Jürgen Habermas (rođen 18. juna, 1929, Düsseldorf) njemački filozof i sociolog, pobornik kritičke teorije društva kao i američkog pragmatizma. U naučnim krugovima je posebno poznat zbog rada na konceptu javne sfere a kojeg je postavio u svojoj teoriji komunikativne akcije. Njegov rad se bavi doprinosom društvenoj teoriji i epistemologiji, analizi kapitalističkih društava u razvoju i demokratijom, vladavini zakona u kritičkom socio-evolucionarnom konteksu, kao i savremenom politikom, posebno njemačkom politikom. Habermasov teorijski sistem posvećen je istraživanju mogućnostima razuma, procesa emancipacije i racionalno-kritičke komunikacije koje nema dovoljno u modernim institucijama kao i ljudskoj mogućnosti da kroz oslobađanje ostvari svoje interese bazirane na racionalnosti.

Javna sfera [uredi] k

Jürgen Habermas je ozbiljno razvijao koncept javne sfere prvobitno se oslanjajući na dijaloge koji su se odigravali u kafanama 18. vijeka u Francuskoj. To su bile takve javne sfere racionalnih debata na teme političke važnosti do kojih se došlo razvojem građanske kulture centrirane u tom vremenu u kafanama, intelektualnim i književnim salonima, kao i printanim medijima što su bili preduslovi da se počne sa razvojem parlamentarne demokratije a koji su promovirali ideale prosvjetiteljstva, jednakost, ljudska prava i socijalnu pravdu. Ovaj oblik javne sfere je bio vođen normama racionalne argumentacije kao i kritičke diskusije u kojoj je snaga nečijeg argumenta bila važnija nego njegov identitet.

Prema Habermasu nekoliko je faktora rezultiralo time da građanska javna sfera, javno mnijenje, već u dobu prosvjetiteljstva doživi prve faze dekadencije. Istaknuta je važna stvar da su strukturalne snage, posebno razvoj komercijalnih masovnih medija, doživjele promjenu u svojoj funkcionalnosti. Umjesto potrebe te su strukturalne snage postale nešto što se konzumira pa se tako i izgubila mogućnost njihova korištenja kao instrumenta za javni diskurs.

U knjizi Teorija komunikativne akcije (Theory of Communicative Action, 1981), koja je svojevrsni Habermasov magnum opus, kritizirao je jednostrani proces modernizacije vođen snagama ekonomske i administrativne racionalizacije. Habermas je posebno isticao da se sve ozbiljnije uplitanje i interveniranje formalnih sistema u svakodnevni život može posmatrati paralelno s razvojem države blagostanja, korporacijskog kapitalizma i kulture masovnog konzumerstva. Ovi trendovi koji postaju sve jači utiču sve šire na područja javnog života podređujući ih sveopštoj logici efikasnosti i kontrole. Obzirom da rutinizirane političke partije kao i interesne grupe zastupaju ideju participacijske demokratije nevjerovatno je da se društvom upravlja daleko od udjela građana. Kao rezultat može se vidjeti da granice između privatnog i javnog, pojedinca i društva, sistema i svijeta uopšte, su zapanjujuće. Demokratski javni život uspijeva jedino tamo gdje institucije daju građanima mogućnost da vode debatu o stvarima koje su javne važnosti. Habermas opisuje idelani tip "situacije idealnog govorništva", gdje su akteri ravnopravni učesnici u skladu s kapacitetima diskursa i gdje jedni drugima priznaju osnovnu društvenu jednakost i kada je izlaganje neometano ideologijom ili nerazumijevanjem.

Habermas i "Budućnost ljudske prirode" [uredi]

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enciklopedijskom stilu pisanja i pravopisu bosanskog jezika.

„Ako budući roditelji utužuju ekstenzivnu mjeru samoodređenja , onda bi bilo u redu da se i budućem djetetu garantira šansa da vodi autonoman život“ ;Kuhlmann

Sedamdesetih godina se uspjelo razdvojiti elementarne dijelove jednog genoma i ponovno ih sastaviti, što je označilo početak razvijanja medicine prema genetskoj modifikaciji ljudi. Sa stajališta znanosti tu nema ničeg moralnog ili nemoralnog, to je samo još jedan veliki uspjeh.

Međutim, etički gledano, da li je moralno čovjeku nametnuti ličnost koja mu prirodno ne bi bila predodređena? Sama mogućnost oplođivanja jajne ćelije izvan majčinog tijela ili surogat roditeljstva dovela je do razdvajanja pojma roditeljstva na socijalno i biološko.

Sam autor smatra, kao i većina nas, da genetska modifikacija kao sredstvo za sprječavanje bolesti ili za sprječavanje fizičkih i mentalnih nedostataka može poslužiti kao pozitivno medicinsko oružje za „bolji i pravedniji“ svijet u kojem bi se,ako ništa drugo, mogao smanjiti broj invalidnih osoba.

Predimplatacijska dijagnostika čini mogućim da se embriji u osmoćelijskom stadiju podvrgnu predostrožnom genetičkom ispitivanju. Taj postupak se prvenstveno nudi roditeljima koji bi htjeli izbjeći prenošenje nasljednih bolesti.

Tu se već zamagljuje jasna granica između prirode i znanosti. Ako dopustimo genetsko modificiranje u svrhu dobra, netko će ga željeti u svrhu ne dobroga.Uvijek će postojati oni roditelji koji će biti dovoljno bogati i moćni da sebi omoguće stvaranje svoje savršene djece. Kako na fizički izgled , tako će pokušati utjecati i na selekciju karaktera i potencijalnih sklonosti svoje djece.

Ono što je pomoću znanosti postalo tehnički moguće, to isto pomoću moralne kontrole mora postati neraspoloživim.Jer društveno prihvaćanje u budućnosti će jedva izostati,što znači da će ljudi to prihvaćati kao nešto sasvim uobičajeno, nešto sasvim etično, a razlog tomu je sposobnost medicine da sve svoje postupke objasni uz to da služi zdravijem i duljem životu.

S druge strane, tema pobačaja podijelila je u Njemačkoj (a i šire)pučanstvo na dvije strane – „pro life“ i „ pro choice“. Međutim , i jedni i drugi se bave istom problematikom, moralni status nerođenog ljudskog života.

Prema njemačkom zakonu pobačaj do 12. tjedna trudnoće je protupravan,ali nekažnjiv.Ali zapravo ni zakonom ni moralnim promišljanjem se ne može povući jasna granica do kada je fetus fetus, a kada postaje ljudsko biće.

Samom činjenicom da je čovjek slobodan sve dok njegova sloboda ne ugrožava slobodu pojedinca – nameće moralna pitanja i jednoj i drugoj strani. Da li čovjek ima pravo odlučivati da li će postati roditelj ili iznijeti trudnoću do kraja , ili pak fetus koji potencira biti dijete,pa prema tome i čovjek mora imati priliku roditi se jer kao takvo još nema prava glasa?

S jedne strane , pod uvjetima svjetonazorskog pluralizma mi embriju ne možemo od samog početka pripisati status osobe, a s druge strane intuicija da predosobni ljudski život ne može jednostavno biti učinjen raspoloživim kao konkurirajuće dobro.

Genetsko istraživanje i genskotehnički napredak danas se opravdavaju u svijetlu biopolitičkih ciljeva ishrane ,zdravlja i produljenja života.Međutim, tu se nitko ne osvrće na vlastitu dinamiku prirode. Ono sugerira brisanje temeljnog razlikovanja koje je konstitutivno i za naše samorazumijevanje kao rodnih bića.

U mjeri u kojoj evolucija vrsta ulazi u područje zahvata genske tehnologije dolazi do brisanja granica između onoga što smo proizveli i onoga što je nastalo po prirodi. Sama biopolitika nema neki jasno definirani cilj u poboljšanju genskog sistema roda u cjelini. Moralni razlozi su još duboko usidreni u principima ustava i pravorijeka,pa se zabranjuje instrumentalizacija individua za kolektivistički cilj.

Politički liberalisti žele dokazati da s moralnih stajališta ne postoji velika razlika između eugenike i odgoja.Eugenička sloboda roditelja uvjetovana je s time da ne smije konsolidirati s etičkom slobodom djece.

Nezavisno od toga u kojoj mjeri neko gensko modificiranje učvršćuje osobine , dispozicije sposobnosti buduće osobe i zaista određuje njeno ponašanje , kasnije znanje te okolnosti moglo bi zahvatiti u samoodnošenje dotične osobe spram njene tjelesne i duševne egzistencije.

Tu prijeti opasnost da, biće koje kad sazna da je netko umjesto njega „odlučio“ o njegovom bitku i time uskrati svijest da svagda može početi „sam“. No, s druge strane, odgoj i socijalna sredina su mnogo veće determinante koje odlučuju o čovjekovom životu. Pa i taj čovjek, koji kao genski modificiran, nije oslobođen od svijesti i samosvijesti, te kao individua odluke donosi sam. Na temelju svojih misli, a misli ni na koji način ne mogu biti genski modificirane.

Da, čovjeka možemo stvoriti kao nekoga tko će biti skloniji glazbi ili pak agresiji,ali socijalni odgoj kao i vlastito jastvo mogu od tog istog čovjek napraviti nešto sasvim novo

i neočekivano.Genskom modifikacijom možemo planirati novo društvo i stvarati ga,ali nikad nećemo moći unaprijed znati što će se dogoditi.

Poboljšavajući genetski zahvat okrnjuje se etička sloboda jer se ta osoba nikad neće moći shvatiti kao autora vlastitog života.Sam proces proizvodnje ljudi na ovaj način podijelio bi svijet na dvije proste grupe. Oni koji bi imali novca stvorili bi rasu intelektualaca, savršenih i moćnih ljudi, a oni koji nemaju bivali bi potlačeni i diskriminirani kao potencijalno niža intelektualna bića.

Pretpostavimo da se s embrionalnim istraživanjem provodi praksa koja zaštitu predosobnog života rangira niže od drugih svrha, pa i od izgleda za razvoj visokorangiranih osobnih dobara poput razvoja novih postupaka liječenja.Pogled na neku moguću budućnost ljudske prirode poučava nas o potrebi reguliranja koja je već danas nestala.

Glavna djela [uredi]

Student i politika (1961) Strukturalne promjene javnosti (Javno mnenje) (1965) Teorija i praksa (1963) Prilog logici društvenih nauka (1967) Tehnika i nauka kao ideologija (1968) Saznanje i interes (1968) Ka racionalnom društvu (1970) Filozofsko-politički profili (1971) Teorija komunikativne akcije (1981) Budućnost ljudske prirode (2003) Podijeljeni zapad (2006)

http://books.google.ba/books?id=L6ISsCJsjfEC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=Habermas+tehnika+i+znanost+kao+ideologija&source=bl&ots=r2d7DCxqhO&sig=Y9QPzqbuo-GHh4prgjjMi9V5HGg&hl=hr&ei=d2_jTevoBcjAswaY47HsBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=Habermas%20tehnika%20i%20znanost%20kao%20ideologija&f=false

Jürgen Habermas (English pronunciation: /ˈj ɜ r ɡ ən/ or /ˈj ʊ ər ɡ ən ˈh ɑː bərm ɑː s/ ,[1] German: [ˈj ʏʁɡ ən ˈhaːb ɐ maːs] ; born June 18, 1929) is a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and pragmatism. He is perhaps best known for his theory on the concepts of 'communicative rationality' and the 'public sphere'. His work focuses on the foundations of social theory and epistemology, the analysis of advanced capitalistic societies and democracy, the rule of law in a critical social-evolutionary context, and contemporary politics—particularly German politics.

Habermas's theoretical system is devoted to revealing the possibility of reason, emancipation, and rational-critical communication latent in modern institutions and in the human capacity to deliberate and pursue rational interests. Habermas is known for his work on the concept of modernity, particularly with respect to the discussions of "rationalization" originally set forth by Max Weber. While influenced by American pragmatism, action theory, and even poststructuralism, many of the central tenets of Habermas' thought remain broadly Marxist in nature.

Contents[hide]

1 Biography o 1.1 Teacher and mentor

2 Theory o 2.1 Reconstructive science o 2.2 The public sphere

3 Habermas versus Postmodernists 4 Important transitional works 5 Key dialogues

o 5.1 Historikerstreit (Historians' Quarrel) o 5.2 Habermas and Derrida o 5.3 Dialogue with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI)

6 Habermas today 7 Major works 8 See also 9 References

o 9.1 Notes o 9.2 Further reading

10 Awards

11 External links

[edit] Biography

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Born in Düsseldorf, Rhine Province, in 1929, to a middle class and rather traditional family, Habermas came of age in postwar Germany. In his early teens, during World War II, Habermas was profoundly affected by the war. The Nuremberg Trials were a key formative moment that brought home to him the depth of Germany's moral and political failure under National Socialism.

Until his graduation from gymnasium, Habermas lived in Gummersbach, near Cologne. His father, Ernst Habermas, was executive director of the Cologne Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and was described by Habermas as a Nazi sympathizer. He was brought up in a staunchly Protestant milieu, his grandfather being the director of the seminary in Gummersbach. He studied at the universities of Göttingen (1949/50), Zürich (1950/51), and Bonn (1951–54) and earned a doctorate in philosophy from Bonn in 1954 with a dissertation written on the conflict between the absolute and history in Schelling's thought, entitled, Das Absolute und die Geschichte. Von der Zweispältigkeit in Schellings Denken ("The absolute and history: on the schism in Schelling's thought"). His dissertation committee included Erich Rothacker and Oskar Becker.

From 1956 on, he studied philosophy and sociology under the critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt am Main Institute for Social Research, but because of a rift between the two over his dissertation—Horkheimer had made unacceptable demands for revision—as well as his own belief that the Frankfurt School had become paralyzed with political skepticism and disdain for modern culture[2]—he finished his habilitation in political science at the University of Marburg under the Marxist Wolfgang Abendroth. His habilitation work was entitled, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit; Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (published in English translation in 1989 as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society). It is a detailed social history of the development of the bourgeois public sphere from its origins in the 18th century salons up to its transformation through the influence of capital-driven mass media. In 1961, he became a privatdozent in Marburg, and—in a move that was highly unusual for the German academic scene of that time—he was offered the position of "extraordinary professor" (professor without chair) of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg (at the instigation of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Löwith) in 1962, which he accepted. In this same year he gained his first serious public attention, in Germany, with the publication of his habilitation. In 1964, strongly supported by Adorno, Habermas returned to Frankfurt to take over Horkheimer's chair in philosophy and sociology. The philosopher Albrecht Wellmer was his assistant in Frankfurt from 1966 to 1970.

He accepted the position of Director of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg (near Munich) in 1971, and worked there until 1983, two years after the publication of his magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1984.[3]

Habermas then returned to his chair at Frankfurt and the directorship of the Institute for Social Research. Since retiring from Frankfurt in 1993, Habermas has continued to publish extensively. In 1986, he received the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, which is the highest honour awarded in German research. He also holds the uncharacteristically postmodern position of "Permanent Visiting" Professor at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, and "Theodor Heuss Professor" at The New School, New York.

Habermas was awarded The Prince of Asturias Award in Social Sciences of 2003. Habermas was also the 2004 Kyoto Laureate in the Arts and Philosophy section. He traveled to San Diego and on March 5, 2005, as part of the University of San Diego's Kyoto Symposium, gave a speech entitled The Public Role of Religion in Secular Context, regarding the evolution of separation of Church and State from neutrality to intense secularism. He received the 2005 Holberg International Memorial Prize (about € 520,000). In 2007, Habermas was listed as the 7th most-cited author in the humanities (including the social sciences) by The Times Higher Education Guide, ahead of Max Weber and behind Erving Goffman.[4]

[edit] Teacher and mentor

Habermas is a famed teacher and mentor. Among his most prominent students were the pragmatic philosopher Herbert Schnädelbach (theorist of discourse distinction and rationality), the political sociologist Claus Offe (professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin), the social philosopher Johann Arnason (professor at La Trobe University and chief editor of the journal Thesis Eleven), the social philosopher Hans-Herbert Koegler (Chair of Philosophy at University of North Florida), the sociological theorist Hans Joas (professor at the University of Erfurt and at the University of Chicago), the theorist of societal evolution Klaus Eder, the social philosopher Axel Honneth (the current director of the Institute for Social Research), the anarcho-capitalist philosopher Hans-Hermann Hoppe, the American philosopher Thomas McCarthy, the co-creator of mindful inquiry in social research Jeremy J. Shapiro, and the assassinated Serbian prime minister Zoran Đinđić.

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Habermas has constructed a comprehensive framework of social theory and philosophy drawing on a number of intellectual traditions:

the German philosophical thought of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Hans-Georg Gadamer

the Marxian tradition — both the theory of Karl Marx himself as well as the critical neo-Marxian theory of the Frankfurt School, i.e. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse

the sociological theories of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and George Herbert Mead

the linguistic philosophy and speech act theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, Stephen Toulmin and John Searle

the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg the American pragmatist tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey the sociological social systems theory of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann Neo-Kantian thought

Jürgen Habermas considers his major contribution to be the development of the concept and theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than in the structure of either the cosmos or the knowing subject. This social theory advances the goals of human emancipation, while maintaining an inclusive universalist moral framework. This framework rests on the argument called universal pragmatics - that all speech acts have an inherent telos (the Greek word for "end") — the goal of mutual understanding, and that human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about such understanding. Habermas built the framework out of the speech-act philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and John Searle, the sociological theory of the interactional constitution of mind and self of George Herbert Mead, the theories of moral development of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, and the discourse ethics of his Heidelberg colleague Karl-Otto Apel.

Habermas's works resonate within the traditions of Kant and the Enlightenment and of democratic socialism through his emphasis on the potential for transforming the world and arriving at a more humane, just, and egalitarian society through the realization of the human potential for reason, in part through discourse ethics. While Habermas has stated that the Enlightenment is an "unfinished project," he argues it should be corrected and complemented, not discarded.[5] In this he distances himself from the Frankfurt School, criticizing it, as well as much of postmodernist thought, for excessive pessimism, radicalism, and exaggerations.[5]

Within sociology, Habermas's major contribution was the development of a comprehensive theory of societal evolution and modernization focusing on the difference between communicative rationality and rationalization on the one hand and strategic/instrumental rationality and rationalization on the other. This includes a critique from a communicative standpoint of the differentiation-based theory of social systems developed by Niklas Luhmann, a student of Talcott Parsons.

His defence of modernity and civil society has been a source of inspiration to others, and is considered a major philosophical alternative to the varieties of poststructuralism. He has also offered an influential analysis of late capitalism.

Habermas perceives the rationalization, humanization, and democratization of society in terms of the institutionalization of the potential for rationality that is inherent in the communicative competence that is unique to the human species. Habermas contends that communicative competence has developed through the course of evolution, but in contemporary society it is often suppressed or weakened by the way in which major domains of social life, such as the market, the state, and organizations, have been given

over to or taken over by strategic/instrumental rationality, so that the logic of the system supplants that of the lifeworld.

[edit] Reconstructive science

Habermas introduces the concept of “reconstructive science” with a double purpose: to place the “general theory of society” between philosophy and social science and re-establish the rift between the “great theorization” and the “empirical research”. The model of “rational reconstructions” represents the main thread of the surveys about the “structures” of the world of life (“culture”, “society” and “personality”) and their respective “functions” (cultural reproductions, social integrations and socialization). For this purpose, the dialectics between “symbolic representation” of “the structures subordinated to all worlds of life” (“internal relationships”) and the “material reproduction” of the social systems in their complex (“external relationships” between social systems and environment) has to be considered. This model finds an application, above all, in the “theory of the social evolution”, starting from the reconstruction of the necessary conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-cultural life forms (the “hominization”) until an analysis of the development of “social formations”, which Habermas subdivides into primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. “ This paper is an attempt, primarily, to formalize the model of “reconstruction of the logic of development” of “social formations” summed up by Habermas through the differentiation between vital world and social systems (and, within them, through the “rationalization of the world of life” and the “growth in complexity of the social systems”). Secondly, it tries to offer some methodological clarifications about the “explanation of the dynamics” of “historical processes” and, in particular, about the “theoretical meaning” of the evolutional theory’s propositions. Even if the German sociologist considers that the “ex-post rational reconstructions” and “the models system/environment” cannot have a complete “historiographical application”, these certainly act as a general premise in the argumentative structure of the “historical explanation””.[6]

[edit] The public sphereFor more details on this topic, see public sphere.

In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas argues that prior to the 18th century, European culture had been dominated by a "representational" culture, where one party sought to "represent" itself on its audience by overwhelming its subjects.[7] As an example of "representational" culture, Habermas argued that Louis XIV's Palace of Versailles was meant to show the greatness of the French state and its King by overpowering the senses of visitors to the Palace.[8] Habermas identifies "representational" culture as corresponding to the feudal stage of development according to Marxist theory, arguing that the coming of the capitalist stage of development marked the appearance of Öffentlichkeit (the public sphere).[9] In the culture characterized by Öffentlichkeit, there occurred a public space outside of the control by the state, where individuals exchanged views and knowledge.[10] In Habermas's view, the growth in newspapers, journals, reading clubs, Masonic lodges, and coffeehouses in 18th century Europe, all in different ways, marked the gradual replacement of "representational"

culture with Öffentlichkeit culture.[11] Habermas argued that the essential characteristic of the Öffentlichkeit culture was its "critical" nature.[11] Unlike "representational" culture where only one party was active and the other passive, the Öffentlichkeit culture was characterized by a dialogue as individuals either met in conversation, or exchanged views via the print media.[11] Habermas maintains that as Britain was the most liberal country in Europe, the culture of the public sphere emerged there first around 1700, and the growth of Öffentlichkeit culture took place over most of the 18th century in Continental Europe.[11] In his view, the French Revolution was in large part caused by the collapse of "representational" culture, and its replacement by Öffentlichkeit culture.[11] Though Habermas' main concern in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was to expose what he regarded as the deceptive nature of free institutions in the West, his book had a major effect on the historiography of the French Revolution.[9]

According to Habermas, a variety of factors resulted in the eventual decay of the public sphere, including the growth of a commercial mass media, which turned the critical public into a passive consumer public; and the welfare state, which merged the state with society so thoroughly that the public sphere was squeezed out. It also turned the "public sphere" into a site of self-interested contestation for the resources of the state rather than a space for the development of a public-minded rational consensus.

In his most known work to date, the Theory of Communicative Action (1981), is based on an adaptation of Talcott Parsons AGIL Paradigm. In this work, Habermas voiced criticism of the process of modernization, which he saw as inflexible direction forced through by economic and administrative rationalization.[12] Habermas outlined how our everyday lives are penetrated by formal systems as parallel to development of the welfare state, corporate capitalism and mass consumption.[12] These reinforcing trends rationalize public life.[12] Disfranchisement of citizens occurs as political parties and interest groups become rationalized and representative democracy replaces participatory one.[12] In consequence, boundaries between public and private, the individual and society, the system and the lifeworld are deteriorating.[12] Democratic public life cannot develop where matters of public importance are not discussed by citizens.[13] An "ideal speech situation",[14] requires participants to have the same capacities of discourse, social equality and their words are not confused by ideology or other errors.[13] In this version of the consensus theory of truth Habermas maintains that truth is what would be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.

Habermas has expressed optimism about the possibility of the revival of the public sphere.[15] He discerns a hope for the future where the representative democracy-reliant nation-state is replaced by a deliberative democracy-reliant political organism based on the equal rights and obligations of citizens.[15] In such direct democracy-driven system, the activist public sphere is needed for debates on matters of public importance and as well as the mechanism for that discussion to affect the decision-making process.

Several noted academics have provided various criticisms of Habermas's notions regarding the public sphere. John B. Thompson, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Jesus College,[16] has pointed out that

Habermas's notion of the public sphere is antiquated due to the proliferation of mass-media communications. Michael Schudson from the University of California, San Diego argues more generally that a public sphere as a place of purely rational independent debate never existed.

[edit] Habermas versus PostmodernistsHabermas offered some early criticisms in an essay, "Modernity versus Postmodernity" (1981), which has achieved wide recognition. In that essay, Habermas raises the issue of whether, in light of the failures of the twentieth century, we "should try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment, feeble as they may be, or should we declare the entire project of modernity a lost cause?"[17] Habermas refuses to give up on the possibility of a rational, "scientific" understanding of the life-world.

Habermas has several main criticisms of postmodernism.

First, the postmodernists are equivocal about whether they are producing serious theory or literature.

Second, Habermas feels that the postmodernists are animated by normative sentiments but the nature of those sentiments is concealed from the reader.

Third, Habermas accuses postmodernism of being a totalizing perspective that fails "to differentiate phenomena and practices that occur within modern society".[17]

Lastly, Habermas asserts that postmodernists ignore that which Habermas finds absolutely central - namely, everyday life and its practices.

[edit] Important transitional worksIn the period between Knowledge and Human Interest and The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas began to develop a distinctive method for elaborating the relationship between a theoretical social science of modern societies, on the one hand, and the normative and philosophical basis for critique, on the other. Following Horkheimer's definition of critical theory, Habermas pursued three aims in his attempt to combine social science and philosophical analysis: it must be explanatory, practical, and normative. This meant that philosophy could not become the sole basis for normative reflection. Rather, Habermas argued, adequate critique requires a thoroughgoing cooperation between philosophy and social science.

In this transitional phase from Knowledge and Human Interest to The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas's basic philosophical endeavor was to develop a more modest, fallibilist, empirical account of the philosophical claim to universality and rationality.

[edit] Key dialogues

[edit] Historikerstreit (Historians' Quarrel)Main article: Historikerstreit

Habermas is famous as a public intellectual as well as a scholar; most notably, in the 1980s he used the popular press to attack the German historians Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer, Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber. Habermas first expressed his views on the above-mentioned historians in the Die Zeit on July 11, 1986 in a feuilleton (opinion piece) entitled “A Kind of Settlement of Damages”. Habermas criticized Nolte, Hildebrand, Stürmer and Hillgruber for “apologistic” history writing in regard to the Nazi era, and for seeking to “close Germany’s opening to the West” that in Habermas’s view had existed since 1945.[18] He argued that they had tried to detach Nazi rule and the Holocaust from the mainstream of German history, explain away Nazism as a reaction to Bolshevism, and partially rehabilitate the reputation of the Wehrmacht (German Army) during World War II. Habermas wrote that Stürmer was trying to create a "vicarious religion" in German history which, together with the work of Hillgruber, glorifying the last days of the German Army on the Eastern Front, was intended to serve as a "kind of NATO philosophy colored with German nationalism"[19] The so-called Historikerstreit ("Historians' Quarrel") was not at all one-sided, because Habermas was himself attacked by scholars like Joachim Fest,[20] Hagen Schulze,[21] Horst Möller,[22] Imanuel Geiss [23] and Klaus Hildebrand [24] In turn, Habermas was supported by historians such as Martin Broszat,[25] Eberhard Jäckel,[26] Hans Mommsen [27] and Hans-Ulrich Wehler.[28]

[edit] Habermas and Derrida

Habermas and Jacques Derrida engaged in a series of disputes beginning in the 1980s and culminating in a mutual understanding and friendship in the late 1990s that lasted until Derrida died in 2004.[29] They originally came in contact when Habermas invited Derrida to speak at The University of Frankfurt in 1984. The next year Habermas published "Beyond a Temporalized Philosophy of Origins: Derrida" in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity in which he described Derrida’s method as being unable to provide a foundation for social critique.[30] Derrida, citing Habermas as an example, remarked that, "those who have accused me of reducing philosophy to literature or logic to rhetoric ... have visibly and carefully avoided reading me".[31] After Derrida’s final rebuttal in 1989 the two philosophers didn’t continue, but, as Derrida described it, groups in the academy “conducted a kind of ‘war’, in which we ourselves never took part, either personally or directly”.[29] Then at the end of the 1990s Habermas approached Derrida at a party held at a university in the United States where they were both lecturing. They then met at Paris over dinner, and afterwards have participated in many joint projects. In 2000 they held a joint seminar on problems of philosophy, right, ethics, and politics at the University of Frankfurt.[29] In December 2000, in Paris, Habermas gave a lecture entitled "How to answer the ethical question?" at the Judeities. Questions for Jacques Derrida conference organized by Joseph Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly. Following the lecture by Habermas, both thinkers engaged in a very heated debate on Heidegger and the possibility of Ethics. The conference volume was published at the Editions Galilée (Paris) in 2002, and subsequently in English at Fordham University Press (2007). In the aftermath of 9/11, Derrida and Habermas laid out their individual opinions on 9/11 and

the War on Terror in Giovanna Borradori's Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. In early 2003, both Habermas and Derrida were very active in opposing the coming Iraq War, and called for in a manifesto that later became the book Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe for a tighter union of the states of the European Union in order to provide a power capable of opposing American foreign policy. Derrida wrote a foreword expressing his unqualified subscription to Habermas's declaration of February 2003, "February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe,” in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe which was a reaction to the Bush administration demands upon European nations for support for the coming Iraq War.[32] Habermas has offered further context for this declaration in an interview.

[edit] Dialogue with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI)

In early 2007, Ignatius Press published a dialogue between Habermas and Roman Catholic Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), entitled The Dialectics of Secularization.

It addresses such important contemporary questions as these:

Is a public culture of reason and ordered liberty possible in our post-metaphysical age?

Is philosophy permanently cut adrift from its grounding in being and anthropology?

Does this decline of rationality signal an opportunity or a deep crisis for religion itself?

In this debate a recent shift of Habermas became evident — in particular, his rethinking of the public role of religion. Habermas writes as a “methodological atheist,” which means that when doing philosophy or social science, he presumes nothing about particular religious beliefs. Yet while writing from this perspective his evolving position towards the role of religion in society has led him to some challenging questions, and as a result conceding some ground in his dialogue with the Pope, that would seem to have consequences which further complicate the positions he holds about a communicative rational solution to the problems of modernity.

In an interview in 1999 Habermas stated that,

"For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up

to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk."[33]

The statement was later misquoted in a number of American newspapers and magazines as: "Christianity, and nothing else, is the ultimate foundation of liberty, conscience, human rights, and democracy, the benchmarks of Western civilization,"[34] which Habermas did not say.

Habermas now talks about the emergence of "post-secular societies" and argues that tolerance is a two-way street: secular people need to tolerate the role of religious people in the public square and vice versa.[35]

[edit] Habermas todayHabermas currently ranks as one of the most influential philosophers in the world.[36] Bridging European and Anglo-American traditions of thought, he has engaged in debate with thinkers as diverse as Gadamer and Hilary Putnam, Foucault and Rawls, Derrida and Brandom. His extensive written work addresses topics stretching from social-political theory to aesthetics, epistemology and language to philosophy of religion, and his ideas have significantly influenced not only philosophy but also political-legal thought, sociology, communication studies, argumentation theory and rhetoric, developmental psychology and theology. Moreover, he has figured prominently in Germany as public intellectual, commenting on controversial issues of the day in German news papers such as Die Zeit.

Two broad lines of enduring interest are found in Habermas's work, one having to do with the political domain, the other with issues of rationality, communication, and knowledge.[37]

[edit] Major worksMain article: Jürgen Habermas bibliography

The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) ISBN 0262581086 Theory and Practice (1963) On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967) Toward a Rational Society (1967) Technology and Science as Ideology (1968) Knowledge and Human Interests (1971, German 1968) "On Social Identity" . TELOS 19 (Spring 1974). New York: Telos Press Legitimation Crisis (1975) Communication and the Evolution of Society (1976) On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction (1976) The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1983)

Philosophical-Political Profiles (1983) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985) The New Conservatism (1985) The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State (1986) Postmetaphysical Thinking (1988) Justification and Application (1991) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and

Democracy (1992) On the Pragmatics of Communication (1992) The Inclusion of the Other (1996) A Berlin Republic (1997, collection of interviews with Habermas) The Postnational Constellation (1998) Rationality and Religion (1998) Truth and Justification (1998) The Future of Human Nature (2003) ISBN 0745629865 Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe (2005) ISBN 184467018X The Divided West (2006) The Dialectics of Secularization (2007, w/ Joseph Ratzinger) Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays (2008) Europe. The Faltering Project (2009)

[edit] See alsoKarl Heinrich Marx (Karl Marks; Trier, Njemačka 5. maj 1818. – London, 14. mart 1883.), njemački filozof.

Karl Heinrich Marx bio je uticajan njemački filozof, politički ekonomist, te revolucionar, organizator "Međunarodne udruge radnika".

U svojim razmišljanjima dotiče široku lepezu pitanja, no najpoznatiji je po svojoj analizi historije u terminima borbe klasa, sažetoj u poznatoj uvodnoj misli uvodnika u Komunističkom manifestu: "Historija svih do sada postojećih društava je historija borbe klasa."

Sadržaj[sakrij]

1 Marxov dijalektički metod 2 Marxovo poimanje historije i društva 3 Humanizam i općeljudska emancipacija u djelu Karla Marxa 4 Sloboda štampe i Marxovi stavovi 5 Relevantni članci

6 Vanjski linkovi

Marxov dijalektički metod [uredi]

Dijalektika je pojam preuzet od starih Grka, koji su svom izvornom određenju, znači da se kroz proturječnosti stajališta, dvaju ili više sugovornika, dolazi do objektivne istine. Grci u razvili sistem naivne, zdravorazumske dijalektike, čiji je rodonačelnik Heralit i „Panta rei“, sve teče, ovaj život je vječna vatra, koja se s mjerom pali, i s mjerom gasi. Ali, Grci su dijalektiku, osobito Sokrat, poimali kroz proturječje suprostavljenih pojmova, i ona je prevashodno bila pojmovno-teoretski, a ne povjesno-zbiljski definirana.

Hegel će dijalektici, nastojati u svom dijalektičkom metodu, dati zbiljsko-povjesno značenje. Ali, on samu povjest, materijalističku zbilju, koristi kao sredstvo da bi dokazao kretanje duha, u onom što predstavlja nešto spiritualno i određuje postojeći svijet socijalnog života. Hegel je dijalektiku poimao kao permanentni razvoj duhovne supstancije, pa iz tih razloga kažemo da je njegov pristup povjesti društva, države, čovjeka, spiritualističkog karaktera, mada je duh supstanciji davao primat, ona je kod njega osobito u poimanju povjesti države i društva materijalistički obojena. Fundamentalna paradigma njegove dijalektike je dijalektička trijada, koja se odvija kroz logičke pojmove: teze, antiteze i sinteze. Na bazi ove trijade može se u potpunosti shvatiti naša spoznaja, gnoseologija, kretanje cjelokupne povjesti, kao i razvoj prirode. Cjelokupna povjest, nije ništa drugo nego razvoj duhovne supstracije, koja se operacionalizira ponovno kroz trijadu: subjektivni duh, objektivni duh, i apsolutni duh. Sfera objektivnog duha je utemeljena na: običajnosti, moralu i državi. Sfera apsolutnog duha na: filozofiji, religiji kao apsolutnim spoznajama svijeta i kraju historije. Kod Hegela, kada je riječ o dijalektici, riječ je o ideološko-filozofskoj konstrukciji.

Ono što je vrijedno u ovoj konstrukciji jeste dijalektički metod, dijalektičke logičke kategorije, koje preuzima Marx i daje im zbiljsko, materijalističko određenje. Cjelokupnu povjest društva čovjeka, njegovu spoznaju, Marx sagledava kroz prizmu načina proizvodnje date epohe. Prema njemu ideje nisu supstracija i fundament postojećeg svijeta, života, već je materijalni život, tak koji određuje duhovni, politički, državni, pravni i svijet činjenica. Kod njega je dijalektika, historija sama po sebi, kao historija klasnih materijalističkih borbi, sukob materijalnih interesa, iz ovog sukoba se rađaju ideje, oblici društvene svijesti, političke grane i institucije. S pravom možemo reći da je mrxistička dijaletkika materijalistička. Na ovaj način Marxovo učenje definiramo kao povjesni materijalizam, a njegov dijalektički metod kao dijalektički materijalizam.

Nastavljači Marxovog djela, ovaj njegov dijalektički materijalizam su vulgarizirali. Da materijalna proizvodnja, direktno bez stvaralačkog posredovanja čovjeka, mehanički određuje oblike društvene svijesti, političke i pravne institucije. Kada imamo ovo stajalište u okviru marxizma, da materijalna proizvodnja direktno, mehanički određuje odlike društvene svijesti, političke i pravne institucije, onda ovo stajalište definiramo kao VULGARNI MARXIZAM, vulgarni materijalizam. Tipični predstavnici vulgarnog marxizma su bili: Karl Kaucki, Bernštajn, Rener i dr.

Usljed nedostatka vremena i prostora Marxu nije pošlo za rukom da na jednom mjestu sistematski izloži povratan uticaj oblika društvene svijesti, pravnih i političkih institucija,

na materijalističku bazu društva. Iako se u njegovom opisu vidi koliko kultura, oblici društvene svijesti, religija, ideologij, književnost, umjetnos nisu samo puki, mehanički izrazi date zbilje, nego proizvodi i rezultat slobodne, stvaralačke kreativnosti čovjeka, i da imaju, itekako povratno značenje, uticaj na dinamiku statiku socijalne baze društva.

Marx je bio oduševljen grčkom umjetnošću, osobito epikom jednog Homera, dramom jednog Shakespearea, te je uvijek naglašavao koliko velika stvalačka umjetnost, nadilazi svoje vrijeme i da izražava materijalnu supstancu tog vremena. Ako ga nadilazi, ona ima svoje vlastite imanentne zakone, nedostižive ideale, ka kojima konkretan čovjek teži.

Samo nam jedan vulgarni marxist, može objašnjenjem jednog umjetničkog djela dati, ako djelo vezuje direktno za materijalnu proizvodnju vremena, kada je ono nastalo.

Marxovo poimanje historije i društva [uredi]

On nije povjest posmatrao kao jednu vrstu voluntarizma, samotoka, već je historijske determinante posmatrao kroz objektivne nužnosti klasne borbe, potčinjenih i vladajućih. Ovaj klasni supstrat determinira historijsko kretanje, koje je uvijek kretanje ka višem, ka progresu. Marx, kada je riječ o poimanju historije, od Hegela preuzima jedno dominantno načelo, da je stepen historijskog progresa, uvijek proporcionalan sa stupnjem razvoja ljudske slobode i općeljudske emancipacije. Mada preuzima ovo načelo od Hegela, on se s njim razilazi u jednom njegovu, drugom određenju, jer Hegel polazi od paradigme, kada se kroz povjesni proces konstruira država, historijski proces je završen, to je kraj historije, jer je ostvaren najviši stepen slobode.

Hegel polazi od fundamentalne paradigme; “Ondje gdje je država, a ona je rezultanta historijskog procesa, tu se realizira i najviši stepen slobode čovjeka, država se manifestira kao druga strana, ili drugi oblik ljudske slobode.“

Marx polazi od pretpostavke: “Ondje gdje je država, tu je vlast, moć, ona je negacija slobode čovjeka. Jer država je klasna tvorevina, a ondje gdje je vladavina, država, tu je na djelu političko otuđenje, nesloboda, ropstvo, podaništvo čovjeka kao takvog.“

Marx cjelokupnu historija, izuzev prvobitne zajednice, sagledava kao historija klasnih borbi, gdje vodi i razjašnjenje ovog klasnog antagonizma, u konstituciji jednog društva – socijalizma, njegova diktatura proleterijata, kao prijelaznog oblika ka komunizmu.

To je poimanje historije, pa kosekventno tome i društva, Marx će najbolje izraziti u svom jednom pismu upućenom 50-ih godina 19.st. svom prijatelju Vajdmajeru, u kome kaže da njemu ne pripada zasluga da sam otkrivanja društvenih klasa, klase su prije njega otkrili historičari, u doba restauracije Tijer i Menje. Ono što njemu pripada, i što je otkrio jeste činjenica da postojanje klasa vezano za određeni način materijalne proizvodnje, da klasna borba vodi diktaturi ploreterijata, i da diktatura proleterijata predstavlja samo prijelazni oblik ka besklasnom društvu.

Ovo njegovo stajalište o historije, i društvu, koje treba doći, u sebi sadrži dosta onog problemsko-političkog, utopijskog, iako je pretendiralo da bude objektivno, znanstveno. U ovom stajalištu, ima, osobito u poimanju povjesti, njenom razrješenju, njenom kraju, dosta toga Mesijanskog, jer je ovdje proleterijatu data uloga Mesije, Spasitelja, koji treba razriješiti sa kostitucijom socijalizma sve probleme, ne samo date epohe, nego cjelokupne povjesti čovječanstva. Ova programska, politička organizacija Marxa, koja je bila oficijelno usvojena na kongresu Prve internacionale 1864.g., u sebi sadrži jednu vrstu političke teologije.

Marx je društvo podijelio na dvije velike grupe: društvenu bazu i društvenu nadgradnju.

Pod društvenom bazom, on podrazumijeva način proizvodnje, materijalnog života, ovaj način proizvodnje materijalnog života je sastavljen od proizvodnih snaga i produkcijskih odnosa. Proizvodne snage su sredstva proizvodnje i čovjeka, kao temeljna proizvodna snaga društva. Produkcijski odnosi, su oni odnosi, u koje ljudi stupaju nužno, nezavisno od volje, u odnose proizvodnje. Ovi su odnosi determinirani samim vlasničkim odnosima. Kada je riječ o vlasničkim odnosima prema Marxu, onaj koji je vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju, u materijalnoj produkciji i reprodukciji života, on je vladajući subjekt društva, države, prava, te je njegova svijest, valadajuća svijest date epohe.

Pod društvenom nadgradnjom, Marx podrazumijeva državnu, pravnu, političku sferu, kao i oblike društvene svijesti. Pod oblicima društvene svijesti podrazumijevamo religiju, ideologiju, znanost, različite sadržaje, forme umjetnosti, itd.

Marx je uočio dualizam između građanskog društva i same države, a taj se dualizam prelama kroz samu egzistenciju individua, pa je individue u građanskom društvu on definirao kao HOMO DUPLEX, tj. kroz individuu se prelamaju javna i privatna sfera.

Privatna sfera je utemeljena na egoističkom interesu koji određuje individualno ponašanje pojedinca. Javna sfera, tj. politika i država su utemeljeni na općem interesu. Ovaj opći interes je apstraktan i on u potpunosti ne izražava interese i potrebe konkretnih individua. Kada je riječ o individualnosti, javna, politička sfera ne polazi od konkretnog individualizma, već od apstraktnog, pa je riječ o čovjeku kao apstraktnom građaninu. Ovaj pojam apstraktnog građanina, kao navodno slobodnog, Marx nastoji objasniti kroz samu sferu produkcijskih odnosa gdje je, prema njemu, čovjek slobodan u dvostrukom smislu riječi, slobodan od sredstava za proizvodnju i slobodan da svoju radnu snagu na tržištu prodaje kome hoće. Prema Marxu, ovdje je riječ o formalnoj, lažnoj slobodi jer da bi čovjek živio, da bi reproducirao svakodnevno svoju biološku ili kulturnu egzistenciju, čovjek nužno mora prodavati svoju radnu snagu na tržištu. Prema njemu, čovjek može biti istinski slobodan stvaratelj, kreativac, tek ako nadvlada ovu ekonomsku nužnost koja isključuje pojam i čin slobode.

Stoga, on analizira i sam kapitalistički način proizvodnje koji prema njemu stvara realne pretpostavke istinske slobode čovjeka i njegove emancipacije i dolazi do fundamentalnog zaključka da je građansko društvo sa svojim načinom proizvodnje u totalnoj proturiječnosti, te Marx spoznaje fundamentalni zakon samog građanskog načina proizvodnje, a to je da imamo na djelu sve više procese podruštvljavanja procesa proizvodnje, a način prisvajanja novostvorene vrijednosti je prevashodno privatnog karaktera.

Drugi Marxov temeljni zakon po čemu je i danas aktuelan, je ZAKON O VIŠKU VRIJEDNOSTI, na kojem počiva cjelokupan kapitalistički sistem. Do ovog zakona je došao putem, analize strukture i funkcija kapitala, kao društvenog odnosa. Tako kada je riječ o strukturi kapitala, onda ga Marx dijeli na dva dijela:

1. Stalni, nepromijenjivi ili sterilni kapital – riječ je o sredstvima za proizvodnju i sirovinama;

2. Promjenjivi kapital, ozbiljen u radnoj snazi kao roba. Kapitalista na tržištu nalazi i jedan i drugi kapital, plaća ih i organizira proces proizvodnje.

U novostvorenoj vrijednosti, kada je proces proizvodnje završen, ovaj sterilni ili nepromjenjivi kapital prenosi samo jedan dio svoje vlastite vrijednosti, a ne stvara novu vrijednost. Novu vrijednost stvara promjenjivi kapital, radna snaga kao roba.

Marx otkriva jednu specifičnost, koja je do tada bila nepoznata u historije politekonomskih doktrina, tj. da je radna snaga takva vrsta robe, ako radnik, npr. radi 8 sati, on za 4 sata sa svojim društveno priznatim radom može stvoriti dio novostvorene vrijednosti koja će mu osigurati biološku i kulturnu reprodukciju, njega i njegove obitelji, pa se postavlja fundamentalno pitanje. Radnik radi 8 sati, za 4 sata je osigurao svoju egzistenciju, što je sa ostala 4 sata. Prema njemu je to višak vrijednosti koje prisvaja kapitalist, pa na ovom višku počiva cjelokupan kapitalistički sistem, kako njegova baza tako i njegova nadgradnja.

Treći zakon koji je Marx nastojao objasniti kao znanstvenik, a znanost je pokazala da je pseudoznanstvenik je ZAKON O TENDENCIJSKOM PADU PROSJEČNE PROFITNE STOPE. Ako kapitalist sa razvojem nauke i tehnike sve više ulaže u tehničko znanstveni proces proizvodnje, a prema njemu sterilni kapital ne stvara novu vrijednost, dakle profit, onda se postavlja fundamentalno pitanje, zašto konstantno kapital ulaže u nauku i njenu tehničku primjenu, upravo iz tih razloga da bi se uvećao profit što je pokazala savremena praksa građanskog svijeta, jer razvojem znanosti i tehničke primjene u proizvodnom procesu dominantno značenje ima tehnika, a sve manje radna snaga kao takva. Npr.danas u zapadnoj Evropi u novostvorenoj vrijednosti nauka i tehnika učestvuje sa 95%, a radna snaga sa 5%. Marx je posmatrao ovaj tendencijski pad prosječne profitne stope kao jednu

vrstu samotoka vlastitog kretanja kapitala, ka svom vlastitom uništenju, ka jednom kaosu koji će sam od sebe stvoriti jedno novo društvo – socijalizam, odnosno komunizam. On ovdje pada u jednu vrstu proturječja. S jedne strane govori da sam kapital odnos svojim imanentnim razvojem vodi ka uništenju, a s druge strane on polazi od mesijanske uloge i zadaće radničke klase koja je po svojoj prirodi svjesni stvaralački subjekt, koja će kroz misao i čin socijalisičke revolucije srušiti kapitalizam i stvoriti novo društvo.

On je cjelokupnu problematiku građanskog svijeta, koji je nezavisno od bilo čega u odnosu na predhodne društveno-ekonomske formacije, bio najprogresivniji svijet, koji je stvorio pretpostavke za nesmetani razvoj nauke i tehnike do interkontinentalnih razmjera. Marx je smatrao da sa bogatstvom i emancipatorskom ulogom tog građanskog svijeta na uvećano bogatstvo, sve više raste njegova bijeda radništva, što je pogrešno, pa je on u kategoriji te opće bijede vidio i pretpostavku same socijalne revolucije.

Međutim, niko nije bolje na znanstvenom nivou objasnio strukturu kapitalodnosa građanskog društva, pod uvjetom ako zanemarimo njegovu političko-proletersku opciju, kao Karl Marx. On je spoznao zakon akumulacije, centralizacije kapitala, teoriju viška vrijednosti, prostu i proširenu produkciju. Zatim u drugoj polovini 19.st. uočio je dvije fundamentalne tendencije građanskog svijeta koje će u 20.st. postati opća zakonitost kapitalističkog načina proizvodnje. U klasičnom kapitalodnosu sve do prve polovine 19.st. u jednoj ličnosti, u ličnosti kapitaliste, imali smo da je on bio istovremeno vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju i da je organizirao proizvodni proces. U drugoj polovini 19.st. kada tehnika kao primjenjena znanost postaje odnos produkcije i reprodukcije kapitala, ove funkcije vlasništva i upravljanja kapitalom se razdvajaju u proizvodni proces upravljanja kapitalističkim načinom proizvodnje ulaze stručnjaci različitih profila i oni predstavljaju jednu novu proizvodno organsku strukturu koja je dominantna u proizvodnom procesu, a definiramo je kao vladavinu tehničke strukture. Sada je na djelu tehnička, humanistička inteligencija iz svih oblasti naučnih sredstava koja ima dominantno značenje ne samo u proizvodnom procesu, već i u društvu kao cjelini.

Ovdje je riječ o fundamentalnoj preinaci društvenog odnosa, jer kapitalist kao vlastnik sredstava za proizvodnju nije više dominantna ekonomska snaga, a to nam govori da se sukcesivno i mijenja socijalna struktura građanskog društva kao takvog, što će nam u potpunosti pokazati socijalistička struktura kapitalističkih odnosa u 20.st. U socijalnoj strukturi društva vište nisu na djelu, dvije antagonističke klase, tj.buržuji i proleteri, već je društvo utemeljeno na socijalnoj stratifikaciji, osobito na vladavini srednjeg sloja, na dominaciji ove tehno-strukture koja upravlja proizvodnim procesom.

Drugu tendenciju, koju je Marx uočio a koja će u 20.st. postati općim zakonom funkcioniranja i reprodukcije kapitala jeste sve manje značenje funkcija proizvodnog, a sve veća funkcija financijskog kapitala gdje se ostvaruje višak vrijednosti – profit kroz špekulativni kapital putem malverzacije porodaje dionica na međunarodnim burzama, gdje „novac koti novac“N-N´“

Humanizam i općeljudska emancipacija u djelu Karla Marxa [uredi]

Marx polazi od jednog filozofsko-ontološkog stajališta da sve institucije građanskog društva, država, pravo kao i oblici društvene svijesti, ideologija religija, moral, književnost, umjetnost, usljed totalnog otuđenja se u građanskom društvu manifestiraju kao samostalni entiteti, subjektiviteti, kao neka vrsta utvara, gdje se zaboravlja njihovo sociološko, klasno porijeklo ovih institucija, oblika društvene svijesti, pa oni umjesto da budu sredstva u rukama individua, ove institucije i oblici društvene svijesti se nameću kao neka vrsta novih gospodara. Prema njemu država, pravo, religija, nisu ništa drugo nego oblici vladavine vladajuće klase. Ondje gdje postoji građansko društvo prema Marxu, tu je na djelu negacija humanizma koja se ostvaruje kroz totalno otuđenje. Marx je prevashodno fenomen otuđenja razmatrao u ekonomskoj sferi građanskog društva, pa je spoznao korijenje i ključ razriješenja, otuđenja kroz razotuđenje cjelokupnog građanskog svijeta.

On u prvoj glavi, prvog toma Kapitala, u poglavlju FETIŠIZAM ROBE, analizira ekonomsku osnovu otuđenja građanskog svijeta. Roba posjeduje upotrebnu i prometnu vrijednost. Upotrebna vrijednost robe je određena njenom kvalitetom, a prometna kvantitetom. Da bi se jedna stvar iz proizvodnog procesa manifestirala kao roba, odlazi na tržište, a zakoni tržišta vladaju nezavisno o subjektivne volje ljudi. Proizveo ih je čovjek gdje uložena količina manuelnog i intelektualnog rada. Taj rad je bitna odlika čovjekove prirode kao društvenog bića. Kad roba odlazi na tržište putem imanentnih zakona tržišta, mi ne znamo što se s tom robom dešava, ona dobija magična, fetiška obilježja, postaje novom mističnom fetišističkom snagom. Umjesto da mi njom vladamo, jer je dio našeg bića, mi smo je proizveli, te robe zapravo vladaju nama kao nova božanstva. U toj vladavini one se odvajaju od svojih korjena, od porjekla te istupaju kao samostalne, otuđene, ostvarene sile. Kao što je ovdje slučaj sa robom, tako je slučaj i sa pravom, državom, ideologijom, drugim oblicima društvene svijesti, to su sve tvorevine koje imaju sociološko-antropološki korjen, ali zahvaljujući kapitalodnosu, jednom kada su stvorene one zadobijaju samostalnu moć i postaju jedna nova vrsta vladaoca nad ljudima i narodnostima.

Kad obrazlaže fenomen otuđenja onda Marx uočava da je na prvom mjestu čovjek otuđen od svoje vlastite biti. Njegova bit je rad manuelni i intelektualni, koji je odpremećen u robama. Kada je otuđena čovjekova bit od samog čovjeka, onda je na djelu podjeljenost između ljudske esencije i egzistencije. Ako je čovjek otuđen od svoje biti, onda je prvo otuđen od sredstava za proizvodnju, od proizvoda svoga rada, zatim od drugog čovjeka i na kraju cjelokupnog građanskog svijeta koji je čovjek stvorio, otuđen je od drugog

čovjeka. Ovo otuđenje se prema Marxu može prevladati kroz misao i čin socijalističke revolucije. Kod njega pojavu socijalističke revolucije daje široke mogućnosti, da se ona ne može samo reducirati na političku revoluciju nego da kapitalodnos može svojom vlastitom socijalističkom revolucijom prijeći u jedno novo stanje socijalizam, odnosno komunizam.

Marx socijalizam definira kao diktaturu proleterijata, a to nije ništa drugo nego radnička klasa, organizirana na stepen države. Diktatura proleterijata predstavlja prijelazni oblik ka jednom višem stupnju socijal-komunističke zajednice, već je slobodan razvoj pojedinca oslobođen svake dužnosti, biti uvjet i pretpostavka slobode socijalne zajednice. Ova slobodna zajednica socijalističkih proizvođača predstavlja novi humanizam- kao društveni naturalizam- kao realizirani humanizam. Kada je riječ o odnosu humanizma-naturalizma, onda to podrazumijeva harmoničan odnos, saradnju čovjeka sa prirodom i s drugim čovjekom sa samom socijalnom zajednicom. Cjelokupna dosadašnja povjest je bila utemeljena na socijalističkoj i političkoj moći, na eksploataciji prirode, jer čovjekova moć nad prirodom se istovremeno projicirala kao i moć nad drugim čovjekom, jer čovjek je i prirodno biće te Marx smatra da će ovaj novi komunistički humanizam kao dovršeni naturalizam predstavljati onaj društveni socijalni protest gdje će čovjek, dokinuti sve oblike otuđenja, postojeće institucije i oblike društvene svijesti, staviti pod svoju plansku strukturu, slobodnu kontrolu kao oblike vlastite socijalističke moći. Dakako ovo je jedna vrsta utopije što ne znači da nekada neće biti realizirana, jer otkako postoji pisana historija, ljudi su, počevši od Platona, sanjali o slobodi čovjeka, o njegovom drugom stanju, gdje će kako Marx kaže čovjek biti korjen za drugog čovjeka.

Sloboda štampe i Marxovi stavovi [uredi]

Prioritetna načela novinarske profesije su istina I poštivanje privatnosti, poštivanje zakona, odgovorno ponašanje i slično. Međutim minuli rat u Bosni I Hercegovini predstavlja primjer negacije I istine I slobode pa time I etike kako u primjeru potpunog kršenja elementarnih prava ljudi (na primjer – prava na život) tako I u pogledu kršenja slobode I nepoštivanja istine. U decenijama raspada bivše Jugoslavije njeno novinarstvo nije bilo bez pravila a novinari bez znanja. No oni su napustili načela I prihvatili nalog vlasti a umjesto etike profesije nemoral režima kao svoj moral. Čak su se oglušili I o “Marksovu etiku novinarstva” koju su znali jer je ona bila, kao sastavnica vladajuće ideologije dijelom njihovog obrazovanja, a ta gledišta nisu nevažna. Neka Marksova stajališta su tako od velike važnosti, a njihova aktualnost je vidljiva I danas, jedan I po vijek nakon što su izrečene.

Kada je Karl Marks još davne 1842. godine javno kritizirao cenzuru štampe on je time upozorio na opasnost od posezanja u slobodu štampe I naznačio potrebu kritičkog odnosa prema zakonima koje donosi vlast u cilju ograničavanja slobode, izricanja istine. Naime on je ukazao na to da zakoni koji se donose ne smiju biti od “kritike razuma”. Marks je upozorio da se u zakonu o cenzuri prepoznaje namjera vlasti da bude jedini kriterij istine. On je oštro osudio zakone (zakon o cenzuri) koji za svoj glavni kriterij nemju čin kao takav već nakanu činitelja. Istovremeno Marks je upozorio I na činjenicu da cenzura

svojim prisustvom osigurava otpor prema sebi. U tom kontekstu on je naglasio: “Budući da se duh svakog pojedinog naroda izražava u njegovoj štampi to će u štampi biti prisutne ne samo njegove vrline nego I njegovi nedostaci”. Ustvari, Marks je osporavajući nepravične državne zakone (poput ovog o cenzuri) ocijenio neprihvatljivim nadređenu poziciju vlasti koja vidi samu sebe. Zato I jeste zabranu slobode štampe okarakterizirao kao odraz čovjekove nezrelosti.

Osam osnovnih Marksovih stavova o slobodi štampe koji se I danas čine aktualnim su:

neprihvatljivost cenzure štampa kao svestran izraz duha jednog naroda sloboda štampe kao uvjet korekcije društvenog stanja zakon o slobodi (nezavisnosti) štampe kao nužnost značaj kritike slobodne štampe za razvoj društva kritika vlastodršstva kao interes slobode štampe šutnja štampe – izdaja poziva naglašena prava birokracije I policije – suprotnost slobodi štampe

U osnovi Marksovih poticaja za promišljanje značaja slobode štampe bilo je zakonodavstvo pruskih vlasti koje su zavele cenzuru I može se reći da je upravo to iniciralo njegov angažman u cjelovitom sagledavanju tako važnog odnosa države prema štampi te funkcija štampe u društvu, posebno kritičkog odnosa prema pitanju zakonske regulative. Treba dalje reći da je njegov akcenat na kritici I potcrtavanju nezadovoljstva postojećim poticajan I aktualan I danas kada ustavi većine država garantiraju pravo na informiranost I slobodu izražavanja jer su odstupanja evidentna. U funkciji eksplikacije snage I dalekosežnosti njegove recepcije slobode stoje i dva Marxova stava koja se tiču slobode štampe I zakonske regulative a u primjeru tako davnih njegovih reakcija na konkretne akcije Pruskih vlasti. “Loša je samo ona štampa koja se ostvaruje u ambijentu ograničene slobode a ona štampa koja se ostvaruje u ambijentu slobode dobra je bez obzira na njene moguće ili stvarne nedostatke. Nedostatke štampe treba promatrati sa stajališta njenog razvoja I razvoja uopće.” (Marks)

Kada se Marks 1848.g u povodu nacrta zakona o štampi koji je bio ponuđen Pruskom parlamentu na usvajanje suprotstavio pokušajima ograničavanjima slobode štampe on se zapravo založio za pravo da se javno I argumentirano kritizira aktualna vlast. S druge strane on se suprotstavio kontroli vlasti kako bi se zapriječila mogućnost da štampa predstavlja službeno glasilo vlasti I time osigura samovolja državnih činovnika. Ovo pitanje ni do danas razrješeno. Ono se postavlja kao problem uklanjanja granica slobode štampe permanentno tokom proteklog vijeka. Ako se tome doda kakvu su praksu donosili ratovi I krize, totalitarizam-fašizam, vojne diktature, komunizam, onda je sasvim uputno priznati Marksu ne samo snagu misli I intelektualne kuraži, već prije svega intelektualnu moralnost, u smislu njegova stava prema novinrskoj profesiji I u tom smislu teorijski doprinos poimanju slobode štampe. Marks se nigdje u svom cjelokupnom djelu nije založio za ograničenje slobode štampe pa ni u socijalizmu, komunizmu za čiju se revoluciju teorijski i praktično angažirao. Naprotiv, smatrao je da je u svakom društvu pa i u socijalizmu nedopustivo ograničavanje slobode štampe, odnosno da je “moć

razumskih zakona” kao kritika razuma nezaobilazna u razvoju društva u cjelini, I štampe posebno.

UtopiaMain article: Utopia (book)

More sketched out his best known and most controversial work, Utopia (completed and published in 1516), a novel in Latin. In it a traveller, Raphael Hythlodeaus (in Greek, his name and surname allude to archangel Raphael, purveyor of truth, and mean "speaker of nonsense"), describes the political arrangements of the imaginary island country of Utopia (Greek pun on ou-topos [no place], eu-topos [good place]) to himself and to Pieter Gillis. At the time, most literate people could understand the actual meaning of the word "utopia" because of the relatively widespread knowledge of the Greek language. This novel describes the city of Amaurote by saying, "Of them all this is the worthiest and of most dignity".

Utopia contrasts the contentious social life of European states with the perfectly orderly, reasonable social arrangements of Utopia and its environs (Tallstoria, Nolandia, and Aircastle). In Utopia, with communal ownership of land, private property does not exist, men and women are educated alike, and there is almost complete religious toleration. Some take the novel's principal message to be the social need for order and discipline rather than liberty. The country of Utopia tolerates different religious practices but does not tolerate atheists. Hythlodeaus theorizes that if a man did not believe in a god or in an afterlife he could never be trusted, because he would not acknowledge any authority or principle outside himself.

More used the novel describing an imaginary nation as a means of freely discussing contemporary controversial matters; speculatively, he based Utopia on monastic communalism, based upon the Biblical communalism in the Acts of the Apostles.

Utopia is a forerunner of the utopian literary genre, wherein ideal societies and perfect cities are detailed. Although Utopianism is typically a Renaissance movement, combining the classical concepts of perfect societies of Plato and Aristotle with Roman rhetorical finesse (cf. Cicero, Quintilian, epideictic oratory), it continued into the Enlightenment. Utopia's original edition included the symmetrical "Utopian alphabet" that was omitted from later editions; it is a notable, early attempt at cryptography that might have influenced the development of shorthand.

Utopia ironically points out, through Raphael, More's ultimate conflict between his beliefs as a humanist and a servant of the King at court. More tries to illustrate how he can try and influence courtly figures including the king to the humanist way of thinking but as Raphael points out, one day they will come into conflict with the political reality.

[edit] Religious polemics

In 1520 the reformer Martin Luther published three works in quick succession: An Appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation; Concerning the Babylonish Captivity of the Church; and On the Liberty of a Christian Man.[21] In these works Luther set out his doctrine of salvation through grace alone, rejected certain Catholic practices, and attacked the abuses and excesses of the Catholic Church.[22] In 1521, Henry VIII responded to Luther’s criticisms with a work known as the Assertio, written with the editorial assistance of More. In light of this work, Pope Leo X rewarded Henry VIII with the title Fidei defensor (“Defender of the Faith”) for his efforts in combating Luther’s heresies.[23]

Martin Luther then attacked Henry VIII in print, calling him a “pig, dolt, and liar”.[24] At the request of Henry VIII, More set about composing a rebuttal: the resulting Responsio ad Lutherum was published at the end of 1523. In the Responsio, More defended the supremacy of the papacy, the sacraments, and other church traditions. More’s language, like Luther’s, was virulent, and he branded Luther an “ape”, a “drunkard”, and a “lousy little friar” amongst other insults.[25]

This confrontation with Luther confirmed More’s theological conservatism, and from then on his work was devoid of all hints of criticism of Church authority.[25] In 1528, More produced another religious polemic, A Dialogue Concerning Heresies that asserted that the Catholic Church was the one true Church, whose authority had been established by Christ and the Apostles, and that its traditions and practices were valid.[26] In 1529, the circulation of Simon Fish’s Supplication for the Beggars provoked a response from More entitled, The Supplication of Souls.

In 1531, William Tyndale published An Answer unto Sir Thomas More’s Dialogue in response to More’s Dialogue Concerning Heresies. After having read Tyndale’s work, More wrote his half-a-million-word-long Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer over the next several months. The Confutation is written as a dialogue between More and Tyndale in which More responds to each of Tyndale’s criticisms of Catholic rites and doctrines.[27] These literary battles convinced More, who valued structure, tradition, and order in society above all else, that Lutheranism and the Protestant Reformation in general were dangerous, not only to the Catholic faith but to the stability of society as a whole.[27]

[edit] Correspondence

Most major humanists were prolific letter writers, and Thomas More was no exception. However, as in the case of his friend Erasmus of Rotterdam, only a small portion of his correspondence (about 280 letters), survived. These letters include everything from personal letters to official government correspondence (mostly in English), letters to fellow humanist scholars (in Latin), including several epistolary tracts, verse epistles, prefatory letters (some fictional) to several of More's own works, letters to his children and their tutors (in Latin), and the so-called "Prison-Letters" (in English) which he

exchanged with his oldest daughter, Margaret Roper while he was imprisoned in the Tower of London awaiting execution.[28]

[edit] ChancellorshipAfter Wolsey fell, More succeeded to the office of Chancellor in 1529. He dispatched cases with unprecedented rapidity. At that point fully devoted to Henry and to the cause of royal prerogative, More initially co-operated with the king's new policy, denouncing Wolsey in Parliament and proclaiming the opinion of the theologians at Oxford and Cambridge that the marriage of Henry to Catherine had been unlawful. But as Henry began to deny the authority of the Pope, More's qualms grew.

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More supported the Catholic Church and saw the Reformation as heresy, a threat to the unity of both church and society. Believing in the theology, polemics, and ecclesiastical laws of the Church, More "heard Luther's call to destroy the Catholic Church as a call to war."[29]

His early actions against the Reformation included aiding Wolsey in preventing Lutheran books from being imported into England, spying on and investigating suspected Protestants, especially Publishers and arresting any one holding in his possession, transporting, or selling the books of the Protestant reformation. More vigorously suppressed the travelling country ministers who used Tyndale's English translation of the New Testament. This English language translation of the Bible challenged the Catholic monopoly of reading the Latin Bible. It contained translations of certain words—for example Tyndale used "elder" rather than "priest" for the Greek "presbuteros"--and some footnotes which challenged Catholic Doctrine.[30] It was during this time that most of his literary polemics appeared.

Sir Thomas More is commemorated with a sculpture at the late 19th-century Sir Thomas More House, opposite the Royal Courts of Justice, Carey Street, London.

Rumours circulated both during More's lifetime and posthumously regarding the treatment of heretics during his time as Lord Chancellor. The popular anti-Catholic polemicist John Foxe, who "placed Protestant sufferings against the background of ... the Antichrist"[31] was instrumental in spreading rumours of torture in his famous Book of Martyrs, claiming that More had often personally used violence or torture while interrogating heretics: more current Protestant authors, such as Brian Moynahan and Michael Farris, continue to cite Foxe as a source when repeating these allegations in their own respective works.[32] More himself denied these allegations:

“ Stories of a similar nature were current even in More's lifetime and he denied them forcefully. He admitted that he did imprison heretics in his house — 'theyr sure kepynge' — he called it - but he utterly rejected claims of torture and whipping . . . 'so helpe me God.' [33] ”

In total there were six heretics burned at the stake during More's Chancellorship: Thomas Hitton, Thomas Bilney, Richard Bayfield, John Tewkesbery, Thomas Dusgate, and James Bainham.[34] Burning at the stake had long been a standard punishment for heresy—about thirty burnings had taken place in the century before More's elevation to Chancellor, and burning continued to be used by both Catholics as well as Protestants during the religious upheaval of the following decades.[35] Ackroyd notes that More explicitly "approved of Burning"[36] After the case of John Tewkesbury, a London leather-seller found guilty by More of harboring banned books and sentenced to burning for refusing to recant, More declared: he "burned as there was neuer wretche I wene better worthy.".[37]

Historians have been long divided over More's religious actions as Chancellor. While respected historians such as Ackroyd have taken a relatively tolerant view of More's campaign against Protestantism by placing his actions within the turbulent religious climate of the time, other equally eminent historians, such as Richard Marius, have been more critical, believing that such persecutions were a betrayal of More's earlier humanist convictions. As Marius writes in his biography of More: "To stand before a man at an inquisition, knowing that he will rejoice when we die, knowing that he will commit us to the stake and its horrors without a moment's hesitation or remorse if we do not satisfy

him, is not an experience much less cruel because our inquisitor does not whip us or rack us or shout at us."[38]

[edit] Resignation

As the conflict over supremacy between the Papacy and the King reached its apogee, More continued to remain steadfast in supporting the supremacy of the Papal throne over that of his King. In 1530 More refused to sign a letter by the leading English churchmen and aristocrats asking the Pope to annul Henry's marriage to Catherine, and furthermore, quarrelled with Henry VIII over the heresy laws. In 1531, Henry had isolated More by purging most clergy who supported the Papal stance from senior positions in the Church. In addition, Henry had solidified his denial of the Papacy's control of England by passing the Statute of Praemunire which forbade appeals to the Roman Curia from England. Realizing his isolated position, More attempted to resign after being forced to take an oath declaring the king the Supreme Head of the English Church "as far as the law of Christ allows". Furthermore, the Statute of Praemunire made it a crime to support in public or office the claims of the Papacy. Thus, he refused to take the oath in the form in which it would renounce all claims of jurisdiction over the church except the sovereign's. Nonetheless, the reputation and influence of More as well as his long relationship with Henry, kept his life secure for the time being and consequently, he was not relieved of office. However, with his supporters in court quickly disappearing, in 1532 he asked the king again to relieve him of his office, claiming that he was ill and suffering from sharp chest pains. This time Henry granted his request.

[edit] Trial and execution

Rowland Lockey after Hans Holbein the Younger, The Family of Sir Thomas More, c. 1594

In 1533, More refused to attend the coronation of Anne Boleyn as the Queen of England. Technically, this was not an act of treason, as More had written to Henry acknowledging Anne's queenship and expressing his desire for the king's happiness and the new queen's health.[39] Despite this, his refusal to attend was widely interpreted as a snub against Anne, and Henry took action against him.

Shortly thereafter More was charged with accepting bribes, but the patently false charges had to be dismissed for lack of any evidence, given More's reputation as a judge who could not be bribed. In early 1534, More was accused of conspiring with the "Holy Maid of Kent," Elizabeth Barton, a nun who had prophesied against the king's annulment, but More was able to produce a letter in which he had instructed Barton not to interfere with state matters.

On April 13, 1534, More was asked to appear before a commission and swear his allegiance to the parliamentary Act of Succession. More accepted Parliament's right to declare Anne Boleyn the legitimate queen of England, but he steadfastly refused to take the oath of supremacy of the Crown in the relationship between the Kingdom and the Church in England. Holding fast to the ancient teaching of Papal supremacy, More refused to take the oath and furthermore publicly refused to uphold Henry's annulment from Catherine. John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, refused the oath along with More. The oath reads:

... By reason whereof the Bishop of Rome and See Apostolic, contrary to the great and inviolable grants of jurisdictions given by God immediately to emperors, kings and princes in succession to their heirs, hath presumed in times past to invest who should please them to inherit in other men's kingdoms and dominions, which thing we your most humble subjects, both spiritual and temporal, do most abhor and detest;[40]

With his refusal to support the King's annulment, More's enemies had enough evidence to have the King arrest him on treason. Four days later, Henry had More imprisoned in the Tower of London. There More prepared a devotional Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation. While More was imprisoned in the Tower, Thomas Cromwell made several visits, urging More to take the oath, which More continued to refuse.

On July 1, 1535, More was tried before a panel of judges that included the new Lord Chancellor, Sir Thomas Audley, as well as Anne Boleyn's father, brother, and uncle. He was charged with high treason for denying the validity of the Act of Succession. More, relying on legal precedent and the maxim "qui tacet consentire videtur" (silence presumes consent), understood that he could not be convicted as long as he did not explicitly deny that the king was Supreme Head of the Church, and he therefore refused to answer all questions regarding his opinions on the subject. Thomas Cromwell, at the time the most powerful of the king's advisors, brought forth the Solicitor General, Richard Rich, to testify that More had, in his presence, denied that the king was the legitimate head of the church. This testimony was extremely dubious: witnesses Richard Southwell and Mr. Palmer both denied having heard the details of the reported conversation, and as More himself pointed out: " Can it therefore seem likely to your Lordships, that I should in so weighty an Affair as this, act so unadvisedly, as to trust Mr. Rich, a Man I had always so mean an Opinion of, in reference to his Truth and Honesty,...that I should only impart to Mr. Rich the Secrets of my Conscience in respect to the King's Supremacy, the particular Secrets, and only Point about which I have been so long pressed to explain my self? which I never did, nor never would reveal; when the Act was once made, either to the King himself, or any of his Privy-Counselors, as is well

known to your Honours, who have been sent upon no other account at several times by his Majesty to me in the Tower. I refer it to your Judgments, my Lords, whether this can seem credible to any of your Lordships." However, the jury knew where their own best interests lay, and took only fifteen minutes to find More guilty.

More was tried, and found guilty, under the following section of the Treason Act 1534:

If any person or persons, after the first day of February next coming, do maliciously wish, will or desire, by words or writing, or by craft imagine, invent, practise, or attempt any bodily harm to be done or committed to the king's most royal person, the queen's, or their heirs apparent, or to deprive them or any of them of their dignity, title, or name of their royal estates ...

That then every such person and persons so offending ... shall have and suffer such pains of death and other penalties, as is limited and accustomed in cases of high treason. [41]

After the jury's verdict was delivered and before his sentencing, More spoke freely of his belief that "no temporal man may be the head of the spirituality". He was sentenced to be hanged, drawn, and quartered (the usual punishment for traitors who were not the nobility), but the king commuted this to execution by decapitation. The execution took place on July 6, 1535. When he came to mount the steps to the scaffold, he is widely quoted as saying (to the officials): "I pray you, I pray you, Mr Lieutenant, see me safe up and for my coming down, I can shift for myself"; while on the scaffold he declared that he died "the king's good servant, and God's first."[42] Another comment he is believed to have made to the executioner is that his beard was completely innocent of any crime, and did not deserve the axe; he then positioned his beard so that it would not be harmed.[43] More asked that his foster daughter Margaret Giggs be given his headless corpse to bury.[44] He was buried at the Tower of London, in the chapel of St Peter ad Vincula in an unmarked grave. His head was fixed upon a pike over London Bridge for a month, according to the normal custom for traitors. His daughter Margaret (Meg) Roper rescued it, possibly by bribery, before it could be thrown in the River Thames.

The skull is believed to rest in the Roper Vault of St. Dunstan's Church, Canterbury, though some researchers have claimed it might be within the tomb he erected for himself in Chelsea Old Church (see below). The evidence, however, seems to be in favour of its placement in St. Dunstan's, with the remains of his daughter, Margaret Roper, and her husband's family, whose vault it was. Margaret would have treasured this relic of her adored father, and legend is that she wished to be buried herself with his head in her arms.[citation needed]

Among other surviving relics is his hair shirt, presented for safe keeping by Margaret Clements (1508–1570), his adopted daughter.[45] This was long in the custody of the community of Augustinian Canonesses who until 1983 lived at the convent at Abbotskerswell Priory, Devon. It is now preserved at Syon Abbey, near South Brent.

In addition to writing in defense of the Catholic Church, More wrote about the more spiritual aspects of religion. This is how he wrote A Treatise on the Passion (Treatise on the Passion of Christ), A Treatise to Receive the Blessed Body (Holy Body Treaty), and De Tristitia Christi (The Agony of Christ), which reads his own hand in the Tower of London at the time he was confined before his beheading on July 6, 1535. This last manuscript, saved from the confiscation decreed by Henry VIII, passed by the will of his daughter Margaret to Spanish hands and through Fray Pedro de Soto, confessor of Emperor Charles V, went to Valencia, home of Luis Vives, a close friend of More. Now kept in the collection of Real Colegio Seminario del Corpus Christi Museum in Valencia, Spain.

[edit] Canonisation

Statue of Thomas More by Leslie Cubitt Bevis in front of Chelsea Old Church, Cheyne Walk, London.

More was beatified by Pope Leo XIII in 1886 and canonised, with John Fisher, on 19 May 1935 by Pope Pius XI. His name was added to the Roman Catholic calendar of saints in 1970 for celebration on 22 June jointly with St John Fisher, the only remaining Bishop (owing to the coincident natural deaths of eight aged bishops) who, during the English Reformation, maintained, at the King's mercy, allegiance to the Pope.[46] In 2000, Pope John Paul II declared More the "heavenly patron of statesmen and politicians".[47] In 1980, More was added to the Church of England's calendar of Saints and Heroes of the Christian Church, jointly with John Fisher. More is commemorated on 6 July.[48]

[edit] Influence and reputation

The steadfastness and courage with which More held on to his religious convictions in the face of ruin and death and the dignity with which he conducted himself during his imprisonment, trial, and execution, contributed much to More's posthumous reputation, particularly among Catholics. Many historians argue that his conviction for treason was unjust, and even among some Protestants his execution was viewed as heavy-handed.[citation needed] His friend Erasmus defended More's character as "more pure than any snow" and described his genius as "such as England never had and never again will have." When he knew of the execution, Emperor Charles V said: "Had we been master of such a servant, we would rather have lost the best city of our dominions than such a worthy councillor."

More was greatly admired by the Anglican writer Jonathan Swift. Swift wrote that More was "a person of the greatest virtue this kingdom ever produced".[49][50] Samuel Johnson is often cited as the origin of that quote,[51][52] but mistakenly: it is not to be found in his writings or recorded by Boswell.

Winston Churchill wrote about More in the History of the English-Speaking Peoples: "The resistance of More and Fisher to the royal supremacy in Church government was a noble and heroic stand. They realized the defects of the existing Catholic system, but they hated and feared the aggressive nationalism which was destroying the unity of Christendom. [...] More stood as the defender of all that was finest in the medieval outlook. He represents to history its universality, its belief in spiritual values and its instinctive sense of other-worldliness. Henry VIII with cruel axe decapitated not only a wise and gifted counsellor, but a system, which, though it had failed to live up to its ideals in practice, had for long furnished mankind with its brightest dreams."

Catholic writer G. K. Chesterton said that More was the "greatest historical character in English history".

[edit] Popular cultureMore was portrayed as a wise and honest statesman in the 1592 play Sir Thomas More, which was probably written in collaboration by Henry Chettle, Anthony Munday, William Shakespeare, and others, and which survives only in fragmentary form after being censored by Edmund Tylney, Master of the Revels in the government of Queen Elizabeth I (any direct reference to the Act of Supremacy was censored out).

As the author of Utopia, More has attracted the admiration of modern socialists. While Catholic scholars maintain that More's attitude in composing Utopia was largely ironic and that he was an orthodox Christian, Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky argued in the book Thomas More and his Utopia (1888) that Utopia was a shrewd critique of economic and social exploitation in pre-modern Europe and that More was one of the key intellectual figures in the early development of socialist ideas. Others have seen in it an attempt at mythologizing Indian cultures in the New World during a time when the Catholic Church was still debating over how to view the decidedly anti-Christian cultures of the Indians.

The 20th-century agnostic playwright Robert Bolt portrayed Thomas More as the tragic hero of his 1960 play A Man for All Seasons. The title being drawn from what Robert Whittington in 1520 wrote of More:

"More is a man of an angel's wit and singular learning. I know not his fellow. For where is the man of that gentleness, lowliness and affability? And, as time requireth, a man of marvelous mirth and pastimes, and sometime of as sad gravity. A man for all seasons."[53]

In 1966, the play was made into the successful film A Man for All Seasons directed by Fred Zinnemann, adapted for the screen by the playwright himself, and starring Paul Scofield in an Oscar-winning performance. The film won the Academy Award for Best Picture for that year. In 1988, Charlton Heston starred and directed in a made-for-television film that followed Bolt's original play almost verbatim, restoring for example the commentaries of "the common man".

Catholic science fiction writer R. A. Lafferty wrote his novel Past Master as a modern equivalent to More's Utopia, which he saw as a satire. In this novel, Thomas More is brought through time to the year 2535, where he is made king of the future world of "Astrobe", only to be beheaded after ruling for a mere nine days. One of the characters in the novel compares More favourably to almost every other major historical figure: "He had one completely honest moment right at the end. I cannot think of anyone else who ever had one."

Karl Zuchardt's novel, Stirb du Narr! ("Die you fool!"), about More's struggle with King Henry, portrays More as an idealist bound to fail in the power struggle with a ruthless ruler and an unjust world.

A number of modern historians and writers, such as Richard Marius, have evaluated More in his political capacity and have criticized him for Anti-Protestantism and, "intolerance." The historian Jasper Ridley, author of several biographies including one on Henry VIII and another on Mary Tudor, goes much further in his dual biography of More and Cardinal Wolsey, The Statesman and the Fanatic, describing More as "a particularly nasty sadomasochistic pervert," a line of thinking followed by the late Joanna Denny in her 2004 biography of Anne Boleyn.

Several authors have criticized Sir Thomas More for his war against Protestantism. Brian Moynahan in his book "God's Messenger: William Tyndale, Thomas More and the Writing of the English Bible", takes a similarly critical view of More, as does the American writer, Michael Farris. The novelist Hilary Mantel portrays More as a religious and masochistic fanatic in her 2009 novel Wolf Hall. Wolf Hall is told through the eyes of a sympathetic Thomas Cromwell. Literary critic James Wood calls him "cruel in punishment, evasive in argument, lusty for power, and repressive in politics".[54]

Aaron Zelman's non-fiction book "The State Versus the People" includes a comparison of "Utopia" with Plato's "Republic". Zelman is undecided as to whether Thomas More was

being ironic in his book or was genuinely advocating a police state. Zelman comments, "More is the only Christian saint to be honoured with a statue at the Kremlin."[citation needed] By this Zelman implies that Utopia influenced Lenin's Bolsheviks, despite their brutal repression of organized religion.

Other biographers, such as Peter Ackroyd, have offered a more sympathetic picture of More as both a sophisticated philosopher and man of letters, as well as a zealous Catholic who believed in the authority of the Holy See over Christendom.

The protagonist of Walker Percy's novels, Love in the Ruins and The Thanatos Syndrome, is Dr. Thomas More, a reluctant Catholic and descendant of Sir Thomas More.

More is the focus of the Al Stewart song A Man For All Seasons from the 1978 album Time Passages, and of the Far song Sir, featured on the limited editions and 2008 re-release of their 1994 album Quick. In addition, the song "So Says I" by indie rock outfit The Shins alludes to the socialist interpretation of More's Utopia.

Jeremy Northam depicts Sir Thomas More in the television series The Tudors. In The Tudors, More is portrayed as a peaceful man, as well as a devout Roman Catholic and loving family patriarch. He vocally expresses his loathing for Protestantism. By the order of King Henry VIII, More commissions the burning of Martin Luther's books. He is shown exercising his authority as Chancellor by burning English Protestants who have been convicted of heresy. The Tudors shows More engaging in the conversation that Richard Rich testified about regarding the King's title as Supreme Head of the Church of England. More's avowed insistence that Rich's testimony was perjured is excised from the show's depiction of the trial.

The opera The Passion of Saint Thomas More, written by composer Garrett Fisher, is available on BIS Records (Sweden).

The cultus of Sir Thomas More has been satirized. In the The Simpsons episode Margical History Tour contains a parody of both Henry VIII and Sir Thomas More. King Henry (Homer Simpson) is depicted as a gluttonous slob who stuffs his face while singing, "I'm Henery the Eighth, I am." He then wipes his mouth with Magna Carta and sets out to dump Queen Catherine (Marge Simpson). Sir Thomas (Ned Flanders) objects, "Divorce! Well, there's no such thing in the Cath-diddly-atholic Church! But it's the only Church we got, so what are you gonna do?" King Henry retorts, "I'll start my own Church... Where divorce will be so easy, more than half of all marriages will end in it!" When a horrifed Sir Thomas refuses to go along, King Henry has him shot out of a cannon.

[edit] Institutions named after Thomas More

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HegelFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia"Hegel" redirects here. For the surname, see Hegel (surname).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Full name Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Born August 27, 1770Stuttgart, Württemberg

Died November 14, 1831 (aged 61)Berlin, Prussia

Era 19th-century philosophyRegion Western Philosophy

School German Idealism; Founder of Hegelianism; Historicism

Main interests

Logic, Philosophy of history, Aesthetics, Religion, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Political Philosophy,

Notable ideas

Absolute idealism, Dialectic, Sublation, master-slave dialectic

Influenced by[show]Influenced[show]

Part of a series on

G. W. F. Hegel

HegelianismAbsolute idealism

British / German idealismDialectic

Master-slave dialectic

Works

Phenomenology of SpiritScience of Logic

EncyclopediaPhilosophy of Right

Philosophy of History

People

Immanuel KantJohann Wolfgang von Goethe

Johann Gottlieb FichteFriedrich HölderlinFriedrich Schelling

Arthur SchopenhauerSøren Kierkegaard

Karl MarxBaruch Spinoza

Related topics

Right HegeliansYoung Hegelians

Marx's theory of alienationThe Secret of Hegel

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The birthplace of Hegel in Stuttgart, which now houses The Hegel Museum

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (German pronunciation: [ˈ ɡ e ɔʁ k ˈv ɪ lh ɛ lm ˈf ʁ iːd ʁɪ ç ˈheː ɡ əl] ) (August 27, 1770 – November 14, 1831) was a German philosopher, one of the creators of German Idealism. His historicist and idealist account of reality as a whole revolutionized European philosophy and was an important precursor to Continental philosophy and Marxism.

Hegel developed a comprehensive philosophical framework, or "system", of Absolute idealism to account in an integrated and developmental way for the relation of mind and nature, the subject and object of knowledge, and psychology, the state, history, art, religion and philosophy. In particular, he developed a concept of mind or spirit that manifested itself in a set of contradictions and oppositions that it ultimately integrated and united, without eliminating either pole or reducing one to the other. Examples of such contradictions include those between nature and freedom, and between immanence and transcendence.

Hegel influenced writers of widely varying positions, including both his admirers (Strauss, Bauer, Feuerbach, T. H. Green, Marx, F. H. Bradley, Dewey, Sartre, Küng, Kojève, Fukuyama, Žižek, Brandom) and his detractors (Schopenhauer, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Stirner, Peirce, Popper, Russell, Heidegger).[2] His influential conceptions are of speculative logic or "dialectic", "absolute idealism", "Spirit", negativity, sublation (Aufhebung in German), the "Master/Slave" dialectic, "ethical life" and the importance of history.

Contents[hide]

1 Life o 1.1 Early years

1.1.1 Childhood 1.1.2 Tübingen (1788-93) 1.1.3 Bern (1793–96) and Frankfurt (1797–1801)

o 1.2 Career years 1.2.1 Jena, Bamberg and Nuremberg: 1801-1816 1.2.2 Heidelberg and Berlin: 1816-1831

2 Works

3 Thought o 3.1 Freedom o 3.2 Progress o 3.3 Civil society o 3.4 Heraclitus o 3.5 Religion

4 Legacy o 4.1 Reading Hegel o 4.2 Left and Right Hegelianism o 4.3 Triads o 4.4 Renaissance o 4.5 Criticism

5 Works o 5.1 Published during Hegel's lifetime o 5.2 Published posthumously

6 Secondary literature o 6.1 General introductions o 6.2 Essays o 6.3 Biography o 6.4 Historical o 6.5 Hegel's development o 6.6 Recent English-language literature o 6.7 Phenomenology of Spirit o 6.8 Logic o 6.9 Politics o 6.10 Republicanism o 6.11 Aesthetics o 6.12 Religion o 6.13 Hegel's reputation o 6.14 Comparative studies

7 See also 8 Notes 9 Further reading 10 External links

o 10.1 Audio o 10.2 Societies

o 10.3 Hegel's texts online

[edit] Life

[edit] Early years

[edit] Childhood

Hegel was born on August 27, 1770 in Stuttgart, in the Duchy Württemberg in southwestern Germany. Christened Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, he was known as Wilhelm to his close family. His father, Georg Ludwig, was Rentkammersekretär (secretary to the revenue office) at the court of Karl Eugen, Duke of Württemberg.[3] Hegel's mother, Maria Magdalena Louisa (née Fromm), was the daughter of a lawyer at the High Court of Justice at the Württemberg court. She died of a "bilious fever" (Gallenfieber) when Hegel was eleven. Hegel and his father also caught the disease but narrowly survived.[4] Hegel had a sister, Christiane Luise (1773–1832), and a brother, Georg Ludwig (1776–1812), who was to perish as an officer in Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812.[5]

At the age of three Hegel went to the "German School". When he entered the "Latin School" aged five, he already knew the first declension, having been taught it by his mother.

In 1776 Hegel entered Stuttgart's Gymnasium Illustre. During his adolescence Hegel read voraciously, copying lengthy extracts in his diary. Authors he read include the poet Klopstock and writers associated with the Enlightenment such as Christian Garve and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Hegel's studies at the Gymnasium were concluded with his Abiturrede ("graduation speech") entitled "The abortive state of art and scholarship in Turkey."

[edit] Tübingen (1788-93)

At the age of eighteen Hegel entered the Tübinger Stift (a Protestant seminary attached to the University of Tübingen), where two fellow students were to become vital to his development—his exact contemporary, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, and the younger brilliant philosopher-to-be Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Sharing a dislike for what they regarded as the restrictive environment of the Seminary, the three became close friends and mutually influenced each other's ideas. They watched the unfolding of the French Revolution with shared enthusiasm. Schelling and Hölderlin immersed themselves in theoretical debates on Kantian philosophy, from which Hegel remained aloof. Hegel at this time envisaged his future as that of a Popularphilosoph, i.e., a "man of letters" who serves to make the abstruse ideas of philosophers accessible to a wider public; his own felt need to engage critically with the central ideas of Kantianism did not come until 1800.

[edit] Bern (1793–96) and Frankfurt (1797–1801)

Having received his theological certificate (Konsistorialexamen) from the Tübingen Seminary, Hegel became Hofmeister (house tutor) to an aristocratic family in Bern (1793–96). During this period he composed the text which has become known as the "Life of Jesus" and a book-length manuscript entitled "The Positivity of the Christian Religion". His relations with his employers having become strained, Hegel gladly accepted an offer mediated by Hölderlin to take up a similar position with a wine merchant's family in Frankfurt, where he moved in 1797. Here Hölderlin exerted an important influence on Hegel's thought.[6] While in Frankfurt Hegel composed the essay

"Fragments on Religion and Love". In 1799 he wrote another essay entitled "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate" which was not published during his lifetime.

[edit] Career years

[edit] Jena, Bamberg and Nuremberg: 1801-1816

In 1801 Hegel came to Jena with the encouragement of his old friend Schelling, who was Extraordinary Professor at the University there. Hegel secured a position at the University as a Privatdozent (unsalaried lecturer) after submitting a Habilitationsschrift (dissertation) on the orbits of the planets. Later in the year Hegel's first book, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, appeared. He lectured on "Logic and Metaphysics" and, with Schelling, gave joint lectures on an "Introduction to the Idea and Limits of True Philosophy" and held a "Philosophical Disputorium". In 1802 Schelling and Hegel founded a journal, the Kritische Journal der Philosophie ("Critical Journal of Philosophy") to which they each contributed pieces until the collaboration was ended by Schelling's departure for Würzburg in 1803.

In 1805 the University promoted Hegel to the position of Extraordinary Professor (unsalaried), after Hegel wrote a letter to the poet and minister of culture Johann Wolfgang von Goethe protesting at the promotion of his philosophical adversary Jakob Friedrich Fries ahead of him.[7] Hegel attempted to enlist the help of the poet and translator Johann Heinrich Voß to obtain a post at the newly renascent University of Heidelberg, but failed; to his chagrin, Fries was later in the same year made Ordinary Professor (salaried) there.[8]

Hegel sees the "world spirit on horseback", Napoleon.

His finances drying up quickly, Hegel was now under great pressure to deliver his book, the long-promised introduction to his System. Hegel was putting the finishing touches to this book, now called the Phenomenology of Spirit, as Napoleon engaged Prussian troops on October 14, 1806, in the Battle of Jena on a plateau outside the city. On the day before

the battle, Napoleon entered the city of Jena. Hegel recounted his impressions in a letter to his friend Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer:

I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it . . . this extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire.[9]

Although Napoleon chose not to close down Jena as he had other universities, the city was devastated and students deserted the university in droves, making Hegel's financial prospects even worse. The following February Hegel's landlady Christiana Burkhardt (who had been abandoned by her husband) gave birth to their son Georg Ludwig Friedrich Fischer (1807–31).[10]

In March 1807, aged 37, Hegel moved to Bamberg, where Niethammer had declined and passed on to Hegel an offer to become editor of a newspaper, the Bamberger Zeitung. Hegel, unable to find more suitable employment, reluctantly accepted. Ludwig Fischer and his mother (whom Hegel may have offered to marry following the death of her husband) stayed behind in Jena.[11]

He was then, in November 1808, again through Niethammer, appointed headmaster of a Gymnasium in Nuremberg, a post he held until 1816. While in Nuremberg Hegel adapted his recently published Phenomenology of Mind for use in the classroom. Part of his remit being to teach a class called "Introduction to Knowledge of the Universal Coherence of the Sciences", Hegel developed the idea of an encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences, falling into three parts (logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit).[12]

Hegel married Marie Helena Susanna von Tucher (1791–1855), the eldest daughter of a Senator, in 1811. This period saw the publication of his second major work, the Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik; 3 vols., 1812, 1813, 1816), and the birth of his two legitimate sons, Karl Friedrich Wilhelm (1813–1901) and Immanuel Thomas Christian (1814–1891).

[edit] Heidelberg and Berlin: 1816-1831

Having received offers of a post from the Universities of Erlangen, Berlin, and Heidelberg, Hegel chose Heidelberg, where he moved in 1816. Soon after, in April 1817, his illegitimate son Ludwig Fischer (now ten years old) joined the Hegel household, having thus far spent his childhood in an orphanage.[13] (Ludwig's mother had died in the meantime.)[14]

Hegel published The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817) as a summary of his philosophy for students attending his lectures at Heidelberg.

Hegel with his Berlin studentsSketch by Franz Kugler

In 1818 Hegel accepted the renewed offer of the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, which had remained vacant since Fichte's death in 1814. Here he published his Philosophy of Right (1821). Hegel devoted himself primarily to delivering his lectures; his lecture courses on aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of history, and the history of philosophy were published posthumously from lecture notes taken by his students. His fame spread and his lectures attracted students from all over Germany and beyond.

Hegel was appointed Rector of the University in 1830, when he was 60. He was deeply disturbed by the riots for reform in Berlin in that year. In 1831 Frederick William III decorated him for his service to the Prussian state. In August 1831 a cholera epidemic reached Berlin and Hegel left the city, taking up lodgings in Kreuzberg. Now in a weak state of health, Hegel seldom went out. As the new semester began in October, Hegel returned to Berlin, with the (mistaken) impression that the epidemic had largely subsided. By November 14 Hegel was dead. The physicians pronounced the cause of death as cholera, but it is likely he died from a different gastrointestinal disease.[15] He is said to have uttered the last words "And he didn't understand me" before expiring.[16] In accordance with his wishes, Hegel was buried on November 16 in the Dorotheenstadt cemetery next to Fichte and Solger.

Hegel's son Ludwig Fischer had died shortly before while serving with the Dutch army in Batavia; the news of his death never reached his father.[17] Early the following year Hegel's sister Christiane committed suicide by drowning. Hegel's sons Karl, who became a historian, and Immanuel, who followed a theological path, lived long lives during which they safeguarded their father's Nachlaß and produced editions of his works.

[edit] WorksHegel published only four books during his lifetime: the Phenomenology of Spirit (or Phenomenology of Mind), his account of the evolution of consciousness from sense-perception to absolute knowledge, published in 1807; the Science of Logic, the logical and metaphysical core of his philosophy, in three volumes, published in 1811, 1812, and 1816 (revised 1831); Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, a summary of his entire philosophical system, which was originally published in 1816 and revised in 1827 and

1830; and the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, his political philosophy, published in 1822. In the latter, he criticized von Haller's reactionary work, which claimed that laws were not necessary. He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously.

Hegel's tombstone in Berlin

Hegel's works have a reputation for their difficulty and for the breadth of the topics they attempt to cover. Hegel introduced a system for understanding the history of philosophy and the world itself, often described as a "progression in which each successive movement emerges as a resolution to the contradictions inherent in the preceding movement"[citation needed]. For example, the French Revolution for Hegel constitutes the introduction of real individual political freedom into European societies for the first time in recorded history. But precisely because of its absolute novelty, it is also unlimited with regard to everything that preceded it: on the one hand the upsurge of violence required to carry out the revolution cannot cease to be itself, while on the other, it has already consumed its opponent. The revolution therefore has nowhere to turn but onto its own result: the hard-won freedom is consumed by a brutal Reign of Terror. History, however, progresses by learning from its mistakes: only after and precisely because of this experience can one posit the existence of a constitutional state of free citizens, embodying both the benevolent organizing power of rational government and the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality. Hegel's remarks on the French revolution led German poet Heinrich Heine to label him "The Orléans of German Philosophy".

[edit] Thought

[edit] Freedom

Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Plato and Kant. To this list one could add Proclus, Meister Eckhart, Leibniz, Plotinus, Jakob Boehme, and Rousseau. What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus, the Stoics, and Thomas Hobbes, and from empiricists like David Hume, is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications, for soul or mind or divinity. This focus on freedom is what generates Plato's notion (in the Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus) of the soul as having a higher or fuller kind of reality than inanimate objects possess. While Aristotle criticizes Plato's "Forms", he preserves Plato's cornerstones of the ontological implications for self-determination: ethical reasoning, the soul's pinnacle in the hierarchy of nature, the order of the cosmos, and an assumption with reasoned arguments for a prime mover. Plato's high esteem of individual sovereignty Kant imports to his considerations of moral and noumenal freedom, and God. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects.

In his discussion of "Spirit" in his Encyclopedia, Hegel praises Aristotle's On the Soul as "by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic".[18] In his Phenomenology of Spirit and his Science of Logic, Hegel's concern with Kantian topics such as freedom and morality, and with their ontological implications, is pervasive. Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to subsume it within "true infinity", the "Concept" (or "Notion": Begriff), "Spirit", and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given."

The reason why this subsumption takes place in a series of concepts is that Hegel's method, in his Science of Logic and his Encyclopedia, is to begin with ultra-basic concepts like Being and Nothing, and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph. In this manner, a solution that is reached, in principle, in the account of "true infinity" in the Science of Logic's chapter on "Quality", is repeated in new guises at later stages, all the way to "Spirit" and "ethical life", in the third volume of the Encyclopedia.

In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursues the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" (or, in Plato's case, "good") which transcends bodily restrictiveness. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite (a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought"[19]), the universal going beyond the particular (in the Concept), and Spirit going beyond Nature. And Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by (ultimately) his argument in the "Quality" chapter of

the "Science of Logic." The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because, as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality",[20] what determines itself—rather than depending on its relations to other things for its essential character—is more fully "real" (following the Latin etymology of "real": more "thing-like") than what does not. Finite things don't determine themselves, because, as "finite" things, their essential character is determined by their boundaries, over against other finite things. So, in order to become "real", they must go beyond their finitude ("finitude is only as a transcending of itself"[21]).

The result of this argument is that finite and infinite—and, by extension, particular and universal, nature and freedom—don't face one another as two independent realities, but instead the latter (in each case) is the self-transcending of the former.[22] Rather than stress the distinct singularity of each factor that complements and conflicts with others—without explanation—the relationship between finite and infinite (and particular and universal, and nature and freedom) becomes intelligible as a progressively developing and self-perfecting whole.

[edit] Progress

The obscure writings of Jakob Böhme had a strong effect on Hegel. Böhme had written that the Fall of Man was a necessary stage in the evolution of the universe. This evolution was, itself, the result of God's desire for complete self-awareness. Hegel was fascinated by the works of Kant, Rousseau, and Goethe, and by the French Revolution. Modern philosophy, culture, and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other, freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Hegel's main philosophical project was to take these contradictions and tensions and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that, in different contexts, he called "the absolute idea" or "absolute knowledge".

According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of reality—consciousness, history, philosophy, art, nature, society—leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up (Aufhebung) to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who, through their own understanding, bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself.

"Mind" and "Spirit" are the common English translations of Hegel's use of the German "Geist". Some have argued that either of these terms overly "psychologize" Hegel,[citation

needed] implying a kind of disembodied, solipsistic consciousness like ghost or "soul." Geist combines the meaning of spirit—as in god, ghost or mind—with an intentional force. In Hegel's early philosophy of nature (draft manuscripts written during his time at the University of Jena), Hegel's notion of "Geist" was tightly bound to the notion of "Aether" from which Hegel also derived the concepts of space and time; however in his later works (after Jena) Hegel did not explicitly use his old notion of "Aether" any more.[23]

Central to Hegel's conception of knowledge and mind (and therefore also of reality) was the notion of identity in difference, that is that mind externalizes itself in various forms and objects that stand outside of it or opposed to it, and that, through recognizing itself in them, is "with itself" in these external manifestations, so that they are at one and the same time mind and other-than-mind. This notion of identity in difference, which is intimately bound up with his conception of contradiction and negativity, is a principal feature differentiating Hegel's thought from that of other philosophers.

[edit] Civil societySee also: Civil society

Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right.[24] In this work, civil society (Hegel used the term "buergerliche Gesellschaft" though it is now referred to as Zivilgesellschaft in German to emphasize a more inclusive community) was a stage on the dialectical relationship between Hegel's perceived opposites, the macro-community of the state and the micro-community of the family.[25] Broadly speaking, the term was split, like Hegel's followers, to the political left and right. On the left, it became the foundation for Karl Marx's civil society as an economic base;[26] to the right, it became a description for all non-state aspects of society, including culture, society and politics.[27] This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was followed by Alexis de Tocqueville.[26]

[edit] Heraclitus

According to Hegel, "Heraclitus is the one who first declared the nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle."[28] For Hegel, Heraclitus's great achievements were to have understood the nature of the infinite, which for Hegel includes understanding the inherent contradictoriness and negativity of reality, and to have grasped that reality is becoming or process, and that "being" and "nothingness" are mere empty abstractions. According to Hegel, Heraclitus's "obscurity" comes from his being a true (in Hegel's terms "speculative") philosopher who grasped the ultimate philosophical truth and therefore expressed himself in a way that goes beyond the abstract and limited nature of common sense and is difficult to grasp by those who operate within common sense. Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for

his logic: "... there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic."[29]

Hegel cites a number of fragments of Heraclitus in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.[30] One to which he attributes great significance is the fragment he translates as "Being is not more than Non-being", which he interprets to mean

Sein und Nichts sei dasselbeBeing and non-being are the same.

Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C, etc., which is not-A. Hegel, however, interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity.[31] Pure being and pure non-being or nothingness are for Hegel pure abstractions from the reality of becoming, and this is also how he interprets Heraclitus. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought.

For Hegel, the inner movement of reality is the process of God thinking as manifested in the evolution of the universe of nature and thought; that is, Hegel argued that, when fully and properly understood, reality is being thought by God as manifested in man's comprehension of this process in and through philosophy. Since man's thought is the image and fulfillment of God's thought, God is not ineffable (so incomprehensible as to be unutterable) but can be understood by an analysis of thought and reality. Just as man continually corrects his concepts of reality through a dialectical process so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming.

For his god Hegel does not take the logos of Heraclitus but refers rather to the nous of Anaxagoras, although he may well have regarded them the same, as he continues to refer to god's plan, which is identical to God. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought.

The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself"; that is, it does not depend on anything else, such as matter, for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining.[32]

Although Hegel began his philosophizing with commentary on the Christian religion and often expresses the view that he is a Christian, his ideas of God are not at home among some Christians, although he has had a major influence on 19th- and 20th-century theology. At the same time, an atheistic version of his thought was adopted instead by

some Marxists, who, stripping away the concepts of divinity, styled what was left dialectical materialism, which some saw as originating in Heraclitus.

[edit] Religion

Hegel's thoughts on the person of Jesus Christ stood out from the theologies of the Enlightenment. In his posthumous book, The Christian Religion: Lectures on Philosophy of Religion Part 3, he espouses that, "God is not an abstraction but a concrete God...God, considered in terms of his eternal Idea, has to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself; he is the process of differentiating, namely, love and Spirit". This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and Human. Hegel further attests that God (as Jesus) not only died, but "...rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed." Hegel therefore maintains not only the deity of Jesus, but the resurrection as a reality.

[edit] LegacySee also: Hegelianism

There are views of Hegel's thought as a representation of the summit of early 19th century Germany's movement of philosophical idealism. It would come to have a profound impact on many future philosophical schools, including schools that opposed Hegel's specific dialectical idealism, such as Existentialism, the historical materialism of Karl Marx, historicism, and British Idealism.

Hegel's influence was immense both within philosophy and in the other sciences. Throughout the 19th century many chairs of philosophy around Europe were held by Hegelians, and Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels--among many others—were all deeply influenced by, but also strongly opposed to, many of the central themes of Hegel's philosophy. After less than a generation, Hegel's philosophy was suppressed and even banned by the Prussian right-wing, and was firmly rejected by the left-wing in multiple official writings.

After the period of Bruno Bauer, Hegel's influence did not make itself felt again until the philosophy of British Idealism and the 20th century Hegelian Western Marxism that began with Georg Lukács. The more recent movement of communitarianism has a strong Hegelian influence.

[edit] Reading Hegel

Some of Hegel's writing was intended for those with advanced knowledge of philosophy, although his "Encyclopedia" was intended as a textbook in a university course. Nevertheless, like many philosophers, Hegel assumed that his readers would be well-

versed in Western philosophy, up to and including Descartes, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. For those wishing to read his work without this background, introductions to and commentaries about Hegel can contribute to comprehension, although the reader is faced with multiple interpretations of Hegel's writings from incompatible schools of philosophy. The German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno devoted an essay to the difficulty of reading Hegel and asserted that there are certain passages where it is impossible to decipher what Hegel meant. Difficulties within Hegel's language and thought are magnified for those reading Hegel in translation, since his philosophical language and terminology in German often do not have direct analogues in other languages. For example, the German word "Geist" has connotations of both "mind" and "spirit" in English. English translators have to use the "phenomenology of mind" or "the phenomenology of spirit" to render Hegel's "Phaenomenologie des Geistes", thus altering the original meaning. Hegel himself argued, in his "Science of Logic", that the German language was particularly conducive to philosophical thought and writing.

One especially difficult aspect of Hegel's work is his innovation in logic. In response to Immanuel Kant's challenge to the limits of pure reason, Hegel developed a radically new form of logic, which he called speculation, and which is today popularly called dialectics. The difficulty in reading Hegel was perceived in Hegel's own day, and persists into the 21st century. To understand Hegel fully requires paying attention to his critique of standard logic, such as the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. Many philosophers who came after Hegel and were influenced by him, whether adopting or rejecting his ideas, did so without fully absorbing his new speculative or dialectical logic.[citation needed]

If one wanted to provide a big piece of the Hegel puzzle to the beginner, one might present the following statement from Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Logic:

... a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of philosophy — the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by a later. Most commonly the refutation is taken in a purely negative sense to mean that the system refuted has ceased to count for anything, has been set aside and done for. Were it so, the history of philosophy would be, of all studies, most saddening, displaying, as it does, the refutation of every system which time has brought forth. Now although it may be admitted that every philosophy has been refuted, it must be in an equal degree maintained that no philosophy has been refuted. And that in two ways. For first, every philosophy that deserves the name always embodies the Idea: and secondly, every system represents one particular factor or particular stage in the evolution of the Idea. The refutation of a philosophy, therefore, only means that its barriers are crossed, and its special principle reduced to a factor in the completer principle that follows.

[edit] Left and Right Hegelianism

Some historians have spoken of Hegel's influence as represented by two opposing camps. The Right Hegelians, the allegedly direct disciples of Hegel at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-

Universität, advocated a Protestant orthodoxy and the political conservatism of the post-Napoleon Restoration period. The Left Hegelians, also known as the Young Hegelians, interpreted Hegel in a revolutionary sense, leading to an advocation of atheism in religion and liberal democracy in politics.

In more recent studies, however, this paradigm has been questioned.[33] No Hegelians of the period ever referred to themselves as "Right Hegelians"; that was a term of insult originated by David Strauss, a self-styled Left Hegelian. Critiques of Hegel offered from the Left Hegelians radically diverted Hegel's thinking into new directions and eventually came to form a disproportionately large part of the literature on and about Hegel.[citation

needed]

The Left Hegelians also spawned Marxism, which inspired global movements, encompassing the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and myriad revolutionary practices up until the present moment.

Twentieth-century interpretations of Hegel were mostly shaped by British Idealism, logical positivism, Marxism, and Fascism. The Italian Fascist Giovanni Gentile, according to Benedetto Croce, "...holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo-Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy."[34] However, since the fall of the USSR, a new wave of Hegel scholarship arose in the West, without the preconceptions of the prior schools of thought. Walter Jaeschke and Otto Pöggeler in Germany, as well as Peter Hodgson and Howard Kainz in America are notable for their recent contributions to post-USSR thinking about Hegel.

[edit] Triads

In previous modern accounts of Hegelianism (to undergraduate classes, for example), especially those formed prior to the Hegel renaissance, Hegel's dialectic was most often characterized as a three-step process, "thesis, antithesis, synthesis"; namely, that a "thesis" (e.g. the French Revolution) would cause the creation of its "antithesis" (e.g. the Reign of Terror that followed), and would eventually result in a "synthesis" (e.g. the Constitutional state of free citizens). However, Hegel used this classification only once, and he attributed the terminology to Immanuel Kant. The terminology was largely developed earlier by Johann Fichte. It was spread by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus in a popular account of Hegelian philosophy, and since then the misfit terms have stuck[citation

needed]. What is wrong with the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" approach is that it gives the sense that things or ideas are contradicted or opposed by things that come from outside them. To the contrary, the fundamental notion of Hegel's dialectic is that things or ideas have internal contradictions. From Hegel's point of view, analysis or comprehension of a thing or idea reveals that underneath its apparently simple identity or unity is an underlying inner contradiction. This contradiction leads to the dissolution of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented itself and to a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more adequately incorporates the contradiction. The triadic form that appears in many places in Hegel (e.g. being-nothingness-becoming, immediate-mediate-

concrete, abstract-negative-concrete) is about this movement from inner contradiction to higher-level integration or unification.

Believing that the traditional description of Hegel's philosophy in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis was mistaken, a few scholars, like Raya Dunayevskaya, a devout Marxist who was once Leon Trotsky's secretary, have attempted to discard the triadic approach altogether. According to their argument, although Hegel refers to "the two elemental considerations: first, the idea of freedom as the absolute and final aim; secondly, the means for realising it, i.e. the subjective side of knowledge and will, with its life, movement, and activity" (thesis and antithesis) he doesn't use "synthesis" but instead speaks of the "Whole": "We then recognised the State as the moral Whole and the Reality of Freedom, and consequently as the objective unity of these two elements." Furthermore, in Hegel's language, the "dialectical" aspect or "moment" of thought and reality, by which things or thoughts turn into their opposites or have their inner contradictions brought to the surface, what he called "aufhebung", is only preliminary to the "speculative" (and not "synthesizing") aspect or "moment", which grasps the unity of these opposites or contradiction. Thus for Hegel, reason is ultimately "speculative", not "dialectical".

It is widely admitted today[by whom?] that the old-fashioned description of Hegel's philosophy in terms of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" is inaccurate. Nevertheless, such is the persistence of this misnomer that the model and terminology survive in a number of scholarly works.

[edit] Renaissance

In the latter half of the 20th century, Hegel's philosophy underwent a major renaissance. This was due to: (a) the rediscovery and reevaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; (b) a resurgence of the historical perspective that Hegel brought to everything; and (c) an increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method. The book that did the most to reintroduce Hegel into the Marxist canon was perhaps Georg Lukács' History and Class Consciousness. This sparked a renewed interest in Hegel reflected in the work of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Raya Dunayevskaya, Alexandre Kojève and Gotthard Günther among others. The Hegel renaissance also highlighted the significance of Hegel's early works, i.e. those published prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The direct and indirect influence of Kojève's lectures and writings (on the Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular) mean that it is not possible to understand most French philosophers from Jean-Paul Sartre to Jacques Derrida without understanding Hegel.[citation needed]

Beginning in the 1960s, Anglo-American Hegel scholarship has attempted to challenge the traditional interpretation of Hegel as offering a metaphysical system: this has also been the approach of Z.A. Pelczynski and Shlomo Avineri. This view, sometimes referred to as the 'non-metaphysical option', has had a decided influence on many major English language studies of Hegel in the past 40 years. U.S. neoconservative political theorist Francis Fukuyama's controversial book The End of History and the Last Man was heavily influenced by Alexandre Kojève. Among modern scientists, the physicist David

Bohm, the mathematician William Lawvere, the logician Kurt Gödel and the biologist Ernst Mayr have been interested in Hegel's philosophical work.[citation needed]

A late 20th century literature in Western Theology that is friendly to Hegel includes such writers as Dale M. Schlitt (1984), Theodore Geraets (1985), Philip M. Merklinger (1991), Stephen Rocker (1995) and Cyril O'Regan (1995). The contemporary theologian Hans Küng has also advanced contemporary scholarship in Hegel studies.

Recently, two prominent American philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom (sometimes, half-seriously, referred to as the Pittsburgh Hegelians), have produced philosophical works exhibiting a marked Hegelian influence. Each is avowedly influenced by the late Wilfred Sellars, also of Pittsburgh, who referred to his seminal work, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, as a series of "incipient Méditations Hegeliennes" (in homage to Edmund Husserl's treatise, Meditations Cartesiennes).

Beginning in the 1990s, after the fall of the USSR, a fresh reading of Hegel took place in the West. For these scholars, fairly well represented by the Hegel Society of America and in cooperation with German scholars such as Otto Pöggeler and Walter Jaeschke, Hegel's works should be read without preconceptions. Marx plays a minor role in these new readings, and some contemporary scholars have suggested that Marx's interpretation of Hegel is irrelevant to a proper reading of Hegel. Some American philosophers associated with this movement include Clark Butler, Vince Hathaway, Daniel Shannon, David Duquette, David MacGregor, Edward Beach, John Burbidge, Lawrence Stepelevich, Rudolph Siebert, Randall Jackwak, Theodore Geraets and William Desmond.

[edit] Criticism

Criticism of Hegel has been widespread in the 19th and the 20th centuries; a diverse range of individuals including Arthur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Eric Voegelin and A. J. Ayer have challenged Hegelian philosophy from a variety of perspectives. Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th Century German group known as the Young Hegelians, which included Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and their followers. In Britain, the Hegelian British Idealism school (members of which included Francis Herbert Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and, in the United States, Josiah Royce) was challenged and rejected by analytic philosophers G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell; Russell, in particular, considered "almost all" of Hegel's doctrines to be false.[35] Logical positivists such as Alfred Jules Ayer and the Vienna Circle also criticized Hegelian philosophy and its supporters, such as F. H. Bradley.

Hegel's contemporary Schopenhauer was particularly critical, and wrote of Hegel's philosophy as "a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking" [36] Kierkegaard criticized Hegel's 'absolute knowledge' unity [37] Scientist Ludwig Boltzmann also criticized the obscure complexity of Hegel's works, referring to Hegel's writing as an "unclear thoughtless flow of words".[38] Bertrand Russell stated that

Hegel was "the hardest to understand of all the great philosophers" in his Unpopular Essays and A History of Western Philosophy.

Karl Popper makes the claim in the second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies that Hegel's system formed a thinly veiled justification for the absolute rule of Frederick William III, and that Hegel's idea of the ultimate goal of history was to reach a state approximating that of 1830s Prussia. Popper further proposed that Hegel's philosophy served not only as an inspiration for communist and fascist totalitarian governments of the 20th century, whose dialectics allow for any belief to be construed as rational simply if it could be said to exist. This view of Hegel as an apologist of state power and precursor of 20th century totalitarianism was criticized by Herbert Marcuse in his Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, on the grounds that Hegel was not an apologist for any state or form of authority simply because it existed: for Hegel the state must always be rational. Other scholars, e.g. Walter Kaufmann and Shlomo Avineri, have also criticized Popper's theories about Hegel.[39] Isaiah Berlin listed Hegel as one of the six architects of modern authoritarianism who undermined liberal democracy, along with Rousseau, Helvetius, Fichte, Saint-Simon, and Maistre.[40]

[edit] WorksFor the volume numbers of his complete works (Gesammelte Werke) and the corresponding subjects of each volume, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel bibliography.

[edit] Published during Hegel's lifetime Life of Jesus Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, 1801

The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, tr. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, 1977

The German Constitution , 1802 Phänomenologie des Geistes , 1807

Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie, 1910; 2nd ed. 1931Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller, 1977Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Terry Pinkard, 2010

Wissenschaft der Logik , 1812, 1813, 1816

Science of Logic, tr. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, 2 vols., 1929; tr. A. V. Miller, 1969; tr. George di Giovanni, 2010

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften , 1817; 2nd ed. 1827; 3rd ed. 1830 (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences)

(Pt. I:) The Logic of Hegel, tr. William Wallace, 1874, 2nd ed. 1892; tr. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris, 1991; tr. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom 2010

(Pt. II:) Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, tr. A. V. Miller, 1970(Pt. III:) Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, tr. William Wallace, 1894; rev. by A. V. Miller, 1971

Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts , 1821

Elements of the Philosophy of Right, tr. T. M. Knox, 1942; tr. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen W. Wood, 1991

[edit] Published posthumously Lectures on Aesthetics Lectures on the Philosophy of History (also translated as Lectures on the

Philosophy of World History) 1837 Lectures on Philosophy of Religion Lectures on the History of Philosophy

[edit] Secondary literature

[edit] General introductions Francke, Kuno, Howard, William Guild, Schiller, Friedrich, 1913-1914 " The

German classics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: masterpieces of German literature translated into English Vol 7, Jay Lowenberg, The Life of Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel". Retrieved 2010-09-24.

Beiser, Frederick C. , 2005. Hegel. Routledge Findlay, J. N. , 1958. Hegel: A Re-examination. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-

19-519879-4 Gouin, Jean-Luc , 2000. Hegel ou de la Raison intégrale, suivi de : « Aimer

Penser Mourir : Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud en miroirs », Montréal (Québec), Éditions Bellarmin, 225 p. ISBN 2-89007-883-3

Houlgate, Stephen, 2005. An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History. Oxford: Blackwell

Kainz, Howard P., 1996. G. W. F. Hegel. Ohio University Press. ISBN 0-8214-1231-0.

Kaufmann, Walter , 1965. Hegel: A Reinterpretation. New York: Doubleday (reissued Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978)

Plant, Raymond , 1983. Hegel: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Singer, Peter , 2001. Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press

(previously issued in the OUP Past Masters series, 1983) Stirling, James Hutchison , The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in

Origin Principle, Form and Matter Taylor, Charles , 1975. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-

521-29199-2. A comprehensive exposition of Hegel's thought and its impact on the central intellectual and spiritual issues of his and our time.

Scruton, Roger , "Understanding Hegel" in The Philosopher on Dover Beach, Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1990. ISBN 0-85635-857-6

[edit] Essays Beiser, Frederick C. (ed.), 1993. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-38711-6. A collection of articles covering the range of Hegel's thought.

Adorno, Theodor W. , 1994. Hegel: Three Studies. MIT Press. Translated by Shierry M. Nicholsen, with an introduction by Nicholsen and Jeremy J. Shapiro, ISBN 0-262-51080-4. Essays on Hegel's concept of spirit/mind, Hegel's concept of experience, and why Hegel is difficult to read.

[edit] Biography Althaus, Horst, 1992. Hegel und die heroischen Jahre der Philosophie. Munich:

Carl Hanser Verlag. Eng. tr. Michael Tarsh as Hegel: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000

Pinkard, Terry P., 2000. Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-49679-9. By a leading American Hegel scholar; aims to debunk popular misconceptions about Hegel's thought.

Rosenkranz, Karl , 1844. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben. Still an important source for Hegel's life.

Hondt, Jacques d', 1998. Hegel: Biographie. Calmann-Lévy /// Recension (2009) de cette biographie en tandem avec celle de Horst Althaus (1999), parue dans la revue Nuit Blanche : Le Commissaire et le Détective

[edit] Historical Rockmore, Tom , 1993. Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to

Hegel's Thought. Indianapolis: Hackett. ISBN 0-87220-648-3. Löwith, Karl , 1964. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-

Century Thought. Translated by David E. Green. New York: Columbia University Press.

[edit] Hegel's development Lukács, Georg , 1948. Der junge Hegel. Zürich and Vienna (2nd ed. Berlin, 1954).

Eng. tr. Rodney Livingstone as The Young Hegel, London: Merlin Press, 1975. ISBN 0-262-12070-4

Harris, H. S., 1972. Hegel's Development: Towards the Sunlight 1770-1801. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Harris, H. S., 1983. Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806). Oxford: Clarendon Press

Dilthey, Wilhelm , 1906. Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (repr. in Gesammelte Schriften, 1959, vol. IV)

Haering, Theodor L. , 1929, 1938. Hegel: sein Wollen und sein Werk, 2 vols. Leipzig (repr. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963)

[edit] Recent English-language literature Inwood, Michael , 1983. Hegel. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (Arguments of

the Philosophers) Rockmore, Tom, 1986. Hegel's Circular Epistemology. Indiana University Press

Pinkard, Terry P., 1988. Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility. Temple University Press

Westphal, Kenneth, 1989. Hegel's Epistemological Realism. Kluwer Academic Publishers

Forster, Michael N., 1989. Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-38707-4

Pippin, Robert B. , 1989. Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-37923-7. Advocates a stronger continuity between Hegel and Kant.

Maker, William, 1994. Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel. State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-2100-7.

Winfield, Richard Dien, 1989. Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-07008-X.

[edit] Phenomenology of SpiritSee also: The Phenomenology of Spirit

Stern, Robert, 2002. Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-21788-1. An introduction for students.

Cohen, Joseph, 2007. Le sacrifice de Hegel. (In French language). Paris, Galilée. An extensive study of the question of sacrifice in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

Braver, Lee. A Thing of This World: a History of Continental Anti-Realism. Northwestern University Press: 2007. ISBN 978-0-8101-2380-9 This study covers Hegel's Phenomenology and its contribution to the history of Continental Anti-Realism.

Doull, James. 2000. Hegel's Phenomenology and Postmodern Thought. Animus 5, ISSN 1209-0689.

Hyppolite, Jean , 1946. Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. Paris: Aubier. Eng. tr. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman as Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979. ISBN 0-8101-0594-2. A classic commentary.

Kojève, Alexandre , 1947. Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. Paris: Gallimard. Eng. tr. James H. Nichols, Jr., as Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, Basic Books, 1969. ISBN 0-8014-9203-3 Influential European reading of Hegel.

Solomon, Robert C. , 1983. In the Spirit of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harris, H. S. , 1995. Hegel: Phenomenology and System. Indianapolis: Hackett. A distillation of the author's monumental two-volume commentary Hegel's Ladder.

Westphal, Kenneth R., 2003. Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Indianapolis: Hackett. ISBN 0-87220-645-9

Russon, John , 2004. Reading Hegel's Phenomenology. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-21692-3.

Bristow, William, 2007. Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-929064-4

Kalkavage, Peter, 2007. The Logic of Desire: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books. ISBN 978-1-58988-037-5. This work provides insights on Hegel's complex work as a whole as well as serving as a sure guide for every chapter and for virtually every paragraph.

Scruton, Roger , "Understanding Hegel" in The Philosopher on Dover Beach, Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1990. ISBN 0-85635-857-6

[edit] LogicSee also: Science of Logic

Burbidge, John, 2006. The Logic of Hegel's Logic: An Introduction. Broadview Press. ISBN 1-55111-633-2

De Boer, Karin, 2010. On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0230247547

Hartnack, Justus , 1998. An Introduction to Hegel's Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett. ISBN 0-87220-424-3

Houlgate, Stephen, 2005. The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity. Purdue University Press. ISBN 1-55753-257-5

Rinaldi, Giacomo, 1992. A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. ISBN 0-7734-9509-6

Schäfer, Rainer, 2001. Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegels Logik. Hamburg/Meiner. ISBN 3-7873-1585-3.

Wallace, Robert M., 2005. Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-84484-3. Through a detailed analysis of Hegel's Science of Logic, Wallace shows how Hegel contributes to the broadly Platonic tradition of philosophy that includes Aristotle, Plotinus, and Kant. In the course of doing this, Wallace defends Hegel against major critiques, including the one presented by Charles Taylor in his Hegel.

Winfield, Richard Dien, 2006. From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic. Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-5536-9.jdj

[edit] Politics Avineri, Shlomo , 1974. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge

University Press. Best introduction to Hegel's political philosophy. Ritter, Joachim , 1984. Hegel and the French Revolution. MIT Press. Riedel, Manfred , 1984. Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian

Transformation of Political Philosophy, Cambridge. Marcuse, Herbert , 1941. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social

Theory. An introduction to the philosophy of Hegel, devoted to debunking the conception that Hegel's work included in nuce the Fascist totalitarianism of National Socialism; the negation of philosophy through historical materialism.

Rose, Gillian , 1981. Hegel Contra Sociology. Athlone Press. ISBN 0-485-12036-4.

Scruton, Roger , "Hegel as a conservative thinker" in The Philosopher on Dover Beach, Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1990. ISBN 0-85635-857-6

[edit] Republicanism Moggach, Douglas. 2006. "Introduction: Hegelianism, Republicanism and

Modernity", The New Hegelians edited by Douglas Moggach, Cambridge University Press.

[edit] Aesthetics Bungay, Stephen , 1987. Beauty and Truth. A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics. New

York. Danto, Arthur Coleman , 1986. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.

Columbia University Press. Desmond, William, 1986. Art and the Absolute. Albany (New York). Gethmann-Siefert, Annemarie , Einführung in Hegel's Ästhetik, Wilhelm Fink

(German). Mark Jarzombek , "The Cunning of Architecture's Reason," Footprint (#1, Autumn

2007), pp. 31–46. Maker, W. (ed.), 2000. Hegel and Aesthetics. New York. Olivier, Alain P., 2003. Hegel et la Musique. Paris (French). Roche, Mark-William, 1998. Tragedy and Comedy. A Systematic Study and a

Critique of Hegel. Albany. New York. Winfield, Richard Dien, 1996. Stylistics. Rethinking the Artforms after Hegel.

Albany, Suny Press.

[edit] Religion Desmond, William, 2003. Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?. Ashgate. ISBN 0-

7546-0565-5 O'Regan, Cyril, 1994. The Heterodox Hegel. State University of New York Press,

Albany. ISBN 0-7914-2006-X. The most authoritative work to date on Hegel's philosophy of religion.

Cohen, Joseph, 2005. Le spectre juif de Hegel (in French language); Preface by Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris, Galilée.An extensive study of the Jewish question in Hegel's Early Theological Writings.

Dickey, Laurence, 1987. Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit, 1770–1807. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-33035-1. A fascinating account of how "Hegel became Hegel", using the guiding hypothesis that Hegel "was basically a theologian manqué".

Fackenheim, E. The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought. University of Chicago Press. 0226233502.

[edit] Hegel's reputation Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2: Hegel and Marx. An

influential attack on Hegel. Stewart, Jon, ed., 1996. The Hegel Myths and Legends. Northwestern University

Press.

[edit] Comparative studies

Peter Henrici. Hegel und Blondel: Eine Untersuchung uber Form und Sinn der Dialektik in der 'Phanomenologie des Geistes' und der ersten 'Action'. Pullach bei Munchen: Berchmanskollege, 1958.

Siemens, R. (1997). The problem of modern poverty: significant congruences between Hegel's and George's theoretical conceptions. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 56, 617-637. (Note: A comparison between Hegel and Henry George.)