jillson- the political structure of constitution making the federal convention of 1787

8/3/2019 Jillson- The Political Structure of Constitution Making the Federal Convention of 1787

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The Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal Convention of 1787Author(s): Calvin C. Jillson and Cecil L. EubanksReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 435-458Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110899 .

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ThePolitical tructurefConstitutionaking:TheFederalConventionf1787*CalvinC. Jillson,ouisiana tateUniversityCecilL. Eubanks, ouisiana tateUniversity

The authors ontend hat urunderstandingf theFederalConventionnd oftheConstitutionthat tproduced as beensubstantiallyndunnecessarilylouded y an ancient ispute etweenheadherentsf twovery road raditionsfpolitical nalysis.A "rationalist"ineof nterpretationasconsistentlyrgued or he entralityf deas andpolitical rincipleso theoutcome ftheConven-tion'sdebates,while "materialist" raditionasconsistentlytressed he mportancefpracticalpolitics ndeconomic nterests. he authorsntegratehese lternativeraditionsf analysis ndexplanationydemonstratinghat dynamicelationshipfmutualnterdependencexisted etweenphilosophicalnd materialnfluencesn the Convention. he authors emonstrate,hroughothempiricalnd nterpretiveeans, hat, lthoughuestionsf both hilosophicalnd materialontentand import erebefore he Conventionhroughout,uestions f eachgeneral ypedominatedheConvention'sttentionuring articularhases f ts work.Therefore,hefocus f debate nd deci-sion,as well as thevoting oalitions hat onfrontedne another ver he ssuesunder iscussion,wereorganized round hared rinciplest somestages,while t other imes heywereorganizedaroundonflictingaterialnterests.

Ever incemen eganreflectingnpolitics hey ave scillated etweenwodiametricallypposednterpretations.ccordingoone,politicss conflict.. . . Accordingo the ther . . , politicss an effortobringbout he uleoforder nd ustice. -Maurice Duverger1966, p. xii)Introduction

Thisstudyontendshat urunderstandingftheFederal onventionndoftheConstitutionhattproducedas been ubstantiallyndunnecessarilyloudedbyan ancient ispute etween he dherentsftwovery road raditionsfpolit-icalanalysis.Robert ahl located he pistemologicalource f this ntellectualdisputey dentifyingtwofundamentallyifferentypes"ofexplanationor herelationshipetween oliticalnstitutionsndthebroaderocioeconomicndcul-tural ontexts ithin hich hey ise.Dahl (1963) hasarguedhat a Rationalistexplanation . . givesprimacyo thewaymen think boutpolitics. . . But*Earlier ersions f thispaperwerepresentedefore heLSU Political cienceDepartment'scolloquium n "The Study fPolitics n theSocial Sciences" and at the 1982 Southern oliticalScienceAssociationmeetings.Weare very ratefulo themany riendsnd colleagueswho ontrib-uted arious ormsfsupport,ounsel, ndencouragementuringtsdevelopment.pecialthanks otoThorntonnderson,arry odd, LeroyRieselbach, incent strom,WilliamRiker, ricUslaner,ChrisWolfe, im olner, obert ecker, anCrabb, ance Brouthers,ndRickWilson.


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436 CalvinC. Jillsonnd CecilL. Eubankssincemendo nothaveequalpower,t s thephilosophicaleliefs f therulersthat re treateds] particularlyritical. . . AMaterialistxplanation. . holdsthat . . thewaypeople hinkbout oliticss a rationalizationr defensef thepolitical, ocial, andeconomicnstitutionshat hey hinkwillmaximize heirown materialnterests"pp. 107-8). Becauserationalistndmaterialistxpla-nations f politics nd political ehaviorre based in radically ifferentpiste-mologicalraditions,hey avefrequentlyeen viewed s mutuallyxclusive ydevotees ho dhere o themwith deological ervor.Weargue hathempactfthis isputenstudiesfthe ederal onventionhas beenboth lear nd almostwholly nfortunate.ne ineof nterpretationasconsistentlyrgued or he entralityf deasand political rincipleso theout-comeoftheConvention'sebates,while he ther as stressed he mportancefpractical olitics ndeconomicnterests.Inthis tudy e attempto ntegratehese lternativeraditionsf xplanationand analysis ydemonstratinghat dynamicelationshipf mutualnterdepen-dence xisted etween hilosophicalnd materialnfluencesn theConvention.Our thesiss that rinciples uided ction ndistinguishableypes fquestions,while n otherets fquestions ersonal,tate,ndregionalnterestsncroachedupon, nd nsome asesoverwhelmedndsubordinated,he ndependentmpactof deas.More mportantly,e demonstratehat uestions f each general ypedominatedheConvention'sttentionuring articularhases f tswork,o thatat somestages, he dominantoting oalitionswereorganized round haredprinciples, hile t other imes hedominantoalitionswereorganized roundconflictingaterialnterests.

Conflictingnterpretations:rinciple ersus nterestAmericansnteredhe wentiethenturyonvinced hat ritish rimeMin-isterWilliamGladstone ad capturedhe pecial haracterftheAmericanon-stitutionndescribingt as "the mostwonderfulork ver truck ff t a giventimeby thebrain ndpurpose fman" (Smith, 980, p. 94). Yet, ess thandecade nto henewcentury,.AllenSmith1907) setthe one or nexplicitlymaterialistnterpretationftheConvention'sork y rguinghat theAmericanscheme f governmentasplanned ndsetup toperpetuatehe scendancy ftheproperty-holdinglass" (p. 298). CharlesA. Beard 1913) elaboratedhis"economicnterpretation"fthemotivesfthe ramersnd he utcomeftheirdeliberations.e concluded hat themembersfthePhiladelphiaonventionwhich raftedheConstitutionere,with few xceptions,mmediately,irectly,

andpersonallynterestedn,and derived conomic dvantagesrom,he stab-lishmentf thenew ystem"1913, p. 324).Bymid-century,he harges gainstheFounders adbecomeesspersonal,butno ess materialistncharacter.ohn .Roche 1961) applied he ssumptionsofdemocraticluralismohisanalysis f theConventionndconcluded hat heConstitutionas nomore han particularlympressivexample f "politicalimprovisation"p. 810). Itwas "a patchworkewn ogethernderhepressure


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 437ofboth ime ndevents y a group fextremelyalented emocraticoliticians"(p. 815). ThoughRochedid not ntend isreadingo "suggest hat heConsti-tution ested na foundationf mpurer base motives"p. 801) many nalystsfeared hat hecumulativempact fhis andothermaterialistnterpretationsftheFounding addiminishedhenation's enseofdirectionndpurpose.WalterLippmann1955) concluded hat thepublic hilosophythat uided henation'searly evelopment]s inlargemeasure ntellectuallyiscreditedmong ontem-porarymen. . . The signs nd seals oflegitimacy,rrightnessnd oftruth,havebeen taken verby menwho reject . . thedoctrine fconstitutionale-mocracy" pp. 136-37).Therecoveryfa sound nd effectivepublic philosophy" idnot omequickly. ully wenty ears fter ippmann rote,Martin iamond 1976) wasforcedoconclude hat the old rootAmericandeas have beenchallengednnearly very rontnd cast ntodoubt y themost owerfulontemporaryntel-lectual urrents"p. 3). Indefense f theFoundersnd thepolitical ystem hatthey reated, iamond doptedndpromoted viewthat learly,ven ombat-ively, mphasizedhe mpact f deasandpolitical rinciplesvermaterialnter-ests ntheConvention. e argued hat the Conventionupplies remarkableexample f . . howtheoretical attersovernhedispositionfpracticalmat-ters" Diamond, 981, p. 30). InDiamond'sview, the debate ver heConsti-tution asa climactic ncounteretween worivalpolitical heoriesf howtheendsofdemocraticonsent,ibertynd competentovernmentan bestbe ob-tained" 1981, p. 54). Despite heprofoundmpactfDiamond'swork nmanystudentsfAmerican olitical deas and institutions,thers ave continuedoembrace hepredominatelyaterialistiew thatwe have dentified ith mith,Beard, ndRoche.Despite hepersistencef this ong-standingisputewithin he raditionfconstitutionaltudies,we take the view of MauriceDuverger hatpolitics s"always nd at all times oth he nstrumentywhich ertain roups ominateothers . . andalso a means . . ofachievingome ntegrationfthe ndividualinto he ollectivityor hegeneral ood" (1966, p. xiii). Therefore, e seektodemonstratehat ebatemoved, etween wo evels fconstitutionalonstructionand that hese evelsrepresentedignificanthiftsntherelativemportancefpolitical rinciplesndmaterialnterestsntheConvention.ThisreadingftheConvention'sork as beengiven mpressiveheoreticalsupport ytwo mportantnalyticalistinctionsoncerninghe ogical tructureofconstitutionalhoicemadesometwenty ears go by James uchanan ndGordon ullocknd elaboratedmore ecentlyyVincent strom. uchanan ndTullock1962) began heirttemptodevelop "positive"or"economic heoryofconstitutions"y distinguishingetweenhe"operational"evelofpracticalpoliticsnd he ultimate onstitutionalevel fdecision-making"p. 6). Ostrom(1979)hasexpandednthis istinctionyexplaininghat hoice t "the consti-tutionalevelfocuses pon lternativeetsof rules r nstitutionalrrangements. . .that applyto thetaking f futureperationalecisions" p. 2). At the


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438 CalvinC. Jillson nd Cecil L. Eubanksoperationalevel,on theother and, "one is concerned ithwhogetswhat,when, ndhow," ndatthis evel, theprimaryreoccupationf nquirys withtheplay fthepolitical amewithin given etof rules" ibid.,p. 1).

When oncern ocuses xclusively ponchoiceand decision t theconsti-tutionalevel,Buchanan nd Tullock1962) suggest hat heconstitution-makermust ddress wo related utanalyticallyistinct ets of issuesor questions."Individualshoose,first fall, thefundamentalrganizationf activity.ec-ondly, heyhoose hedecision-makingules" Buchanannd Tullock, 962,p.210). This distinctionighlightshefact hat hefirst rder fbusiness uringconstitutionalonstructions to addresswhat,nthis ssay,we willcall "higher"levelquestionsfregime ype nd ofthebasicoptions ornstitutionalesign.Onlywhen hese ecisions avebeenmadedoes choicepasstowhatwe willrefertoas a "lower" level fconstitutionalesign,where hedecision ules hatwillregulatendorder ehavior ithinhe egime's rimarynstitutionsre selected.These"lower" evel hoices pecifyhewaysn whichater perationalecisionswillbemade,by whom, nd overwhat ange f ssues.At the"higher" evel,theconstitution-makerrestleswithgeneral ues-tions oncerninghe cope, scale, and formppropriateogovernment.ill theregime e an aristocratic,emocratic,rmixed epublic?Will thegovernmenthavea legislative r an executive ocus?Will its legislaturee bicameral runicameral? ill tsexecutive e one manorseveral? hesequestionsre lesslikelyobe decidedwith eferenceothe conomictatus,ocialrole, rmaterialcharacteristicsf the onstitution-makerhanwith eferenceo hisphilosophicalassumptionsoncerninghe nterplaymong uman ature, oliticalnstitutions,andthegood society.As thegeneralnstitutionalesign nd therelationshipshatwill pertainamongts omponentarts ecome lear, he ndividualonstitution-makerovescloser o the ealm fpracticalolitics. hequestionshat ominatehis lower"level fconstitutionalesign oncernhe egulationfpolitical ehaviorhroughrulesgoverninguchspecificmatterss citizenship,uffragendvoting, ligi-bility ooffice, ndrepresentation.he choicesmadeconcerninghesemattersdeterminehe ontextfday-to-dayolitics t theoperationalrpracticalevel.Therefore,uestionstthis evel re muchmore ikelyobe decidedwith irectreferenceo thepolitical,conomic, nd socialcharacteristicsfthe hooser, isstate, rhisregionhanwith eferenceo hisphilosophicalrinciples.Our ntentionnthis ssay stosuggesthathe ivisionf cholarlynalysisinto ationalistersusmaterialistrprinciple ersus nterestnterpretationsftheConvention's ork erives rom tendencyfscholars o focus none levelofconstitutionalhoice rthe ther. hosewhoposit hedominance f deas ntheConventionave oncentratedheir ttentionlmost xclusivelyn the higher"levelofconstitutionalhoice,where hegroups choosingmong egime ypes(as inextended ersusmall epublic orms). hoseanalysts hoposit hedom-inance f nterestsntheConventionavefocused nquestions t the"lower"level ofconstitutionalhoice, where ebateover pecific ecision ules as in


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 439proportionalersus qual representationn the egislature)ends o bear muchmore he nterest-lacedharacterfpracticalolitics.Further, e show hatwhen heConventiononcentratedn "higher" evelquestions f constitutionalesign, oalitions ormed long ines of intellectualcleavage.During hese hasesoftheConvention's ork, hedelegates rom hemore ationallyriented iddleAtlantictates pposed hemore ocally rienteddelegates epresentinghenorthernnd outherneriphery.hen he ocus hiftedto "lower" evel hoices mong pecific ecision ules, achofwhich epresentedan alternativeistributionfauthorityithin nd over he nstitutionsf govern-ment, he tates plit long inesdefined yeconomic nd geographicnterest,state ize largeversus mall), ndregion North ersus outh).

The ExtendedRepublicversusTraditionalRepublicanism:Power nd PrincipleThe Convention'sirstwoweeks fsubstantiveebate, 9 Mayto9 June,saw a fundamentallymportantlashof deas atthe"higher" evelofconstitu-tional hoice Jensen,964, p. 43; Smith, 965, pp. 36-41). In broad utlinesvery imilar othose ketchedyMartin iamond,DouglassAdair 1957) hasargued hatheAmerican onstitutionasbornna clashbetween new cienceofrepublican olitics, pawned ythe Scottish nlightenment,nd traditional

republicanism.n addition, dair ontendedhat themost reativendphilo-sophical isciple fthe cottishchool f science ndpoliticsn thePhiladelphiaConvention as JamesMadison," nd"his most mazing olitical rophecy. .was thathe izeoftheUnited tates nd tsvarietyf nterestsouldbe madeguaranteef stabilitynd usticeunder new constitution"1957, p. 346).Madison'stheoryf the"extended epublic"sought o offer positivenewapproachoprovidinga republicanemedy or he diseasesmost ncidentorepublicanovernment"Earle, 1937,p. 62).Nonetheless,adison's new science"met ubstantialppositionromel-egateswhoclung o the raditionalepublicanismhat ad nformedheRevolu-tion, he arly tate onstitutions,ndtheArticlesfConfederation.s MartinDiamond 1972) correctly oted: The mainthrustf theoppositionesultedfromhemore eneralrgumenthat nly he tate overnmentssmall epublics),not omehuge entral overnment,ould be madeeffectivelyree nd republi-can" (p. 635).These alternativeisions fthe ppropriatecopeand scalefor epublicangovernmentidnot tand nequaltermss theConventionpened.After decadeofupheaval nd turbulencet thestate evel andimpotencet the evelof theConfederation,raditionalepublicanolutions ad cometo be questioned ynearly veryonend rejected y many.WhereasMadison rrivednPhiladelphiawith newunderstandingfthegoverningotentialnherentntherepublicanform,he raditionalepublicansrrivedlingingo old nostrums hose redibil-ity eemed learly o be on thewane. Cecilia Kenyon 1955) hascaptured hepredicamentfthese ispiritedepublicansy describinghem s "menof ittle


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440 CalvinC. Jillson ndCecilL. Eubanksfaith"p. 3). Perhapsmore othepoint, heywere men ofshaken aith,"menwhosepolitical rinciplesmanynowthought ore ppropriateo spawningrevolutionhan o providingheproper asis forust and stable epublican ov-ernmentWood,1969,pp. 396-413).JamesMadison nd hosemembersftheConventionho oughtoenhancedramaticallyheauthorityndindependencefthenational overnmentoveddecisivelyndsuccessfullyocapture heConvention'sgenda ndtherewithosetthe one f tsdeliberations.headoption,n29 May, fMadison'sVirginiaPlan gave the"extended epublic"men an initial dge because their eneralprinciplesbviouslynderlaytsspecific rovisions. n 30 May, hey oughtosolidifyhis otentialdvantage y puttingheConventionnrecordnfavorfradical hange.Therefore,dmundRandolphmoved thata nationalGovern-ment oughtobe established]onsistingfa supreme egislative,xecutive ndJudiciary"Farrand, 911,vol. 1, p. 33).Manydelegates ympathizedith his oot nd branchpproach,ut therswerewary,referringhe ncrementalpproachotheConvention'susiness nun-ciatedbyJohn ickinson f Delaware.Dickinsonimply houghthatwholesalechangewasunnecessary.We may esolve herefore,. . that he onfederationis defective;ndthen roceed othedefinitionfsuchpowers s may e thoughtadequate othe bjects orwhicht was nstituted.. . Theenquiryhould e-

1. What re the egislative owerswhichwe should est nCongress.2. Whatudiciary owers.3. What xecutiveowers" Farrand, 911,vol. 1, p. 42).Table1 highlightshedramatic ivisionwithinheConventionverhowtoproceed nd over hepurposes nd intentionshat nderlayhe alternativep-proaches. heextendedepublicmen factor ) soughtoundertakemmediatelytheradical hanges ecessaryo nstitutetruly ational overnment,hile hesmall epublicmen factor ) favoredncrementalhangesnthe xistingonfed-eration. he fact hat earlywo-thirds64.3 percent)fthevariancentheroll-call voting ver heConvention'sirst woweeks s captured y this wo-factorsolutionndicates hat his leavagewas both eep andstable.Theextended epublicmenfromheMiddleAtlanticegion, edby Virgin-ia's Madison nd by Pennsylvania'samesWilson nd RobertMorris,bviouslyheld he arlynitiative.his argely eflectedhe act hat he mall epublicmenhad yet oformulaten acceptable alancebetween ational nd state uthoritythat ouldbe offereds a coherentlternativeoMadison'sVirginia lan.As aconsequence,heir ppositionacked he onvictionnd cohesion hat haracter-ized the upport orMadison'sextendedepublic. his uncertaintyas evidentinthefact hat woofthe mallrepublic elegations, assachusettsnd NorthCarolina,gave substantialupporto the extendedepublic ause. These twostates plit heirupportlmostvenly etween he wofactors, hilenostate nthe irst actor rovidedvenmodestupportor hencrementalpproach avoredbythe mall epublicmen.


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 441TABLE 1

Extended epublic ersus mallRepublic: owernd Principle-Two-FactorSolution orRoll-CallVotes -36, 29 May-9 June, arimax otationOrtho)1 2

Extended epublic SmallRepublic h2New Hampshire absent absent absentMassachusetts (.60) (.67) .81Connecticut -.21 (.63) .44NewYork (.76) .29 .66NewJersey absent absent absentPennsylvania (.82) -.10 .68Delaware (.70) .08 .49Maryland (.77) -.12 .60Virginia (.66) .32 .54North arolina (.51) (.68) .73SouthCarolina -.04 (.86) .74Georgia .27 (.81) .73Sumofsquares 3.50 2.93 6.43Percentagefvarianceexplained 35.00 29.30 64.30

NOTE:The followingefinitions ayhelpthosewhoare notfamiliar ithfactornalysis ointerprethe able bove nd thosewhich ollow. hecolumns eaded ynumbersnd titles ontainfactoroadings. The loadings . . measurewhich ariablesstate oting elegations)re nvolvedinwhat actorcoalition f state oting elegations)nd to what egree.They recorrelationoeffi-cients etweenariables ndfactors"Rummel, 970,p. 137). "The column eaded 2displays . .theportionf a variable'sstate's) otal ariance hat s accountedor ythefactorsnd s the umof the quared oadings or variable"Rummel, 970, p. 142). Parenthesesdentifyhe tates hatachieve ull oalitionmembership,efineds factoroadingsf 50 orhigher.ee themethodologicalappendixor brief iscussion f thefactormodel mployednthis tudy.

Madison'svision fa great ommercialepublic, uledby a powerful a-tional overnmenthatwould egulate ith ompetencend ustice he ctivitiesof the everal tates,wasdirectlyhallenged yJohn ickinson n 2 June.nDickinson's iew, he ritical roblem osedby governmentna free ocietywasthe angerhatuthority ightoncentratendbecome yrannicalBailyn,1969,pp. 55-93). To minimize his onstantanger, ickinson rgued, he nationalgovernmenthould emainweak and "theLegislative, xecutive, Judiciarydepartmentsught obe madeas independentseparate]s possible" Farrand,1911,vol. 1, p. 86).On 4 June,Madison et aboutdismantlingickinson's rgumenthat hedefense frepublicaniberty equired stricteparationfresponsibilitiese-tween hedepartmentsf a modestlympoweredational overnment.n this


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442 CalvinC. JillsonndCecilL. Eubanksimportantpeech,Madison arefullyresentedndexplained he heoreticaln-derpinningsfhis"extendedepublic."William ierce fGeorgia ecordedhat"Mr.Madisonna veryble and ngeniouspeech . . provedhat he nlywaytomake Governmentnswer ll the end of its institutionas to collect hewisdom f ts everal artsnaid ofeach otherbyblurringpure eparationfpowers]whenevertwasnecessary"Farrand,911,vol. 1,pp. 110). By stress-ing theprinciple f "checks andbalances"as a supplementndbuttresso astrictseparation fpowers," he xtendedepublicmen oughtocreate gov-ernmentaltructuren which achdepartmentasfully apable fandmotivatedtoself-defense.fthe ntegrityfthe tructurend ts bility oforestallyrannybymaintainingeparate enters f power ould be depended pon, thengreatpowerouldbe given othenationalovernmentntheknowledgehat nebranchwould heck otentialbusesofthe ther.As thefull mplicationsfMadison'sprogramecame learer othe mallrepublicmen, hey truggled ithncreasingeterminationgainst he deathatsubstantialuthoritytthenationalevel ouldbe either ecessaryrsafe.On 6June, oger hermanontendedhat reat ower ouldnotbe wellused because"the objectsof the Union . . were few" (Farrand, 911, vol. 1, p. 133).Moreover,reat ower houldnotbe housed tthenationalevelbecause most"matters ivil& criminalwouldbe muchbettern thehandsof theStates"(ibid.).Therefore,hermanoncluded, theGenl.Governmentshould] e a sortofcollateral overnmenthich hallsecure heStates nparticularifficulties.I am against Genl.Governmentnd in favor f the ndependencendconfederationfthe tates" ibid., pp. 142-43).Madisonmet herman'sppositiono "Genl.Government"y hallenginghisassumptionhathe esponsibilitiesfthenational overnmentould e few.Inadditionothose bjects oted yShermandefense,ommerce,nd disputesbetweenhe tates),Madison combinedwith hem henecessity,fprovidingmore ffectuallyor he ecurityfprivateights,nd the teady ispensationfJustice"Farrand, 911, vol. 1, p. 134). Most ofthedelegates greedwhenMadison rgued hatnterestedocalmajoritiesad been"the source ftheseunjustawscomplainedfamong urselves"p. 135). Madisonproposed so-lution o theproblem fmajorityyrannyhat ewothers nderstoodndthatmany aw asdangerouslypeculative. The only emedys toenlarge he phere... as far s thenature fGovernmentould dmit. . . This [is] theonlydefensegainst he nconveniencesfdemocracyonsistent ith hedemocraticform fGovernment"p. 136).

Madison's pponents new hat dditionalowerswouldhave obe grantedto a central overnment,utthe dea of a truly ational overnmentlasheddirectly ithhe hilosophicalssumptionsithwhichheyandmostAmericanswith hem) ad beenoperatingincebefore herevolution.et,bereft fviablealternatives,hese menofshaken aith" ouldopposeonlyhalf-heartedlyhenMadison ontendedhat itwas ncumbentn[them]otryhis extendedepub-lic]remedy,nd . . toframe republicanystemnsuch scale& insucha


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 443form s will controlll the vilswhich avebee-nxperienced"Farrand, 911,vol. 1, p. 136). While he onflict emainedt this higher" evelofconstitu-tional hoice,the smallrepublicmen cast aboutfor lternativesoMadison'sfrighteninglyadical pproach.None came readily o hand Diamond,1981, p.27).

Large Statesversus mall States: Power nd InterestOn 7 June hetenor fthequestions efore heConventioneganto driftfrom hehigh lane ftheoryo the ough ndtumble fpractical,nterest-drivenpower olitics. ickinsonpened he iscussion n 7 June yrestatinghemodestcommitmentf the smallrepublicmento "the preservationf theStates n acertain egree f agency" Farrand, 911,vol. 1, p. 153). JamesWilson,onbehalf f the supportersf the Virginia lan, observed hat he"doubts anddifficulties"urroundingheplaceofthe tate overnmentsntheproposed ys-temderived romhethreat hat hey eemed opose tothe ndependencendeffectivenessf henationalovernment;he wished okeep hemromevouringthenational overnment"ibid.).Thosedelegateswhofollowedhe ogicofMadison's xtendedepublicx-pected ny nitiativeeftwith he tate overnmentso be misused.Their heo-retical rinciplesold hem hatmall epublics ad lways eenviolentndshort-

lived ecause nterestedocalmajorities,ossessed fthemeans,nvariablyctedunjustly. herefore,harlesPinckney roposed thattheNational egislatureshould ave uthorityonegativell [State] aws which heyhouldudgeto beimproper"Farrand, 911, vol. 1, p. 164). Madison seconded hePinckneymotion,aying hat e "could notbutregardn indefiniteower Pinckney adcalled t a "universalityfpower"]to negativeegislativects of theStates sabsolutely ecessaryo a perfectystem" ibid.).Elbridge erry, unning edford,nd WilliamPatersonprangothede-fense fthe tates.Gerrycornfullyejectedhe deaof"an indefiniteower onegativeegislativectsofthe tates" as thework f"speculative rojector(s)"whosetheory ad overwhelmedheir xperiencendtheirudgmentFarrand,1911,vol. 1, pp. 164-65). Bedfordemindedis small tate olleagues fthedangersnherentn such plan.Patersoneinforcededford's emarksyholdingup "Virginia,Massachusetts,ndPennsylvanias the hreearge tates, ndtheother en s small nes" (p. 178).He concluded hat thesmall tateswillhaveeverythingo fear. . . New Jerseywill never onfederate n theplan before heCommittee. he wouldbe swallowed p" (ibid., pp. 178-79). JamesWilsonrespondednkindfor he arge tates.He saidthat if the mallStates would]not onfederaten this lan,Pennsylvaniand hepresumed]omeothertates,would ot onfederatenany ther"ibid.,p. 180).ThisexchangendicatesowquicklynddecisivelyheConvention'socus hiftedromeneralheoriesboutthenaturefrepublican overnmento the mpact f variousmodes frepresen-tation nparticulartates ndregions.t also highlightshe nterest-lacedhar-


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444 CalvinC. Jillson nd CecilL. Eubanksacterwho gets what,when, ndhow)ofdiscussion t the "lower" level ofconstitutionalhoice.Table 2 showshow dramaticallyhe voting lignmentshangedwhen heConvention'sttentionhiftedromhigher" o"lower"level uestionsfcon-stitutionalhoice.During heConvention'sirstwoweeks, he tates ftheDeepSouth theCarolinasndGeorgia) adbeenwaryfMadison's lan oplacegreatpower t thenationalevel.Nonetheless,he xtendedepublicmenhadsuccess-fully vercome heobjectionsfthedelegates romheNortheastnd theDeepSouth o establish irmlyheprinciplefa strong ational overnment.owthequestion aswhowouldwield his reat ower? nder hese ew ircumstances,the apidly rowingtates ftheDeepSouthoinedMassachusetts,ennsylvania,andVirginia factor ofTable2) topursue roportionalepresentationnbothhouses fthenationalegislature.helarge tateswere pposedby five mallerstates rom he Middle Atlanticegion factor of Table2) demandingqualrepresentationnat eastone branchftheproposed egislature.heoppositionvoting atternnTable accounts or ver ne-half50.7 percent)fthevariancein thevotingfall the tates resent etween 1 Junend17July.Theconfrontationntensifiedn 11JunewhenRoger hermanfConnecti-cut uggestedhat eats ntheHouseofRepresentativese allocated o the tatesin proportiono thenumberffree nhabitants,ith ach state ohaveonevote

TABLE2LargeStates ersus mallStates: ower nd nterest-Two-Factorolution orRoll-CallVotes 7-156, 11June-16 uly, arimax otationOrtho)

1 2LargeStates SmallStates h2

NewHampshire absent absent absentMassachusetts (.80) .13 .66Connecticut .13 (.59) .37NewYork -.02 (.52) .27NewJersey -.13 (.75) .58Pennsylvania (.65) .09 .43Delaware -.08 (.74) .56Maryland .25 (.78) .68Virginia (.73) .08 .54North arolina (.79) .12 .64SouthCarolina (.55) -.22 .36Georgia (.69) -.10 .49Sumofsquares 3.13 2.45 5.58Percentagefvarianceexplained 28.45 22.25 50.70


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 445in theSenate.The large tatemen tilldemanded roportionalepresentationnboth ouses.Rufus ingofMassachusettsndWilson fPennsylvaniaounteredwith motion roposingthat heright f suffragen . . [theHouseofRepre-sentatives]ught otto be according o theruleestablishedntheArticles fConfederationequality], utaccordingo someequitable atioofrepresenta-tion,"which fter ome discussion assed seven o threewith ne abstention(Farrand, 911,vol. 1,p. 196). The arge tate oalition nanimouslyotedyesandwas oinedbyConnecticutnpursuancefSherman'suggestedompromise.NewYork,NewJersey,nd Delaware pposed hemeasure,while heMarylanddelegatesweredivided.Wilsonthen ought o reinforceheallegiance f thesouthernersothe arge tate oalition y awardinghem three-fifthsepresen-tation or heir laves. OnlyNew Jerseynd Delaware pposed ibid., p. 201).Pressing he arge tate dvantage,Wilson nd Alexander amiltonmoved hat"therightfsuffragenthe ndbranchthe enate] ughtobe accordingo thesamerule s in the1stbranch" ibid.,p. 202). Theywere uccessfulythe amesix-to-fivelignmenthat ppearsnTable2. Thus,proportionalepresentationnbothhouses, or time, adbeenachieved ythe riumphf the arge tates.The opposing oalitions eldfirm hrough 9 June,whenConnecticut'sOliver llsworthgaindeclared heneed for compromiseettlement. ilson,arguing gainst nycompromiseythe arge tates n this rucial ssue,ada-mantlyejected he dea, saying, If a separation ust akeplace, t couldneverhappen n better rounds" Farrand, 911,vol. 1,p. 482). Gunning edfordfDelaware nswered or he mall tates, I do not,gentlemen,rust ou. fyoupossessthepower,heabuseofitcould notbe checked; nd what henwouldprevent oufromxercisingt to ourdestruction?"ibid.,p. 500).With he roceedingsbviouslyt a dangerousmpasse, compromiseom-mittee as chosen n 2 July hat ot nly ailed o ncludeWilson nd Madisonbut lso omittedveryne ofthe trongpokesmenor he arge tate nterestnproportionalepresentation.lbridgeGerry, hosomeweeks arlier ad calledMadison "speculative rojector," as elected ommitteehairman. ccordingtoGerry,he mall tates eld a separatemeeting . . ofmost f thedelegatesof those ive tates factor of Table2], theresult f whichwas, a firm eter-minationn their artnotto relinquishherightfequal representationntheSenate" Farrand, 911,vol. 3, p. 264). With he mall tates tillunyielding,nocoursewas left ut o compromise. n 5 July, erry elivered hereport fhiscommitteeotheConvention.t proposed: That inthefirst ranch ftheLegislatureachofthe tates ow ntheUnion e allowed neMember or veryfortyhousandnhabitants.. . That nthe econdBranch fthe egislatureachState hallhave nequalVote" Farrand, 911,vol. 1,p. 524). Between Julyand 16Julywhen heConnecticutompromise as finally dopted, heNorthandtheSouth attledver he pportionmentf seats ntheHouseofRepresen-tatives hroughwo additional ompromiseommitteesnd interminableloordebates o insure hat heregions f the new nationwouldbe institutionallypositionedo defend heir aramountnterestsJillson, 981, pp. 36-41).


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446 CalvinC. Jillsonnd CecilL. EubanksExecutive ower nd CitizenParticipation:Principle nd Interest

The coalitions hat ad aligned ehind onflictingiewsofrepublican ov-ernmenturingheConvention'sirst woweeks esurfacedmmediatelyollow-ing the Connecticut ompromises the Convention'socusturnedgain toquestionstthe higher" evel fconstitutionalhoice.Thesefamiliaroalitions,still dividedby philosophical ifferencesoncerninghe nature f republicangovernment,ontrolledheConvention'susiness or henext iveweeks,wellinto ateAugust. he smallrepublicmen factor of Table3) sought o controlthepotentialor buseofgovernmentalower ymeans f a stricteparationfdepartments,modestmpowerment,nd theuseofexplicitonstitutionalro-hibitionsnd restraints here anger till eemed o lurk.Madisonrepeatedlyenunciatedhe ounterargumentnfavorf "checksand balances"as a supple-ment oa pure separationfpowers" hat he xtendedepublicmen onsidereddefinitivend towhich hey requentlyeferreduring ebate ver uestionstthe higher" evel f constitutionalhoice.He argued hat

if a Constitutionaliscriminationf thedepartmentsn paperwere sufficientecurityoeachagainst ncroachmentsf theother,ll furtherrovisions ould ndeed e superfluous.Butexperienceadtaughts a distrustfthat ecurity;nd that t s necessaryo ntroducesuch a balanceofpowers nd interests,s willguaranteeheprovisionsn paper. nsteadthereforefcontentingurselveswith aying own heTheoryn theConstitutionhat achdepartmentughtobe separatenddistinct,twasproposedo add a defensiveower o eachwhich houldmaintainheTheorynpractice.n so doingwe did notblend hedepartmentstogether. e erected ffectualarriersokeepthemeparate. Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 77;see also TheFederalist, os.47, 48, and 51)An initial lanceat Table 3 wouldseemto indicate hat hesix-membercoalition f arge nd smallMiddleAtlantictates, anging rom onnecticutoVirginia,would gainoutnumberhefive-memberoalition fperipheraltates,madeupofNew HampshirendMassachusettsntheNorthwith heCarolinasandGeorgiantheDeep South.Buton closer nalysis,hematch egins o ookmore ven,perhaps venpositivelykewednfavorftheperipheralroup.The factoroadings or heperipheraltates n factor are notonly uitestrong,ut llfive reclosely lusteredetween70and 79. Obviously,heverydivisive attles ftheseveralweekspasthadcost thesmallrepublic oalitionalmost othingntermsfsupportmong tscoremembers.Within he oalitionof MiddleAtlantictates, he ituation asquitedifferent.he small tates adbecomemuchmorewary ftheirarge tate olleagues. his s clearlyndicated

bythe modest ommitmentsfConnecticut, ew Jersey,nd Delaware o thecoalition f MiddleAtlantictates.Therefore,n closevotes n criticalssues,the ikelihood asthathe oalitionfMiddleAtlantictateswould e weakenedbythe elativelyrequentefectionf ts mallermembers.On 17 July,heday mmediatelyollowinghe resolutionfthestrugglebetween he arge nd small tates ver olitical ontrol f the egislative ranch,thequestion fthegeneral ormppropriateo the xecutive stablishmentas


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 447TABLE 3

SmallRepublic ocalists ersus xtended epublic osmopolitans-Two-Factorolution orRoll-CallVotes157-399, 17 July 29 August,Varimax otationOrtho)1 2

SmallRepublic Extended epublic h2New Hampshire (.75) .14 .58Massachusetts (.70) .12 .51Connecticut .24 (.52) .33New York absent absent absentNew Jersey .08 (.58) .35Pennsylvania .16 (.71) .53Delaware .19 (.55) .34Maryland -.04 (.66) .43Virginia .19 (.63) .43North arolina (.71) .21 .55SouthCarolina (.79) .06 .63Georgia (.70) .19 .52Sum ofsquares 2.84 2.36 5.20Percentagef varianceexplained 25.82 21.45 47.27taken p. Early ntheConventionoger herman adexpressedhedoctrine fexecutiveower owhichhe mall epublicmen on factor ofTable3) adheredwhen e saidthat e"considered heExecutivemagistracys nothing ore hanan nstitutionor arryinghewilloftheLegislaturento ffect"Farrand, 911,vol. 1, p. 65). Sherman's iewswere mmediatelyhallenged ytheextendedrepublicmen onfactor of Table3), whoheld hat ower eednotbe severelylimitedf tsundue oncentrationnany ingle ranchfgovernmentas avoided.Seen nthis ight, powerfulnd ndependentxecutiveouldbe usedto restraina volatilendpotentiallyangerousegislatureBailyn, 967,pp. 55-93; Wood,1969,pp. 18-28,352-59, 430-38).TheConventionuicklyranslatedhese woperspectivesnexecutiveowerinto hreemajor tructurallements:modeofappointmentbythe egislaturerby specially hosen lectors); engthf termtenure);ndreeligibilityJillson,1979, p. 388). Itwas apparentothedelegateshat hese lements ere hem-selvesnterrelatednd hatheyll revolvedroundhe uestionf he elationshipof the xecutive ranch othe egislature.harlesWarren1928) hasnoted hat"theviews fmost fthedelegatess to engthftermndas tore-electioneredependentnthemode felection"p. 365).Thebattle ver xecutiveelection asrejoinedn 17Julyver he lause"To be chosenby theNational egislature," hich, fter wochallengingro-


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448 CalvinC. Jillson nd CecilL. Eubanksposals for opular lectionnd selectionyelectorswere oundly ejected, onunanimous pproval.To counter he peripheraltates' factor of Table 3)achievementfselection y thenational egislature,heMiddleAtlantictates(factor of Table3), behindGouverneur orris fPennsylvania,uccessfullymoved o strikeut"tobe ineligible second ime," rguinghatodootherwisewould e to nstitutionalizenexperiencet thehelm fthenational overnment.When motion asdefeatedo strikeutthe even-yearerm s well, heCon-vention as eftwith egislativeelectionnd long erm f evenyears, utwithreeligibilityermitted;hus,virtuallyssuring,n Madison's words, hat theExecutiveouldnotbe independentftheLegislature,fdependentnthepleas-ureofthat ranch or re-appointment"Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 34). Even headvocates fa broadly mpoweredational xecutive esitatedt theprospectfan unrestrictedligibilityo successive ong erms f office.The question fexecutive election eappearedn 19 July,llowing lls-worth f Connecticuto reintroducehe deaofelectors. hesixMiddleAtlanticstates, angingn a solidphalanx rom onnecticuto Virginia, oted n favor felectors, hile he hree tates ftheDeep South pposed lectorsnd Massa-chusettsivided n the ssue Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 58). Bothreeligibilityand six-yearerm ere lsoquickly pproved. houghheprinciplefelectoralselection ow seemed o enjoymajorityupportntheConvention,hepracticalquestionfdistributingower monghe tatess they articipatednthat rocesscontinuedo defy esolutionThach,1923,p. 102).This problemn "lower"level onstitutionalesign, he llocationfpres-identiallectorsmong he tates,was directlyonfrontedn 20 July henOliverEllsworth,peaking or he mallMiddleAtlantictates, roposed thefollowingratio: owit-onefor ach Statenot xceeding 00,000 nhabitants,wofor achabove thatnumber nd notexceeding 00,000 nhabitants,nd, three or achstate xceeding 00,000" (Farrand, 911,vol.2, p. 57). JamesMadison, lwaystheadvocate nd defenderf proportionalepresentation,bserved that thiswouldmake ntime ll ornearlyll theStates qual. Since therewerefew hatwouldnot ntime ontain henumberf nhabitantsntitlinghemo3 Electors"(ibid., p. 63). With hisproportionalepresentationiewagain dominatinghelarge statedelegations, ew Jerseynd Delaware bandoned heir arge statecolleagues o oin the fivemembersfthe peripheraloalitionnreinstitutinglegislativeelection, long erm, nd an ineligibility.oon thereafter,heCon-ventiondjournedor endays o givetheCommitteef Detail"time o prepareandreportheConstitution"ibid,p. 128).

The criticaluestions acing heConventionver he hreeweeks mmedi-ately ollowinghedeliveryftheCommitteefDetailreportn 6 August on-cernedhe tance hat henewrepublic ould ake owardts itizens, articularlythose itizenswhomight oldofficenthenewgovernment.n theonehand,the osmopolitanelegatesromheMiddleAtlantictates, enerallyupportingMadison's extended epublic," eld cautious utoptimisticallyositive iewofthe rdinaryitizen's bilityoparticipaten a well-constructedational ov-


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 449emnmentroadly mpoweredo govern reelys changingimes ndan indeter-minate uturemight ictate.On the otherhand, the ocalistdelegates f theperipheraloalition, enerallyearfulfconcentratedower ndsupportinghe"smallrepublic" iew, ook muchessoptimisticiew fthe ualityfpopularparticipationnd of thefeasibilityf constructingdequate checks and bal-ances" in anygovernmentwarded reat iscretion.he small epublicmen tillthoughtt bothwise andexpediento depart s little s possiblefrom puretheoryf"separationfpowers."Thedebates hat ccurreduringheweekof 9 to 15August nresidencyqualificationsor heHouse and theSenateproviden example fthemiddlestates' penness nd he eripheraltates' kepticismowardhenation's itizens.On9 August,Gouverneur orris roposed 14-year esidencyequirementorSenators,urging hedanger fadmittingtrangersnto urpublicCouncils"(Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 235). Charles inckneygreedwhenGeorgeMasonindicated hat he shouldbe forrestrainingheeligibilityntotheSenate,tonatives,"were t notfor he fact hatmany oreignersad served oblyn theRevolutionibid.).PierceButler fSouthCarolina upported asonandMorris,observinghat oreignersringwith hem ideasofGovernmento distinctromours hatnevery oint fview heyredangerous"ibid., p. 236).Madison ndhisnationalisticupportersromhemiddle tates houghthisapproach nnecessary,lliberal,ndunbecomingothenation.Madison ndicatedthat"he thought ny restrictionn the Constitution . . improper:because it[would]givea tincturef illiberalityo the Constitution"o bar newcitizensfrom heSenateforfully 4 years, etaloneto restricthathighprivilege onatives. enjamin ranklinosetoMadison's upport,lsodwellingnthe il-liberality,"s wellas the dverse mpact nEuropean pinion, fsuchan ideapermanentlynsconcedntheConstitution.ilsonoinedMadison ndFranklinin pointing o "the illiberal omplexion hich hemotionwouldgiveto theSystem"Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 237).Thevote n Morris'smotionor 14-yearesidencyequirement,hen nefor13 years, nd, finally,nother or10 yearswere ll defeatedya MiddleAtlantic loc ofstates tretchingromMassachusettsoNorth arolina. inally,nineyearswasproposedndnarrowlypproved.Wilson oughtoturnhismod-estvictorynto ositivemomentumor hemiddle tate ationalistsymovingoreconsiderhecitizenshipequirementor heHouse n order o reduce tfromsevenyears o three. hough hismotionwas defeatedya united eriphery,futherttemptas made oattach a proviso hat he imitationof evenyears]should ot ffectthe ights f] anyperson ow Citizen" Farrand, 91 , vol.2, p. 270). In response, familiar horus f voicesfromhePeripheryrguedthat ven hispresumptionn favor fimmigrantsho hadattaineditizenshipunder tate aws wouldconstitute danger. ohnRutledge bservedhat thepolicy fprecaution as as greatwith egard oforeignersowCitizens; s tothosewho aretobe naturalizedn [the]future." hermanupportedutledgewith hevery emarkabletatementhat theU. States avenot nvitedoreigners


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450 CalvinC. Jillsonnd Cecil L. Eubanksnorpledged heir aith hat hey hould njoy qual privileges ithnative iti-zens" (ibid.). Madison,Morris, ndWilsonpresentedounterarguments,utwhenhe oteswere ecordedfamiliaratternasevident. nce gain, unitedcoalitionfthe eripheryad uccessfullyxploitedhedivisions ithinhemorediffuseoalitionfMiddleAtlantictates otransformts onservativereferencesinto onstitutionalrovisions.With hese undamentaluestionsf executiveelection nd citizen artici-pation t east emporarilyesolved,oth oalitionsoughtoexertheirnfluenceon collateralssues.The peripheralroup id so always or hegeneral urposesof imitingowerndmaintaininghe herishedoctrinef"separationfpow-ers."The middle tate oalitionoughtoprovideachdepartment,rcombina-tions hereof, ith he bility o defendtself. nce the ntegrityf the tructurewasguaranteed,he xtendedepublicmen ook areto avoidminuteestrictionsonthe ssumptionhat utureovernments,onfrontingew ndunforeseenrob-lems,wouldneed o draw nanunrestrictedange foptions.

Slavery, ommerce, xecutive election nd theWest:State and Regional nterestAs theConvention oved nto ateAugust, everal ritical ssues at the"lower" levelofconstitutionalhoice, ncludingomeprovisionor he ritical

regionalssues fslaveryndcommercialegulation,or xecutiveelection,ndfor ontrolfthewesternands, toodunresolved.nitially,t seemed hat hedominantoalition fperipheraltateswouldresolve ach ofthese ssues nitsown favor gainst he ncreasinglyesultoryppositionftheMiddleAtlanticstates.As themiddle tate oalition otteredowardollapse, hemore ohesiveperipheraloalition eemed o gather ewstrengths its northernndsouthernwings uickly ndsmoothlyame to an accommodationn thedangerousnddivisive egionalssuesofthe lave radendcommercialegulation.When ebate nthe lave rade pened n themorningf22August, eneralCharles otesworthinckney ent irectlyothe egionalconomics fthe on-flict etween he tates ftheUpper outhMarylandndVirginiafthemiddlestate oalition) ndthe tates ftheLower outh theCarolinas ndGeorgia ftheperipheraloalition) n thisvolatile ssue. General inckney aid, "SouthCarolina& Georgia annot o withoutlaves.As toVirginia hewillgainbystoppinghe mportations.er laveswillrise nvalue,& shehas more han hewants" Farrand,911,vol.2, p. 371). Forthe hippingnterestso dear othenortherning ftheperipheraloalition inckney eld ut heprospecthat themore laves, hemore roduce o employ he arryingrade; he more onsump-tion lso, andthe moreof this, he morerevenue or hecommon reasury"(ibid.).Though ickinson nd others romhemiddleAtlanticrgued hat urtherimportationsere"inadmissible n every rinciplefhonor ndsafety," ingspoke or hedominanteripheraloalitionwhenhe remarkedhat thesubjectshould e consideredna political ight nly" Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 372).


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 451Viewed rom his ractical erspective,ingfeared hat theexemptionf lavesfrom utywhilst very thermport as subjected o t, was]an inequalityhatcouldnotfail o strikehe ommercialagacity f theNorthn middle tates"(ibid.,p. 373). General inckneygreed hat llowance or modest utywould"remove nedifficulty,"ndG. Morris uicklymoved obroadenhegroundorcompromiseo nclude he ensitiveegional oncernsfslaveryndcommercialregulation,aying, these thingsmay form bargain mong he NorthernSoutherntates" ibid.,p. 374). A compromiseommitteefone member romeach statewas quickly ppointed.LutherMartin,Maryland'sepresentativen thecommittee,ater eportedthat he ubstance fthecommittee'seportnvolvedn interregionaluid proquo betweenhenorthernndsouthern ings ftheperipheraloalition. Theeastern tates,notwithstandingheir version o slavery, ere verywilling oindulge he southerntates, t least with temporaryibertyoprosecute heslave-trade,rovided hesoutherntateswould, ntheir urn, ratifyhem, ylaying o restrictionsn navigationcts" (Farrand, 911, vol. 3, p. 210-11).The Deep Southwouldbe allowed o continuemportinglaves until t least1800, while henortherntateswouldbe allowed o setcommercialolicybysimplemajorityote fthenationalegislature.The CommercendSlave TradeCompromise asreportedo thefloor n24 August utwas notdebated ntil 5 August.n the nterim,heConventionreturnedo the omplexssueofexecutiveelection. gain, heMiddleAtlanticstateswerepowerlessgainst united oalition fperipheraltates. heprecisequestion efore heConventionas whetherhePeriphery'sreferenceoregis-lative election ouldbe exercisedy separate allotsntheHouse andSenate,or, s Rutledge ow uggested,nthehopeofdriving wedgebetween ennsyl-vania ndVirginiand theirmall tate llies,by "jointballot"of bothhousesvoting ogether.hermanmmediatelybjectedhat he jointballot"wouldde-prive he maller tates representedntheSenate f thenegativentendedheminthat ouse." When hevotewas taken,New Hampshire, assachusetts,ndtheCarolinaswere upportedythe argestf theMiddleAtlantictates, enn-sylvania,Maryland,ndVirginia,napprovinghemeasure even o four. ele-gatesfrom he maller tates uickly oughto reestablishheirnfluencenthepresidentialelectionrocess yproposinghat ach state elegationhould aveone vote ven fthepollingwas doneby "jointballot."The motion as lostbya single ote,five osix,whenPennsylvaniandVirginia gain oinedthepe-ripheraltates oturn ack heir ormerllies.Theremnantsf heMiddleAtlanticstate oalitionuccessfullyvoided inal efeat y postponinghe ssue.Whendebate n theprovisionsf theCommercendSlaveTradeCompro-miseopened n themorningf 25 August,General inckneymoved o extendtheperiod uring hich reemportationf slaveswouldbe allowed rom 800to1808.On this mendment,ndonthe ntirelause s amended,he ommercialnortheast,ewHampshire, assachusetts,ndConnecticut,nticipatingorth-ern ontrolver ommercialegulationn directxchangeor heirupportnthis


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452 CalvinC. Jillson nd Cecil L. Eubanksmatterf theslavetrade,oined theDeep South odefeat heMiddleAtlanticstates f NewJersey,ennsylvania,elaware, ndVirginia.With hesouthernhalf f the ompromisehus asily onfirmed,henorthernections ealingwithcommercialegulation erepostponednd did not eappear ntil 9 August.In the nterim,hedelegates rom outhCarolinamaneuveredo gain addi-tional ecurity or heir ropertyn slaves,whilemany ther outhernersrewincreasinglypprehensivehat hey adgiven p toomuchn agreeing o com-mercialegulationy simplemajority. hen henorthernalf fthe ompromisedidcomebeforeheConvention,harles inckney oved o strikeut he ectionallowing implemajorityecision n commercialuestions. earinghat he n-tireCommercend Slave TradeCompromiseparticularlyheright ocontinueimportations)ightomeunhinged,he lder inckneyrgued hat he"liberalconduct oward heviewsofSouthCarolina" shown ythenortherntates adconvinced im hat no fettershould e imposed n thepower f makingom-mercial egulations"Farrand, 911,vol.2, pp. 449-50).Despite he ssurances fferedyGeneral inckney,pinionnthe outherndelegationsan tronglyothe iew hatommercialegulationy implemajoritywas an invitationo southernestruction.asonargued trenuouslyhat theMajority illbegovernedytheirnterests.he Southerntates re theminorityin bothHouses. s ittobeexpectedhat heywilldeliver hemselvesoundhand& foot o theEastern tates?" Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 451). Randolphwasfinallyrivenodeclare hat therewerefeatureso odious n theConstitutionas itnow tands,hat e doubted hethereshould eable toagree o t" (ibid.,p. 452). Puttinghe nterestsfthe outherntates ncommercialegulationtthedisposal fthenortherntates wouldcompleathedeformityfthe ystem"(ibid.). Despite his eeply ooted outhernpposition,solidblocof ixnorthernstates, angingrom ewHampshireoDelaware,oined nly ySouthCarolina,defeated aryland, irginia, orth arolina, ndGeorgia nthe uestion.SouthCarolina's ervice othenortherntateswasquickly ewardedyanadditionalncrementfsecurityorherpropertyn slaves.TheConventionp-provedButler'sproposal that "any personbound to service . . [escaping] intoanother tate . . . shall be deliveredup to theperson ustlyclaimingtheir erviceor abor" Farrand, 911,vol.2, p. 454). But, he ostto argerouthernnter-ests, nwhich outhCarolina bviouslyhared,washigh. outhCarolina's lindpursuitfsecurityor erpropertyn slavesbroke he outh s aneffectiveorceintheConvention.With heperipheraloalition rokenythe hatteringf ts southern ingand he oalition fMiddleAtlantictates isruptedy renewedensionetweenits arge ndsmallmembers,he one ftheConvention'sinal ayswasunmis-takablyetbythedebates hat eganon30 August ver ontrolftheunsettledwesternands.Daniel Carroll fMaryland pened his onfrontationymovingto strike uta provisionequiringthe consent ftheState o [landsundertsjurisdiction]eingdivided" Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 461). Carroll rgued hatthiswas anabsolutelyundamentalointwith hose tates hat idnothold laims


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 453to vasttracts f thewesternerritoryJensen, 966, p. 150; Rakove,1979, p.352).Pennsylvania'samesWilsonopposedCarroll'smotion, rguing hat heknewnothinghatwouldgive greater r uster larm han hedoctrine, hatpolitical ocietys to be tome sunder ithouttsownconsent"Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 462). This argumenttruckhedelegates rom he maller tates s yetanother razen ejectionfprinciplen favor f nterest.utherMartin aid that"hewishedMr.Wilson ad houghtlittleooner f he alue fpolitical odies.In thebeginning, hen he ights fthe mall tateswere n question, heywerephantoms,dealbeings.Now when heGreat tateswere o be affected,oliticalSocietieswere fa sacred ature" ibid.,p. 464). When hevoteswere ounted,NewJersey,elaware, nd Marylandtood lone.Itwas eminentlylear o thedelegates romhe maller tates hat heCon-vention as once again lipping utof controlnd that angerousonsequencescouldresult. f the arger tates ffectivelyominated he executive electionprocess ndthevastresourcesepresentedythe unsettledands n theWest,theirtaturen thenew ystemouldonly e enhanced, hile hat f the mallerstateswould ust s certainlyecline.With hese oncernsoremostnthemindsof thedelegates romhe mallertates, committeefone memberromachstatewas appointedn 31Augustoresolvemattershat till emained ndecided.TheBrearleyommitteenpostponednd undecidedarts eportedrieflyn 1September,ut twas not until and5 Septemberhat tdeliveredhe maincomponentsf tscomplexnd controversialompromiseeporto thefullCon-vention.Table4 highlightsoththe mpact f the ssues thatbroke he dominantcoalitionsn ateAugustndthenature f thenew lignmentshatmergedromtheBrearley ommitteeo dominateheConvention'sinal ays.The arge tateswere ffectivelysolatedsee factor ofTable4), while hefive outherntates,theirnfluencen theConventionargely pent,were catteredarmlesslycrossall three actorsn Table4. The small tates, n theother and, mergedromtheBrearleyommitteeeterminedo defend reporthatwasdesignedoen-hancedramaticallyheir otentialor nfluencenthenewgovernmentWarren,1928,p. 664).Mostofthemembersfthenewmajorityfsmall nd northerntates adlongpreferredxecutive election y specially hosen lectors olegislativee-lection. heBrearleyommitteeeportnvisioned returno electoralelection,butperhapsmoremportantly,hefailure fanycandidate o receive majorityof the lectoral oteswould esultn thereferencefthefive eading andidatesto the enatewhere he mall tates ad anequalvotewith he arge tates) orfinal election.Madison,Morris,nd Masonfearedhat heSenatewouldulti-mately ecide nineteenimes ntwenty"Farrand, 911,vol. 2, p. 500). Fur-ther, reaties, s well as ambassadorial, upremeCourt,and othermajoradministrativeppointmentsereto be made by the Presidentnly "with theAdvice nd Consent f theSenate" (ibid., pp. 498-99). And finally,lthough


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454 CalvinC. Jillson nd Cecil L. EubanksTABLE4

A New Northern ajorityefends heRoleofthe mallStates-Three-Factorolution orRoll-CallVotes 41-569,4-17 September,Varimax otationOrtho)1 2 3

Northern LargeState SouthernMajority Minority Minority h2New Hampshire (.72) .44 .25 .77Massachusetts (.62) (.55) -.18 .73Connecticut (.78) .22 .03 .63New York absent absent absent absentNew Jersey (.81) .04 .18 .69Pennsylvania .16 (.80) .03 .66Delaware (.74) .04 .18 .59Maryland .45 .23 (.59) .61Virginia -.07 (.76) .38 .73North arolina .04 .05 (.81) .65SouthCarolina .38 (.55) .11 .45Georgia .45 .37 .45 .53Sumofsquares 3.29 2.26 1.51 7.06Percentagefvarianceexplained 29.90 20.50 13.90 64.30theHousewould hargehePresidentn mpeachableffenses,hefinal isposi-tion f hese harges ould ccur nthe enate.Theseprovisionsave he mallerstateswhatmany fthedelegates houghtouldbe fearfullyirect ontrol verthe ppointment,onductnoffice,ndremovalfthePresident. oth he argerstatesfactor ofTable ) andtheDeep South dispersedcross actors,2, and3 ofTable4) opposed hesedramaticnhancementsf senatorialuthority.et,as theConventionnteredtsfinal ays,neitherhe arge tates or he outhernstateswere n a positionooppose ffectivelyheBrearleyommitteeeportndthe eterminedhalanxf mallMiddleAtlanticndnortheasterntates hat toodbehindt.Thegreat ear f many elegateswasthathepowersdded o the enate oenhance heroleof the mall tatesnthenewgovernmentadsetthe tageforaristocracy.uchof5 September as taken p bythe xpressionf suchfearsandbythe earch orways o alleviate hemwithouteducinghe nfluencefthesmaller tates ver heprocess fexecutiveelection.Mason fearedhat, con-sideringhepowers f thePresident . . . theSenate, f a coalition hould eestablishedetween hese wobranches,heywill be able tosubvertheConsti-tutionFarrand, 911, vol. 2, p. 512). Randolph's omments dwelton the


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 455tendencyf such n influencen theSenate ver he lection fthePresidentnadditiono tsother owers,oconverthat ody nto real& dangerous ristoc-racy" ibid.,p. 513).

In light fthesefears, elt y small statemen as well as large, t is notsurprisinghat heresponsewas immediatendoverwhelminglyositivewhenConnecticut'soger herman,peakingorhe ominant ajorityf mallnorth-ern tates, roposedhat ecoursenthe venthat ocandidate ada majorityfthe lectoral otes or residenthould otbe to the enate, ut o"the HouseofRepresentatives. . eachStatehaving nevote" Farrand, 911,vol.2, p. 527).Masonquickly espondedhathe "liked the attermode best as lessening hearistocraticnfluencen the enate" ibid.). Nearlyveryonegreed, s thevoteon Sherman'smotion asapproveden oone,with elaware lone till damantabout etaininghis uthoritynthe enateibid.).This olutionllowed he mallstates oretainheir ominantositionnthe xecutive electionrocess,whilesimultaneouslylleviatinghefear hat heSenatehad cometo be a dangerouslypowerful ody.With his ast andmostdifficultuestion inally esolved, heConventionurriedowarddjournment.Conclusion

Webeganthis ssaywith n argumentbout henaturefpolitical eality,namely, hat t is characterizedythe nteractionf alternativeisions f thecommunity'seneralnterestr common oodwith hepartial nd exclusiveinterestsfthe ndividuals,roups, lasses, tates,ndregions hat omprisehecommunity.hroughouthis ssay,we have oughto show hat hedebates nddecisions ftheFederalConventionearthedistinctive arks f that rudgingaccommodationetween rinciplesnd interestshat s characteristicf demo-cratic olitics.General rinciples,uch s republicanism,ederalism,eparationfpowers,checks ndbalances, ndbicameralism,efinehe tructurefgovernmentnlyinvagueoutlines. herefore,iscussion fgeneral rincipleservesmerelyoidentifyhebroad aths longwhich hegeneralnterestsndthe ommon oodofthe ommunityan bepursued. theronsiderations,rimarilyerivingromdiverse olitical,conomic,ndgeographicnterests,uggestndoften irtuallydeterminehemodifications,djustments,ndallowances hat rincipledonsis-tencymustmake opolitical xpediency.amesMadisonmadepreciselyhis ointin a letterhat ccompanied copyof thenew Constitutionent oJeffersonnParis n late October 787. Madison xplainedhat thenature fthesubject,thediversityf human pinion, . . the collision f local interests,nd thepretensionsfthe arge& small tateswill . . account . . for he rregularitieswhichwillbediscoveredn the ewgovernment's]tructurendform"Farrand,1911,vol.3, p. 136). Similarly,lexander amiltonelt onstrainedo warn isreadersnthefirst umberfTheFederalisthat houghourchoice hould edirectedya judicious stimatefourtruenterests,nperplexedndunbiasedbyconsiderationsot onnected ith hepublicgood, . . theplan . . affects


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456 CalvinC. Jillsonnd CecilL. Eubankstoo many articularnterests,ot o nvolven tsdiscussion varietyf objectsforeigno tsmerits"Earle, 1937,p. 3).In our ttempto llustratendexplain he nteractionetween rinciplesndinterestsn theFederal onvention,e usedthree nterpretiveevices.The firstwas a theoreticalistinctionetween "higher" evelof constitutionalhoice,wherewe expectedndfoundhe nfluencef principleo guide ction, nd a"lower" levelofconstitutionalhoice,whereweexpectednd foundhe nflu-enceofpoliticalndeconomicnterestsobe decisive.The second evice, actoranalysis,was used toanalyze heroll-call oting ecord eft y theConvention.Throughhismeans,we identifiedhevotingoalitionshat ormedmong hestates t thevarious tages f theConvention'susiness. inally, eengagedna closeexaminationf theConvention'sebatesn order o link he ontendingvoting oalitionsothe onflictingatternsfpolitical rinciplet the higher"level ndto opposing atternsfpolitical, conomic,nd geographicntereststthe lower" level f constitutionalhoice.Weconclude hat heFederal onventionf1787,fromtsopening ayon25 Mayuntil tsfinal djournmentn 17September,onfrontedwodistinct,utintimatelyelated,spects f constitutionalesign.The first asgeneral.Whatkind frepublicanovernmenthould e constructed?sthe elegatesonsideredand discussed lternativeisions ftherelationshipetween uman ature,heinstitutionsfgovernment,nd he ualityfthe esultingocialorder,he emperand toneoftheir eliberationsas quietandphilosophical.ome measure fdetachmentaspossible t the"higher" evelof constitutionalhoicebecausethedebates vergeneral rinciplesrovidedittle ndicationfpreciselyowthechoice f one setof principlesver nother ould ffecthe pecificnterestsfparticularndividuals,tates, rregions.While hedelegatesonsidereduestionsfbasicconstitutionalesign, heyseemed lmost blivious o the onflictsf nteresthatnevitablyroseas theymoved o the"lower" level ofconstitutionalhoice,where heir heories ndprinciplesould eshaped ndmolded nto racticalrrangementsor overning.When istributionaluestionsame othe ore, ebatentensified,emperslared,and conflictredominated.uestionsouching ponthe llocation frepresen-tativesndpresidentiallectors,he tatus fslavery,ndregulationf thena-tion's ommercend ts westernandsdirectlyffectedhepolitical, conomic,and social nterestsf distinctlasses, tates,ndregions.ndeed, t wasonly tthis "lower" level of constitutionalonstruction,here nterestslashedsoloudly,hat heConventionasthreatenedith issolution.Manuscriptubmitted1 September983Finalmanuscripteceived January984

APPENDIXMethodological ote

Inthis tudy, eemployactornalysis rimarilyn tsrole s a "confirmatory"r"hypothesis-testing" evice.As Harman1976) explains, Confirmatoryactornalysismay eused to check r


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POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 457test . . a givenhypothesisbout he tructuref thedata" (p. 6). The introductiono thispaperoffers hypothesisesigned o explain he omplex nteractionshat haracterizedheFederal on-vention's usiness.Others aveofferedlternativexplanations.actor nalysiswill aid in showingwhich fthese xplanationsomports ost asilywith he mpiricalstructuref thedata."

This study mploys principalomponent -factornalysis hroughoutRummel, 970,pp.112-13).We group tatesvariablesn thematrixolumns) n thebasis oftheir esponses o the 69roll-call otes cases in thematrix ows) aken uring heConvention.he 12 states hat ttendedheConventionomprise hevariablesn this tudy. hey reNewHampshire, assachusetts,onnect-icut,New York,New Jersey,ennsylvania,elaware,Maryland, irginia,North arolina, outhCarolina, ndGeorgia.As indicatedbove,the cases are the569 roll-call otes aken uringheConventions recordedn Farrand's heRecords ftheFederal Conventionf1787 (1911). Voteswere odedfor nalysis s follows: -yes, 2-no, 3-absent, 4-divided. Each factornalysisnthis tudy egins rom correlation atrixNie, 1970). SincevotingntheConventionasbystatedelegation,atherhan y ndividualelegate, eletionf absences nddivided otes llows achcellofeachcorrelationatrixo define he egree fassociationetween wo tatesnyes ndnovoting.

REFERENCESAdair, ouglass. 1957. Thatpoliticsmay e reduced oa science:DavidHume,JamesMadison ndtheTenth ederalist. untingtonibrary uarterly,0 (August):343-60.Bailyn,Bernard, 969. The ideological rigins ftheAmerican evolution. ambridge: arvardUniversityress.Beard,CharlesA. 1913.AneconomicnterpretationftheConstitutionf theUnited tates.NewYork:Macmillan.Buchanan, amesM., and Gordon ullock.1962. The calculusofconsent: ogicalfoundationsfconstitutionalemocracy. nnArbor: niversityfMichigan ress.Dahl, Robert. 963. Modern olitical nalysis.New York: rentice-Hall.Diamond,Martin. 972. TheFederalist.n Leo Strauss ndJoseph ropsey,ds.,History f oliticalphilosophy,d ed. Chicago:RandMcNally: p. 631-51.. 1975.The Declarationnd heConstitution:iberty,emocracynd he ounders.hePublicInterest,1 (Fall):39-55.. 1976. The Americandea of man:Theviewfrom hefounding.n Irving ristol ndPaulWeaver,ds., TheAmericans: 976. Lexington, ass.: Lexington ooks:pp. 1-23.1981.The oundingf hedemocraticepublic.tasca, ll.: Peacock.Duverger, aurice.1966.The deaof olitics. ondon:Methuen.Earle,EdwardMead, ed. 1937.Federalist apers.NewYork:Modern ibrary.Farrand,Max. 1911. The records fthe Federal Conventionf1787. 4 vols. New Haven:YaleUniversityress.Harman, arry . 1976.Modernactor nalysis.Chicago:UniversityfChicagoPress.Jensen, errill. 964. The Articles f Confederation:n interpretationfthe ocial-consitutionalhistoryf heAmerican evolution774-1781.Madison:Universityf Wisconsin ress.. 1966.Themaking f heAmerican onstitution.ewYork:VanNostrandeinhold.Jillson, alvin.1979. Theexecutivenrepublican overnment:he case of theAmericanounding.PresidentialtudiesQuarterly,(Fall):386-402.. 1981. The representationuestion ntheFederalConventionf 1787: Madison'sVirginiaplan nd tsopponents.ongressionaltudies, (1):21-41.Kenyon, ecilia. 1955. Men of ittle aith: heAnti-Federalistsn thenature frepresentativeov-ernment. illiamndMaryQuarterly,2:3-43.Lippmann,Walter. 955.Thepublic hilosophy.ew York:Mentor.Nie, Norman,970. Statisticalrogramor he ocial sciences.New York:McGraw-Hill.Ostrom, incent. 979.Constitutionalevelofanalysis: roblemsnd prospects. onventionaperdeliveredt themeetingsftheWesternolitical cienceAssociationn Portland, re.,22-24March 979.


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458 CalvinC. Jillsonnd Cecil L. EubanksRakove, ackN. 1979 Thebeginningsfnational olitics:An nterpretiveistoryf heContinentalCongress.New York:Knopf.Roche,John 1961. Thefoundingathers: reformaucus naction.American olitical cienceReview, 5 (December);799-816.Rummel, udolph . 1970.Appliedfactornalysis.Evanston: orthwesternniversityress.Smith, avid G. 1965.The Conventionnd theConstitution.ewYork: t. Martin's.Smith, . Allen.1907. Thespirit fAmerican overnment.eprintd. Cambridge: elknap ress;1965.Smith, age. 1980. Theshaping fAmerica:Apeople'shistoryftheyoung epublic. ol. 3. NewYork:McGraw-Hill.Thach,Charles . 1923.Thecreationf he residency775-1789. Baltimore:ohns opkins ress.Warren, harles. 1928. Themaking fthe Constitution.eprint d. New York:Barnes& Noble,1967.Wood,Gordon. 969.Thecreation f heAmericanepublic 776-1787. New York:Norton.

jillson- the political structure of constitution making the federal convention of 1787

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