issn:2241-438x nmio tc · 41 somali piracy: following the paper trail ... commandant’s editorial...
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Marime Interdicon Operaons journaljournal
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nmiotcIssue 7Issue 7
July 2013July 2013ISSN:2241-438XISSN:2241-438X
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nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjooUUrrnnAAllppUUbblliiSShheerrnmiotc Souda bay, cretezip 73200, Greecetelephone:2821085716
ddiirreeccttoorr commodore i. pavlopoulos Grc n commandant nmiotc
eexxeeccUUttiivvee ddiirreeccttoorrcdr G. tedeschini itA ndireor of training Support
jjooUUrrnnAAll mmAAnnAAGGeerrcdr. K. Sampanis Grc n
eeddiittoorrlt cdr n.Ariatzis Grc n
wweebb eeddiittoorrcpo K. boutsifakou Grc n
AAddmmiinniiSSttrrAAttiioonn AAnnddddiiSSttrriibbUUttiioonnenS K. papanastasis Grc n
eeddiittoorriiAAll bbooAArrdddr. Alex bordetskydr marios efthymiopoulosdr joship Kasumdr p. michalasdr S. desautelprofessor i. Koukosprofessor G. tsialtasprofessor n. nikitakosprofessor f. papoulias
ccoollUUmmnniiSSttSSlt G. Georgiev bGr n
ccoonnttrriibbUUttoorrSSmr eric follstadmr martin wooleydr ronald Kesselmr david wikoffAdmiral(ret) p.chinofotisdrSiousouras petrosKyriakidis Kleanthisphddr marios efthymiopouloscdr harvey l.Scottmr ingo Klaus wamsermr pierre St. hilaire
2 Issue 7, July 2013
44 ccoommmmAAnnddAAnnttSS eeddiittoorriiAAllby commodore ioannis pavlopoulos Grc n
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1144 cc33ppoo:: AAnn eexxAAmmppllee ooff SSmmAArrtt ddeeffeennSSee AAtt tthheeSSeerrvviiccee ooff tthhee bbooAArrddeerrSS
by cdr G.A.tedeschini itA(n), nmiotc training Support director
1166 jjccttdd cc33ppoo mmiilliittAArryy UUttiilliittyy AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt
by mr eric follstad, US centcom Science and technology
2200 AAddvvAAnncceedd SSiittUUAAttiioonnAAll AAwwAArreenneeSSSS ttrrAAiinniinnGG by mr martin wooley, orbiS operations llc, nAto Act c-ied ipt
2233 nnoonn--lleetthhAAll ccAAppAAbbiilliittiieeSS iinn mmAArriittiimmeeSSeeccUUrriittyy
by dr ronald Kessel, cmre
2288 bbiioommeettrriiccSS iinn nnAAttoo mmiiooby mr david wikoff, US eUcom biometric s lno
3311 eeffffeeccttiivvee ccooooppeerrAAttiioonn:: tthhee bbeeddrrooccKK ooffAAnnyy SSeeccUUrriittyy AArrcchhiitteeccttUUrree
by Admiral (ret) p.chinofotis Grc n,
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by by dr. Siousiouras petros & Kyriakidis Kleanthis, phd
3399 SSppeecciiAAlliizzAAttiioonn AAnndd pprreeppAArreeddnneeSSSSiinn ccooUUnntteerriinnGG eemmeerrGGiinnGG tthhrreeAAttSS AAtt SSeeAA
by dr marios efthymiopoulos, Strategy international ceo
4411 SSoommAAllii ppiirrAAccyy:: ffoolllloowwiinnGG tthhee ppAAppeerr ttrrAAiill
by mr pierre St. hilaire, head of interpol maritime piracy task force
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by commander (ret) harvey l. Scott USn
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by mr ingo Klaus wamser
Issue 7, July 2013 3
e nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall is a professional publication of nAto maritime interdiction op-erational training center, aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovativethinking on nAto maritime interdiction related issues such as doctrine, concepts, force structure, em-ployment and readiness.
e views and opinions expressed or implied in the nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall are those of theauthors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of nAto.e nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall is open to receive and publish articles at [email protected] we reserve the right to make editorial changes.
All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice (), may be reproduced in whole orin part without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice () may be reproduced for anynAto purpose but without permission. if an article is being reproduced, the nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaallrequests a courtesy line. to obtain permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice() for other than nAto purposes, please contact the author of the material rather than the nnmmiioottccmmiioo jjoouurrnnaall..
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piracy, or robbery on the high seas, has alwaysexisted since people, commercial goods and commoditieshave traveled through the oceans, and ever since thebeginning of State-sponsored navies, the suppressionof piracy has been one of their major concern andresponsibility.
e ancient Greeks, romans, and chinese had thecommon complaint and concern, and thus created navalforces to bght pirates.
As early as 74 b.c., when julius caesar was capturedby pirates during his journey to rodos, the brst thing hedid after paying the ransom and being released was to btout a squadron of ships to sail against those pirates andto take his revenge.
e word piracy is derived from the ancient latinword pirata (sea robber) and even earlier from theGreek term peirates (those who attack ships). piracy,
though, has evolved over time, as maritime commercialtrade expanded.
e frightening increase in piracy off the coast ofSomalia since the beginning of the present centurydemonstrates how fast this kind of threat can evolve andhow severe the difficulties in understanding andsubduing it can be.
e collapse of the Siad barre regime, in 1991,resulted in the creation of a period of instability inSomalia. between 1991 and 1995 the considerablemaritime traffic transiting through the important lanesof passage off the horn of Africa was effectivelymonitored by the naval task force associated with theUnited nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia(UnoSom i and ii). ese routes were historicallyused for all shipping movements towards the Gulf ofAden and the red Sea, and in most cases ships passedquite close to the Somali coast to achieve a moreeconomical passage.
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4 Issue 7,July 2013
NMIOTC Journal>>>Commandants Editorial
by commodore ioannis pavlopoulos Grc n
when the United nations forces left, in 1995,Somalia had no effective government and was not able tomaintain a continuous monitoring of the waters off itscoasts, hence it fell into a period of clan warfare.
e chaotic situation ashore and the damage incictedto the economy and the infrastructure of the countryhad a very important effect on the seas.
for generations, offshore bshing represented the onlyregular and signibcant livelihood for many coastalvillages, communities and families. ese bshermendepended entirely on the rich bshing off the Somali coastand they operated from small dhows, boats or woodencanoes, or more recently from modern small motorizedbberglass skiffs. ey used traditional techniques, mainlyusing nets to gather their catch and then off-loading thetake for sale upon returning to shore.
in 1995 the Somali region found itself exposed touncontrolled foreign exploitation, as large commercialbshing vessels started crossing and working off the coastof Somalia, very often also within the countrys territorialwaters, interfering with traditional domestic bshing areasalong the shoreline.
e presence of these large-scale bshing vesselssignibcantly impacted the activities of the boatsconstituting the local bshing ceet, and placed the coastalsubsistence and the local economy based on traditionalbshing practices in danger. e piracy problem in thearea emerged from this context.
many former bshermen became pirates, and armedthemselves with weapons which were easily available dueto the bghting among the Somali clans in their strugglefor power.
e Somali waters, with a coastline of more than2.000 miles, soon became one of the worlds mostdangerous areas for piracy.
when clashes between local bshermen andcommercial bshing vessels began, no central governmentexisted to set the whole problem in a national context,with legal agreements and power to effectively enforcelegality.
no clan or presumptive central authority intervenedto prevent an uncontrolled escalation, and the initiallylegitimate effort to limit the foreign exploitation ofSomali resources turned into the modern piracybusiness.
As their illicit activities proved to be lucrative, piratesprogressively increased the range of their activities, andwhen they made their leap to the high seas, they started
looking for much larger commercial vessels as victims.
e skiffs employed were the same small bberglassmotorized boats that are extremely common along thecoastline, and with which all bshermen among whompirates were recruited were very familiar.
ey naturally still used the traditional tools availableto Somali bshermen, but with some tactical rebnement.
by 2004 the pirates began to use multiple skiffs intheir work. A larger skiff provided room for theprovisions of food and water needed to sustain the piratecrew for up to two weeks and at a range of two hundrednautical miles, just as a bshing party would do. it couldalso provide the means and space for storing andrepairing bshing nets, mirroring the more traditionaloccupation and habits of the local crews.
in this way, while looking for their targets, thesebshermen-turned-pirates appeared no different from themajority of the local maritime presence, and a patrolvessel or a potential prey could hardly notice thedifference at distance between a pirate and a legitimatebsherman.
in response to the increased threat of piracy off theSomali coast, on the 2nd of june 2008 the Un Securitycouncil adopted resolution 1816, observing thatSomalia lacks the capacity to interdict pirates or patroland secure its territorial waters. is resolutionauthorized, for an initial period of six months thenextended, foreign naval vessels to enter Somali territorialwaters and to use all necessary means to repress acts ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea, consistent with existingand relevant provisions of international law.
e resolution, and the consequent internationaleffort against piracy, resulted in a progressive reductionof the presence of pirates and in the decrease of thenumber of successful attacks to commercial maritimefreight, but it did not address the underlying factors thatgenerated the phenomenon. in looking for a solution, itis necessary to recall the history of the problem: theSomali situation emerged from the inability of localbshermen to preserve their resources and livelihood.us, the long-term solution to this problem should gobeyond traditional coalitions, formal alliances and thedefeat of individual targets, as the phenomenon of piracycannot be defeated at sea.
naval vessels patrolling the Gulf of Aden, the Somalibasin and the indian ocean, while being effective inensuring the protection of merchant vessels transitingthe area of high piracy risk, address the symptoms butnot the cause. And history suggests that in naval
Issue 7, July2013 5
NMIOTC Journal Commandants Editorial
6 Issue 7, July 2013
NMIOTC Journal>>> Commandants Editorial
operations as well as in international or regional disputes,prosperity and rule of law cannot be injected surgically,but it is rather necessary to create the social, cultural andeconomic conditions for an enduring safe and secureenvironment.
it is of high importance to remember at this point,what the Secretary General of imo, mr. Koji Seikimizu,said once more in march 2013 regarding the currentcounter piracy situation:
we must be thankful for the efforts of theinternational naval forces and their robust operationsand to the shipping industry for the increasing adherenceto bmp and for embracing a culture of heightenedsecurity. but it is too early to claim victory and whilstthe navies and bmp continue to suppress the piratesuccesses at sea, we must increase our efforts to addressthe roots of the problem in Somalia, and create bettermaritime security capacity in the region.
is basically means that, we have partially fulblledour mission but the threat is still there. needless tomention that armed robbery at sea is still considered ahigh threat for the international shipping community inthe western part of Africa, where the phenomenon is ina different format and exceedingly more berce actionsare taking place.
in the end, the solution to piracy is as local as the lostlivelihood of a former bsherman recruited as a pirate ina camp along the Somali coast, and as global as thecommon interest of the international community andof all littoral countries to see their merchant vessels sailthe oceans safely to ensure a courishing commerce.
if we can see the coexistence of these two aspects ofthe problem and act accordingly, the region will be ableto bnd once again both the necessary rule of law and aneffective way to grant its own sustainment.
in this scenario, as professional sailors serving in thenAto maritime interdiction operational trainingcenter, we are strongly committed and aware of our role,being proud to effectively contribute to the internationaleffort against piracy by delivering valuable dedicatedtraining to nAto and non-nAto units designated toparticipate to the counter-piracy operations in the Gulfof Aden and the Somali basin, such as the nAto-ledoperation ocean Shield and the eU-led operationAtlanta, and additionally contributing to the regionalcapacity building efforts of imo, by providing specibctraining to military and law enforcement personnel ofthe djibouti code of conduct countries.
CCoommmmooddoorree IIooaannnniiss PPaavvllooppoouullooss was born in the city ofessaloniki (northern Greece) on April 13th, 1961. Hegraduated the Hellenic Naval Academy and was commissioned asEnsign in June 1983.
His specialties are Officer of Navy Special Forces' andCommunication Officer. He attended the basic training courseof the Underwater Demolition School, the static line and free-falling parachuting course of the Army, unconventional warfarein the U.S. and several NATO SoF courses in Germany.
He served on several types of warships (destroyers, guidedmissile patrol boats, landing crafts) as a Communication andNavigation Officer and as an XO onboard DDG KIMON.
He spent most of his sea carrier onboard amphibious ships.He was assigned as Commanding Officer on the HS RODOS(LST type) from 1995 to 1997 and as Operations Staff Officerin the Landing Fleet Command from 1999 to 2000. FromAugust 2005 to September 2006 he assumed the duties ofCommanding Officer on HS SAMOS.
From 1989 to 1994 he served in the Navy's Special Forces asan operational team leader and staff officer. He accomplishedseveral missions (boarding officer during IRAQ crises in 1990 inthe Red Sea, during UN sanctions imposed on Former Yugoslaviain the Adriatic Sea in the years 1992 and 1994, security teamleader of ex-USSR President Michael Gorbachov and the Chiefsof the US Armed Forces in 1993).
From September 2006 till July 2008 he was assigned asCommandant of the Navy's Special Forces.
In 1993 he served for six months under the United Nations
Gag in northern IRAQ as a UN guard team leader. From 1997 to 1999 he served in the Naval Academy as
Director/Major of the Naval Cadets' battalion. After his graduation from the Naval War College in 2000 he
served as Head of the Current Operations Planning Department(J3) in the Hellenic Navy General Staff (2000 to 2002); NavalAttach of the Embassy of Greece in Paris/France (2002-2005),Deputy Director in the Naval Staff Officers' Course School(2009-2010) and Director of the Athens Multinational SealiftCoordination Center (2010-2012).
Being promoted at the rank of Commodore the 1st of August2012, he has been assigned as Commandant of the NMIOTCon the 28th of August 2012.
He bears the Gold Cross Phoenix battalion, the PeaceOperations' medal (3 ops), the Military Merit, the SuccessfulCommand medals and the Gold Cross of Honor battalion.
e States of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also decoratedhim for his participation in the operations for the liberation ofKuwait. He has also been decorated with the Peace Operationsmedal of the United Nations and the expert riGe-shooting awardof the US ARMY.
On June 2006, he was decorated by the French Republicas "Chevalier dans l'Ordre National du Merite" for hisappointment as Naval Attach of Greece in France.
Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos HN speaks English andFrench. He is married, father of two children.
Issue 7,July 2013 7
NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training
nmiotcs training is following Acts trainingguidelines and principles. it is using the three key wordsthat Act has implemented in the training concepts...
eeffffeeccttiivvee eeffifficciieenntt andAAffffoorrddaabblleetraining is eeffffeeccttiivvee by having modular struc-
ture, providing ad-hoc and on request - just in timetraining, executing specibc training analysis for each tar-get audience, conducting adjustable training levels on acase by case basis, conducting tailored and customizedtraining iaw operational needs and bnally by deliveringa mission rehearsal training.
it is eeffifficciieenntt as it follows nAto standards, it isbeing enriched with subject matter experts / specializedtrainers/ experienced lecturers, by implementing day andnight training scenarios and bnally by having strong co-operations with other institutions/Agencies and the Ac-ademia.
it is aaffffoorrddaabbllee primarily because it is at very lowcost, students pay only for incremental costs like simu-nition and helicopter usage and bnally becausenmiotc has the ability of deploying its Specializedmio mobile training teams (mtt) to customerspremises at very low cost.
8 Issue 7,July 2013
NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training
Issue 7,July 2013 9
NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training
10 Issue 7, July 2013
nmiotcs instructors (in blue) teaching counterpiracy techniques to a mio boarding team. training isbeing executed with nmiotcs rhibs in Souda bay
conducting realistic and mission reahearsalscenarios.
recently nmiotcs training support team installedsmoke, noise and background noise generators inside
training ship hS Aris in order to make trainingmore realistic and effective for the students creating a
real war gaming zone environment.
rreeaall ppiirraattee wwhhaalleerr aanndd sskkiiffffare used for practical small vessel investigation training.
nmiotc extensively apply the model ofrreeaalliissttiicc mmiissssiioonn rreehheeaarrssaall
pictures from the monitors of the cctv system onboard nmiotcs training ship hS Aris, where
students actions are being recorded and played backafter training in post evaluation training briefs. ese
pictures show the material collected from 31microcameras in hidden places inside the training
NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training
Issue 7,July 2013 11
NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery
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visit of thenAto SnmG1 commanderrear Admiral (l.h.) Georg w. von maltzan Ger (n)
27 may 2013
visit of the US cApStone class 13-2 SwA of national defense University
19 february 2013
visit of the German defence Attach in Greececolonel norbert dreshke Ger (A)
28 may 2013
12 Issue 7, July 2013
NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery
visit of nAto forAcS Steering committee 15 may 2013
visit of operation AtAlAntA force commander commodore jorge manuel novo palma por (n)
27 march 2013
visit of thevice chief of hndGS vice Admiral Alexandros eodosiou Grc (n)
19 April 2013
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courtesy viisit of the SSn SAphir commanding officer4 february 2013
visit of the head of the counter piracy project implementationUnit (piU) of imo,mr philip holihead
5 july 2013
Issue 7, July 2013 13
NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery
14 Issue 7, July 2013
piracy is one of the most ancient threats to sea linesof communication and the brst crime in the history forwhich the international jurisdiction was established.
ere are examples of pirates even in the classicperiod, ancient Greeks, romans and etruscans but it islater in the 17th century when the principle ofconsidering the attack of a merchant to anothermerchant in the high sea as an international crime wascommonly and authoritatively stated. pirates of the seaswere considered enemies of the humanity and anynation had the jurisdiction to intervene with the use offorce in order to defeat them. is principle is nowcustomary law and it is regulated by the internationalconvention of the law of the Sea of montego bay 1982.during the last ten years maritime piracy has tripled inintensity and affects wider and wider areas, so theattention of the international community of nations hasbeen attracted again, especially in the horn of Africa(hoA) which has become the biggest concern and casestudy for maritime Security.
in hoA multiple maritime operations are in forceand multiple naval formations, belonging to differentorganizations, are operating in the same maritime
areawith similar counter piracy / counter terrorismmissions:
cmf (combined maritime force under thelead of US central commad )
ooS (operation ocean Shield under the leadof nAto maritime command )
operation Atalanta (under the lead of europeanUnion maritime Schipping centre horn of Africa )
russian republic counter piracy maritimemission;
chinese republic counter piracy maritimemission;
An average of 40 naval units is deployed in the highseas in front of hoA.
Since the 17th century civilization and humanrights have gone a long way forward and there is theneed to grant a fair trial to pirates, evidence collection,biometrics and information sharing have a crucial role.A brilliant study on the maritime piracy in the horn ofAfrica was run in 2010 by nAto joint lessons learntcentre, of monsanto portugal. jAllc analysts spread
NMIOTC Journal>>>Capability Development
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Issue 7,July 2013 15
around the globe, from the maritime headquarters innorthern europe and eastern America to operationalcenters in bahrain and eastern Africa and moreovervisiting naval Units and collecting a single astonishingresult.
in the age of global communication, crime evidencesand biometrics are very difficult to share. ey are notshared with sufficient efficiency and the whole success ofthe mission is affected by this issue. e reason lays thedifferent status and the different security policies whichare in force in the many organizations involved.
e challenge to address this issue was engaged by thejoint capability technology demonstration (jctd), asmall agile team of experts in technology based tampaflorida within the military framework of US centralcommand.
e out of the box idea is based on the principle thatboarding teams collect raw information and rawinformation, before it is not processed and correlated is,by debnition, unclassibed.
jctd has created a information collection andsharing system in which the sailors of the boarding teamsare the main users both as data input and data extraction.A pretty neat situation, which allow instant data sharing,at the lowest thinkable level and among multinationalboarding teams, as qualibed users, law enforcementpeople of the area of operations. Snapshots of singleevents in time and space are shared globally. nojudgments but simple facts, positions and veribedidentities.
Since they presented their idea during nmiotcannual conference 2011, we immediately recognized thegreat value in it and offered our support as subject matterexperts in maritime interdiction operations, which is themain toolset with which is addressed counter piracy in
hoA. After the developing phase nmiotccontributed to the operational evaluation and themilitary utility assessment of the system.
nmiotc consider c3po a great leap forward in theeffectiveness of maritime security multinationaloperations. it is particularly impressive that all this isachieved at very low cost. no expensive equipment isnecessary to be part of the network. A cloud database, aweb based software, which is reachable by a standard webbrowser (e.g. chrome or explorer) by the boardingteams at sea, with nothing more than a simple personalcomputer and internet. identity veribcation loops areembedded in the system and warnings on specibcpersons show up with the colors of a traffic light next tothe names of the crew members of the merchant vessel.
in the concept of making c3po operationalnmiotc stands ready to provide practical training onthe use of c3po to all nAto and partners boardingteams.
A more detailed article is published at page16 of thisissue.
NMIOTC Journal Capability Development
16 Issue 7, July 2013
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we have all heardand presumably usedvariousclichs and noble parables regarding individual andcollective pursuits that are believed to ensure theachievement of stated goals. Sayings such as hard workpays off, Keep your nose to the grindstone, no pain,no gain, and if at brst you dont succeed.try, tryagain are all meant to inspire and elicit a belief that ifone will just work harder and put in additional time,success can be assured. Supposedly, failure to achievestated goals can then be defended since it was not due toa lack of effort. ere is no argument that time andeffort play a distinct role in the achievement of goals;however, it can also be argued that in order for work tobe applied in the manner and form necessary for theachieving of goals, the proper tool for the job must be anintegral component of performing the task at hand.
e need for improved tools and processes governingboarding operations pertaining to maritime interdictionoperations (mio) recently brought assessment activitiesto the nmiotc. e combined end-to-endexpanded maritime interdiction operationsperformance optimization (c3po) joint capabilitytechnology demonstration (jctd) military Utility
Assessment (mUA) conducted from 2 to 11 April 2013at nmiotc was an effort to equip mio forces with theright tools for the job and to perform more effectiveoperations.
in the most simplistic terms, mio is used tofacilitatauthorized maritime security operations (mSo)in upport of each countrys national interests or pursuantto an internationally recognized mandate. today,thousands of mio operations have been and continue tobe conducted by a variety of naval forces, host nationand/or regional law enforcement agencies, and otherrecognized and authorized agencies assigned mSomissions. expanded mio (emio) has been developedby the U.S. department of defense (dod) to deter,degrade, and prevent attacks against the U.S. and itsallies, and involves interception of targeted personnel ormaterial that poses an imminent threat.
over the years, naval forces and law enforcementagencies have conducted tens of thousands of boardings.Unfortunately, most of the data created from pastboardings is not available to support todays global miomission planning and operations. As you read thisarticle, decisions to board suspect vessels are being madeby ships commanding officers or mio commanderswith little to no background or historical boardinginformation regarding the vessel about to be boarded.currently, this hail or hail-and-board decision is fraughtwith unnecessary risk and uncertainty that could bereduced [eliminated] simply by having access topreviously documented reports regarding past activitiesof the ship and crew under interrogation. is inabilityof the mio commander, commanding officer, and/or
NMIOTC Journal>>> Capability Development
jjccttdd cc33ppoo mmiilliittAArryy UUttiilliittyy AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt
by mr eric follstad, US centcom Science and technology
C3PO Opera%onal View
Issue 7, July 2013 17
boarding officer to leverage historical boarding data,regardless of source, to make the best operationallyinformed decision, is summarized by the operationalproblem statements below:
U.S. and coalition boarding teams are unable toshare actionable maritime interdiction information in atimely manner, resulting in missed interdictionopportunities, unnecessary boarding events, and thepotential failure to detain persons of interest orconbscate suspected contraband.
boarding teams lack a common repository toconsolidate and share mio data. once boarding data iscollected, it usually remains in theater or in combinedsystems, which inhibits efficient analysis and processingby US and coalition partners.
in developing the necessary toolsets to address theoperational problem, thresholds were debned, and it wasdetermined that the capability demonstrated must beable to perform the following tasks:
Share past boarding data between participatingnavies
o Simple web-based architecture utilizingcommercial browsers
o Globally accessible content utilizing basicinternet access
Support pre-mission planning
o Access historical boarding reports and imagerywith the click of a mouse
provide near-real-time biometric veribcation
o faster response from the identity managementdatabases
consolidate and share boarding data
o create boarding reports, upload images, andexport to after action reviews
o Support end-users and decision-makers
based on over 18 months worth of consultation,development, iterative testing, exercising, andexperimentation with US, nAto, and other nationalrepresentatives, the c3po enterprise boardingoperations Support System (ceboSS) softwarepackage was created. hosted on servers located in theUS (and accessible worldwide), ceboSS provides theemio toolsets that previously were not available forforces executing mio operations. with theimplementation of ceboSS, shipboard capabilities foremio planning now include the following:
Unclassibed web-based user interface accessibleanywhere
Searchable database of historical boardinginformation
Automated data exchange with biometricidentity management databases
boarding report templates
information sharing among partners andorganizations
even with the 18-month c3po collaborativedevelopment effort leading to the creation of theceboSS capability, there remained key questions thatwere unanswered pertaining to the overall conceptbehind the c3po project: is the ceboSS capabilityoperationally relevant in supporting current and future
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mS0, and does it have the military utility thatcommanding and boarding officers desire to have? esequestions were unanswered until now.
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hort of actual combat operations, an acceptable andwidely used method to evaluate a new capability orcapability under development is to utilize current andqualibed operators (users) on actual systems with asupporting concept of operations (conopS) andcorresponding tactics, techniques, and procedures (ttp)in an operationally realistic setting with lifelike scenarios.is was the premise for assessing the military utility ofceboSS.
leveraging the intellectual capital of the nmiotcstaff, US naval forces central command(nAvcent), and the US coast Guard as well asnAto subject matter experts from Germany and thehellenic navy, eight scenarios based on actual boardingswere created along with more than 700 appropriateprops, artifacts, identibcation documentation, andrelated paraphernalia that are typically collected anddocumented during boarding operations. rough theuse of role players and surrogate agents, vessel hailingevents and compliant boarding operations were plannedand executed utilizing the nmiotc headquarters andthe training ship AriS.
even though current mio conopS and ttps havebeen standardized and agreed upon by US and nAtoorganizations, there was a desire to evaluate potentialdifferences between US and nAto use of ceboSS asit pertained to mission planning, execution, and post-event reporting. Since ceboSS was envisioned to beused and accessed worldwide by an untold number ofpotential users, there needed to be considerationregarding how [potentially] other countries and users
would view and use the ceboSS functionality and userinterfaces. to evaluate these differences, the assessmentutilized two teams: a US-only manned team and anAto team. e US team was comprised of visit,board, Search, and Seizure (vbSS) members andanalysts from USnAvcent/US coast Guard, and thenAto team was comprised of members fromnmiotc. of note during the course of the assessment,several software changes were recommended in an effortto better support differences in nAto and US planningmethodologies. us, the decision to utilize both nAtoand US boarding teams proved to be a valuableassessment approach.
e basic script for the execution of the assessmentwas to initiate planning utilizing many of the inherentsearch features maintained within the ceboSSsoftware. role players utilized photo teams to initiatevisual identibcation of suspect vessels. based onfeedback from these teams, visual characteristics of thevessel allowed shipboard boarding teams the ability tosearch the ceboSS system against a variety of vesselcriteria such as vessel name, color, and distinguishingfeatures. if a match and positive identibcation werefound, critical past boarding information wasimmediately available to assist with mission planning.based on reviewing and analyzing past boarding data andcontrasted with the current operational situation, adecision to hail the vessel was then made. e boardingofficer could then utilize ceboSS to prepare the actualhail scripts, develop a set of questions for the vesselscrew, andbased on responses from the suspect crewverify information provided by the crew against pastboarding data.
in support of pre-boarding preparations, boardingteams extracted historical boarding information fromceboSS to support mission planning. data availableassisted in determining suspect crew composition, vessel
NMIOTC Journal>>> Capability Development
Issue 7, July 2013 19
cargo, past destinations, and potential tripwires for useduring crew interviews as well as a myriad of other datafor use during boarding or questioning.
during the actual boarding event, boarding teamshad the ability to maintain an ongoing narrative withthe ship to conduct ceboSS inquiries and dataexchange as needed to answer/verify/dispute issues thatarose during engagement with the crew underinterrogation. is served to empower the boardingteam by affording them the ability to corroborateinformation from past boardings while the boardingteam was still on the boarded ship. not only didceboSS provide near-real-time access to historicalboarding data to better affect pre-boarding planningactivities, ceboSS provided live connectivity tobiometric identity management databases. is criticaloperational attribute allowed boarding teamsvia ahandheld biometric deviceto capture, upload,transmit, and quickly receive biometric responsesregarding personnel encountered during boardingoperations. it also allowed boarding teams the ability toanticipate and verify crewmembers who may be onboarda suspect vessel based on data entered into ceboSSfrom previous boardings. is is a critical capability thataddresses past issues seen with releasing vessels withpersons of interest onboard, due to lack of identityveribcation during actual boarding events.
Another critical issue identibed by mio personnelduring the development of the c3po jctd involvedthe generation of reports. report generation followinga boarding can be laborious, time consuming, mentallyexhausting, and a distraction from primary duties. toremedy this situation ceboSS employs an automaticreport generation template that streamlines andautomates the after-action report (AAr) in accordancewith current US and nAto standards. ese templatescan be easily updated and refreshed to account for new
standards and reporting requirements. Users enjoyed theability to populate the ceboSS database as theboarding was being executed, bnish the data entryshortly after returning to the ship, export the data intopre-debned report templates, and publish their boardingreport for worldwide access and review with just the clickof a mouse. e capability that ceboSS provided towork smarter, not harder was heralded as a resoundingsuccess by boarding officers.
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during the course of assessment planning, dailyscenario mission planning, debriebngs, and the post-mUA hotwash, there were universal agreements that thiscapability is needed. comments from commandingofficers, boarding officers, vbSS teams, trainers, andnmiotc supporting staff have been positive withaffirmation that the ceboSS system addresses keyelements of the operational need. Given ceboSSs brstintroduction to the user community during the mUA,there were several recommendations to improve ttpsand some suggestions for technology interfaceimprovements regarding large data ble transferinefficiencies. e biometrics veribcation process andcorresponding ttps were highly praised and fullysupport recently approved nAto biometrics policies.of note was the desire on the part of nmiotc toimmediately start training on the system for operationalemployment. A bnal report of military utility will beco-signed by the US central command and the USeuropean command and released in August 2013.
NMIOTC Journal Capability Development
20 Issue 7, July 2013
e nAto Allied command transformation (Act)hQ in norfolk, together with the nmiotc, hasrecognized that naval boarding teams are critical enablersin supporting Attack the network (Atn) operations. inaddition to collecting traditional boarding data,boarding teams have the potential to collect vitalforensic, biometric, material and technical data that canbe exploited to support countering threat networks. Asstated in Atp 71, evidence gathering is a critical part ofmaritime interdiction operations (mio). whether insupport of an approved nAto operation or during day-to-day operations in support of national tasking,boarding teams are exposed to valuable information andintelligence that can be used to support maritime targetdevelopment for a specibc operation and/or support abroader counter threat network effort by disseminatingessential information used to attack threat networks.
for a number of years the US military has been usingAdvanced Situational Awareness training (ASAt) toenable early detection of potential threats by use ofhuman behaviour pattern recognition and Analysis(hbpr&A). A second course aimed at tackling theserious threat from green on blue attacks has developedand is named insider reat Situational Awareness
training (it SAt ). is latter course is currentlybeing run in Afghanistan for coalition forces.
incuenced by the successes of ASAt, the nAtomaritime interdiction operational training centre(nmiotc) hosted a pilot maritime ASAt (m-ASAt)from 8 to 12 july this year. e aim of this m-ASAt
NMIOTC Journal>>>Training Issues
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The ASAT methodology
Issue 7, July 2013 21
22 Issue 6, December 2012
(insider reat ASAt).
e. US Special operations command.
f. nAto (A countering ied course and adeveloping maritime course).
numerous compelling accolades exist regarding theeffectiveness of ASAt. ree examples are as follows:
a. Sergeant from task force paladin: is was themost valuable training we have received in the sevenmonths we have been deployed to Afghanistan, a real eyeopener.
b. ASAt course student (officer). ASAt trainedpersonnel are also able to be proactive instead of reactive,giving them relative superiority in any situation."
c. commanding officer of a US navy SealSquadron: ASAt enables operators to short-circuitthreats before they harm friendly forces or publicperception. e training enables individual shooters toreduce civilian casualties and collateral damage frompreventable brebghts. ASAt trained operators are alsoable to be proactive instead of reactive, giving themrelative superiority in any situation.
ASAt is utilized when conducting operationsoutside of the operating base. it SAt is utilizedwhen personnel are inside of the base. it SAt is basedon the fundamentals of ASAt and therefore the briefdescription of ASAt (above) applies equally to it SAt. e purpose, method and end State for it SAt areas follows:
i. close the capability gap permitting green onblue attacks by arming individual coalition memberswith the hbpr&A skills to identify an insider threatand provide the tools for action within a decisionmaking framework.
ii. provide coalition members the gift of time andspace to identify a developing threat and replace hypervigilance with informed awareness.
i. deliver practical, skills oriented, Subject matterexpert (Sme) delivered training and education inhbpr&A.
ii. training is scalable and customized to each typeof unit to bt unique challenges and situations.
iii. instruction is interactive and scenario driven.
c. end State:
i. e most exposed elements of the force aretrained in hbpr&A to identify the insider threat andlinked to a decision making framework.
ii. foster a climate of informed awareness tomitigate the risk to force at the tactical level for coalitionunits operating in a partnered environment and reducerisk to mission at the operational level by closing thecapability gap.
NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues
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much can be said about the term non-lethal. itgenerally refers to military response against a target whenthere no intention of harming associated persons in anylasting way. e term is used in connection with securityoperations outside of combat, for operations such asforce protection, critical infrastructure protection,maritime interdiction operations, counter terrorism,ensuring delivery of humanitarian aid amid concict, andso forth. non-lethal capabilities then draws a cleardistinction from the militarys core capabilities fordelivering lethal force during combat.
in non-lethal capabilities the intent is to purposefullyengage a target without delivering any lasting harm,which is fundamental to the nAto debnition of non-lethal capabilities [ref xx]. in security operations, as inself-protection generally, one typically has a duty to
warn, to prove hostile intent, and use proportionalforce, where the utility of non-lethal capabilities is clear.non-lethal capabilities reduce the risk of harm topersons who may be innocently unaware of securityoperations, and reduce the risk of post-event litigationagainst security forces. ey bll the response spectrumbetween shouting and shooting, as some have said,which ultimately supports larger strategic objectives inmodern concict.
purposeful non-lethal engagement generally takestwo forms: 1) unambiguous warning in a security zonewhere non-cooperation in the target may be interpretedas hostile intent, legitimizing the escalation of forcebrought to bear against, perhaps ultimately lethal force;and 2) incapacitation of a target, to suppress or stop itsadvance, presumably after warnings have been given, asa step in the escalation of force against a non-cooperativetarget. clearly some technical means are required forboth tasks.
technologies have been forthcoming, many of whichhave been examined by the nAto centre for maritimeresearch & experimentation (cmre, la Spezia, italy),especially for use in maritime security, for enforcingsecurity exclusion zones around ships or other maritimeinfrastructure, against the threat of attack by small boatsby underwater intruders, and for stopping small boats.
Among the leading high-readiness technologiesconsidered for countering small-boat threats in ports andharbours are those in the table. ese (and many others)
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NMIOTC Journal>>>Capability Development
have been exercised individually at the waterside or onboard ships, under the controlled conditions needed forperformance assessment and the safety of participants.e goal of the exercises is to help transition promisingnew technologies into capabilities, through independenttest and evaluation, the formulation of concepts of useand of corresponding operational requirements. ineffect, cmre provides a test bed where securityproviders and industry can exercise, experiment, anditerate options, engaging in a process of spiraldevelopment between developers, industry, academics,and subject matter experts, military and civilian.
ideally, one would like to see technologies that couldbe used selectively for both warning and incapacitation,perhaps by turning up the effect of warning to createsome degree of incapacitation in a non-cooperativecontact. is broadens the scope of a single technologyin escalation of force scenarios.
both warning and incapacitation are possible to someextent with the optical disruptor cited in the table forinstance, whose brilliance can create both a point ofattraction in the targets visual beld at very long distances(drawing their attention to security forces for speedyawareness and compliance), and a visual dazzling glarethat makes it difficult to aim a weapon toward the sourceof the optical disruptor. cmre has developed modelsfor predicting the ranges of effectiveness for warning andfor visual suppression by optical disruptors underdifferent daylight conditions.
e long-range acoustic loud hailing device, on theother hand, is found to serve only for warningfordelivering audible alarms and messages (shorter distancesthan optical disruption), but not for incapacitation. forif it occurs at all, incapacitation would only occur veryclose to the acoustic device itself, where sound levelsexceed the threshold of pain, and where they wouldcertainly induce permanent hearing loss, contrary to thenon-lethal concept of no lasting harm. ough oncedescribed as an acoustic weapon, acoustic devices are
now more accurately described by their manufacturersas warning and communication devicesa role they canbll rather well, though with some qualibcations ofcourse.
e running-gear entanglement technology cited inthe table is an instance of incapacitation rather thanwarning. it acts with stopping force on the mechanics ofthe small boat, without physiological effects or harm onits occupants.
ese technologies illustrate that, when evaluatingany candidate technology for use in non-lethalcapabilities more generally, it is necessary to be clearabout its concept of use, if it is to warn or to incapacitate.e purpose determines the way the technology must beevaluated and transitioned into capability.
Going somewhat further in non-lethal capabilitydevelopment, given a number of technologies for non-lethal capabilities, there emerges an array oftechnology-driven options, each with its own concept ofuse, range of effectiveness, mode of operation,technology demonstration, and so forth. ese might beused together for more complete capability and coverageagainst a range of threats; against small boats, jet skis,and underwater intruders for instance. it is difficult tocreate a picture of overall capability simply by listingtechnologies as in table (xx). And it is more difficult stillto validate the overall capability afforded by a numberof non-lethal technologies used together in practice,through at-sea experimentation, particularly in light ofthe risks that close engagements with fast boats present.
Given the advances being made in serious gamingusing computers, however, it is possible to exercise anynumber of options together in a virtual exercise. indeed,the results of many separate at-sea exercises of candidate
Exercising a running-gear entanglement system
Issue 7, July 2013 25
non-lethal technologies were used by cmre to createcomputer models of each, for use together in real-time,virtual exercises of integrated capability for escalation offorce scenarios in maritime security. cmres maritimetactical eatre Simulator was used in the harbourprotection table-top exercise (hpt2e, march 2012,cmre) as part of nAtos defence Against terrorismprogramme of work.
in hpt2e, 30 military and civilian subject-matterexperts from 9 nAto nations participated in many fast-paced, free-play engagements in a realistic virtual port,playing the role of security providers in security missionssuch as the protection of a military vessel exiting a portor of an lnG off-loading facility during times of highalert of terrorist attack. ey were equipped with virtualpatrol boats, communications, surveillance sensors, anda number of non-lethal response technologies in orderto exercise the non-lethal technologies consolidated intomaritime escalation of force capability, with thetechnologies subject to realistic constraints of awareness,communication, time for action, distance of action, andso forth, much as they were found to be in real-worldexperiments.
many separate vignettes of engagement were played,half with attackers, and half with only benign butpossibly troublesome port traffic. participants playingdefenders had no prior knowledge of the nature or time
of security zone challenges (randomized, blind trials).e play of each vignette was followed by a debriebngsession with selective replay to review the use of the non-lethal capabilities, from initial decision to engage, tosituation resolution.
e exercise taught participants about the kinds ofcandidate technologies that are of high readiness for usein maritime securityabout their modes and ranges ofoperation, aiming and maneuvering requirements,expected effectiveness, nominal costs, and so forth. moreimportantly, by exercising the technologies in realisticaction, participants developed a good appreciation forone technology relative to another when used togetherabout their complementary nature, for use againstdifferent threats, at different ranges, time to effectiveness,with different objectives: warning and incapacitation.over 80 % of attacks were stopped before the attackerreached his or her objectives, and never were benign buttroublesome ship traffic (from teenagers on jet-skis tobelligerent bshing vessels) harmed.
much of the challenge along the transition path ofemerging technologies into non-lethal capabilities formaritime security therefore amounts to matchingperformance to newly-debned operational requirementsfor new technologies, then integrating severaltechnologies together into capability against a numberof threats, and conveying an appreciation for what thatoverall capability can be under realistic time-speed-distance constraints for close engagements. progressdepends on clear concepts for non-lethal capabilitiesfrom the outset.
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training of the hellenic Udt4-8 feb 2013
training of hnlmS de rUyter31 jan - 01 feb 2013
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NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery
norwegian coastal rangers12-24 january 2013
training of rS SeveromorSK 14-18 january 2013
>>> NMIOTC Journal
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Graduation ceremony for fS coUrbet and esthonian vpd8 february 2013
training of USS nicholAS4 - 7february 2013
training of hnlmS vAn SpejiK23 - 24 may 2013
Issue 7,July 2013 27
NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery
maritime interdiction operations (mio) are gettinga boost in effectiveness by using an old science with newtechnology biometrics.
militAry problem. boarding teams have thechallenge of correctly identifying people onboard vessels.criminals and terrorists alike use many names andidentibcation documents to easily slip through the cracksof the mio process. mio teams unknowinglyencounter the same pirate or smuggler multiple times,but he is recorded under different names and notrecognized.
is gap hinders intelligence and strengthens thecapability of bad actors who exploit such weaknesses toremain anonymous and operate probtably. biometricstechnology dramatically increases the difficulty foradversaries to remain anonymous and it correlatesintelligence about a persons biometric signature andmany aliases. commonly insurgents in the iraq andAfghanistan wars used numerous false names. in onecase, an insurgent leader had over 90 false names inmultiple databases, but the disparate databases were notsynchronized to paint a true picture of the insurgent.
biometricS defined. So, what is a biometric?everyone already has an idea of what it is, but they maynot recognize it under the term biometrics. biometricsis the automated recognition of individuals based on
their behavioral and biological characteristics.biometrics is used for identibcation or veribcation insupport of a variety of operations or activities. e mostcommonly recognized examples of biometric signaturesare bngerprint topography, deoxyribonucleic acid(dnA) structure, iris structure and facial topography.technology is advancing in other biometric signaturesthat have military usefulness, such as gait, hand-writing,typing and voice dynamics.
biometric fUnctionS. biometric capabilitiesare being used for force protection, criminal prosecution,targeting, sourcing, humanitarian, law enforcement andintelligence purposes. biometrics technologies are used
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by mr david wikoff, US eUcom biometrics lno
NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues NMIOTC Journal
28 Issue 7, July 2013
by diverse organizations, government and privateindustry alike. e United nations initiated a refugeebiometric data base; law enforcement has a well knownhistory of using biometrics; Sea world and disneyworld use biometric devices at their entry points; andindia is biometrically enrolling all residents to betteradminister government functions such as voting, healthcare, banking, and welfare.
e most common identibcation process simply usesa facial picture. when a policeman examines thephotograph on a drivers license he compares it to theowners facial characteristics. however, identibcationdocuments can be falsibed and policemen are notgenerally trained as facial recognition experts who canspot the difference when an individual has gainedweight, changed hair style, or shaved a beard. becausephysical changes occur frequently, many police officersaccept similar physical characteristics, even though theymay be uncertain. biometrics capabilities automate thesame identibcation process used by the police officer, butwith phenomenally greater identibcation accuracy.
biometrics can also support training missions. whennAto nations train navies such as Somalias, biometrics
can help vet students to ensure nations are not providingtraining to pirates or nefarious actors.
e biometric process (bgure) is easilyimplementable, although the details can be challenging.
e phases are being described in the next paragraphsin summary.
plAnninG: in planning you establish thearchitecture for the rest of the biometrics process.examples include establishing legal authority to collectbiometrics, rules of engagement, architecture, role andresponsibility, technical standards, training andequipment resources, and task organizing the capability.ese steps ensure effective biometrics operations.
collect: collection can include live-scancollection at a check point using a biometrics device (e.g.bgure 2), processing detainees, or other activity. it canalso include forensic processes such as developing latentbngerprints from captured enemy material. And lastly,collection can occur with sharing of biometric holdingssuch as bngerprint databases or criminal cards.
Store And mAtch: collected biometric recordsare checked against one or more local or centralizedbiometrics databases. e biometrics systemarchitecture, as well as sharing caveats and arrangementsdetermine how dissemination and matching isconducted. biometric matches are compiled into amatch record displayed to the collector, or sent from acentralized database to inform the collectingorganization and operator at the point of encounter, andmay also trigger an analytical process. e sharing isdone differently based on sharing agreements that applyin different situations.
AnAlyze: biometric enabled intelligence (bei) isintelligence information associated to a biometric
NMIOTC Journal Training Issues
NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues
signature or collection. bei answers the So what? orsignibcance of a biometric collection. bei associatedwith a biometric record can reveal a persons aliases, linkpersons of interest to a network, and reveal previoustactics, technique, and procedures. bei can also indicatethreat levels and potential intelligence value.
Action: bei products and results are used by
leaders to make decisions at the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. one product of bei analysis is thebiometrics enabled watchlist (bewl), a collection ofbiometrics records of persons of interest, for example,
wanted by law enforcement, denied access to militarybenebts such as training or money, or denied access tobases or sensitive areas. if a person on a bewl changestheir identity, they will still match to the bewl on thedevice or database and be biometrically identibable whenthey enter biometric screening. A bewl can consist ofdifferent categories of interest, and is customizable tosupport operations.
A custom bewl is particularly helpful during mioevents because it can identify persons of interest at thepoint of encounter, or if training a foreign navy, studentscan be vetted for previous nefarious activities.
SUmmAry: e power of biometrics will continueto expand across a spectrum of nAto operations.biometrics has garnered major success in the land warsof iraq and Afghanistan by identifying unknown insiderthreats, bomb makers, bomb emplacers, and high valuetargets. biometrics serve as a force multiplier for nationsby being able to track transient threats around the worldand at the borders of Ally nations. reats at sea are alsotransient and as nAto begins to apply biometrics inmio, nAto will continue to increase stability andsecurity worldwide.
30 Issue 7, July 2013
The NMIOTC Mari%me Biomer%cs Train the Trainers course
mr david wikoff currently has been employed at theUS european command as an lno from ArmytrAdoc capabilities manager for biometrics andforensics.email your comments to: [email protected]
e future security in an unpredictable world dependupon dynamic changes in the worlds geopoliticalsituation, the evolving nature of threats, constrainedresources, severe weather climate events andrevolutionary technological development together withits rapid spread.
e Strategic concept for the defence and Securityof e members of the north Atlantic treatyorganization and the Alliance maritime Strategydelineate the modern security environment whichcontains a broad and evolving set of challenges to thesecurity of nAtos territory and populations.
e Alliance has the framework and a robuststructure to meet the requirements of the Strategicconcept and Alliance maritime Strategy (AmS) as well,in order to secure its strategic interests at any strategicdistances. furthermore, the Alliance been sensible of thegeostrategic reality and of the great importance for aneffective and efficient cooperation with its internationalpartners, emphasizes in the Strategic concept, itscommitment to prevent crises, manage concicts andstabilize post-concict situations, including by workingmore closely with our international partners, mostimportantly the United nations and the europeanUnion.
e evolution of challenges, experience gained by theAlliances involved players, detailed analyses, studies andconferences conclusions may offer a fresh ground and afood for thought on issues regarding security.
e 2013 nmiotcs thematic focusing on futureSecurity at Sea , provides an in depth looking into an
environment which can often be used as a hiding placefor a lot of illegal actors and their consequent threats,both above and below the surface. e consequentinsecurity factors, are not in isolation from the landenvironment thus reducing the barriers of security andits basic parameters. in this context, certain threats tosecurity could arise like:
- proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons ofmass destruction and effect ,
- international terrorism in its various forms,
- supranational organized crime ( interrelated or notwith terrorism ),
- cyber-warfare, asymmetric use of technology,
- illegal human trafficking and immigration,
- economic criminality and escalating incidents ofpiracy with or without entailing crews hostagesituations,
- natural or manmade disasters, distraction ordisruption of any critical infrastructure or/and energyresource, epidemic diseases,
- illegal trafficking of weapons and narcotics,
All these threats and their derivatives-components canbe posed from any direction: mainland, coastland, ttwand littoral waters, islands, sea platforms, high seas andfrom any strategic distance.
As you may recall, in response to Strategic concept,the Alliance maritime Strategy(AmS) set out emaritime security environment and e maritimecontribution to Alliance security which describes Alliedmaritime ops and activities as vital contributors toAlliance security. in particular, as it is debned in para 7of the AmS, such contributions may include:
-deterrence and collective defence;
in the section of maritime security is clearly debnedthat:
a. the maintenance of ability of nAtos maritime
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by Admiral(ret) p.chinofotis, chod emeritus, former deputy Greek minister of interior
NMIOTC Journal Strategic Issues
forces to undertake the full range of maritimeinterdiction missions is a prerequisite, including insupport of law enforcement and in preventing thetransport and deployment of wmd
b. the Alliances maritime forces are prepared, inaccordance with decisions taken at the lisbon Summit,to contribute to energy security including protection ofcritical energy infrastructure and sea lines ofcommunication(Slocs).
e maritime dimension of a comprehensiveapproach (part iv of the AmS) directs for an effectivecooperation through enhancement and extension to itsimplementation actions. e imposed enhancement andextension in cooperation is not restrictive in themaritime domain only. e nature of challenges,portrays a complex of interdependencies among themaritime and land security environment and theirrelevant actors, which usually turns up its complication.
e comprehensive Approach Action plan and itsUpdated list of tasks, as well as the relevant supportingdocuments debnes the key areas of work in order tofulbll the requirements for improving effectivecooperation, mutual understanding and trust amonginternal and relevant external actors and organizationsas well. e key areas of work encompasses planningand conduct of operations, lessons learned-training-education and exercises, enhancing cooperation withexternal actors, public messaging.
A multi-dimension approach to the broad horizonof security challenges asks for a well-based securityarchitecture, capable not only to cure but to prevent.Security and defense are two separable but not separatedbelds. often, security and defense overlap one anotherand could produce a vague and confused situation as foractions to be taken and ambiguities to be resolved.effective cooperation among security and defensedisciplines is imperative to face a joint perspective andmuch faster cycles of decision making. e
accomplishment requires to turn the capabilities of onebeld into an advantage for the other, thus fosteringoperational synergy and achieving effective and practicalcooperation. to this end, key components comprise:
-a well-calibrated cow of information and network-centric capability
-pinpointing and accessing expert information,
-elimination of malfunctioning,
-interoperability, inter-service and interagencycooperation to the maximum extent possible.
-security missions connectivity by means of a cross-jurisdictional ability to assess risk and utilize networkenablers
-agile and usable forces ( in terms of eligibility,readiness, deployability, cexibility, maneuverability inthe area of operations, endurance and sustainability forprotracted operations)
e fact that the Alliance calls for a non-stopimproving security architecture is evident, as it happenswith the need for adjustment to the rapidly developingnew challenges in order to be proactive and in advanceof any unpredictable or developing threat.predominant trigger for being aware of any new securitychallenge and/or any emerging security situation is thecow of information and its process through theintelligence cycle steps. in particular, regarding thementioned certain threats (from proliferation up toillegal trafficking) the following six points would supportthe Alliance efforts by fostering the cooperation withexternal actors in the beld of security informationgathering and distribution:
a . to modulate an extended information grid, inorder to provide an enlarged network-centricenvironment specibcally tailored for speed ininformation cows and enabling the sharing ofinformation at the appropriate level of the externalactors,
b. a joint information fusion capability,including the Armed forces intelligence centres whitepicture, would offer, through a single hub, a robustability to plan add direct information requirements,collect, process, produce and disseminate actionableinformation. So, a consolidated and coordinated threatassessment would be provided to decision makers,
c. to establish liaison offices for interpoland eUropol, in a manner as in the Un and eU, onthe ground that nAto has a substantial cooperation
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NMIOTC Journal>>> Strategic Issues NMIOTC Journal
with the Un, strategic partnership with the eU andfriendly and cooperative relations with all countries ofthe euro-Atlantic partnership council and partnershipfor peace, the mediterranean dialogue and the istanbulinitiative. e round-the-clock support and a wide rangeof operational assistance by the interpol to membercountries, as well as the operational and strategicagreements and cooperation of eUropol withorganizations and non-eU states should be consideredfor further exploitation,
d. to enrich the nAto civil-military fusioncentre (cfc) in norfolk,vA with personnel andinformation from interpol and eUropol,upgrading the classibcation status of cfc accordingly,
e. in particular evolutions following specibcemerging security situations, the restrictive principle ofneed to know to be modibed to a duty-to-share one,depending on the emerging situation, possibleconsequences and effects as well as the promptnessrequired for response.
f. based upon the previous points, a proper andusable information Sharing Strategy would support thesecurity architecture to face the certain threatsmentioned above (from international terrorism up toillegal trafficking).
e relevance between the aforementioned sixpoints with security operations focused on certainthreats is obvious.
e revolution in information and communicationsmakes top-down control and reports through theestablished channels more efficient and faster. in somerespects this development enables much greaterawareness in the operating environment, picturecompilation, connectivity to a common informationnetwork and a timely and trusted operating picture withall the actors involved at different levels of securityarchitecture. during a maritime interdiction operationa series of activities inherent to the security architecture
pillars takes place: domain awareness, recognition ofpotential violators, approach for identibcation,interrogation and stopping of suspect vessels, compliantor non-compliant boarding, inspection and collection ofevidence and bnally unblock, diversion or seizure whenthe situation dictates so.
maritime Security operations must be able to tacklethe certain threats mentioned above (from internationalterrorism up to illegal trafficking) and support nationsand law enforcement organizations in dealing withthose threats. information sharing and improved synergyare the key components of the operations.
roughout the worlds history the maintenance ofsecurity at sea has its own uppermost signibcance due tothe interdependent network of commercial, bnancialand political relationships.
An effective cooperation among all security partnersis the bedrock for a well based security architecturewhich serves to establish a common informationenvironment, facilitates collaboration in shaping mutualunderstandings of the operating domain and permitsintegrated planning, coordination and conduct ofactions in order to achieve desired results and the properend-state. So we can evaluate and put on scale needsbeforehand in order to meet a fast detect > to engagecycle, what the full range of responses is and who todepend on.
it is imperative to outgeneral any adversaries. to thisend, we must continue to forge the cooperation amongall security echelons with the optimum use of regionalagencies and enabling capabilities. ensuring cohesionand effectiveness we avail of the present in order to meetthe future.
Issue 7, July 2013 33
NMIOTC Journal Strategic Issues
34 Issue 7, July 2013
nAto Sea Sparrow international tactics wG3 - 7 june 2013
nmiotc Advisory board 20135 february 2013
jctd c3po military Utility Assessment2 11 April 2013
2013 nmiotc Annual conference18 -20 june 2013
Advanced Situational Awareness training (ASAt) Seminar26 february 2013
recce visit of the Swedish delegation17 january 2013
Issue 7, July 2013 35
human migration has been a perpetual phenomenonfor centuries and the reason has always been the same:pure survival at worst or the hope of a better future atbest. europeans have been immigrants themselves andnot always legally. Americans, who turned out to be verystrict as regards immigration , tend to forget that theyare all immigrants themselves with the exception of the,close to extinction, indigenous population. ere isnothing wrong with migration, as long as the emigrantswant to bnd a new home, share common values andaspirations with the locals and the host nation can affordthem. Greeks, having been refugees after a lost war, oremigrants (both legal and illegal) after a brutal civil warand two world wars, they have always been sympatheticand sensitive to any human being suffering the same fate.nevertheless, something has dramatically changed,mainly due to the economic crisis. in this paper we willtry to illustrate how illegal immigration effects maritimesecurity and can become the most important and hard to
face challenge for any navy and coast Guard;furthermore, how it is perceived as the number oneproblem in both Greece and europe despite its decliningnumbers, and how we can handle the situation, withoutexchanging our democratic values for a more secureenvironment.
have we reached a consensus about who can bedeemed illegal immigrant? not in absolute terms.categorically, the persons who cross the borders illegallyor the ones who enter legally into a third country butwith falsibed documents, belong to this group. howabout the ones who are born into irregularity or have notrenewed their visas or temporary residence and workpermits? in most cases, they are considered illegalimmigrants. e ones who should return to theircountries but cannot do so, for practical reasons?probably, not. nevertheless, it is not the purpose of thispaper to examine legalities pertaining to the
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by dr. Siousiouras petros & Kyriakidis Kleanthis, phdc
36 Issue 7, July 2013
phenomenon; just to clarify that illegal immigration isnot conbned only to unlawful passages, on which ouranalysis focuses.
Another interesting question is where immigrantscome from. i suggest that most people can sense theanswer. Afghanistan ranks brst in terms of detection ofillegal border-crossing and has been the case manytimes in recent years, with pakistan being usually thesecond and this year the third. nevertheless, there areoutliers, due to sudden geopolitical events. us, in2011 the country with most illegal immigrants wastunisia and in 2012 the second country was Syria; bothof them did not appear in these statistics the previousyears. As regards tunisian emigrants in 2011, theproximity of their country to malta and italy made, forthe brst and predictably last time, the centralmediterranean route, the one with most illegal bordercrossings in europe. e Arab Spring created a waveof illegal immigration and the shortest way to reach eUis by crossing few sea miles.
Starting our analysis with the perception of peril, ina very interesting survey in six european countries alongwith canada and the US, there was an alarming 56% ofthe people surveyed in italy and over 40% in Germany,netherlands and france that consider authorized notirregular - immigrants responsible for the increase ofcriminal activities . immigrants are targeted for gettingthe jobs of the locals because they do not participate inthe social security system and get paid peanuts; moneyenough to survive but debnitely lower than theminimum wage. is is partly true, because there arejobs that many europeans are simply unwilling to doand are more than happy to have illegal immigrants do
them instead. e locals mainly (not the immigrants)are therefore to blame for the rise of unemploymentthrough labor exploitation. nonetheless, it is anirrefutable fact that illegal immigrants put tremendouspressure on public services and undermine to an extentthe rule of law.
is the perceived threat a clear and present danger?first and foremost, irregular migration, another term forillegal immigration, much more politically correct, is notmerely a maritime challenge right now. but it is going tobe in the near future. Actually, nowadays, 90% of theillegal immigrants use land borders and the singlehotspot which spectacularly increases the number ofdetected illegal crossings is evros river, the land borderbetween Greece and turkey . Any State can use methodssuch as the creation of artibcial obstacles in land (likethe building of walls, fences or ditches) in order tocontain illegal immigration. nonetheless, this is areactive approach, bound to fail for the followingreasons:
firstly, if a maritime country, like Greece, achieves ahigh rate of restraining illegal immigration by land, theimmigrants will seek other loopholes and cross the seaborders, which are debnitely much more vulnerable andmuch less controllable. hence, at least in the long run,the land border surveillance leads to a displacement ofthe phenomenon to the sea and not to its reduction. ischange is for the worse for practical reasons. if theirregular migrants travel in the high seas and their boatssink, either due to bad weather conditions or purposely,they are people in distress. in that case, they have to besaved by navies and coastguards for humanitarianreasons. And if there are people in danger, we will alsoconduct search and rescue operations, which by the wayare very costly. concluding, utter sea surveillance andconstant patrolling is unfeasible and sometimes bringsabout the opposite results rather than the onesanticipated.
Secondly, the problem is universal and not local. iffor instance Greece manages its borders in an excellentand absolutely effective way, illegal immigrants will stillbe able to cood europe through other countries. if ourpolicies focus on reinforcing the surveillance on onespecibc geographic area, the desperate immigrants willbnd another entrance point. Some europeans are happyto see that illegal immigrants are less than 1% of the totaleU population; but for countries like Greece this wasthe percentage back in early eighties; nowadays, the oddscan be horrifying. e legal immigrants are just over 4%of the population (and they were a bit more than 7% 10years ago, which shows that immigrants have beenaffected by the crisis as well).. illegal immigration,
>>> Political Issues
Issue 7, July 2013 37
according to estimations exceeds 8% of the Greekpopulation, far outnumbering the legal immigrants. eestimations partly stem from the fact that the numberof arrests people attempting to cross the borders in aclandestine way in 2010 was equal to 3% of the totalGreek population. At this point we need to highlightthat the entire european South has sea borders whichcannot be fully monitored. italy and malta suffered acouple of years ago with thousands of libyans andtunisians, who had to leave their country. 63,000 peoplelanded in italy alone in 2011 despite the prime ministerhad proclaimed by decree on february 2011 a State ofemergency.
irdly, i just used the phrase had to leave theircountry. desperate people function in a do or diemode. let us assume that they are arrested, or evendeported, how can we be sure that they would notreturn? it is natural to expect that they would try againto save themselves and try as many times as it takes, untilthey achieve their goal.
fourthly, by combating certain problems, like piracy,we increase illegal immigration as a by-product. let meelaborate on this seemingly strange point, a true paradox.e poor Somali pirate who cannot survive out of piracy,the former drug farmer in Afghanistan, the iraqi refugee,they all have two things in common. ey turn to illegalimmigration in order to survive and they blame thewest for their misery. not only do they become illegalimmigrants, but they are also dangerous.
before moving to the possible long-term solutions ofthe problem we need to see if the situation is getting anybetter. As aforementioned we have fewer incidents ofillegal immigration and over the last decade theestimated stock of unauthorized migrants in the eU-15has decreased , but this is due to all the wrong reasons.e brst reason is that the eU and Greece in particularare in the midst of a huge economic crisis and thereforedo not represent the promised land or a Garden ofeden. being less attractive due to your problems is not
exactly a big success. e rise of ultra nationalism,combined with xenophobia, islamophobia and attackson immigrants (legal or illegal) in the entire europeancontinent, has created an unsafe environment and manypotential migrants have second thoughts about theirventure. we should not be very proud or happy for thisdevelopment, because the european Union has alwaysbeen considered the beacon of democracy and theincarnation of the protection of human rights; especiallyGreece which has been the cradle of both.
concerning our country, we need to say that Greeceis europes most vulnerable point. in 2008 illegal bordercrossing in Greece was just over 50% of the totalcrossings in the eU, this number increased in 2009 andbecame 75% and in 2010 the number reached theincredible 90%.in 2009 three out of four illegalimmigrants entered the eU from Greece. in 2010it gotworse. 90% of all illegal immigrants came throughGreece. At a point there were more than 350 irregularmigrants crossing the evros river per day! ere areseveral reasons for Greece being that exposed. extensiveland borders with turkey but also with Albania, sincethe frontex has identibed as one of the routes forillegal immigrants, the one it calls Greece-Albaniacircular route. Additionally there is the western balkanroute and of course the huge eastern mediterraneanroute with migrants crossing the land borders fromturkey. e sea borders are also weak. hundreds ofislands make it easy for traffickers who can choose when,where and how to cross the sea borders. Greece and to alesser extent malta and italy, was also unlucky, becausethe turmoil caused by the Arab Spring created waves ofirregular migration from libya, egypt and lately Syria.from all these countries, the nearest and easiest point ofentry to the eU is Greece.
without being political, turkey needs also to do morein order to contain the illegal immigrants. According toa eUropol report its geographical position, the
38 Issue 7, July 2013
presence of historical smuggling routes and thecomparative ease with which entry visas may be obtainedhave transformed turkey into the main nexus point forillegal immigrants on their way to europe . e eUparliamentary Assembly has recognized that turkeyshould honour its agreement with Greece for the returnof migrants who have entered Greece without authorityfrom turkey , which means that turkey obviously failsto do so.
what is to be done? well, one initiative which isdebnitely paying off is the establishment and thesuccessful operations of frontex . Solidarity andburden sharing is a sine qva non for the solution of theproblem and the eU understands that, as it increasedfrontex budget from just over 6 million euros in2005 to almost 100 million in less than 5 years. esuccess is not only due to frontex of course. As it isvery well documented in frontex reports, theoperation of the Greek police force, xenios zeus andShield (Aspida), with the deployment of 1,800 policeofficers to the Greek land border with turkey wasextremely successful both preventively and through lawenforcement. As expected, a byproduct of this success isthe increase of illegal immigration by sea. probably thedesired end-state for frontex is to eventuallytransform to the initially proposed model of a europeanborder Guard agency.
moreover, since it is a european problem, bnancialaid should be given to the entire south, to improve theirland surveillance and mostly their maritime situationalawareness, by ameliorating their infrastructure.especially, in Greece, if the evros border is sealed oneway or another, the sea border cannot be fully controlled.turkey should receive some aid in order to play its role,especially nowadays that the Syrian crisis has put on ittremendous pressure. organizations with vested interestin combating illegal immigration or any kind oftrafficking including weapons of mass destruction shouldassist themselves by helping Greece.
e second policy to be applied is combating thetraffickers. ere is no room for misunderstanding;human trafficking is a lucrative business, which caneasily probt-wise, be compared with the smuggling ofdrugs or guns. e penal laws in most countries areextremely harsh for drug dealers but more lenientconcerning human trafficking. erefore, harshpunishment for traffickers, including the conbscation oftheir properties, should be adopted. we also have todebne who we consider traffickers and thus we need toinclude counterfeiters who falsify documents, corruptedmembers of local bureaucracies and not only the crewsof small boats or some truck drivers.
e third policy that should be applied is particularto Greece. e irregular migrants who are detected inGreece are handed a decision to leave the country withina week. i suggest that in the interim, many prepare andexecute an alternative plan and thus stay, instead ofleaving. 48 hours would be more than enough.
one more policy recommendation to be adopted,this time by the eU is to change or abolish dublin iiregulation which relocates irregular migrants from theentire continent to their initial eU countries of entry.us, it puts enormous pressure on the South, which ison the verge of collapse. if this hideous regulationremains in place, it should be amended and the Southshould be reimbursed for every patrolling or search andrescue operation conducts in its effort to combat illegalimmigration. e eU parliamentary Assembly hasadopted a resolution , highlighting both the need torevise and implement dublin ii in a fairer way and theneed to maintain a moratorium on returns to Greece ofasylum seekers under this unfair regulation. even if thephenomenon is examined with pu