jvdhphenomenologicalmovemet

8/8/2019 JVdHPhenomenologicalMovemet

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/jvdhphenomenologicalmovemet 1/40

CHRISTANPERSPECTVES/9



CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES SERIES 1965

THE RISE

AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

MOVEMENT

by Johan Vander Hoeven

Three lectures given at the

1964 Study Conferences

of

The Association for Reformed Scientific Studies

Publia hod by

'1'11111AHH<HrIA'I'ION II'Olt Itlill"OltMI'lD SCIENTIFIC STUDIES"" 11 I lppl' I' < :111(11AVI", IIl\lrIIlLC1I1. Ollt.III'IO, Cnnudn



Printed in Canada by

GUARDIAN PUBUSIJING COMPANY 1.'1 '1>.

TJIUn Iltnn , Onturlo, Cunadu

Foreword

The 1965 Christian Perspective Series Lectures were delivered

at the Unionville, Ontario Study Conference of The Association

for Reformed Scientific Studies in August, 1964. The lectures

on Phenomenology were given also in Vernon, British Columbia

and at a student conference in Unionville in September. Their

appearance in printed form will make them available to a muchwider circle than those who hear them delivered.

Dr. Johan Vander Hoeven's analysis of phenomenology and

Dr. Remkes Kooistra's critique of modern university education

complement each other nicely. The lectures of Kooistra cover a

broad field of modern university education and show the destruc-

t ive influence of science that has divorced itself from the controlling

power of the Word of God. Those of Vander Hoeven deal in

some depth with a specific way in which modern philosophical

thought, called phenomenology, has traveled far toward the dead

end of a blind alley that started with assurance of reason's self-

directedness.

Taken together, the lectures of the 1965 Series show with

new force that learning that will not bow to the kingship of

Christ nor follow the law of His Word nor recognize as His the

order He has set permanently in created reality, provides no hope

of salvation to modern man in his quandry. Modern scholarship,

separated from the source of Light and in enmity with Him who

is the Wisdom and the Power of God (I Corinthians 1 :24), has

bound itself in service to an idol, and in spite of its great achieve-

ments, can offer man only confusion and bondage. Unless it is re-

deemed by Jesus Christ, its last state will be worse than the first,

The Association which has sponsored these lectures and now

f'Iers them in printed form would like to think that many of

t he readers will come to see that not the discovered truths of the

science of pretended autonomy can set man free but only the

nut horitative TRUTH of the Word of Christ.

To Il consideration of this claim we would challenge the

"1'11(11'1',

Pnul G, Schrotenbccr



JOHAN V AN DER HOEVEN

Johan van tier Hoeven was born in Rotterdam,

• The Netherlands in .1932. He studied theology

in the Theological College in Kampen and pur-

sued graduate study in philosophy at the Univer-

sity of Leuien. He receuoed his doctor's degree

there upon presenting a dissertation entitledJ:

Kritische ondervraging van de fenomenologische

rede. He is now associate professor in Philosophy

at the Free University in Amsterdam.



CONTENTS

Lecture I

Husserl and the crisis of European "Reason"

Lecture 11

Phenomenology and Existentialism

Lecture III

Beyond Existentialism

Page

11

33

59



Lecture I

Husserl and the crisis of European

"Reason"

1. Introduction and general remarks

I should like to begin with a word of appreciation. I have

only just started as a lecturer at the Free University of Amster-

dam. I therefore consider it an honour to be permitted to

deliver lectures on this continent and for this community. You

have many ties with the Netherlands and regularly supply the

Free Univers ity with enthusiastic and energetic students. II con-

sider it the greatest privilege that the bond which joins us to

our Master and the refreshing experience of contact with these

students can be strengthened in this way.

Rise of phenomenorogyin the beginning of the 20th century

I have been asked to speak to you on the phenomenological

movement. This philosophical movement arose in Europe in the

beginning of this century and quickly attained a strong influence

there. Both in philosophy and the special sciences, in particular

the so-called social sciences, phenomenology in Europe has slain

its thousands. This does not mean that it was a very 'popular'

philosophy. On the contrary, I should warn you at once that these

lectures will not be easy. Much has been thought during the

Pl\~t ages and phenomenology has assimilated it in its own

manner. Besides, because phenomenology itself is such a laboriousoxortion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is neces-

('xI'I'lion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is as neces-

ru-y f1~ difficult to follow the leading phenomenologists as to recog-

1I1i';('he' salient point where a wrong track starts.

You may already have heard or read about the inner crisis

11111\il(' extreme disruption, into which humanism, the leading

IHIW('" of W('Ht('1'1lsoC'iC'ty,has come since the last century.

l/ollI:hly NJ)('/lldI\I~, 111('IDlh c'('tlllll'Y succombcd to positi1)iwn. This

J )(I /ll Il vilml WII .' 1 llu: 11'1:IIhlllllt' lu-lr of l hr: 1I1~(I-()ld Nf"io'l7oo-id,<'nl, but



then in a situation which was determined by the critique of know-

ledge of the great humanistic philosopher Immanuel Kant. This

critique itself had opened the door to a historicism) which increas-

ingly gained ground. From this historicism an anarchistic rela-

tivism resulted.

Dilthey and the inner dialectic of the humanistic standpoint

One of the noblest minds of this period was the famous

philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, He lived through this crisis intensely

and all his life tried to find an escape by means of a so-called

critique of historical reason. However, when he gave the final

account of this critique, he had to acknowledge: "In the mind of

the present period and its philosophy the last and most charac-

teristic feature arises out of the discord of the sovereignty of

scientific thought and the desperation of the mind concerning

itself . . . . Here the emptiness of consciousness asserts itself,

whereby all standards have been abolished; everything fixed has

become wavering, an unlimited liberty of admission, the play

wi th boundless possibil ities le t the mind enjoy its sovereignty and

at the same time give it the pain of its lack of content." 1

These are striking and penetrating words. When they werespoken, phenomenology came into existence. In this movement

age-old humanism has, as it were, made its last, impressive

attempt at resurrection and renewed concentration. In this last

gathering of forces the whole development contracts itself once

again. But because in the above mentioned crisis we have to do

with an inner crisis of humanism as such, We must state that

in this undoubtedly great attempt the essential crisis becomes

vividly evident. A height has been reached, which at the

same time implies a Iow point. The words of Dilthey cited

above give expression to a profound dialectic. A dialectic is a

tension between two poles, here s imultaneously excluding and pre-

supposing each other. We can designate these poles with the wordsof Dilthey himself: on the one hand the sovereignty or autonomy

of the human ('rational') mind, on the other hand the total

1 "Aus dieser Dissonanz der Souveranitat des wissenschaftlichen Denkensund der Ratlosigkeit des Geistes iiber sich selbst . . . entsteht nun del'letzte und eigenste Zug im Geiste des gegenwar tigen Zeitalters und in scincr

,Philosophie .... In ihnen macht sich die Leere des Bewusstaotna gcltC'nd,da alle Massstabe aufgehoben worden sind, alles F'estc ist, schwnnkondgeworden, eine schrankenlose F'reiheit dol' Annahmon, (lIlK Rpipl mitgrenzenlosen Mdglichkeitcn Iasscn -dcn GOiHt H0illClRUUV(l1'1Iit, llI, g'I'IIII'HH(11lund geben ihm zurrleic'h d(\I1 Rc'hltH'l 'l '. H(licH'r InhIlItJot\lg 'lwlt.", W. III It.Ilt1yGeSMnmcl/,(I So/Wi/II"II, vol. V Ill, n. IIll!.

I"

rational domination of reality, the human mind itself included.

In short: a tension between rational autonomy and autonomous

rationality. The first pole is and remains the primary one: man

in his apostasy from the living God, his Origin, chooses himself,

decides to be autonomous at all cost. But he cannot really be

autonomous, he cannot really disengage himself from his Creator

and from the wholesome order of creation; in his insurrection

against God, man falls away to a spurious, would-be creative

origin. For humanism this means an apostasy to the human

function of rational d ist inct ion, a function that is dislocated fromits real meaning and now continually threatens the 'autonomous'

self-consciousness from which this absolutizat ion of 'reason' origi-

nated. Now phenomenology tried anew and very laboriously to

overcome this fundamental tension with all its disastrous conse-

quences and to discover again the higher, 'transcendental' unity

of life. It results, however, in a manifestation of this tension:

the two poles are confronted with each other once again, but in

this way the original dualism comes to light even more clearly.

This is the historical meaning of phenomenology in its religious

perspective.

Why we are interested in phenomeoology

Precisely for this" reason this philosophical current is par-

ticularly instructive for us all. We have to deal with it. As

people of Western culture and primarily as 'natural' men we live

in a society wherein a dominant humanism constantly tries to

assert its power via philosophy and from there via the various

sciences.

There is a second reason why it is important for you and

me to concern ourselves with phenomenology. The phenomeno-

logical way of thinking arose as a European, originally German

and then also French, philosophy. But recently it has met with

more interest in America too. Lately English translations haveuppcared of the main works of the outs tanding phenomenologis ts :

l Iusscrl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. James M. Edie,

nrorcssor at the Northwestern University, who studied in Europe

1111' pig-ht years, published a book What is Phenomenology?, a trans-

lnl lnn of art icles by the well-known French-Swiss phenomenologist

1'11'1'1'(' 'I'})('vcnnz, with Cl preface by John Wild.' In 1960 Herbert

,111111"11, 1·:1111', 11h"l III JlIII'IIII/III'illllill/l/t lon:l.

I II I II IM I~H"( \ .11"/'1 ' 1 '11111,11 11 ~III'VI'.VIIr LI", I I'IIIIHIIII 101111 I ll " I ho mn in ph l' l1 (J Il l( ,.

111I1"pll'lIl WIII'II



Spiegelberg, who lives and works in the United Sta tes, pub lished,

especially for American readers, an important book in two vol-

umes, entitled The Phenomeno loq ica l Movement. A historical In-

troduction?

However in my opinion this influence of phenomenology is

far from 'pure' that is, it is main ly the influence of phenomenology

in its last phase. Th is phase is marked by the clear manifestation

of the tensions which characterized this philosophy from the

outset and by the appearance of a certain disintegration. Manyadherents, to be sure, still try to hold on to what at first looked

like a hopeful revival of the once vital humanistic ideals. At the

same time there is an increasing search for the possibilities of

cross- fertiliz ation with schoo ls that formerly were considered as

antagonists. Precisely in order to draw your attention to this

situation, I spoke briefly at the beginning about the spiritual

'climate,' wherein phenomenology came into existence. Yet we

cannot deny, that the original, 'pure' phenomenology already gave

occasion to the alliance which 1 now point out. Here we meet

with a noteworthy course in the development of the phenome-

nological movement. The first impression of this course is con-

fusing. But this cannot be a reason to neglect or to simplify itfor convenience's sake. On the contrary, we must try to pene-

trate in to the inner dialectics o f the humanistic relig ious g round-

motive as a community-motive.

Thus we touch the third and main reason that induces us

to a serious confrontation with phenomenology. You know or

have heard abou t the work A New Crit ique of Theoret ical 'I 'houqhi:

by Herman Dooyeweerd. This title is a clear allusion to those

of the main works of Kant, the great philosopher of modern

times. Indeed, nowhere in the Western world can philosophy

after Kant be the same as before him. His appearance had the

significance of a real tu rn ing -point, because he, like nobody else,

summoned humanism to a critical self-reflection upon its own

foundations. One can theoretically throw one's 'light' upon all

sorts of things and try to combine this in a universal system of

thought, but when one system opposes the other, when 'universal'

systems of knowledge come and go and in the end all is in danger

of' ending in scepticism (think of Hume) , then it is high time

to -sub ject the 'dogmatical,' naive self-ev idence of this un iversal

3 H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomcnolouioal Movcm(·nt. A hi8torioal int,·orluotion.2 vols. Den HUIlA' 19GO.

theoretical knowledge to a searching critique by asking: what

is knowledge? how is it possible? what are its a priori 'transcen-

dental' conditions? This is what Kant did. But precisely in the

'cri tique of reason' the humanis tic original dualism appeared. (1

shall return to this point presently.) Since Kant, much has hap-

pened, but I must by-pass it now. 1 mention only the end crisis

about which I spoke at the beginning. The meaning of phenome-

nology, briefly stated, consists then in the fact that in it we are

concerned with the last, renewed endeavor within humanism to

reach an integral and radical 'critique of reason.'

The cardinal po int of impact between humanistic and Christian

philooO'phy

Here is the cardinal point of impact between humanistic and

Christian philosophy. Every Christian who works in science

should be particularly interested in this attempt of humanism.

For humanism is characterized by its belief in the autonomy of

'reason.' Against that the Christian thinker has to protest most

p ro foundly fo r the sake of his so le Master, Jesus Christ. Opposite

to the stagnation and the inevitable tensions, which this belief

entails, the Christian scientist has to show in a positive way,

what a great liberation. faith in Jesus Christ - a faith that

discloses its own meaning - brings about for reflecting upon

the many-sided reality, into which we all have been placed. It

is, as a matter of fact, self-evident that, in trying to do this

we can learn much from humanistic thinkers. We should not

be narrow-minded or even hypocritical in this respect. From the

beginning to the end we stand in the God-created reality, that

surrounds us on every side. There is no other reality. And we

all must work together to open up this creation, even in spite

of ourselves; we have been charged with this task. But the

direction is always decisive and that is chosen in faith. Only

in the true direction do the various moments of truth become

what they really are: moments of the Truth.

Now when a philosopher like Husserl makes a critique of

reason a main point of his program, the Christian thinker has

10 pay close attention. Obviously this points up that there is

HOnlt'l hlrur wrong with 'autonomous reason': something in the

dt'VI'lopmont hn» run stuck and the movement has to be started

up IIgllll1. 'I'hl» will bc' our <'c'/11nt) point of view in these lee-

1111'PH(Ill phl'/1oIJlI'llo1ogy.

)"



The d ifficul ty of a (definition )

A central point of view - which cannot be forced from the

outside - is certainly needed. Of course it would be easiest for

you and me, if I could begin with a short and clear answer to

the question: what is phenomenology? You may ask me, what

are you speaking about? But this very question encounters a

great difficulty, for a concise answer is impossible. The terms

'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological' are among the most un-

defined, chameleon-like terms of modern philosophy. Sometimesthis is considered as a sign of the particular fruitfulness of this

thought. At any rate, there is no use in denying that in various

respects we can learn from and be stimulated by the outstanding

phenomenologists. But as a matter of fact, under the banners

of phenomenology sails a rather heterogeneous company. Already

"-uring the lifetime of Husserl, grave dissidence arose between

him and Heidegger concerning the meaning of phenomenology.

For various reasons this difference has issued in a grave aliena-

tion between these two great men. Nowadays we must ascertain

why such great figures as Heidegger and Sartre hardly mention

'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological.' On the other hand, as

far as these terms are still used with some regularity, they often

are hollowed out and only vaguely intend to indicate a certain

tradition which no longer has much positive un iting force. Many

philosophers, strongly divergent among themselves, who, traveling

along different ways, almost all came to an impasse and, more

than once inclined to defeatism, clung to 'the' phenomenology as

the new perspective. Since this perspective appears to fail as

the final insight, for the once enthroned philosophy only two

ways seem to be left. On the one hand: an escape into explicit

mythology. On the other: the seal of stagnation and of power-

lessness in the pragmatistic proclamation of the 'plurality of the

truth.' In this case for practical philosophizing ..there. is hardly

another avenue left than that of a logicistic thought-and-language-

technique - without much to say. The vangueness of the term

'phenomenology' is rather symptom of the character o f our time;

it is a melting-pot into which all sorts of things are thrown to-

gether. It is difficult to say what will come from this, apart from

some contours gradually appearing here and there.

, Nevertheless, there is a certain continuity between Husscrl

and the existentialist phenomenology, as well as bet woon the

first and the last phase of th0 latter. But to <IiH(,OV(,1' this con-

tinuity, wo cannot ~tuy I'll tho Hlll'lnc·<'.

111

2. Huseeri's program of philosophy as a rigorous science

Husserl/s experience of a crisis

In this first lecture we speak on Husserl, the initiator of the

movement. To arrive at the centre of 'Husserl's intentions, it is

useful to listen to a note in his diary of 1906. Here Husserl says:

"In the first place I mention the general task that I must fulfill

for myself, if I should be able to call myself a philosopher. I mean

a critique of reason. A critique of logical and practical reason,

of 'valuing' reason in general. Without coming to clarity in broadoutline about the meaning, the essence, the methods , the main view-

points of a critique of reason, without having contrived, drawn

up, established and founded a general draft for it, I most truly

cannot live. I've sufficiently passed through the vexations of a

lack of clarity, of wavering doubt. I must come to an inner

firmness. I know that great geniuses have failed at it and if

I would compare myself with them, I should have to despair

in advance." 6,

Such a high and far reaching endeavor, pronounced in such

charged words, presupposes the experience of a crisis. In another

way this crisis was already attested by two great older contempo-

raries of Husserl , viz., Dilthey and Nietzsche. Towards the end ofhis life Husserl himself published a great and important work

entitled The Crisis Of European Sciences and Transcendental

Phenomenoloqu? You see then that in 1937 Husserl was still

in tensely occupied with what stirred h im already in the beg inning

of our century.

What was it, more concretely, which engaged Husserl so

ser ious ly, and what gives him his specia l s ignif icance and infuence

in the philosophical life of this century? We discover a first

• "An erster Stelle nenne ich die allgemeine Aufgabe, die ich fiir rnich Iosen

muss, wenn ieh mieh soll einen Philosophen nennen k6nnen. Ieh meine eine

Kritik del' Vernunft. Eine Kritik del' logischen und del' praktischen Ver-nun ft, del' wertenden iiberhaupt, Ohne in allgemeinen Ziigen mir iiber

Sinn, Wesen, Methoden, Hauptgesichtspunkte einer Kritik del' Vernunft

ins Klarc zu kommen, ohne einen allgemeinen Entwurf fUr sie ausge-dacht, entworfen, festgestellt und begrundet zu haben, kann ieh wahr

und wahrhaftig nicht leben. Die Qualen del' Unklarheit, des hin- und

horachwankenden Zweifels habe ich ausreichend genossen. Ich muss zupiner inneren Festig-ke,it hinkommen. Ieh weiss, dass grosse Genien daran

(IHchciiert Hind und wollt ich mich mit ihnen vergleichen, so miisst ich

VU/I vornhor cln vorzwo if'eln ." Cited in the "Introduction of the editor"

(W. Hh'ltwl) or ItL IIl1HRM1, Di« Idoc de?" Pluienomenolooie (The Idea ofI'lwuonJIIllOluI{Y), I )C'II 111l/lg' 10rlO.

IJ;,' oIir;H;1I tll,/, "lIl'fJ/III";/I"""// 1I';mll'IIHc'III1!1 If/Id d ie L1' an ll zcndcn ta /c : Phao.I /f JI /I f' // "/U/J; ,I , 1 l1 '" 11'111111 IIIM.



main line in his strenuous striving in his idea of 'philosophy as

a rigorous science.' With this idea Husserl placed himself over

against two sides: on the one hand the so-called 'naturalistic'

positivism and on the other hand the historicistic philosophy of

life-and-world-views (Weltanschauungsphilosophie). That is to

say, tendencies which meanwhile have passed through a certain

development, but in their proper purport are still relevant.

All his life Husserl was attached to this ideal of a philosophy

as a rigorous science. Until his death he remained laboriously

engaged in its realization. From the outset he knew that he

had to row against the stream. At the end of his career he

had to admit in disillusion: 'Philosophy as science, as serious,

r igorous , even apodict ical sc ience, - the dream has been dreamt.' 6

In the next lectures we shall expand on this point. In view of

this course it may seem obvious to consider Hlisserl's thought

only as a last stand, as a temporarily retarding barrier in a stream

that could not be stopped. Surely, there is truth in this view.

However, in the history of the Western world that has searched

for its great glory in its science, Husserl's impressive enterprise

of a 'philosophy as rigorous science' is too important for us to dis-

miss merely as a more or less interesting historical phenomenon,

as the cramped reaction of a clever scholar who was not ableto keep up with his time.

Natural scientific method and (understand ing~ (Verstehen)

Against which stream did Husserl have to battle? In order

to understand his specific position as a 'critic,' we must realize

that he came from the so-called exact sciences. In the Western

world these sciences have been presented as the model of un-

assa ilable t rustworthiness . Unt il now final certa in ties in a ll sor ts

of areas, even in the so-ca lled social sc iences, have been expected

from mathematical, natural scientific methods. Actually, since

the end of the last century in Europe, especially under the in-

fluence of Dilthey, the monopoly of this method has been called

into question. We can observe a clear aversion to the manipu-

la tions with hypotheses, which can be verif ied from the principle

of causality and thus lead to the establishement of 'laws' that are

conceived in a naturalistic way; from the determination of the

eourse of all events according to these laws; from the idea that

the knowledge of the latter would enable to the (in principle)

6 "Philosophie ala Wissenschaft, aJ'R crnatlichc, Htr(\nR'(', jn npodiktlach«Wissenschaft - dor TI'II'UIn il lt l\uHj.\'(' tl ' llumt,", '1'''" IUI'i~i~ ... , p, r,OH.

IH

total domination of all these events. There is an attempt, at

least as far as the area of the 'social sciences' is concerned, to

found the sc ienti fic certa in ty on a so-cal led 'understanding' (Ver-

stehen) of the varying subjec tive act ing and i ts possible 'motives. '

It is an attempt) and those who make it generally are still so

attached to the 'only saving' natural scientific method that they

are at a loss what to do with a knowledge that surpasses it. To

put it differently: they have so surrendered their heart to this

way of thinking as the fundamental and all-dominating cer-

tainty, that they become uncertain, as to any question that con-cerns a direction-giving view-point to the theoretical investi-

gation of that which does not belong to the 'natural' sides of

reality. I mean those sides of reality where we see man in his

responsible acting with 'nature' in his various societal relation-

ships.

For a fruitful investigation of these aspects, it is required

that we be willing to have our theoretical knowing itself opened

up by a central self-knowledge and knowledge of men, a know-

ledge which reaches far above any natural scientific method, and

above any psychological 'understanding' or 'feeling' (Einfiirhlung).

This central self-knowledge can only be granted us by the World-

revelation and thus, once accepted in faith, liberates our wholetheoretical outlook. But this opening-up is fundamentally excluded

as long as one a-priorily shuts himself up in an attitude of theo-

retical thought, disengaged from its meaning, with the con-

comitant method, which - apart from this absolutization - can

indeed-be fruitful for the discovery and analysis of that which

really has been entrusted to the control of man.

Husserl 's batt le with psychologism

Positivism, dominant in the beginning of Husserl's career,

operated, as best it might, from this premise of a natural scien-

tific method. As best it might, for at any rate it had learnedfrom Kant, that nowhere can man (or, as humanistic philosophy

puts it, the (subject», with his act-life be left out of account. For

every 'fact' is at least always a perceived fact, and this perception

is direct ly accompanied by a certa in interpretation. Yet it tried

to sight also these undeniable 'subjective' factors in the trusted

'objective,' i.e.) natural scientif ic way. The result was the psycholo-

gism of the 19th century, an absolutization of the psychical

Iunct ion that IH, human nets, which in reality carry only the

pHyehknl fund Ion 111-1OIl(' (lmportnn t.) aspect among- others, were

I.!I



enclosed in this function. Thus there was a preference for speak-

ing about the 'stream' of sensations, ideas etc. This 'stream'

was most f requently conceived of as an 'objective ,' natura l- factual

process, in which, by virtue of the physical 'causality,' one thing

proceeded 'necessarily' from another. The 'subjective' (i.e., for

a humanist, meaning-giving) character of the acts was then in

danger of disappearing in the course of the 'stream,' closed in

itself. The typical totality-structures of human acts (uni ties , point-

ing above themselves, of all functions in a certain typical order)

were d issolved in so-called most simple 'elements' (o f sensationsand the like), out of which then more or less intricate complexes

of 'representations' e.g., arise. That is to' say: by. means of

them these thinkers tried to reconstruct the whole. (Mill even

spoke about 'mental chemistry' ).

To understand Husserl, we must realize that in this way

the logical norms of human thought-activity were directly en-

dangered. For in this all-embracing 'process' these norms could

not fail to vaporize into one psychical factuality among others, a

factuality of reiatvoe s tabil ity and of more or less 'practica l uti lity. '

Thus this 'scientific' way of thinking entered the threshold of a

disa strous scep ticism . Just now we heard Husserl himself attest

this scepticism in a penetrating way .

Perhaps Husserl's program of a philosophy as a rigorous

science now has come somewhat nearer to you. For another

aspec t o f the scep ticism implied the increasing d istance be tween

philosophy and the special sciences. The latter unfolded ever

more quickly and widely, in consequence of an enlargement of

the technical possibilities as well as through the fact that the

ever more disclosing, integrating and d iffe rentiating soc iety de-

manded specified and refined distinction. But at the same time

the first symptoms appeared of a malady that in our time has

really burst out: great activity of ever more specialists who

hardly know any longer 'With. what they a re occup ied.

'Deecruptive psychology) and the problem of foundation

Husserl and Kant

In th is situation Husser! wanted to rehab ilitate philosophy .

-Phtlosophy would again have to devote itself seriously to its

task and reflect upon the really ultimate questions of 'conscious'

humanity and upon the foundations of the various specia l sciences .

But at the same time it would' have to proceed in a rigorously

scientific manne r. Over against specula tive phantasy , brilliant

o

or no, Husserl placed the sober, laborious and patient analysis

of that which was really 'given,' of the so-called 'things them-

selves.' But he wanted just as much, with this parole ('to the

things themselves') to confront the so-called unprejudiced (in

reali ty constructivistic) methods of posit ivist psychologism which,

as we saw, developed into scepticism. According to Husserl, the

important thing before all construction is to attain insight into

that which is really given 'Within the human act-experience itself

and to describe this as accurately as possible. Descriptive psy-

chology against natural scientif ic psychology - this was Husserl' sstart.

The general framework of his train of thought was that

of his time: psychology. The basic denominator that must bring

together the different sides of reality was the so-called stream

of expe riences of consciousness. But w ithin this general frame-

work Huser! had in mind something else, which could not fail

to break through it and indeed did so afterwards.

His main problem was the problem of foundat ion) namely

that of the universal validity of scientific, i.e.) logical statements.

That is why his first important philosophical publication bears

the title: Logical Investigations (Logische Unte'tsuchungen).7 Thisvalidity, he stated, cannot be maintained; on the contrary, it is

undermined when human consciousness together with i ts acts , not-

withstanding the lip-service which positivistic psychologism renders

to it , i s handled as a conglomerate of contingent natural processes,

characte rized by certain regularities, bu t for the rest is conceived

of as a general, indeterminate stream without any real meaning.

For how can one uphold, from this point of view, the (implicitly

claimed) validity and meaning of the scientific statements con-

cerning these processes?

Undoubtedly Husserl's critique of psychologism was quite

to the point in several respects and did not fail to make an im-

pression. But as for himself the way of solving the problem

was far from easy. He could not return to Kant who had founded

universal validity upon so-called transcendental, a p riori forms

of sensory perception and thought, taken toge the r in the so-called

consciousness-in-general (Bewusstsein uberhaupt). For it is true

that this Kantian consciousness was meant to be subjective and

Cl!'; such the last, spontaneous origin of meaning. But, on closer

oxnmination, it was only a formal unity, which largely restricted

T i ,l ll liHO/r" (J/ lI"I 'H"r /r" "V"/I . 11,111111.11.1'4.,1022, 102R, 2 vols.

"1



the insight into the place and role of human acting as such, an

acting which never can be reduced to a form, le t alone a theoretica l

form of thought. The Kantlan solution shows too clearly the

tenacious influence of the old rationalism for which 'reason' is

the all-embracing, primari ly given order of real ity) the universal

framework wherein we exis t, our most unproblematic, self-evident

asset. (Even when Kant established a second domain of 'prac-

tical' reason, where the most proper essence of man should be

found, viz.) his autonomous moral 'conscience,' -even then Kant

clung to a formal law: you ought (Du sol ls i) , and thus ratherobscured the subjective auto-nomy).

As a matter of fact, this was exactly one of the reasons

why the renewed attention to the human act-life - after the

brilliant but highly speculative metaphysics about it of German

idealism - fell back into psychologism and thus in reality re-

mained below the level of Kant. For Kant had at least tried

to lift humanistic reasoning up above its stagnation, its fixation

( idee f ixe) with respect to the psychical aspect of life, to point

out the relation of this reasoning itself to a 'transcendental idea.'

In his Logical Investigations Husserl wants to overcome the im-

passe of this psychologism without returning to the formalism

of Kant and his consciousness-in-general, however transcendental

it may be called. The primary intention of Husserl is not to

explain the rules for the logical activity, but to show and

to establish that there are universal, 'constant essences (eide) ,

which, according to the great phenomenologist, are of a logical

nature and must be considered as undeniably real structures of

human acts themselves. But how can this be established?

Husserl's conception Of (intentionality '

The first thing is to take the act as act, i.e.) not as a blind,

mechanically passing process, but as a conscious experience.

Husserl explains this by a specific term, intentionality. Every

act, as an act of consciousness, is characterized by intending,

by meaning something. Let us take the example of a house.

You can perceive it, admire it for its beauty, pass judgment on

it, design it, occupy it, even set it on fire (if you are a pyromaniac)

, and so on. But in all these different acts the house has meaning.

That which is meant is not something like a thing-in-itself (Ding

an sich) , a so-called real object. Husserl, to be sure, does not

deny the real existence of the house; he is willing to concede

that there is a certain collection or stones, wood etc., with a

certain size and geometrical form, cal1ed 'house.' But he is not

interested' in this; this may be a matter with which physicists

and builders are concerned. We have to make a passing reference

to this point, for we must see that Husserl does not disengage

himself from the old and tenacious tradition which closes 'reality'

in its (abstracted) natural aspects, i.e., in those which, by natural

scientific means, can be calculated and measured and thus mas-

tered. What remains must then be placed in an (ideal' sphere,

where either 'pure' logic or 'metaphysics' or artistic experience

and expression or even mythology and 'religion' can try to exerttheir strength.

Husserl does indeed dis tinguish between the natura l, material

'reality' and the sphere of meaning, which is called 'ideal.' This

appears for instance from his argument that a house can be

burnt down, but not its meaning. We must allow this remark to

pass without comment. Suffice it to say that this separation is

based upon a more fundamental dualism which cannot be accepted

by a Christian philosophy. At any rate, within this general

tradit ional scheme H;usserl, who has experienced the consequences

of positiv istic phychologism with its exclus ive natural sc ientific

methods, fixes his eye towards that second domain, which for him

is the prevailing one. So he takes the positivist concept of

'reality' for granted, but, as he says , rea l existence (in this abstrac t,

restricted sense) is not relevant for the aim of his phenomeno-

logical investigations. According to Husserl, it is quite possible

to fix the meaning or the essence of a product of phantasy like

that of a centaur.

In any case, however, this opinion sharpens the question:

what is the meaning of this conception of 'meaning' and how

is it established? Certainly, it was important and high time, too,

that the question of meaning was raised again emphatically. In-

deed, here we touch the typical peculiarity of phenomenological

thought: its proper interest does not lie in what effectively goesn in consciousness or - in a later phase and more generally -

in human activity, in order to describe this as completely as

posslblo, to make statistics of it and then to apply this knowledge,

j('C'hnically, in 'practice'; nor is it specially concerned with the

components of a correct logical statement. Its main question

IN: what do we mean by perceiving, feeling, dreaming, imagining,

.I1111J-tlnJ-tor - in El later phase - existing as such, and, with

pClc'llk 1"('/'('1'1'11<'(' t () tll(' HJ)(\('iul : .wiC'l1ceH? What do we mean

hy phYH1I'1I1, I lIolydl lcuI , loglcnl , hlatortcul, l lngulstlc, ethical, 're-

.\



Iigious"? (Incidentally, to prevent misunderstanding, it may be

profitable to' observe that Husserl does not aim at a sort of

linguistic analysis. His intentions penetrate much mare deeply

than the pursuits af the linguistic school which may be sound

in same respects against certain phantastic, speculative and care-

less tendencies in thought, but as a whale, in my conviction, is

a sign of the decadence of Western philosophy, because it practi-

cally displays an indifference to' the real meaning of language as

well as of analysis.)

A cardinal ques tion

At this paint of our exposition of Husserl we must be at-

tentive. Far now that the question of the meaning of the different

acts has been put, another (prior) question cannot be avoided:

From which standpoint can the diversity of meaning be distin-

guished as such and can we expect to' f ind an answer to' the f irst

quest ion? This standpo int cannot be included within the diversity,

far then our speaking about diversity of meaning itself would

'lose its meaning. On the contrary, it must be a central paint, to

which this diversity is related. Here we meet with a fundamen-

tal tension in Husserl's thought. On the one hand there is no

doubt that Husserl in his Logical Investigations considers this

Point as a psycho-lagical one. The psychological 'stream of sub-

ject ive exper iences' i s the basic denominator of his investigat ions.

This denominator, however, presupposes) as the composed ward

'psychological' al ready indicates, the mean ing-coherence, which

precisely is reduced and put aside by this denominator, in order

to' reconstruct the meaning-coherence autonomously, as well as

passible. Up to' this point Husserl remains a child of his age.

The Kant ian solu tion of the problem of universal val idi ty of taking

the logical 'reason' as the sa-called transcendental, a priori form

of a sensory matter of experience could no longer satisfy Husserl

either. Logical acts or experiences themselves are reduced to' a

species of the general, all-embracing psychological stream of ex-

perience .•

But at the same time the abstract character of this 'stream'

i.e., its insufficiency as a real basic denominator - becomes

clear. Far, an the other hand, Husserl's main concern was to'

avoid the pitfalls of psychologism. Far this purpose Husserl puts

forward theoretical-logical thought with its methodical abstraction

as such. This means that logieal thought, which on 1he one side

is classified under the 'universal' stream of (lx(lI'I'l(\IH'(1 (which,

nil

in fact, was already an abstract 'coherence'), an the other side

is set apart and put in the foreground as the central 'Archimedean

point ' i tself , the point from which the diversity of acts and their

'meaning-contents' can be viewed and established. At the same

moment the psychological basic denominator is reduced to the

'objective' field which must receive its meaning from logical-

methodical reflection.

This must take place _in a rigorous, methodical analysis.

Starting from a definite, 'concrete' act and its contents, this ana-lysis has to' sift, by 'varying' the act in its different possibilities

and impossibilities (possibilities of thought!) , the 'individual', 'can-

tingent' features of it. At last it has to' accomplish itself in a

sa-cal led intuit ive insigh t into the 'essence' (eidos), which insight

also must play the role of a final criterion. This is, in bra ad

outline, the meaning of what is called in phenomenology the

eidetic reduction.' In this eidet ic reduction the theoret ical ou tlook

is directed primarily to the 'objective' part of the 'intentional'

act, namely to' the intended 'meaning' as such. Husserl maintains

that it is an intended meaning, that the meaning-content is im-

manent to the intentional act itself and that the units of meaning

are nothing but the ideally grasped moments of these acts. But

since Husserl himself reasons within the general framework Of

psychologism) which had dissolved the central point of reference

in the psychological 'stream' with its conglomeration of various

'objective facts', no other expedient to save the universal validity

is left than the substant ializat ion of the var ious logical 'meanings'

to' a domain of 'ideality.' The latter oscillates between a positl-

vistically conceived 'objectivity' and a sphere of 'laws,' but at

any rate exists at the cost of subjective activity. This is what

we can call the rationalistic trait in Husserl. It cannot be the

final word abou t him, however . Later an we meet with a 'phenome-

nological' or 'transcendental' reduction, in which the situation

has been modified. We shall return to this paint presently.

Reflection and fa ith

Husserl does not hesitate to declare that we must suspend

Ihe act-in-its-operation and leave aside its 'naively' intended 'ob-

Jects' (Gegenstande), in order to' reflect upon the act and its

mcuning-contont - without asking himself haw this operation

0(' SW11)('IlSion CHn be executed. This question should have been

put, liS Ih(, 1\('ls 01' HUSp£'IlAionnd reflection themselves simul-

IHlII'olIsly 111'(1 dIlHS('d IIIHi('r the psyC'hologknl denominator of the

..~)



'stream of experiences.' What becomes evident here? Husserl's

faith in the revealing power of tl.eoreti al reflection itself - and

that in a rather naive way -, together with the untenableness

of this faith. For, after all, the relativity of this reflection urges

itself upon him, as appears in the first place from the dialectical

tension between the psycho-logical basic denominator and the

absolutized logical thought i tself. KJant 's so-called consciousness-

in-general as such is not mentioned, but even more so it is

self-evident as the Archimedean point and the origin of meaning-

giving. Even the Kantian reserve of the transcendental idea,

which pointed to a supra-theoretical, 'practical' unity of human

existence, is no longer present. As a matter of fact, this higher

unity of Kant did not surmount the level of abstraction either.

To Husserl speaking in this phase about an 'I-ness,' as a concen-

tration-point of acts, makes no real sense. Factually he stays at

the level of the 'psychology without a soul' iPsucholoqie ohne

Seele) of his time.

Of course the difficulty of this fundamental position has its

consequences. Husserl's hopeful program of accounting for what

is really given within human act-life, in fact amounts to a de-

preciation of the meaningful dynamic of this act-life itself. It

is reduced to the fixed anti-pole of the primari ly f ixed logical re-

f lec tion. From the autonomous methodical reconstruction by the

latter it has to receive its meaning. The dynamic, many-sided

given-ness of pre-theoretical, practical experience, which unfolds

its meaning, among others, also in theoretical knowledge, cannot

be accounted for. 'Meaning' is frozen into the abstract counter-

part of the subjective phenomenological reflection. The latter

for the time being remains as such in the background, as Husserl's

most urgent task was to stem the tide of the scepticistic conse-

quences of contemporary psychologism, to save the universal

validity and meaning of scientific thought. Husserl neglects

the many-s idedness of theoret ica l-logical concepts: there are psy-

chological, juridical, ethical concepts etc. He also fails to see that

such concepts derive their meaning from the meaning of the

psychical, the juridical, the ethical sphere (which are only dis-

tinguished as such by means of 'reflection'); otherwise they would

fal l into nothingness.

Husserl and Dilthey

At this point it may be worthwhile to make a short com-

parison between Husserl and Dilthey, ospcclnlly h('('/lu.'1P theso

')(j

two lines converge, in a typical way, in phenomenological exis-

tential ism. Dilthey too stuck to the humanistic t radition according

to which one cannot go back behind theoretical reason. Until the

end, when his 'critique of historical reason' had designated the

historical 'stream of life' as the true universal, he tried to cling

to the theoretical contemplation and interpretation of 'history.'

Nevertheless, Dilthey had much difficulty with this position, be-

cause he seriously wanted to avoid the so-cal led 'phenomenalism, '

i.e., the attitude of the 'pure' spectator, who is not really engaged

in actual life and its essential, autonomous progress. Husserl, onthe other hand, advocates the position of the 'uninterested spec-

tator,' in order to avoid the dispersion of the 'subject' into the

vicissitudes and multiplicity of the 'factual' course of things. The

ideal of the universal achievement of theoretical reflection revives

once more in Hussetl. But it is the last revival of an idea which

suffers from a vitium origin is.

Indeed, the inner emptiness of this ideal appears pre-emi-

nently in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl tries to revive Des-

cartes, the father of modern Western philosophy, but he can not

simply return to him and his mathematical science-ideal, nor to

Hume and his psychologism, not even to Kant and his rigorous

separat ion of 'pure' , i.e. natura l scientif ic , and 'practica l' reason.

In history there is no real return. Former simplifications and

levellings, which had been constructed to carry through the

postulate of the continuity of thought (a certain type of thought),

can never hold out against the transcendental dynamic of the

many-s ided unfolding of meaning which characterizes this divine

creation. Husserl had to take into account more and also more

complicated problems than Descartes or Kant.

3. Some remarks about Husseri's further development

The question of the origin of meaning-giving

What are the main lines of the further development ofHusserl's phenomenology? The ideal of a truly universal science

is no longer as self-evident as it formerly was. The phenomenolo-

gist almost passionately searches for the assurance of this ideal.

This implies that his thought is increasingly focused on the

f'innl origin of meaning-giving. Husserl had thought to have

ostubllshed the existence of a sphere of logical idealities, but

(notwithstanding the frequent use of the term 'act') only at the

('OHt0 1' It (kgl'll<i1lIon of subjective activity and then in such a

wily thnt tlllH Hpll\'I '\' I 'IlC 'tul lllyWIlHonly an upper s tory above



the doma in of the so-called 'empirical' (psycho logica l) d iversity

and multiplicity. A real coherence of meaning concentrated in

a real jocue failed. Thus phenomenology was in danger of be-

coming a 'picture-book-phenomenology.' This danger has re-

mained and even increased, now that Husserl's strenuous search -

ing for a real central grasp and a universal firm ground on the

whole has been abandoned.

Husserl's next step is to disengage himself further from

psychologism. Now all sciences, natural science as well as psy-chology, must be 'suspended ' as se lf -evident unit s-of-validity and

maintained only as 'phenomena,' in order to discover the origi?U3

of the scientific and everyday validities. This implies that now

the turn to the 'subject,' already present but at the same time

devia ting in the logical investigations , becomes more pronounced.

This turn must be appreciated by a Christian thinker, for accord-

ing to God's Word revelation the human subjectivity in its act-

life is always at stake. In this subjectivity, which has been made

universally responsible, the whole creation is centred. Husserl,

however, following the line o f the en tire human istic tradition, in

a very plain way puts the knowing, theoretically reflecting subject

in the foreg round . The Cartesian , subjective cogito is the uni-

versal focus of reality and the rest can only be significant as

the cogitata (the things though t), the 'objec tive,' intended coun-

terparts of this cooito, immanent to this active cogito. Never-

theless this counterpar t remains a counte1'-part and is called there-

fore a 'transcendence within the immanence.' Thus the funda-

mental dualism remains in force, although Husserl tries more

and more to surmount it by explaining the immanence of the

cogitata to the cogito as a constituting of the objec t by the coqito,

then called 'transcendental consciousness.' Here we explici tly meet

with the humanist ical ly dis torted creation-motive, which, to be

sure, was already at work. For however much is said about the

necessity of being attentive to what is really g;ven, Husserl beqin»

with an autonomous eliminatiOn of the coherence of meaning,

within which the logical function (in its theoretical unfolding)

itself is given, and then tries, on the basis of the absolutized

theoretical reflect ion, to reconstruct methodically this coherence

after the image of th is phenomenological thought.

At any rate, it is typical of Husserlian phenomenology that,

on the basis of the fundamental dualism, and tied to the theo-

retically determined sub ject-ab ject-scheme, it attempts, almost

passionately and repeatedly, to surmount this dualism and 10

"H

discover the all-embracing unity, but it is its fate now to be

forced to objectify ever more and to retain only a vacuum for

the desired transcendental unity.

(Life-world' and (egology'

In his last phase Husserl makes a final attempt to avoid

this vacuum. His fi rs t 'conclusion ' is a sor t of confess ion. HusserI,

who cannot simply retu rn after positivism to the former absolute

idealism of creative freedom, admits that in the reality of being,

we must stay with the 'riddle o f the sub ject-objec t-correlation."

We human be ings live tin a 'world' (the 'life-world', Lebenswelt)

and this (world,' is even the immediate ly given real ity.

But the other, in fact most important, result of Husserl's

thought is his so-called egology. Here the person of the philoso-

pher himself is immediately at stake. Husserl, although he

gradually turned away from psychologism, can no longer be

sati sfied with a formal consciousness-in-general, and chooses his

Archimedean point in the ego cogito of the phenomenologis t him-

self. Faced with the extinction of the ideal of personality in

positivism, Husserl once more tries to save the primacy of the

individual person with his unremovable responsibility. In factthis individual ego passes for the final certainty of the phenome-

nologist. This is an important point, not only in view of the

later deve lopment of phenomenology in existentialism , bu t a lso

for our own position. Indeed, personal responsibility can never

be avoided nor pushed off. I think, I live, I must decide, and I

cannot hide myself behind anything. But for a Christian the

ultimate certainty can never be his individuality, let alone his

individual thought.

Intensification of the problematics

As for Husserl, now that he has found his ultimate point

of support in this ego, a clear short-circuit arises. For at the sametime the claim of universal validity is upheld. That is to say,

IIusserl definitely wants to arrive at this 'ego ,' and tha t by means

of the so-called phenomenological reduct ion. The la tter amounts

1.0 a methodical ref lect ion and as such remains umproblematic, i .e.)

it is trusted as the only way to the universal Truth. Husserl, to

ho sure, does not simply stick to his former standpoint, when he

HPol<.(' about the self -e limination of the phenomenologis t. When

h(· 11-1 HI'HI'('hhl~~ r-xplk-It ly /'01' the universal origin of 'meanings ' and

I'Clt' I h IH PIII'POHC' IIIIl'o«lIc'.'1-I hi" »honomonologtcal 01' 1ransccndental



reduction, this 'self-elimination' can no longer run so smoothly. For

in this reduction the whole world (with its concomitant 'empirical'

subjectivi ty) is, as Husserl puts it , 'bracketed ' or even methodi-

cally 'annulled' and the 'pure' temporal stream of transcendental

consciousness is left, and in this the pure transcendental ego

appears as the constitutor of his meaning-world by means of his

intentional achievements . How then can this origin, this funda-

mental being, be the result, the 'resuiue' of the reduction? The

latter is, after all, a reflection and continually remains related to its

anti-pole, generally called the (world' (with its 'empirical,' 'naive,''natural' or 'human' subjectivity in i t) .

But the other pole of the humanistic ground-motive, i.e.

'autonomy,' as well as the intrinsic relativity of theoretical re-

flection - its tendency to the Origin of meaning - cannot fail

to stir. Husserl has to concede that the phenomenological 'residue,'

the 'transcendental subjectivity,' at the same time must be the

condit ion of possibi li ty of the reduction itself and must be 'anti-

cipated.' But as long as this transcendental subjectivi ty in fact

only represents the absolutized phenomenological reflection itself,

which must borrow its content from the object of this reflection

and in which the individual philosopher is not recognizable, the

autonomy-pole remains suppressed, Therefore Husserl speaks

afterwards about the 'splitting of the ego,' which accomplishes

itself in the phenomenological attitude (Einstellung). And at

last the reduction is also presented as an inner change, a sort

of rel igious conversion, which must take place in one fell swoop

(in einem Schlage) and without which phenomenology cannot

really be understood.

At the same moment the problem of (intersubjecti'llity' be-

comes very urgent . Husserl has given some complicated reflec-

tions to this topic," which is very important in our 'social' age

and is much discussed. I cannot here retrace the l ine of his argu-

ment. It results in the conception that there is a plurality of'monads': strictly individual units, which in the last resort are

only bound together by phenomenologicalrationality and of which

the phenomenologicizing Ego is the primordial one (Urmonade).

On the other part, only the horizon of the 'world' can be the all-

embracing coherence of the subjectivities.

8 Esp . in h is Cartesiomische Meditattlonen (Cartesian Meditations), Den Haag1950, and his Formale und Transzendentale LoOilc (Formal and Transcen-dental Logic), Hal le a.d.S. 1929.

:\0

As a matter of fact, even when the ego in its subjective

autonomy has urged itself upon the great phenomenologist, the

coqito (with its inevitable annex, the 'world') retains the predomi-

nant position. Husserl clearly expresses this, when in his last

work, The Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenome-

nology, he says: (The method demands that the (transcendental)

Ego comes to know itself by systematic analysis , starting from

its concrete world-phenomenon." At bottom, however, i t is not

the method that makes its demands. Fundamentally we are con-

cernedwith the urge ofthe (ego' to autonomous, universal meaning-giving. This urge wants to realize i tself in methodical-theoretical

analysis. But analysis always remains analysis-of . , . , and a

method alway remains a way, which starts somewhere. Therefore

the urge to universal sovereignty, which wants to realize i tself

in this methodical analysis, can only 'maintain' itself in a con-

tinuously and laboriously endeavored reductive (reflexive) liber-

ation from that to which reflection remains necessarily related.

This religious 'state of affairs ' implies that the constituting Ego

(Ur-Ich), in spite of its key-position, must get to the background.

The so-called(natural attitude' is characterized by the naive direct-

edness of the subject to the 'world' (of things, events and values)

round about it, and this attitude must be radically altered intothe 't ranscendental att itude,' in which the subject learns to dis-

cover i tself as the ' intent ional const itutor ' of i ts world. Never-

theless, the natural attitude remains the necessary presupposition

or condition, without which the apparently autonomous reflection

(of the individual subject) cannot operate. In other words,

Husserl, who strenuously and passionately had tried to arrive at

a concrete-critical philosophy, participates in the crisis of human-

istic self-consciousnessand indeed became an important exponentof it.

Final remar7cs

The latter must be said, because the father of phenomenology

was right in underlining the special place and meaning of our

logical, analytic function in its 'acting.' Rightly he did not

ontent himself with speaking about subjective 'acts' and 'expe-

riences,' about 'significance,' 'facts,' 'values' etc., without explicitly

giving account of the fact that we always are concerned with a

11"))i(1 M!'!,hodn (1f'fOl'dC'l'L nun, dllHA dnH (1g'0 v on sei nom k on kr oto n Welt-.I)hlll1ol111'1I IIUH HYML('lUlltiHC'l1 1I11)'il('lcfl'I1g'L und daboi sich HolbHL ... kcnncn)(II'I1t.". 7'1/,1 i (J ri ni n .• .• JI, 1(11,



'conscious' subject . Man knows what he does, and in the temporal

order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflect ion is com-

mitted , human responsib ility is 'founded ' in h is logical (wh ich is

not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl,

against irrationalism, which also gained ground in Dilthey's 'Cri-

tique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely

because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of

humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly

the inner d isco rd of the human istic g round-position as such .

This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to irrat ionali sm,

as Dilthey made and the existential ist phenomenologists, fol lowing

his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi:ation betweenthe two repelling poles of (ego) and 'coqito] as Husserl made in

his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can

be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very

outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is

noth ing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's

radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation

of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance

of th is faith fu l su rrender to this Word-revelation , which reveals

to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function

unfold its proper and important meaning, viz.) the ever more

refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given)'i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics)

in which God's creative power works in the direction of his

coming Kingdom. Th is Kingdom has come and is coming th rough

the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the

Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profes-

sion he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be

any other than to distinguish sharp ly and continuously tru th from

the error which lives in the heart of us all.

Lecture II


1. Introduction)' general remarks

In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenome-

nology. Much might be said abou t this continuation of phenome-

nology. In the period between the two world wars, especially

since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world

war, th is phenomenological ex isten tia lism conquered the mind

of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It sur-

passed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomeno logy, in

the first place because of the turn which the famous modern

philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of

Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phe-

nomeno logy. H is book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), firstpublished in, 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend

the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger 's

train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain

extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we

can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture

we shall comment on the most outstand ing French phenomenolo-

gist Jean-Paul Sartre.

The success of exis tentialis t phenomenology is based to a large

extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey,

i.e., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original

way and with a peculiar and suggestive expressiveness. The latte r

point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but

Merleau-Ponty too, deal elaborately with the importance of lan-

guage. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher,

is a p rominen t litera ry figure; the first vo lume of his autobiogra-

phy appeared recently under the title The Words. (Les Mats).

2. Sch(3Z(3r)shenomenological (personalism)

FlrHt. of n11 le'1 w, I race Ihe' trnnsl tlon from Husscrl's thought

10 phc'I lOnl(l llOlog l( ,l I\ P X1 Ht<'1I1 \1l \iHIl1 . S C'!w\( 'r 'H propurn! ion for 1hiR

:i



'conscious' subject . Man knows what he does, and in the temporal

order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflect ion is com-

mitted, human responsibility is 'founded' in h is logical (wh ich is

not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl,

aga inst irrationa lism , which also gained ground in Dilthey 's 'Cri-

tique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely

because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of

humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly

the inner d isco rd of the humanistic g round-position as such .

This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to ir ra tionali sm,

as Dilthey made and the existential ist phenomenologists, fol lowing

his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi'ation between

the two repelling poles of {ego' and 'coqiio] as Husserl made in

his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can

be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very

outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is

nothing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's

radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation

of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance

of this faithful surrender to th is Word-reve lation , which reveals

to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function

unfold its proper and important meaning, viz., the ever more

refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given;

i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics,

in which God's creative power works in the direction of his

coming Kingdom. This Kingdom has come and is coming through

the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the

Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profes-

sion he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be

any o ther than to distingu ish sharp ly and continuously tru th from

the error which lives in the heart of us all.

...,~

Lecture II


1. Introduction; general remarks

In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenome-

nology. Much might be said about th is con tinuation of phenome-

nology. In the period between the two world wars, especially

since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world

war, th is phenomenolog ical ex isten tialism conquered the mind

of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It sur-

passed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomenology , in

the first place because of the turn which the famous modern

philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of

Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phe-

nomeno logy. H is book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) , first

published in 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend

the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger's

train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain

extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we

can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture

we sha ll comment on the most outstanding French phenomeno lo -

gist Jean-Paul Sartre.

The success of exis tentia lis t phenomenology is based to a large

extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey,

i .e ., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original

way and with a pecul iar and suggestive expressiveness . The la tter

point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but

Merleau-Ponty too, dea l e laborately with the importance of lan-

guage. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher,

is a prominent literary figu re; the first volume of his autobiog ra-

phy appeared recently unde r the title The Words. (Les Mots).

2. Scheier'« phenomenological (personalism'

I·'in;t. or. all 1('1 us 1race the ' t rans it ion f rom Husser l' s thought

1n pil t' II<l1I lf 'l lOlog\ ('1l1 ( 'X lston 1nllsm. St"tw\<'r'H prepara tion for this



transition can be called a phenomeno logical 'personalism .' Th is

philosopher must have been a brilliant, fascinating personality

and was very well read but had a restless mind. Till the end

of his life he searched again and again for certainties in the

dynamic developments of his t ime.

As for Husserl, his main problem was the question of the

universal trustworthiness of scientific thought as such. The as-

surance of this implies that the historical 'stream of life' as

well as religious persuasions, and even the person of the phe-nomenolog ist himself have to be suspended in order to fall within

the phenomenological reduction. This reduction was not meant

as a real destruction) but it was at any rate an elimination of the

given meaning-coherence of reality, in order to reconstruct it

by a supposedly autonomous phenomenological thought. In the

first lecture I tried to po int out some aspects of the en tanglement

which then arises. The fundamental entanglement is this, that

only the phenomenological method can restore order, but only

at the cost of the transcendental (ego/ which nevertheless should

remain the ultimate guarantee and active source of phenomeno-

logical 'constitution.' In fact th is ego remains a vacuum. To be

sure, Husserl makes a final attempt to fill the vacuum and forth is purpose appeals, like Dilthey, to 'histo ricity.' Th is appears

for instance from a statement of his last period: "The mind em-

braces all beings in an absolute historicity." Even then, however,

the 'teleology' of history, according to him, consists in its ratio-

nality, fulfi ll ing itself in the methodical questioning of phenomeno-

logical though t as the truly conscious, responsible way of living .

Phenomenology as a (tool)

In Scheler, however, we can see how the tension between the

phenomenological systematics and that wh ich the phenomenolo-

gist has ultimately in view, increases more and more. System-

atics as such falls to the background. But from there, with its

overstrained abstract structure, i t keeps exert ing its silent strength.

Herbert Spiegelberg is right when he writes that for Scheler the

main destination of phenomenology lies "in the developmen t and

utili za tion of impulses which Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson had

given to modern thought long before Husserl," and that Scheler

"conceived of phenomenology as the great tool ... , as a s tepping

stone on the way to his ulterior objectives." 1 But the interesting

t H. SJli('g-clbllr~r, 01'. oit . , p.p, 240, 200.

and important question is: is this tool, this stepping stone, only

an innocent and harmless thing, which as such is neutral with

respect to the 'ulterior objectives'? We have seen that in Husserl

the methodical problematics was a direct expression of a funda-

mental one: in the beginning two impulses collide with each other,

namely, the ideal of autonomous freedom and the avid desire

to universal rat ional domination, which only seeks 'accommodation'

in the structure o f methodical, theoretical though t.

(Pract ica l) reason; values and logic

With Scheler, 'practical reason' emphatically claims its r ights

within the phenomenological movement. While Husserl remained

mixed up in the problems of the assurance of the classical science-

ideal and expected the decisive answer to all the questions of

conscious life from a 'radical theory of knowledge,' Scheler shows

a primary interest in "the place of man in the cosmos." 2 Just

like Kant he fixes his eye on the ethical function of man's acting.

For the rest, Scheler's trend of thought is considerab ly different

from the Kantian. We cannot elaborate on this comparison now.

Suffice it to say in this connection that Scheler in the final resort

falls back upon the individual person as the centre of an ir ra tional-istic act-life, wherein 'values flash up' (as he puts it).

According to Scheler, the values are a priori given) namely,

within 'consciousness.' Scheler wants to maintain the phenome-

nological principle of 'intentionali ty.' However, this consciousness

is not theoretical-log ical, but the 'emotional feeling .' With in this

emotional-voli tional consciousness the values are materia lly and

a priori present. Their content can be brought to light and

established by ethics, and this in entire independence of logic.

Here Scheler's turning away from Husserl is clear. Logic, he

says, should not be coordinated with ethics as another value-

science, because truth, with which logic is concerned, is not a

value at all. It is an 'idea,' different from all values and fulfilling

itself, when the meaning-content of a judgment is in accord with

a state of affairs and this accord itself is given evidently.

Scheler's detachment of ethics from logic is connected with his

irrationalism. The accomplishment of the subject ive 'emot ional'

acts is as such the final source of values. The values 'flash up'

" 'l'h ln iM t.hl' Iit.l« of nn« or t h« illHL public a Lions of Scheler : Die Stellung

11"11 /11"//111111"11 i/II /\OHII/li/l (1IlilK). ~'kh(\l(,t"H main work is entitled: Der

II'/I"IIII/""IIIII~ i ll , /' " /I/lIIilr IIlId il i» uuurriu!» II"'/ 'Iothi/C (1913 ctc.) (Formal-

I/I'm. ;11 1'11""11 "1/'/ //11/1,'/'/'", 1)1I/1/,."I/I/(IH),



in this activity of 'feeling,' preferring, loving, hating etc. Scheler

is still too much of a phenomenologist and too much of a disciple

of Husserl to forget that he himself is at work in a philosophical,

theoretical-logical way. He admits that his own statements con-

cerning 'values' etc. must also satisfy a criterion of truth.

What then is this criterion? No other than the universal

validity of the phenomenological ' in tuition of essences' (Wesens-

schau); - in this case: essences of values, of evaluating acts

and of the person as the one, unique and individual accomplisherof the different acts. Even the fact that the values flash up,

come to 'givenness' in the original, 'personal' accomplishment

of the act, belongs to the 'state of affairs,' and this state of

affa irs is establi shed and judged by the phenomenological essence-

intuition. Scheler, to be sure, describes this phenomenological

intuition as an immediate insight into the a priori contents of

the subjective acts and their connections, and within his system

logical thought, as we were able to observe, shifts to the second

rank: the reflection is called an accompaniment, be it an imme-

diate one, of the act itself. Husserl's sharp distinction of the

'natural' and the phenomenological attitude, which had to make

room for the constitu tive activity of phenomenological reflectionas such, fades away. Nevertheless, Scheler himself declares too

that the so-called immediate phenomenological insight itself is

possible only when one abstracts from every way of setting the

subjects who think the act-essences, in their 'natural equipmen t,'

as well as from an 'object' (Gegenstand) to which the act-essences

might be applicable. Here the abstract character of Scheler's

final criterion becomes evident.

The fundamenta l an tinomy

Scheler further exerts himself to save his irrationalistlc

position within the abstract area of the phenomenological es-

sences. Therefore he speaks emphatically about the individual

person as the immediate ly experienced, never objectif iable , unity

of the act -li fe , with its concrete , s tr ic tly individual (world) as its

'objective' correlatum. But this attempt only sharpens the anti-

nomy. For this individual, autonomous origin of values etc.,

which has its 'reflection' as one possibility among and even

under others, 1'emains contained within the supposed universa l

phenomenological reflection. And the latter cannot lose its typi-

cal, so-called intentional subject-object-rela tion, which keeps ex-

press ing i tse lf, for example , in the irrcmovabln rclutodnos» of the

l

'person' to his 'world.' Even ir-rationalism has fixed itself on

the absolutized theoretical subject-object- re la tion, which never-

theless continues to manifest its intrinsic rela tiv ity. The diff iculty

of this position must reveal itself. Scheler says that the phenome-

nologically established act-essences, however clear, a priori and

material they may be, require a 'supplement' (Erganzung), in

so far as they also should be. The term 'supplement' i s especia lly

significant here! On the other hand, Scheler defends his irra-

tionalistic view on the significance of the individual person in h is

acts (as the source of the final evidence) by saying that this

'state of affairs' has its foundation in the essence of being) not of

' tru th .' He himself, however , had maintained the universally valid

criterion of truth for his own statements.

At any rate we must see how in this way the question of

'being' gains in importance. H.eidegger, for whom 'values' and

abstract phenomeno logical 'essences' have lost their weight, will

make this question the predominating one.

As for Scheler, ultimately there is no other answer to his

question of the place of man in the cosmos than this: the being

of man is a fissure) namely, between the side of his natural,

vital, but 'blind' existence and the side of his 'spiritual,' steering,bu t in themselves powerless acts. In this anwer the 'nothingness'

of human being, about which existentialism speaks, already an-

nounces itself.

3. Heidegger

The question of Being

Let us now consider how Heidegger enters the play. In the

rapidly increasing collapse of former cer ta inties (which collapse

had been accelerated considerably by the first World War and

its consequences) Heidegger undertakes the impressive venture

of putting the question of the meaning of Being as such. Accord-

ing to the philosopher, it is the question of all questions, the

most fundamental one because ultimately it inquires after the

ground and totality of the meaning of all beings. At the same

time it is the most concrete question, for Being is ever the

being of a being. Heidegger says that he does not want to lose

himself in vague metaphysical speculations. But however con-

crete and varied Being may be, everywhere it is Being that is

at stake. EV('t 'ything 'i.'i, a stone, a flower, a cat, a chair, a con-

ept, n l -l tl lt<' , 1\ I II 1111. It may be small or large, beautiful or ugly,

oorl 01' bud, It IIl1ly h•• thlH or thn t, thll-l wny or that way, but

:1



i t always is. Dilthey may have drawn the attention to historical

'life' as an irreducible datum, which cannot be substantialized,

Husserl and Scheler may have warned continuously against dealing

with consciousness and personal acting as things) - even then

the question of the meaning of the being of 'life,' 'consciousness'

and 'acts' as well as of thingness remains.

This seems to be a hopeful start, the most critical one till

now: finally even the age-old mystifications called 'consciousness'

and 'thought' seem to be made problematic; the question of

their being, of their meaning, seems to be put. But how does

Heidegger continue?

The question of the 'Archsmedeosi po in t) o f the ph ilosopher

In order to avoid meaningless speculations and to discover

a first hold and clue in the obvious obscurity of the fundamental

question, we have to address ourselves to a be' ing. But which?

We must realize that this is an important question. It is the

question of the Archimedean point of the philosopher. The choice

cannot be arbitrary; otherwise the answer to the fundamental

question can be missed. The only being that is able to assume

the role of the Archimedean point is the being which inquiresafter the meaning of Being-as-such, i.e. of us ourselves, more

precise ly, of the philosopher himself . Every ques tion concerning

a matter needs a preceding guidance on behalf of that which is

sought. According to Heidegger this means that there is already

a certain understanding-of-Being (Seinsverstandnis) and that this

understanding has to be the central starting-point and clue for

our inquiry after the meaning of Being.

You may remark that Heidegger follows Husserl's line in

his turn to the 'subject' - though he likes to avoid this charged

term - and tries to present a real self-reflection. But we have

to observe likewise that Heidegger as well as Husserl considers

this human understanding of 'Being' as the primary, autonomous

point from which we are able to start, be it in a 'provisional'

way. Provisional, for the idea of Being as such is already pre-

supposed in the fixation of this special being. Therefore, properly

speaking, the investigation ought to be 'repeated' in the reversed

direction, after the meaning of Being-as-such has become clear.

This point is important in order to understand the significance

of Heidegger 's later so-called 'reversal ' (Kehre). For the moment

suffice it to say that the so-called provisional chn 1"11('1 ('I' of lIei-

degger 's s tarting-point is , indeed, connected with till' dllll'llC'1er

:IH

of Heidegger 's basic denominator, viz.) with his pronounced his-

toricism, but that does not alter the fact that it is Heidegger's

firm and permanent Archimedean point. As long as the meaning

of Being-as-such remains 'questionable ' and obscure for the philo-

sophical insight, this point continues to be the first and final

point, where the clue of philosophical questioning has been af-

fixed."

Since, secondly, the most fundamental question and the clue

to its answer are concerned, this understanding of Being is not

an accidental quality of this inquiring being, but is its most

essential characteristic. To be sure, it remains one being among

others and as such does not coincide with Being-itself. But it

nevertheless is (literally) out-standing, by virtue of its under-

stand ing o f Being. To put it in Heidegger's own words: the antic

characteristic of this being consists in its being ontological.

Here too Heidegger remains true to the phenomenological

tackling of Husserl, who continually had harped on the string

of the 'intentional consciousness,' which never should be passed.

Indeed, as we observed above, in the temporal order the human

function of logical distinction is presupposed by all of the follow-

ing functions. But this is not to say that this function can playthe role of the central core and focus in which all other functions

are concentrated. No single function can take this role, but

all are neither more nor less than so many rays from the one and

only focus and root of our temporal existence.

The idea of (existence)

Meanwhile Heidegger has coined a special term for his Archi-

medean point. It is the practically untranslatable German word

Dasein, literally rendered: to-be-there. By this designation Hei-

degger does not mean that this being can be localized in a fixable

here or there. We must remember that this being is out-standing.

This word can be taken as the literal translation of Heidegger's

other descr iption of this being, viz., existence (ex-sistence). And

this is to say, that Dasein. is the opposite of all locally determinable

phenomena. Its being-there is the openness, the unlocked-ness

(Erschlossenheit) as such, and only through this openness can all

beings appear in their being; it is the primary and necessary

.ondition of possibility for them to come to light.

n C], IIt.ltI(lllllt'r, S tt ill I lII d Zl'it, p, llR.

:m



Heidegger explains his intentions by pointing to the being-

temporality of the Dasein, i .e.) its being-historicity. Dasein is

thorouglhy temporal, never fixable here or there, but always

'further,' 'beyond'; is nothing substantial, but 'existential,'

standing-out. Here at the same time the true meaning of its

ireedom. reveals itself, which is obscured in different manners by

philosophy. We can cling to a kind of soul-substance in the manner

of Greek thought, or to a thinking substance like that of Des-

cartes, or to the consciousness-in-general as a formal unity of

'transcendental' thought (in the way of Kant), or even to thetranscendental ego coaito of Husserl and the 'person' of Scheler.

True freedom, however, consists in transcending all sorts of

'givenness,' in being ever beyond all these points of support.

These points fix the 'time' in a present of one kind or another.

Heidegger, on the contrary, admits the primacy of the future

(coming) which is experienced only in the ever new 'instant'

(Augenblick). For this view Heidegger in his early lectures

made reference also to the New Testament and its stress on the

Christian expectation of the future. Incidentally, I make bold

to remark that this may be a humiliating example for us. Too

often we don't live and think from the truth that we have to

expect the fulfilment of the times in the coming of our Lord andthat the past receives its meaning from there, unfolds it fully in

this future. I don't mean to say, however, that ifIeidegger is more

or less a Christian without being aware of it. On the contrary,

Heidegger closes off time in its (undoubtedly important) historica l

aspect, and this implies at the same time a distortion of the

meaning of this aspect, for the latter reveals itself only in its indis-

soluble coherence with all the other aspects. In this case we meet

with a striking elimination of the normativity of this aspect and

with the identification of it with its subjective side.

(Past> and (future>; factic ity and proiec t

The clearest tension which must be established is the tension

between the 'past' and the 'future.' Between this past and this

future stands, of course, the present. But this present cannot dis-

solve the tension, because in reality it is torn asunder by it. In

the 'past' the contingency-side of human existence professes i tself:

always we are already there, in a certain world, which happens to

be thus. This is a last fact which we never can get rid of, namely,

our facticity) and we always carry with us and in us this 'burden'

of our Dasein: This implies that Heidegger rejects the view of

110

the past as a perished 'thing,' with which we are no longer con-

cerned. In this view our being-temporal is not taken into account,

and we are (in the time,' whereby time is conceived as a sort

of space with separate, successive extents. According to Hei-

degger, however, temporality as the meaning of existentiality

unfolds itself in three exis tential perspectives (ex-s tases), which

are equally original - although, as we saw, the 'future' receives

the primacy.

The facticity is also called our throum-ness into the world.

This term is significant for the spirit out of which Heideggerwrote: the disillusionment, the serious decay of the humanistic

ideal of personality. Now that the once vital idealism of free-

dom with its unproblematic start from creative Ego or Mind has

resulted in the historicism of Dilthey, which in its turn had no

effective defence against positivism, no other support appears

to be left for the reflecting man than the 'factual' world. How-

ever, the inner dissatisfaction, the silent revolt against this 'con-

tingent' condition betrays itself in the terms used. Husserl still

retained the persuasion that man's 'worldliness' or 'facti city' was

a more or less accidental feature and even reserved to the subject

(viz.) in phenomenological thought) to rise above this world, to

'transcend' it. Heidegger can no longer agree with this 'solution,'which indeed was none.

For the moment we should stay with the implications of the

'past' in Heidegger's existentia lism. Husserl had to face the vacuum

of the pretended autonomous subjectivity, but he continued to

keep the 'world' at a certain distance; consequently, for the filling

of the vacuum there is no other 'expedient' than to let the subject

cease to be subject, to let it tumble back into the factual world.

Now Heidegger makes the attempt to include, from the outset,

the world in the being of the subjective Dasein itself, to make it

a so-called 'existential' (Existenzial). But this implies that now

the tension returns, even more intensely, within this 'existential'

subject itself.

The historical (objectivi ty) (extant-ness and serviceableness)

Indeed, apart from that, Heidegger continues to speak about

the thrown-noss into the world, and this apparently implies a cer-

tain pre-existence of the latter. Heidegger in fact admits this

by mont lonlng the cxtant-ncss (Vor'handonhei't) as an irreducible

'('11('goI'Y,' 1)('lolIl~i ll{ t Cl thiH world. Furt her, IIcidegger introduces

l H ( I( '( )I ul , I II f 'l Id Jll'lilllll'Y, ('lIt('I~()I'Y, namely that of being-ready-



at-hand, serviceableness (Zuhandenheit ), i .e .) the world of instru-

ments, of 'tools' (Zeug), more or less representing the objective-

histor ical counterpa rt o f the histor ical (existent ial ) subject . These

'tools' are character ized by a so-cal led unto-structure, a structure

of reference-to ... , of in-order-to .... As such they refer more

directly to the existence of Dasein as to-be (Zu-sein), as being

projects itself.

The tension within the Dasein as such: disposition) anxiety;

inauthent ic ity and authent ic ity

This is all quite interesting, but the most important matter

is the manifestation of the tension within the Dasein itself. The

existential significance of the 'past' appears in the 'mood,' the

disposition (Stimmung). By this Heidegger does not mean a psy-

chical phenomenon. According to him the disposi.tion is a much

more profound, ontological datum: we always are already dis-

posed in one way or another; disposition is not something that

we can or cannot have, that we can or cannot make, it is-there,

it 'comes over' us; it is a fundamental tonality of our being-in the-

world, in which we 'find' ourselves (Befindlichkeit).

The fundamental, comprehensive disposition, by which Da-

sein as such is disclosed to itself in its thrown-ness, is anxiety.

Anxiety is not the same as fear. When we fear, we are afraid of a

definite something, of a being within the horizon of the world.

But anx ie ty is anxiety about nothing. When we experience anxiety,

precisely all beings with which we are occupied in the so-called

dissipation of our 'everyday fallen-ness' slip away into insignificance.

What is left is the being-in-the-world as such, our unfoundable

thrown-ness, our being homeless, with which we are confronted

directly. So at least from one side, from the dimension of the

'past,' the Dasein i s pe rmeated by 'no thingness,' by non-being. This

past, as we saw, is never 'gone': anxiety can always arise. This

fundamental 'facticity' is apparently cured, but in fact only dis-

guised by our every-day life of being occupied with the beings

of the world. This contingent 'non-being' remains the permanent

threat - even more than this - of the Dasein. in its 'back.'

But there is more. The attitude of escape, much as it attests

the intrinsic fallen-ness and 'inauthenticity' of the Dasein, would

be impossible if the other dimension of the 'futuro \\'1'1'(1 1I0t

'simultaneously' there. The latter is prepondorunt. IIC'ldl'gg('I', it

is true, cannot do without the 'past,' but ill thI ' tI'll<I)' ( II ' hl~ 1I1'j.!u-

11'

ment it functions mainly as the spring-board, without which the

leap or 'anticipation' of our ex-sistence would not be possible. In

the development of modern Western philosophy we must consider

Heidegger's thought about the 'past' etc. as an eloquent and pene-

t ra ting , be i t somewhat ghost ly, expression of the f inal consequence

of the classical humanistic domination motive. This motive, reli-

giously considered, meant a refusal to start from what is given,

from the granted-ness and therefore significance of our full ex-

istence. Now it has turned into its reverse and man is terrified

by what once was considered as the terrain to which the imma-

nent forces of human domination could be exerted. Now he can-

not but concede the given-ness of our existence, the revelation

which manifests itself in it. He can, however, do anything but

accede to this character of our existence. He continues to main-

tain himself by speaking now about 'thrownness' and facti city

and his final self-revelation in his anxiety. There is no point in

contesting the reality of this anxiety. It does exist and the kernel

of our apostate being is involved in it. I believe that the depth

of the human heart opens better when man has suffered defeat

than when he begins his conquest with great self -confidence,

Thus the domination motive within the 'system' remains, be

it in an inverted, threatening way. The other pole of the human-

istic ground motive, however, the pole of autonomy, expresses

itself in existentialism too, especially in Heidegger, even first of

all in him. For the dimension of the 'past' may be urgently

'present,' ex-sistence also and primarily implies, that Dasein is

'in advance' (sich-vorweg) that it is a to-be and lives in possibility,

as possibility. It is its own project; it has to decide responsibly

in the ever new 'instant,' to choose itself again and again. Its

contingent 'condition' may become a 'situation' by this resolute

decision, which, if maintained as ever new resoluteness tBntschlos-

senheii), attests our possible authentiCity.

Being-unto-death

But what is the meaning or the content of this decision? To

what is Daeein resolved? To itself. But what can this 'self' be? It is

no longer a 'substance' nor a 't ranscendental subjec t' nor a 'person .'

I t i s thoroughly temporal , t.e., historical, and the two co-ordinates

( this historicity, the 'past' and the 'future,' are all-embracing:

the 'present' romalns framed within these two and oscillates to

and I't'O by t I\p Il t t I 'l let ion of' both. Especially in the future di-

1I\('IIHlolI 01' ( 'X iHk ll l'C' ( j( )( 'H 111(' ('iIlHHic'lIi humnnlst k ideal of autono-

4:\



mous personality show its last traces, its last convulsions, which

themselves however demonstrate the obst inate wil l to autonomy,

even in its downfall; for the future as anticipation of being also

results in nothingness. From this side death is the permanent

threat. Here too we must be on our guard against considering

temporal existence as a succession of points, of 'now' points, the

last of which will then be death. Our being is not a being that

has an end, it is a being-unto-end (Sein-zum-Ende). Death is the

utmost possibility for existence, because at the same time it is

its mere impossibility. The really authentic way of existing consistsin facing, in holding out, without any illusion, this utmost possi-

b il ity. Then we re-ca ll ourselves, conscious ly and in consc ience,

from the fallen-ness of our always being-present-to-the-world to

... ? Indeed, to 'nothing,' to our utmost possibility which coin-

cides with our impossibility.

There is no real centre left, towards which the 'historical'

movement of the Dasein can gravitate. Authenticity in reality

amounts to an ever failing and ever renewed attempt at liberation

from inauthenticity, without any positive aim. Even Being-as-

such, the question which directed Heidegger's first start, is not

able to come to the rescue. Indeed, at the end of the book itturns up again, but only as a question. For this Being-as-such

remains at most an idea. An idea which must derive its meaning

from the Archimedean point and root, where the philosopher

has chosen position, namely the abstracted 'historical' existence

in i ts radical ly subject iv istic and irrationa list ic shape. But is th is

point able to serve as a rea l Archimedean point? No, for it manifests

its abstract character in the permanent polarity of Dasein and its

'world,' and it consumes itself in its inner discord. Thus its inner

in-self-sufficiency manifests itself after all. Therefore the question-

of-Being, as the question of the totality of meaning, must persist,

but also continue to be a question, because a preliminary answer,

and a false one, has been given.

The pecul iar char,acter Of the fundamental tension in He idegger

Here we touch the fundamental problemat ics of Heidegger's

phenomenological ontology as well as the roots of the general

and sharp dist inction of authentici ty and inauthentlc ity. A similar

distinction turns up, somehow and somewhere, in every humanistic

philosophy. In Husserl we came across it in his speaking about

the 'natural attitude' and the 'trancendcntal,' pbonomonologlcal

ono, which at a glv('n moment resulted ill !\ ':4pliWt)r~ of 1hC'

Ego.> Gradually the problematics of the 'outer' world and its

exis tence loses its preponderance in the development of Western

philosophy and the main interest concerns the 'subject' and its

act-life. But as this happens, even more strongly a dualism ap-

pears within this 'subject,' which always remains primarily a

knowing, either a principially 'theoretical' or a historically 'under-

standing,' subject. We should make a serious mistake if we

should think that in the distinction of authenticity and inauthen-

ticity a point of contact might be discovered with the Christian

confession of the inner discord of our life, about which Paul

speaks so penetratingly in the 7th chapter of his epistle to the

Romans. We must be clearly aware of the fact that the 'natural'

or 'inauthentic' way of living is essentiall y ind ispensab le and in -

superable within the system of the phenomenologist . This system,

as a manifestation of the supposed 'original,' i.e., revealing and

re-creating phenomenological thought, cannot do without a cer tain

opposed domain, which as such is marked by meaninglessness and

obscuri ty, and therefore is capable of re-creat ion and revela tion.

In this oppositional relation the typical structure of theoretical

thought, however absolutized and distorted, continues to shine

through. (In theoretical thought we always meet with an element

of resistance.)" That is why the frequently mentioned (worrld'reta ins, on the background, an irreducible posi tion , which makes

possible the so-called natural attitude or inauthenticity of the

'subject.' This 'world,' to be sure, is no longer the fixed and closed

natural area of the former natural scientific ideal of science,

but in the first place is the 'lived' world of the 'historical' subject

in its handling and shaping things, its 'field' of historical experience

and 'pract ical ' understanding. Certa in ly , this h is torical 'dress' as

such undoubtedly gives evidence of 'a better awareness of the dy-

namic character of the whole creation. But in this dress the

classica l scheme i tsel f, with its subject -objec t-polarity, is main-

tained." Consequently, because, on the one hand, the 'world'

always remains related to the human subject and its responsibleactivity, the inauthenticity must be a subjective matter, but be-

cause, on the other hand, the world happens to be here in its

mere and permanent presence , even the 'authentic ' existence must

retain its polar relation to this world, be it in a 'reserved' way.

, For an elaboration of this point I may refer to the publications of Prof.

Dooyeweerd, esp. his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, an d also

his In the TwUiUht o] Western Thouuht.

D Ro(\ 1I1HO Prof', Mt'lt1c(IH, Sl'h01J1·1i?1{IH01JOnbwri'llU 11'11. WijsllC'!lOlwto (1961), p, 91-OR.



But on account of this splitting-up of the subject, a very

urgent question arises: where does the philosophiz ing subject i tself

stand, the thinker who reveals al l these 'rela tions' in his phenome-

nology? Let us give the answer at once: nowhere, i.e., he 71.a8

crept auay behind his phenomenoioqica l (system' in order to let

his thought retain the character of revelation of the T1"Uth at

any price. This price is high for a fundamental antinomy becomes

evident now. As phenomenological existentialism, strongly in-

fluenced by the increasing historistic trend of Western thought,

- which in Husserl still had remained mainly an undercurrent -,

puts all its eggs in the basket of indiv idualist ic , moving and

split-up 'existence,' the more the necessity of aiming at the pos-

ition of the philosopher himself must suggest, together with the

impossibi li ty of this posit ion . The more the phi losopher is forced

to conceal himself, in order to be 'able' to maintain the silently

claimed (unity' and universality of his pos it ion as a philosopher.

The more the trust, the faith in his phenomenological thought

comes to light, a thought which in this case tries to join, in an

a priori synthes is, the (abs trac ted) historical func tion as i ts bas ic

denominator. Indeed, it i s the s ignif icance of phenomenological

existential ism to have made this fundamenta l problemat ics (with

which we all are concerned) clear as to its fundamental character.

As for Heidegger, in order to loosen the question of Being,

he had chosen his starting-point in our 'understanding' of Being.

This is explained as 'existential ,' h istorical , ' ri sky, ' because in th is

'understanding' Dasein's own being is 'at s take,' because ready-made

answers and certainties can never be given and this being is

rather a question in itself. It is also explained as ever individual

(jemeinig). Of course Heidegger does not deny the reality of

society, but this is in the first place a datum belonging to the

inauthentici ty . Here prec isely 'nobody' or, as Heidegger prefers

to put it , 'people' (das Man) is leading. The philosopher , i t is t rue,

theoretically reserves a place for authentic being-with-others

(Mitsein), but as a matter of fact this is a very small place and,

in the last resort, this authentic being-with-others can derive its

meaning only from the authentic being-in-advance of the st rict ly

individual existence. As Heidegger himself states, "the Dasein

is authentically itself in the original isolation of the silent, anxiety-

facing resoluteness." 6

All these features may be elaborated in an impressive and

suggestive manner, but very soon it appears that this 'existence'

n SlIin. wnd Zllit, p. 822.

Hi

cannot be the true Archimedean point. It is not really a prime

datum} which is unfolded within phi losophical ref lect ion, but it is

a fi rst poin t of contact to philosophical thought and finally appears

to be a point fixed by and receiving its meaning f rom this supposed

autonomous thought. Heidegger declares that this 'primary' un-

derstanding of Being is vague and average and therefore cannot

serve as the suitable clue to the ontological reflection; on the

contrary it must be investigated by this reflection itself. Heidegger

to be sure finds himself obliged to say, that this ontological

reflection also ultimately must be rooted in the existential, ontic

being-and-understanding of the philosopher himself. He has to

say this because he pretends to give a true self-reflection, even

the most fundamental one until now. But this remark in fact

remains only incidental and the philosopher himself for the rest

remains hidden behind his philosophy, even to the extent that

further on in the argument this existential philosophy is brought

on the scene as the " in terpre ta tive liberation of the Daseisi to. its

utmost existential possibility." Here the proper character of this

humanis tic philosophy, its pseudo-revelation/ its pretention to

be the final, universally valid Wor'd, is very clear. It is all the

more clear because the content of this philosophy is marked by

'his toric ity,' ' indiv idua li ty ,' 'ques tion ,' threa t, anxie ty , death e tc.

Heuieqoer's idea of phenomenology as 'hermeneutics'

Concerning the phenomenological character of this ontology,

Heidegger like Scheler accentuates the methodical, the way-char-

ac te r of phenomenology. Now that real ity and even the vehemence

of 'history' and its speed has urged itself upon theoretical reflec-

tion too, the so-cal led transcendental , d isengaged att itude of the

'coqito' with i ts 'const itut ion ' of an ideal universe - which Husser l

himself already tried to 'supply' later on - is quickly going

to lose its appeal. But this does not imply that a really new

position is discovered.

Heidegger, who wants to focus the true depth of life, its

dynamic 'be ing, ' presents the phenomenology as a 'hermeneuiice,'This term is adopted by Heidegger from Dilthey, who had borrowed

it from the theologian Schleiermacher.

'l'hiA 1.(\ 'm h nf l h( lO I1 borr-owed from Prof. Mckkcs. For a more elaborate

tliH('UHHioll of' 1.1\" qll!'Hli(loIlH wh irh in ~I!(\H(, lectures can only be glancedut, tWlI lily li?"lI;"I'/u.' t ll ld "/ '' '/ '( /( /; // I/ / /( 11 / cl" f l' lI (/ml 'l /ol()f I;~o/w ?·l ldo. vol. J,A'r lu ll I l ou a ( (' ", ." ., ,( // ; 1I /I I/ ,/ ·t ll /l Il ;t ll I u] / th ,'/ ItI/ //I'l It ll tl l/ ;I 'I I! 1 'IIII~O/l J).



Theology has a lot on its conscience already, but especially

in its idea of 'hermeneutics' it has increased its guilt, precisely

because this subject looks rather innocent and apparently in-

volves no specula tive dogmat ical const ruct ions. Nowadays th is

subject enjoys an unprecedented interest (cf. Bultmann). But

we have to be very careful here! Too often the essential idea of

this 'hermeneutics' implies that God's Word-revelation needs theo-

logical interpretation) in order to be understood really by the

faithful to whom it speaks. The reliable methods of this theo-

logical interpretation must then be learned in 'hermeneutics.'It goes without saying that those theologians, who still maintain

that God reveals Himself in his Word, never want to attach more

importance to hermeneutics and interpretation than an inter-

mediary one. This in itself is enough to shrink from, but, as a

matter of fact, it is not all. For since in God's Word-revelation

we are concerned most eminently with our only Creator and

Redeemer himself, who can be heard only with our heart (which

does not mean that our logical function is excludoo), the mere

thought of being an (intermediary) is foolish pride and in fact

implies a substitution of God's living universal and re-creating

Word-revelation by theological 'reason.'

A similar state of affairs must be established with regard

to Heidegger 's idea of phenomenology as an 'hermeneutics of the

Dasein:' Here th is Dasein in a humanistic manner is put in the

foreground as the primary and final origin of meaning-giving

and therefore as self-revealing. But because this Dasein at the

same time is 'vague' and 'inauthentic' self-understanding and

lives in 'dissimulation' and 'forgottenness, ' i.e.) because the self-

sufficiency of philosophical reflection must be maintained, there-

for the Dasein needs phenomenology to discover, to reveal to

it its true 'being.' To reveal to it, I say, for the existential Dasein

must remain the point from which (as Heidegger puts it) philo-

sophical questioning arises and to which it hits back. Thereforephenomenology as 'hermeneutics' plays 'only' an ' in termediary'

role. But we have seen already, that this 'modest' role can no

more be upheld than theological 'hermeneutics' can be (the wrong

hermeneutics, I mean). Phenomenology, even if adjusted to

Heidegger's spec if ic a ims, remains the dec isive and universal ly

valid "way of access to and determination of that which becomes

the theme of ontology." 8

n 8(1ihl U7l(Z Zl'it, p. 36.

f.I

3. Sartre

Introductory remarks

I should like to conclude this lecture with a few remarks

about the most outstanding representative of French phenome-

nological existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre. If you now feel in-

clined to heave a deep sigh, I can assure you that I can 'under-

stand' that in a more than phenomenological way. But recall the

warning I gave you in the beginning of my first lecture: the

subject-matter cannot be presented more easily. It is Cl. laborious

and difficult endeavor to penetrate into the phenomenologicalphilosophy and to arrive at the points which really are at stake,

without breaking off the 'dialogue' prematurely,

Sart re openly admits tha t he has been influenced profoundly

by Heidegger. He also wants to present a phenomenological

'ontology,' which is both existentialistic and historicistic: the

(distorted) historical temporality in its subjective, even still more

pronouncedly individua lized, side functions as the basic denomi-

nator of human existence, i.e., of 'human reality,' as Sartre often

puts it . Nevertheless Sartre's existentia lism is spec if ic. To char-

acterize it very briefly, we may call it an existential ism of can-

sciousness. Sartre wants to cling to the cogito of his famous

French predecessor, Descartes. However, within his system this

subjective cogito ultimately falls into the abyss of nothingness) of

non-being. The title of Sartre's main work is Being and Nothing-

ness (L'etre et le neant),

Dialectics of 'consciousnees'

Let us try to understand what this curious accentuation of

consc iousness means. According to Sartre, Heidegger has not ye t

entirely settled accounts with idealism. This is a rather serious

reproach, because Sartre thinks that we are in need of a 'concrete'

philosophy, which throws idea lism overboard for good. The lat te r

must be considered as an alienation of man from himself, from

his being-free and being-responsible. It fixes man, above his

'world ,' in a so-cal led transcendental consciousness, conce ived

of as a system of ideas. Indeed, man's freedom and responsibility

arc anchored in his being-conscious. But then we must take con-

sciousness in its phenomenological meaning, viz., as intentionality)

and this implies for Sartre tha t consciousness always is conscious-

ncsH-of-sV?nOLh'i.'I'lfl-ol.'W.Consciousness has no interior ity, it is only

its own outside '; i t. is un nhsolutc 'flight,' a refusal to be 'sub-

xtunthtl.' ThlH IH'll lg.lu-f11ght dll ll 'ne'tc'! ' 01' ccnscfousncss involves

n



that it is a movement. Here Sartre's irrationalistic historicism

appears: this movement is primordial, fundamental and un-

regulated , norm-less, is wholly an affai r of subjec tive, indiv idual

consciousness itself.

The presence-to . . . .

Sart re , however , d iffe rs from Heidegger in his accentuat ion

of the present. He wants to maintain that the movement is con-

sc ious , and consc iousness in the first p lace is presence-to; that is,when I am conscious of a thing, I am present to this thing. NQIW

I must take my decisions, which according to Sartre constitutes

my most proper being: I am choice, which is the same as to

say: I am freedom. I am consciousness, and this is an instant-

aneous manner. Consciousness as presence-to and as choice is

thoroughly spontaneity. It retains, it is true, its temporality-struc-

ture, i.e., the dimensions of the 'past' and the 'future' can never

be neglected. Every decision has a certain motive) because it is

accomplished in a factual 'situation.' But this implies by no

means that this decision is explicable or would be predictable from

th is 'mot ivation ' and 'si tuation .' On the contrary, in the same con-

dition a certa in person, as a free existence , might have made qui te

another decision, might have projected himself as quite another

possibility. In fact the meaning of the 'situation' is determined

by the choice as its situation. Without this spontaneous meaning-

giving there would only exist a brute, meaningless massive 'con-

dition,' a pure being-in-itself (en-soi).

Of course in this 'project' the dimension of the 'future' im-

mediately announces itself. Sartre does not deny that there is

something like Heidegger's 'understanding' as the anticipating

project of the subjective possibilities. He does not think, how-

ever, that this 'understanding' is the most original one. Man can

withdraw too easily from his 'conscious' present and his present

responsibility. Too quickly the 'primacy' of the future may be-come a last idealistic port of refuge, in which man, especially

philosophizing man, tries to evade his real 'situation,' namely,

that he has to decide now. According to Sartre, Heidegger's idea

of existence in general labours under the mistake that it wants

to retain a last reserve, tha t is , in the so-called being-in-advance-

of-itself the projected 'self' is in danger of becoming a new main-

stay, be it a weak one. Then the 'world' can only appear as the

pure distance from 'self' to 'self,' in spite of Heidegger's descrip-

tion of the Dasein as being-in-the-world. Sartre perceives ft slmi-

so

lar tendency in Heidegger's idea of Being-as-such, in which the

Dasein ultimately seems to be lifted up above its tensions and

'saved' in a new substitute of the religious 'transcendent.'

Sartre himself resolutely endeavors to explode for good the

self-complacent attitude of the (bourgeois satisfaW (self-satisfied

bourgeois), be this either a more idealistic or a more positivistic

one, and to arrive at a radical, open confrontation of man with

himself, however horrible this may be. As to the question of

idealism or positivism, Sartre believes there is no fundamental

difference. In the first case the self-sufficiency - which inreality is only an al ienation - is expressed, in the projection of

a 'transcendental subjectivity'; therefore Sartre plainly rejects

Husserl's transcendental Ego as the 'inhabitant ' of consciousness:

he ca lls i t the death of consciousness, because consc iousness only

' lives' in i ts being-unfixed and without any content. In the second

case the sel f-suff icient subjec t remains 'sa fe ' on the background

as the self-assured master of his 'world.'

Appraisal

Sartre is relatively correct in his criticism of Heidegger.

Though time is indeed directed to the future, we can never

make an attempt at playing it off against the present, let alone

use it as an escape from the present into a 'future' as a sort of

myst if icat ion. Heidegger speaks about the 'silence' of authentic

existence, and his extreme histor ic ism does not bring out clear ly

the proper place and meaning of man's logical function, which

in the real temporal order precedes his historical function and in

which his universal responsibility begins to manifest itself. In-

deed, my 'intuit ion, ' as the universa li ty-in- its -own-sphere of my

analytica l (not primarily theore tical ) func tion, accompanies a ll

my acts, inc luding those that are histor ical ly qual ified . Equipped

with this function I have to decide now with respect to the

'future.' This is what Sartre has in mind but cannot really under-

stand because he, i f possible st il l more s trongly than Heidegger ,has bound his thought to the fixed abstract theoretical subject-

objec t-re lat ion in a logicist ic and irra tional ist ic manner . This we

should consider briefly.

The dJissolution of the (self'

Snrt I'() uppenrs to be f'ascinatcd by the word 'oneself,' which

l~rl\nlllll\l k-nlly IH ('1111('(1 It 1'1'I'1('xlv(' pronoun. TIc refuses to make

1111.'1 'rt- f'h-x lv« rr- ullty 1\ ('( '1'111111 jIl'o.l(·('llolI In tho future: it Is

.,1



immediately p resen t as one's own 'reflection.' Th is 'reflection '

is not a real object, as the 'oneself' directly re fe rs to the subjec t.

Nevertheless, some dietomce is left; otherwise, it would not be a

'reflection.' Therefore Sartre speaks about the 'tpreretlecciue coaito;

which is the heart of 'human reality' as a self -conscious one.

Consciousness-of is possible only as consciousness-of-oneself. By

preference Sartre writes this as consciousness (of) oneself, in

order to emphasize that nothing separates the two. This s tructure

is not accidental, as if there would exist a human subject which

has also a self-consciousness. It is the most proper being of thissubject: being self-conscious does not mean that there is a 'self'

somewhere, which has consciousness, for the mentioned 'self' is

itself a conscious one. In this way Sartre arrives at his thesis

that self-consciousness as such is the pure 'reflection,' i.e., nothing,

non-being, because the re is noth ing 'substantial' in it, which would

not be 're flection' itse lf. Self-consciousness is the split-ness as

such, the pure distance, and the origin of all 'negativity' in the

world, but at the same time the essence of human freedom, which

does not tolerate any fixation. This is all elaborated in ample,

difficult , dialect ical reasonings, which continually force the reader

to leap from one side to the other and vice versa. When we read

Sartre, it is as though we enter a hall of mirrors which all

reflect our image in such a confusing way that at last we no

longer know where we are.

{Bad faith'

Sart re tr ies to approach and i llus trate the essential negativi ty

of consciousness by the discussion of some specimens of human

conduct. Sartre dwells especially on the phenomenon of 'bad

faith' (mauvaise [oi), the analysis of which is a striking example

o f h is undaunted , piercing intellec t and of h is d ia lec tical ab ility.

Let this suffice to make clear Sartre's argument." Suppose

somebody reproaches me for drinking too much. Then I might

answer: you are right, this has happened in the 'past,' but just

now I have made up my mind to prevent it from happening

again. At that moment the reproach becomes empty. It hits a

past person but not me as I am now. I appeal to my freedom

and my future and remove myself entirely from the past; my

bad faith consists in my doing as though nothing has ever hap-

pened. But a different answer is possible too. I might reply:

9 See also J. Th. C . Arntz OiP., De liefde in de ontologie vc~n Jcam-PaulSortre (Love in the ontology of Jean-plJIUl Sartro), 1960, p. 205.

r

!I

I happen to be that way, I cannot help it. In that case the re-

proach is also empty for at bottom it does not hit me. As

a matter of fact, my dipsomania in me drinks, not 1. Sartre

concludes that in bad faith the po in t is to constitu te human reality

as a being that is what it is not and is not what it is. And

this bad faith is made possible by the fact that human reality in

its centre does indeed not coincide with itself, that it is a being-

in-non-identity. Therefore bad faith remains the permanent

threat of every existential self-project. The bad nature of this

faith howeve r consists in its use of this being-in-non-identi ty, in

order to shelter oneself (as one 'self') behind this being-in-non-

identity ... as a new 'identity ,' as a new being-in-itself. Accord ing

to Sartre we have to take this split-ness quite radically: our

non-being cannot be made a new 'being ,' bu t it must be understood

as non-being, as a 'hole within being.' On close examination we

cannot say that we are free, but only that we have to be free.

Freedom means to make oneself free, again and again, from the

being-in-itself, which is always present to and even in the heart

of consciousness it se lf, and thus to experience in a radical manner

the spli t-ness of sel f-consciousness . There i s no other 'synthes is '

than the nothingness of the split itself, and in Sartre Being-in-

gene ra l is en tire ly abso rbed in the dialec tica l movement be tweenthese two fixed poles (of being-for-i tself and being-in-itself).

The question of the origin

But when only these two poles are ultimately left, where can

the movement as such, the dynamics of consciousness, arise?

This is an important question, and Sartre cannot neglect it.

He thinks that human reality does indeed pursue a certain ideal,

by which it is attracted, namely the synthesis of the for-itself

and the in-itself. This ideal, however, is impossible, according

to Sartre , because eve ry synthesis between 'the two an tagonistic

'beings' is excluded. It is the idea of God as causa sui (cause of

himself), and this idea must therefore be rejected. But because

this striving, this 'desire to be,' apparently is essential to human

reality, thi s reali ty as such must be called antinomical. As nothing-

ness can only appear as non-being, against the background of

bring, in metaphysics an attempt might be ventured to say more.

The most accep table hypothesis would be , then, that once , a t some

mOI1H\nt,Bdng- l1fHmch has made an attempt at sel f- foundation,

1111<1 tl11H IItl('mpt. has resulted in its divlsion. Here the power-

(,WIWI'HN 01' Sn 1'1 I''''H Id('1I or t1w humnn exlstonco becomes evident:

Iho 'world.' however ' Iuctunl' I Il Id I IH I1l l< 'h 1lH 'l Il ll nl .! ll 'HH at bottom

,,:\



it may be, is overpowering, and so the ideal of autonomy has

bled to death into a 'total void' (one of Sartre's expressions for

consciousness) .

Nevertheless this autonomy is maintained at all cost. We

cannot but start from the consciousness (of) self as the 'foun-

dation' of its own 'non-being' and 'temporal' moving. The 'world,'

however, in the broad sense of 'natural' and 'cultural' 'milieu,'

simultaneously is 'there' with its massivity; it immediately urges

itself upon consciousness, and in the 'natural attitude' the lattereven loses itself in it. But consciousness cannot fail to present

itself. Then, however, a new danger appears, namely that of the

so-called accomplice-reflection. This means that it has a com-

plicity in the 'natural attitude' and is characterized by 'bad faith,'

because in this case consciousness and freedom are made inde-

pendent and indif ferent 'beings. ' True authenticity can only consist

in a way of living, which in a radical way takes on and expe-

riences the being-at-distance-from-oneself as a never accomplished

task. This 'structure' of human 'being' can be discovered, on the

one hand, by anxiety (which appears only occasionally), but

generally and with universal validity by the so-called (pure,'

phenomenological reflection.

With Sartre this reflection is on the way to become explicitly

dialectical. The transcendental tra it of reflec tion, its directedness

to a unity which reaches above ' time,' d isappears more and more ,

in favour of the dialectical-logical domination as such. Sartre,

to be sure , remains true to the proper tendency of phenomenology,

i.e., its turn to the 'subject' with its actual and irreplaceable re-

sponsibility. In a way he radicalizes this turn, because he cannot

rightly be content with Husserl's Ego and the 'silent' re tiredness

of Heidegger's 'authentic' existence. But the remedy to 'liberate'

human reality from these positions turns out to be worse than

the disease. The craving for logical domination manifests itself

clearly in the splitting-up of our self-consiousness without anyreserve. The only possibility to 'save' human reality then is to

let the 'world' become immediately present, be it as an anti-pole,

and to have the relations settled in the last analysis by the

dialec tics as such.

The meaning of Sartre

Considered from this point, the so-called 'risky' position of

our existence, about which the philosopher manages 10 Ray much,

does not exist for Mmself: he 100 has ('rl'pf nwny hohlnd hls phi-

.1

losophy and in this sheltered position, which according to him

can be none, he holds his universal pretensions. It is very im-

portant to have a clear insight into this state of affairs, for other-

wise we might think there is much in this philosophy that can

or must be accepted and possibly may be 'completed' or ' interpreted'

in a 'Christian' manner. I don't deny that there are appealing

parts in this thought, namely, as possible antidotes) for instance

against a certain 'Christian' hypocrisy and theological self-com-

placency, which no longer lives by faith. But this is at stake:

that we seriously try to confront the philosopher at the rightpoint, that is the point where he himself wants to stand and where

he too often tries to withdraw himself, precisely in order to save

his real 'faith,' namely the faith in the universal validity of his

phenomenological thought, which operates within the absolutized

subject-object-scheme. From this point all h is statements receive

their proper meaning.

Concerning our self-consciousness, this secret is never explicable

on the basis of this scheme. It is indeed a presupposition of our

reflect ion and is experienced and understood only in faith. In fai th

we 'understand' it as the outstanding revelation of our Creator

within our 'being-there. ' In the complete surrender and subjection

of this faith we actually profess our being-nothing in ourselves,

but right then we experience the true fulness of meaning of our

existence as 'subjective,' or responsible and as a transcendental

related-ness to the living God, who out of His love has been

pleased to reveal Himself in and through us. But this surrender

is indeed a decisive, fundamental choice, which cannot be cleared

up by any philosophy, not even a Christian philosophy, but rules

every philosophical formation of concepts and ideas .

Two more poin ts: 1. The problem. of ( intersubjectivity'

It might be interesting and useful to mention more of Sartre's

thought but time fails me and so, in conclusion, we glance at twopoints only.

The real insuf fic iency of the logical subject-object-scheme

and the disastrous consequences of its absolutization come to

light especially in the discussion of the problem of 'inter-subjec-

tivity.' This discussion covers the largest part of Sartre's main

work. Here we can perceive the more 'social' strain of Sartre

with respect 10 ITURRCrlnd Hcidcggcr, but at the same time we

HC'(, tho utter ilnpoHHibility of any real 'communication' within

fhl' ,'.'/IIU(lWOI')( or filtH thoiurht,



Sartre wants to explain the meaning of my real meeting

with the other subject. He does not want to prove the factual

existence of other subjects; they are 'there' contingently. But

what does their mutual meeting imply? To make a long story

short, this meeting is an encounter; contact is conflict and conflict

is contact. It cannot be otherwise, because the (look) of another

subject, his actual presence-to ... , makes me an object} while

I remain subject , and have the possibil ity to make the other subject

an object (a real 'clash') or to recognize his subjectivity and

to take my objectivity upon myself. But when I act in this way,I do so in order to 'save' my subjectivity furtively. This is an

attitude of 'escape' and of 'bad faith.' Sartre analyses, often in

a penetrating manner, different kinds of possible attitudes: hatred,

love, masochism, sadism and the like. At any rate, the encounter

(in the sense of conflict) is inevitable; it is, as Sartre says, the

essence of my relations with the other. We have to live with

it, i.e., we have to take on this reality 'consciously,' in every

situation we have to strive after the best possible 'contact.' Prac-

tically this means for Sartre, that he seeks the side of the

'most oppressed' 'class' of society, the labour-class. This class,

be it rather outwardly, is in a way brought 'together' as a con-

sequence of i ts together-being-oppressed by the individualistic'exploi ting c lass' and therefore is necessitated to make itself free.

2. The (existential psycho-analyisis)

The second point is Sartre's idea of 'existential psycho-ana-

lysis.' This method of 'insight into fellow-men' has been used

by Sartre in some expositions of the life and work of literary

figures, and also of himself." As the name indicates, it intends

to be a substitution for the psycho-analysis in the style of Freud.

Sartre, who considers consc iousness as the heart of human being,

cannot agree with Freud in his reduction of the phenomena of

consciousness to unconscious 'processes' of various psychical drives,

which are understood in a biological sense. Sartre himself does

not say that every act is founded on consideration and reflection,

for consc iousness is primarily pre-ref lexive consciousness (of)

oneself. In this sense even psychical emotions as well as our

will must be cal led 'consc ious. ' In all his acts man is in a certain

relation to the purposes he makes for himself on the basis of a

10 In his already mentioned book "The Words" (Lee mot.R), 10(13 tC]. my

article in Mededeli 'l1gen va.n de VerO' l1igi 'l1l l voor Call1illiMliM(·lttl Wijllbfl-

geerte, July 19601).

fundamental self-project. The 'emotional' man for example, has

decided to l ive in a 'magic ' world in which he looks for 'symbol ical '

solutions to the question of his being. The fundamental self-

project itself, however, which gives meaning and coherence to

my life, remains inexplicable, and without foundation. There is

no reason why it might not have turned out differently. Every

'motive' is only a motive in function of this fundamental choice,

which coincides with consciousness. When we make an attempt

at understanding another person, we should recognize this fun-

damental project as well as possible.

In my opinion Sart re's cr it ic ism of Freudianism is sometimes

to the point. As a matter of fact, psychology in traditional

Western thought, generally has a tendency to present itself as a

sort of general science of man. The traditional natural scientific

strain of this psychology, either in a Freudian or in a more 'be-

havioristic' or in a mainly 'statistical' sense, is on the whole

still carried on. Thus, in this varied psychologism, both sides

of the old humanistic tradition seem to have entered into a happy

alliance. In so far as Sartre tries to disengage hilmself from this

idea of psychology and to accentuate the entire responsibility

of man, this endeavor deserves our sincere interest. Indeed, the

task of psychology is nothing more or less than the investigationof the psychica l aspec t of humam. acts (I leave the psychology of

animals out of consideration now). But because of the univer-

sality of the spheres, all the other aspects are mirrored here in

a special arrangement." Every psychology which does not take

into account that man can and does digest his 'impressions' and

control his emotions - which deals with the psychical life as a

closed sphere, ent ire ly ruled by so-ca lled natural scienti fic 'laws, '

representing the (absolutized) analogies or retrocipations to pre-

ceding natural aspects (espec ial ly biotica l and mechanical ones) ,

and which therefore cannot really account· for such phenomena

as the sense of justice, linguistic feeling, sense of beauty, moral

feel ing and the l ike, in which the anticipatory structure of 'feeling'reveals itself, - every similar psychology cannot fail to come to

a deadlock and do violence to the central meaning-dynamics of

human l ife in i ts transcendenta l d irectedness.

Sar tre's extremely irrat ional ist ic subject iv ism does not per-

mit the admission of any real structures at all. That is why

snrtro at a given moment describes the emotion as a 'degradation

11 cr. I)". 111111111'" III Ch";HII'III/ I'/I/'H/lt'n/iv/IH, 10UI, p. (ill fr.



of consciousness,' i.e.) a being involved in the 'desire to being,'

which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the

bas is of the fundamental split -ness of sel f-consciousness, which,

once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades'

emotional life more or less to insignificance - at least in the

theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can

acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function

is present everywhere in our ad-life, at every turn determined in

its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order,

presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, inmy opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality

such as the 'emotional value' of a certain word (as a symbolical

designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious'

processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical'

aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - prrovided that

it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic de-

nominator of human existence, but from the very outset is con-

sidered as an (important) function of human responsible act-

life, i.e.) in its vertical direction.

lH

Lecture III

Beyond existentialism?

The last phase of phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty) Heuieqqer,

Sartre

Introductorry remarks

In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase

of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall'

o f the movement because especially in the case o f Merleau -Ponty

we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole

however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through

the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger 's and Sartre's thought.

As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological

categories in historical connections. Often they are too 'innocent, '

too uncomplicated, especia lly when a dif ficult, revolutionary and

'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is

made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we

say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an

analogy with bio tical development as such . -

I. Merleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P), who died a few

years ago, h is philosophy might have been discussed in our second

lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and re-mained a phenomenological exis tent ia lis t whose influence, a t least

in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely

this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the

internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psy-

ihology) more fully, and seemed a more 'rea l' and less 'scandalous '

author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a

certain transitional character of his thought. Therefore he may

1>(' pl ll( '( 'd 111Ihls IItHI 1(1('1111"1'. lkHi<1(,H, the second lecture was,

I thlnk, 1(}1l1~ ('IIIHlldl!

•III



of consciousness.' i.e., a being involved in the 'desire to being,'

which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the

basis of the fundamental split-ness of se lf -consciousness , which,

once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades'

emotional life more or less to insign ificance - at least in the

theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can

acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function

is present everywhere in our act-life, at every turn determined in

its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order,

presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, inmy opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality

such as the 'emotional value' of' a certain word (as a symbolical

designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious'

processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical'

aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - provided that

it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic de-

nominator of human existence, but from the very outset is con-

sidered as an (important) function of human responsible act-

life, i.e., in its vertical direction.

58

Lecture III

Beyond existentialism?

The last phase of phenomenology: MerZeau-Ponty, Heu ieqqer,

Sartre

Int roductory remarks

In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase

of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall'

of the movement because especia lly in the case of Merleau-Ponty

we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole

however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through

the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger 's and Sartre's thought.

As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological

categories in historical connect ions. Often they are too 'innocent, '

too uncomplicated, especia lly when a dif ficult, revolutionary and

'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is

made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we

say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an

analogy with biotical development as such. -

I . M erleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P) , who died a few

years ago, his philosophy might have been discussed in our second

lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and re-mained a phenomenological existential ist whose influence, at least

in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely

this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the

Internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psy-

hology) more fully , and seemed a more 'real' and less ' scandalous '

author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a

cortaln t,/'(t'Yu{Uioool character of his thought. Therefore he may

1>('plll('('(( ill tills IlIst lccturo. B('sidc's, the' second lecture was,

I thluk, IOllg ( ' IHl\ II~h!

,,!I



The two major works of M-P are: The structure ot conduct

(La structure du comportement, 1942) and Phenomenology oi

perception (1945). M-P wants to call h is own theory a 'phenomeno-

logical positi'1{ism/ a remarkable characterization indeed, of which,

however, the adjective 'phenomenological' must not slip our at-

tention.

'Consciousnees' and (nature>

In the open ing sen tence of h is first book, M-P clearly exp lains

his principal aim. There he says that he desires to understand

the relations of consciousness and nature, the latter conceived of

as 'organic, psychological and social.' Nature, then, is under-

stood as a multiplicity of events which are exterior one to an-

other and are connected by relations of causality.' As a matter

of fact, this beginning expresses the constant main theme of his

works. But at the same time we have to notice that M-P appears

to start [rom. a duality. Like all other humanis tic phi losophers,

he wants to surmount this duality - and this the more emphati-

cally, as especially in Sartre's thought the dualism had become

crudely pronounced -, but as it is the starting point and the

expression of the dualistic humanistic ground-motive, it can at

most be repaired somewhat. When , for instance, M-P describes

the essential relation of the two as a 'circular causality,' then,

on close examination, the term 'circular' appears to lack real

foundation, because there is no real centre) round about which a

circle can be drawn.

'Consciousness,' which in itself was already a precarious

'synthesis' of the subjective logical function and another subjective

function (psychical, historical etc.), was, as we have seen, the

traditional point of a ttachment for the impulse of autonomy, while

'nature' has represented of old the terrain on which the domina-

tion-motive, by means of theoretical thought, had to try itsstrength. Another way to describe his intention is the following

sentence of M-P: " ... the point is to join the perspective of

'idealism,' according to which everything is only an object for

consciousness, and the perspective of ' realism, ' according to which

1 "Notre but est de comprendre les rapports de la conscience et de la nature,

organique, psycholcgique, ou meme sociale. On entend ici par nature une

multipli cit c d'evcnements oxte ricurx les uns nux aut rcs ot lies par des

rapporta do cuusnl iL('." L« 81'/'//('/1/1'(1 dn~ (lO'll/1101'! ('1//('11 t, p. 1.

00

the 'consciousness-ss' are woven into the tissue of the objective

world and of the events-in-themselves." 2

'Phenomenoloqical positivi8'YI'l,J

M-P thinks it is the proper achievement of phenomenology

to have joined the utmost subject ivism and the utmost objectivism,

to wit, in its notion of the (world.' This is , indeed, a quite remark-

ab le pronouncement, especially considering the 'rad ical subjec-

tivism,' which was proclaimed by Husserl as the only outlet in

the 'crisis of European reason,' and, in a way, was radicalized

even more in the 'existential' phenomenology of Heidegger and

Sartre. For these philosophers, too, the notion of the 'world'

was , i t is t rue, a lready important, especia lly as the inner emptiness

of the 'subject' had clearly manifested itself. At any rate, they

had, apart from their mutual differences, explicitly chosen the ir

fundamental position in subjective autonomy as the origin of

true meaing-giving, be it an ever 'failing' meaning-giving. For

M-P , however, the 'world ' has gained in importance. Somewhere

he calls it 'the true transcendental' or 'the cradle of meaning.'

Here indeed, we can perceive a peculiar trait of M-P's 'phenome-

nological positivism,' which, however, remains phenomenological

and even existentialistic and not a traditional, 'na tural scien tific'

positiv ism . The latter point will demand our atten tion presen tly .

At any rate , there is a connection with this cur ious 'posi tiv ism,'

when M-P, after he, too, has establi shed (time> as the f inal horizon

of our exis tence- in-the-wor ld , a lso disputes Heidegger's 'primacy

of the future' and, like Sartre, accentuates the 'present' - but

then as a present that is rooted in the (past,' which constitutes

the indispensable 'f ie ld ' of my present and antic ipat ing 'decis ions .'

Ultimately M-P's 'phenomenological positivism' even shows a

development to a 'mytho logy' of 'Nature' (written with a capital).

'Nature,' then, is conceived of as a universal stream of 'savage'

life, which, it is true, can toss us to and fro, but at the same

Li:me'bears' and holds us and is experienced immediately in our

'co rporeal' existence and its bodily 'perception.' Even then, how-

ever, the primordial duality still operates. For the notion of

Being-us-such is not wholly absorbed in this 'Natu re.' The dimen-

xion of' the 'Logos' ultimately cannot be reduced to it. According

.. " . , , il H'HI(IHllllil . dll 1'( '11( '1' lu P("I'H\lpcLivo ldcaliate, salon laquelle rien n'est

1\11(\ ('011111111 ohJl'I, pnu r \11 ( '( 11111( '1(11\ (' (\ , «L 1/\ lWI'Hp("('~iv(\ re alisto, solon la-

1I111111c.\"M ('IIIIH('I"III' '' " Mllllt. 11111"'1,,"(111lllll1 In tlHRII ell! mond« objcctlf ot dos, 'VdU'IlIC'II!." ( '11 ~111." l'h,"1I011I,<lIUIIlJ.(11I cI," III P"I '( '( lpt lun, p, IIHIl.



to M-P this dimension shows itself pre-eminently in human

'language,' in its un ique, creative revelations (cf. le cture IT).

This, in a nutshell, is the main line of development of M-P's

endeavor to achieve a doctrine of (engaged consciousness.' At

last it results, in order to avoid the triviality of a positivism

and pragmatism without any trace of self-reflection, into a rap-

prochement to Freudian psycho-analysis with its descent to the

h idden 'dep ths' of (un-consciousness.' In this 'descent' the really

transcendental t ra it of phenomenology, which we have pointed out

more than once already, has turned in to its reverse in a remarkable

way.

The inner tension in Merieau-Pontu's idea of pheoomenology

Nevertheless, we must continue to notice that for M-P

too, from the outset, it is consciousness which has to 'engage'

itself, and that it is consciousness which has to 'engage' itself·

What does this mean? When we see the development of phe-

nomenology in the central l ight of i ts dia lectical relig ious ground-

motive and the inner tensions of the latter, we must establish

that M-P is the phenomenologist who tries to rescue the 'auto-

nomous' subject from the 'los t' pos ition of emptiness and 'nothing-

ness,' in which it had made its final attempt at self-maintenance

in Heidegger and Sartre, by means of a reinforcement and con-

solidation of its relations to the 'world.' The question remains

whether this ' remedy' is able to improve the s ituat ion, considering

the fact that phenomenology does not leave a real escape from

the problematics of the 'subject'-and-i ts-'world. '

At any rate, in the famous preface of his Phenome?Wlogy

of Perception M-P clearly shows his existentialist intentions.

After he has pointed out the various difficulties and interpre-

tations of phenomenology, which again and again revive thequestion: what is phenomenology? he declares that only in our-

selves can we find the unity of phenomenology and its true mean-

ing. This pronouncement is strongly stressed when he writes:

"I am the absolute source, my existence does not come from my

antecedents, from my physical and socia l sur roundings , it goes to

them and supports them, for it is I who make be for me (i.e'J 'be'

in the only meaning which the word can have for me) that

tradition which I decide to resume or this horizon whose distance

to IInC would disappear . . . , if I wcre not there to traverse it

Kt

with my look." 3 Strictly speaking, this would imply that we have

to consider this pronouncement as well as the res t of this philosophy

as the highly personal express ion of the highly personal individual,

viz'J M-P. But, of course, this is not what the philosopher means.

He wan ts to discover universally valid truth; he wan ts to address

you and me.

But how must this take place? Here already M-P declares

at the same time that phenomenology - about which he said

that it has its unity and true meaning in ourselves - is only

accessible to a phenomenological method. So phenomenology, con-ceived in this way, seems to be self-sufficient. This is indeed

what M-P means, for according to him phenomenology, as reve-

lation of the 'world,' i.e., as truly universal, rests in itself. And

thus we see M-P fill, in a way that looks somewhat 'innocent'

in comparison with the 'g rim ' self-re flection of his p redecessors,

the greatest part of his main work with a so-called 'direct,'

phenomenological 'description' of the so-called 'liie-uiorld/ in which

we live (Lebenswelt). Yet M-P is too great a phenomenological

philosopher to let it go at that. After the accomplishment of this

'direct description' - into which we shall go further presently -

a 'phenomenology of phenomenology' is necessary, he says. In

this one the preceding 'description' has to receive its final checkand certainty.

The shift in the phenomenology of Merleau-Pontu

What is the final inspection-point? It is the 'subject' again,

and this sub ject again first conceived of as cogito. However, even

here at this 'final' inspection-point, we are concerned with a

"phenomenoloqu of phenomenology '! Therefo re the question can

no longer be suppressed now, if in this way we don't land in

a so-called regressus ad infin itwm: phenomenology of phenome-

nology of phenomenology of phenomenology etc . without any per-

spective. Precisely to avoid a similar reqressus, Sartre had put

in the foreg round the so -called pre-reflexive cogito, in which nodistance at all is left, but which also appeared to be as such pure

'nothing-ness.' Merleau-Ponty, who wants to steer clear of this

rock, has, in fact, no other expedient than to fall back upon

n " .. jo suis la source absoluo, mon existence ne vient pas de mes ante-

r6ci(\I1IH, do mon cntournze physique et social, elle va vers eux et les

HOlIllC'lIt, ('/11' ("('Hl moi qu] fah; Gll'o PO'tl1' moi (et done Iltre au soul sens

1111(\10 mol. 111111-11\(1vnlr 110\11'mol ) cct to tradition quo [e choisis do re-

IIt 'HlIII I'II 0111.('1'1. lun-Izon dOIl't In diHlulH'o n mol 1\'(,fConcll'c'l"nit ... , si jo

n',"11I11I III IIUIII' III 1)111'('11111'11'u 1·I'~rnl'd,". /'/1111/11/11.ill /(1. 1)('?'o(Jl>timl, p. TIT.

n: \



phenomenology as such i.e., with respect to the content of his

philosophy, a heavier weight of the (world/ This is, in my opin ion,

the proper meaning of the shift in M-P 's phenomeno logy with

regard to Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. This is also why in

M-P's work the fundamental 'd ispositions' of 'anxie ty ' and 'loath-

ing',' as expressive utterances of subjects which are entirely

thrown back upon themselves , hardly re turn. This shi ft , especia lly

for us who are able to look back and to see some of its historical

consequences, is significant, but is no more than a shift. As we

saw, M-P returns at last to the subjective coqito, which, in the

preface of his book, he had already indicated as the ultimate

source of meaning-giving. Again, to be sure M-P is out to show

the cogito as an intentional one, i.e., as an (act) directly moving

to the (things.,' to the (world.' To think always means in the first

place to think something. This sounds rather general and vague,

indeed, bu t it is th is general (opinion,' this 'rough adhesion to the

world' (as M-P calls it), which is and remains our fundamental

'hold,' because it is this wh ich makes 'something in general' arise

for us. M-P too, however, holds fast a sort of 'prereflexive

coqito:' The intentional moving toward the world remains in

itself conscious; it must start f rOm a primordial opening-to this

'field' of the world. Therefore M-P introduces a 'tacit-coqito'

(cogito tacite), which he describes as an 'undeclinable subjectivity, 'a 'presence of oneself to oneself,' wh ich precedes all philosophy.

But now at the same moment we are faced with the limit) where

the fundamental difficulty appears again . For this 'tacit cog ito ,'

this 'undeclinable subjectivity, ' upon which consequently also this

philosophy must be based and be dependent, simultaneously functions

within this philosophy, behind which the philosophiz ing subject

himself - whose position, indeed, is untenable - hidJe.shimself,

in order to (save,' anyhow, the universal validity of this philosophy,

i.e., of his own 'Coqito' as (pseudo-j Word-revelation.'

Because M-P desires to avoid the snares of Sartre's 'noth ing-

ness' and its concomitant dialectics, inexorably elaborated with

logic is ti c means and henceforth 'unreal ,' he soon lets the problem-

atics, so to speak, 'slip,' and returns to his 'world.' The 'tacit

cogito' has, according to him, only a 'gliding,' slipping hold on

itself and on the world. It 'guesses,' presumes, the latter round

about itself as its 'field,' which happens to be there and in the

'ambiguous' conversation with which a 'meaning' appears. Th is

' slipping' presence is expla ined also by M-P as the direct expression

• Cf. lecture H.

64

of the thoroughly ' temporal,' i.e.) historical, character of our ex-

istence. With him, too, this 'historical' temporality ultimately

serves as the f inal denominator of this exis tence. And the mention-

ed absolutization of phenomenology as such, it s self -suf ficiency,

must be 'compensated' by the statement, that phenomenology,

however much it is maintained as the final 'revelation' of mean-

ing, is an 'infinite meditation,' which never knows where it

goes, but which is 'odoeniurous:' This statement, indeed, has

come true, for, as we saw, with M-P phenomenology, once born

as a 'rigorous scientific' investigation of the 'intentional con-sciousness,' finally passes into a certain 'mythology' of 'Natu re.'

The fundamental difficulty

Once more, however, the fundamental tension becomes evident

within the 'historical' denominator itself. At the end of his

expositions the philosopher, after his 'conclusion' that he is 'a

psychological and historical structure,' states that "even the

thought of a philosopher is only one way to explicate his hold

on the world, that which he is.)) 5 Again, then, he neglects that

it is precisely this philosophy itself to which the final word con-

tinues to be reserved and which alone reveals the so-called psycho-

logical and historical structure. The antinomy is very sharp here,

precisely because at last the philosopher himself, in a critical

self-reflection, seems to turn up, as he is. But in fact he conceals

himself the more firmly. He spooks) from the outside , within his

Phenomenology and without any poss ibili ty to account :

Here lies the essential weakness of this philosophy as well

as its fundamental point of encounter with a Christian way of

thinking. Therefo re we first purposely d iscussed somewhat ela-

bo rately this idea of a 'phenomenology of phenomeno logy .'

In the idea of 'temporality ' (historicity) itself, wh ich should

bring the final elucidation, the tension still works. Now the three

dimensions of this temporality become it s components , while M-P

shows the tendency to accentuate the present -in-i ts -broad-sense

(as he puts it). This is to say, the 'field' of the present, the am-

biguous alliance of (moving) consciousness-and-li fe-wor ld . This

" "Jo IItliH uno structure psychologique ct historique. J 'ai recu avec I'existenceu n o t tl 'l ll lc 'I I' (\ d '( 'x iH L ul ', I In H L yk , T'outos mos actions et mes pensces sont enruppnr], IIVCW(,t' LLcI HLl' lu' t,III ' O, (' ,L m ~n'll ' In pcns60 d'un phi losophe n'est1111'111111 Itlll,dc'm ,1'c 'xplfcoILt'I ' ~I\ pl'ilH' aur Itl ItIO11 de, cola qu' ll cat", l'hrlnmn,/111 lu 1//1/'(1., 11, Jj Ill,



field always is already 'present,' and thus it is rooted in the 'past.'

In reality M-P has to fall back, in this concluding part of his

'phenomenology of phenomenology,' upon the result of his so-called

'direct description,' namely the (,natural' and 'social') 'world' as

the 'true transcendental.'

The (di rec t description ) and the (l ife -world)

This is not to say that the typically phenomenological ideas

are not already present in this 'direct description' as such, which,

indeed, serves as a demonstration of 'phenomenological positivism'and tries to keep a close contact with the so-called 'positive'

sciences. They are. In the first place there is the idea of

'description' as such. We spoke about it in the first lecture

already and we saw that it had a polemical side, namely, against

the natural scientific method of causal explanation and construction

on the basis of an 'objective' basic denominator, as it was prac-

tised in current positivism. M-P agrees with this idea of descrip-

tion. By the 'world' he means the so-called 'life-world,' the world

lived in by the subject in its moving existence and, therefore,

a moving, 'open' one itself. This life-world does not consist of

a series of separate physical-chemical 'elements,' but is the uni-

versal, shifting horizon of our 'lived experience,' a whole withdifferent levels, each of which are characterized as 'wholes,' as

'structures,' showing a primary and clear coherence. The or-

ganic, the psychical and the historical level are the main ones

which M-P distinguishes here (especially in his Structure of

conduct). As such this life-world 'is more original than the fixed,

determinate universe of 'science' or the closed world of the

'natural attitude.' M-P develops this view in the way of a criti-

cal discussion of the postulates and results especially of modern

psychology. More than once, indeed, he shows in a striking

manner that the discoveries made particularly by the so-called

Gestalt-psychology clearly evince the untenability of the usually

behavioristic-positivistic postulates of modern psychology, Gestalt-psychology itself included. These discoveries can only be really

utilized and interpreted in their true meaning-COherence by a

phi losophical , i .e. , phenomenological , 'descr ipt ion ,' which has

broken resolutely with these postulates and is able to discover

this really primordial 'world' under that of science and of the

'natural at ti tude. ' As a mat te r of fac t, over agains t the posit ivist ic ,

behavioristic constructions, he often gives evidence of a consider-

ably greater sense of reality, and the perusal of this can be

very instructive:

6

The 'reduction' and the (natural attitude)

This is not to say, however, that M-P has managed to

liberate himself entirely from ordinary posi tivism. Now a second

typical trait of his phenomenology must be mentioned, namely

the reduction. The l ife -world with i ts mobili ty may represent the

most original and most embracing horizon of our directly lived

experience, i.e., of our 'perception,' it can be discovered only

by means of this reduction, which is a reflection. This implies

that, in order to become aware of our being-intentional-movement-

to-the world, Wemust suspend this movement. The natural atti-

tude and its certainties are, it is true, not annulled by this re-

flexive reduction. It is characteristic of M-P, who wants to sur-

mount the vacuum of Husserl's t ranscendenta l cogito as well as

the existential non-being of Heidegger and Sartre, which is ab-

solutely present to itself in anxiety, that he, on the one hand,

shows his trust in the immanent possibilities of the reflection

also within his exposit ions, but, on the other hand, remains enough

of an existentialist to reject a simple return to Husserl's 'trans-

cendental coqito' and its constituting of a previously 'annulled'

world. This is the fundamental 'ambiguity' of his position; the

ambiguity, about which he speaks much within his argument,

is only a consequence of the first. 'He thinks that the 'naturalattitude' must be considered as presupposed by every philosophy.

Nevertheless, it is not able to know itself really as movement-to-

the-world; it s certainties 'pass' as 'se lf-evident. ' So the phenome-

nological reduct ion is indispensable in order to cause the appear-

ance of the being-in-the-world , inaugurated by Heidegger .

I believe that rafter all our previous discussions it needs no

demonstration that the order is in fact an inverse one. First of

all the phenomenological reflection is dis.engaged from the co-

herence of meaning of our full experience, set and held aside

as the decisive self-revelation. Thereiore - as this reflection

remains a reflection-upon-something, and, as sel f-revelat ion, pri-

marily upon a subjective 'something' - the so-called 'naturalattitude' is needed as the so-called 'presupposition' of this re-

flection. At the same time, however, it must be 'reduced' and

remain secondary with regard to this reflection. 'Secondary,'

then, implies always a degradation of this 'na tura l' experience .

~ven M-P, who pursues a certain 'rehabilitation' of this natural

attitude, cannot avoid this degradation. More than once this

It Lt it ude il-1 dcscribod as 'dogmatical,' as orientated to the world

liS 11 {Iiv('n, fi::n()(t 1111ivcrso, in which everyth ing has been se tt led,

In shurt, IlH 11 'l)()HlllvIHtk' world. But bocausc th is na tura l a tt itude



within the phenomenological view indeed remains indispensable ,

we must say that positivism, be it in a mere or less negative

sense , continues to be presupposed by this phenomenological phi-

losophy, As fer the phenomenological reflex ion and reduction as

such, which is set and held apart, where does it stand? Nowhere,

i .e., everywhere. Even the se-called pre-reflexive of pre-conscious

experience of the life-world, which according to what the phi-

losopher says, is the initial, constant and final 'situation' of the

'conscious' activity o f reflexion , can on ly really go en as a 'subjec-

tive' g iving of mean ing, when the abstract, absolu tized structureof reflexion, se to speak, has been projected 'back' into it before-

hand. Even the 'life-world,' then, remains on the 'objective' side

of the line , whereas the 'l ived experience ' of this 'world ' keeps to

the 'subjective' side.

Inbentiorvality as {perception.' Functionalism

On the whole, however, M-P tries to surmount the age-old

dualistic sub ject-objec t-scheme by means of this denominator of

' lived exper ience,' which he usually cal ls {perception.' It is in this

'sensory' perception and its typical mobile 'structure' that the

true unity must be found, But the difficulty of this task doesnot fail to appear. On the one hand, perception is defined as an

(intentional' act; but as such it should anticipate the 'conscious,'

i.e., fer M-P , the logical and historical functions of our existence

and thus a 'subject' with an 'objective' field over against it.

Therefore, en the ether hand, M-P sets perception apart as a

se-called {operating,' even sometimes 'unconscious,' intentionality,

which, in a way, remains 'active,' but in the first place refers to

a certain receptivity as the expressions ef our always being-in-

the world. This concept of 'operating intentionality' is quite ob-

scure and confusing, though M-P's abundant imagery gives it a

suggestive force. At any rate, he insists en it and in this line

later on even inclines to the already mentioned mythology of

'Nature.'

In order to judge the expositions of M-P. correctly, we have

to realize that there is indeed ne logical distinction er historical

formation without preceding sensory affect-ivity , in the sense of

psychical sensitivity, in which indeed, a specific 'mobility' as

well as a cer ta in receptivity are evident. These features , however ,

can never be closed up and understood in themselves by means

of an absolutized abstrac tion. This is what we call ' functionali sm.'

They only reveal their true meaning in the dynamic coherence

of mean ing which unfolds in the vertically directed typical struc-

tures of the human act, in which the different functions only

function. A sensory 'impression,' er a perceptive 'linage,' can

never be made a closed, possibly even 'movable,' 'whole,' but we

have to admit that such an 'impression,' in the temporal order,

in itself demands, is designated to, 'conscious' (log ical, bu t no t

primarily theo retical) distinction , to historical 'con tro l,' to sym-

bolical express ion etc ., and this a ll in one dynamic direct ion, which

points above time. Functienalism , en the contrary, remains con-

fined within the temporal horizon with its 'horizontal' order of

functions, and it revenges itself in the lability and inner tensions

of the function chosen as the basic denominator.

Se much fer M-P's 'perception,' which, as we established

already, appeared to require 'completion' in another bas ic denomi-

nator , namely the 'h is torica l' function.

Corporality

One point must still be briefly dealt with, namely M-P's

v iew of corporality. In this corporality M-P. thinks he can point

out the real intermediary between 'subject' and 'world.' In our

perception, my enaaaement-m-the-uorui attests itself, but it con-tinues to be my perception. This perceiving subject, thi s 'na tura l

Ego,' is called 'body' er bodu-subieci, On this point, again, M-P

is correct and also instructive in his protest against every attempt

at closing up and confining our bodily existence in its physico-

chemical or even biotical functions. The body, he says, has its

own motor ia l exper ience, which impl ies a direct, pract ical 'know-

ledge' of the 'world' without the necessi ty of any ' representa tions .'

It is an original, general, be it a rough, 'adhesion to the world.'

As such, however, it has an impersonal character. The truly per-

sonal, i .e ., ' conscious ' and 'active,' exis tence continues to be char-

acteri stic of the {historical' existence. Therefore the body-subject

is, en the ether hand, called only a provisional draft of this his-torical existence. The relation between body and 'existence' is

dialectical; he says that the body is the fixed or generalized

existence and that exis tence is a continual incarnation. Ultimate ly

the true initiative is reserved to the 'historical' subject, on the

constan t basis of the subject-ob ject scheme. Fer he declares tha t

this bodily perceiving sub ject is never an abso lute subjectivity,

that it remains a {blind' adhesion to the world and is destined

to 1>C"C'OI11(' o1>,1('('t to an ultimate Ego, This means that this

would-he 'Ill I«rmorlln ry' of OH' 'body,' ttsolr, in sptto of some useful

nn



desc riptions o f it, is a c lear demonslration of the gene ral tension

in which his thought moves.

II The last phase of Heidegger and Sartre

Heidegger's (reversal '

This must suffice to give you a general impression of this

thought. To conclude these Iectures about phenomenology I

should like to make some remarks about the last development

of Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. Don't be afraid that it will

be too difficult and tiring - I, too, 'bodily' know that it is the lastday of the conference -, for we are not concerned with an entirely

new philosophy, but with a cer ta in development of the previous ly

elaborated lines , which development in a sense implies a (reversal.'

This development, however, is worth considering for a moment

as a sign of the times.

When we say 'reversa l' tEehre), we touch the central term

of the second phase of Heidegger's thought. What does it mean?

According to the philosopher himself we have to understand it

primarily as a turn in the history of Being-as-such, i.e., in

Being-as-such as history. A turn, in which this thoroughly his-

torical Being has imparted, has com-mitted (sich eu-schiclcen)

itself as such. This reversa l implies, in the second place, that nowthe way of the book Being and Time, which we discussed last time,

must be reversed. Now the question is not to find and to investi-

gate a being, viz., 'existence,' as the central point from which

Being-a s-such, or rather, the 'idea' o f Being, may be discovered,

but now Being itself, its tru th, its self-revelation and its re lated-

ness to beings, the Dasein included, are at stake. Here we are

concerned with the most primordial question and questionable-ness

(Frag'UYilrdigkeit). The question of 'existence' is dependent upon

th is most p rimordia l question , although the questionable -ness o f

this Being-as-such can only appear in the true light via the s tart

of Being and Time, i.e., via the profound, penetrating investigation

of the Dasein , wh ich, as you wil l recal l, resulted into 'nothing. 'Only in this way can the age-old 'error' (1rre) of history

be discovered as such, namely, the 'error,' which derived from

the ' [orqotten-ness' of Being-as-such, i .e., of i ts dif-ference tUnter-

schied) from the beings. This age-old error, which according to

Heidegger already starts clearly with Plato, is called by him the

era of metaphysics. Metaphysics, to be sure, cannot really dis-

engage itself from the dif-ference (of Being-as-such and 'being(s) '),

it has, like all human thought and activity, to receive its primary

stimulus from this all-porvading dlf-J 'crcnco. nut. 01(' inner ton-

()

dency of metaphysics is to efface this dif-ference. It starts from

the 'beings' or from Being-in-general and strives to 'explain' it

from -, to re-present it to a highest being as the uniting 'founda-

t ion' of being-in-general. In modern times this founding 'ground,'

to which beings are re-presen ted, is called 'subjectivity ,' to which

the rest appears as its 'ob-ject' tGeqen-etosui), The pre-eminent

demonstration and also ultima te completion of th is deve lopmen t

is the modern technical system (Gestell), in which everything

is re-presented,calcula ted and arranged, and in which the meaning-

lessness o f be ing -in-general together with the immediate threat

to our free, 'ex-sistential' Dasein becomes terribly clear. In this

a ll -embracing re-presenta tion the most proper character of Being,

its 'verbal' character, its to-be - what we 'may translate as

(presence' - remains forgotten, becomes 'dissimulated,' even beyond

all recognition. Especially Nietzsche was already aware of this"

when he proclaimed the era of (nihilism.'

But Heidegger goes a step further. He thinks that precisely

in th is 'ultimate' situation of 'plane tary' re-presen tation, which

is rapidly perfecting itself now, Being-as-such, i.e., the truth of

'presence,' of to-be , has i ts proper chance. Precise ly in thi s utmost

hidden-ness i t might reveal i tsel f as different, namely to him who

has undergone the radical exper ience of 'Being-forgottenness ' and

who is willing to take the radical existential (leap' (Sprung).

This view, however, implies that the era of 'metaphysics,'

the age-old 'error' of history was (properly we should say: is)

a necessity. Indeed , the inner tension in the Dase in as 'ex istence '

between 'freedom' and 'necessity,' which we established in the

p revious lecture, now retu rns in Being-as-such, and th is the more

so, because 'historicity' is now presented as the truly universal

'origin,' which leaves no room for any 'foundation' whatsoever,

not even to a 're-solved' existence and its 'decisions' (which, as

a matter of fact, appeared to be without any perspective). Now

that Heidegger in order to veil this lack of any perspective, hasshifted the essential 'decision' and the responsibility for it to

'Being-as-such,' he has to admit that this 'inauthentic' era of

'metaphysics,' of re-presentation, belongs to this 'Being-as-such.'

Being as presence, as dif-ference, can only 'be,' if, in itself, in

its being-dif ference, it sets free the manifestation of being-in-

general and, thus, occasions the re-presenting, 'technical' turn

to the latter, in order to continue to be free. This latter trait,

which rcmnlns the prvailing one for IIeidegger, he describes as

Ilt'i 11INJVn1 t (lO'r-f"i{/'I'I';,'1), the kC'l'I1C'l of historicity. In the e-vent,

,1



of Being as a (play,' which is , in fact , only a more ' innocent' and

friendly word for the dialec tics we mentioned above . When at

bottom nothing happens (in the e-vent), every thing can 'happen.'

In this 'play' the search for 'foundation' can be abandoned. But

rules too, fail, and even something that is at stake. In my opinion

this 'p lay' betrays the 'resignation' of the humanistic European

thinker to the (force maieure' of a 'technically' dominated time

together with a final attempt at preserving an inner 'distance.'

I t goes without saying tha t this attitude, a t least with less pro-

found and erudite disciples , easily may join a pragmatist ic op-portunism, which, under the guidance of a powerful eli te, seems

to promise more for the 'present. '

Sarire'e turn to Marxism

For Sartre too, systematic philosophy, as it recently has

appeared in phenomenological analysis , is no longer that self-

evident authority and cultural power, which it has been in Western

SOcietyfor centuries. His last work, Cri tique of dia lect ical reason/

i t is true, to judge by its t it le and appearance, looks tradi tional.

But Sartre in fact professes here his new 'universal, ' namely

Marxism. That is to say,he wants to present an (engaged) critique,

which no longer takes a re tired, idealistic position (actually arefuge-posi tion), which at the same time rejects the posit iv is tic

trend of dispersion into a multiplicity of 'facts' and 'events'

without real self-reflection,i.e., a critique which joins the centralmovement of reality, i.e., of (history! This movement according

to Sartre is that of the 'rising class,' the labour-class, which

gradually has become (conscious' of its prominent position and

has re-flected itself in the dialectical doctrine of Karl Marx. The

.latter had already said that the point was, to change the world,

instead of endlessly 'interpreting' it, and to 'engage' philosophy in

this 'h istorical' endeavor. Because, as we have seen, ' freedotm'

ultimately means: making oneself free, Sartre thinks that this

'human reali ty ,' this motor of all historical movement, is repre-sented pre-eminently by the 'oppressed' labour-class, which has

to struggle for 'freedom.' It never can be satisfied with the

existing conditions and consolidate itself in a 'natural attitude,'

but it experiences, pract ical ly , i ts (dialectical' relation to its

present 'na tura l' existence, which re la tion urges itself imme-

diately upon the labourer in his (needs' (besoin), at the same

the proper 'gathering' of beings takes place, precisely because the

e-vent as such is a 'withdrawal ' (Entzug), and only in this with-

drawal can it really continue to be 'authentic.' The 'issue' (Aus-

trag) in the being-in-general and this withdrawal balance each

other in a dialectical and at the same time labile way, whereby

the latter remains accentua ted, but the first cannot disappear.

We might, if need be , denote this as the inner 'risky' charac terof Being.

(Mythological' thought

All this may look like quite obscure language to you, al-

though I tried to present it in such a way that you might observe

the continuity of Heidegger's thought. It is obscure, indeed, and

all the numerous 'interpretations' are not able to make this

thought-and-language-of-Being (Seinsdenken) ' clear'. In fact, this

thought-of-Being results in a sort of mytho-logy, wherein Being-

as-such and its 'revelation' - the transcendental question of which,

as we saw, had to arise - evaporate into an idle myth. At the

same time the philosopher appears as the 'prophet,' as a sort

of 'oracle, ' but without any real message. This thought-of-Being,

however, remains thought: the dialect ical balance, in which the

polar ity of concealment and un-covering, of withdrawal andleaving 'behind,' stand in the foreground, in the last resort hinges

on mouatu; namely a thoroughly historicis,tic thought. Presum-

ably we can say that in Heidegger historicism arrives at i ts f inal

consequences, and thus, at its end. The philosopher himself,

who had started with a so-called 'fundamental ontology' with

an apparently radical and crit ical questioning of our truly prim-

ordial posit ion, now seems to have abandoned every attempt at

a really philosophical account of essential 's tates of affairs' ; he

speaks, but without message. For in this mature historicism,

this historicism in its 'eventide,' both 'history' and 'thought' lose

their intrinsic, specific 'speech.' In reality both structurally are

designated one for another within a super-arbitrary meaning-coherence which points forward, and, thus, function within God's

universa l reve la tion in creation. Here they mutually become

each other's 'echo' 6 Heidegger 's later philosophy can, in a way,

as has been done, be designated as 'metacritical.'

The 'grim' accents of this first thought, it is true, are replaced

by milder ones. But Heidegger's final word is the description

6 Cf. J. P. A. Mokkos, Sohl'7/pi?10soponlulrino 1111 wijH1wl/llllrll', p, 4/).1 Cr; ,1i l/ lH l t l« la rainOrl (Unirotiq'lto, vel . I , Tht lo ri o , le s e ns embl es p ra ti qu es ,

IUIlO.

:\



time requires his (project' and thus constitu tes the real historical

movement. In this movement class-consciousness increases grad-

ually, i.e., mostly in a revoZutionaTY way.

You see, Sartre's existen tialistic ca tegorie s are used now to

justify the dynamic progress of communism. At the same time

the factual power lessness of phenomenological-exis tent ia lis tic

'reason,' gravitating to the idea of 'freedom,' becomes evident.

Still Sartre wants to save this idea within the Marxist framework.

The 'historical' dialectics as such can be neglected in favour of a

new tyrannical dogmatism, which theoretically works with the

primacy of 'matter' and admits 'consciousness' only as a 'super-

structure,' based on the primary substructure of 'matter.' The

Stalinistic period was a very strik ing example of th is. Therefore,

a critique of dia lectica l reason' is needed. This cri tique, however

can only be accomplished by dialectical reason itself. This dia-

lectical reason first of all has to take seriously the historical,'temporal' character of dialectical existence. This is to say,

within the primarily 'economical' engagement of the subject in

it s 'material' wor ld , th is subject, on account of i ts self -conscious-

ness is at the same time already beyond it s present condition.

Within this engagement, which also Implies an increasing engage-

ment in 'groups ' and other 'communities,' a lthough start ing f rom

the individuals as such, subject ive consciousness holds it se lf f ree

fo r itself in its being-beyond-itself. As such th is 'historical' con -

sc iousness, however, to use Sa rtre 's own words, is nothing more

than an 'ephemeral' subjectivi ty . In this manner the exis tent ia lis t

subjectivity, which in its radical 'autonomy' had fallen into

'nothingness, ' i s now wholly absorbed into a dia lect ical his torical

'p rocess' in Marx ist fash ion, w ith the on ly rese rve that it reta ins

i ts inner, in reali ty ineffective, consciousness- (of)-freedom.

On the o the r side, howeve r, 'consc iousness,' i.e. dialec tical

(reason' as such continues to be itself, i.e., in spite of all 'histori-city,' it remains umioersal. For this conscious reason remains,

in the final analysis, that which 'jYUts ioruxmi this 'crit ique of

dialectical reason,' that behind which the philosopher himself,

who within his philosophy presents himself as one of the 'ephemeral

subjectivities,' remains concealed in a definitely uncritical way,

that which he SImply lets speak. Here the insuperable religiOUS

dia lectics of the humanis tic qrousui-motive appears once more .

The his torica l development of thi s ground-met ivc , however , now,

after the last, violent , but at tho same 1lmo powl'l' lc 'HH1'( 'vo11of the

autonomy-polo, hnA nrrlvrxl n1 11 phllHl' , WhC'I' I' II I, wlt h J h'jcl('g1!f'I'

as well as with Sartre , though in divergent d irections, the factual

inner cap itula tion of humanistic philosophical self-re flection,

po larized of old to the idea of 'autonomy,' has become c lear.

Perspectives

What can still be expected of this developement? It is not

easy to speak positively about this point. At any rate, as may

appear already from our brief discussion, we are faced with a

drastic transition in the history of philosophy, which of course

is connected with the present intensity of history in general. We

may presume in the European area a rapidly increasing decay

of real philosophy, i .e., of serious cri tical self-reflection, a growing

rapprochemen t to a practical pragmatism with philosophy in the

secondary posit ion of a 'supporter' and, a t times, of a weak 'brake. '

We may presume, on the other hand, an attempt at a final

refuge of Weste rn , autonomously 'reflecting ' man in to a certa in

mytho-logy, more or less new, at any rate 'esoteric' and lacking

any power of historical formation. This is the only 'beyond' I am

able to point out, when I take up again the questioning title of

this lecture and try to answer it.

We may presume. We shall have to wait. But this waiting

canno t be passive. If anything has became clear in the present

confused situa tion , it is this tha t the question of the true, tenable,

universal and responsible, engagement is now most urgent for

us all. The primordial decision concerning this vital question

is also decisive as far as the fulfilment of our philosophical and

scientific vocation is concerned , as an in teg rant pa rt of our to tal

life-vocation. First of all we have to learn again and again that

ph ilosophy is a modest occupation, that our whole life has to be

evangelization, always and everywhere. Ph ilosophy has to be sub-

servient to this 'authentic ' life, which, however , can use all avail-

able really philosophical and scientif ic means. In this full en-

gament, which coincides with our rea l liberaiurn, also philosophy

can unfold its true meaning, namely in a direction which always

points (beyond,' towards the only full unity of life, Jesus Christ,

who is coming - now.

jvdhphenomenologicalmovemet

Documents