izard (2009) emotion theory

ANRV364-PS60-01 ARI 24 November 2008 18:31

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Emotion Theory andResearch: Highlights,Unanswered Questions,and Emerging IssuesCarroll E. IzardPsychology Department, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2577;email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009. 60:1–25

The Annual Review of Psychology is online atpsych.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163539

Copyright c© 2009 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

0066-4308/09/0110-0001$20.00

Key Words

emotion schemas, emotion-cognition interactions, emotionknowledge, emotion regulation, emotion utilization, meme,development, consciousness, levels of awareness, emotion feelings

AbstractEmotion feeling is a phase of neurobiological activity, the key com-ponent of emotions and emotion-cognition interactions. Emotionschemas, the most frequently occurring emotion experiences, are dy-namic emotion-cognition interactions that may consist of momentary/situational responding or enduring traits of personality that emergeover developmental time. Emotions play a critical role in the evolutionof consciousness and the operations of all mental processes. Types ofemotion relate differentially to types or levels of consciousness. Unbri-dled imagination and the ability for sympathetic regulation of empathymay represent both potential gains and losses from the evolution andontogeny of emotion processes and consciousness. Unresolved issuesinclude psychology’s neglect of levels of consciousness that are distinctfrom access or reflective consciousness and use of the term “uncon-scious mind” as a dumpster for all mental processes that are consideredunreportable. The relation of memes and the mirror neuron systemto empathy, sympathy, and cultural influences on the development ofsocioemotional skills are unresolved issues destined to attract futureresearch.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES. . . . . . 2SEVEN PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3ON THE ORIGINS AND NATURE

OF EMOTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4The Origins of Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . 4Emotion Feeling as Neurobiological

Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Feeling is the Key Psychological

Aspect of Emotion: Motivationand Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Agreement on Components andCharacteristics of Emotion . . . . . . 7

Emotions as Causal Processes . . . . . . 7TYPES OF EMOTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Basic Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Emotion Schemas: Dynamic

Emotion-CognitionInteractions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Transitions from Basic Emotionsto Emotion Schemas . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

EMOTIONS ANDCONSCIOUSNESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Factors Affecting Emotion-

Consciousness Relations. . . . . . . . . 11Emotion Feelings and

Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11TYPES OF EMOTION AND TYPES

OF CONSCIOUSNESS . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Basic Emotions and PhenomenalConsciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Emotion Feelings and PhenomenalConsciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Emotion Schemas and AccessConsciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Gains and Losses in the Evolutionof Emotions and Consciousness. . 13

Remarkable Gains from LinkingEmotion Feelingsand Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

UNRESOLVED ISSUES ANDTOPICS FOR FUTURERESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Psychologists’ Neglect of

Phenomenal Consciousness . . . . . 16The Psychological Unconscious:

A Default ExplanatoryConstruct? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Emerging Issues: ContinuousEmotion, Memes, and the MirrorNeuron System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Continuous Emotion-CognitionInteraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Memes and Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Mirror Neuron Systems, Emotions,

and Empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . 20

DET: differentialemotions theory

INTRODUCTION

This prefatory chapter, like every essay, review,or data-based article, is influenced by its au-thor’s feelings about the topics and issues underconsideration as well as the author’s personal-ity and social and cultural experiences. To helpcounterbalance the effects of such influences onthis article and provide some perspective on itscontents, I present below the major theses thathave emerged in my theorizing and research onemotions.

THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

The key principles of differential emotions the-ory (DET; Izard 2007a) have changed period-ically. They change primarily because of ad-vances in methodology and research. They mayalso change as a result of theoretical debatesthat highlight the need for some clarificationsand distinctions among constructs. The cur-rent set of principles highlight distinctly dif-ferent types of emotions and their roles in theevolution and development of different levels

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of consciousness/awareness and of mind, hu-man mentality, and behavior. The ongoing re-formulations of DET principles are facilitatedby advances in emotion science, cognitive neu-roscience, and developmental clinical science,as well as in social and personality psychology.For the present article, the seven principles be-low guided the choice of topics and the selec-tive review of the literature on emotions andtheir relations to cognition, action, and con-sciousness. They led to a new perspective onemotion-related gains and losses from evolu-tion and opened the door to theoretical devel-opment and research on emerging topics suchas the role of the mirror neuron system in emo-tion experiences, empathy, and sympathy andmemes and their relations to emotion schemas.

An overarching aspect of the theoretical per-spective represented in the following princi-ples and in this article is that emotion andcognition, though often treated correctly ashaving functionally separate features and in-fluences (e.g., Bechara et al. 2000, Talmi &Frith 2007), are interactive and integrated ormingled in the brain (cf. Lewis 2005, Pessoa2008, Phelps 2006). This thesis is consistentwith the long-standing recognition of the highdegree of connectivity among the brain’s neu-ral structures and systems. I hypothesize thatemotion will have substantial and measurableeffects on cognition and action when the stim-ulus or situation is a personally or sociallysignificant one. The foregoing general the-sis and the more specific hypothesis seem torun counter to extreme constructivist posi-tions. Such positions (e.g., Barrett 2006) de-fine or locate emotion at the level of percep-tion and apparently have no place for the ideaof interactions among distinct features of emo-tion (e.g., motivation/feeling) and cognition(e.g., higher-order conceptual processes). Thepresent position may bear some similarity tocomponential–dynamic approaches, at least interms of continuously changing aspects or con-figurations of mental processes (e.g., Ellsworth1994, Scherer 2000). However, the present po-sition may differ from the latter in viewing emo-tion and cognition as always interacting and

Mirror neuronsystem (MNS): isassumed to consist ofneurons that fire bothwhen one acts andwhen one observes thesame action performedby another; neuronsthat “mirror” thebehavior of another

Memes: behavioral(cognitive, emotional,action) units that canpropagate (be readilycopied) and becomesubject to naturalselection

Emotion schemas:emotion-cognitioninteractions/structuresthat generatefeeling-thoughtexperiences andbehavioral tendenciesthat range frommomentary processesto trait-likephenomena (e.g.,anger schemas,interest schemas)

Emotion feeling: aphase ofneurobiologicalactivity that isexperienced asmotivational andinformational and thatinfluences thought andaction, a felt cognition,or action tendency

Levels of awareness:levels of consciousness,ranging fromphenomenalconsciousness to access(verbally reportable)and reflectiveconsciousness, whichsupport the processesin higher-ordercognition-emotionschemas

thus normally precluding pure cognitive andemotion states.

SEVEN PRINCIPLES

1. Emotion feeling (a) derives from evo-lution and neurobiological development,(b) is the key psychological componentof emotions and consciousness, and (c) ismore often inherently adaptive than mal-adaptive.

2. Emotions play a central role in the evolu-tion of consciousness, influence the emer-gence of higher levels of awareness duringontogeny, and largely determine the con-tents and focus of consciousness through-out the life span.

3. Emotions are motivational and informa-tional, primarily by virtue of their expe-riential or feeling component. Emotionfeelings constitute the primary motiva-tional component of mental operationsand overt behavior.

4. Basic emotion feelings help organize andmotivate rapid (and often more-or-lessautomatic though malleable) actions thatare critical for adaptive responses to im-mediate challenges to survival or well-being. In emotion schemas, the neuralsystems and mental processes involved inemotion feelings, perception, and cogni-tion interact continually and dynamicallyin generating and monitoring thoughtand action. These dynamic interactions(which range from momentary processesto traits or trait-like phenomena) can gen-erate innumerable emotion-specific ex-periences (e.g., anger schemas) that havethe same core feeling state but differentperceptual tendencies (biases), thoughts,and action plans.

5. Emotion utilization, typically dependenton effective emotion-cognition interac-tions, is adaptive thought or action thatstems, in part, directly from the experi-ence of emotion feeling/motivation andin part from learned cognitive, social, andbehavioral skills.

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Emotion-cognitioninteractions: dynamicneuropsychologicalprocesses thatdetermine the relativesignificance ofemotion and cognitionin planning, decisionmaking, and actions

Phenomenalconsciousness: alevel of awareness inwhich objects, events,and emotion feelingscan register andremain verballyunreportableexperiences. Emotionfeelings in phenomenalconsciousness retaintheir functionality

6. Emotion schemas become maladaptiveand may lead to psychopathology whenlearning results in the development ofconnections among emotion feelings andmaladaptive cognition and action.

7. The emotion of interest is continuallypresent in the normal mind under nor-mal conditions, and it is the central mo-tivation for engagement in creative andconstructive endeavors and for the senseof well-being. Interest and its interactionwith other emotions account for selec-tive attention, which in turn influences allother mental processes.

Elaboration and empirical support for prin-ciples 1–6 can be found in the following sourcesand their reference lists (Ackerman et al. 1998;Izard 2002, 2007a; Izard et al. 2008a,b,c; Silvia2006). Principles 1–3 apply to all emotions, and4–6 primarily concern emotion schemas. Prin-ciple 7 consists of propositions about the mostubiquitous of all human emotions—interest-excitement. Specific empirical support does notexist for the hypothesis of continual interest inthe normal mind.

In this article, I discuss the issues of defin-ing the term “emotion” and types of emotion,emotion-cognition interactions, emotions andconsciousness, relations among types of emo-tions and types of consciousness, and note someremarkable gains and losses from the evolutionof emotions and multiple levels consciousness.

This article addresses a critical need forclear distinctions between basic positive andbasic negative emotions and particularly be-tween brief basic emotion episodes and emo-tion schemas. Unlike basic negative emotionsthat occur in brief episodes and involve very lit-tle cognition beyond minimal perceptual pro-cesses, emotion schemas involve emotion andcognition (frequently higher-order cognition)in dynamic interactions (Izard 1977, 1984; cf.emotional interpretation, Lewis 2005).

This article also contrasts phenomenal (pri-mary) and access (reflective) consciousness,considers the construct of levels of conscious-ness, and questions the integrity of current con-ceptualizations of the unconscious mind. Typi-

cally, psychologists ignore the concepts of phe-nomenal consciousness and levels of conscious-ness and do not distinguish these constructsfrom the unconscious. I conclude by identifyingsome unanswered questions and briefly com-ment on a few emerging topics—continuousemotion-cognition interactions, memes andemotions, and the mirror neuron system andempathy—that seem destined to become moreprominent in psychological science in the com-ing years.

ON THE ORIGINS AND NATUREOF EMOTIONS

None of the many efforts to make a widely ac-ceptable definition of emotion has proved suc-cessful (Izard 2006, Panksepp 2003a). Yet, I dareonce again to raise the 124-year-old storiedquestion asked by James (1884): What is emo-tion? It happens that the answer James gave tohis own question has a rather popular reprievein the annals of contemporary neuroscience.Like James, Damasio (1999) argued that brainresponses constitute emotion or the body ex-pression of emotion and that emotion feelingis a consequence of the neurobiological (body)expression. In contrast, I propose that emotionfeeling should be viewed as a phase (not a conse-quence) of the neurobiological activity or bodyexpression of emotion (cf. Langer 1967/1982).

The Origins of Emotions

Russell (2003) proposed that core affect is con-tinuous in the brain and provides informationon the pleasure/displeasure and arousal valueof stimuli. In contrast, I have maintained thata discrete emotion or pattern of interactingemotions are always present (though not nec-essarily labeled or articulated) in the consciousbrain (Izard 1977, ch. 6; Izard 2007a,b). Barrett(2006) suggested that discrete emotions ariseas a result of a conceptual act on core affector as a function of “conceptual structure thatis afforded by language” (Barrett et al. 2007,p. 304). In contrast, we have proposed thatdiscrete emotion feelings cannot be created,

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taught, or learned via cognitive processes (Izard& Malatesta 1987; Izard 2007a,b). As Edelman& Tononi (2000) observed, “ . . . emotions arefundamental both to the origins of and the ap-petite for conscious thought” (p. 218, cf. Izard1977, ch. 6). So, perceptual and conceptual pro-cesses and consciousness itself are more like ef-fects of emotions than sources of their origin.Discrete emotion experiences emerge in on-togeny well before children acquire languageor the conceptual structures that adequatelyframe the qualia we know as discrete emotionfeelings. Moreover, acquiring language doesnot guarantee that emotion experiences can al-ways be identified and communicated verbally.Even adults have great difficulty articulatinga precise description of their emotion feelings(cf. Langer 1967/1982).

Thus, emotion feelings can be activated andinfluenced by perceptual, appraisal, conceptual,and noncognitive processes (Izard 1993), butcannot be created by them. In describing theorigins of qualia—conscious experiences thatinclude emotion feelings—Edelman & Tononi(2000) wrote, “We can analyze them and giveprescription for how they emerge, but obvi-ously we cannot give rise to them without firstgiving rise to appropriate brain structures andtheir dynamics within the body of an individualorganism” (p. 15). They maintained that suchstructures arise as a result of brain changes dueto “developmental selection” (p. 79), an aspectof neural Darwinism. Eschewing the cognitive-constructivist approach advocated by Barrett(2006), Edelman & Tononi (2000) concludedthat “the development of the earliest qualia oc-curs largely on the basis of multimodal, body-centered discriminations carried out by propri-oceptive, kinesthetic, and autonomic systemsthat are present in the embryo and infant’sbrain, particularly in the brainstem” (p. 157).

Emotion Feeling asNeurobiological Activity

Apparently consistent with the position ofEdelman (2006), Langer (1967/1982), andPanksepp (2003a,b), I propose that emotion

Accessconsciousness: alevel of awareness thatincludes verballyreportable content

feeling is a phase of neurobiological activity thatis sensed by the organism. It is sensed and ex-pressed even in children without a cerebral cor-tex (Merker 2007). This component of emotionis always experienced or felt, though not neces-sarily labeled or articulated or present in accessconsciousness.

Emotion feeling, like any other neurobio-logical activity, varies from low to high lev-els of intensity. The autonomic nervous systemmay modulate the emotion feeling but does notchange its quality or valence (cf. Tomkins 1962,1963). Neither a moderate nor a high level ofautonomic nervous system activity is necessaryfor the emergence of emotion feelings. Theconscious mind is capable of detecting and dis-criminating among slight changes in neurobio-logical activity and among the resultant qualia(Edelman 2006) that include emotion feelings.[Contrary to earlier formulations (Izard 1971,Tomkins 1962), neural processes in observablefacial expressions may or may not be a part ofthe critical neurobiological activity involved inemotion feeling.]

Emotion feelings arise from the integrationof concurrent activity in brain structures andcircuits that may involve the brain stem, amyg-dale, insula, anterior cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices (cf. Damasio 2003; Lane et al.1997; Panksepp 2003a,b). Levels of emotionfeelings, like other neurobiological activities,range from low and subtle to high and extreme.Current theory and evidence suggest that thefeeling component of emotions contributed tothe evolution of consciousness and to the affec-tive, cognitive, and action processes involved ingoal-oriented behavior.

Defining emotion feeling as a phase of a neu-robiological process circumvents the argumentthat feeling is nonphysical and hence cannot becausal. A counterargument, though, is that atbest, feelings are only the qualia of neurobi-ological processes and not neurobiological ac-tivity per se. However, even if this were true,Edelman (2006) maintains that qualia could stillbe described as causal because they are true rep-resentations of core thalamo-cortical activity.Thus, whether or not one accepts the present


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Entrainment:harmonioussynchronization ofneural processes

Individuation: thoseprocesses throughwhich differentiatedcomponents tend tobecome a more unifiedwhole

Basic emotions:emotions that organizeand motivate rapidvirtually automatic yetmalleable responsesthat are critical inmeeting immediatechallenges to survivalor well-being

proposal that feelings are a phase of neurobi-ological activity, they can still be conceived ascausal processes.

The present formulation of the origins andnature of emotion feelings differs from thosethat describe emotion feeling and emotion state(or emotion-related neurobiological activity)as separate and independent (e.g., Lambie &Marcel 2002). Moreover, the view of emotionfeeling as a phase of the neurobiological activ-ity or body expression of emotion differs fromthe idea that neurobiological or body expres-sion must precede emotion feeling (Damasio1999, p. 283). The current description of emo-tion feeling is tantamount to saying that it isevolved and unlearned neurobiological activity.For those who think that the idea of emotionfeelings as evolved neurobiological processes isstrange or unfounded, the tough questions are:Where else could emotion feelings come from?What else could they be?

Feeling is the Key PsychologicalAspect of Emotion: Motivationand Information

Feeling is the dynamic component in emotion(cf. Panksepp 2003a,b) and in two related psy-chobiological processes—entrainment and in-dividuation (cf. Langer 1967/1982). The mo-tivational, cue-producing, and informationalfunctions of feelings enable them to entrain,or simplify and organize, what might become(particularly in challenging situations) an over-whelming number of impulses into focusedcognitive processes and a few adaptive actions(cf. Langer 1967/1982). Such feeling-mediatedentrainment of impulses across situations anddevelopmental time facilitates the formation offeeling-cognition-action patterns that consti-tute individuation—the organization of traitsand their assembly into a unique personality.However, feeling an emotion does not guaran-tee that it will be labeled, articulated, or sensedin reflective consciousness or at a high level ofawareness. The level of awareness of an emo-tion feeling depends in part on its intensity andexpression, and after language acquisition, on

labeling, articulating, and acknowledging theemotion experience. These capacities, criticalto personality and social development, dependon the neural activity and resultant processesinvolved in symbolization and language.

Through development, the conceptual selfbecomes important to the process of feeling andexpressing an emotion, but a higher-order con-ceptual “self” is not essential for either. Infantsexperience and express basic emotions long be-fore they can provide any evidence of a self-concept (Izard et al. 1995), and so do childrenwithout a cerebral cortex (Merker 2007).

Motivational and cue-producing emotion-feeling provides information relevant to cog-nition and action (Izard 1971, p. 185). Othershave conceptualized emotion as information,and the topic has inspired a considerable bodyof related research (Clore et al. 2001, Schwarz& Clore 1983). Consistent with the idea thatemotion feelings are cue-producing and infor-mational phenomena, they may also afford akind of prescience. Feelings may predict the ef-fect of future stimulations by anticipating thelink between future critical situations and sub-sequent emotion experiences and needs, e.g.,danger→fear→safety or loss→sadness→socialsupport (cf. Langer 1967/1982, Vol. 1, p. 101).Such anticipatory activities can facilitate the so-cialization processes associated with the learn-ing of emotion-related social skills in an imag-ined or “as if ’’ world.

Although an emotion feeling may begin toform reciprocal relations with perception orcognition by the time that it is fully sensed,there is no reason to assume that its qualityis altered by perceptual and conceptual pro-cesses (Panksepp 2003a,b). Actually, the par-ticular quality of each discrete emotion feel-ing evolved because its effects on other senses,cognition, and action are generally adaptive(cf. Edelman & Tononi 2000). For all basicemotions, motivational and action processes oc-cur in similar fashion across situations. Amongemotion schemas, however, there are wide dif-ferences in motivational, cognitive, and actionprocesses across individuals. The determinantsof which particular emotion feeling and what

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cognitive content occurs in a specific emotionschema include individual differences, learn-ing, culture, and the conceptual processes influ-enced by them (Izard 2007a; cf. Shweder 1994).

Agreement on Componentsand Characteristics of Emotion

Though there is no consensus on a general def-inition of the term “emotion” (cf. Kleinginna &Kleinginna 1981), many experts do agree thatemotions have a limited set of components andcharacteristics (Izard 2006). Although they donot agree in all details, they agree that emo-tions have an infrastructure that includes neuralsystems dedicated, at least in part, to emotionprocesses and that emotions motivate cognitionand action and recruit response systems. Wemay also be reaching a consensus that there aredifferent forms of emotions, e.g., basic emo-tions rooted and defined primarily in evolutionand biology and emotion schemas that includecognitive components that differ across individ-uals and cultures (Izard 2007a, Panksepp 2007).

Emotions as Causal Processes

Although experts agree that emotions motivateor influence cognition and action, not all agreeon precisely what mediates the effects of emo-tions. The answer may depend on whether it isa basic emotion or an emotion schema. It mayalso depend on whether and how a distinction ismade in the roles of emotion neurophysiologyand emotion feelings (cf. Panksepp 2003a,b).

Arguably, no one thing (even emotion) isever the sole mediator of personally or sociallysignificant behavior. Other person and contex-tual variables typically contribute to the causalprocesses. Yet, I propose that emotion feeling isvirtually always one of the mediators of actionin response to basic emotion and a mediatorof thought and action in response to emotionschemas. Thus, the specific impact of emotionfeeling in generating and altering behavior de-pends on the type of emotion involved in thecausal process. Feeling in basic emotion affectsaction but not higher-order cognition, which

has little or no presence in basic emotion pro-cesses. Feeling in emotion schemas may fre-quently affect action and will surely affect cog-nition. Thinking is a key agent in regulating(sometimes suppressing; Gross 2002) and guid-ing behavior that stems from emotion schemas.

TYPES OF EMOTIONS

Emotions can be usefully divided into twobroad types or kinds—basic emotion episodesand dynamic emotion-cognition interactions oremotion schemas. Failure to make and keep thedistinction between these two kinds of emotionexperiences may be the biggest source of mis-understandings and misconceptions in currentemotion science (Izard 2007a, Gray et al. 2005).I included an update on the distinction betweentypes of emotions here for two reasons. First, Isee the fundamental nature of emotions and theclosely connected issue of emotion-cognition-action processes as central to emotion science,now and for the foreseeable future. Second, Ithink researchers often look for the correlatesand effects of basic emotions (labeled simply asemotions) when the variables in their experi-ments are actually emotion-cognition interac-tions or emotion schemas.

Basic Emotions

In the past, I have used the term “basic emotion”in referring to any emotion that is assumed tobe fundamental to human mentality and adap-tive behavior (Izard 1977). Recently, misunder-standings and debates about its meaning led meto draw a sharp distinction between basic emo-tions and affective-cognitive structures or emo-tion schemas (Izard 2007a). Here, consistentwith that distinction, the term “basic emotion”refers to affective processes generated by evo-lutionarily old brain systems upon the sensingof an ecologically valid stimulus (Izard 2007a).

Basic positive emotions. The basic positiveemotions of interest and joy (e.g., an in-fant’s interest activated by the human face;Langsdorf et al. 1983) and joy activated by the


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familiar face of her mother (Izard et al. 1995) areequally essential to survival, evolution, and de-velopment. However, their structure and timecourse may differ significantly from each other.The infant’s experiences of joy may be relativelybrief by comparison with experiences of inter-est. The basic positive emotion of interest mo-tivates play in early development and thus mayhave short or relatively long duration.

Basic positive emotions emerge in early on-togeny (Izard et al. 1995). Like the basic nega-tive emotions, they are subject to developmen-tal changes. The most critical of these changesis mediated by the acquisition of language andemotion labels and the ability to communicate(or share) emotion experiences through sym-bolic processes or language (Izard 1971, Izardet al. 2008).

Basic negative emotions. Basic negativeemotions (sadness, anger, disgust, fear) typicallyrun their course automatically and stereotypi-cally in a brief time span. The basic emotionof fear (or a fear-action episode) was describedrather precisely in the earliest human records:“A man who stumbles upon a viper will jumpaside: as trembling takes his knees, pallor hischeeks; he backs and backs away . . . ” (Homer’sIliad, c. 7000 BCE, p. 68).

Research has repeatedly demonstrated thatin mammals, the experience and expressionof basic fear is mediated by the amygdala(LeDoux 1996, Mobbs et al. 2007). Typically,basic negative emotions are activated by sub-cortical sensory-discriminative processes in re-sponse to ecologically valid stimuli (Ekman2003, LeDoux 1996, Ohman 2005). Percep-tual processes and action usually follow andrun their course rapidly and automatically toenhance the likelihood of gaining an adap-tive advantage (cf. LeDoux 1996, Ohman 2002,Tomkins 1962). Because of their nature, somebasic negative emotions (e.g., sadness, anger,fear) are difficult to study in the laboratory.Thus, most extant research on what are usuallycalled emotions (most often negative emotions)actually concerns negative emotion schemas.

Basic or fundamental emotions? The dis-crete emotions of shame, guilt, and contempt(sometimes called the social or self-consciousemotions) and the pattern of emotions in loveand attachment may be considered basic inthe sense that they are fundamental to hu-man evolution, normative development, hu-man mentality, and effective adaptation. Af-ter language acquisition, the emotions relatedto the self-concept or self-consciousness aretypically emotion schemas that involve higher-order cognition (e.g., about self and self-otherrelationships) and have culture-related cogni-tive components (Tangney et al. 2007).

Emotion Schemas: DynamicEmotion-Cognition Interactions

The core idea of dynamic interaction be-tween emotion and cognition has a long andvenerable history dating back at least to theearliest written records: “ . . . Peleus . . . lashedout at him, letting his anger ride in execra-tion . . . ” (Homer’s Iliad, c. 7000 BCE). Theidea was prominently displayed in seventeenth-century philosophy (Bacon 1620/1968, Spinoza1677/1957) and was most eloquently elaboratedby Langer (1967/1982).

In the vernacular, as well as in much of theliterature of emotion science, the term “emo-tion” most frequently refers to what is de-scribed here as an emotion schema. An emo-tion schema is emotion interacting dynamicallywith perceptual and cognitive processes to in-fluence mind and behavior. Emotion schemasare often elicited by appraisal processes but alsoby images, memories, and thoughts, and var-ious noncognitive processes such as changesin neurotransmitters and periodic changes inlevels of hormones (Izard 1993). Any one orall of these phenomena, as well as goals andvalues, may constitute their cognitive compo-nent. Appraisal processes, typically conceived asmechanisms of emotion activation (for a review,see Ellsworth & Scherer 2003), help providethe cognitive framework for the emotion com-ponent of emotion schemas. Their principalmotivational component of emotion schemas

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consists of the processes involved in emotionfeelings. Emotion schemas, particularly theircognitive aspects, are influenced by individualdifferences, learning, and social and culturalcontexts. Nevertheless, the feeling componentof a given emotion schema (e.g., a sadnessschema) is qualitatively identical to the feel-ing in the basic emotion of sadness. Thoughthere may be some differences in their underly-ing neural processes, the sadness feeling in eachtype of emotion shares a common set of braincircuits or neurobiological activities that deter-mine its quality (cf. Edelman 2006, Edelman &Tononi 2000).

Positive and negative emotion schemas mayhave a relatively brief duration or continueover an indefinitely long time course. A prin-cipal reason why they can endure more or lessindefinitely is because their continually inter-acting cognitive component provides a meansto regulate and utilize them. Evidence indi-cates that experimentally facilitated formationof emotion schemas (simply learning to labeland communicate about emotion feelings) gen-erates adaptive advantages (Izard et al. 2008a;cf. Lieberman et al. 2007). Although we havevery little data relating to their normative devel-opment, neuroscientists have begun to increaseour knowledge of the substrates of emotion-cognition interactions (Fox et al. 2005, Gross2002, Lewis 2005, Northoff et al. 2004, Phelps2006).

Emotion schemas and traits of tempera-ment/personality. Frequently recurring emo-tion schemas may stabilize as emotion traitsor as motivational components of tempera-ment/personality traits (Diener et al. 1995,Goldsmith & Campos 1982, Izard 1977, Magai& Hunziker 1993, Magai & McFadden 1995;cf. Mischel & Shoda 1995, Tomkins 1987). Innormal development, the cognitive content ofemotion schemas should enhance the regula-tory, motivational, and functional capacities oftheir feeling components. However, in somegene X environment interactions, a cluster ofinterrelated emotion schemas may become aform of psychopathology (e.g., anxiety and de-

pressive disorders: Davidson 1994, 1998; J.A.Gray 1990; J.R. Gray et al. 2005; Izard 1972;Magai & McFadden 1995).

Early-emerging emotion schemas. Asidefrom the simple emotion-cognition connec-tions that a prelinguistic infant forms (e.g., be-tween her own feelings of interest and joy anda perception/image of her mother’s face), theearliest emotion schemas probably consist of at-taching labels to emotion expressions and feel-ings. Development of emotion labeling and theprocess of putting feelings into words begintoward the end of the second year of life andcontinue during the preschool and elementaryschool years (Izard 1971) and throughout thelife span. Indeed, games and activities that pro-mote the accurate labeling of emotion expres-sions and experiences have been a componentof intervention processes for many years (seeDomitrovich & Greenberg 2004 and Denham& Burton 2003 for reviews).

Emotion schemas or affective-cognitiveunits? The concept of affective-cognitivestructure or emotion schema (Izard 1977,2007a) seems quite similar to that of theaffective-cognitive unit as described in thecognitive-affective personality system (CAPS)theory of personality (Mischel & Shoda 1995,1998). One significant difference may be that inthe CAPS approach, an affective-cognitive unitis conceived mainly as a stable or characteristicmediating process or part of the personalitysystem. In DET, an emotion schema may be ei-ther a temporally stable trait-like phenomenon(affective-cognitive structure) or a briefemotion-cognition interaction that may medi-ate behavior in a specific situation. Comparedto the CAPS approach, DET gives emotiona greater role in motivation and assumesthat the emotion component of the emotionschema drives the behavior mapped or framedby perceptual-cognitive processes. DET alsoemphasizes that, as seen particularly clearly inearly development and in emotion-based pre-ventive interventions, connecting appropriatecognition to emotion feelings increases the


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individual’s capacity for emotion modulationand self-regulation (Izard et al. 2008a). DETand CAPS agree in assigning a significantcausal role to the dynamic interplay of emotionand cognition in determining human behavior.Both approaches also conceptualize the in-terplay of emotion and cognitive processes assources of data on ideographic or within-subjectdifferences in emotion-cognition-behaviorrelations.

In brief, emotion schemas are causal ormediating processes that consist of emotionand cognition continually interacting dynam-ically to influence mind and behavior. It isthe dynamic interaction of these distinct fea-tures (emotion and cognition) that enablesan emotion schema, acting in the form of asituation-specific factor or a trait of tempera-ment/personality, to have its special and power-ful effects on self-regulation and on perception,thought, and action (Izard et al. 2008a).

Transitions from Basic Emotionsto Emotion Schemas

In early development, the first steps in the tran-sition from basic positive emotions to positiveemotion schemas consists simply of the infantusing her increasing cognitive and emotion pro-cessing capacities to make connections betweenpositive emotion feelings and positive thoughts,memories, and anticipations of people, events,and situations. Through learning and experi-ence, the same stimuli that once elicited a basicpositive emotion may become stimuli for posi-tive emotion schemas and greater expectations(cf. Fredrickson 1998, 2007).

Basic negative emotions occur relativelymore frequently in infancy than in later devel-opment. Moreover, the transition from basicnegative emotions to basic negative emotionschemas and the regulatory advantage providedby their cognitive component may prove diffi-cult and challenging. The transition from ba-sic anger (protests) and sadness (withdrawal) ofa toddler being separated from mom, to theinterest-joy response of a four-year-old being

dropped off at kindergarten, may involve sev-eral rather stressful times for many children.

For adults, transitions from a basic emo-tion to an emotion schema may start abruptlybut finish smoothly and quickly. Simply sens-ing that the object in your path and just a stepahead of you is long, round, and moving mayactivate the basic emotion of fear and the ac-companying high-intensity neurobiological re-actions. However, if language, learning, and an-other 50 ms enable you to recognize and labelthe object as a harmless garden snake (i.e., con-struct an emotion schema), you might even takeit gently into your hands rather than engage inextreme behavior. The concomitant change inneural and neuromotor circuits would consti-tute a paradigmatic transition across types andvalences of emotion and emotion-related phe-nomena. In this case, one would make a transi-tion from basic fear to interest-cognition-actionsequences in a positive emotion schema.

EMOTIONS ANDCONSCIOUSNESS

Whatever else it may be, emotion feeling isat bottom sensation. Thus emotion feelings,like other sensations, are by definition processesthat are felt or at least accessible (in the broadsense of that term) in some level of conscious-ness. Level of cognitive development as wellas top-down processes, such as attention shift-ing and focusing, may influence (or preclude)the registration of feeling in reflective or cog-nitively accessible consciousness (Buschman &Miller 2007). When that happens, emotionfeelings/experiences occur in phenomenal con-sciousness (or at a low level of awareness). Phe-nomenal consciousness of an emotion feeling,the experience itself, generally co-occurs withsome level of reflective/reportable conscious-ness (cf. Chalmers 1996). Thus, I propose thatthere are usually interactions among the neu-ral systems that support these two types of con-sciousness (cf. Pessoa 2008). These interactionsbetween the two sets of neural systems enableemotion feelings to retain their functionality in

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influencing thought and action, even in prelin-gual infants (Izard et al. 2008b).

Factors Affecting Emotion-Consciousness Relations

Another determinant of our level of awarenessof emotion is the intensity of the neurobiolog-ical activity involved in emotion feeling. Low-intensity emotion feeling (e.g., interest arousalmotivating learning skills related to aspects ofone’s work) would not ordinarily grab attentionin the same way as a viper and might go unno-ticed. In this case (and in other instances of lowarousal), “unnoticed” does not mean that thefeeling is “unconscious.” It may register and befully functional at some level of consciousness(cf. Lambie & Marcel 2002). The developmentof theory and techniques to examine the op-erations of emotion feelings in different levelsof awareness should help reduce the number ofpsychological processes that are currently rele-gated to the ambiguous concept of the uncon-scious (Izard et al. 2008b; cf. Bargh & Morsella2008).

Emotion Feelings and Consciousness

As the foregoing formulation suggests, theneurobiological processes involved in emo-tions generate conscious experiences of feelings(emotional sensations) just as in seeing greenneurobiological activities in the visual brain cre-ate the experience/sensation of greenness (cf.Humphrey 2006). The sensory processes in-volved in emotion feelings like joy, sadness,anger, and fear may represent prototypicalemotion experiences. Such emotion feelings arecritical to the evolution of human mentalityand reflective consciousness (cf. Edelman 2006,Langer 1967/1982).

Emotion experiences/sensations continue tobe critical in the maintenance and functioningof consciousness. When trauma leads to dam-age or dysfunction of a sensory system, it af-fects the whole person, including the sense ofself and of others as self-conscious. For exam-ple, when a dysfunctional visual cortex resulted

in blindsight, the blindsighted person couldguess rather accurately the location of objects inthe environment and learn to navigate aroundthem. Yet, she experienced her sensation-lessvision as emotionless and reported that “see-ing without emotion is unbearable” (Humphrey2006, p. 68–69). She may also think of herself as“less of a self” and one that could not feel “en-gaged in the ‘hereness, nowness, and me-ness’of the experience of the moment” (Humphrey2006, p. 70). In the social world, the blind-sighted person lacks a basis for empathy andfor understanding the mental states of othersby simulation.

Taken together, these observations on the af-termath of the loss of the visual sensory system(which provides the bulk of our incoming infor-mation) suggest that having sensations may bethe starting point of consciousness (Humphrey2006, pp. 66–71). The emergence of the ca-pacity to experience and respond to emotionfeelings may have been the most critical stepin its evolution (cf. Langer 1967/1982). Dis-crete emotion feelings play a central role inanticipating the effects of future stimulationsand in organizing and integrating the associ-ated information for envisioning strategies andentraining impulses for targeted goal-directedcognitive processes and actions. The coales-cence of the emotion-driven anticipatory pro-cesses, entrainment (organizing and integrativeprocesses), and the resultant individuation andsense of agency may have constituted the dawnof human consciousness (cf. Edelman 2006,Humphrey 2006, Langer 1967/1982).

TYPES OF EMOTION AND TYPESOF CONSCIOUSNESS

The concepts of consciousness and awarenesshave received very little attention in contem-porary psychology. With a few exceptions, thecontributors to a recently edited volume onemotion and consciousness dealt with many in-teresting issues other than some critical oneson the nature of consciousness and its relationto emotions (Barrett et al. 2005b). Most con-tributors explicitly or implicitly assumed that


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access or reflective consciousness was either theonly kind of consciousness or the only one thatmattered to psychologists (cf. Lambie & Marcel2002, Merker 2007).

Basic Emotions andPhenomenal Consciousness

It is quite reasonable to assume that human in-fants (and all nonhuman mammals; Panksepp2003a,b) have some form of consciousness(Izard et al. 2008b, Merker 2007). Wider accep-tance of this notion should save young infantsa lot of pain. Various invasive procedures (in-cluding circumcisions and needle pricks to drawblood for analyses) are still performed withoutanalgesic. The facial expression of infants un-dergoing such procedures constitutes the pro-totypical expression of pain. With increasingage, the prototypical expression of pain in re-sponse to these procedures alternates with theprototypical expression of anger (Izard et al.1987).

Developmental data suggest that young in-fants experience basic emotions (Izard et al.1995). Their inability to report their emotionexperiences via language rules out the idea thatthey experience emotions in access (verbally re-portable) consciousness and suggests that theiremotion feelings must occur in some otherlevel of awareness or in phenomenal conscious-ness. Current conceptualizations of phenom-enal consciousness, however, may not explainall emotion experiences in infancy (Izard et al.2008b).

Developmental scientists have obtained ev-idence that shows that prelinguistic infants notonly experience objects and events, but theyalso respond to and communicate nonverballyabout objects and events in meaningful ways(Izard et al. 2008b). Moreover, their experi-ence often involves emotion that is indexed byemotion-expressive behavior and other formsof action that influence the social and physicalworld (Claxton et al. 2003, Izard et al. 1995).Apparently, these behaviors reflect the devel-opment of different levels or complexities ofawareness, and further studies of them may of-

fer possibilities of extending current conceptu-alizations of ways to access phenomenologicalexperiences. These experiences do not fit pre-cisely into the categories of “phenomenal” or“access” consciousness as traditionally defined.Yet these experiences are surely part of theinfant’s phenomenology, and the functionalityof these experiential processes clearly demon-strates that they are accessible by noncogni-tive routes (Izard et al. 2008b, Merker 2007;cf. Block 2008).

Emotion Feelings andPhenomenal Consciousness

The conceptualization of emotion feeling as aphase of a neurobiological process is congru-ent with the idea that emotions can be sensedand registered in phenomenal consciousnessand at low levels of awareness without beingperceived. Such emotion feelings are often de-scribed erroneously, I think, as unconsciousemotion (cf. Clore et al. 2005, Lambie & Marcel2002). What may be unconscious is not the feel-ing but the perception of the feeling, and thislack of perception could account for the failureof the feeling to register in access conscious-ness. Insofar as emotion feeling is at bottomsensation, then generating a feeling ipso factogenerates a state of consciousness. Thus, anemotion feeling always registers in phenomenalconsciousness. Often, if not always, it also reg-isters in some other level of consciousness thatis accessible by various routes. After languageacquisition, emotion feelings can often (but notalways) be reported via symbolic processes. Inprelingual infants, young children, and otherswith insufficient emotion vocabulary, it maybe manifested in emotion-mediated behavior(cf. Izard et al. 2008b). Evidence suggests thatemotion feelings are operative and expressiblevia facial and body movement and other be-havior even when not reportable (cf. Lambie &Marcel 2002).

Happily, an enormous amount of informa-tion processing proceeds very well in the realmof the unconscious, but I propose that the func-tionality of emotion feelings (that are not in

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access or reflective consciousness) might beexplained better in terms of phenomenal orother levels of consciousness. The term “un-conscious” emotion implies nonfelt emotion. Itseems very difficult if not impossible to iden-tify and explain the mediators of the effectsof nonfelt or nonconscious emotion (e.g., deGelder 2005). Much of what has been callednonconscious emotion has not met the “re-quirement of deliberate probing by indirectmeasures” (Lambie & Marcel 2002, p. 16). Norhave data on unconscious emotions been ex-amined in terms of the functional correlates ofhypothesized emotion feelings. Such researchmight suggest replacing the concept of psycho-logical unconscious with that of phenomenalconsciousness or some other level of conscious-ness that cannot be verbally reported.

The concept of unlabeled, unarticulated,and linguistically inaccessible emotion feelingin phenomenal consciousness or some othercognitively inaccessible level of consciousnessis compatible with the notion that this compo-nent of emotion is felt and functions as a media-tor of behavior (cf. Clore et al. 2005, Izard et al.2008b, Lambie & Marcel 2002). Because it isfelt, the emotion feeling retains its characteris-tic motivational and informational qualities. Tosay that the feeling component of emotion canreside unfelt in phenomenal consciousness, anyother level of consciousness, or the unconsciousseems to be a pure non sequitur.

To acknowledge that the subjective compo-nent of emotion is felt and real in phenome-nal and other cognitively inaccessible levels ofconsciousness may inspire theory and researchon how an emotion feeling remains functionaland motivational without being symbolized andmade accessible in reflective consciousness vialanguage. Evidence of the functionality of emo-tion feelings in prelingual infants and chil-dren without a cerebral cortex seems to sup-port the argument for more research on thefunctionality of emotion feelings in phenom-enal consciousness. So do the observations thatpatients who suffer blindsight report feelingswithout having corresponding visual experi-ences (Weiskrantz 2001). On the other hand,

subjects with blindsight can perceive objectsand make accurate perceptual judgments with-out any corresponding sensation or feeling atall (Humphrey 2006). The extent to whichthese seemingly disparate observations on peo-ple with blindsight inform normative relationsamong perception, sensation, and emotion feel-ings is not yet clear. Neither are the effects andlimits of top-down control of sensation in rela-tion to perception and to emotion feelings andtheir registration at some level of consciousness(Buschman & Miller 2007).

Emotion Schemas andAccess Consciousness

Emotion feelings can operate in phenomenalconsciousness with little or no cognitive con-tent. This fact is easy to appreciate while re-membering that phenomenal experience is themodal variety in prelingual infants and non-human mammals. Although prelingual infantsapparently demonstrate higher levels of aware-ness than phenomenal consciousness, they def-initely cannot exhibit reflective consciousnessas traditionally defined in terms of cognitiveaccessibility.

Once development enables emotion expe-riences to become connected to higher-ordercognition, children begin to link emotion feel-ings and concepts and to form more and morecomplex emotion schemas. The language asso-ciated with a given emotion feeling in particularsituations becomes a tool in emotion manage-ment, self-regulation, and other executive func-tions (Izard et al. 2008a).

Gains and Losses in the Evolutionof Emotions and Consciousness

Darwin recognized many turns in evolutionthat pointed to the seeming cruelty of natu-ral selection—life-threatening parasites, killerreptiles, and the bloody work of preda-tors (Dawkins 1989). He also recognized theadaptive advantages in positive emotions andtheir expressions in social interactions: “ . . . themother smiles approval, and thus encourages


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her children on the right path, or frowns dis-approval” (Darwin 1872/1965, p. 304). Gainsrelated in some way to the emotions andtheir interactions with perception and cogni-tion may represent the finest—and possiblymost challenging—products of evolution.

Among the finest and most interesting prod-ucts of evolution was gaining the capacity forlanguage and eventually the learning of vocab-ulary for labeling emotions and describing andsharing emotion experiences. These gains alsohelped enable humans to anticipate future de-sirable and undesirable emotion feelings. Takentogether, these newly emerged capacities repre-sent enormous gains in executive functions, par-ticularly for understanding and managing emo-tions and self-regulation (Izard 2002, Izard et al.2008a). They have direct and indirect benefitsfor the cognitive and action processes involvedin adaptive idiosyncratic and social function-ing (Izard et al. 2008b, Lieberman et al. 2007).Some have argued that the enormous gains thatresulted from brain evolution, the acquisitionof language, and the accompanying increases incognitive abilities did not come without someaccompanying losses (Langer 1967/1982).

A possible loss: the evolutionary empathy-sympathy exchange. Basic empathy dependsmainly on neurophysiological response systemsthat do not require or involve the higher-order cognitive processes involved in sympa-thy (Hoffman 2000). Thus, long before humanevolution produced language and its accompa-nying cognitive prowess, a high-level of abilityfor empathy and empathic responding emergedin nonhuman animals (Langer 1967/1982).This great capacity for empathy apparentlyaccounts for the lack of con-specific preda-tion and cannibalism among nonhuman mam-mals. “Among the higher animals few, if any, ofthe carnivores—bears, wolves, lions and othergreat cats—habitually prey on their own kind”(Langer 1967/1982, Vol. 1, p. 141). They arerestrained from predation, not by signals of ap-peasement or surrender, but by “a ready em-pathetic response, so common and effectivethat it takes no principle, moral or other, to

safeguard the members of a species againsteach other’s appetites in ordinary conditions”(Langer 1967/1982, Vol. 1, p. 142).

The animal empathy that constitutes a safe-guard against con-specific predation establishesa special kind of relationship that enables an es-sentially physiological transmission of the “feel-ing of one creature to another so it appearsto the latter as its own” (Langer 1967/1982,Vol. 1, p. 140). In contrast, as the media are wontto remind us through blow-by-blow accounts offlagrantly aggressive and ethically and morallydevious behavior, humans prey on each otherwith considerable frequency. And such preda-tion often leads to death and destruction, evengenocide. Furthermore, although cannibalism(a total breakdown in empathy) is generally ab-sent among higher-order nonhuman animals, ithas been observed in many human cultures.

Compared to instantaneous empathy, sym-pathy depends in important ways on concep-tual processes (including the projected costsand benefits of helping) that are notably slowerand less certain of occurrence. Sympathetic re-sponses are also more subject to top-down con-trol (e.g., mental manipulations stemming frombiases and imagined consequences) than rapid,automatic, animal empathy. Thus, sympatheticresponses may often be too little and too latefor the victims of disasters, some of which re-sult from only slightly disguised human pre-dation exemplified in transactions between richand poor and between high- and low-status eth-nic groups. Thus, a potentially grave questionremains: Does the evolutionary shift in capaci-ties for empathy and sympathy represent a netloss or a net gain?

The pros and cons of unbridled imagina-tion. There is also some question as to whetherthe evolutionary increases in the power of imag-ination should be judged a net gain or lossin weighing the emotion-related products ofevolution. In some individuals and circum-stances, unbridled imagination can facilitatetragedies on a personal as well as a national andglobal scale. Imagination can be fueled by ei-ther positive or negative emotion feelings or the

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interaction of both, and in turn, it can pro-duce a cornucopia of both positive and nega-tive emotion stimuli and behavioral responses(cf. Langer 1967/1982). Imagination doubtlessplayed a role in the creation of nuclear weaponsand still plays a role in planning their projecteduses. It is also a factor in the development offactories, products, and policies that increaseglobal warming and the pollution of the earthand the atmosphere at a dangerous rate.

In contrast, during early ontogeny thefeeling-thought patterns of unbridled imagi-nation facilitate cognitive and social develop-ment from the first moment that the youngchild engages in make-believe or pretend play.In these developmental processes and through-out the life span, imagination remains part emo-tion feeling and part cognition. It continues toadd to individual and cultural accomplishmentsthrough the creative endeavors of artists andscientists.

Thus, “In the evolution of mind, imagina-tion is as dangerous as it is essential” (Langer1967/1982, Vol. 1, p. 137). Nurturing imagina-tion through the life span with a good balanceof emotion feelings and the encouragement ofempathy, sympathy, and reason, and an appreci-ation of how these ingredients can interact andwork together for the common good, ubiqui-tous peace, and the preservation and flourishingof the species seem equally essential.

Remarkable Gains from LinkingEmotion Feelings and Language

The process of symbolizing emotion in aware-ness has the potential to add significantly toadaptive personality and social functioning.Language is by far the most common method ofsymbolization across individuals and cultures,and researchers have verified at the behavioraland neural levels the positive effects of linkingwords to discrete emotion expressions and feel-ings (L. Greenberg & Paivio 1997, Izard 1971,Izard et al. 2008a, Kennedy-Moore & Watson1999, Lieberman et al. 2007). Major among thepositive effects that accrue when we can use lan-guage to symbolize emotion feelings, especially

in early development but also throughout thelife span, are those relating to increases in emo-tion knowledge, emotion regulation, and emo-tion utilization.

Emotion utilization is the harnessing ofan emotion’s inherently adaptive motivation/feeling component in constructive affective-cognitive processes and actions (Izard 1971,2002, 2007a; Izard et al. 2008c; cf. Mayer& Salovey 1997). Emotion utilization involvesspontaneous as well as planned actions, and itis conceptually different from direct attemptsto regulate emotion or emotion-related behav-ior (cf. Eisenberg & Spinrad 2004). Althoughemotion regulation and emotion utilization aredifferent constructs, they interact dynamically.Emotion utilization may be viewed as the op-timal mode of emotion regulation, and variousforms of the latter enhance the former.

It would be difficult to overestimate the sig-nificance of the civilizing and socializing effectsof learning to recognize, articulate, and uti-lize emotion feelings constructively, not onlyin early development but also throughout thelife span. A key process here is developing con-nections between feelings, words, and thoughts.Unfortunately, linking emotion feelings to mal-adaptive thoughts like those that characterizeracism, sexism, ageism, unbridled profit mo-tives, and plans for vengeance, revenge, or ter-rorism can wreak extensive havoc to individu-als, ethnic groups, and all of human kind. Foran abundance of evidence supporting the fore-going assertion, read history and watch or listento any daily news program.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES ANDTOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Two unresolved issues seem to impede scien-tific advances in the study of consciousness andlevels of awareness. The first concerns the roleof phenomenal consciousness and various lin-guistically inaccessible levels of awareness in re-search on mind and behavior. The second con-cerns the relation of phenomenal consciousnessand the psychological unconscious, their simi-larities and differences.


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Psychologists’ Neglect ofPhenomenal Consciousness

Several factors may have contributed to thegeneral neglect of phenomenal consciousnessin psychological theory and research. The firstis a long-standing reluctance to acknowledgethe extent to which emotions drive cognitionand action and the possibility that some ofthe driving emotions register only in phenom-enal consciousness. The second is the strongtendency of mainstream psychology to neglectdevelopmental perspectives on critical issuesand thus to ignore evidence of the existenceand functionality of phenomenal consciousnessand other linguistically inaccessible levels ofawareness in early development and probablyin various forms of psychopathology. A thirdproblem is that many psychologists think thatmost emotions are episodic, of limited duration,and in focal awareness. A related misconceptionis that once an emotion episode ends, the mindis free for purely rational processes. This no-tion persists despite eloquent arguments sug-gesting that there is no such thing as purereason (Creighton 1921, Langer 1967/1982),especially in relation to personally or sociallysignificant matters. Evidence suggests that inhumans it may not be possible to study cog-nition and emotion separately (Lewis 2005,Phelps 2006). This conclusion is quite consis-tent with the present position, if the term “emo-tion” refers to emotion schemas.

A more appropriate goal would be to developmore effective ways to study emotion-cognitioninteractions and integration/mingling and con-sequent behavior change, particularly in re-search that involves constructs like emotionschemas (Izard 1977, 2007a), emotional inter-pretations (Lewis 2005), or affective-cognitiveunits (Mischel & Shoda 1995). This would in-clude most emotion research that does not focuson basic negative emotion episodes.

A final and perhaps most worrisome reasonwhy phenomenal consciousness is still not a ma-jor concern of psychologists is that it is con-flated with the psychological “unconscious.”Clearly, a vast amount of the processes of the

brain and the rest of the body (blood circulation,digestion) often do occur without our awarenessof them and, in normal circumstances, with-out direct effects on thought and action. Whensignificant behavioral effects do occur withoutreadily observable causes, they are often as-signed to the psychological unconscious, wheremechanisms are difficult to identify and explain(Kihlstrom 1999).

More parsimonious and accurate explana-tions of unconscious behavior might accrue ifwe looked for mediators of thought and action(e.g., emotions) that reside in phenomenal con-sciousness. An example is the phenomenolog-ical (feeling) component of an unlabeled andthus unarticulated emotion experience, a feel-ing that you know you are experiencing but can-not specifically identify or describe. Inability toput the feeling into words bars it from linguisticaccessibility and thus from access consciousnessas typically defined, but not from phenomenalconsciousness and various levels of awareness.An emotion feeling in phenomenal and othernonlinguistic levels of consciousness retains itsproperties, including its power to motivate andregulate cognition and action. Thus, conceptu-alizing fully functional emotion feelings as pro-cesses in phenomenal consciousness (Panksepp2005) provides an alternative way of explainingmuch of what has been attributed by others tothe psychological unconscious (e.g., Kihlstrom1999, Winkielman et al. 2005; cf. Clore et al.2005, Lambie & Marcel 2002).

Concern about types of consciousness maystimulate further thought and research aboutwhich mental processes relate to phenomenalconsciousness and which are truly unconscious.Such research could look for processes that re-side at a level of awareness that is unavailable viacognitive or verbal access but not necessarily viaother forms of access. Several types of nonver-bal behaviors reflect the operations of mentalprocesses that clearly are not in linguisticallyaccessible consciousness and that may reside inphenomenal consciousness (Izard et al. 2008b;cf. Merker 2007). The lack of linguistic acces-sibility does not render an emotion or emotionfeeling nonfunctional.

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Phenomenal consciousness and other formsof linguistically inaccessible consciousness maybe better concepts for psychology than is theconcept of unconscious. The latter concept isnotoriously vague and ill defined in the psycho-logical literature. Dictionary definitions char-acterize it as not conscious as a state, withoutawareness, or sensation, virtually nonphysical,and thus make some uses of it very close to thedomains of spookiness and Cartesian dualism.

The Psychological Unconscious:A Default Explanatory Construct?

Although there is considerable agreement onthe qualities of thought processes in psycholog-ical or access (verbally reportable) conscious-ness, there is no consensus on the contentsand processes of the unconscious (cf. Bargh &Morsella 2008). The behavior of prelingual in-fants suggests that it is not prudent to labelall verbally unreportable processes as uncon-scious, a practice that may impede or misguidethe search for causal processes. Better heuris-tics might come from the conceptualization ofcausal-process mechanisms operating at differ-ent levels of awareness and as accessible by mul-tiple behaviors other than verbal report. Divid-ing the mind and all mental processes into twodomains—conscious and unconscious—mightbe the greatest oversimplification in currentpsychological science. Moreover, misattribu-tion of causal processes to the unconscious mayopen a Pandora’s Box replete with blind alleysand dead ends.

Four things have contributed to psycholo-gists’ penchant for attributing causal processesto the unconscious rather than to emotion feel-ings, including emotion feelings in phenom-enal consciousness. First, many psychologistshave typically looked for nonemotion media-tors to explain changes in cognition and ac-tion. Second, emotion feelings (and their rolesin influencing cognitive processes) are notori-ously difficult to identify and describe in words(Creighton 1921, Langer 1967/1982). How-ever, infants and young children experienceemotions and respond to them in meaningful

ways long before they can label or describeemotions (Izard et al. 2008b). Such evidencepoints to the utility of assessing emotion feel-ings by measuring their functional correlates.Third, many psychologists remain reluctant toattribute to emotion a significant causal role inordinary as well as critical thinking, decisionmaking, and action despite a growing body ofevidence to the contrary (e.g., Bechara et al.2000, De Martino et al. 2006, Lerner & Tiedens2006, Miller 2006, Naqvi et al. 2006). Fourth,many psychological scientists tend to think thatemotions are typically brief and that emotionfeelings are always sufficiently intense to graband hold attention. Actually, plausible argu-ments suggest that emotion feelings are phe-nomena that vary on a very wide dimension ofintensity while retaining their functional/causalproperties (Izard 2007a).

Emerging Issues: ContinuousEmotion, Memes, and the MirrorNeuron System

The topics of continuous emotion or contin-uous emotion-cognition interaction and inte-gration, memes, and the mirror neuron system(MNS) may prove to be critical for emotion sci-ence and to psychology in general. The idea ofcontinuous emotion in phenomenal conscious-ness or access consciousness will prove diffi-cult to address in empirical research, but thatmay soon change with improved technology forstudying brain-emotion-behavior relations. Al-ready there is some convergence among theo-rists and researchers who argue that there is nosuch thing as a conscious mind without emotionor affect (Izard 2007a; cf. Lewis 2005, Phelps2006, Russell 2003). The other two, memesand the MNS, relate to emotion and behaviorin ways not completely understood. Yet, theyhave already become hot topics for those in-terested in new approaches to understandingwithin- and across-generations transmission ofcognitive and action structures and the neurobi-ological bases for the transmission of emotionfeelings in empathy and the processes in em-pathic and sympathetic responding.


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Continuous Emotion-CognitionInteraction

The notion that some emotion or emotion-cognition interaction is continuous in phenom-enal or access consciousness or some level ofawareness is not new (e.g., Bacon 1620/1968).The hypothesis implicit in that idea may provedifficult to falsify. Yet, without the attributionof causal power to emotion (feeling) and theconcept of continual emotion-cognition inter-action, we may have no way to explain selectiveattention. And selective attention is a necessaryfactor in the simplest forms of exploration andlearning as well as in higher-order cognitionand sequences of organized behavior.

I have hypothesized that the brain auto-matically generates the emotion of interest tocapture and sustain attention to particular ob-jects, events, and goals. This mode of oper-ation is standard when the brain is not re-sponding to internal or external conditionsthat activate other emotions, emotion schemas,or emotion-cognition-environment interac-tions (Izard 2007a; cf. Panksepp 2003a,b).

A major challenge for future research is tounderstand how emotion and cognition behavein their continual interaction. One possibilityis that they achieve complete integration andinfluence behavior as a unified force or singlefactor. However, I propose that although emo-tion and cognition continually interact, theydo not lose their separate identities. They re-tain separate and distinct functional proper-ties (cf. Pessoa 2008). Whereas emotion feel-ing undoubtedly contains a kind of information(Clore et al. 2001) or cues for behavior (Izard1971, 2007a), emotion remains primarily aboutmotivation. Cognition (particularly about goalconcepts that typically have an emotion com-ponent) may be conceived as having a moti-vational aspect, but it remains primarily aboutknowledge.

Memes and Emotions

Memes are one of several epigenetic mecha-nisms that challenge the dominance of DNAas the central life force (cf. Noble 2006). Nat-

ural selection may operate on not only genes,DNA, or RNA. It can also act on “replicant”units (memes) that consist of cognition and ac-tion patterns, things other than biological struc-tures that can be transmitted through imitativelearning (Dawkins 1989). Apparently, memesemerged to serve unique adaptive functions insocial interactions.

In the course of evolution, the brain contin-ued to evolve and increase in complexity un-til learning via imitation became a major toolin the human repertoire and a way of acquir-ing memes. Imitation and make-believe play inearly development should prove a fertile groundfor studying the transmission of memes. Evennewborn infants can imitate simple facial be-havior (Meltzoff & Moore 1994) that may con-stitute part of the emotion expressions that theydisplay later in infancy (Izard et al. 1995). Byage three years, children show great imitativeskills while enjoying the fantasyland of make-believe play and learning socioemotional skillsby assuming the roles of persons far beyondthem in age, knowledge, skills, and experience.Thus, it was both phylogenetic transmissionand the highly creative processes of ontoge-netic development (Noble 2006) that producedthe capacity for imitative learning, which inturn essentially created a context where memescould replicate and compete ( Jablonka & Lamb2005).

Though memes were originally describedin terms of cognition and action patterns(Dawkins 1989), the exclusion of emotion asa component may have been inadvertent. In-deed, emotion schemas seem perfect candidatesfor attaining status as memes. They not onlyhave a cognitive component but also an emo-tion component and a kind of action compo-nent (the action tendencies in emotion states;Izard 2007a,b). Thus, emotion schemas are wellsuited to emerge and operate as memes. Theiremotion feeling component is often expressedthrough facial, vocal, and body-movement sig-nals that are easily imitated, even by youngchildren. In addition, imitating the expressivebehavior of another person may activate neu-ral and sensory motor processes that increase

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the likelihood of experiencing the emotion (andaction tendencies) of the other person (Izard1990, Niedenthal 2007). Young children’s im-itation of their parents’ positive emotion ex-pressions and interactions may contribute tothe development of memes that represent sig-nificant social skills. Thus, emotion-schemamemes (ESMs) as replicant units with a feel-ing/motivational component seem to be an ex-pectable (epigenetic) extension of biogenetic-evolutionary processes.

Because emotions are contagious (Hatfieldet al. 1993, Tomkins 1962), memes thatare essentially emotion schemas can propa-gate profusely. They can do so for two rea-sons. First, such schemas have the attention-grabbing and motivational power of an emotion(Youngstrom & Izard 2008). Second, they arehighly functional phenomena independent oftheir relations to biological fitness and survival(cf. Aunger 2002, Blackmore 1999, Distin2004). The idea that an emotion schema mightform a replicant unit opens another door to in-vestigations of the transfer of adaptive as wellas maladaptive patterns of emotion, cognition,and action within and across generations.

Emotion schema memes begin to developearly in ontogeny, become plentiful, and mayrelate substantially to the MNS. There has beena surge of interest in the MNS, in part becauseit may be among the neural substrates of so-cial perspective taking and empathy (e.g., Carret al. 2003, Keysers & Perrett 2004, Rizzolatti& Craighero 2004).

Mirror Neuron Systems,Emotions, and Empathy

If the concept of memes becomes a staple in psy-chology, it may happen for two reasons. First,perhaps the most interesting and socially signif-icant memes have an emotion component andare essentially emotion schemas whose behav-ioral manifestations (facial, vocal, gestural ex-pressions of emotion) can be readily observedand analyzed. Second, they may depend in parton the MNS, which seems to mediate capabil-ities for perspective taking and empathy. The

Emotion-schemamemes (ESMs):epigenetic emotion-cognition processesderived from mimicryof emotion-expressivecognition and actionand endowed withmotivation forinfluencingdevelopment andbehavior

MNS may enable one to take the perspec-tive of another and provide the shared emo-tion feeling that defines the essence of empathy(cf. Dapretto et al. 2006, Keysers & Perrett2004). The MNS apparently translates one’ssensory-perceptual experiences and accompa-nying conceptions of the expressions and move-ments of others into patterns of neural activityin the observer (cf. Langer 1967/1982). Thisneural activity and its products help the ob-server to understand and predict the thoughtsand feelings of the observed person.

The MNS may relate to sympathy and al-truism as well. The cognitive component of anemotion schema, in interaction with its feelingcomponent, may transform empathy to sym-pathy. This transformation would entail a shiftfrom a response governed primarily by neuro-physiological or motor-system contagion to onethat requires conceptual processes (cf. Langer1967/1982). An MNS that facilitates sympathy,altruism, and mimetic processes would facilitatehighly adaptive advantages (Miller 2008, Talmi& Frith 2007).

Empathy alone is not always sufficientto motivate helping behavior (Rosenthal1964/1999). The cognition (particularly the ac-tion plans) in an ESM provides the context forits feeling component, and the interaction ofthe cognition and feeling in the meme can guidesympathetic actions. Dysfunction of the MNSmay help account for the deficits in socializationthat are observed in autism spectrum disorders(Oberman & Ramachandran 2007) and in an-tisocial personality or perhaps in any disorderinvolving deficits or dysfunction in social skills(Iacoboni 2007).

The possibility that the MNS and associatedemotion systems mediate the generation andpropagation of memes suggests the fruitfulnessof studying memes that can be clearly identi-fied as ESMs. ESMs should prove plentiful be-cause they have an enormous appeal to forcesthat generate and propagate memes. The emo-tion component of an ESM has the motivationalpower to influence perception, grab attention,generate more emotion-cognition structures,and influence action. ESMs may constitute a


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major factor that shapes consciousness, per-sonality and social functioning, and culture(Youngstrom & Izard 2008).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Emotion research has increased exponentiallysince Tomkins’s (1962, 1963) landmark volumeshelped bring a nascent emotion science into anunevenly matched competition with the forcesof the contemporaneous revolution that pro-duced cognitive science. The two disciplines arebecoming increasingly collaborative and pro-

gressing toward becoming one. As the realiza-tion of this exciting prospect proceeds, greatchallenges await scientists who will seek to un-derstand how the brain assigns weights or sig-nificance to emotion and cognition (which as-sumedly retain distinct functions) as they areintegrated or mingled in different periods ofdevelopment, personalities, and contexts. Theywill find equally interesting challenges in re-search on ways to facilitate these processes togain adaptive advantages, bolster constructiveand creative endeavors, and prevent destructiveand maladaptive behavior.

SUMMARY POINTS

1. Emotion feelings are a phase of neurobiological activity and the key psychologi-cal/motivational aspect of emotion. They constitute the primary motivational systemsfor human behavior.

2. Emotion feelings are prime factors in the evolution, organization, and operations ofconsciousness and the different levels of awareness.

3. The ability to symbolize feelings and put them into words provides a powerful tool foremotion regulation, influencing emotion-cognition relations, and developing high-levelsocial skills.

4. The term “emotion” has defied definition mainly because it is multifaceted and nota unitary phenomenon or process. Use of the unqualified term “emotion” makes formisunderstandings, contradictions, and confusions in theory and research.

5. Basic emotions, emotion schemas, and emotion-schema memes are distinctly differentin terms of their origin, content, causes, and effects.

6. Transitions from basic emotions to emotion schemas and emotion-schema memes aremajor milestones in development and in achieving social and emotion competence.

7. The psychological unconscious is an ill-defined and potentially misleading term. Thereis no consensus regarding its contents and functions. The concept of levels of awarenessmay provide a better bridge to understanding human mentality and brain/mind processes.

8. Emotion utilization is the harnessing of an emotion’s inherently adaptive emotion moti-vation/feeling component in constructive affective-cognitive processes and actions. Sym-bolization and effective communication of emotion feelings play a key role in emotionutilization, particularly in real or simulated social interactions.

9. The concept of emotion-cognition interaction, well validated in neuroscience and be-havioral research, suggests that the presence of functionally distinct features in the in-teractants would increase both the flexibility and generality of the resultant processes.

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FUTURE ISSUES

1. Experimental validation of the hypothesis that the feeling component of some emotionor emotion schema is continuous at some level of awareness should prove an interestingchallenge for future research. So should studies designed to verify the hypothesis thatinterest or an interest schema is the default emotion or emotion-cognition interaction.

2. Insights on the early development and life-span growth of emotion-schema memes shouldadd substantially to our understanding of the contributions of social and cultural factorsin mental processes and behavior.

3. Distinguishing between emotion regulation and emotion utilization may provide newinsights on the independence and interdependence of these two constructs.

4. Determining how the emotion and cognitive components of emotion schemas andemotion-schema memes integrate or mingle in the brain should provide leads for trans-lational research. The findings from such research should contribute to preventive in-terventions that facilitate the development of emotion and social competence and theprevention of psychopathology.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of thisreview.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Work on this article was supported by National Institute of Mental Health grants R21 MH068443and R01 MH080909.

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AR364-FM ARI 11 November 2008 15:42

Annual Review ofPsychology

Volume 60, 2009Contents

Prefatory

Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions,and Emerging IssuesCarroll E. Izard � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

Concepts and Categories

Concepts and Categories: A Cognitive Neuropsychological PerspectiveBradford Z. Mahon and Alfonso Caramazza � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �27

Judgment and Decision Making

Mindful Judgment and Decision MakingElke U. Weber and Eric J. Johnson � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �53

Comparative Psychology

Comparative Social CognitionNathan J. Emery and Nicola S. Clayton � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �87

Development: Learning, Cognition, and Perception

Learning from Others: Children’s Construction of ConceptsSusan A. Gelman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 115

Early and Middle Childhood

Social Withdrawal in ChildhoodKenneth H. Rubin, Robert J. Coplan, and Julie C. Bowker � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 141

Adulthood and Aging

The Adaptive Brain: Aging and Neurocognitive ScaffoldingDenise C. Park and Patricia Reuter-Lorenz � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 173

Substance Abuse Disorders

A Tale of Two Systems: Co-Occurring Mental Health and SubstanceAbuse Disorders Treatment for AdolescentsElizabeth H. Hawkins � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 197

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Therapy for Specific Problems

Therapy for Specific Problems: Youth Tobacco CessationSusan J. Curry, Robin J. Mermelstein, and Amy K. Sporer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 229

Adult Clinical Neuropsychology

Neuropsychological Assessment of DementiaDavid P. Salmon and Mark W. Bondi � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 257

Child Clinical Neuropsychology

Relations Among Speech, Language, and Reading DisordersBruce F. Pennington and Dorothy V.M. Bishop � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 283

Attitude Structure

Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective AffinitiesJohn T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 307

Intergroup relations, stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination

Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessmentof Research and PracticeElizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. Green � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 339

Cultural Influences

Personality: The Universal and the Culturally SpecificSteven J. Heine and Emma E. Buchtel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 369

Community Psychology

Community Psychology: Individuals and Interventions in CommunityContextEdison J. Trickett � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 395

Leadership

Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future DirectionsBruce J. Avolio, Fred O. Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 421

Training and Development

Benefits of Training and Development for Individuals and Teams,Organizations, and SocietyHerman Aguinis and Kurt Kraiger � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 451

Marketing and Consumer Behavior

Conceptual ConsumptionDan Ariely and Michael I. Norton � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 475

viii Contents

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Psychobiological Mechanisms

Health Psychology: Developing Biologically Plausible Models Linkingthe Social World and Physical HealthGregory E. Miller, Edith Chen, and Steve Cole � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 501

Health and Social Systems

The Case for Cultural Competency in Psychotherapeutic InterventionsStanley Sue, Nolan Zane, Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, and Lauren K. Berger � � � � � � � � � � 525

Research Methodology

Missing Data Analysis: Making It Work in the Real WorldJohn W. Graham � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 549

Psychometrics: Analysis of Latent Variables and Hypothetical Constructs

Latent Variable Modeling of Differences and Changes withLongitudinal DataJohn J. McArdle � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 577

Evaluation

The Renaissance of Field Experimentation in Evaluating InterventionsWilliam R. Shadish and Thomas D. Cook � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 607

Timely Topics

Adolescent Romantic RelationshipsW. Andrew Collins, Deborah P. Welsh, and Wyndol Furman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 631

Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror NeuronsMarco Iacoboni � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 653

Predicting Workplace Aggression and ViolenceJulian Barling, Kathryne E. Dupre, and E. Kevin Kelloway � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 671

The Social Brain: Neural Basis of Social KnowledgeRalph Adolphs � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 693

Workplace Victimization: Aggression from the Target’s PerspectiveKarl Aquino and Stefan Thau � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 717

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 50–60 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 743

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 50–60 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 748

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Psychology articles may be found athttp://psych.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml

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