofcourseitshouldalwaysbereleasedearlierifanexceptionceasestoapply.



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Article 26(1)(6) allows public authorities to refuse requests which involve“conductingotheranalyticalwork”.Itisnotclearwhatthisrefersto.Itislegitimatetorefuserequestsforinformationwhichapublicauthoritywouldhavetocreate(i.e.for information which it does not yet hold). But automated extraction ofinformation, for example from a database, should be done where necessary toanswerarequest.

Recommendations:

Serious consideration should be given to fundamentally revising thewholeapproach of the draft Law to the regime of exceptions, specifically byincluding a fully‐developed regime of exceptions, which would overridesecrecy laws to the extent of any inconsistency, rather trying to modifyexistingsecrecylaws.

The grounds for refusing requests based on protecting the constitutionalstructure,humanrightsandfreedomsandpublicmoralsshouldberemovedfromArticle5(3)(1).

Article26(1)(6)shouldberevisedtomakeitclearthatitonlyappliestotheidea of creating new information, and not to extracting information fromdatabases.

A “sunset clause” should be added to the law, so that exempt informationmustbereleasedafter15or20years.

6. Appeals ThedraftLawonlyprovides for limitedappealoptions.Pursuant toArticle29(1),requestersmayappealagainstactionsorinactionofpublicauthoritieswhichharmtheirrighttoinformationtosuperiorofficersand/orthecourts.It isgoodpracticeto provide for an internal appeal as amechanism of first recourse. This can helpresolveappealsinternally,withaminimumoffuss.However,itwouldbepreferableto set out clear procedures in the law to guide this process, including stricttimelines.It isalsouseful forappealstogo,ultimately,tothecourts.However,courtappealsarebytheirnaturedifficult,timeconsumingandexpensive.Asaresult,theyshouldbeconsideredanavenueoflastresorttocompelinformationdisclosure.Experiencein other countries has clearly demonstrated that effective implementation of theright to information requires a right of appeal to a specialised independentadministrativebody.Tobeabletodischargeitsoversightroleeffectively,thisbodyneeds to be independent and have the power to issue binding decisions. The



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operations of this body should be guided by clear procedural rules, and appealsshouldbefreeandshouldnotrequirealawyer.

Recommendations:

ClearproceduresforinternalappealsunderArticle29(1)shouldbeincludedinthelaw.

An independent administrative body should be created or designatedwiththe power to hear appeals of claims that public authorities have notdischargedtheirrighttoinformationobligations.

7. Sanctions and Protections Effectiveimplementationofrighttoinformationlegislationrequirestheavailabilityofsanctionsforofficialswhoactinwaysthatunderminetheright.Thesesanctionsmaybeadministrativeorcriminalorbothinnature.Thisabilitytoimposeremedialmeasures on public authorities that regularly fail to live up to their disclosureobligations is also a very useful implementation tool. Ideally, the independentadministrative body that hears appeals should have the power to imposeadministrative sanctions on individual officials and remedial measures on publicauthorities.Article31ofthedraftLawprovidesverygenerallythatviolationofthelawentailsresponsibility.Itisnotclearwhatthisreallymeansintermsofimposingsanctionsonofficials.Abetterapproachwouldbetoincludeaspecificanddedicatedregimeofsanctionsinthetextoftherighttoinformationlaw,inlinewithmostsuchnationallawsaroundtheworld.Article29(2)of thedraftLawenablesrequesters toobtaindamages for the illegalrefusal of information. This is an interesting approach. However, its effectivenessmaybeunderminedbythefactthatinmostcasesofinformationrefusal,theharmisdifficult to quantify. Indeed, in most cases the harm of refusal is not to any oneindividualbuttosocietyasawhole,sincetheabsenceoftransparencyundermineseffectivegovernmentaccountability.ThedraftLawalso fails toprotectofficialswho, ingood faith, release informationpursuant to its provisions. Such protection is important so as to give officials theconfidencetoreleaseinformation,somethingtheyhavebeentaughtformanyyearsnottodo.Article 30 of the draft Law protects sources of information and informerswheretheir disclosures create more public benefit than the harm caused by their



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disclosures. This is a form ofwhistleblower protection, albeit a very limited one.Betterpracticewhistleblowerprotectionapplieswheneveradisclosureinmadeinthepublicinterest.Itisnotreasonabletoexpectwhistleblowerstobeabletoweighuptherelativebenefitsanddisadvantagesoftheirdisclosures.Itisenoughforthemtobeactinginthepublicinterest.Furthermore,thisarticleonlyprovidesprotectionagainst liability, whereas whistleblowers should also be protected against otherformsofretaliation,suchasadministrativeorprofessionalsanctions.

Recommendations:

ThedraftLawshouldbeamendedtoprovideforspecificadministrativeandcriminalsanctionsforindividualswhounderminetherighttoinformation.

Where public authorities regularly fail to discharge their opennessobligations, theyshouldbesubject tobeingrequiredtoundertakeremedialmeasurestoredressthisproblem.

Thelawshouldprovideprotectionforgoodfaithdisclosurespursuanttoitsprovisions, as well as comprehensive protection for anyone who releasesinformationonwrongdoing(whistleblowers).

8. Promotional Measures A major problem with the draft Law is that it includes almost no promotionalmeasures. Such measures are extremely important to ensure effectiveimplementationofarighttoinformationlaw.The draft Law does not designate a central body to take responsibility foroverseeingandpromotingitsimplementation.Inmanycountries,thistaskisgiventotheindependentadministrativeoversightbody.Inothercountries,thistaskmaybe undertaken by a government body, although this is generally considered lessthanoptimum.Anumberofotherpromotionalmeasureswhicharefoundinbetterpracticerighttoinformation laws are alsomissing from the draft Law. It does not require publicauthorities to provide training to their staff on informationmanagement or theirnewlyestablisheddisclosureobligations.Thereisnoprovisionforoutreacheffortsdesignedtoraisepublicawarenessaboutthelaw.Thereisalsonorequirementforpublicauthoritiestocreateandmaintainregistriesoftheinformationtheyhold,inordertobetterfacilitateinformationrequests.Publicauthoritiesarenotunderanyobligationtoreportontheactionstheyhavetakentoimplementthelaw,andthereisnoprovisionforcentralreportingtoparliamentonsuchactionsacrossthepublicservice.And therearenosystems topromotebetter recordmanagement, soas toimproverecordkeepinginthepublicsector.



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Recommendations:

The draft Law should designate a central body to oversee implementationand promotion of the right to information, including through presenting aconsolidated annual report to parliament on overall implementation of thelawandthroughundertakingpublicawareness‐raisingefforts.

The draft Law should require public authorities to report annually on theactionstheyhavetakentoimplementtheirdisclosureobligations,alongwithstatistics regarding their performance in response to information requestsoverthepastyear.

The draft Law should require public authorities to provide training forofficialsintheirresponsibilitiesundertherighttoinformation.

The draft Law should require public authorities to create and updateregistersoftheinformationintheirpossessionandtomakethesepublic.

Systemsforimprovingrecordmanagementshouldbebuiltintothelaw.

kazakhstan - centre for law and democracy2010/07/11 · +1 902 431-3688 kazakhstan: draft law on...

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