Forabout the last threeandahalfyears, Ihavebeenstudying the foreignpolicyofPresident Kennedy, outside of Vietnam and Cuba. I thought that had been done todeath,whilehispoliciesinplaceslikeAfrica,Indonesia,andtheMiddleEasthadbeenignoredtothepointthatnooneknewhehadsuchpolicies.Recently, I decided to return toVietnambecause I thinkwecan learn something incomparaDve terms with new documents and tapes that have been declassified onJohnson,NixonandKennedy.IfyoureadtheSecondEdiDonofDes$nyBetrayed,youwillseethatImakethecasethatJohnsondeliberatelybrokewithseveralofKennedy’snew foreign policy forays, e.g., Indonesia and Congo, and returned to the Dulles/Eisenhower policies that Kennedy had consciously and deliberately broken with in1961.KennedyhadspokenaboutthesplitbetweenhimandDullesmorethanonce;for example, on the eve of the 1960 convenDon, he said that if Stu Symington orLyndon JohnsonwonthenominaDon, itwould justbeaconDnuaDonof JohnFosterDulles.Andaswewillsee,hewasright. What Iamworkingonnowisanewessaywhich is an extension of this thesis –– that is, how Nixon and Kissinger extendedJohnson’spoliciesevenfurtherthanLBJhadgoneincertainplaces.Tothepointthatby1974,whenNixon resigned,Kennedy’s reformswereessenDallydeadandburiedforever.WhatyouseehereisasummaryoftheVietnampartofthatessay.

Preamble

The preceding image conveys the overall message that themainstreammediaheldabouttheVietnamconflictthroughout.Itwas somehowan inevitable tragedy brought on by an eliDsta[tude in the State Department combined with a can-domentality in theCIAandPentagon. That idea,asweshall see,wasmostpopularlyconveyedbyDavidHalberstam’sbestsellingbookTheBestandtheBrightest.ItheldunDl1991.Whenthishappened:

In December of 1991, Mr. X met Jim Garrison, and thegeneralpublicwasfirstalertedthatX (FletcherProuty)hadbeenworkingonPresidentKennedy'splantowithdrawfromVietnam.

HistorianDanielHallinmappedout theabove chart as tohowtheMSMworks. ThemeeDngbetweenXandGarrisonwas inthesphereofdeviance,whereeven ifthestory istrue, itdoesnotgetprinted. Thereforethefilmwasadackedsevenmonthsinadvance.

In the above adack in theWashington Post, GeorgeLardner wrote that there was no abrupt changebetween Kennedy’s Vietnam policy and Johnson’sVietnampolicy.But the screen writers had something that helpedprovetherewasachange,somethingthatLardnerwasnotawareof.

“The President approved themilitary recommendaDonscontainedinSecDonIB(I-3)ofthe report, but directed thatno formal announcement bemadeoftheimplementaDonofplans to withdraw 1,000 U.S.military personnel by the endof1963.”

Fletcher Prouty, a consultant on thefilm, actually wrote the McNamara/Taylor report along with his bossVictor Krulak. That report was thebasisforNSAM263.TheirwriDngwassupervisedbyBobbyKennedy,attherequest of President Kennedy. Thatreportwas then jededout toHawaiiandhandedtoMcNamaraandTaylorontheirreturnfromSaigon.Itwasinboundform.Theyread itonthewaytoWashington.

Lt.Gen.VictorKrulak

Gen.MaxwellTaylor

In1997,theARRBdeclassifiedMcNamara'sSec/DefConferenceofMay1963.

“b.) The program currently inprogress to train Vietnameseforces will be reviewed andaccelerated as necessary toinsure that all essenDalfuncDons visualized to berequired for the projectedoperaDonal environment,i n c l u d e d t h o s e n o wperformed by US militaryunits and personnel, can beassumed properly by theVietnamese by the end ofcalendaryear1965.”

“Papers Support Theory that Kennedy Had Plans for a Vietnam Pullout”

Letus see justhowbadlymisinformedDavidHalberstam was in this book which sold 1.8millioncopies.Let us focus on the key role of RobertMcNamara, who got blamed for the war, tothe point that it was called “McNamara’sWar”.

“He became the principal deskofficer on Vietnam in 1962 becausehe felt the President needed hishelp.”(Halberstamp.214)Nextpage,hewritesthatMcNamarahad no different assumpDons thanthePentagondid.

ItwasnotMcNamarawhowenttoKennedyon Vietnam. As we know today, Kennedys e n t J o h n K . G a l b r a i t h ’ s r e p o r trecommendingwithdrawal toMcNamara inthe spring of 1962. From that point, unDlKennedy’s death, McNamara was fulfillingJFK’s intent to leave Vietnam beginning inlate 1963, with complete withdrawalaccomplishedby1965.

Formoreevidenceofthis,considerthefollowingtapemadeinthefall of 1963 when Kennedy was forcing NSAM 263 through hisreluctantadvisors.

JohnK.Galbraith

October2,1963:

[McNamara]…webelievewecancompletethemilitarycampaigninthefirstthreecorpsin’64andthefourthcorpsin’65…webelievewecan train the Vietnamese to take over the essenDal funcDons andwithdrawthebulkofourforces. AndthisthousandisinconjuncDonwiththat….

[Bundy]What’sthepointofdoingit?

[McNamara]WeneedawaytogetoutofVietnam.This isawayofdoingit.

Kennedy had implemented his withdrawalplan by going around him since he knewBundywas too hawkish. RetroacDvely BundyhadnothingbutadmiraDonforthatmove.Auer reviewing the declassified record, hetoldGoldstein thatKennedywasnevergoingintoVietnam.

When NaDonal Security AdvisorMcGeorge Bundy listened to theabove tape with his biographerGordonGoldstein, he realizedwhathadhappened.

WitnessesforKennedyhandingoffthiswithdrawalplantoMcNamara:

JohnK.Galbraith,Ambassadorto

India

RoswellGilpatric,DeputySecretary

ofDefense

JohnMcNaughton,AssistantSecretary

ofDefense

McGeorgeBundy,NaDonalSecurity

Advisor

Now let us look at what Lyndon Johnson did withMcNamaraandKennedy’swithdrawalplan.Keep inmind that Johnson always said that hewassimply keeping faith with what Kennedy had done.As we will see, these taped conversaDons do notbear that out. Consider the first one, just twomonthsauerKennedy’sassassinaDon.

[Johnson] I always thought it was foolish for you to make anystatementsaboutwithdrawing. Ithoughtitwasbadpsychologically.Butyouandthepresidentthoughtotherwise,andIjustsatsilent.

[McNamara]Theproblemis…

[Johnson]ThencomethequesDons,howinthehelldoesMcNamarathinkwhenhe’slosingthewarhecanpullmenoutofthere?

February20,1964:

As the reader can see, LBJ thought — differingwithKennedy—thatSouthVietnamwaspartofAmer i ca ’ s naDona l secur i t y i n te res t s .Acknowledging his differences with Kennedy, heimpliedwecouldnotwithdrawatthatDme.In the following tape, LBJ actually wantsMcNamara to write a memo saying that he didnot really mean he was going to withdraw athousandmenfromVietnamin1963, that itwasjustatest.Which,asthereadercanseefromthisevidence,itwasnot.

[Johnson]Iwantyoutodictatemeamemorandum…Nowwhy’dyousayyou’dsendathousandhomeinOctoberof1963? WhydidMcNamara say theywere coming back home in ’65? ... That doesn’tmeaneverybodycomesback,butthatyourtrainingought to be in predy good shape by that Dme.That’swhat’ssaid,notanythinginconsistent.

March2,1964:

Clearly, Johnson is rewriDng history in order toblur the line between his Vietnam policy andKennedy’s.In this followingcall toMcNamara, thepresidenttells him that he has heard that several ofKennedy’sappointeesrealizewhatheisuptoandtheydon’tlikeit.

[Johnson] Well, it was at [Rowland] Evans’ house.And theKennedycrowddecided that Ihad framedup to get the Armed Service commidee in theSenate to callMcCone to put theVietnamWar onKennedy’s tomb…and thiswasmy game… to layVietnam off onto Kennedy’s inexperience andimmaturityandsoforth.

January13,1965:

Onebyone…

Bundy

SalingerO’Donnell

Ball

…leavetheWhiteHouse.

McNamara

More proof of Johnson’s very abrupt alteraDon ofKennedy’s Vietnam policy is in the following twodocuments.AfewdaysauerKennedy’sdeath,NSAM273wasalteredby LBJ in order to allow use of the American Navy forpatrols very close to North Vietnamese waters. Thiscaused the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which eventuallyallowedcombattroopstobesenttoVietnam,somethingKennedywasintentnottodo.[Followingslide,leu]NSAM288wasapprovedbyJohnsoninMarchof1964. Itallowed for the choice of American air adacks at certaintargets in thenorth. LBJused this rightauer theTonkinGulfincidenttobombthenorth.[Followingslide,right]

NSAM273NSAM288

In this 1972 book, two ofKennedy’s closest advisors wrotethat LBJ broke with Kennedy’sVietnampolicy.TheymenDonhowNSAM 263was rescinded and thenumber of advisors actuallyincreasedunderLBJ.

RichardNixonlikedtosayinprivateand,atDmesinpublic,thathewasnotgoingtoblameKennedyorJohnsonforge[ngusintoVietnam.This isanothercaseofblurring the truth. WhenKennedy was inaugurated, America had alreadybeen in Vietnam for at least six years. Americacreated South Vietnam, and cancelled theunificaDonelecDonsthatweretobeheldin1956.

TheFourMenWhoGotUsintoVietnam

[John Foster Dulles] “We have a clean base there nowwithoutataintofcolonialism.DienBienPhuwasablessingindisguise.”

In fact, aswe shall see, John FosterDullesactuallywanted touse atomicweapons tobailoutthefatalFrenchsiegeatDienBienPhu,andNixonactuallyproposed inserDngAmerican combat troops that samemonthifFrancefell.

Operation Vulture: Dulles’ Plan to Save France

ü  60 B-29’s ü  150 jet fighters for

cover against the Chinese

ü  3 Convair B-36s to

drop three atom bombs

InApril1954,Nixonsaidthatifthe Frenchwere defeated, theplight of the free world wasdesperate:“In order to avoid it we musttake the risk now by pu[ngAmericanboysin,Ibelievethatthe execuDve branch has totake the poliDcally unpopularposiDon of facing up to it anddoingit,andIpersonallywouldsupportsuchadecision.”

WhenOliver Stone started his film,only 3% of Nixon’s audiotapes hadbeen declassified, and only 15% ofhis presidenDal papers had beenreleased.

But sDll, the LA Times got, of allpeople, Henry Kissinger to reviewthefilm.

We are about to seewhy Nixon hired a fleet oflawyers to fight declassificaDon all theway unDlhisdeathin1994.His record may be, in some ways, even worsethan Johnson’s. For example, Nixon droppedmorebombsonIndochinathanLBJdid—andthedifferenceisnotreallyclose.Itamountstoaboutamillionmoretons.But further, aswewill see,whenNixon enteredofficehe knew thewar could not bewon! Thiswas the conclusion of a study memorandumcalledNSSM1.

[Nixon to Kissinger] “In Saigon, thetendency is to fight the war forvictory. Butyouand Iknowitwon’thappen, it is impossible. EvenGeneralAbramsagreed.”Yet,hesDllexpandsthewar intotheB-52 carpet bombings and theinvasions of Laos and Cambodia, theladercausingthefallofSihanoukandLonNol,andtherisetopowerofPolPotandthedeathsofaboutamillionpeople.

1969(auerNSSM-1wascompiled):

Thiswasallpartofthe“MadmanTheory.”

Kissinger:“Whenindoubt,webombCambodia.”

Nixon inherited the “Madman Theory” fromFoster Dulles, who called it the “UncertaintyPrinciple”: if you acted irraDonally andunpredictably, the enemy would be inDmidatedandgiveup.Itfailedhere.But something else was happening at this Dme:the American army was falling apart. This wasdescribedinafamousarDclebyRobertHeinl.

Fraggings:1969=96;1970=209

1971=235(endofyearprojecDon)

Some U.S. pilots refused to fly during theChristmasbombings.

Col.RobertDHeinl

AlthoughMyLaiwasbyfarthelargestsinglemassacre, it was not an excepDon. Manysmaller-scaleatrociDeswerecoveredupanddocumentsdeepsixed.

Contrary to what he says, Kissinger didconsider theuseof tacDcal atomicweaponsfor interdicDon purposes, near the Chineseborder.

[Nixon]Shouldwetakethedikesoutnow?

[Kissinger]Thatwilldrownabout200,000people.

[Nixon]Wellno,noI’dratheruseanuclearbomb.Haveyougotoneready?

DuringEasterCampaign:

Theendgamebecame theDecent Interval strategy,Vietnamcan fall auer the USA leaves. In his China briefing book,Kissingerwrote: “Wewantadecent interval. Youhaveourassurances.”Whatwasthisdecentintervalreallyaboutthen?

[Nixon] “I’ve come to the conclusion thatthere’snowaytowinthewar. Butwecan’tsay that of course. In fact,we have to saythe opposite, just to keep some degree ofbargainingleverage.”

1968:

[Haldemannotes]“...won’tbethe1stPtolosewar...”

Henry Kissinger called an old friend that dayandsaid,“Weshouldhaveneverbeenthere.”

IfallthishadbeenexposedinpublicattheDme,thewar could not have conDnued as long as it did. IfAmericahadamediathatwasnotguidedbyHallin’sSpheres, again, the war would have been sDllborn.Secrecyisnotjusttheenemyoftruth,buttheenemyofdemocracy.In that regard, we leave you with the one foreignpolicyvisionaryamidthisprolongeddisaster. Thesewordswerespoken23yearsbeforethefallofSaigon,andtwoyearsbeforeDienBienPhu;theWashingtonPostcompletelyforgotthem.

“No amount of Americanm i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n ce i nIndochina can conquer anenemy which is everywhereand at the same Dmenowhere, ‘an enemy of thepeople’ which has thesympathyandcovertsupportofthepeople.”SenatorJohnF.Kennedy(1952speech)

•  JamesBlight,ed.,Virtual JFK:Vietnam IfKennedyHadLived,Bowman&Lidlefield,2009.

•  GordonGoldstein,Lessons inDisaster:McGeorgeBundyandthePathtoWarinVietnam,TimesBooks,2008.

•  JohnNewman,JFKandVietnam:Decep$on,Intrigue,andtheStruggleforPower,WarnerBooks,1992;2nded.,CreateSpaceIndependentPublishingPla|orm,2017.

•  KenHughes,FatalPoli$cs:TheNixonTapes,theVietnamWar,andtheCasual$esofReelec$on,UniversityofVirginiaPress,2015.

•  JeffreyKimball,TheVietnamWarFiles:UncoveringtheSecretHistory of Nixon-Era Strategy, University Press of Kansas,2004.

Sources(andsuggestedreading)