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Jonathan Rosen AJ Rosen & Associates

LLC (518)225-0882

Jrosen396@gmail.com

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Disaster Preparedness

CSEA 2014 Health & Safety Conference

Thursday May 1, 2014 and Friday May 2, 2014

Jonathan Rosen, National Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training Jeff Hyman, CSEA H&S Department Josh Kemp, CSEA H&S Department

Agenda

1. Introductions

What agency do you work for? What is your role in role in disaster preparedness? Are you mainly concerned with workplace or community preparedness and response? Review training objectives

2. Small group activity, disaster types and responses: Activity 1: List natural and human made disasters, and the differences in people's reactions to them

Activity 2: List emergency incidents and responses you know of or have participated in and offer suggestions for improvement

3. Quiz, What do you know?

4. What OSHA/ PESH standards apply? a. Emergency Action Plans b. Fire Safety Plans c. PPE, Respiratory Protection, others?

5. Key elements of an Emergency Action Plan and Fire Safety Plan Small

Group Activity Activity 3: Small group activity on Exit Routes, Emergency Action Plans and Fire Prevention Plans, Imperial Foods Chicken Plant Fire 2

6. Impact of climate change and lessons learned from previous disasters a. 9/11 b. Sandy c. Gulf Oil Spill

7. Keys to protecting disaster worker health and safety

Activity 4: Small group activity, flooding scenario

8. Union Strategies? Where do we go from here? Questions?

9. Please complete the evaluation form

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CSEA Disaster Preparedness Resources

Health & Safety Conference 2014

Training Materials

Agenda

PPT

CSEA Emergency Action Plan Guidelines, includes checklist

General Sites

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) Emergency Preparedness & Response http://www.bt.cdc.gov

National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) Emergency Preparedness website https://tools.niehs.nih.gov/wetp/index.cfm?id=556 Info on floods, earthquakes, oil spills, pandemics, wild fires, resiliency, dirty bombs.

St. Louis University Center for the Study of Bioterroism http://bioterrorism.slu.edu/index.html

Federal Emergency Management Agency http://www.fema.gov

U.S. EPA Emergencies http://www2.epa.gov/learn-issues/learn-about-emergencies

New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oct//

Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Attack, NIOSH CDC, May 2002

Checklists

Ten Point Checklist for Emergency Preparedness

Bomb Threat Call Procedures, Homeland Security

Business Resumption, Disaster Safety Checklist, ASSE

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Small Business Disaster Preparedness Checlkist, from Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) Final\PDFs\BOMA Small Bizx checklist.pdf

Emergency Response Plans and Fire and Life Safety Information

FEMA Emergency Management Guide For Business & Industry, Federal Emergency Management Administration

OSHA "Fire Safety" site includes technical links, recognition, evaluation, control, and other documents https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/firesafety/

OSHA Emergency Preparedness and Response site including links to standards and documents related to emergency response recognition, control and compliance https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/index.html

OSHA pdf document, How to Prepare for Workplace Emergencies, 2001

OSHA pdf document, Principal Emergency Response and Preparedness Requirements and Guidance

NYS Emergency Management Office http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oem/

NYS Office of General Services - Tenant Safety Handbook http://www.ogs.state.ny.us/building/safety/

Emergency Evacuation Procedures for Employees with Disabilities Job Accommodation Network

Employee emergency plans - OSHA standard 29 CFR1910.38 https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=9726&p_table=standards

Fire prevention plans - OSHA standard 29 CFR1910.39 https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=12887

OSHA Part 1910 Subpart E - Means of Egress https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=10113

OSHA Part 1910 Subpart L - Fire Protection https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=10123

OSHA Workplace Fire Safety Factsheet

Evacuation of High Rise Buildings

Model Emergency Action Plan

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New York City Regulations

NYC Fire Dept Regulations 3 RCNY §6-02, entitled "Office Building Emergency Action Plans"

FDNY Rules Title 3 of the Rules of the City of NY http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/rcny_legal/rcny_3rcny_sect_6_02.shtml

New York City Administrative Code Title 29, NYC Fire Code Chapter 1 Enactment of the NYC Fire Code

New York State Executive Law

New York State Executive Law 2-B, Natural and Man-made Disasters

Climate Change & Workplace Safety

RICOSH Factsheet

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CSEA Disaster Preparedness Training Safety & Health Conference 2014

Small Group Exercises

In this exercise, participants will form small groups (6 to 8 people). One person will be assigned to be the recorder and reporter. Activity 1: The purpose of the exercise is to the list the various natural and man made disasters that may be encountered and to describe the different reactions people have to the different types of disasters. Participants will list:

1) Natural disasters that could affect their workplace.

2) Manmade disaster that could affect their workplace.

3) What are the differences in reactions that people may have to these different types of disasters?

a. Who's to blame?

b. Whether or not the affected people can be warned?

c. Whether or not the disaster is preventable?

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2 Activity 2: The purpose of the exercise is to facilitate the development of an emergency preparedness plan by participants. Participants will list:

1) An INCIDENT that could be a workplace emergency of any type

2) What were the emergency RESPONSES to that incident?

3) What could be done to improve the RESPONSE or PREVENT the incident?

After reporting out the rest of the class may offer suggestions for the responses and solutions.

1) Describe an incident:

2) Describe the responses:

3) List solutions to improve the response or prevent incidents:

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Activity 4: The purpose of the exercise is to list the key steps necessary to protect disaster work health and safety. Scenario: Flooding from a storm surge has caused extensive damage to the basements and lower levels of two county owned buildings. Department of Public Works employees are being mobilized to remove debris, bushes, and fallen trees from the exterior of the buildings. A second crew will be removing water damaged materials from the buildings. Participants will list:

1) What steps should be taken before the crews are mobilized to do the work? Keep in mind these buildings are in a disaster zone!

2) What type of PPE should be available and used?

3) Should respirators be provided and what must employers do in addition to providing the equipment?

4) What arrangements should be made for decontamination, clean-up, sanitation, breaks, and meals?

5) Do OSHA/ PESH standards apply? Which ones?

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Emergency Preparedness Quiz (1) OSHA/PESH requires all employers to have a written emergency action plan.

(a) True (b) False

(2) Emergency plans should identify escape procedures and escape routes.

(a) True (b) False

(3) “Means of egress” is the procedure to inform authorities of an emergency. (a) True (b) False

(4) Total building evacuations are the only proper type of evacuations.

(a) True (b) False

(5) Emergency plans should cover:

(a) Fires (b) Bomb threats (c) Hazardous chemicals (d) Biological agents (e) All of the above

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(6) The best way(s) to prepare your worksite for emergencies:

(a) Involve employees in the development of emergency plans and frequently review them

(b) Practice emergency procedures (c) Prepare for all types of emergencies (d) Train designated employees to assist in the safe and orderly evacuation

of employees (e) a and d (f) b and c (g) all of the above

(7) The duties of the Agency Control Director include:

(a) Assessing the situation and determining whether an emergency exists which requires activating the emergency procedures.

(b) Directing all efforts in the area including evacuating personnel and minimizing property loss.

(c) Ensuring that outside emergency services such as medical aid and local fire departments are called in when necessary.

(d) All of the above. (8) CSEA is working to improve emergency preparedness by:

(a) Meeting with management. (b) Filing PESH complaints. (c) Educating members and encouraging worksite involvement. (d) All of the above

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Exit Routes, Emergency Action Plans and Fire Prevention Plans

(Subpart E: 1910.33 - 1910.39)

Objectives

By the end of this module, each participant will be able to:

1. Given a case study, identify areas of non-compliance according to this standard

2. Recognize major cause of death in fires and how the standard addresses

that problem

3. Given a floorplan from the case study, identify problem areas in terms of arrangement of and access to exits

4. List other types of emergencies, besides fire, that are covered by an

emergency action plan

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Excerpts from NFPA Journal (January/February, 1992)

Exit Routes, Emergency Action Plans and Fire Prevention Plans

Case Study

25 Die in Food Plant Fire

by Thomas J. Klem

An intense, fast-moving fire in the Imperial Foods Processing Plant in Hamlet, North Carolina took a tragic toll; 25 of the estimated 90 occupants died and 54 were injured. The fire broke out at approximately 8:15 a.m. on September 3, 1991 and quickly spread products of combustion throughout the plant. Some occupants escaped without incident. Other employees found exterior doors unavailable and sought alternative means of escape. An Unprotected Facility

The fire occurred in a one-story, unprotected, noncombustible building of approximately 33,000 square feet. The unsprinklered, windowless building had undergone several changes in ownership. Numerous alterations had been made over the years.

At the time of the fire, the facility was classified as a food processing plant for industrial occupancy. Plant operations included preparing and cooking chicken pieces for distribution to restaurants. During a normal shift, approximately 90 employees were involved in various phases of production. Portions of the plant included a large preparation area, with trimming, marinating, and packing areas; and areas for the storage of preparation materials and finished product, including cooler or freezer units (see Figure 1).

Interior partitions in the preparation areas had large openings to allow product movement throughout the processing areas. Most preparation areas were cooled to prevent product spoilage, and hard plastic doors in the interior helped maintain constant room temperatures. As a result, most of the plant's occupied areas lacked barriers that would effectively prevent the spread of products of combustion.

The building had numerous exterior openings for personnel and for shipping and

receiving goods. Exterior personnel doors were located at the southeast loading dock, at the main east entrance, in the break room, at the north loading dock, and in the dry storage area. Exterior service doors also were provided from the mechanical equipment

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room. Although these service doors were used as exits by maintenance workers in that room, they could not be considered in the exit design for occupants in other plant areas. Each personnel door had deficiencies in various components, in size, or in structural arrangements that precluded its use as part of a properly designed exit system. Ignition and Fire Spread

The fire began approximately 8:15 a.m. in the processing area of the plant, a critical area since it is at the center of the occupied space (see Figure 1). Investigators determined that the fire cause was the ignition of hydraulic oil from a ruptured line only a few feet from a natural gas-fueled cooker used in preparing the chicken. The rupture occurred during a repair operation, when the incoming hydraulic line separated from its coupling at a point approximately 5 feet above the concrete floor. The line began to discharge the fluid at a pressure estimated at about 800 psi. This high pressure and the subsequent flow sprayed hydraulic fluid on the floor and onto the nearby cooker. Ignition, probably by the natural gas burners, was immediate.

Employees in the processing room were driven away from the immediate area of involvement. As the rapidly spreading fire distributed thick, black smoke throughout the building, occupants in other areas of the plant, either received word of the emergency or detected the smoke. Intense fire impinged on a natural gas regulator directly above the ruptured hydraulic line, causing the regulator to fail and adding to the fuels being consumed. Within minutes of ignition, the fire had dispersed hazardous products of combustion throughout most of the plant. Occupants in the affected areas had little or no time to evacuate before their way was blocked and their visibility obscured. Actions of the Employees

At the time of the fire, approximately 90 employees were in the plant. About 40 employees were in the trimming area and approximately 18 were in the processing area. Other employees were spread throughout the building. The processing room employees were immediately confronted with fire. They tried to reach safety through structural openings to the northeast and the southwest.

Employees outside the processing room were alerted to the fire by the shouts of other employees and by rapid smoke movement throughout the building. Employees in the trimming and the marinating mixing areas moved toward the loading dock at the building's southeastern corner. Some of them reached the area only to find the entry door next to the loading dock inoperable. They could not exit through the loading dock opening because a tractor-trailer truck was blocking the way. Within approximately 1 minute of fire discovery, smoke had obscured their visibility.

Several of these employees remained in the loading dock area and attempted to alert others outside the building to remove the tractor-trailer truck. Other employees apparently moved toward the cooler area and took refuge in the cooler when they found they could not move past the fire area.

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Although employees in other parts of the building were not exposed as severely to the fire, they too began seeking escape routes. Some workers in the packing and shipping areas escaped through the loading dock opening at the northeastern end of the building. Many people working in the marinating/cutting area moved eastward and left through the front entrance, which was the one most employees used when arriving at work. Fire and Rescue Operations

The Hamlet Fire Department learned of the fire from an employee who drove several blocks to the fire station and told on-duty personnel there was a serious fire at the plant. Fire personnel arrived on the scene at 8:27 a.m. to find 14 casualties - 3 fatalities and 11 injuries - outside the south end of the plant. They administered first aid to the injured and rescued a survivor who was trapped between and exterior wall frame and a dumpster. Fire fighters learned that both the truck and the dumpster at the southeast loading dock had been repositioned. First-arriving fire personnel observed severe fire conditions inside the building and requested mutual aid from neighboring fire and rescue departments.

At 8:45 a.m., a team of three fire fighters entered the southern end of the building through a loading dock door. They found two fatalities in the loading dock area and removed the bodies. Meanwhile, fire fighters at the northwest side of the plant made a search and rescue attempt using a personnel door that originally had been bolted, but was forced open by an employee who escaped with others through the breakroom. The search team encountered heat and fire in both processing areas and in the various stock containers. They withdrew and advanced a 13/4-inch line to extinguish the fire in the stock containers and cool the burning fry vats in the processing room. Another line was advanced through the adjacent equipment room and into the processing room to cool the rest of the burning vats.

Search and rescue efforts were continuing at the southeast end of the building. At 8:55 a.m., fire fighters found a third fatality under a conveyor system, about 12 feet from where the first two fatalities were discovered. Severe fire conditions and poor visibility hampered search and rescue efforts, and fire fighters in full protective equipment also used lifelines to aid search operations.

The fire was extinguished around 10 a.m. following the application of foam. At 10:18 a.m. a female survivor was removed from a cooler at the southwest corner. At this time, a partial collapse of the roof assembly was reported, and the department took time to account for all interior personnel. At 10:28 a.m., one fatality and one survivor were removed from the cooler area. During the next hour, 11 fatalities and three survivors were recovered from the cooler area.

At 11:50 a.m., a victim was located at the northern end of the processing room.

Five additional victims were removed from this area in the next 25 minutes. At 12:10 p.m., a victim who subsequently died was found alive in the blast freezer area in the northern end of the processing room.

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Analysis of the Fire The ignition scenario in this fire led to the rapid spread of products of combustion

throughout much of the building, immediately threatening most occupants. Survivors indicated that thick, black smoke quickly obscured visibility. Survival depended largely on the employee's location and on the availability of exits.

The area of fire origin was in the center of the plant. Because of its location, as well

as its magnitude and rapid development and spread, the fire was an immediate threat to employees in the processing room and to those in or near the trim room. Although there was one known survivor, most of the processing room employees were cut off from exits by the rapidly developing fire. Seven fatalities were found in the north end of the processing room.

A group of about 40 employees from the trim room and the break room moved to

the southeast loading dock area, but discovered an inoperable exterior door. Most then moved to the tractor-trailer truck positioned at the loading dock and began to bang on its sides and shout to alert others outside to move the truck. A portion of this group was rescued or left the building when the truck was moved. Several others escaped when an employee opened the exterior door from the outside. Before this was done, however, part of this group apparently sought refuge in the adjacent cooler area. Although several survived, fire fighters removed 12 fatalities from the cooler. It was determined that the cooler door had remained partially open, exposing those inside to toxic products of combustion.

The combination of rapid fire growth and the building's open floor plan left only a

narrow window of time during which occupants could evacuate safely. In spite of this, many did escape, often by unconventional means. In the moments before smoke obscured their vision, other employees found exterior openings unavailable for use and took alternative actions. Some of these occupants were assisted by others outside the building or were rescued by fire fighters.

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Exit Routes, Emergency Action Plans, and Fire Prevention Plans

(Subpart E: 1910.33 - 1910.39) Exercise - Activity 3

Objectives

By the end of this module, each participant will be able to:

1. Given the case study, identify areas of non-compliance according to this standard

2. Recognize major cause of death in fires and how the standard addresses

that problem

3. Given a floorplan from the case study, identify problem areas in terms of arrangement of and access to exits

4. List other types of emergencies, besides fire, that are covered by an

emergency action plan

1. From what you read in the case study, does it sound like this plant was in compliance with paragraph. 1910.36(b)(1&2)?

The number of exit routes must be adequate. 1910.36(b)(1) Two exit routes. At least two exit routes must be available in a workplace to permit prompt evacuation of employees and other building occupants during an emergency, except as allowed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. The exit routes must be located as far away as practical from each other so that if one exit route is blocked by fire or smoke, employees can evacuate using the second exit route. 1910.36(b)(2) More than two exit routes. More than two exit routes must be available in a workplace if the number of employees, the size of the building, its occupancy, or the arrangement of the workplace is such that all employees would not be able to evacuate safely during an emergency.

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2. Was the company in compliance with 1910.36(d)(1)?

An exit door must be unlocked. 1910.36(d)(1) Employees must be able to open an exit route door from the inside at all times without keys, tools, or special knowledge. A device such as a panic bar that locks only from the outside is permitted on exit discharge doors.

3. How long did it take for smoke to obscure the visibility of the people trying to get out of the plant?

4. What fire-suppression equipment was available to assist people in getting out of the building?

5. a. How were workers alerted to the presence of the fire?

b. According to 1910.37(e) & 1910.38(d), how should they have been warned?

1910.37(e) An employee alarm system must be operable. Employers must install and maintain an operable employee alarm system that has a distinctive signal to warn employees of fire or other emergencies, unless employees can promptly see or smell a fire or other hazard in time to provide adequate warning to them. The employee alarm system must comply with § 1910.165. 1910.38(d) Employee alarm system. An employer must have and maintain an employee alarm system. The employee alarm system must use a distinctive signal for each purpose and comply with the requirements in § 1910.165.

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6. What killed most of the people in this fire? a. The heat of the fire b. The toxic smoke produced by the fire c. The freezing temperatures of those who sought refuge in the cooler d. Other workers trampling over them in a rush to get out

7. If there is a door, passage, or stairway, which is neither an exit nor a way

to an exit and is so located as to be mistaken for an exit, what must a sign say on that door? [1910.37(b)(5)]

8. Standard 1910.38 is concerned only with fire prevention 1910.38(c)(1) 1910.38(c)(1) Procedures for reporting a fire or other emergency;

True False

9. List some things which could have saved lives in this case:

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