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nmiotcIssue 6Issue 6

December 2012December 2012ISSN:2241-438XISSN:2241-438X

NMIOTC in Support toNMIOTC in Support toRegional CapacityRegional Capacity

BuildingBuilding

NMIOTC MIO JOURNALPUBLISHERNMIOTCSouda Bay, CreteZip 73200, GreeceTelephone:2821085716

DIRECTORCommodore I. Pavlopoulos GRC NCommandant NMIOTC

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORCdr G. Tedeschini ITA NDirector of Transformation

JOURNAL MANAGERCdr. K. Sampanis GRC N

EDITORLt Cdr G.Mantzouris GRC N

ASSISTANT EDITORLtCdr N. Ariatzis GRC NLt G. Georgiev BGR N

WEB EDITORCPO K. Boutsifakou GRC N

ADMINISTRATION ANDDISTRIBUTIONENS K. Papanastasis GRC N

EDITORIAL BOARDDr. Alex BordetskyDr Marios EfthymiopoulosDr Joship KasumDr P. MichalasDr S. DesautelProfessor I. KoukosProfessor G. TsialtasProfessor N. NikitakosProfessor F. Papoulias

COLUMNISTSCapt M. Holub CZE ALt G. Georgiev BGR N

CONTRIBUTORSProfessor Henry FoucheDr A. CoutroubisMr. Erik SandahlMr. George KiourktsoglouCdr Raymond Albarado USA NLtCdr Mihal Egorov ROU N

2 Issue 6, December 2012

CONTENTS

4 COMMANDANT’S EDITORIALby Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos GRC N

11 VIPVISITS GALERY

14 NMIOTC IN SUPPORT TO REGIONAL CAPACITYBUILDING INAFRICA

16 FROM MILITARY INTERVENTION TO JUDICIALPROSECUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP

by Prof Henri Fouché

26 WHAT IS THE NATO MARITIME C-IEDINITIATIVE?

By CDR Raymond Albarado, NATO ACT C-IED IPT

32 “MIO INAN ERAOFCONVERGING – DIVERGINGMARITIME SECURITYOPERATIONS”

By Erik Sandahl, NATO HQ/Operations Division

35 IS MARITIME SECURITYAWICKED PROBLEM?by Dr. Alec Coutroubis and George Kiourktsoglou , PhD candidate

40 AD-HOC SENSOR NETWORKS FOR MARITIMEINTERDICTION OPERATIONS AND REGIONALSECURITY

by LT Theofanis Kontogiannis

49 NATO AND IMO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILDREGIONAL CAPACITY TO COUNTER-PIRACY: JOINTNATIONAL TRAINING FOR BOARDING TEAMS FROMDJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT REGION

by Mr Osamu Marumoto, IMO Project Officer (Operations)

52 THE FRIGATE ROS REGELE FERDINAND INSOUDABAY, CRETE

by LtCdr Mihai Egorov ROU (N)

Issue 6, December 2012 3

The NMIOTC MIO Journal is a professional publication of NATO Maritime InterdictionOperational Training Center, aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova-tive thinking on NATO Maritime Interdiction related issues such as doctrine, concepts, force structure,employment and readiness.

The views and opinions expressed or implied in theNMIOTC MIO Journal are those of theauthors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of NATO.The NMIOTC MIO Journal is open to receive and publish articles [email protected]. We reserve the right to make editorial changes.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice (©), may be reproduced in whole or inpart without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice (©) may be reproduced for any NATOpurpose but without permission. If an article is being reproduced, the NMIOTC MIO Journal re-quests a courtesy line. To obtain permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice(©) for other than NATO purposes, please contact the author of the material rather than theNMIOTCMIO Journal.

COMMANDANT’S EDITORIALCOMMANDANT’S EDITORIAL

by Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos GRC N

Economic recession, uncertainty, low optimism,illegal trafficking, maritime acts of terrorism, piracy,illegal flow of weapons and weapons of massdestruction and generally all forms of terrorism, are onlysome of the threats our contemporary society is facing.Daily there are more and more governmental andscientific / academic voices that ring the bell and expresstheir concern that the cohesion of our society is not ashealthy as it was in the past.

On the contrary, another great number of expertsbelieve that we now more than ever have themechanisms to control and effectively use our powersin order to efficiently spot illegal acts and restrict allthose actions that tend to deorbit our society’s focusfrom going towards a security framework. This approachhas also become a tradition, specificaly, now having inmind that our well- formed international institutions andorganizations have acquired and already implement theidea of confronting any illegal action for the sake of thecommon benefit. NATO, EU, UN and other wellrenowned organizations have made significant stepstowards this direction and have altered dramatically theway that our society responds to any illegal andunderground activity that takes place not only nationallyor trans - continentally, but also on a global bases. Ashining example of that is how international coalitionforces are countering piracy and how modern network-based operations among different nations helpcentralized international command centers to takedecisions that affect positively the way of executing ourdaily maritime business.

NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational TrainingCenter (NMIOTC), from its own operational post andbeing an active subset of NATO, supports the aboveidea and effectively contributes to this direction focusingspecifically on how training and transformational effortscan bring a halt to current maritime illegal acts. On a

more specific basis NMIOTC is the only NATOaccredited maritime training facility that providespractical and useful products setting up the acceptableNATO standards for participating in maritimeoperations combating all types of illegal activities thatan individual or a naval unit can meet in the sea. Ofcourse, it is not worthy to mention that all of ouractivities are being in close cooperation and by receivingguidelines from our Superior Commands, which in ourcase is Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk.Not to mention that NMIOTC has close cooperationlinks with all of NATO’s critical maritime componentsand operational commands such as SHAPE, MCCNorthwood and MCC Naples in order to receive up todate operational requirements and provide to thestudents a most effective and efficient type of trainingthat they could finally implement in an operationalenvironment. Generally, NMIOTC’s training is based onstandards of pre-deployment training for operations,executing mission rehearsal exercises that finally deliverto the trainees a firsthand approach to the way NATOoperations are being executed before they actuallyparticipate in the operation itself. A perfect example ofthat is the final tactical exercises that take place in ourtraining products, such as those conducted by the Dutch,UK and the US Navy, as well as other teams that arebeing trained in our center.

Another important area of our activities that hasbecome a trend in the last two years is the increasedparticipation of specialized teams benefit from ouradvanced training products. These trainings seems tooverwhelm our framework, especially in the last year,where numerous highly specialized teams from differentcountries have participated asking for more demandingtraining products, such as “Opposed Boarding” or“Detainee” operations. This fact proves that NMIOTC’straining standards attract even highly specializedpersonnel, and for us this is an honor as well as an

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NMIOTC Journal>>>Commandant’s Editorial

opportunity to strengthen our instructional trainingmaterial and exchange valuable knowledge that couldfurther enhance our initiatives and at the same time setNMIOTC as a primary training hub for pre-deploymentpreparation to maritime security related operations.

At this point and taking into account that NMIOTCcounts only four years of functional operationalcapability, it is worth mentioning that our “customers”are mainly coming from NATO countries (82%representation in training are trainees from NATOmembers states). The total number of students isapproximately 3.300; as for naval units 123 of them haveberthed and received training in Souda bay Crete. Acrucial characteristic to refer to is that this last year therehas been an increase in the total training days that thesetrainees choose to participate in NMIOTC. Duringprevious years the average was 3.3 days per unit or teamor individual, this year, however, even though there is anapparent global economic crisis, this number hasincreased to 5.5 training days in NMIOTC. Thisapparently means that a student now remains andreceives training 30% more time than in the previousacademic years. Moreover greater quality has nowbecome a main objective for NMIOTC.

On top of the above mentioned facts and taking intoaccount that NMIOTC is an accredited NATOEducation and Training Facility, our organization hasvoluntarily participated in the new ACT’s initiative whichrequires that all NETFs and COEs be accredited inaccordance with the procedure of the protocol ofBologna, following Universities Quality Assurancestandards. NMIOTC being one of the very firstinstitutions to take this opportunity / requirement, hasalready undergone the first steps of this qualityassurance process and supports ACT’s guidelines andproducts believing that at the end of this effort trainingand transformational processes inside the organizationwill advance to the next level, which will lead usinevitably to an operational academic environment,following University standards.

NMIOTC, sensing the future challenges and theevolution of actions that may need to be implementedespecially in the maritime environment and listening theglobal heart beat of safety and awareness, is in theprocess and in full alignment with NATO and EUtraining guidelines, of stepping towards the future byproviding training and transformational solutions to theAlliance and elsewhere needed. Some of the examplesof how NMIOTC senses the tone of the future and itsduties for contributing to Alliance’s milestones are asfollows:

• Border security,

• MIO – NEO (Non Combatant EvacuationOperations) linkages,

• Support to real operations at an advisory role,

• Creation of a NATO MIO related exercise inthe Eastern Mediterranean area where NMIOTC willhave a leading training and operational role,

• Increase of bilateral coordination among theCenter and organizations / countries that lie outside thescope of NMIOTC’s MOU,

• Creation of a Knowledge ManagementDatabase in order to increase research activities inNMIOTC,

• Creation of an academic board of directors forbringing universities into the challenging maritimesecurity and interdiction environment, especially afterthe completion of the ACT Quality Assurance cycle,

• Increase cooperation and coordination withGlobal Maritime Lessons Learned Centers for acquiringaccess and analyze issues on a broader perspective,

• Cooperation with national and internationalmerchant marine colleges and institutions for buildingup maritime security awareness behavior to merchantmariners,

• Further exploitation of the geographicalfeatures of Souda bay (sea, air, land).

Finally and as a capstone project NMIOTC is in theprocess of creating a Master of Science or Master ofArts type academic title in cooperation with national andinternational universities providing a holistic approachof maritime security operations to Command Levelofficers and civilians, taking into account that NMIOTChas the uniqueness of combining effectively tactical,operational and strategic knowledge that has beenproven through the years of its functional capacity andcan be delivered to students in a more formal form, suchas by acquiring a Master’s degree.

Concluding this editorial and as NMIOTC’sCommandant I would like to express my sincere feelingthat future will require far greater coordination andtraining efforts among partners, regard to building aserious security “dam” around the maritimeenvironment, by training our personnel as effectively aspossible, in order to tackle the phenomena of futuremaritime terrorism all the more efficiently. NMIOTCstands constantly ready to take new initiatives andactions in order to provide NATO and other relevantpersonnel with the most advanced and complete


NMIOTC Journal Commandant’s Editorial <<<


NMIOTC Journal>>> Commandant’s Editorial

knowledge regarding the maritime environment. Ourinstitution with the immense support of the GreekGovernment, even through this serious economic crisissituation that Greece is going through, and with theimmense contribution of the sponsoring nations(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, Romania and Turkey),as well US with their VBSS instructors, are running theCenter following all the above virtues. In parallel, ourabove work is being supported by representatives fromthe Hellenic Air Force, Army Specialized Forces, PoliceSWAT Teams and Coast Guard Law Enforcement

Officers in order to foster the idea of joint-multinationalexpertise and interoperability, and to increase knowledgeexchange through all levels of interagency collaboration.

Finally, I would like to remind all of us that whoeverknows history has a better and wiser grasp of today’sreality. Maritime terrorism was always been an issue inthe maritime arena. Training, however, has been thecommon proactive weapon to tackle this phenomenon.Therefore, NMIOTC provides this training that willenhance our readiness prior to deployment in the realarea of operations and will act as the non lethal weaponto ensure that maritime terror will no longer be an issuein the near as well as distant future. Quoting Sir WinstonChurchill’s words, the pessimist approach “difficulty inevery opportunity” and the optimist approach“opportunity in every difficulty”, I would like torephrase it and say that even in this bleak period ofglobal crisis we should seize every opportunity to turn itinto an advantage with efficient and responsible workon our part and remain optimistic.

Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos was born in the cityof Thessaloniki (northern Greece) on April 13th, 1961. Hegraduated the Hellenic Naval Academy and wascommissioned as Ensign in June 1983.

His specialties are Officer of Navy Special Forces' andCommunication Officer. He attended the basic trainingcourse of the Underwater Demolition School, the static lineand free-falling parachuting course of the Army,unconventional warfare in the U.S. and several NATO SoFcourses in Germany.

He served on several types of warships (destroyers,guided missile patrol boats, landing crafts) as aCommunication and Navigation Officer and as an XOonboard DDG KIMON.

He spent most of his sea carrier onboard amphibiousships. He was assigned as Commanding Officer on the HSRODOS (LST type) from 1995 to 1997 and as OperationsStaff Officer in the Landing Fleet Command from 1999 to2000. From August 2005 to September 2006 he assumedthe duties of Commanding Officer on HS SAMOS.

From 1989 to 1994 he served in the Navy's SpecialForces as an operational team leader and staff officer. Heaccomplished several missions (boarding officer duringIRAQ crises in 1990 in the Red Sea, during UN sanctionsimposed on Former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea in the

years 1992 and 1994, security team leader of ex-USSRPresident Michael Gorbachov and the Chiefs of the USArmed Forces in 1993).

From September 2006 till July 2008 he was assigned asCommandant of the Navy's Special Forces.

In 1993 he served for six months under the UnitedNations flag in northern IRAQ as a UN guard team leader.

From 1997 to 1999 he served in the Naval Academy asDirector/Major of the Naval Cadets' battalion.

After his graduation from the Naval War College in2000 he served as Head of the Current OperationsPlanning Department (J3) in the Hellenic Navy GeneralStaff (2000 to 2002); Naval Attaché of the Embassy ofGreece in Paris/France (2002-2005), Deputy Director inthe Naval Staff Officers' Course School (2009-2010) andDirector of the Athens Multinational Sealift CoordinationCenter (2010-2012).

Being promoted at the rank of Commodore the 1st ofAugust 2012, he has been assigned as Commandant of theNMIOTC on the 28th of August 2012.

He bears the Gold Cross Phoenix battalion, the PeaceOperations' medal (3 ops), the Military Merit, theSuccessful Command medals and the Gold Cross of Honorbattalion.

The States of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have alsodecorated him for his participation in the operations forthe liberation of Kuwait. He has also been decorated withthe Peace Operations medal of the United Nations and theexpert rifle-shooting award of the US ARMY.

On June 2006, he was decorated by the FrenchRepublic as "Chevalier dans l'Ordre National du Merite"for his appointment as Naval Attaché of Greece in France.

Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos HN speaks Englishand French. He is married, father of two children.


NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training <<<

NMIOTC’s training is following ACT’s trainingguidelines and principles. It is using the three key wordsthat ACT has implemented in the training concepts...

Effective Efficient andAffordableTraining is effective by having modular struc-

ture, providing ad-hoc and on request - just in time train-ing, executing specific training analysis for each targetaudience, conducting adjustable training levels on a caseby case basis, conducting tailored and customized train-ing iaw operational needs and finally by delivering a mis-sion rehearsal training.

It is efficient as it follows NATO standards, itis being enriched with subject matter experts / special-ized trainers/ experienced lecturers, by implementingday and night training scenarios and finally by havingstrong cooperations with other Institutions/Agenciesand the Academia.

It is affordable primarily because it is at verylow cost, students pay only for incremental costs likesimunition and helicopter usage and finally becauseNMIOTC has the ability of deploying its SpecializedMIO Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to customer’spremises at very low cost.


NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training


NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training <<<


NMIOTC’s instructors (in blue) teaching counterpiracy techniques to a MIO boarding team. Training isbeing executed with NMIOTC’s RHIBs in Souda Bay

conducting realistic and mission reahearsalscenarios.

Recently NMIOTC’s training support team installedsmoke, noise and background noise generators insidetraining ship “HS Aris” in order to make training morerealistic and effective for the students creating a real

war gaming zone environment.

Real pirate whaler and skiffare used for practical small vessel investigation

training. NMIOTC extensively apply the model ofrealistic mission rehearsal

before deployment.

Pictures from the monitors of the CCTV system on boardNMIOTC’s training ship “HS Aris”, where students

actions are being recorded and played back after training inpost evaluation training briefs. These pictures show the

material collected from 31 microcameras in hidden placesinside the training ship.

NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training


NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery <<<

VIP VISITS GALERYVIP VISITS GALERY

Visit of the Minister of Defense of Greece and the Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff14 August 2012

Visit of the Commander Allied Command Opera/ons (SACEUR) Admiral James Stavridis USN5 September 2012

Visit of DASG3 August 2012

VIP VISITSVIP VISITS

Visit of the Commander USCG Atlan/c Area and USCG Defense Force East V.Admiral R.Parker20 October 2012

Visit of the Desk Officer for Greece in the US Department ofState

1 October 2012

Visit of the Dutch Ambassador in NATO Mr. F.Majoor23 March 2012

Visit of the Commander SNMG 2 16 November 2012

Visit of CO of FS DUPUY DE LOME27 November 2012


NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery

VIP VISITSVIP VISITS

Visit of the Head of the Military Household of the King of Belgium and the CHOD16 November 2012

Visit of the US Department of State Director for South-East Europe Mrs Maryrouth Coleman4 December 2012

Visit of South-East Europe Brigade15 June 2012

Visit of the Team Leader ot the First Dutch Autonomus VesselProtec/on Detachment

21 August 2012




NMIOTC IN SUPPORT TO REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDINGNMIOTC IN SUPPORT TO REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING(RCB) IN AFRICA(RCB) IN AFRICA

NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Events

Year 2012 marked a new area in which NMIOTC issupporting the global efforts for better maritime security– Regional Capacity Building in Africa.

Recognizing that the piracy problem around Somaliacannot be solved without the help of the countries in theaffected region, IMO launched a RCB initiative calledDjibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) to help buildingcapabilities and interoperability between the participatingcountries. NMIOTC was afterwards chosen as one of themain training providers concerning Counter-Piracy andLaw Enforcement Operations. Three events took placein NMIOTC premises:

- “Train the Trainers” course (in March 2012)during which a tailored training was provided to 15 Navaland Coast Guard personnel from 10 regional states, basedon internationally recognized standards, IMOdocumentation and best practices;

- Two NMIOTC Supported “DCoC National


NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Events <<<

IMO DJIBOUTY CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINIINGIMO DJIBOUTY CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINIING

Trainings” (in October and November 2012). Duringthese events Naval and Law Enforcement personnel fromKenya, Tanzania, Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles,Yemen were trained by trainers from their countries whoreceived the “Train the Trainers” Course in March. Thetheoretical and practical modules were supervised andamplified by NMIOTC instructors and trainers.

Proven to be a good model, the NMIOTC SupportedDCoC National training will continue during 2013. Fourtwo week periods have been already booked by IMO forsuch activities.

NMIOTC is proud that the high quality trainingproducts offered through the last four years since itsinauguration were recognized and extensively used notonly by NATO countries, but worldwide. Having IMO inour “customers” list gives us confidence that the pathNMIOTC follows is the right one.

FROM MILITARY INTERVENTION TO JUDICIALFROM MILITARY INTERVENTION TO JUDICIALPROSECUTION: BRIDGING THE GAPPROSECUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP

by Prof Henri Fouché

International naval forces have been operating since 2008 inthe area off the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the westernIndian Ocean in response to United Nations resolutions callingfor assistance in combating Somali piracy in this region. Thecombined efforts of the international naval forces patrolling andresponding to the threat have been responsible for a reduction in theoverall figures for Somali piracy with many attacks having beenthwarted or disrupted. There have, however, been many challengesto prosecuting the pirates intercepted and arrested by the patrollingnavies. Many of the pirates who were captured since 2008 werereleased without being prosecuted. This article will attempt toidentify some of the challenges to successful prosecution and willsuggest recommendations as to how these challenges can besurmounted. The article will specifically examine the challenges tonavies in terms of legislation, arrest, evidence collection,information sharing and prosecution.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the decades prior to the 21st century most attacksagainst ships worldwide took place in the territorialwaters of states1. The re-emergence in 2000 of classicalsea piracy committed on the high seas in an area outsidethe jurisdiction of any state, is largely due to the piratesof Somalia, taking advantage of the absence of a centralgovernment, military and police force and functioning

criminal justice system in their country to create safeharbours along their coastline from which to launchattacks against ships steaming off the coast of Somalia.The problem of Somali piracy became so serious in2008 that the United Nations, under its mandate inchapter VII to address threats to international security,passed resolutions2, calling on all states to co-operate inthe investigation and prosecution of persons responsiblefor piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.In 2011 it was reported that Somali pirates hadaggressively attacked ships in the northern, eastern andsouthern coast of Somalia. Attacks by Somali pirates hadalso spread and taken place as far off as Kenya, offTanzania, off Seychelles, off Madagascar, offMozambique/ Mozambique Channel and in the IndianOcean and Arabian Sea/ off Oman and off the westcoast of India and off western Maldives3.Internationalnaval forces have been operating since 2008 in the areaoff the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the westernIndian Ocean in response to the UN resolutions. Thecombined efforts of the international naval forcespatrolling and responding to the threat have beenresponsible for a reduction in the overall figures forSomali piracy with many attacks having been thwarted ordisrupted. The role of the navies is critical to the anti-

1 Barry Dubner in M.Meija & P.K. Mukherjee. “Selected issues of law and ergonomics in maritime security.”Journal of International Maritime Law, 10(4) August-September 2004. Pp301-3252 UNSC Resolutions 1816 an 1851 (2008)3 International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau report on piracy and armed robbery against ships for the period 1 January-31 December 2011.


NMIOTC Journal>>> Operational Issues

piracy operations in this area3. There have, however,been many challenges to prosecuting the piratesintercepted and arrested by the patrolling navies. Manyof the pirates who were captured were released withoutbeing prosecuted. In a report issued by the SpecialAdvisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nationson legal issues related to piracy off the coast ofSomalia4, it is stated that over half of the suspectedpirates captured since 2008 were released without beingprosecuted and as of May 2010, more than nine out ofevery ten captured pirates are not being prosecuted. TheInternational Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) guidelinesfor the investigation of piracy5, rightly points out thatthe capture, prosecution and sentencing of pirates andperpetrators of armed robbery against ships is probablythe most appropriate deterrent action against piracyavailable to governments. This article will attempt toidentify some of the challenges to successfulprosecution and will suggest recommendations as tohow these challenges can be surmounted. The articlewill specifically examine the challenges to navies in termsof legislation, arrest, evidence collection, informationsharing and prosecution.

2. CHALLENGES TO NAVIES

In May 2009 the Secretary General of Interpol,Ronald Noble, pointed out that a law enforcementapproach to dealing with sea piracy could provide acritical link between military interventions which led toarrests and the prosecution. In this regard he highlightedthe need for information collection and sharing betweenthe military and law enforcement agencies and the needto create databases with information on the people whoare known to be involved6. In January 2011, the SpecialAdvisor to the Secretary –General of the UnitedNations, while noting that most captured pirates werestill being released without being prosecuted, reiteratedthe need for the current military effort to becomplemented by judicial action to ensure successfulprosecution of perpetrators as a deterrent4. What doesa law enforcement element entail and how could itprovide the link between capture and eventual successfulprosecution of the suspected perpetrators? The lawenforcement element is firmly anchored in soundinvestigative police work, apprehending offenders andgathering admissible evidence to ensure successful

prosecution in a court of law. The element which hashitherto largely been underexploited by navies is theinvestigative phase during which evidence to prove thata crime has been committed and to link the suspectedperpetrators to the crime is collected for court purposes.This is perhaps not surprising as the investigative task isbest conducted using conventional detective methods,assisted by expert personnel specifically trained for thatpurpose. These functions are traditionally carried out bydetectives and forensic investigators attached to statespolice forces and not naval personnel. The Contactgroup on Piracy off the coast of Somalia,7 (CGPCS)took cognisance of this challenge when on 29 March2012 the group noted the difficulty in ensuringsuccessful prosecutions following naval engagement.The group went on to make a call to all parties tomaximise efforts to preserve evidence and facilitatesuccessful prosecution of pirate activity whereverpossible8. The special advisor on legal issues related topiracy off the coast of Somalia concludes that thedifficulty of assembling evidence is the main reason whypirates escape punishmen4.

2.1 LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES:INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONVENTION

The IMO Code of Practice for the investigation ofcrimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships, takescognisance that the fight against piracy is often impededby the absence of effective legislation in some countriesfor investigating reported cases of piracy and armedrobbery. One of the reasons forwarded by many statesfor not prosecuting pirates is the lack of legislation.

4 Report of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the coast of Somalia. Annex to UNSC S/2011/30 dated 25 January 2011form the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations. P21.5 IMO Code of Practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships. IMO Resolution A.1025(26) adopted on 2 December 2009. 6 http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2009/PR0527 The contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, based on UNSC resolution 1851, held its first meeting in January 2009 and identified, amongst other, the taskfor itself to strengthen judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates. Congressional Research Service report “Piracy off the Horn of Africa”April 19, 2010. Available at www.crs.gov 8 Eleventh Plenary session of the contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. New York, 29 March 2012

Crime Scene Walkthrough


NMIOTC Journal Operational Issues <<<

Guilfoyle (2011,960) and Kraska (2011,104) concur thatthe provisions of international law in relation to piracyare sufficient and that the problem lies with states thathave not yet enacted national law designed to implementthe provisions provided for in international law.

United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea (UNCLOS)

The United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea, (UNCLOS: 1982) is the basis on which a littoralstates jurisdiction, rights, privileges and obligations atsea are built. UNCLOS superseded the GenevaConvention of the High Seas, which came into force in1962 to establish a regime for the high seas and whichremains in force for those states that are not party toUNCLOS. Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy asany illegal acts of violence or detention or any act ofdepredation, committed for private ends by the crew orthe passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft anddirected on the high seas against another ship or aircraftor the persons therein. In an audit conducted in January2009 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)found that very few of its members fully incorporate thedefinition of piracy contained in article 101 ofUNCLOS, in their national legislations, nor does theirnational legislations contain a jurisdictional frameworkbased upon the concept of universal jurisdictionregulated by UNCLOS9. To overcome theseshortcomings some states (UK, USA), concludedbilateral agreements with Kenya to prosecute piratescaptured by their navies. Such agreements, however,although providing a way of addressing theshortcomings of international law in the opinion ofGuyo they may go against the international law of thesea (Guyo,2009:1)

Convention for the Suppression of UnlawfulActs against the safety of maritime navigation(SUA)

The second international treaty which provides forappropriate action to be taken against personscommitting unlawful acts against ships is the SUAconvention. These acts include the seizure of ships byforce; acts of violence against persons on board ships;and the placing of devices on board a ship which arelikely to destroy or damage it. Article eight of the SUAconvention defines the roles and responsibilities of themaster of a ship, the flag state and the receiving state indelivering any person believed to have committed anoffence under article three of the convention to the

authorities of any other state party to the convention(Article three includes the hijacking of a ship). Article12 places an obligation on state parties to assist oneanother in connection with criminal proceedingsbrought in respect of offences including, amongst other,the hijacking of a ship. The Convention further obligescontracting governments either to extradite or prosecutealleged offenders. UNSC Resolution 1950 urges statesparty to the SUA convention to fully implement theirrelevant obligations under the SUA convention andcustomary international law. The non mandatoryobligation, again, is that states incorporate the offencescreated by the SUA convention, such as the hijacking ofa ship in article three, in their national legislations.

2.2 LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCILRESOLUTIONS

Resolution 1950- adopted on 23 November 2010

Resolution 1950, acting under chapter VII of theCharter of the United nations in point four renews itscall upon states to take part in the fight against piracyoff the coast of Somalia by deploying naval vessels and“through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, armsand other related equipment used in the commission ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast ofSomalia.” The ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed RobberyAgainst Ships Report for the period 01 January to 30June 2011,10 on page 32 states that “there is an urgentneed for continued action against the pirate skiffs andmother ships at sea. In this respect, the ICC- IMB urgesall countries which have naval vessels in the region toadopt and incorporate the terms of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1950, which calls for theseizure and disposal of vessels, weapons and equipmentused, or suspected of being used for piracy, into theRules of Engagement to their naval commanders”

If interpreted literally by naval commanders, this callwould lead to the destruction of valuable evidencenecessary for producing in court during the prosecutionof the suspected pirates. In April 2011 a merchantvessel designated to be declared a major crime scene andto be forensically examined by an Interpol responseteam with a view to evidence collection for theidentification and prosecution of the perpetrators, wasboarded by a team from a naval vessel en route to theport where the investigation was to take place.11 Thenaval boarding party destroyed valuable evidence such

9 Fouche in Petrig ‘Sea Piracy Law” MPICC 2010 p14810 ICC-IMB Piracy and armed robbery against ships report 1 Jan- 30 June 201111 Fouche & Meyer. 2012. Investigating Sea Piracy: Crime Scene Challenges. WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs. 11: 33-50 DOI 10.1007/s13437-012-0020-7



as the equipment, (specially manufactured aluminiumladders, grappling irons and ropes) used to gain access tothe vessel as well as equipment (magazines for weapons)used during the armed attack on the vessel. Alsodestroyed during the boarding were medicine vials andaddresses and handwriting of the perpetrators to whothe medicine had been dispensed ashore as well aspossible fingerprints on these items for identification.

The special advisor to the secretary General of theUnited Nations on legal issues related to piracy off thecoast of Somalia in his report to the secretary generalin Jan 20114, points out that at the operational level theobjective of naval operations is to discourage and thwartattacks and arrest the pirates with a view to possibleprosecution. He also emphasises the need for collectingevidence such as the weapons and equipment used inthe commission of piracy, in order to facilitateprosecution.

Naval commanders need to bear in mind that thedifficulty of assembling evidence remains the mainreason why pirates escape punishment. Evidence whichcan used in court proceedings to assist the court inreaching a verdict as to the innocence or guilt of asuspected perpetrator needs to be zealously assembledand protected in terms of the rules of evidence. Point12 of resolution 1950 calls upon flag, port and coastalstates to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, theinvestigation and prosecution of all persons responsiblefor acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast ofSomalia. This is to ensure that all pirates handed over tojudicial authorities are subject to a judicial process. Ifthe flag state, for example, fails to lay a charge againstperpetrators who had been positively identified andagainst whom a prima facie case existed, this would beagainst the spirit of point 12 of resolution 1950. Failureto lay a charge would also exonerate perpetrators whoare identified from being arrested in terms of a warrant

and would exclude such perpetrators from being handedover to the relevant judicial authorities for prosecution.As this call is not mandatory no action can be takenagainst member states who do not comply. Points 13 and21calls upon all states to criminalise piracy under theirdomestic law, consistent with applicable internationallaw including international human rights law andrequests states contributing through the Contact Groupon Piracy off the coast of Somalia (CGPCS) , to thefight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, to withinnine months (from 23/11/2010) report to the CGPCSon progress in this regard. This call is not mandatoryand states are not under legal obligation to reportwhether they have established jurisdiction or not. Onthe 14th July 2011, (eight months later) and again on 29March 2012, (a further nine months later)the CGPCSreported progress on legal issues without giving anindication or report on progress with regard tocriminalising piracy in the national legislation of stateswhich have not yet done so.

Resolution 1976 – Adopted on 11 April 2011

At the same time the resolution notes with concernthat the domestic law of a number of states lacksprovisions criminalising piracy and /or proceduralprovisions for effective criminal prosecution ofsuspected pirates. The resolution also expresses concernover the large number of persons suspected of piracyhaving to be released without facing justice and againurges all states, including states in the region tocriminalise piracy under their domestic law andemphasises the further importance of also criminalisingincitement, facilitation, conspiracy and attempts tocommit such acts. The resolution recognises thatindividuals and entities who incite or intentionallyfacilitate an act of piracy are themselves engaging inpiracy as defined under international law.

Resolution 2020- Adopted on 22 November 2011

Points out that the failure to prosecute personsresponsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at seaundermines the anti piracy effort and reiterates itsdecision to continue its consideration, as a matter ofurgency, of the establishment of specialised anti- piracycourts in Somalia and other states in the region withsubstantial international participation and/or support.

REINFORCING UNSC RESOLUTIONS

UNSC resolution 1950 requests certain states, that is,those states contributing to the fight against piracythrough the CGPCS, and other states in the region toreport within nine months on their efforts to establishjurisdiction and co operation in the prosecution of

Collec*ng Forensic Evidence at Mari*me Crime Scene



piracy. It is interesting to note that this is a request forspecific action within a specific time frame and that it isdirected at only a certain number of states. It remains,however, a non-mandatory request.

It is suggested that in considering future UNSCResolutions which address the strengthening of legalinterventions, particularly where international peace andsecurity is at stake, as is determined by resolution 1950to be the case in Somalia, that states be obliged to reportto committees created in terms of the particularresolution on actions taken with regard to complianceto the requirement of the UNSCR and further that thecommittees have the mandate to ensure compliance. Anexample of such a committee is the counter terrorismcommittee which was established to oversee theimplementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 inSeptember 2011.States were asked to adopt legislationcalled for under Security Council Resolution 1373 assoon as possible. All States had to report by 27December 2001 and were asked to give summarydescriptions of measures they had adopted, executivemachinery that was in place and actions taken to fill thegap between their own legislation and requirements ofSecurity Council12. They were also asked when thatwould be done, and whether they would need assistance(Technikon Pretoria, 2001).In April 2011 an InterpolResponse team, assisted by a regional task team,conducted a forensic evidence gathering operation offthe coast of Africa, onboard a vessel at the first port ofcall, after being released by Somali pirates13. During theoperation several suspects were identified by photoalbum and DNA evidence. To date the ship owners havenot registered a criminal case against the suspects in theflag state. The implication of this is that Interpol cannotissue international notices for the arrest and extradition

of the suspects as the country requesting the arrest andextradition for the purpose of criminal prosecutionneeds to have a valid arrest warrant in force for thesuspect in the requesting country. Guilfoyle (2011:960)points out that one of the gaps in the Internationaltreaty of UNCLOS is that although UNCLOS confirmsthe duty of all states to suppress piracy it makes theactual prosecution of pirates discretionary. A possiblestep in the direction of addressing this shortcomingcould be to at least make it mandatory for flag stateswhose vessels are hijacked by pirates to lay a charge inthat state in order that judicial proceeding can beinitiated.

2.3 ARREST

The Special Advisor to the secretary general of theUN on legal issues related to piracy off the coast ofSomalia points out in his report in January 20114,thatnaval operations should be conducted in order to, apartfrom discouraging and thwarting attacks, arrest thepirates with a view to possible prosecution. Article 105of UNCLOS authorises every state to seize a pirate ship,or a ship under the control of pirates due to piracy andto arrest persons and seize property on board such aship on the high seas or in any other place which doesnot fall under the jurisdiction of any state. Resolution1816 of the UNSC authorises states to arrest suspectedpirates in Somalia’s territorial waters, with the advanceconsent of the Transitional Federal Government ofSomalia (TFG). There are, however, constitutionalrestraints which apply when detaining persons at sea asmost states limit the deprivation of freedom of a personto a maximum of 48 hours from arrest to appearancebefore a judicial officer of the court for a decision bythe court as to whether the detention can be extended orthe detained person freed4. Article 5 of the EuropeanConvention on Human rights (ECHR) containsprocedural safeguards that a person lawfully deprived oftheir freedom has the right to be informed of the reasonfor their arrest, is entitled to access to a lawyer and hasthe right to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest(Colvin and Cooper, 2009). It is not always practicablypossible to comply with these provisions at sea as a navalvessel cannot suspend its operations every time a pirateis arrested and return to port. According to Fouché(2010:52) based on the Medvedyev case in which thecourt dismissed a claim that the applicants had not beenbrought promptly before judicial authorities on the basisthat there had been no reasonable alternative to holdingthem for the 13 days required to transport them to the

12 See http;://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ for documentation on the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate, briefings by the Committee, reports filedby members.13 Servamus- community based Safety and security magazine,vol 104 June 2011 p.8 ISSN 1015-2385

Taking Statements and Mari*me Crime Scene



nearest port, Roger Middleton reached the conclusionthat holding suspected pirates for the period of time ittakes for a naval vessel to get to a country where theycan be arrested and prosecuted would not be in breachof article 5 of the ECHR, but that arrest and laterrelease without prosecution may cause problems.

2.4 EVIDENCE COLLECTION

On 29 March 2012 the CGPCS noted the difficultiesat times in ensuring successful prosecutions followingnaval engagement and called on all parties to, amongstother, maximise efforts to preserve evidence to facilitatesuccessful prosecution of pirates8. Burnstein (1999:132)points out that no matter who collects evidence thatperson needs to be mindful that more is involved thansimply looking for and collecting it. When evidence ispresented at a trial it is subject to challenge. If it has beencompromised or made suspect by the way it was handledwhen it was collected or during its examination or whilein safekeeping while awaiting trial, it may be suppressedby the court when presented (Burnstein,1999:132).Possibly years later the person who collectedthe evidence may have to account for the way in whichit was collected, how it was subsequently handled andwhether there was any possibility of it beingcontaminated or tampered with while in safekeepingpending trial. In this regard Saferstein (2004: 34-46)

provides the advice that the crime scene can be recordedby means of photography, sketches and notes. Heemphasises that the collection and packaging of physicalevidence is important so that the integrity of theevidence value is maintained. In order to prove thecontinuity of possession of a piece of evidence in courtevery person who handled or examined the evidencemust be accounted for. In his report to the secretary-

general4, the special advisor on legal issues related topiracy off the coast of Somalia proposed that aninternational model case report on acts of piracy andarmed robbery at sea be formulated to assist naval forcesin acquainting themselves with the procedure forevidence collection, and for ensuring the validitythereof14. In this regard he emphasises the need tomaintain the chain of custody which could becompromised through transfer to another ship oraircraft. The special advisor points out that in order tobuild a case for prosecution such a case needs to beginwith a set of evidence, such as the presence ofequipment on board, a global positioning system,weapons, a large quantity of fuel, the composition ofthe crew and aerial observation of behaviour.Fingerprints of the suspects are also indispensable forestablishing whom one is dealing with and forinformation sharing. The evidence which is moredifficult to collect and which is best left to experts is therecovery from the crime scene of forensic material toassist with the identification of offenders and for linkingthe offenders to the crime scene and the elements ofthe crime. Such potential evidence at a crime scene needsto be protected until appropriately qualified personnelarrive to examine them5.Naval personnel should bemade aware that it is during the initial response that thegreatest risk of crime scene contamination is presentand also that they should advise the master and crew ofany ship involved to provide protection for any possibleevidence. Focussed questioning at the crime scene maylead to the identification and arrest of the offenderstogether with a description of the ship and the directionin which the ship was last heading5. Cole (2011:108)Programme Coordinator at the United Nations Officeon Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides an accoladefor navies by stating that “it is noteworthy that thequality of the evidence packages passed to regionalcountries by foreign navies has improved dramaticallysince the early handovers in 2008 and that theprosecutors and judges of regional states now routinelyreport to the UNODC that the cases prepared byforeign navies (The navies of France, Germany, Italy,Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA), are amongst thevery best they see in their courts.”

2.5 INFORMATION SHARING:INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION

UNSC 1816 (2008) urges all states to co-operate witheach other in terms of sharing information about acts ofpiracy and armed robbery in the territorial waters andon the high seas off the coast of Somalia. Gottlieb

14According to Alan Cole only Kenya and the Seychelles have to date issued handover guidance for foreign navies,specifying the manner in which evidence packagesshould be produced by navies intending to transfer suspects for trial in those countries.

Collec*ng Evidence for Transporta*on to the Forensic ScienceLaboratory



(2010:3) points out that sharing of information remainsa major challenge in combating sea piracy due to thetendency of naval forces designating informationgathered during their policing role on criminal activityas classified. The application of standard navyclassification procedures would preclude the sharing oflow level, yet essential, operational information such asfingerprints and photographs with law enforcementagencies (Gottlieb, 2010:5). The exchange of suchinformation is imperative for the arresting party, usuallya naval vessel on patrol, to establish who they haveapprehended, specifically whether that person is beingsought for previous crimes committed on the high seasor elsewhere and whether a valid warrant for thatpersons arrest and extradition is in force. Should this bethe case time and money could be saved by handing theperson over for prosecution to the authorities which areseeking that person’s arrest.

A memorandum of understanding on maritimesecurity co-operation between South Africa,Mozambique and Tanzania, concluded on 16 February2012 and which gives the forces of the participatingstates the right to patrol, search, arrest, seize andundertake hot pursuit operations on any maritime crimeor piracy suspect15, does not specifically address thequestion as to how information collected on piracy bythe three navies will be shared with law enforcement16.If the standard navy classification procedures arefollowed the classification of the information collectedby the navies while performing a policing function willnot be accessible to law enforcement. In this instancethe “over classification” of operational informationessential to executing the law enforcement function willneed to be guarded against. In this regard it must beborne in mind that the navies in this instance will beperforming a law enforcement function rather than amilitary function, pirates not being part of an opposingmilitary force. Were the information to be classified itwould preclude useful exchange of information with thepolicing agencies of the three countries which couldinitiate/expedite prosecution as well as providing andreceiving useful information for the navies patrolling theIndian Ocean north of the Mozambique channel. It mayalso result in perpetrators driven south by theinternational navies evading prosecution whenapprehended due to lack of information regardingpossible previous encounters with military forces.

Another problem created by not making provision forinformation sharing with law enforcement is thequestion of prosecution. On 15 March 2012 the ChiefMaritime Strategy Director of the South African Navystated during a briefing to reporters in Simons Town, onthe state of the South African Navy, that once pirateswere arrested it could be difficult deciding who dealtwith their criminal prosecution17. This statementhighlights the need for early co-operation betweennavies and law enforcement, with the possible inclusionof representatives of the prosecuting authorities at theoutset of negotiations for MOU’s.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURESFOR COMMUNICATION

In examining the challenges encountered in April2011 during an evidence collection operation conductedat sea onboard a VLCC by an Interpol response team11,it was found that the lack of standing operatingprocedures resulted in a lack of or poor communicationand misunderstanding between the owners, ships agents,law enforcement, Interpol and the first responders fromone of the coalition navies. A team from a naval vesselboarded the VLCC shortly after its release and did notprovide information on their activities on board thevessel to the Interpol response team designated toconduct the evidence collection operation. Details ofthis first encounter with the freshly released hijackedvessel would have been useful to the IRT team in termsof information/intelligence gleaned by the boardingparty regarding the modus operandi used by theperpetrators, information as to the type of crimescommitted, the number of perpetrators who were

15MASHAMAITE, K.P. 2012. “Minister Sisulu signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Security Cooperation with Tanzania and Mozambique”available at http://www.dod.mil-za/news/ news2012/february/mar-sec-coop-tan-moz.htm16Article 4 (8) of the Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the Republic of Mozambique, the government of the Republic of South Africa andthe government of the United Republic of Tanzania makes provision for a supplementary agreement/protocol to the MOU in which the modalities of sharing informationwill be contained. 17 Jenna Etheridge. IOL News “Piracy threatens South Africa” March 15 2012.< online> available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/piracy-threatens-south-africa-1.1257480?showComments=true

Biolgy Dog at Work at Major Crime Scene



involved and other useful information, such as in theincident in question, that the vessel had been used as amother ship and that one of the pirates had died onboard the ship.

FORMAL COMMUNICATION BETWEENNAVIES, POLICE FORCES AND INTERPOL

Naval forces do not necessarily have a criminaldatabasis on personal information of suspects,fingerprints and DNA which are stored on policedatabasis and which are essential for comparison withdata on apprehended pirates. The international policeorganisation, Interpol proposes three models by whichinformation regarding law enforcement activities can beshared between navies and national police forces.

- The navy forwards the information gathered toits country or to its countries Interpol NCB which inturn can communicate the information to other NCB’sand Interpol’s general secretariat.

- The Navy communicates directly with Interpolthrough an extension of the communication system ofthe NCB of that country.

- The exchange of information can take placebetween Interpol and another international organisationwith which Interpol has concluded an agreement(Gottlieb, 2011:14)

2.6 PROSECUTING THE PIRATES: OPTIONSFOR NAVIES

2.6.1. Embarked Officers.Embarking law enforcement officers from states in

the region in terms of article 7 of the Djibouti Code18.The aim of article 7 is to give effect to UNSC 1851 byembarking regional law enforcement officers on the hostparticipants vessel to assist with the arrest of the piracysuspects and to conduct the investigation necessary forthe prosecution in the state which provided theembarked officers

2.6.2. Prosecution in the country of the arresting warship.This will be dependent on, amongst other

considerations, whether the country of the arrestingwarship has fully incorporated the definition of piracy inarticle 101 of UNCLOS in their national legislation andthe degree to which jurisdiction over piracy as aninternational crime which can be subject to arrest andprosecution anywhere in the world has been established.Kontorovich believes that countries may only be willingto bear the high cost of prosecution if their own ships

and crews were subject to attack. He also believes thatcountries who claim that they do not have jurisdictionmay be doing so to conceal their political unwillingnessto prosecute19.

2.6.3 Prosecution in the flag stateFlag states which have ships on their register for flags

of convenience may not have the necessary resourcesor may be unwilling to prosecute.

2.6.4. Hand over to Somali authorities for prosecution.Current thinking favours the “Somalialization” of

solutions which foresees a strengthening of the rule oflaw by the establishment of a court system comprised ofa specialised court in Somaliland and an extraterritorialSomali specialised court established temporarily outsideSomalia4. On 14 July 2011 the CGPCS noted the needfor mechanisms to enable navies to quickly hand overcaptured pirates to competent state authorities forprosecution, using in particular evidence collected onboard naval vessels8.

2.6.5. Memorandums of understanding (MOU’s) with thirdstates in the region

Memorandums of understanding with third states inthe region to undertake the prosecution andincarceration of suspected and convicted pirates.Countries in the region which are being assisted by theUNODC with judicial, prosecutorial and police capacitybuilding programmes to empower them to assist withprosecuting the captured Somali pirates are Tanzania,Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles20.

2.6.6 International court.To try cases of piracy in an international court would

be costly and time consuming. Such trials would have tobe based on international treaty, which would require alot of political cooperation between states

18 Djibouti code of conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian ocean and the Gulf of Adenhttp://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx19 Eugene Kontorovich. Piracy and international law. Available online:, http://www.globallawforum.org/ViewPublication.aspx?Articleld=96>20 UNODC and Piracy. Available online http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html

Prosecu*on of Pirates



(Allesandri,2009:5)

3. FINDINGS

3.1 A major challenge to prosecution is that veryfew states which are members of the IMO have fullyincorporated the definition of piracy in article 101 ofUNCLOS in their national legislations, nor do theirnational legislations contain a jurisdictional frameworkbased on universal jurisdiction regulated by UNCLOS.

3.2 The ICC-IMB request to countries operatingnavies in the region of Somalia to incorporate UNSCres 1950’s call for the seizure and disposal of vessels,weapons and equipment used for piracy into their rulesof engagement may lead to valuable evidence, whichcould have been used for court driven prosecutions,being destroyed.

3.3 The risk of contamination of evidence isgreatest during the first response to an attack.

3.4. Lack of standard operating procedures fordealing with an event which includes interaction with therole players who have a stake in the proceedings maylead to misunderstandings and non adherence to crimescene management principles, leading in turn to thedestruction of evidence.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 It is recommended that in considering futureUNSC Resolutions, particularly those which address thestrengthening of legal interventions where internationalpeace and security is at stake, that states be obliged toreport (mandatory) to committees created in terms ofthe particular resolution on actions taken with regard tocompliance to the requirement of the UNSCR and thatthe committees have the mandate to ensure compliance.

4.2 It is also recommended that it be mademandatory for ship owners to lay a criminal charge inthe flag state against identified perpetrators of acts ofpiracy, hostage taking and kidnapping, to enable Interpolto issue red notices for arrest and extradition to theprosecuting state.

4.4 That the rules of engagement for naviesoperating off Somalia encompass specific provisions forthe zealous protection of possible evidence which canbe used in court for securing successful prosecutionduring court proceedings.

4.5. That the details of suspects arrested at sea becommunicated to International Law Enforcement(Interpol) via the agreed upon channels, together with aprécis of the circumstances of capture in order topossibly positively identify the suspects and or connect

them with other crimes. The information obtained froma search of Interpol’s database may affect the decisionwhether to prosecute or not. Also for Interpol to assistwith possible suggestions as to where the suspects mightbe taken for prosecution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALESSANDRI, E. (2009). Report of the conference “Addressing theResurgence of Sea Piracy: Legal, Political and Security Aspects”, organisedby the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the International Institute ofHumanitarian Law, in collaboration with and the support of the ItalianMinistry of Foreign Affairs, NATO, and European Commission. Rome. 16June.

BURNSTEIN, H.B. 1999. Criminal Investigation. Prentice- Hall, Inc.Upper Saddle River,New Jersey.

COLE, A. 2011 “Prosecuting piracy: challenges for the police and thecourts”Global Challenge, Regional Responses : Forging a common approach toMaritime Piracy : April 18-19,2011 Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Selectedbriefing papers : Published in 2011 by the Dubai School of Government,Dubai, United Arab Emirates. www.dsg.ae

COLVIN, M & COOPER, J. 2009 eds. Human Rights in theInvestigation and Prosecution of Crime. Oxford: University press.

ETHERIDGE, J. 2012. IOL News “Piracy threatens South Africa. March15 online available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/piracy-threatens-south-africa-1.1257480?showComments=true (accessed2012/05/12)

FOUCHE, H. 2010. “Prosecuting the Somali Pirates : The law enforcementapproach.” Acta Criminologica 23 (1).Crimsa,Pretoria. ISSN 1012-8093

GATHII, J.T. 2010. American Journal of International Law. “Kenya’spiracy prosecutions”. Vol 104 Nbr.3, July available online athttp://international.vlex.com/vid/kenya-piracy-prosecutions-228462542(accessed 2012/05/12)

GOTTLIEB, Y.G. 2011. Combating Maritime piracy: Inter-DisiplinaryCooperation and information Sharing. Paper based on presentation made atthe 1st combined Maritime Security Conference (MSC 2011) held in Kiel,Germany, 2-5 May 2011.

GUILFOYLE, D 2011. Global Challenge, Regional Responses : Forging acommon approach to Maritime Piracy : April 18-19,2011 Dubai, UnitedArab Emirates. Selected briefing papers : Published in 2011 by the DubaiSchool of Government, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. www.dsg.ae

GUYO, M. 2009. Taking the Somali pirates to court. ISS Today 15 April.[online]. Available from http://www.issafrica.org (accessed: 2009/04/20).

IMO,2012. Signatory states [online] available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/Signatory-States.aspx

KONTOROVICH, E. 2009. American Society of International Law(ASIL) Insights. “International Legal responses to Piracy off the Coast ofSomalia”. February 6, Volume 13, Issue 2. Available online athttp://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm (accessed 2012/05/12)

KRASKA, J. 2011.Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a commonapproach to Maritime Piracy : April 18-19,2011 Dubai, United ArabEmirates. Selected briefing papers : Published in 2011 by the Dubai School ofGovernment, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. www.dsg.ae

SUA. 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against theSafety of Maritime Navigation 1988. Rome : United Nations



Saferstein, R. 2004. Criminalistics: an introduction to forensic science (8th ed)Pearson/Prentice hall. Upper saddle river

TECHNIKON PRETORIA, 2002. Study guide for Investigation ofCrime IV – Module is based on the South African Law CommissionDiscussion paper 92, Project 105 Review of Security Legislation (Terrorism:Section 54 of the Internal Security Act, 1982).

UNCLOS. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. NewYork : United Nations

Henri Fouché is an Associate Professor at theDepartment of Criminology and Security Science atthe University of South Africa (UNISA) where helectures on Contemporary Crime Issues andsupervises Doctoral students. After completing hisschooling Henri attended the Merchant NavyAcademy, General Botha, in Cape Town, South Africa.This was followed by 3 years at sea as a navigatingcadet in the merchant navy. Thereafter Henriembarked on a career in law enforcement for 24 years,retiring in 1995 from the South African Police in therank of colonel. During his career in law enforcementHenri held, amongst others, the position of area

commander of the Jan Smuts International Airport inJohannesburg (presently OR Tambo International)and deputy director at the South African NationalCentral Bureau (NCB) of Interpol. In 2006 he wasawarded a doctorate by the Tshwane University ofTechnology for a thesis on the Policing of MaritimePiracy. Henri has published on the subject of Policingof Piracy and the law enforcement approach innational and international journals and has presentedpapers on the subject at 23 National and 7international conferences since 2005. He alsoregularly conducts interviews on the subject ofmaritime piracy in the press, magazines, radio andtelevision. In 2009 Henri was awarded a scholarship“Criminal Law and Sea piracy” at the Max PlanckInstitute for Foreign and International Criminal Law,Freiburg, Germany and has since conducted furtherresearch at the Institute in December 2010 as avisiting researcher and presented a paper at a seminarat the MPICC in Freiburg April 2012.

Professor Fouché can be cotacted at e-mail:[email protected]



Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) continue to be theprimary casualty-producing weapon and tactic against NATOforces; this threat will not end after NATO refocuses its missionin Afghanistan in 2014. Without increasing efforts to Attack theNetworks (AtN) that facilitate the employment of IEDs and theinstitutionalization of C-IED capabilities developed duringISAF, NATO will not be prepared for post ISAF operations,will continue to take unacceptable casualties and be challenged infuture operations.

The oceans connect nations globally through aninterdependent network of economic, financial, socialand political relationships and provide a means oftransportation for 90% of the world’s commerce. Theevolving international situation of the 21st centurycombined with the increasing complexity of globalcommerce, the rapid spread of advanced weaponsincluding IEDs and the potential threat from both stateand non-state actors may challenge mission areas theAlliance has historically dominated. Therefore theAlliance must institutionalize C-IED capabilities andadopt a comprehensive approach requiring new levelsof interdependence between states, internationalorganizations and non-governmental organizations tomaintain freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes,critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection ofmaritime resources and environmental safety.

THE GLOBAL IED THREAT

One of the significant threats facing NATO in theforeseeable future is the non-conventional/irregular,

non-state, regional, and trans-national threat networks.This includes insurgents, terrorists, criminals, weaponstraffickers, pirates, etc. These networks have allrecognized the benefits of using the IED as a tactical,operational and strategic weapon of choice against theAlliance, nations, and partners. In addition to killing orwounding more than 15,000 NATO forces inAfghanistan since 2001, from January 2011 to October2012 there have been 12,461 IED events globally(outside of Iraq and Afghanistan), averaging 556 eventsa month, resulting in 27,169 casualties in 121 countriesconducted by 51 regional and transnational threatnetworks1. There were also over 20 recorded IED-related incidents in the maritime environment recordedbetween November 2010 and Jan 20122. Consequently,the IEDs success as a weapon system provides threatnetworks with a disproportionately effective capabilityagainst the Alliance and our partner nations.

NATO has been directlydealing with insurgent andterrorist threat networks,

especially ones that facilitateIED use within the ISAF JointOperating Area (JOA) since 2003.NATO’s success in interdictingthese networks has had limited

results3.To date, NATO has dedicated the majority of its C-

IED efforts to Defeat the Device (DtD) and Preparethe Force (PtF) requirements. This defensive approachhas achieved modest success. The more proactive andoffensive Attack the Networks (AtN)4 approach isnecessary to impact the continued use and emplacementof IEDs. Success in AtN operations to interdict anddefeat threat networks facilitating the use of IEDsrequires synchronized joint, interagency, multinational

WHAT IS THE NATO MARITIME C-IED INITIATIVE?WHAT IS THE NATO MARITIME C-IED INITIATIVE?

By CDR Raymond Albarado, NATO ACT C-IED IPT

1 Institute for Defence Analysis (IDA) Worldwide Improvised Explosive Database, 1 Jun 12.2AllenVanguard Counter Threat Solutions TRITON Database.3 US JIEDDO ISAF 3rd Quarter 2012 Statistics Report dated May 2012.4 It is important to understand that valuable lessons learned from the land domain in ISAF have been written in blood. The current C-IED doctrine, AJP 3.15(B), isan excellent document that explains the current C-IED approach and strategy for the alliance and any other organization that desires to reduce the effect of IEDs. Thoughwritten with a focus on the land domain, its approach can serve as a template or framework for all domains.



as well as political efforts to understand, anticipate, warnon, and interdict threat networks enabling adversaryactivities both within the JOA and in the NATO Area ofInterest (AI). Accordingly, NATO has made AtN itsmain effort but the final step needed is theinstitutionalization of C-IED Capabilities to transformthe Alliance in order to succeed in future conflictenvironments.

The oceans are vast but have well recognized chokepoints, infrastructure and areas of high naval andcommercial traffic. The ability to maintain open seawaysagainst threat networks that would seek to close themor otherwise exploit them, for their own gain, eitherpolitically, strategically or financially, will be paramountto the security and good order of the seaways. Thusmaritime operations, although having not received thesame level of attention as the land counterpart, have animportant and integral part to play in countering thesetransnational threat networks—inter alia facilitating theuse of IEDs. While much of the existing C-IEDdoctrine is entirely relevant to the maritime component,there are unique challenges and operational differencesthat need to be considered. The NATO initiative for C-IED in the Maritime Environment (ME) seeks tohighlight and subsequently resolve these issues and sosteer the Alliance toward an enhanced maritimeoperational capability and effectiveness in counteringthreat networks in the ME.

24 Jan 2011, Reconnaissance ofthe Suez Canal undertaken by AlQaida prompting discussion on

the best way to attack USwarships traversing the waterway.Discussions revealed examplesof improvised Limpet devices foruse by suicide swimmers andtimed devices utilizing chemical

time pencils.2

Threat networks in the ME have exploited themodern maritime industry for decades. Whetherattacking a vulnerable naval vessel in a confinedwaterway, targeting critical oilrigs or in hijacking acommercial trader for ransom or other motives, theyhave exploited a vulnerability that uses sea lanes to movepersonnel and resources regionally and acrosscontinents. The blatant paradox is that the same sea-

lanes that provide our economic lifeblood supply ouradversaries as well.

The adversary IED system diagram shown below isrepresentative of any threat system, criminal or terrorist,where the key planning elements and action stepsleading up to execution of an activity can be identifiedfor intervention action. It is these steps—i.e.,networks—that need to be targeted to prevent an attackfrom occurring. One of the enduring capabilities thatenables these intervening actions is through intelligencedriven, evidence based, operations.

INTELLIGENCE AND EXPLOITATION

Intelligence gathering, including informationobtained from the exploitation of recovered materieland biometric data are vital components of an effectiveAtN and counter-threat networks approach. Thisintelligence and information can be added to wider all-source intelligence so that the best possibleunderstanding of adversary capabilities and intentions,perpetrator relationships and threats can be achieved.The production and dissemination of fused intelligenceassessments informs operational planning and targetingprocesses which can be both kinetic and non-kinetic innature. Biometric data, if collected and processedcorrectly, can also—with other evidence—supportprosecution of terrorists, criminals, pirates and otheradversaries.

The NATO C-IED exploitation model (shownbelow) provides a process to exploit recovered (IED)



material and personnel. Although focussed on C-IEDrequirements, the mechanisms and processes offer asound framework for expansion to meet wider counterthreat network requirements including within themaritime domain. Established NATO exploitationactivities occur in three successive and progressivestages: in the field (Level 1), at theatre-level (Level 2) andout of theatre (Level 3), although there may be situationswhen not all three of the stages are employed. Theapplication and employment of these levels, as well asscales of deployment, are decisions for the forcecommander to determine, influenced by higher-levelpolicy and host nation legal requirements.

MARITIME INTERDICTIONOPERATIONS (MIO) AS AN ENABLER

Maritime forces perform a range of maritime securityoperations, including counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and more routine maritimeinterdiction operations in oceans, seas, bays, estuaries,waterways, coastal regions and ports. MIO is the idealcapability to employ in countering threats and mitigatethe risks of illegal or threatening activities at sea, as wellaiding the free passage of shipping. MIO can be seen asvital in isolating adversaries from external support viathe waterways, and can reduce the effectiveness of threatnetworks such as piracy and criminality, both of whichare funding sources for terrorist activity. Naval supportmay involve the provision of deterrence and presencepatrols that enforce sanctions or blockades and canassist with AtN activity by disrupting adversary supplylines and identifying the individuals responsible as wellas collecting information from boarding’s that could beexploited and used to feed into the intelligence cycle.

THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT (ME)BRINGS ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

At sea, MIO is the vehicle for direct intervention intothe adversaries system and initiation of the subsequentprocesses to exploit the evidence and intelligencegathered. Although no parallel exists or guidance yetprovided in NATO maritime doctrine, exploitationactivities are as applicable to maritime operations as onland and are in any case commonly carried out at thenational level by maritime agencies other than navies.

A maritime exploitation model would almostcertainly reflect a tactical or field capability (level 1),embedded within boarding personnel, and then thecapacity to exploit findings which may be addressedthrough the expedient utilisation of an existing

capability. However, due to the obvious restrictions ofmaritime operations, it is more likely to be a strategichub with the capacity for technical exploitation at bothL2/3 with permission to liaise with other military andnon-military organisations.

SOME CAPABILITY GAPS AND THENECESSARY ENDURING CAPABILITIES

The apparent shortfall in NATO Counter Piracy (CP)capability, specifically in evidence collection to supportthe prosecution of suspected pirates, is highlighted in arecently published (July 2011) Joint Analysis and LessonsLearned Centre (JALLC) study. This work coveredexternal information sharing in support of CPoperations and one of the key findings was that:

“…NATO does not currentlyprovide comprehensive trainingin law enforcement activities toits maritime forces and such

training is needed, especially onthe collection and preservationof evidence needed by foreign orinternational courts for theprosecution of suspected

pirates”There is also increasing acknowledgement of the

need for units and ships to undertake tactical-levelexploitation activities. In the maritime domain, this goesbeyond securing the scene of incidents, as on land, inorder to preserve material of forensic and technicalvalue for specialist exploitation by Weapons IntelligenceTeams.5 In the maritime environment, naval forces areunlikely to be able to call on assistance from dedicatedteams and skills must be embedded in boarding teamsbut beginning at the basic awareness level throughoutthe force.

Given the likely isolation of target vessels, boardingparties must be able to conduct tactical questioning ofpersons found onboard, perform search to gatherintelligence and correctly (and lawfully) recover materialand biometric data for higher level exploitation. Theymust also be capable of planning and effectivelyexecuting such search, intelligence gathering andexploitation tasks, consistent with the safety factorsimposed by the environment. Military requirements,

5 Weapons Intelligence Teams (WIT) often deploy to assist Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams in the investigation of IED events. See AJP 3.15(B) orSTANAG 2298, NATO WIT Capability Standards for further information



especially the need for rapid outputs, may mean thatconditions and processes employed at sea are notidentical to traditional crime scene investigationmethods. Although some degree of compromise maybe necessary, continuity of evidence procedures must beobserved if cases are likely to result in legal action andprosecution through the courts.

Recovery and examination techniques must be non-intrusive and non-invasive in order to preserve themaximum amount of forensic and technical evidencefor higher-level exploitation, unless immediate safetyrequirements dictate otherwise. In order to ensure thatboarding parties and maritime security personnel arefully capable, they should be equipped and trained in theuse of manual (fingerprinting and DNA collection) andautomated systems (e.g. SEEK II, HIIDE etc) in orderto enrol personnel onboard vessels, consistent withextant data protection policies. Teams can also beexpected to produce reports and assessments to supportwider J2 analysis and operational planning. Reports canprovide rapid intelligence assessments of emergingtrends and changing adversary TTPs.

For planned maritime operations, a strict level 1 tolevel 2 to level 3 hierarchy and approach may not beappropriate depending on scale, rate of effort andduration. It is assessed that for typical naval componentcommand / task force deployments, search &exploitation-trained boarding parties would form partof the force structure from the outset. The intelligence,material and biometric data would need to be passed toJ2 staff, ideally in an all-source intelligence fusion centrewith exploitation staff representation for assessmentand linkage of cases. Recovered hardware and evidencecould be transported directly from theatre via securetransportation to appropriate reach-back facilities in thehome base for detailed examination and evidentialprocessing. In this instance level 2 facilities are notrequired, but the intelligence fusion centre would act asa hub for control and information management. A hubapproach ensures timely assessment and intelligenceprovision for the force, as well as chain of custodyassurance through compliance with accepted protocols.

In the maritime domain, search is a key componentof MIO. The maritime environment offers specificchallenges for the conduct of search in comparison toland-based search execution where teams can beexpected to be working onboard vessels at sea in remotelocations, in confined spaces and with limited supportavailable. Nationally, search at sea may well be anembedded capability within boarding teams, but the

application is not consistent and consists largely ofrummage search techniques inappropriate for threat ledsearch activity, where items found are to be treated asevidence likely to be used in a criminal prosecution.Current search doctrine6, while providing a platform formaritime search operations, is not entirely sympatheticto the requirements of seaborne search or the skillsrequired but can relevant considerations in support ofefforts to counter the IED threat.

THE ACT MARITIME INITIATIVE

Terrorism, criminality and piracy are threats to thefreedom and safety of maritime navigation,undermining economic security, and contributing to thedestabilisation of governance and the global securitysituation. The compromise of one strategic waterway orchokepoint, even for limited duration, can have astrategic economic effect nationally and globally; such isthe reliance of nations on sea trade routes andcommunications.

Through the NATO C-IED Action Plan, the NATOACT C-IED Integrated Product Team (IPT) has beentasked to assess the ability of the alliance to counterIEDs in the ME. To date, the IPT has conducted aMaritime C-IED Community of Interest (CoI)workshop, co-hosted with the COE CSW in October2012. The aim of this initiative is to establish a CoI todiscuss the issues and challenges, to share informationand best practices, and to come to a general consensuson potential ways forward for NATO in order toinfluence and improve and develop National and NATOcapabilities to counter IEDs in the maritimeenvironment. The first meeting revealed that some ofthe biggest challenges are not necessarily equipment andmaterial resourcing but understanding and buy-in at alllevels. The next conference is scheduled for 12-14 March2013 in Kiel, Germany.

NOTE: The NATO C-IED Campaign Plancontinues to be staffed for ratification and any maritimestrategy will be aligned with that plan. The aim is to pulltogether all aspects of the much more developedconcepts and strategies for similar land based operationsand to revise them with a joint operational aspect.

Further InformationFurther information on C-IED in the ME Initiative and

upcoming conferences is available from NATO ACT C-IEDIPT at www.c-ied.org.

CDR Raymond Albarado, USA Navy, is the leadMaritime SME and point of contact.

6ATP-73 Vol 1 Military Search and ATP-73 Vol 2 Military Search (Techniques & Procedures).




NMIOTC Journal>>>

COURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGSCOURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGS

WMD in MIO Course11-15 June 2012

Pilot Mari/me C-IED Course2-13 July 2012

Training HMS DIAMOND26-28 June 2012


NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery


NMIOTC Journal <<<


Eurasia Pratnership Capstone 201210-14 December 2012

Training of the French Ship ACONIT1-3 February 2012

Training of German Specialized Boarding Company10-20 September 2012

Training of HMS SOUTHERLAND23-25 July 2012



“Since 90% of the world’s trademust travel by sea, and 95% of allmilitary logistics must go by sea,the Navy is utterly essential to thefreedom and security of allnations. This was not changed by9/11.” (Dr. John Lehman, former USN Secretary).

In all Western countries, the Cold War’s conclusionled to a reduction in armed forces, including fleet size(the U.S. Navy now has the smallest sized fleet since the1930's). Since the end of the Cold War, defencespending by the European NATO allies has fallen byalmost 20%. Over the same period, their combinedGDP grew by around 55%. Within NATO, if onecompares Europe’s spending with that of the UnitedStates, the contrast is also large. By the end of the Coldwar, in 1991, defence expenditures in Europeancountries represented almost 34% of NATO’s total,with the USA and Canada covering the remaining 66%.Since then, the share of NATO’s security burdenshouldered by European countries has fallen to 21%.

Obviously, the current global financial and economiccrisis is likely to increase the existing gap. Thus affectingsignificantly the global distribution of military powerwithin the Alliance and in the world. According to theStockholm International Peace Research Institute,between 2000 and 2009, India’s defence spending grewby 59%, and China’s tripled. This led to a double leapforward: a transformation of these countries’ armedforces and their acquisition of new weapons systems.

Operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistanworsened the decline of navies in allied countries byshifting attention away from emerging powers’ maritimechallenges or Iran’s rise as a regional maritime – andpotentially nuclear - power. The prospect that the ArabSpring will again return the Mediterranean to its historicposition as an intersection of conflicting interest cannotbe ignored. Piracy could affect other regions than theHorn of Africa. Terrorists could shift their activities tocritical sea lines of communications and vulnerableenergy infrastructure ashore or off-shore.

However, Operation Unified Protector last year,which involved an important maritime component, withthe arms embargo on Libya, sends a more positivesignal. This operation showed that European countries,even though they spend less on their militaries than theUS, can still play a central role in a complex militaryoperation, with the support of US and NATO’s uniquecapabilities, and partners’ contributions.

After the US, Europe still holds the world’s mostadvanced military capabilities. The question, however, iswhether Europe will be able to maintain this edge in 5or 10 years.

In this context, I will try to explain what NATO iscurrently doing at the politico-strategic and at theoperational level in the maritime domain and what couldbe envisaged in the future in the context of the SmartDefence concept. A lot is being done. A lot moreremains to be done.

I. WHAT IS NATO DOING?

Developing new Concepts and Policy.

The NAC approved two important documents in2011 that frame the debate on future NATO maritimeactivities and operations.

The Alliance Maritime Strategy “sets out the waysthat maritime power could help resolve criticalchallenges facing the Alliance now and in the future, andthe roles - enduring and new – that NATO forces mayhave to carry out in the maritime environment in orderto contribute to the Alliance’s defence and security andto promote its values. These roles capitalise upon theability of maritime forces to provide a spectrum ofstrategic options to the Alliance, and include appropriatecontributions to Deterrence and Collective Defence;Crisis Management; Cooperative Security: outreachthrough Partnerships, dialogue and cooperation; andMaritime Security.”

The MC Concept on MSO describes the tasks whichNATO should be able to undertake (e.g. support MSA;uphold freedom of navigation; fight against proliferationof WMD; protect critical infrastructure; supportmaritime counter-terrorism; contribute to maritimesecurity capacity building). It also touches on currentmilitary capability and focuses on likely requirements to

“MIO IN AN ERA OF CONVERGING – DIVERGING MARITIME“MIO IN AN ERA OF CONVERGING – DIVERGING MARITIMESECURITY OPERATIONS”SECURITY OPERATIONS”

By Erik Sandahl, NATO HQ/Operations Division



undertake MSO effectively in the future. The NMAshave been tasked to provide an Implementation Conceptfor MSO, which is expected to be ready by October nextyear.

Both conceptual documents are fully in line with thenew Strategic Concept approved at the Lisbon Summitin November 2010, forward-looking and ambitious, butalso pragmatic and resource-conscious. Theirimplementation will be conducted in line with SmartDefence, which is a the heart of NATO’s new approach,as stressed at the Chicago Summit by NATO Heads ofState and Government in their declaration on defencecapabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020.

Alongside this conceptual approach, a far-reachingdecision was taken in 2011 to transfer the command ofall maritime operations to MC Northwood in 2013. Thenew single Allied Maritime Command will be the hub, atoperational level, for all NATO maritime operations.With its integrated structure, it will be able to advise,plan, conduct and support joint operations to influencesecurity from the sea. Collocated with the EU maritimecomponent command, it will maintain, at staff level, aclose link with the EU and build upon the practicalexperience accumulated so far in operations OceanShield and Atalanta. It will also establish and maintainrelations with non-NATO operational partners andfacilitate their engagement in NATO-led operations andactivities, in peace or times of crisis.

Reviewing current maritime operations andlooking at the future.

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, launched inOctober 2001 to counter the threat of terrorism in theMediterranean Sea in the wake of the attacks of the 11September 2001 has evolved considerably overtime. Itis currently transitioning from a platform-based to anetwork-based operation. The new concept consistscurrently into a combination of assets on call and regularsurge and deterrence operations. The transition ofOAE, to be successful, requires the development of arobust information sharing network, to provide accurateand permanently updated maritime situationalawareness. OAE already provides good value for money,in particular with regard to interoperability, enhancedmaritime awareness, engagement of operational partnersand information sharing. The establishment of aneffective sensor and non-sensor network will requiresome 4 to 5 years if the required measures, resourcesand equipment are provided by Allies. NATO nationsare currently considering strategic options for the futureof OAE.

Operation Ocean Shield, launched in 2009 as a

contribution to the international community’s efforts tocounter piracy off the Horn of Africa, works in closecoordination with other key actors, including TaskForces (ATALANTA, CTF 151) and independentdeployers (China, Russia, India, Japan and others, likeSouth Korea and the United States). They havecontributed to a significant decrease of pirate attacks in2011. The focus in on escort and protection ofmerchant vessels in the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden.

In approving the Strategic Assessment for OperationOcean Shield last March, the NAC agreed to enhanceNATO action at sea under the current mandate andOPLAN, with revised ROEs. NATO nations alsoagreed to extend this operation until December 2014.They are currently discussing the Periodic MissionReview of this operation and will consider differentoptions, taking into account recent developmentsaffecting piracy in Somalia and in the region.

Both operations suffer significant critical shortfallsto be fully effective. A critical capability will be ISR.Providing commanders with an accurate,comprehensive, permanently updated RecognisedMaritime Picture thus enhancing the MaritimeSituational Awareness (MSA) requires a range ofsurveillance assets and the development of an effectiveinformation sharing network. In this regard, it is ofutmost importance to enhance the engagement ofpartners and the coordination with relevant internationaland regional agencies.

II. CAN WE DO MORE IN A GENERALCONTEXT OF SCARCITY ANDREDUCED RESOURCES ?

On the paper (AMS, MC Concept for MSO,OPLANs, Summits and Ministerial Meetings’communiqués), NATO’s ambitions are high. Ourcapabilities remain significant as demonstrated last yearin OUP. But those made available by nations for ourcurrent maritime operations remain limited.

Whatever NATO nations envisage for the future inthe maritime domain, it is clear, and I will quote the MCConcept for MSO (MC 0588) approved by the MilitaryCommittee and the Council, that some key conditionsmust be met:

- “Every effort should be made to leverage existingand already planned capabilities to enhance MSOeffectiveness. Concurrently, actors within the MaritimeEnvironment (ME) should endeavour to avoidduplications of existing capabilities. Carefulconsideration to the funding of operations costsgenerated by the task to provide rapid response will also





be required.

- Whilst primarily relying on existing assets andresources, Allies will be guided by the NATO DefencePlanning Process (NDPP) in the development ofcapable, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable andsustainable maritime capabilities.

- Establishing formal NATO relationships withemerging regional maritime organisations, wherecapacity already exists, may also offer an attractive wayof mitigating some of these requirements.

- Inexpensive information sharing mechanisms forworking in coalition with willing partner nations, insupport of Maritime Security, should also be consideredas a force multiplier. “

It is clear that the way forward lies in not spendingmore but in spending better – by pursuing multinationalapproaches, making the transatlantic package ofcapabilities more strategically oriented, and working withemerging maritime powers to manage the effects of theglobalisation of security.

NATO and especially European NATO nations, asrecommended in the new Strategic Concept adopted inLisbon in November 2010, should pursue a “smartdefence” approach, i.e. building security for less moneyby working together and being more flexible. Thisrequires identifying those areas in which NATO alliesneed to keep investing. Priorities should be set on thebasis of threats, cost-effectiveness and performance –not budgetary or prestige considerations alone. Keepinga deployable army, a powerful navy, and a strong airforce costs money and not all European countries canafford to have a bit of everything. European nationsshould work in small clusters to combine their resourcesand build capabilities that can benefit the Alliance as awhole.

European countries can help bridge the gap with theUS by increasing their contribution to two ingredients:deployable and sustainable maritime capabilities. Thisrequires an open and truly strategic dialogue betweenthe US and European allies to discuss issues of commonconcern. In this regard, particular efforts should bemade to ensure that the two major Euro-Atlanticsecurity providers, NATO and the EU, cooperate moreclosely.

Finally, NATO should work more closely with keyemerging powers (China, India). Fostering a mutuallyassured dialogue with these countries would help defusecrises, overcome disagreements and clear-upmisperceptions. Working together, for instance in thecontext of counter-piracy, as it is currently the case off

the Horn of Africa, in counter-terrorism or counter-proliferation of WMDs, could eventually lead to acommon understanding of how to build twenty-first-century global security , which entails a sense of sharedresponsibility.

I will conclude by quoting Anders Fogh Rasmussen,the NATO Secretary General,

“The economic challengesthat European nations face areimmense, but that should notprevent them from seeing thewider strategic picture.Uncoordinated defence cutscould jeopardise the continent’sfuture security. Libya can act asa wake-up call, but this missionneeds to be followed by deeds.Making European defence morecoherent, strengtheningtransatlantic ties, and enhancingNATO’s connections with otherglobal actors is the way toprevent the economic crisis frombecoming a security crisis.”*Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the positionsof NATO

Erik Sandahl is member of the Operations Sectionat the Operations Division of the International Staffin Brussels.

He is a retired Colonel from the French Army(Marine Infantry). In uniform he has participated inseveral peacekeeping and other operations in Africa,Lebanon, and Bosnia- Herzegovina (as Battalioncommander in Sarajevo in 1995).

He was appointed at NATO HQ in 1997, andserved firstly as Branch Chief “Current Operations”at the International Military Staff within theOperations Division. He joined his new position in theIS in January 2000.

In this article we wish to briefly examine maritime security(MARSEC) not in a conventional way used by industry experts,but through the lens of a social policy planner. The latter leveragesthe very unique concept of ‘wicked problem(s)’ to work outsolutions under the most extreme of circumstances, morespecifically, when the key-stakeholders do not have the sameunderstanding of the problem.

THE MARITIME SECURITY PROBLEM

Maritime security is a very broad field of study andoften brings together under the same roof interests fromextremely diverse backgrounds. In the case of Somalipiracy for instance, supra-national (United Nations,International Maritime Organization, InternationalMaritime Bureau), national (Governments, Navies,Intelligence Outfits) and private interests (shipowners,charterers, private maritime security companies, marineinsurers) from around the world have successfullycoordinated their efforts with Non-GovernmentalOrganizations both to avert human suffering of Somalisand seafarers, and to work on a sustainable, long-termsolution.

For such a remarkable alignment of the internationalcommunity behind a common cause, it strikes asparticularly impressive given that the stakeholders have(to put it diplomatically) very diverging views of thechallenge. If you ask a marine insurer, a naval officer, apolitician, a UN officer, a private maritime securityprofessional, even a Somali, ‘what is the problem withpiracy and its practitioners?’ they will all give you widelydiverging definitions of the problem (if any at all…)!

Start with shipowners for instance. They mostprobably will underline the misery of the seafarers incaptivity, insurance premiums, and then the loss ofincome (if not property). Politicians will focus on thehuman drama, regulatory issues (on the use of armedguards onboard merchant vessels) and potentially on theeconomic sustainability of naval fleets off Somalia.United Nations officers will express their feelings for thesuffering both of Somali people and captive seafarers,and will further elaborate on issues of regional(prosecutorial) capacity building and national legislation.Marine insurers will express their absolute horror faceto the risk of losing millions in insurance cover-payments to shipowners. Last but not least, manySomalis in Puntland will express (worst case scenario)

sympathy for the Somali ‘coast guard’ protecting theirocean natural resources. With such a plethora ofdifferent perspectives on the problem, one is seriouslytempted to call it a ‘wicked problem’.

Distinguishing properties of ‘wicked problems’

‘Wicked problems’ share at least ten differentdistinguishing properties which are responsible for theirunique nature. For all it matters though, the hallmarkof these problems which have traditionally pesteredpolicy makers and social planners, has remained all alongthe same: they can be ‘solved’ neither as ‘simple’ nor as‘complex’ ones. Traditional analytical thinking (eveniterative methods) used in engineering and sciencescannot yield ‘solution(s)’ to a ‘wicked problem’. At best,the planner can hope for ‘improvements’ or (as somesocial scientists put it) a re-solution. A ‘clear-cut/endgame solution’ is beyond reach by default.

Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 161) explicitly lay out theten distinguishing properties of ‘wicked problems’:

1. There is no definitive formulation of the asolution to a ‘wicked problem’; For any given tameproblem, an exhaustive formulation can be statedcontaining all the information the problem-solver needsfor understanding and solving the problem, provided heknows his ‘art’, of course. This is not possible withwicked-problems.

2. ‘Wicked problems’ have no stopping rule; whensolving a chess problem or a mathematical equation, theproblem-solver knows when he has done his job. Thereare no criteria that tell when a solution has been found.

3. ‘Solutions’ to ‘wicked problems’ are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad; you cannot ever ‘solve’ a ‘wickedproblem’ in the traditional analytical sense. You can onlyimprove the situation that produces the problematic.

4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a‘solution’ to a ‘wicked problem’; […], any ‘solution’, afterbeing implemented, will generate waves ofconsequences over an extended, virtually an unbounded,period of time.

5. Every ‘solution’ to a ‘wicked problem’ is a ‘one-shot operation’; because there is no opportunity to learnby trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly;with a ‘wicked problem’, however, every implemented

IS MARITIME SECURITY A WICKED PROBLEM?IS MARITIME SECURITY A WICKED PROBLEM?

by Dr. Alec Coutroubis and George Kiourktsoglou , PhD candidate



solution is consequential. It leaves ‘traces’ that cannot beundone.

6. ‘Wicked problems ’do not have an enumerable(or an exhaustively describable) set of potential‘solutions’, nor is there a well-described set ofpermissible operations that may be incorporated into theplan; There are no criteria which enable one to provethat all solutions to a ‘wicked problem’ have beenidentified and considered.

7. Every ‘wicked problem’ is essentially unique;[…] despite long lists of similarities between a currentproblem and a previous one, there always might be anadditional distinguishing property that is of overridingimportance.

8. Every ‘wicked problem’ can be considered to bea symptom of another problem; Problems can bedescribed as discrepancies between the state of affairs asit is and the state as it ought to be. The process ofresolving the problem starts with the search for causalexplanation of the discrepancy. Removal of that causeposes another problem of which the original problemis a ‘symptom’.

9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a‘wicked problem’ can be explained in numerous ways.The choice of explanation determines the nature of the

problem's resolution; ‘Crime in the streets’ can beexplained by not enough police, by too many criminals,by inadequate laws, too many police, culturaldeprivation, deficient opportunity, too many guns,phrenologic aberrations, etc., Each of these offersdirection for attacking crime in the streets. Which oneis right?

10. The planner has no right to be wrong; […] thescientific community does not blame its members forpostulating hypotheses that are later refuted—so longas the author abides by the rules of the game, of course.In the world of planning and ‘wicked problems’ no suchimmunity is tolerated. Here the aim is not to find thetruth, but to improve some characteristics of the worldwhere people live.

Coping Strategies: How do we ‘solve’ ‘wickedproblems’?

The alternative method(s) of solving problems ofany kind are depicted in Figure 1 (Roberts 2009, Ch. 20,p. 356). Pundits call these methods ‘coping strategies’.In the case of ‘wicked problems’ there are two questionsto be asked for the planner to corroborate the nature ofthe problem:

1. Is there broad based agreement over both thedefinition of the problem and its solution?



Figure 1. Coping Strategies

2. Is power to define the problem and at the sametime its solution concentrated or contested?

The rationale described in Figure 1 gradually movesfrom the definition of the type of the problem (simple,complex, ‘wicked’), to the acid test of whether the powerto define (the problem) and solve (it) is ‘contested’ or‘concentrated’. In the former case, there is the choice ofeither a ‘competitive’ (War for instance) or a‘collaborative’ copying strategy. In the latter case, atypical example of a standard bearer of ‘concentratedpower’ who leverages ‘authoritative strategies’ is the U.S.Supreme Court.

Using a collaborative strategy to ‘solve’ a ‘wickedproblem’

The advantages of collaborative strategies used tosolve ‘wicked problems’ are obvious and for goodreasons:

1. They promote cost sharing practices;

2. They create strength in numbers;

3. They eliminate redundancies.

Thus

4. They enhance efficiency.

By the flip side of the same token though:

I. Collaborative strategies increase the so called‘transaction costs’;

II. They potentially create ‘challenging synergies’;

III. They may also render the whole process ofproblem solving more time consuming.

Nancy Roberts (2009, Ch. 20, p. 361-372) describesthe basic steps of a collaborative strategy in search a‘solution’ to a ‘wicked problem’:

A. The bedrock of the whole process is thecreation of a ‘spirit of collaboration’ translated as‘working together’;

B. Of comparable importance is the development,validation and eventually implementation of a ‘strategicframework’ of principles and policies;

C. Collaboration is by default a challenging if notdemanding effort and as such all the stakeholders in theproblem solving process should strive for some‘common ground’ instead of resigning to ‘silo mentality’;

D. The most intriguing part of the search for aplausible ‘solution’ is the ‘failure into collaboration’eloquently summed up in ‘people have to learn whatdoes not work before they are willing to absorb what

they perceive to be the extra ‘costs’ associated withcollaboration. This learning is especially important forpeople who come from different cultures’ (NancyRoberts);

E. Get the whole system ‘in the room’ and create a‘community of interest’. Aligning diverging definitionsof a ‘wicked problem’, let alone the disparate interests ofthe stakeholders is a Herculean task, and for this theprocess must be utterly inclusive;

F. Last but not least, it is of the utmost importancefor the stakeholders to have unwavering trust in the‘solving’ process. Only then, within a context of strongcommitment, does the whole endeavor have its bestchances to come to fruition.

IS MARITIME SECURITY A WICKEDPROBLEM?

To determine the true nature of the maritime securityproblem is to investigate whether Somali piracy, forinstance, features the distinguishing properties of a‘wicked problem’. The challenge posed by Somali piracyhas obviously neither a single, universally accepteddefinition nor a readily understandable stopping rule. Asolution can only be a ‘one shot operation’, good-or-badnot right-or-wrong, with long term (positive or negative)consequences. By the same token, Somali piracy isuniquely benchmarked against the Nigerian one and asymptom of a host of other problems including utterpoverty, corruption, and collapse of the state.

As international pressure has been applied to theSomali piracy problem, the problem has continued tochange. At its inception, Somali piracy was a fairlyunsophisticated, local problem. The widespreadimplementation of industry Best ManagementsPractices (BMP-4), the presence of significantinternational Naval vessels, the use of convoys and aguarded shipping channel through the war risk zone, theinitiation of offensive military operations to combatSomali piracy, the use of armed guard forces aboardtransiting commercial vessels, and the continuedpayments of ever larger vessel ransoms, have combinedto change the nature of the problem, but not toeliminate it. Piracy has become a well organized criminalenterprise. The pirates now utilize more sophisticatedtactics both when seizing vessels, and when negotiatingtheir release. The ransom values have significantlyincreased while the average duration of negotiations hasalso increased. The piracy risk area has expanded toinclude the sea space extending all the way to the Indiancoast, and the overall number of events has drasticallyfallen, but the overall rate of hijackings versus attempts



has not been significantly altered. Additionally, many ofthe conditions in Somalia that make piracy an attractiveventure (including poverty, low life expectancies, armsand vessel availability, ineffective law enforcement, ahigh maritime traffic area, and high returns) still persist.The problem is far from solved (see Figure 2). Given arelaxation in the international pressure applied inresponse to the declining empirical number of annualevents, the problem will undoubtedly morph again to fillthe void.

Establishing the character of maritime security as a‘wicked problem’ creates some very interesting insightsinto a potentially robust ‘solution’ and its correspondingcontext. As was previously mentioned, a strategy ofcollaboration among the disparate stakeholders is ofutmost importance and as such, it begs for fullinclusivity. For all it matters though, (and in the case ofSomali piracy it does matter a lot) inclusivity does notentail a ‘cake cutting exercise’ among the stakeholdersbut rather an alignment of all these interest groups(mainly the Somali people) behind the ultimate cause oferadicating the scourge! Piracy is neither a newchallenge, nor one that has ever been solved. Piracy hassimply moved from one area of the world’s shippinglanes to another based on the solutions applied at anygiven time. We are unlikely to fully eradicate piracy, butwe can limit it by understanding the true nature of theproblem and the nature of potential solutions that maybe applied in a given area at a given time.

REFERENCESU.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, SOMALIA: Piracy Analysis and WarningWeekly (PAWW) Report (Horn of Africa) for 29/Nov. to 05/Dec., 2012.

Rittel, Horace W.J. and Webber, Melvin M. ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory

of

Planning.’ Policy Sciences. Vol. 4. 1973.

Roberts, Nancy. ‘Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan.’Research in Public Policy Management, Volume 11b: Learning fromInternational Public Management Reform. Ed. Lawrence Jones, James Guthrie& Peter Steane. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001.

Dr Alec D Coutroubis (BSc (Hons), DIC, MSc, DBA,MBA, PhD, FCMI, CEng, CSci, MIChemE, FIMarEST,FHEA) is a Principal Lecturer & Teaching Fellow at theUniversity of Greenwich and Visiting Professor of ShiManagement at ALBA Graduate Business School, Greece. Hehas published extensively on a numerous topics relating toMaritime Engineering, Marine Management and Educationthrough a number of Books, Monographs as well as numerouspopular press publications.George Kiourktsoglou obtained his B.Sc. in Mechanical

Engineering in 1992 from the Aristotelian Technical Universityof Thessaloniki in Greece. As an intern, he worked for the IsraeliPublic Corporation of Electricity. Having concluded his militaryservice he went to the U.S.A. to study Nuclear Engineering andApplied Physics at Cornell University. From the latter hegraduated in 1996 with an M.Sc.. From 1996 till 2009 heworked for Royal Dutch Shell both in Greece and abroad,assuming various roles in Downstream Marketing, Strategy,Negotiations and eventually in Health, Safety, Environment andSecurity (H.S.S.E.). Sponsored by Shell Hellas, he graduated in2006 from Alba in Athens with a Diploma in Management andtwo years later with an M.B.A. in Shipping from the sameCollege. Currently he is doing research, as a Ph.D. candidate atthe University of Greenwich. His field of interest is MaritimeSecurity with a special focus on the “Piracy around the Gulf ofAden and the Horn of Africa”. George is a member of theAmerican Nuclear Society, the Chartered Management Instituteand the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science Technology inLondon. He speaks Greek, English, German, Japanese andFrench.



2012 2011 2010 2009

Vessels Hijacked 7 27 51 52

Vessels Boarded 0 17 16 0

Vessels FiredUpon/ Boarding

Attempts24 122 119 129

Vessels Hijacked/Piracy Events 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.29

Figure 2. SOMALIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report (Horn of Africa) for 29/Nov. to 05/Dec., 2012


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VISITS, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPSVISITS, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

Office Call of the Commanding Officer of USS HUECITY

13 July 2012

Office Call of the Commanding Officer of GermanNaval Specialized Boarding Batallion

12 November 2012

Office call of the Commanding Officer of BGS VERNI8 October 2012

ACT Quality Assurance Team Visit12 November 2012

Joint Naval Postgraduate Course (NPS) and Lorance Livermore Na/onal Laboratory (LLNL) WMD Experiment11-15 June 2012




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Unambiguous, robust communications are vital tothe success of naval operations such as area surveillance,control, and interdiction. Communications and sensornetworks allow the flow of data and critical informationthat is necessary for the conduct of an operation fromboth tactical and strategic perspectives. Sensor networkcommunications are affected by several factors, such asthe physical environment, network-systems quality, assetpositioning, and the electromagnetic environment.Conventional wireless networks have stationarynetworking infrastructure such as base stations (e.g.,buildings and antennas) serving as gathering nodes fortraffic emanating from mobile devices. These nodesinteract with the base stations in a client/server fashion.When considering naval operations, the situationbecomes more complicated: the platforms are hardlystationary, as the networking infrastructure operatesfrom a variety of platforms in motion on the sea, abovethe sea, and from space, in the case of satellite support[2]. Such systems are known as sensor networks or ad-hoc networks.

Sensor networks consist of nodes made up of smallsensors that are able to monitor, process, and analyzephenomena over geographical regions of varying sizesand for significant periods. Recent progress in sensor-network technology has led to the invention of small,low-cost sensors that are able to collect and transmit, orrelay, sensor data about physical values (e.g., temperature,humidity, and sea state), or dynamic attributes of objects(e.g., speed and direction of movement), and theexistence or absence of substances (e.g., radioactive

materials and explosives). These capabilities are usefulapplications in a number of other maritime operations(e.g., habitat and environment monitoring, healthcare,and military surveillance) [2]. As mentioned by Hans-Joachim Hof [3], the application of a sensor networkcustomarily determines not only the sensor nodes’design, but also the design of the particular networkcomprising those nodes.

Surveillance is the primary aim of sensor networksused by the military. The purpose of surveillancemissions is to collect or verify as much data as possibleconcerning the enemy’s capabilities, positions, andintentions in order to have a detailed tactical overview,along with data about the area of operations. Sincemanned surveillance missions in forward-deployed areasoften involve high risk for friendly forces, the assetsassigned to the missions require a high degree of stealthand protection. With advances in sensor networks, manysurveillance missions can be achieved with less risk;consequently, the deployment of unmanned surveillancemissions, by exploiting wireless sensor networks, iscrucial for military and other security-related missions.Nowadays, threats vary from bands and organizedgroups to unmanned vehicles able to operate above, on,and even below the sea surface. Combining theaforementioned situation with the potential ofasymmetric threats such as radiological, biological, orchemical agents makes for a difficult security challenge.

A network designed for military and general regionalsecurity purposes has to provide reliablecommunications among the participating nodes and

AD-HOC SENSOR NETWORKS FOR MARITIME INTERDICTIONAD-HOC SENSOR NETWORKS FOR MARITIME INTERDICTIONOPERATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITYOPERATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY

by LT Theofanis Kontogiannis, Msc


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facilitate the flow of information—voice, video ordata—during the operation. Moreover, networkadaptability is critical to allow adjustments based oncurrent circumstances and future operations demandsthat may affect the network (e.g., node positioning andincreases in the amount of data transmissionrequirements). In Maritime Interdiction Operations(MIO), most sensors are employed on assets movingand operating on the sea surface, or in the air, in the caseof unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs). Those dynamicconditions hinder reliable connection (i.e., cause rangechanges among nodes, or interference of physicalobstacles between two network nodes) or even interruptreliable connection among the sensor nodes of the MIOnetwork and require the adoption of methods tofacilitate and maintain area coverage. A military wireless-network design is highly affected by signal-propagationphenomena. Many architectures are tested and utilizedto ensure that alternative routing and handling of dataaddress potential problems and drawbacks beyond thestandards acceptable in civilian ad-hoc networks.Currently, terrestrial node cannot reach far into openseas; therefore, an aerial platform (e.g., a UAV) or otherrelay platform (e.g., smart buoys) [4] are a low-costsolution when there is no coverage by a land-basednetwork, or low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite coverage isinadequate or unavailable.

The network for a MIO must consist of variouskinds of sensor nodes. Some nodes must be equippedwith radar devices for ensuring the surveillance andmonitoring of an area within their effective range; othernodes need a camera to transmit real-timepictures/video; others may have electro-optical (EO)and infrared (IR) equipment for better surveillance andtarget classification at night. Equipment used fordetection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,and Explosive (CBRNE) material is necessary for MIOand regional security operations. For example, theboarding team during the sweep phase of a MIO maytransmit real-time video from the suspect ship fromhelmet cameras while simultaneously transmittinginformation from CBRN sensors. In the case ofmaritime security in an expanded area, the presence ofnodes whose role is just to relay the data to the end node(multi-hop) is essential. The number and the type ofnodes of the network are highly related to the area ofinterest and potential threat.

A critical factor in operation execution is the effectiverange for direct communication between two nodes ofthe network and the overall effective transmission rangewith the multi-hop effect exploitation. During MIO andregional security operations, a primary goal is the

interdiction of dangerous material before they reach avital area (e.g., port or population center). Moreover,during MIO execution, the command post in tacticalcommand may need to keep a safe distance from theseized vessel to avoid damage in case of explosion orbio-hazardous emissions from the cargo. The effectivecommunications range of each node (i.e., the per hoptransmission range) that a node covers relies on severalfactors, such as frequency, transmission power, antennagain, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), height of antenna, andatmospheric conditions. The effective communicationrange significantly affects the number of nodes requiredto ensure the uninterrupted flow of data and,consequently, the total cost of the network constructionand management burden. Current ad-hoc networksmake use of IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) or 802.16 (WiMAX)standard mode of operation. Since IEEE 802.11typically supports relatively short range (few nauticalmiles) Wi-Fi networks, a potential employment ofWiMAX or IEEE 802.16 standard in the networks candramatically increase the communications range amongnodes, and consequently the network coverage, since thetransmitted signal can reach at distances beyond Line ofSight (LOS) to around 50 km (27 nautical miles) withhigh data rates up to 100 Mbps [5].

A significant requirement for ad-hoc sensor networkssupporting MIO and regional security operations is thesecurity of information distributed through the network.Since there is no physical connection between nodes,and data is distributed over the air using electromagneticwaves, there is the potential that the transmittedinformation may be intercepted by anyone within anode’s transmission range. Security of the ad-hoc sensornetwork can be enhanced with the use of a virtualprivate network (VPN) and intrusion-detection systems(IDS). A VPN tunnel encrypts the transmitted dataadditionally to the WEP encryption. VPN can be usedas well for the encryption of WiMAX (IEEE 802.16)standard communications. [6], [7].

For ensuring continuous and reliable functionalityduring an operation, a network operation center (NOC)should be established, not necessarily in the area ofoperations. The NOC assists in managing andmonitoring the network. A primary function ismonitoring all the participating nodes to ensure that theyare connected to the network and working properly. Ifmonitoring uncovers problems in the network, then theNOC assists in providing solutions whenever necessary.Another role of the NOC is to provide accessibility tonew users/nodes on the network, an attribute necessaryfor MIO networks that alter the number of participatingnodes. The NOC can make use of several applications


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for network management such as faultmanagement/service restoration, trouble-ticketadministration, configuration management, securitymanagement, performance management and accountingmanagement [8].

MIO and naval operations related to regional securitygenerally take place at sea, either close to coastal areas orfar away from shore on the open sea. It is obvious thatthe majority of assets used for the conduct of anoperation will be deployed at sea or in the air. However,the use of shore-based stations cannot be excluded,especially when the operation evolves near a coast. Theassets that may carry nodes of a MIO ad-hoc sensornetwork are the boarding team (in the equipment carriedby the team), surface vessels (ships or boats), aerialvehicles such as UAVs, unmanned surface vehicles(USVs), buoys, swimmer or diver equipment, and shore-based nodes, whether mobile (e.g., trucks equipped withsensors and antennas or personnel with equipment) orstationary (e.g., a headquarters, an antenna, or a sensorfor relaying data to other nodes).

During a MIO, a team may board a suspicious vessel.Apart from inspecting the ship’s documentation (i.e.,manifest) and crew (e.g., checking the crew andpassenger list against watch lists), the team may searchfor the presence of illegal and dangerous material in thecargo such as CBRNs or Improvised Explosive Devices(IEDs). The data from sophisticated sensors can betransmitted from the boarded ship to another station forevaluation. For the detection of this material, the teamhas to carry appropriate sensors as they search the ship.Furthermore, the boarding team can have video andvoice equipment to transmit real-time pictures from theship to other nodes of the network to assist scientist inproperly and efficiently identifying the source material.The exchange of information can be enhanced throughtext chatting between the boarding team and other

participants in the network such as CBRNsubject matter experts. All data gathered—picture, video, and sensor data—from theCBRNE detection sensor can be transmittedfrom the suspect ship through the networkwith the communications equipment carried bythe boarding team.

During MIO and regional securityoperations, the deployment of swimmers ordivers in the area of interest may be required toinvestigate the hull of a seized ship or conducta security check on an object floating in thearea of interest for assessment as a potentialthreat. Swimmers should be able to transmitreal-time pictures through the network via

video and voice devices. They may also be able to detectwith portable sensors whether a suspicious objectcontains CBRNE material and transmit that data forfurther evaluation by a subject matter expert broughtinto the network. Obviously the equipment carried by aswimmer must be waterproof.

Apparently, ships and boats can form almost any typeof node in a MIO network. With the communicationand detection equipment that they may have availableonboard, they are able to operate as a communicationsrelay node, and as a sensor node that distributes datasuch as video or radar, IR, or EO pictures of the areawhere the ship is deployed, and/or data concerningmeteorological and atmospheric conditions. They canalso operate as the end node of a network that gathers,processes, and evaluates all data collected by the othernodes of the network. A ship acting as an end node canbe the flagship of a group or division of ships thatexecute MIO or other naval operations. An importantadvantage of ships acting as nodes is the fact that theydo not have the energy constraints that otherassets/nodes, such as buoys and UAVs, face. With thevariety of detection and communication meansonboard, they can collect and transmit data in severalways to the desired destination, even to nodes that arenot necessarily part of the network. Also, ships have theability to repair potential equipment failures because oftrained and specialized crew members; making themhighly important to network performance. Ships mayalso carry and deploy, according to operationalrequirements, additional nodes, such as the boardingteam (even though the team itself cannot be considereda node), swimmers, buoys, UAVs and USVs.

To avoid the employment of a significant number ofships and UAVs as nodes, the use of buoys ascommunications-relay nodes or sensor nodes can be anacceptable and cost-effective solution. Since buoys are


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regularly used as sensors for environmental monitoringpurposes, they are also able to work as sensors for navaloperations. Apart from radar and environmental sensors,cameras and EO/IR devices can be installed, and withthe use the communications equipment, the datacollected by sensors on buoys can be distributedthroughout a wireless network. The combined use ofsensor buoys, ships, and air assets can reliably andeffectively cover a wide area. A buoy with a camera cantransmit real- or near real-time pictures of the area

around it. That data may facilitate decision making by aheadquarters responsible for the area of interest. Forexample, a target detected by radar (perhaps installed ona buoy) is difficult to classify if there is no otherinformation or intelligence about it. The camera allowsthe participants in the network to see the detected targetand provide more data towards identify it. Hence, bytaking advantage of sensor buoys as nodes in a MIO orregional security network, the continuous monitoring ofa wide area can be achieved. Apart from monitoring aparticular area, the buoys may have only acommunications relay role during an operation. In aMIO network, the buoys can be placed permanently inposition for the specific the operation (e.g., as acommunications relay node during the boarding phase),or can float and move towards an area (at very lowspeeds of around two knots). However, a moving buoyis considered an USV or unmanned maritime vessel(UMV). One disadvantage of buoys as nodes in a MIOnetwork is the exposure of the sensors andcommunications equipment to rough conditions,especially when a buoy is placed permanently at sea. Theequipment has to face temperature alterations, humidity,salinity, and winds. Obviously, maintenance of a buoy isnecessary, but the further away it is from the coast, themore difficult it is to maintain and repair it.

Besides buoys, USVs such as small remote-control orautonomous navigation boats can be employed as nodes

of an ad-hoc MIO network. These small craft can beequipped with a wide array of sensors for theinvestigation of items floating at sea that swimmers orstaffed units may be hesitant to approach. When suchan item is detected during an operation, the small USVcan be deployed by another unit (e.g., a warshipconducting a patrol) to examine it at close range andtransmit data to other nodes that can remain aloof fromthe potentially dangerous object. The small dimensionsof many current USVs allow for their storage anddeployment from a wide array of vessel such asdestroyers and patrol boats.

UAVs are “mini” airplanes and helicopters, and theyare becoming prevalent in ongoing operations. Asmentioned before, some sensor nodes can move inairspace, and conduct either surveillance orcommunications relay according to the needs and thetopology of the network. Since staffed, large aircraftmay be too expensive or vulnerable, UAVs offer a goodoption to participate in ad-hoc sensor networks. UAVscan be equipped with several types of sensors, apartfrom their communication systems. A UAV is able toexecute surveillance operations with radar or cameras, atask that is greatly enhanced by the altitude and speedthat this type of asset can achieve. Besides the area-surveillance role, UAVs can relay information on asuspicious vessel within its assigned area by flying aboveit, discovering what kind of cargo this vessel carries, andassessing whether or not there are people on its deck,etc. The collected data can be transmitted to the othernodes of the network with the featured communicationsequipment. As in the case of the previously discussedassets, a UAV is able to perform the role of acommunications-relay node—they are in fact the bestasset for this role due to their antenna height. Thisantenna height, especially for fixed wing UAVs that canfly at high altitudes, enables them to establishcommunications with other nodes of the network ingreater ranges than surface assets can.

Networked Divers During Experiment

Mini-Helicopter for Radioac*ve Material Detec*on at NMIOTCExperiments


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During the experiments that took place (with thecollaboration of NMIOTC, Naval Postgraduate School(NPS) and several expert centers) in the NMIOTCwithin the last three years, a mini-helicopter wasequipped with a nuclear-material detector, a surveillancecamera, and a networking node. The UAV’s role was thedetection of radiological materials from above as suspectvessel on the move. The network equipment allowed theUAV to transmit detection data and video from a vesselin real time to the other nodes of the network. Theemployment of the mini-helicopter extended the rangeof the detection network during a pursuit of asuspicious vessel by friendly patrol forces [9]. Thisdemonstrated that mini-helicopters are a responsive andcapable asset to investigate the existence of dangerousmaterials or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)onboard a vessel or floating object. With the use of aUAV helicopter as the node of a MIO network, thesafety of personnel and units can be improved.Furthermore, UAV helicopters may form acommunications-relay node, extending the range of thenetwork and ameliorating its operational limitations.

Apart from mobile assets in the sea or air, land-basedstations can constitute nodes of a MIO or regionalsecurity network. These stations can be either stationary,such as buildings and sensors infrastructure (e.g., radars,communications antennas), or mobile assets, such astrucks equipped with surveillance and communicationssystems, or even people wearing sensors. They can beequipped with surveillance systems such as radar,EO/IR devices and cameras, meteorological sensors,and communications equipment in order to relay toother nodes the data collected by them and from othersensor nodes of the network.

Since 2004, a series of experiments related to ad-hocsensor networks in support of MIO and securityoperations are being conducted under the aegis of NPS

in cooperation with USA and non-USA organizationssuch as Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), theUnited States Coast Guard, first responders in SanFrancisco Bay, New York, and New Jersey under theDepartment of Homeland Security, and USA federaland international academic and military agencies (e.g.,NMIOTC and Swedish Defense Research Agency(FOI)) under the leadership of NPS’s Professor Dr. AlexBordetsky. During these experiments, useful conclusionsabout the benefits and potential drawbacks of this kindof networks are extrapolated, resulting in a betterunderstanding of the concepts behind them, and howto operate these networks to satisfy operationalrequirements. The main scopes of these experimentsare: (1) network performance, (2) advanced sensors andcollaborative technology assessment, (3) the detectabilityof CBRNE material, and (4) the establishment andpreservation of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shorecommunications via tactical wireless networkconnectivity. The results yield high quality cooperationbetween command-and-control (C2) organizations andexpert centers on a worldwide scale for the rapiddetection, identification, and proper response ofCBRNE threats in various geographical areas [10]. Forthe execution of these experiments, systems such assensors, vessels, UAVs (mini – helicopter), and USVshave been extensively used alongside actual securityoperators (boarding teams, networked swimmers andreach-back centers). These experiments have alreadytaken place in San Francisco Bay, port authority areas ofNew York and New Jersey, riverine areas in Virginia, atthe NMIOTC in Greece, and various locales inGermany, Poland and Sweden.

During the execution of the above mentionedexperiments a reliable direct communication distance ofseven nautical miles has been achieved between mobilesmall surface vessels, utilizing the 802.11 standard. Thatdistance was expandable to fourteen nautical miles withthe use of a relay node exploiting the multi-hop effect.Moreover, these experiments made clear that the higherthe antenna gain of the two nodes, the larger thethroughput and data rate achieved. Consequently, onesignificant factor on which the coverage of an ad-hocsensor network relies is the equipment used. With theappropriate equipment and availability of participatingnodes, the network coverage can be increasedsignificantly beyond fourteen nautical miles.Conceptually, with the inclusion of WiMAX capacities,network connectivity beyond LOS at a distance ofapproximately twenty-seven nautical miles is possible.With relay nodes, the area covered by the network can beaugmented encompass many mobile sensor nodes

UAV standoff detec*on results during NMIOTC experiments


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operating an area with a radius of fifty nautical miles.Moreover, using UAV systems, the network can likelyachieve data-link communications at distances of 100nautical miles. However, connectivity range, andconsequently coverage area, is highly affected by theamount and type of disseminated data (e.g., voice, video,etc.) and still has to be examined thoroughly, especiallyin the case of MIO networks where the assets/nodesare moving on the sea surface and in the air.

Another significant outcome of these experiments,regarding the use of ad-hoc networking in MIO, is theachievement of information exchange betweenassets/nodes operating on-scene and remote expertslocated elsewhere in the world and far away from theMIO. The assets/nodes were the boarding teams, thenetworked swimmers, UAVs etc., that were carryingsensors and disseminating the collected data through thenetwork and consequently to the remote experts who

were evaluating the situation in near real-time.

Concerning the Quality of Service (QoS) that ad-hocsensor networks provide to MIO and regional securityoperations, it is shown in the outcomes of thoseexperiments that data in the form of video, voice, textchat or sensor spectra can be disseminated through thenetwork to provide other nodes with real-timeinformation from the operational theater. Thebandwidth capabilities in the experiments allowedduplex communication among nodes, depending on thenodes’ individual equipment. The latency and the packetloss observed during experiments were not eliminated;however, most of the time, they did not preventcontinuous network connectivity and reliable receipt ofvital information at key nodes (e.g., reach-back centers).Depending on the equipment used and the nature (e.g.,number of bytes) of the data to be disseminated, ad-hocsensor networks appear capable of effectivelysupporting MIO communications requirements, and

offer flexibility to support moving assets/nodes,scalability, and fault tolerance. Moreover, with theappropriate array of nodes, connectivity can bemaintained even in the case of node failures, resulting innetwork survivability during execution. Furthermore,another factor that increases the survivability of thenetwork, and consequently the flow of information, isits own versatility: the availability of ways thatparticipating nodes can transmit data. The survivabilityof the MIO ad-hoc sensor network is also enhancedwith VPN utilization, as has been tested in theseexperiments, preventing non-authorized network useand monitoring, and potential cyber-attacks that couldlead to DoS.

Even though ad-hoc sensor networks can supportMIO and regional security operations, there are stilllimitations to their use. The most significant is theenergy constraints of some assets/nodes. For example,the boarding team or networked swimmers have limitedpower available during their missions. The equipmentthey carry is usually battery powered, so there is thepotential, of running out of energy and not being ableto share their information through the network. Thesame constraint may apply to UAVs such as the mini-helicopter employed in the experiments in NMIOTC.Energy consumption rates also depend on theapplications used and the amount of data to transmit.Another limitation on ad-hoc sensor networks is theconnectivity range. Although a direct connectivity rangeof seven nautical miles was achieved during theseexperiments and is considered more than sufficient forMIO, there remains a need for a greater connectivityrange that allows a less dense array of nodes to coverdata flow for a large area. Extended connectivity rangesalso enhance network survivability in case of nodefailure. Of course, tradeoff analysis will need to beconducted to balance cost of increased connectivitycoverage against more lesser-capable relay nodes. Also,

Network connec*vity at 12.4 nm during an experiment inriverine area of Virginia

Transmi+ed video and videoconference between swimmersand experts during NMIOTC experiments


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the limited standoff distance (few meters) from which asensor can detect CBRNE material can be considered apotential constraint, even though it does not have to dowith the network’s overall performance, rather just thesensitivity of the detector itself. The throughput of thead-hoc sensor network can also be a potential limitation.Though the throughput achieved during theseexperiments was highly satisfying, allowing video, voice,and sensor data to be transmitted in high fidelity fieldexperiments, the amount and variety of data can beexcessively high and may not be supported by thebandwidth of the network, since throughput is reducedduring multi-hop transmission. More experimentationmust be conducted to understand and overcome theselimits.

Apart from MIO and regional security operations,ad-hoc sensor networks are able to support naval areasurveillance operations. For this application, radar, video,and EO/IR systems are required. During the abovementioned experiments, none of these systems—exceptfor cameras—were employed. The use of smart buoysand UAVs, except for the mini-helicopter employed inthe NMIOTC, was not examined, though the presenceof a vessel may be considered a surrogate for a buoy.Assets with the appropriate sensors andcommunications means can be placed in such an array toensure the surveillance and monitoring of a wide areafrom the sea surface. For example, a potential area thatthese assets/nodes could be deployed in is waters offof the Horn of Africa where the detection andinterdiction of pirate vessels that threaten safe and freecommercial navigation is a high profile mission. Anotherarea where a network consisting of UAVs, buoys, vesselswith radar, cameras, WMD sensors, and EO/IR devices,in combination with satellite surveillance, could bedeployed is the Mediterranean Sea to help prevent illegalimmigration from Africa and Asia to Europe.

Except for surveillance purposes, ad-hoc sensornetworks like those for MIOs can enhance the forceprotection, not only of a naval base, but of acommercial port, by detecting suspicious cargo onvessels or floating objects that may pose an imminentthreat.

Connectivity-range augmentation, direct and indirect,is one of the factors defining the coverage area of thenetwork; the other is the coverage of each individualsensor. Together with bandwidth increase, this issue willbe the object of much research. With technologicalevolution, these problems are likely to be resolved soon,but the tradeoff analyses will remain: as technologyevolves, so does the cost of these systems. Theemployment of radar and surveillance systems in ad-hoc

sensor networks has to be examined thoroughly toprovide, in addition to the video and data dissemination,real-time radar picture through the network to othernodes such as Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs),intelligence centers, and ships operating far away.Creating that kind of wide-area, integrated, mostlyunattended sensor-provided SA picture to supportdecision makers’ information needs should be anetworking goal to provide better fidelity surveillancethan can only be achieved by costly satellite surveillanceor the commitment of a large number of mannedmilitary or security force assets. This is a rich area forfuture research.

REFERENCES

[1] T. Kontogiannis, “Ad-Hoc Sensor Networks for Maritime InterdictionOperations and Regional Security,” M.S. thesis, Dept. Inform. Sci., NavalPostgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2012.

[2] I. Koukos, “Ad-hoc Sensor Networks as part of a Regional SecurityGrid,” NMIOTC MIO Journal, issue 3, pp. 40–42, May 2011.

[3] H.J. Hof, D. Wagner, and R. Wattenhoffer, “Chapter 1: Applicationsof Sensor Networks,” in Algorithms For Sensor And Ad-hoc Networks –Advanced Lectures. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2007.

[4] A. Kounoudes and C. Protopapas, “Artemis – A novel multipurposeSmart Buoy,” NMIOTC MIO Journal, issue 4, pp. 77–78, November2011.

[5] K. Scarfone, C. Tibbs, and M. Sexton, Guide to Securing WiMAXWireless Communications – Recommendations of the National Institute ofStandards and Technology. Gaithersburg: NIST – Computer SecurityDivision, September 2010.

[6] S. Misra, I. Woungang, and S.C. Misra, Guide to Wireless SensorNetworks, London. U.K.: Springer, 2009.

[7] J. Frihat, F. Moldoveanu, and A. Moldoveanu, “Impact of Using UpperLayers Security in Ad-hoc Wireless Networks,” U.P.B. Sci. Bull., Series C,vol. 71, iss.2, pp. 63–74, 2009.

[8] M. Subramanian, “Chapter 1.8: Network Management: Goals,Organization and Functions,” in Network Management – Principles andPractice. Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson, 2006.

[9] A. Bordetsky, “Networking and Interagency Collaboration On Maritime– Sourced Nuclear Radiological Threat Detection and Interdiction (June 7–10,2011),” NPS/LLNL-Monterey, California, Experiment TNT MIO 11–2 Report, 2011

[10] A. Bordetsky, “Networking and Collaboration On Interdicting MultipleSmall Craft Possessing Nuclear Radiation Threat,” NPS/LLNL-Monterey,California, Experiment TNT/MIO 09–02 After Action Report, 2009.

Lieutenant Theofanis Kontogiannis HNgraduated the Hellenic Navy Academy in 2001 andsince then served on fregates and participated inseveral National and multinational exercises andoperations. He received Master of System Engineeringfrom Naval Postgraduate School in 2012 . CurrentlyLT Kontogiannis serves as Operations DepartmentDirector of HS AEGEON.


NMIOTC Journal>>> Technology


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Training of US Coast Guard Team22 October - 2 November 2012

Training of German Specialized Boarding Team5-15 November 2012

Training of HMS MONMOUTH29 October - 2 November 2012

Training of US Coast Guard Team22 October - 2 November 2012




Training of HMS NORTHUMBERLAND12-15 November 2012

Training of BNS LOUSE-MARIE15-16 November 2012

Training of BGS VERNI8-11 October 2012

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Following the intensive “train-the-trainer” course forthe maritime law enforcement teams from the westernIndian Ocean region in March 2012 in NATO’sMaritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre(NMIOTC), the trained trainers are now the leaders ofthe national teams from those States that attended.These were invited back to the NMIOTC with theirnational team members to conduct the joint nationaltraining for boarding teams in October and November2012. Teams from key countries: Kenya, Madagascar,Maldives, Seychelles, United Republic of Tanzania andYemen got together and demonstrated what they haveachieved in their national endeavours to counter piracy.

The series of joint training activities are facilitatedand coordinated in partnership by the NMIOTC and theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and thispartnership will continue in 2013, inviting more teamsfrom States in the western Indian Ocean region.

Modus operandi: NMIOTC provides a broad,holistic and comprehensive training package tointroduce trainees to all aspects of piracy & armedrobbery. Training was based on internationallyrecognized standards, IMO documentation and bestpractices. IMO finds the trainees based on a counter-piracy training plan, and facilitates their attendance. Bothparties work together of syllabus. All benefited from theexperience and at the end of the courses, traineesdemonstrated significant improvement, establishing awide and common understanding of piracy & armedrobbery and the actions needed to be taken inoperations.

The latest round of training, which was developedand funded as part of the IMO’s regional counter-piracyprogramme, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which wasled by the country team leaders under the watchful eyeof the NMIOTC Staff, was the second phase of aprogramme aimed at creating small, skilled law-enforcement teams within the maritime law enforcementforces of the region.

As well as developing professional skills it allowsteams from different backgrounds within the sameregion to cooperate to face together the problem ofpiracy and share best practices and experiences. MrMarumoto, IMO Project Officer responsible for thistraining said: “This is exactly the sort of regionalcooperation in the field of maritime interdiction that theDjibouti Code of Conduct is all about. Regionalcooperation in the fight against piracy requiresinteroperability and the interoperability of teams servingat sea from different organizations can only be enhancedby this type of joint training and exercises”.

This pattern will be repeated for those regionalcountries seeking to develop their maritime law-enforcement capability. Joint national training is alsoscheduled to be delivered at NMIOTC in January 2013for more teams from Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, andSouth Africa, and other countries later in the year.

NATO AND IMO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD REGIONAL CAPACITYNATO AND IMO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD REGIONAL CAPACITYTO COUNTER-PIRACY: JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING FOR BOARDINGTO COUNTER-PIRACY: JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING FOR BOARDINGTEAMS FROM DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT REGION TEAMS FROM DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT REGION by Mr Osamu Marumoto, IMO Project Officer (Operations)

NMIOTC Events <<<<<<NMIOTC Journal


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After nearly three days of sailing, ROS RegeleFerdinand frigate moored in the port of Souda onFriday, September 15th. The port is like a second homefor the ship, if you consider that from 2005, within thefirst Romanian participation in Operation ActiveEndeavour, and in the following years, the ship wasalways entering the port of Souda while deployedoverseas. Crete greeted the crew with a bright sun, thesame splendid landscape and wonderful possibilities forboth recovery and building up action capability.

The most important activity in Souda harbor wasorganized at NMIOTC (NATO Maritime InterdictionOperational Training Center). The counter-piracy coursewas attended by the ship's command team, boarding andSOF teams.

The official opening of the course took place onMonday, 15th of September, at NMIOTC, in thepresence of Commodore Ioannis G. Pavlopoulos HN,the commandant of the center. The ship was introducedto NMIOTC institution and facilities, offered thetraining schedule for the event involving Romaniansailors. Also, the ship has presented the operatingcapabilities and missions of ROS Regele Ferdinandfrigate in the recent years.

After the official lecture, the command team,boarding and SOF teams started the training. Piracy, asit became a widespread phenomenon in recent years, has

been theoretically analyzed, identified and clarified oncemore for the command team. Gulf of Aden/Horn ofAfrica area of operation was analyzed and the meansand current modus operandi of the pirates waspresented. A number of case studies were analyzed.

At the same time boarding and SOF groups startedtraining in the use of weapons in different conditions,tactical action procedures when working on a piratedship, insertion methods, etc.

Monday was also a good opportunity for thecommanding officer of ROS Regele Ferdinand - CaptainMihai Panait - to have an informal meeting withCommodore Ioannis G. Pavlopoulos. The Commodore,who had a good knowledge of Romanian Navy,expressed his satisfaction for the third participation ofFerdinand in NMIOTC courses. He described thetraining capabilities of the center – with trainedpersonnel, equipped to NATO standards andexperienced in training NATO and Non-NATO crewsprior their deployments.

Captain Panait thanked for facilities offered andstated that the premises were best suited to make theevent beneficial for crew’s frigate in the preparation andexecution of missions in Operation ATALANTA.

A return visit was scheduled and conducted on thenext day, when Commodore Ioannis G. PavlopoulosH.N. together with NMIOTC Deputy Commander, theChief of Staff and a number of officers from SoudaLogistics Base paid a visit aboard frigate.

The first deployment of the ship’s helicopter (PUMA330 SOCAT NAVAL) into an overseas mission and the

facilities it offers to the ship was one point onto thediscussion agenda. The visit also brought together twoofficers - LCDR Decebal Ciobanita and LCDR AdrianGobjila, past and present Romanian staff members inNMIOTC.

THE FRIGATE ROS REGELE FERDINAND IN SOUDA BAY,THE FRIGATE ROS REGELE FERDINAND IN SOUDA BAY,CRETECRETE

by LtCdr Mihai Egorov ROU (N)

NMIOTC Journal


After three days of training at Souda NMIOTC, ROSRegele Ferdinand had two days of Final TrainingExercises. The scenario was a dynamic one, close to areal piracy event in HOA. Instructors have observed theresponse of the crew in the event of a “citadel scenario”,the action of Boarding and SOF teams capturing pirates’skiffs and the force-on-force engagements onboard apirated ship (played by MV ARIS). Following a thoroughevaluation, carefully supervised by NMIOTC, the crewproved to be overall prepared for such interventions.Recommendations were made to work on "finesse"details that will allow all the “gears” within themechanism called "ROS Regele Ferdinand frigate" tooperate at a maximum level during the deployment inOperation ATALANTA.

Friday, after the last analysis, a graduation ceremonyconducted onboard awarded certificates to the teams,considering the effort they have made the throughoutthe week. It was the final rehearsing prior the firstRomanian deployment in the Operation ATALANTA.

ROS Regele Ferdinand frigate has left sunny Greeceand headed for action in HOA/GOA area under theEuropean Union command.

Lieutenant Commander Mihai Egorov, ChiefEditor of Navy Media Group was assigned as PublicAffairs Officer on board ROS Regele Ferdinandduring her deployment in the EU Counter-PiracyOperation “ATALANTA”

NMIOTC Events <<<NMIOTC Journal



Training of Swedish Marine Boarding Team20 August - 7 September 2012

NMIOTC MIO Resident Cources12-19 October 2012

Mari/me Opera/onal Terminology Course24 September - 5 October 2012


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Shaking hands with SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis USN

NATOMaritimeInterdictionOperationalTrainingCentre

Marathi Souda Bay, Crete

Zip 73200Greece

Phone:+302821085716 Email:

[email protected]

www.nmiotc.gr

“NEVER DECLINE THE DANGERS OF WAR”NMIOTC Crest Logo

issn:2241-438x nmio tc - nato

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