HE

RO

IN IN

SO

UT

HE

AS

T A

SIA

he functioned simultaneously as the T

hai consul, and the tour Sea Supply as w

ell as for insurance companies run by his form

ordinate C

.V. S

tarr.s Am

erican Bankers Insurance w

as itself unusual firm

; one of its directors, James L

. Kink, w

as also a d of the M

iami N

ational Bank through w

hich the Lansky syi

reportedly passed millions en route to G

eneva's Swiss E

xolLin

Investment B

ank. One of the S

wiss bank's directors, L

ou Polle

sat on the board of King's M

iami N

ational Bank."

Moreover, in the fifties and sixties, T

hai and Nationalist C

capital w

as invested in Florida's explosive development, m

uch ( w

ay of the General D

evelopment C

orporation controlled by ates of M

eyer Lansky." It's im

portant to note the dubious Ole

Southeast Asian pow

er groups with those concerned w

ith Flori C

uba. This early m

utuality of business interests is the key to E

follows, and M

iami is the nerve center to w

hich we w

ill conti

return. T

he alliance was com

prised of the China L

obby, OS

S

hands, Cuban exiles, the L

ansky syndicate, and CIA

hawks p

for all-out involvement in Indochina and against C

astro's Cuba.

lesced between 1961 and 1963, and its m

embers had three th

comm

on: a right wing political outlook, an interest in A

sian and a thirst for political m

ight. The last factor led to another cc

denominator in w

hich the alliance invested heavily: Riche

Nixon.

of

liance. Am

ong them

Som

e people effec the

e Ho' and H

un T

omm

y Corcora

behind United F

ruit's ed r

lent

Miam

i-based Double-C

hek Corp., a C

IA front that supplied pla

the Bay of P

igs invasion." Corcoran w

as the Washington es

General C

hennault's widow

Anna C

hen Chennault, erstw

hile I the C

hina Lobby, the key to S

outheast Asian opium

." A

nother key figure in the China L

obby was w

eapons dealer tier W

illiam P

awley, the A

merican cofounder of C

hennault's T

igers." Paw

ley's name w

as the password to intrigue: O

SS

T

omm

y Corcoran," C

IA cover firm

s," and arms shipm

ents t C

hinese on Taiw

an in defiance of a State D

epartment ref

authorization." All w

ere either directly or indirectly tonne

Pawley. H

e also rubbed elbows w

ith the U.S

. heroin Mafia v

1963, 116,,,, Santo 'IYaffican

tr7al . jd C

uban exiles took part it

the countless boat raja on 'CIT

I;a." T

he China L

obby's Southeast Asian connection naturally v

tl

130 T

HE

GR

EA

T H

ER

OIN

CO

UP

mind of the C

IA's P

hoenix assassination program, w

ere recalled to the U

.S. at the start of the seventies.

After M

ao T

se-tung's rise to

pow

er in C

hin

a, OS

S v

eterans

formed a num

ber of firms that w

ould be linked both to the CIA

and to its reactionary client regim

es Iii the Far E

ast. `VV

ith financial assis-tance from

his friends in Asia, O

SS China hand C

.V. Starr gained con-

tro of several U.S

. insurance companies. A

s brought to light during the M

cClellan hearings, Jim

my H

offa awarded one of them

, U.S. L

ife, a sm

aller company, U

nion Casualty—

whose agents P

aul and lien D

orfman w

ere among H

offa's links to the underworlds —

a T

eamsters U

nion contract despite a lower bid from

a larger, more

reputable insurance firm.4

was the pow

erful Washington-based T

omm

y orcoran's law

partner, William

Youngm

an, w

as a direc o

r o 1

. Life. C

orco

ran's o

ther clien

ts inclu

ded

the

United F

ruit Com

pany, Chiang-K

ai-shek's influential brother-in-law

T.V

. Soong, and the m

ysterious airline, Civil A

ir Transport (C

AT

), of w

hich 60 percent was ow

ned by the Taiw

an regime and 40 percent by

the CIA

.6 On behalf of U

nited Fruit, C

orcoran triggered a CIA

plot—in w

hich E. H

oward H

unt was the agency's chief political action

cer —to overthrow

Guatem

ala's President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.6

OS

S C

hina hand Willis B

ird settled in Bangkok, T

hailand to head ffice of S

ea Supply, Inc., a C

IA proprietary headquartered in

mini, w

hich furnished weapons to opium

-smuggling N

ationalist C

hinese (KM

T) troops in B

urma. O

ne William

Bird, representing C

AT

in B

angkok, coordinated CA

T airdrops to K

MT

troops and ran an engineering firm

that constructed short airstrips used for the collec- .,_

tion of L

aotian opium.?

Sea S

upply also provided arms and aid to P

hao Sriyanonda, the

head of Thailand's 45,000-m

an paramilitary police force and reputed-

a ly one of the most corrupt m

en in the history of that corruption-ridden ation. F

or years his troops protected KM

T opium

smugglers and

directed 1

, . a

When P

resident John F. K

ennedy in 1962 attempted a crackdow

n on the m

ost hawkish C

IA elem

ents in Indochina, he sought the pros-ecution of W

illis Bird, w

ho had been charged with the bribery of an aid

official in Vientiane. B

ut Bird never returned to the U

.S. to stand

Upon returning to M

iami, the O

SS

Chief of S

pecial Intelligence and head of D

etachment 202 in K

unming, C

olonel Paul Helliw

ell, was

a busy man. In M

iami offices of the A

merican B

ankers Insurance Co.

pro

per co

nduct w

as at long last b

eing b

ared, th

e Washington P

ost continued !:ting and deleting disclosures related to the assassinations.

CIA

document num

ber 1035-960 proposed a plan of action against the 'arren C

omm

ission critics. It reads,

Action. W

e do not recomm

end that discussion of the assassination question be initiated w

here it is not already taking place. Where

discussion is active however addressees are requested:

To discuss the publicity problem

with liaison and friendly elite

contacts (especially politicians and editors), pointing out that the War-

ren Com

mission m

ade as thorough an investigation as humanly possi-

ble, that the charges of the critics are without serious foundation, and

that further speculative discussion only plays into the hands of the opposition. P

oint out also that parts of the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by C

omm

unist propagandists. Urge them

to use their influence to discourage unfounded and irresponsible speculation.

To em

ploy propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of

the critics. Book review

s and feature articles are particularly approp-riate for this purpose. T

he unclassified attachments to this guidance

should provide useful background material for passage to assets. O

ur play should point out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) w

edded to theories adopted before the evidence w

as in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially interested.

The irrelevant and insulting questions that had follow

ed me for a decade had

en formulated and prom

ulgated at CIA

headquarters. T

he document suggests that "a useful strategy m

ay be to single out Epstein' s

:ory for attack." Edw

ard J. Epstein had w

ritten a book that tentatively raised ne questions about the W

arren Report. T

he CIA

document explained that

lark Lane's book" is "m

ore difficult to answer as a w

hole." The three-page

cument urged that "review

ers" of books critical of the Warren C

omm

ission night be encouraged to add to their account the idea that, checking back w

ith • R

eport itself, they found it far superior to the work of its critics." A

bsurd Ium

ents that have been put forth in the last decade in support of the Warren

port can be traced to the CIA

document.

The C

IA suggested that "in private or m

edia discussion" various arguments

hould be useful." Am

ong those the CIA

offered as most effective to destroy

impact of R

ush to Judgment and other books critical of the W

arren Report are

se:

a. "No significant new

evidence has emerged w

hich the comm

ission did not isid

er." b. "C

ritics usually overvalue particular items and ignore others."

c. "Conspiracy on the large scale often suggested w

ould be impossible to

Iceal in the United S

tates."

2

conspirator. He w

as a 'loner,' mixed-up, of questionable reliability and an

unknown quantity to any professional intelligence service."

Review

ers and apologists for the Warren C

omm

ission offering themselves

as freethinking iconoclasts have slavishly adopted the CIA

's proposals and developed new

spaper columns, m

ajor reviews and, on occasion, entire m

agazine articles around them

. This has been so even though a w

ealth of newly-discovered

significant evidence reveals that the Warren C

omm

ission did not secure the facts. T

he Select Com

mittee on Intelligence of the U

nited States Senate discovered that the C

IA itself had w

ithheld significant evidence from the W

arren Com

mission.

Conspiracies on a large scale, have of course, occured w

ithin the United S

tates. T

he Watergate episode and its cover-up involved a P

resident, an Attorney

General and m

any others. The evidence now

available discloses that Osw

ald w

orked for the FB

I and with the C

IA; perhaps that does call into question the

professionalism of those services as the C

IA docum

ent might suggest.

For those review

ers and publications not perceptive enough to understand the C

IA line, the agency w

as kind enough to furnish more assistance. R

egarding one long m

agazine article defending the Warren C

omm

ission and attacking the critics the C

IA boasted: "T

his was pulled together by [nam

e deleted] in close conjunction w

ith [name deleted]. W

e furnished most of the source m

aterial, proposed m

any of the themes and provided general 'E

xpertise' on the case." In addition the C

IA prepared a book review

of Rush to Judgm

ent on August

2, 1966, before the book was published. It began, "I review

ed the attached proof copy of the above book per your request." T

he name of the C

IA official w

ho requested the review

was deleted . A

nother mem

orandum dated A

ugust 25, 1966, addressed to the "D

irector of Central Intelligence" carried this heading, "S

ub-ject: N

ew B

ook: Rush to Judgm

ent by Mark L

ane." That seven page review

was

dispatched by the CIA

to eleven different CIA

departments including its P

lans • D

epartment, know

n as the "Departm

ent of Dirty T

ricks" within the agency.

""-----g

noth

er C

IA re

po a

te a

nus ,

, s reportedly earned from

the book. Although W

illiam M

anchester had earned m

ore than ten times the am

ount I did for his defense of the Warren R

eport, the C

IA, taking note of his incom

e, indicated that he should be exempt from

criticism

and said that he should not "be classed with critics of the C

omm

is-sion." A

CIA

letter dated October 1, 1964, w

as sent to J. Lee R

ankin, then the G

eneral Counsel of the W

arren Com

mission. It too dealt w

ith a critic, Joachim

Joesten. A copy of the letter w

as sent by the CIA

to the FBI, D

epartment of State,

and the Imm

igration and Naturalization S

ervice. Attached to the letter w

as a docum

ent dated, "Berlin, 8 N

ovember, 1937." T

he letterhead read "Secret

State P

olice (Gestapo), G

estapo Headquarters." It w

as addressed to "The C

hief of the S

S and of the G

erman P

olice in the Ministry of Interior." T

he document

said that Joesten "has seriously transgressed against his duty to remain faithful to

his [the Germ

an] people and State by his anti-G

erman conduct in foreign

countries." It seems that Joesten had fled froH

itler's Germ

any to warn the

c

rn

x

lisbed

ill separate volu

mes th

at rup

plem

eo this rep

ort, as are reports by the C

omm

ittee staff and our scientific panels. In

all, the com

mittee's p

ub

lished

materials, in

add

ition to

this rep

ort, fill 27 volum

es.

THE R

EPOR

T

The com

mittee's last official act, in D

ecember 1978, w

as to approve its findings and recom

mendatir

wh

ich w

ere p

ub

lished

in Jan

uary 1979. T

his rep

ort is a comm

entary

on those findings and recomm

endations; it summ

arized the ev

iden

ce on

wh

ich th

ey w

ere based

an

d p

resents th

e com

mittee's an

alysis of that evid

ence._

Th

e final fin

e In b

oth assassin

ations is con

spiracy. It is

ironic in

light of th

e susp

icions th

at cause,: th

e comm

ittee to b

e created th

at, we d

id n

ot find

governm

ent agen

cy com

plicity, n

ot even a coveru

p b

y the favorite targets of

the critics, th

e CIA

and

FB

I. Wh

at we d

id fin

d w

as not so

mu

ch "

coverup

" as a "

failure to u

ncover"

by th

ose agen-

cies and

others in

governm

ent th

at consp

iracies were re-

spon

sible for th

e death

s of Presid

ent K

enn

edy an

d D

r. K

ing. T

o pu

t it blu

ntly, th

e official find

ings on

the con

-spiracy question in both cases w

ere wrong.

In stating its conclusions about the assassinations in this rep

ort, th

e com

mittee, fo

r go

od

reaso

n, sp

eak

s with

m

uted

tongu

e. As I h

ave n,ted, w

e were deeply concerned

abou

t the in

heren

t risk of a legislative investigation into

criminal cooluct. W

e decided, therefore, that our language ought to be m

oderate and that we ought not state a finding

beyond what is absolutely indicated by the evidence.

Th

e comm

ittee realized fu

rther th

at ultim

ately ind

i-vid

ual resp

onsib

ility in th

e consp

iracies had

to be d

eter-m

ined, under our system of governm

ent, in a court of law.

When it becam

e apparent that follow-up investigation w

as n

ecessary, we b

ecame m

ore aware th

an ever th

at we m

ust

mak

e our fin

din

gs with

mod

eration an

d lim

it them

to the

crucial facts in

each case. It w

as a soberin

g experien

ce for m

e to discover failu

res by ou

r governm

ent to th

e degree

that w

e set out in

this rep

ort. Th

e failures w

ere so sober-

ing th

at some m

emb

ers of the com

mittee w

ere not w

illing

to carry the con

clusion

s out to th

e full force of th

e evi-d

ence. R

ealizing th

at there w

ould

be an

opp

ortun

ity for others to fill in the details—

that there might be indictm

ents an

d trials as a resu

lt of futu

re investigation

--we d

ecided

to p

resent an

un

derstated

case. We ch

ose a cautiou

s ap-proach.

Yes, there are still unansw

ered questions. It would have

been

neat an

d tid

y if we sim

ply cou

ld h

ave pu

t our stam

p

of approval on the 'official findings of 1964 and 1968. But

they tu

rn ou

t to be in

adeq

uate an

d w

rong, an

d w

e were

left to ask, but not able to answer w

ith assurance, questions like these:

Wh

y did

Yu

ri Nosen

ko, th

e KG

B d

efector, lie about his know

ledge of Osw

ald? W

as Fid

el Castro told

in 1963 th

at Osw

ald h

ad

threaten

ed th

e presid

ent w

hen

he visited

the C

ub

an

consulate in September 1963?

Did

anti-C

astro Cu

ban

exiles pu

t Osw

ald u

p to

killing, the president? W

as the K

enn

edy assassin

ation a sop

histicated

or-ganized crim

e "hit"? W

as "Raoul" in reality a brother of Jam

es Earl R

ay? D

id th

e St. L

ouis con

tract sup

ply th

e motive for

Dr. K

ing's murder? FU

TUR

E AC

TION

Dow

n P

enn

sylvania A

venu

e, not far fiu

m th

e Cap

itol, therm

is a depa:tment of governm

ent, called in Washington

simply, "Justice." T

he Attorney G

eneral and his deputies m

ay feel there are matters of greater urgency than know

ing th

e truth

abou

t the d

eaths of P

residen

t Ken

ned

y and

Dr.

Kin

g, that th

eir limited

time an

d resou

rces migh

t well b

e N

etter spent on "cut rent cases," or that if these two cases

were actively reop

ened

, the d

epartm

ent m

ight fail in

its efforts to solve th

em. If th

ey do, th

ey are overlookin

g som

ething that has always seem

ed clear to me. T

he Am

eri-can

peop

le are willin

g to accept failu

re wh

en th

ere has

been

an h

onest effort to su

cceed. W

hat th

ey will n

ot ac-ct. pt from

our government—

or anyone else—is a refusal

to make that

comm

ittee, I believe, h

as • •

B

y that I

meat, it has fully answ

ered the questions posed in its man-

date for its legislative p

urp

oses. It has assessed

the p

er-form

ance of govern

men

t agencies an

d fou

nd

it to have

been flawed. It has m

ade recomm

endations for administra-

tive and legislative reform.

/a for issue on

e, the com

mittee w

as satisfied w

ith th

e id

entification

of the k

illers of Presid

ent K

enn

edy an

d D

r. K

ing. B

ut, on

the issu

e of consp

iracy, we h

ave, I believe,

drsedcally altered the verdict of history. F

or reasons I h

ave listed, w

e stopp

ed sh

ort of that

iimactic p

oint in

mystery n

ovels wh

en th

e mu

rderer is

;man did. W

einer gave Spilotro $33,000 of the com

--$16,000 of it in cash in a briefcase that L

aurie was

liver—to open his gift shop at C

ircus Circus and get

fegas. A

nd h

e gav

e a friend o

f Spilo

tro's an

oth

er le day the friend w

as released from prison. W

einer veral thousands of dollars in cash paym

ents to Spi-

Angeles. D

e Angeles w

as the man W

einer picked to /-\ lur factory. H

e was m

ore than a plant foreman. H

e now

n as the mob's electronics w

izard. In 1970 the w

as operating on Lake M

ichigan just off the Chicago

d by Chicago police, w

ho found it full of sensitive eq

uip

men

t. When

they

decid

ed th

at they

could

n't

believed—that D

e Angeles w

as intercepting radio :ted w

ith the police surveillance of organized-crime

ye him a sum

mons for w

ater pollution. id also been suspected of m

asterminding the killi

'ormer w

ith a radio bomb a few

years before. ' file reported that for m

oving to New

Mexico to set

Angeles had been given—

all by the Gaylur C

om-

home, a $35,000 private plane, $1,700 in "personal

$500-a-week salary. In addition, D

e Angeles w

as n conduit for funneling the big m

oney from the pen-

organized-crime bosses back in C

hicago. Com

pany that he had received a $150,000 contract for "ser-rm

ed." De A

ngeles reportedly also used company

1,000 worth of w

iretapping equipment (w

hich was

) tap the phones of Weiner's children, w

hom W

einer :otics involvem

ent.) He used another $7,000 to pay

)r himself and m

obster Sam

Battaglia and to com

-1 a new

car for Battaglia's son.

e Clo

wn" L

om

ba

rdo: L

ombardo, an alleged loan-

drew $19,000 from

Gaylur. H

e was involved in a

ny in

Ch

icago

that h

elped

laun

der m

oney

for th

e r that com

pany, Daniel S

eifert, would later agree to

ution witness against L

ombardo and the other al-

;ion fund fraud conspirators.

74 the operatives of IRS

, FB

I, Postal S

ervice and nt w

ere sure th

ey h

ad p

ut to

geth

er a solid

case.

They staged a long series of grand jury hearings—

including one in w

hich a tongue-tied Fitzsim

mons testified that he knew

very little about w

hat went on at the pension fund even though he w

as a trustee. , on F

ebruary 19, they got the grand jury to indict Alderisio,

orfman, S

pilotro, De A

ngeles, and Lom

bardo on twelve

nts of embezzlem

ent and mail fraud for m

ilking the pension fund of the $1,400,000 in loans that had gone to the now

-bankrupt Gaylur

Products C

ompany. A

lso indicted were tw

o Fund trustees w

ho, the g

ov

ernm

ent ch

arged

, had

mad

e trips to

the G

aylu

r plan

t and

had

know

n about the fraudulent nature of the loans. O

n the day of the indictment, the prosecution team

got a good taste of w

hat they were up against. N

ormally defendants on the day they

are indicted are arrested or at least ordered to appear in court to be booked and post bail. B

ut that was the day on w

hich federal agents w

atched Dorfm

an play golf all day at La C

osta with F

itzsimm

ons and 1 1

,i

obster Lou R

osanova. While the other defendants flelv.,it)

m 'V

IM.

to plead innocent and post bail, Dorfth ffti

A'

a former assistant attorney general in the N

ixon m

ade the arrangement for D

orfman to appear tw

o

t4 weeks later. T

he press reported that Leonard asked the U

.S. A

ttor-t ick C

hicago for the delay as "a courtesy" to himself, because he

Ylrvolved in another case. H

owever, D

orfman told m

e in a 1977 Interview

that he had asked Leonard to get the delay explaining, "I

wanted to stay out on the coast because I w

as working on a prison

eform program

with Jim

my H

offa." T

he p

rosecu

tion

's top

witn

esses in th

e case were tw

o in

siders-

turned-informants, H

arold Laurie and D

aniel Seifert (w

ho had been involved in the C

hicago fiber-glass business with L

ombardo.) B

y the tim

e the trial began nearly a year later only one witness w

as available. O

n S

eptem

ber 2

7, 1

974, at ab

out 8

A.M

., D

aniel Seifert, age

twenty-nine, arrived at the sm

all plastic-products company just out-

side of Chicago that he had taken over a few

weeks before. H

is wife

and his two-year-old son w

ere with him

. As they entered the office

the Seiferts w

ere confronted by two ski-m

asked gunmen. A

s his wife

and son watched, the m

en pistol-whipped S

eifert. Then one fired a

shotgun at his head. Som

ehow, it only grazed his cheek. S

eifert ran out the door and over into a sm

all, nearby factory, shouting for some-

one to

call the p

olice. T

he g

unm

en fo

llow

ed h

im. O

ne p

oin

ted a

shotgun at Seifert from

about ten feet across the factory floor. Ac-

cord

ing to

the au

topsy

, the b

last ripped

away

the b

ack o

f Seifert's

i\I \ 0

-/ 11 r)

Coast, that M

alcolm—

aided and abetted by Nasser and N

krumai

—m

ight try

to in

cite African

studen

ts to o

verth

row

moderate

pro

-Western

govern

men

ts like th

eir ow

n. T

hey

natu

rally p

re ferred

that h

e not b

e allow

ed in

Paris, w

here th

ere was a larg

e A

frican student colony and a small but active O

AA

U 'chapter

two dozen or so A

fro-Am

erican and Latin-A

merican blacks. M

al colm

had been scissored once again in the power politics of A

frica an

d its co

ntin

uin

g liaiso

n w

ith th

e white W

est, the m

ediu

m o

ex

chan

ge b

eing fran

cs this tim

e instead

of d

ollars. T

he tact th

4

forb

ade an

yo

ne's say

ing

so at th

e time h

as no

urish

ed th

e con

spiracy theory of M

alcolm's assassination ever since, and conspira

cies, in the popular culture of the Left, are the m

onopoly propert ; of A

merica and the C

IA.

Malco

lm w

ent b

ack to

Englan

d, fo

r a speech

at the L

ondor

School of E

conomics and a controversial side trip to S

methw

icl, a w

orking-class satellite of Birm

ingham then m

uch troubled by sw

elling nonwhite im

migrant population. A

camera crew

from th-

BB

C

Tonight sh

ow

had

got h

im th

ere, hopin

g fo

r an o

n-scen

t debate w

ith Sm

ethwick's T

ory MP

, Peter.G

riffiths. When G

riffith: did

n't sh

ow

up, th

e BB

C p

eople w

ere uncertain

what to

do w

ill except w

alk him around tow

n, pose him in front of a "foi

sale" sign an

d in

terview

him

on th

e tow

n h

all steps, w

here h

E

liken

ed th

e treatmen

t of b

lack p

eople lo

cally to

that o

f the Jew

s in

Nazi G

erman

y. "I w

ould

not w

ait," he said

, "for th

e fascist elem

ent in

Sm

ethw

ick to

erect gas o

ven

s." The v

isit created

great furor, the mayor calling it "deplorable," the papers view

inE

it with

alarm, G

riffiths p

roposin

g th

at Malco

lm b

e barred

from

E

ngland forever and the BB

C nervously shelving its film

unshown.

It was th

e kin

d o

f contro

versy

Malco

lm lo

ved

; seeing th

e pic-

tures o

f him

walk

ing d

ow

n M

arshall S

treet in S

meth

wick

in h

is to

pco

at, astrakhan

and a y

ard-w

ide g

rin, o

ne g

uesses th

at he en

- joyed him

self—quite possibly for the last tim

e in his life. He ran

out his stay abroad for a week and liked it all; liked being a states-

man and a celebrity and an object of high debate in the press and

in Com

mons; liked feeling safe, as it w

as no longer possible for him

eel atAom

e. While h

e was aw

ay, h

e wro

te a pain

ful letter to

254

TH

E D

EA

TH

AN

D L

IFE

OF

MA

LC

OL

M X

255

Com

ing Apar

penny." The security m

an wouldn't take it. M

alcolm flung it to the

floor. M

om

ents later, h

e was b

undled

into

a car, sped

across th

e ap

ron

to a L

on

do

n-b

ou

nd

Air F

rance C

aravelle an

d o

fficially d

e-ported

as a threat to

the p

eace of P

aris. The rally

at the M

utu

alite w

ent o

n w

ithout h

im, th

e speak

ers den

ouncin

g n

ot o

nly

the in

-volv

emen

t of w

hite m

ercenaries in

the C

ongo an

d th

e U.S

. inter-

ven

tion in

Vietn

am, w

hich

had

been

the m

ain ag

enda item

s for

the evening, but the detention and forced departure of their guest star.

The F

rench

had

their reaso

ns, th

ough n

ot th

e ones th

ey an

-nounced publicly—

or the more sinister ones M

alcolm and his fol-

low

ers susp

ected. T

he o

fficial govern

men

t explan

ation w

as that

Malco

lm's sp

eech co

uld

hav

e "pro

voked

dem

onstratio

ns th

at w

ould

trouble th

e public o

rder." T

his access o

f cautio

n w

as not

very convincing, given that Malcolm

had spoken in the same hall

with

out in

ciden

t a scant th

ree month

s befo

re, and th

e lack o

f official candor gave rise to the w

idespread and enduring suspicion th

at the U

nited

States g

overn

men

t was in

volv

ed—

perh

aps crim

i-nally

so. M

alcolm

him

self blam

ed th

e State D

epartm

ent, th

ough

it surely occurred to him that S

tate would have intervened to keep

him out of E

ngland as well if silencing him

abroad were A

merican

policy

. Sin

ce his d

eath, a co

nsid

erable fo

lklo

re has g

row

n u

p

around a far u

glier ru

mor—

that F

rench

intellig

ence h

ad learn

ed

that th

e CIA

plan

ned

his m

urd

er and th

at Fran

ce did

n't w

ant h

is 1pe

blood spilled on its soil. There is even a published quotation to this

effect from

an u

nnam

ed N

orth

African

dip

lom

at, declaring—"in

"UV

---. elegan

tly m

odulated

Fren

ch"—

that h

is countr

erted b

y P

aris in case M

alcolm

flew in

from

they

- m

ore e v

ersio

n w

as a

e re

nc a

c e

. on

the re

pre

sen

tatio

n

wo o

f their lately

liberated

colo

nies, S

eneg

al and th

e Ivory

1 -1 so

-c—

'The quotation appeared in a7piece on the assassination by E

ric Norden in the

F bruary 1967 issue of T

he Realist, an early underground journal that styled itself

0(:)----P

-0(

'the m

agazin

e of wrongeous indignation." T

he quotation is impossible to evaluate;

C

the piece as a whole is crow

ded with error, supposition, hearsay and casual report.

ing and is informed by a double-o-seven view

of the role and power of intell'gence

a enc -s in the real world.

1

)\) L

L—

LI4

dr

CO

TH

E E

ND

S O

F P

OW

ER

I do

n't w

ant e

xcuse

s. I want re

sults. I w

ant it d

one;

whatev

er the co

st." C

olso

n w

as off an

d ru

nnin

g. S

hortly

thereafter h

e wro

te me

a mem

o fo

r the atten

tion o

f the P

residen

t. He said

that th

e

pro

secutio

n o

f Ellsb

erg w

ould

presen

t a great o

pportu

nity

.

He is a n

atural v

illain to

the ex

tent th

at he can

be

pain

ted ev

il. . . . We can

discred

it the p

eace move-

inen

t and h

ave th

e Dem

ocrats o

n a m

arvelo

us h

ook

becau

se thus far m

ost o

f them

hav

e defen

ded

the re-

lease of th

e docu

men

ts. . . . I hav

e not y

et thought

thro

ugh all th

e subtle w

ays in

which

we can

keep

the

Dem

ocratic P

arty in

a constan

t state of civ

il warfare,

but I am

convin

ced th

at with

som

e imag

inativ

e and

creative th

ought it can

be d

one.

Expan

din

g h

is thesis in

a telephone call to

a friend, C

olso

n

said

, "We m

ight b

e a

ble

to p

ut th

is basta

rd in

to a

hell o

f a

positio

n an

d d

iscredit th

e New

Left."

Colso

n w

asn

't conte

nt w

ith th

e W

hite

House

am

ate

urs

like K

rogh a

nd Y

oung. H

e fo

und a

n e

x-C

IA a

gent n

am

ed

How

ard H

unt to

assist them

. He called

Hunt.

CO

LS

ON

: L

et me ask

you, H

ow

ard, th

is questio

n: D

o

yo

u th

ink

with

the rig

ht reso

urces em

plo

yed

,

that th

is thin

g c

ould

be tu

rned in

to a

majo

r

public case ag

ainst E

llsberg

and co

-consp

irators?

HU

NT

: Yes, I d

o, b

ut y

ou'v

e establish

ed a q

ualifica-

tion h

ere

that I d

on't k

now

wheth

er it c

an b

e

met.

CO

LS

ON

: W

hat's th

at? H

UN

T:

Well, w

ith th

e pro

per reso

urces.

CO

LS

ON

: W

ell, I thin

k th

e resources are th

ere.

HU

NT

: W

ell, I would

say so

abso

lutely

.

CO

LS

ON

: T

hen

your an

swer w

ould

be w

e should

go

dow

n th

e line to

nail th

e guy co

ld?

HU

NT

: G

o d

ow

n th

e line to

nail th

e guy co

ld, y

es.

Colso

n tap

ed th

is call and sen

t a transcrip

t to E

hrlich

man

along w

ith a n

ote: "T

he m

ore I th

ink ab

out H

ow

ard H

unt's

1 1

6

The W

ar—an

d th

e

back

gro

und, p

olitics, d

ispositio

n, an

thin

k it w

ould

be w

orth

your tim

e tc

So H

unt cam

e aboard

and w

as a

And it seem

ed H

unt h

ad a frien

d,

was h

ead o

f a public relatio

ns ag

ency

Com

pan

y. C

olso

n d

idn't k

now

that

agen

cy, an

d th

at Ben

nett reg

ularly

officer. F

rom

the tim

e of th

e Pen

tago

gate b

reak-in

this o

dd trio

, Hunt,

third

s CIA

contro

lled, w

ould

embarl

pro

jects which

would

com

e to b

e ca

Nix

on w

orried

what m

ight b

e revea

receive h

is black

mail m

oney

. And to

actions o

f this trio

, one m

ore in

grec

The R

obert R

. Mullen

Com

pan

y

IN

but h

ad a

s its prin

cip

al c

lient, N

i)

Hughes. T

he C

IA co

nnectio

n w

as to

years later. D

urin

g H

unt's b

rief career with

with

Gord

on L

iddy, w

ho h

ad b

een

by B

ud K

rogh. S

upposed

ly th

ey w

ere

tion o

f Kro

gh an

d Y

oung, w

ho in

man

's directio

n. B

ut in

the E

lisber

receivin

g o

rders an

d fin

ancial su

p

som

ewhere alo

ng th

e way

, they

we

from

Bob B

ennett, o

utsid

e of th

e

the C

IA an

d th

e CIA

's silent p

artne

Neith

er Nix

on

, Eh

rlichm

an, n

or

ricular affair w

ith an

outsid

er nam

ed

Bennett w

as being used by us as a so .

O'B

rien's p

ast relationsh

ip w

ith 1

that a C

IA em

plo

yee w

as, in effect,

team.

The P

lum

bers' u

nit w

as disb

andec

break

-in in

the fall o

f 1971. H

unt

man

for C

olso

n as a W

hite H

ouse o

time w

ent o

nto

the p

ayro

ll at the

wen

t to C

RP

as legal co

unsel, w

itl

117

tentativ

e film, a 'ru

n th

rou

gh

' of id

eas, charac-

ters a

nd sty

les w

hic

h G

odard

is testin

g in

actio

n, fittin

g to

geth

er in a slig

htly

mak

eshift

: his o

wn b

rief appearan

ce to g

uid

e the

aom

n can

he seen

, in retro

spect, as a so

rt of

crypto

gram

adm

itting th

is. Clearly

Godard

learnt a lo

t simp

ly fro

m th

e act of m

akin

g th

is film

, wh

ose relatio

n to

his later w

ork

is hin

ted

at by th

e open

ing w

ord

s of B

runo's n

arration

in Le P

etit Soldat 'T

he tim

e for actio

n is p

ast. I h

ave g

row

n o

lder. T

he tim

e for reflectio

n h

as _

com

e.' - —

7

Still: P

atricia

betra

ys Mich

el to th

e police.

wo

not is t L

e T

h

ant G

o

pal in

t So

Early

on

she ask

s Mich

el, wh

en h

e men

tion

s h

oro

scop

es, 'Q

u'est-ce q

ue c'est l'h

uro

vcop

e H

er Fren

ch isn

't too g

ood, b

ut th

is is hard

ly a

difficu

lt wo

rd . . . th

e exch

ang

e is schem

atised

to se

t Patric

ia's b

lankness a

gain

st Mic

hel's

concern

with

the fu

ture, w

hich

lie goes o

n to

ex

plain

. Her failu

re of v

erbal u

nd

erstand

ing

stan

ds fo

r a failure o

f moral u

nderstan

din

g.

Her v

ision d

oesn

't exten

d b

eyond th

e presen

t (she can't respond to his im

pulse to go to Rom

e). L

ikew

ise her fin

al questio

n, •Q

iie3t-ce (pie c'est degueulasse ?', fo

llow

ed b

y h

er abru

pt tu

rnin

g-

aw

ay, im

plie

s the la

ck o

f a w

hole

mora

l dim

ensio

n: h

er betray

al 'mean

s' noth

ing to

her.

The ch

allenge to

her o

f Mich

el's perso

nality

resem

bles th

e data w

ith w

hich

Lem

my co

n-

fronts A

lpha-6

o; sh

e trie

s to c

ope b

y u

sing

logic, an

d th

e results are d

isastrous.

In th

is sense

Mic

hel sta

nds fo

r love a

nd

visio

n (it is clear w

here G

od

ard's o

wn

sym

-path

ies lie) but h

e does so

only

in a p

athetically

ten

uo

us an

d co

mp

rom

ised w

ay. T

his in

itself doesn

't make th

e film

incohere

nt—

it is the

patte

rn o

f man

y g

an

gste

r films—

bu

t • it is notab

le that G

odard

doesn

't use th

is pattern

ag

ain: h

is films sin

ce A

Bout d

e Souffle have

sho

wn in

tellig

en

t men re

actin

g v

iole

ntly

ag

ain

st their e

nv

iron

men

t to se

ek

lov

e a

nd

fre

edom

(Bru

no, L

ern

my, F

erd

inand a

nd

Pierro

t), or, so

metim

es, bru

tish h

eroes (th

ose

of

Les C

ara

bin

iers, Arth

ur in

B

ands a

Part)

whose

conditio

nin

g b

y so

cie

ty is a

cute

ly

analy

sed. M

ichel w

as an aw

kw

ard m

ixtu

re. A

hero

com

ing fro

m n

ow

here

; a p

atte

rn o

f q

uestio

nin

g, fro

m th

e PO

UR

QU

OT

spelt o

ut

in cig

arette pack

ets on

a bed

roo

m w

all, thro

ug

h

all Patricia's q

uestio

ns to

the fin

al line; a d

ead-

end. It is th

e only

Godard

film w

hich

seems at

all vuln

erable to

the ch

arge th

at his deep co

n-

cern ab

ou

t civilisatio

n is so

meth

ing

read in

to

his film

s by

ad

mire

rs wh

o, in

Ray

mo

nd

D

urg

nat's w

ord

s, `impreg

nate h

is blan

dness

with

their p

ain'. T

he fin

al imp .scio

n is o

f •

LE PETIT SOLDAT

Richai

Bru

no F

orestier (M

ichel S

ubor) is a

deserter

share a C

OM

M

from the F

rench Arm

y who w

orks to Switzerland

share. U

n m

en

for a right-wing terrorist organisation (in effect,

'a Pek

in tram

- th

e O.A

.S.). H

e is ord

ered to

kill Palivo

da, a

th

e p

assin

g

broadcaster with A

rab sympathies. B

runo meets,

Thirties, b

ut r

ph

oto

gra

ph

s an

d fa

lls in lo

ve with

Vero

nica

(F

or h

im

Mal

Dreyer (A

nn

a K

arin

a), n

ot kn

ow

ing

tha

t she

equally

noble.:

works fo

r the o

ther sid

e, i.e. the F

.L.N

. After

of freed

om

': f his first, relu

ctant a

nd a

bortive a

ttempts to

kill freed

om

`to c

Pa

livod

a, h

e is cap

tured

an

d to

rtured

by th

e your o

wn v

oit

Arabs. T

o earn freedom for him

self and Veronica

Th

is is Bru

no

' in

So

uth

Am

eric

a h

e k

ills Pa

livo

da

, on

ly to

betray

him

. fin

d th

at h

is side h

as ca

ptu

red V

eron

ica a

nd

B

runo ro

ot:

tortured her to death. e, 'h

ard

m

irrors a d

th

run

o F

orestier is `u

n m

erdeu

r', a man

wh

o

imag

e caught

refuses to

do w

hat is ex

pected

of h

im p

recisely

sum

mer d

ay

because it is expected of him. H

e is a mystery to

ph

oto

grap

h a

bo

th sid

es: susp

ected b

y th

e O.A

.S. o

f bein

g a

the so

ul h

eh

d

ou

ble ag

ent, h

e baffles th

e F.L

.N. b

y refu

sing

P

ho

tog

raph

im

to speak under torture. A m

an without loyalties,

her im

age. F

t w

ithout ideals, he is loyal to an ideal of himself.

wears h

er hail

'Wh

at matters is n

ot h

ow

oth

ers see yo

u b

ut

truth

. Jud

gin

g

ho

w y

ou

see yo

urself', h

e tells Vero

nica an

d

Bu

t imag

es an

adds, sig

nifican

tly, th

at the w

ord

s are his o

wn.

betra

yed n

o :

He is a

dese

rter, a

n e

xile

, a fu

gitiv

e fro

m

Pierrot le F

ou politics, th

e Nap

oleo

nic `trag

edy

of o

ur tim

e'. d

e So

uffle. T

ri H

e p

oin

ts out to

Jacques th

e h

ouse

where

lies can

con

ve

Mm

e d

e S

tael, th

e m

ost re

no

wn

ed

of

to th

e O

.A.S

N

apoleo

nic ex

iles, lived

with

Ben

jamin

Con-

Bru

no's v

oice

stant: a m

om

ent later P

aul in

terrupts th

at they

h

er lov

e to E

are arriv

ing

at the rad

io statio

n an

d B

run

o is

teleph

on

e. TI

about to

th

e m

an h

e h

as 1

10r&

redw

r

V1

ilaica ide

by

'the sh

ape

Bru

no d

oes n

ot k

now

`where

to g

ive h

is F

or B

runo

heart'. F

or h

im C

om

munism

and C

atholicism

reality

mu

st

106-• t 'fur& eZ

se lean Seberg's hod) vk as found

Park last year. fresh questions been raised about the tragic facts

f the 'actress's death — and life.

900

RO

BE

RT

KE

NN

ED

Y A

ND

His T

IME

S

xt

The K

enned

y cam

paig

n, C

harles Q

uin

n said

later, becam

e a "huge,

joyous ad

ven

ture."1

7 E

ven

reporters fo

und th

emselv

es caught u

p

in th

e e

nte

rprise

again

st all th

e ru

les o

f pro

fessio

nalism

. "Quite

frankly

," said T

om

Wick

er, head

of th

e New

York 7im

es Washington

bureau

, "Bobby K

enned

y w

as an easy m

an to

fall in lo

ve w

ith," an

d

he w

arned

his o

wn p

eople ag

ainst it."' Ju

les Witco

ver, w

ho later

wro

te an ex

cellent b

ook ab

out th

e campaig

n, sp

oke o

f Ken

ned

y's

"way o

f pullin

g in

div

iduals a

round h

im in

to h

is orb

it, a stra

nge

disarm

ing q

uality

about h

im th

at som

ehow

evoked

sym

path

y." "

9 By

the tim

e of O

regon, as R

ichard

Harw

ood, in

itially th

e most h

ostile o

f

all, said later, "W

e were g

etting p

artisan. W

e had

n't q

uite b

ecom

e

cheerlead

ers but w

e were in

dan

ger o

f it."' One rep

orter ask

ed to

be tak

en o

ff the cam

paig

n after C

aliforn

ia becau

se he felt h

e could

no lo

nger b

e objectiv

e.'"

Undern

eath th

e fun lay

foreb

odin

g. A

shad

ow

had

fallen acro

ss

the h

appy d

ay o

f the W

abash

Can

nonball w

hen

the train

stopped

at

Logan

sport, an

d so

meo

ne saw

on to

p o

f a build

ing, etch

ed ag

ainst

the sk

y, a m

an w

ith a g

un. H

e turn

ed o

ut to

be a p

olicem

an, b

ut

Thom

as Congdon lo

ng rem

embered

the "ag

onized

" look o

n th

e face

of Jerry

Bru

no, th

e advan

ce man

.'2' One e

venin

g a

gro

up o

f re-'•

porters sat aro

und o

ver d

rinks. S

om

eone ask

ed w

heth

er Ken

n

had

the stu

fLugo all th

e way

.

cours

. to stu

ff. till

the w

ay,,, rep

lied Jo

hn J. L

indsay

of N

ewsw

eek, "but h

e's nor h

ere to

o a

ll t wa

Som

ebod is to

s oot

re was

„...L

itunnesfak

-ound th

e

le. O

ne y

one, e

at J

our

agreed

. Lin

dsay

said, "H

e's out th

ere now

win

Rom

aln

ary

, t nove 1

st, came to

Am

erica that sp

ring;,;

with

his w

ife, the actress Jean

Seb

erg. T

hey

lunch

ed w

ith P

ierre

Salin

ger after K

ing's m

urd

er. "You k

now

, of co

urse," G

ary said

"that y

our g

uy w

ill be k

illed.' v

e with

that fear.

, an th

at isn

't much. H

e ru

ns a

round lik

e q

uic

ksilv

er."

month

later, Gary

met K

enned

y h

imself. T

he n

ovelist fo

und K

e

oria

l from

Senato

r Georg

e M

cG

overn

)," (n.p

., n.d

. (19684 S

ee a

lso G

eorg

e

Govern

, in re

cord

ed in

terv

iew

by L

. J. H

ackm

an, J

uly

16,.1

97o, 5

7-6

2, R

FK

His

tory

Pro

gra

m.

• Ric

hard

Hai w

ood, in

record

ed in

terv

iew

by J

ean S

tein

, Septe

mber 6

, 1968,

Ste

in P

apers

. Ben B

radle

e, H

arw

ood's

edito

r, had o

rigin

ally

giv

en H

arw

ood

assig

nm

ent b

ecause h

e h

ad b

een s

o "o

uts

pokenly

skeptic

al o

f Bobby" (B

enja

min

C

Bra

dle

e. C

oni.e

ntith

m., w

ith K

ennedy

New

York

, 19751, 2

2).

_„1

he Long D

ay Wanes

iedy's b

oyish

ness an

d ch

arm "m

uch

more

(I ruth

lessness" an

d sin

gularly

thought tf

r come, h

e would

look a b

it like C

ord

ell

y is goin

g to

try to

kill y

ou." K

enned

y

antees again

st assassinatio

n. "Y

ou'v

e ju

e peo

ple an

d to

trust th

em, an

d fro

m th

e

smith you o

r it isn't. I am

pretty

sure th

ere'll

:-sooner or later. Not so

much

for p

olitical

ness, that's all. "123

Th

is was w

hy B

ill Barry

was alo

ng. "It w

job w

ith m

e," h

e told

Jules W

itcover. "It

qualified me fo

r. This w

ould

be m

y ju

ggler',

with less co

operatio

n fro

m h

is prin

cipal. B

i

:- Kennedy th

rough c

row

ds. W

hen th

e c

an

Kennedy refu

sed p

rotectio

n. B

arry tried

s

such

as hirin

g o

ff-duty

policem

en to

stay

dared

not risk

Ken

ned

y's d

ispleasu

re by p

next to h

is room

. When

Ken

ned

y learn

er

arrangements, h

e canceled

them

.

His attitude, B

arry said

later, "was th

at h

not b

e constan

tly fearfu

l of w

hat m

il

ted as m

uch

pro

tection as h

e got b

ec

n't have had anybody if really

left to I

nsing, Mich

igan

, a police lieu

ten

Aiiith a rifle had g

one in

to a b

uild

ir

:sh ad Kennedy's c

ar d

riven in

to th

e

-enter it with

out g

oin

g o

ut o

n th

e 51

,Aarage,

Kennedy w

as fu

rious. H

e

Don't ev

er chan

ge w

hatev

er we're

don't ever w

ant to

chan

ge it b

ecat

If things happen, they

're goin

g to

h

e turn

ed ou

t to be an

office woe

rid.) K

enn

edy p

articularly

objected

U :A

s Lieutenant Jack

Eberh

ardt o

f

ent put it, Ken

ned

y "in

no u

ncerta .

for our assistance. H

e felt that w

e

g a close rapport w

ith h

is follo

wers.'

re were sev

eral alarms —

in C

leve

rnia. K

enn

edy ig

nored

them

. Rep

t

lion the danger. H

e told

Charles Q

t it, bu

t he w

asn't goin

g to chan

ge I

his eyes got a faraway

look, an

d I

. ever elected P

resident, I'm n

ever g

oin

g n

MIC

HA

EL

X

81

he had his room. M

alik reminded A

bbott to lock the gate as he left the yard; and C

hadee saw in that instruction about

the gate a direct threat to himself, a further order to stay

where he w

as. Malik, after this, got up and w

ent to the main

house. Chadee didn't see w

hat he could do. The boy P

ar-m

assar was w

ith him; S

teve Yeates w

as in the second bed-room

of the servants' quarters; Kidogo had the back bed-

room

in th

e main

house, ju

st across th

e patio

from

the

servants' quarters. Chadee lay dow

n on the cushions next to P

armassar. H

is mind w

as "in a mess"; he had never heard

"such a conversation" before. He prayed to G

od and hoped that in the m

orning the plan would be forgotten. T

hen his m

ind went blank and he fell asleep.

Across the road, in the house w

ith Jamal and B

enson, A

bbott didn't sleep. He w

as lying down in his clothes, think-

ing. He thought about his m

other and what M

alik might do

to her. He rem

embered the looks M

alik, Kidogo and S

teve Y

eates had given him earlier in the evening.

At six in the m

orning Malik w

oke Parm

assar. Parm

assar w

oke Chadee, sleeping beside him

on the cushions. And

then Malik sent P

armassar across the road to get A

bbott, to tell him

that the time had com

e to start digging the hole for B

enso

n. P

armassar d

idn't h

ave to

wak

e Abbott: A

bbott

hadn't slept, and was still in his clothes.

Th

ey w

ere all up

no

w. C

had

ee saw S

teve Y

eates and

K

idogo come out of K

idogo's room. Y

eates called Chadee

out in

to th

e yard

, and C

had

ee sat outsid

e again

st the

kitchen of the main house. K

idogo• and Parm

assar (reap-pearing) w

ent "to the back" and began to collect tools: a spade, a fork, tw

o shovels, a cutlass and a file. They asked

Chadee to help. H

e took the two shovels. P

armassar had the

fork

and th

e spad

e; Kid

ogo h

ad th

e cutlass an

d th

e file. A

bbott was w

aiting outside the gate. They passed the tools

to him, clim

bed over the gate and walked dow

n the road to the dead end, tw

o hundred feet away from

the house, on w

aste ground above the ravine. N

ot long afterward M

alik reversed his Hum

ber car to w

here the four men w

ere—A

bbott, Kidogo, P

armassar and

Chadee—

and showed them

where the hole w

as to be dug. It w

as beside a manure heap; C

hadee saw "a lot of bam

boo p

oles aro

un

d th

e man

ure." M

alik ask

ed K

ido

go

for th

e tim

e. Kidogo said it w

as six-twenty, and M

alik said again that they had forty-five m

inutes to dig the hole. Malik him

-self w

asn't going to be present while anything happened. A

s h

e had

said th

e prev

iou

s even

ing

, he w

as go

ing

to tak

e Jam

al out for a drive, to keep Jamal out of the w

ay. And it

was only now

—sitting in his car—

that he gave his final orders. N

ot to all of them, but only to A

bbott. He called

Abbott over to the car. A

bbott w

ent an

d said

, "Oh, G

od, M

ichael, y

ou d

on't

have to do this. Spare the w

oman." M

alik said he didn't w

ant to hear any more of "that old talk from

last night." "H

e sat behind the wheel pulling his beard and w

atching m

e. He told m

e that Steve Y

eates would drive up in the

jeep; he will bring the w

oman H

ale out. I was to tell her

when she saw

the hole, if she got suspicious, that it was for

stuff to be decomposed, or w

ords to that effect. He told m

e I w

as to grab tharwom

an and take her into the hole. When I

had her I was to tell her w

hat the hole was for: to tell her it

was for Jam

al." As for the killing itself, that w

as to be done by K

idogo. "He told m

e Kidogo had his orders. H

e said that if I did anything to endanger the safety of the m

en around that hole, or his fam

ily or himself, by not obeying, I w

ould die. W

hat he was telling m

e was I w

ould die that morning

with the know

ledge that my m

other would be dead also,

because that was w

here he Jwas heading w

ith J m 1." A

b-

\\)

• .•••>.k.,44.

. and I oreman in regard to the which arc interrogation'

nber 1969. Hanes was asked nip') cannot agree that James where are too many unanswered this one: "I still believe that Each thought says two things.

)onspiracy. write this last sentence, that h

le never said that Ray was the

to for and been paid $1,000 each Huic, the latter $11,000.

sually than most men do of iy about what they got from ent along on this business of a felacorte Press wanted it, and (for which Look alone paid him lit first that Ray was the

u edit the articles in Look glow and Mr. Percy Foreman?" His edited them. 1 am not an editor 1111 ntence from the article bearing 4. Martin Luther King, Jr.?" for Mr. Hanes. Mr. Hanes wrote

anes had often and widely sive again, for the question was s making small changes in what

Ink is as good a place as any to add a rei , Le t. n 1 is knout of the assassination was diligent. proiessional. and not congenial to the official It is interesting that in 1970. although he was then 28 years old, he via),

rdered to active duty by the Army, which etas not happy about some of his other reporting, especially about Green Beret murders and military justice. It Leifermann had been in the reserve since 1964 and was scheduled for discharge) in

ovember of 1970. The reason given for calling him up is his alleged missing of reserve meetings. Leifermann went to court. charged his writing was the reason for assignment to active duty, and blamed officials for disposing of the

statements of doctors accounting for his absences. U.S. District Court Judge Howard F.

Corcoran, in Washington, heard Leifermann's appeal on September 21 and 22. 1970.

121 A funny thing happened to the real Gall on the long way to the minitrial. After his name appeared in the papers as one that had been used by Ray, a truck

ed into the Union Carbide plant where Galt works. As Galt told Richard Bernabei, t truck driver approached Galt with what appeared to be a newspaper picture of • ter than usual quality. It was one of a series of pictures taken in

ter the assassination of John Kennedy. This one was not known to have

en published and showed tramps in custody. Pointing to one of them. who was dead-ringer for the man in the FBI sketch of the person wanted for killing King. e truck driver told Galt, "There's your pal," meaning Ray. The picture was

nknown to the real Galt. The trucker's explanation is hard to credit. He said he ound the picture on the seat of his truck after a stop somewhere in the United tates. This means he was a rather extraordinary "truckdriver" with rather

lai ceptional knowledge, to know of the possible significance of a picture he s was merely left on the seat of his truck by persons and means and for

sons unknown to him.

To show the reader how bizarre this episode was, I reprint here the relevant hotographs.

tributed to James Earl Ray, it 2., the beginning of a concoction the connivings of "federal trials of racist murderers in the

lee" can be arranged. If one is c racists. such a plot within ication they regard as brilliant,

7 story. he could accurately nation, it was thought the ce into another part of town." wrote that "several police cars raced toward the scene of the es per hour"—to which chase re was no official reference.

Sketch of man wanted for King slaying, from New York Times of 4/11/68 (not repudiated by FBI) compared with picture of man in police (ist°y at scene of JFK assassination in Dallas, 11/22/63, shortly after that assassi ation. (See p. 254.)

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