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Is Microinsurance Different? Microinsurance PPPs from a Social and

Political Science Perspective

Tabea Goldboom, Freie Universität Berlin 12 April 2012

VidaAgrícola microinsurance scheme

Introduction

Agricultural Insurance

Goods InsuranceLife Insurance

Bolivian Insurance Firms

Fundación Profin

Government of Tarija (Departamento)PPP

Research problem and objective

• Research question: In which ways do the perspectives and arguments that social and political scientists have developed with regard to PPPs facilitate research about the institutional processes and outcomes of microinsurance PPPs?

• Basic assumption: Microinsurance PPPs are not so different from other PPPs.

• Relevance: Understand under which circumstances PPP setups in the field of microinsurance are helpful/ problematic, and in which ways they influence the outcomes of projects.

Content

• Research material• Microinsurance PPPs – a brief typology • PPPs – four central themes of discussion• Analysis of the VidaAgrícola scheme • Conclusion• Three discussion points

Research material

• Qualitative data: Expert interviews, participant observation, individual and group interviews with the target groups

• Fieldwork: in La Paz and Tarija (Bolivia) 2010-2012, total of eight months

• Participant observation in detail: e.g. meetings between project partners, market research, discussions with target groups

Microinsurance PPPs – a brief typology …based on primary actors/scope of activity

Private institutions Public institutions

1) Partnerships involving donors (Ramm 2011)

Different possible actors, e.g. insurance company

Intergovernmental organization, bilateral donor

2) Partnerships involving government institutions (Ramm 2011)

Different actors possible, e.g. insurance company

State actor (in the respective country)

3) Transnational multistakeholder PPP: Microinsurance Network

Insurance companies, research institutions, associations …

ILO, IADB, GIZ, IFAD …

Definition PPP: “… continuous and relatively institutionalized (…) interactions between public and private actors that formally strive for the provision of collective goods, whereas private actors can be for-profit and/ or civil society organizations.” (Schäferhoff et al 2009:10)

PPPs – four central themes of discussion

1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs(Output – Outcome – Impact)

- Rational choice arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004)

- Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures(Beisheim et al. 2008)

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Ramm 2011; Rohregger et al. 2010

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Rohregger et al. 2010

3) Legitimacy of PPPs 4) Unintended effects of PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency, accountability): often limited (Schäferhoff et al. 2009) - Output legitimacy: few studies

- Induce abandonment of state duties (Bäckstrand 2006)- Create control problems (Höring ‘03)- Unequal gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004)

VidaAgrícola microinsurance scheme

Agricultural Insurance

Goods InsuranceLife Insurance

Indexed yield insurance covers investment costs:

Maize: Up to 2500 Bs./ ha

Potatoes:

Up to 6000 Bs./ ha

PPPs – some central lines of discussion

1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs(Output – Outcome – Impact)

- Rational choice arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004)

- Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures(Beisheim et al. 2008)

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Ramm 2011; Rohregger et al. 2010

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Rohregger et al. 2010

3) Legitimacy of PPPs 4) Unintended effects of PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency, accountability): often limited (Schäferhoff et al. 2009) - Output legitimacy: few studies

- Induce abandonment of state duties (Bäckstrand 2006)- Create control problems (Höring 03)- Unequal gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004)

Reasons for the creation/ work division

• Specific interests of the private actors: – Seek political support of the farmers’ union – Seek support with regard to commercialization

• Specific interests of the public actors: – Want to claim a political success in an overall difficult

situation– Under conditions of low resources

• Responsibilities of the public actor (Sedag): – Supports commercialization through its decentralized

structure – Supports the evaluation of agricultural (yield) losses

PPPs – some central lines of discussion

1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs(Output – Outcome – Impact)

- Rational choice arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004)

- Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures(Beisheim et al. 2008)

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Ramm 2011; Rohregger et al. 2010

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Rohregger et al. 2010

3) Legitimacy of PPPs 4) Unintended effects of PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency, accountability): often limited (Schäferhoff et al. 2009) - Output legitimacy: few studies

- Induce abandonment of state duties (Bäckstrand 2006)- Create control problems (Höring 03)- Unequal gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004)

Effectiveness of this PPP to date

• Strengths: – Facilitation of regulatory approval – Facilitation of commercialization through Sedag – (…)

• Weaknesses: – Commercialization could have received stronger support– Weak role of Sedag with regard to the evaluation of yield

losses

Overall a mixed record. But…

PPPs – some central lines of discussion

1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs(Output – Outcome – Impact)

- Rational choice arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004)

- Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures(Beisheim et al. 2008)

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Ramm 2011; Rohregger et al. 2010

With regard to microinsurance PPPs:Rohregger et al. 2010

3) Legitimacy of PPPs 4) Unintended effects of PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency, accountability): often limited (Schäferhoff et al. 2009) - Output legitimacy: few studies

- Induce abandonment of state duties (Bäckstrand 2006)- Create control problems (Höring 03)- Unequal gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004)

Relationships within the PPP and legitimacy • Unequal relationships within the PPP:

“You have to talk in the way the client wants you to talk to him. [At least] if you want to use marketing techniques (…). I don’t want you to speak in those very technical terms, don’t come with your watch, at least not your Rolex; come with your local watch. And don’t talk over the shoulder of Elvio [the representative of the farmers’ union]. You have to look into his eyes, even though he is small. Don’t talk with this self-sufficiency of a professional who believes he is superior because he is professional.” (representative of the Sedag, November 2011; own translation)

Relationships within the PPP and legitimacy

• This PPP is marked by inequalities on several levels: – Unequal possibilities to influence decision making (low

degree of input legitimacy) – Resource differences– Unequal responsibilities – Perceived status differences– Diverging interests?

Conclusion: VidaAgrícola scheme

• The specific ways in which inequalities within partnerships are generated and sustained merit close attention: they can put project success at risk.– “Input legitimacy” can be decisive for the output. – It is not only interests and organizational cultures

that should not differ too strongly within a PPP. • A look that goes beyond goal attainment (in the

narrow sense) helps to explain the success of PPPs. • The overall social and political context matters as it

impacts on the workings of the PPP.

Conclusion: microinsurance PPPs

• Social and political science perspectives can also be applied to other microinsurance PPPs:– Structure and systematize case studies – Raise questions that are currently not addressed

in microinsurance research • Two aspects have received relatively little attention

in microinsurance research so far: – Legitimacy of PPPs – Unintended effects of PPPs

Thank you very much for your attention!

Three discussion points

• Do these findings mirror some kind of experience that other participants have made in the context of PPPs?

• Which aspects of microinsurance PPPs seem to be most relevant from a practical point of view and should be studied in more detail? (motives of creation, effectiveness, unintended effects, legitimacy)

• Are there important aspects of microinsurance PPPs that are not mirrored at all by the four strands of social and political science research exposed here?

Institutional setup

Insurance Firms: Navi, Latina

Seguros

Fundación Profin

„Channels“ = microfinance institutions (sell the microinsurance product)

Departmental Agro and Livestock Service: Servicio

Departamental Agropecuario (Sedag) TarijaFarmers` Union:

Federación Sindical Única de Comunidades

Campesinas de Tarija (FSUCCT)

ILO (Microinsurance Innovation Facility)

Tarija

La Paz

Maize and Potato Farmers in Tarija (are supposed to buy microinsurance)

Departm. Govern-ment of Tarija

Public institution Private institution with commercial objectivesLegend - specific actors:

National Government (plans to introduce national

agricultural insurance)Lobbying

PPP

Who should take responsibility – and for what? Institutional structure of the VidaAgrícola project (Tarija, Bolivia) at the end of 2011

APS: Insurance Regulator