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Samin Mohebbi IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

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Iranian Nuclear Weapons program. Samin Mohebbi. Nuclear Weapons. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Samin Mohebbi

IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Page 2: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

NUCLEAR WEAPONS• About 12,000 nuclear weapons are deployed in 14 states. Five states:

New Mexico, Georgia, Washington, Nevada, North Dakota which account for 70 percent of the total. The others are in Wyoming, Missouri, Montana, Louisiana, Texas, Nebraska, California, Virginia, Colorado.

• Overseas, about 150 U.S. nuclear weapons are at 10 air bases in seven countries: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Britain.

• The United States is believed to be the only nation with nuclear weapons outside of its borders. The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in

Europe has greatly decreased from more than 6,000 in the early 1980s.

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Page 4: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

• A nuclear weapon is so powerful that one single weapon explosives can be capable of destroying or seriously disabling an entire city.

• In the history of warfare, nuclear weapons have been used for World War II.

• Nuclear weapons have been detonated, mostly for testing purposes, by the following seven countries: the United States, Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, India and Pakistan.

• Basically these countries are the declared nuclear powers countries.

Page 5: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HISTORY• The first nuclear weapon was created by the United States.

• The first weapons was developed basically out of fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them.

• They were used against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

• The Soviet Union developed that tested their first nuclear weapon in 1949.

• The USA and USSR wanted to develop weapons powered by nuclear fusion during the 1950s.

• During the 1960s, it became possible for nuclear weapons to be delivered anywhere in the world.

Page 6: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

HISTORY CONT…

• The Nuclear weapons were symbols of military and national powers.

• Nuclear testing was to test new designs as well as to send political messages.

• Other nations also developed nuclear weapons, including the United Kingdom, France, and China.

• There was a “nuclear club” which wanted to attempt to limit the spread of nuclear proliferation to other nations.

• There was at least three other countries India, South Africa, Pakistan, and most likely Israel who developed nuclear arms.

• During the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the Russians Federation inherited the weapons of the former USSR, and along with the USA pledged to reduce their stockpile for increased international safety.

Page 7: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

HISTORY CONT…

• Nuclear proliferation is still going on, with Pakistan testing their first weapon in 1998, and the state of North Korea claiming to have developed nuclear weapons in 2004.

• Nuclear weapons have been at the heart of many national and international political disputes.

• Nuclear weapons has played a major part in popular culture since their dramatic public debut in the 1940s.

• In 1995, the US and USSR Russia launching its weapons in retaliation for a supposed attack.

• During the Cold War the US and USSR came close to nuclear warfare many times.

• Now, there are at least 29,000 nuclear weapons held by at least seven countries, though 96% of these are in the possession of just two the United States and the Russian Federation.

Page 8: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

ATOMIC BOMBING OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

• The United States Army Air Force dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, 1945 during World War II.

• There goal was basically to secure the surrender of Japan.

• At least 120,000 people died immediately from the attacks.

• Thousands of people died years after from the effects of nuclear radiation.

• About 95% of the casualties were civilians.

• These bombings were the first and only nuclear attacks in the world history.

Page 9: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI CONT…

• The U.S. believed that the bombing ended the war sooner.

• The survivors of the bombings are called hibakusha, a Japanese word that literally translates to “bomb-affected people.”

• The suffering of the bombing is the root of Japan’s postwar pacifism, and the nation has sought the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world ever since.

Page 10: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

AFTERMATH CONT…

• The blast was so powerful it ruin almost most of the country.

Page 11: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Page 12: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

• Iran's nuclear program began in the Shah's era, including a plan to build 20 nuclear power reactors.

• 1979, all nuclear activity was suspended.

• Iran started the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and since February 1992 has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities.

• It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort.

• Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program.

• Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.

Page 13: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War,

they develop weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to Iran's legitimate efforts to develop its nuclear power-generation industry,

Iran appears to be following a policy of complying with the NPT and building its nuclear power program in such a way that if the appropriate political decision is made, know-how gained in the peaceful sphere could be used to create nuclear weapons.

Also they have purchased several nuclear warheads in the early 1990's

Page 14: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 15: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 16: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Nuclear Program of Iran – Current Status

This presentation is based on information publicly availablesince 2002 from 30 reports of the Director General of the IAEA

Page 17: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Background- Iranian nuclear program originates from 1950’s

Pre-revolution:

= US, France and Germany were involved in the program= interested also to get fuel cycle technology

After the revolution: program was in decline until it was revitalized in mid-1980’s

- Iran tried to acquire nuclear technology: Germany, France, Brazil, Argentina etc, but unsuccessful.

- Attempts also included uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor technology.

- Some success with China and Russia, but no real access to sensitive technologies apart from laser enrichment.

- Turned in mid-1980’s to nuclear black markets to get technology

Page 18: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 19: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

- Iran failed to report some of its uranium conversion activities from mid-1980’s.

- Iran failed to report uranium enrichment activities from early 1990’s

-The existence of Natanz enrichment facility revealed in August 2002

Page 20: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

What We Know

Iran continues:

-Uranium exploration and mining:Saghand mine and Ardakan Yellow Cake Production Plant underconstruction

-Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan:Produced 371 tonnes UF6 since March 2004About 35 tonnes UF6 are used in Natanz

-Uranium Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Isfahan:Produced one assembly, small amount of fuel pellets and rods forIR-40 reactorUnder construction

Page 21: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Water Reactor

Page 22: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

What We Know

- Uranium enrichment:

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz

Producing 20 % U-235 since February 2010

Experimenting IR-2,IR-3, and IR-4 centrifuges

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in NatanzSince February 2007 produced ca 3 tonnes LEU

UF6

About 8000 IR-1 centrifuges; half of them operating

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)Revealed in September 2009; under constructionAnnounced construction of additional facilitiesConstruction of the third facility began in 2011

Page 23: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 24: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

What We Know

- Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak:

In operation- Heavy Water Reactor IR-40 at Arak:

40 MWth, under construction

Stated to be operation in 2013

Originally Iran said it to be the replacement of the aging

Tehran Research reactor (TRR)- Light Water Reactor at Bushehr

Fuel loading is being completed

First criticality expected in coming weeks- Design of an indegenous LWR at Darkhovin continues

Page 25: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
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What We Do Not Know

Since Iran-is not implementing the Additional Protocol-does not provide early information about design andconstruction of new facilities,-and is not heeding to the requests of the IAEA Board andthe UNSC resolutions:

-Magnitude of current and future activities mentioned above-R&D on uranium enrichment, including laser enrichment-R&D on reprocessing-Design of new research reactors-Activities related to nuclear weapon design and manufacturing

Page 27: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) – Natanz

Unit Cascades Cascades Total(Centrifuges) (Centrifuges)fed not fed

A24 17 1 18(2788) (164) (2952)

A26 6 12 18(984) (1968) (2952)

A28 0 18 18(0) (2952) (2952)

Total 23 29+ 52+(3772) (5084) (8856)

As of 28 August 2010; situation is almost identical to February 2010.All machines in Production Hall A are IR-1s.Production Hall B has no machines installed.

Page 28: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IR-1s - Natanz

Page 29: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) – Natanz

Single machine and small cascade tests:

-22 May 2010- 20 August 2010 84 kg natural UF6 fed into:-Single IR-1,IR-2m, and IR-4 centrifuges-20-machine IR-4 cascade-20 machine IR-2m cascade-Product and tails recombined and recycled

Production of 20 % U-235:

-On 9 February 2010 Iran started to feed LEU to a 164 IR-1 machine cascade-On 23 July 2010 Iran started recycle material from another interconnected 164 IR-1 machinecascade to the first cascade-As of 20 August 2010 22 kg UF6 of ca 20 % U-235 produced-Unannounced inspections

Page 30: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 31: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IR-2 with Components

Page 32: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IR-2s at the background

Page 33: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)– Qom

- On 21 September 2009 Iran notified the IAEA about the facility

- Iran yet to provide a complete design information andclarifications regarding the chronology

- Currently designed for 16 cascades total of 3000 IR-1 machines;installation of more advanced machines planned- No nuclear material or centrifuges at the facility- Iran: ‘Since Natanz is under continuous threat, it was decided inthe second half of 2007 a contingency plant would be built to one ofthe sites of the Passive Defence Organization’- Planned is operational since 2011

Page 34: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Other Enrichment Related Activities

-On 18 August 2010, the IAEA reiterated its request to have access toadditional locations related to:

-Manufacturing of centrifuges-R&D on uranium enrichment incl. laser enrichment-Uranium mining and milling activities

-On 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the requested information, butreiterated that it was “continuing to cooperate with the IAEA inaccordance with the Safeguards Agreement”

Page 35: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Heavy Water Reactor Related Activities

-Heavy Water Production Plant; seems to be operational, but noaccess provided-Sampling of produced heavy water not permitted-Fuel Manufacturing Plant: no new assemblies, rods or pelletsproduced

Page 36: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

- In June 2010, Iran requested the IAEA assistance to have fuel forthe TRR- Subsequently the US, France and Russia participated in thenegotiations- In October 2009, ElBaradei made a proposal to ship 1200 kgs of LEUto Russia for enrichment, and then processing it to fuel in France- On 17 May 2010, Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Turkey and Iran signedTehran a Joint Declaration- Most likely to be discussed with P5+1 in talks in December 2010

Page 37: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program
Page 38: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Military Dimension

1. Centrifuge components produced to substantial extent inmilitary workshops

2. Uranium Hemisphere Document- a 15 page document describes in generic termsconversion of HEU UF6 to uranium metal, its machiningand coating for uranium metal hemispheres

3. Military personnel, institutes, and companies involved inprocurement activities in nuclear area

Page 39: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Military Dimension, cont.

4. Green Salt Project- a process diagram for UF4 production in bench scale- involvement of military related people, institutes, companies

5. High Explosive Studies

6. Missile Re-entry Vehicle

- technical studies to reengineer a new payload for the Shahab-3

- mass and dimension are compatible with some parameters seen inhigh explosive testing

- parameters indicate that possibly a nuclear payload

Page 40: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IAEA’s Assessment on Military Dimension

- Information provided by several IAEA Member States

- Some information originates from Agency’s own investigations and itsfindings in Iran and/or contacts with individuals and companies

- Information appears to be generally consistent.

- Information seems to be pointing towards nuclear weapondevelopment.

Page 41: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Iranian Assessment Related to Military Dimension

- Baseless accusations and fabricated data- Some of the technical information has mistakes- Documentation does not follow Iranian confidentiality practices- Wants to have access to original information to be able to prove itscase- Claims that its work on detonators with high precision is for civilianand conventional military use- Challenges the IAEA’s authority to investigate military relatedactivities which it considers being beyond the provisions of thesafeguards agreement- Considers the UNSC and the IAEA Board resolutions illegal

Page 42: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

Summary

1. The IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of the declarednuclear material, but the necessary co-operation to permit the IAEA toconfirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities is missing.

Note: Article 2 of the SGs Agreement, authorizes and requires theIAEA to seek to verify both the diversion of nuclear material from thedeclared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclarednuclear activities (i.e. completeness).

2. Iran has not co-operated in outstanding issues which give rise toconcerns on possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.

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3. Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities

4. Iran is apparently still struggling with the enrichment program:The UF6 throughput at FEP remains low albeit the production rate oflow enriched uranium has slightly improved during last one year.Great number of installed centrifuges has been replaced.

5. Progress with advanced centrifuges is also slow.

6. The fuel loading at the Bushehr LWR continues; the first criticality isexpected in coming weeks.

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IRAN CONT…

• Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons.

• If Iran did have atomic bombs, it would put pressure on other countries in the region.

• Many Arab countries believe it is unfair that Israel has nuclear weapons.

• If Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia but also Egypt and possibly Syria, found themselves caught between a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran, it would greatly increase pressures to pursue their own nuclear options.

• This could result in a regional arms race in the Middle East which is likely to be quite destabilizing, given the number and of conflicts in the region.

Page 45: Iranian Nuclear Weapons program

IT IS A BOMB BUT A PEACEFUL ONE