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Interpreting Ancient SocialOrganization: Conceptual Metaphorsand Image SchemasRob Wisemana

a Oxford Archaeology East, 15 Trafalgar Way, Bar Hill CB23 8SQ,Cambridgeshire, UKPublished online: 09 Apr 2015.

To cite this article: Rob Wiseman (2015) Interpreting Ancient Social Organization: ConceptualMetaphors and Image Schemas, Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness andCulture, 8:2, 159-190, DOI: 10.1080/1751696X.2015.1026030

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Interpreting Ancient SocialOrganization: ConceptualMetaphors and Image Schemas

Rob Wiseman*

Oxford Archaeology East, 15 Trafalgar Way, Bar Hill CB23 8SQ,Cambridgeshire, UK

(Received 4 November 2014; accepted 18 February 2015)

This article outlines an approach that archaeologists can use to predict awidespread family of concepts about social organization in past societies.Such concepts are all ultimately conceptual metaphors: people map theirexperiences in other domains onto their society, to reason about socialorder. The Sumerians used the experience of sheepherding to under-stand their KINGS AS SHEPHERDS and PEOPLE AS FLOCKS; the Maya understoodPEOPLE AS CORN and their RULERS AS RAIN GODS. These concepts share animage schema derived ultimately from the experience of applying forceto physical objects. This image schema is universal. Archaeologists canuse it to predict parallel concepts of social organization in other socie-ties, using commonly-recovered material remains. The theory of con-ceptual metaphor also suggests there is a minimum size of communitiesin which such concepts might develop.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor; image schema; force dynamics; socialorganization; social concepts

IntroductionThis article presents a new perspectiveon one of archaeology’s long-standinggoals: to understand the social organiza-tion of past societies. This problem has

been approached in many ways, butmost proposals fall into two broadgroups. One sees social organization asone part of the human response to envir-onmental factors, drawing on sharedhuman needs and behaviors, producing

*Email: rob.wiseman@oxfordarch.co.uk

Time & Mind, 2015Vol. 8, No. 2, 159–190, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1751696X.2015.1026030

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

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universal patterns within human societies.The other stresses social organization asthe product of historical developmentand individual agency, mediated by sym-bols and ideology open to multiple inter-pretations, and so producing culturesinfinitely varied and idiosyncratic (seealso Trigger 2003, 4–11). The approachtaken here shares interests with both, butis distinct from them. My concern is withancient people’s ideas about how theirsocieties were organized and the waythose ideas resulted from the experi-ences and the neural networks that allhumans have.

Ideas are important to the way socie-ties are organized (Ringmar 2008). Peoplenot only need to be organized, but theyneed to understand how their society isorganized in order to live their lives. Butorganizing thousands or millions of peopleis not hard-wired into human brains orDNA: it is something every person inevery society has to learn. Groups of peo-ple have no inherent organization.Without some concept of how they areto interact and relate to others, people willquickly find themselves at cross purposeswith others. If archaeologists can under-stand how people formulate ideas aboutsocial order, then they will have a muchbetter chance of grasping the nature of theideas at work in ancient societies. In thisarticle, I discuss how people worldwideformulated one important family of con-cepts. (Please note that I will follow theusual convention in cognitive linguistics ofmarking concepts in SMALL CAPITALS, andinstances of the concept in italics.)

Concepts of SocietyThere are many concepts about society,and many ways of framing them. A com-mon one is that the SOCIETY IS A BODY. In

this vein, we find expressions like “thebody politic”, “organs of state”, as well asassociated concepts like “a healthydemocracy”, in which the wellbeing ofsociety is likened to the wellbeing of thebody. Body-based concepts from othercultures include the French corps-état,Meiji Japanese kokutai, “national body”,and ancient Chinese guoti. Many peoplesrefer to leaders as “heads”: Old Norsehofðing “head man”; Modern Greekkephal�e, “head, chief”; Hebrew reš“head, chief”; Amharic ras “head, prince”;Turkish ba�skan “leader” from ba�s “head”;Mongolian darga “head, chief”; and Zuluinhloko “head, leader”.

Another widespread, and possiblyuniversal, concept is that of the FAMILY.Leaders are parents, usually fathers orelders, e.g., “Founding Fathers”, “senators”(from Latin senex “elder”). The mass ofthe population are children, e.g., “Sons ofLiberty”, “Children of Israel”. Withinsociety, people of equal rank are brothersor sisters, e.g., “brothers in arms”, “theMuslim Brotherhood”. The idea thatSOCIETY IS A FAMILY still operates today,even in the largest and most complexnations. Lakoff (2002) and Cienki (2005,2008) for example, demonstrate that var-iations on it are the central political meta-phor in the United States.

An elaboration on the concept ofFAMILY is SOCIETY AS A HOUSEHOLD. In it,the categories of FAMILY are expanded toencompass the more-varied social rela-tions and hierarchies at work in a largehousehold (e.g., dependents, hired staff,servants, slaves). The concept of SOCIETY

AS HOUSE appears, for example, inLincoln’s “House Divided Speech”:

A house divided against itself cannotstand. I believe this government cannotendure, permanently, half slave and half

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free. I do not expect the Union to bedissolved – I do not expect the house tofall – but I do expect it will cease to bedivided. (Lincoln 1991, 25)

For all their ubiquity though, ideas ofBODY, FAMILY and HOUSEHOLD lack sufficientdetail to order a complex society. Largersocieties require richer concepts. Thesethree concepts do, though, illustrate howpeople develop ideas about social order.All three are metaphors. In each, peoplemap their experiences of their bodies,family, and households onto larger socialgroups, to infer how society ought to beorganized and people behave within it.For example, just as children traditionallyowe parents the duty of obedience, sosubjects owe their rulers obedience. Thelimitations of BODY, FAMILY, and HOUSE

metaphors are that, first, they lack suffi-cient categories to manage complexsocieties with many different social rolesand, second, they operate with only anarrow spectrum of interactions.Families, for example, run on personalinteractions and shared personal history:experiences that are absent in the run-ning of a nation or a state. There are,though, other domains that people candraw on, which are much richer andprovide stable models for social order.

There are four main claims I want toargue in this article. The first is that manymajor concepts of social organization aremetaphoric. The second is that there isan important and widespread family ofmetaphors with a shared “image schema”– a conceptual structure I will explainlater. My third claim is that the formationof this RULING schema, as I will call it, ispredictable, and is built on the cognitiveexperience of applying physical force toobjects. Finally, fourth, the conceptualmetaphors structured by this imageschema are likely to form if a number of

criteria are met: (1) communities arelarge for people to live with many stran-gers; (2) people can be conceptualized asa “mass” without internal divisions (suchas classes or castes); and (3) large parts ofthe community need to be directlyinvolved in or familiar with activitieswhich involve the application of force toachieve some outcome. The conditionsunder which the schema and metaphorswill form will usually be visible in thearchaeological record. The result is thatarchaeologists will be able to make strongpredictions about the conceptual organi-zation of past societies with populationsof a few thousand or more.

Conceptual MetaphorsBefore exploring the organization ofcommunities, I want to discuss the natureof metaphor. Metaphor has made occa-sional appearances in archaeological the-ory and interpretation over the last 30years – most of it in a post-processualistvein. Examples include Parker-Pearson’s(Parker-Pearson and Ramilisonina 1998)explanation of Stonehenge as wood forthe living, stone for the dead; Hodder’s(1982, 218–227) interpretation of theNeolithic tombs of Orkney as “houses”for the dead; Brück’s (2004) interpreta-tion of Bronze Age grave goods as meta-phors for the self, and Richards’ (2013,82ff.) suggestion that stone circles are“wrappings”. What these and mostother archaeological uses of metaphorhave in common is that they note thatone “domain” of material culture hasbeen deliberately given the attributes ofanother. Tilley (1999) provides manymore examples of material cultureshaped by metaphor. But what theseobservations do not explain is why peo-ple use metaphors to shape material

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culture, nor the cognitive processesunderlying how people create and inter-pret metaphor. In many of theseaccounts, “metaphor” is little more thana synonym for “analogy” or “symbol”.Also implicit in most archaeological usesis that “metaphor” is a completely free,unconstrained act of imagination. Thismakes it very difficult to explain whypeople around the world routinelyassociate some concepts – warmth withfriendship, tombs with houses, death withjourneys, and size with importance.

There is, though, an alternative bodyof theory that answers the bulk of theseproblems, and makes it possible forarchaeologists to develop strong hypoth-eses regarding the concepts that struc-tured ancient societies: conceptualmetaphor theory (CMT). Although itnow occupies a central position in cogni-tive science and linguistics, this theory hasbeen little used by archaeologists. Thehandful of exceptions include Ortman(2000, 2008, 2012), Potter (2002),Culley (2003, 2006a, 2006b), Hays-Gilpin (2006), Loubser (2010), andWiseman (2014).

The model that currently dominatesmetaphor theory outside archaeologywas first outlined in Lakoff andJohnson’s (1980, 1999) Metaphors WeLive By, and reached its mature form intheir Philosophy on the Flesh. The centraltenet of this theory is that metaphorsare central to human cognition, andinvolve using experiences in one domainto structure and understand another.When people use metaphors, they arenot just describing one thing in terms ofanother: they are using the metaphors tothink about and experience one thing asanother. The linguistic expressions tradi-tionally referred to as “metaphors” areactually an expression of the underlying

concepts. Over the last 30 years, cogni-tive scientists have found that metaphorsare pervasive in most fields of humanexperience. They are fundamental toconcepts including TIME, CAUSATION, LIFE,DEATH, EMOTION, COMMUNICATION, IDEAS,SOCIETY, and SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS (e.g.,Reddy 1979; Lakoff and Johnson 1980,1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Lakoffand Turner 1989; Kövecses 1986, 1990,2000; Rigney 2001). Such metaphors arenot just occasional linguistic flourishes, asmetaphors are conventionally perceived.They are pervasive and systematic inthe way people structure ideas andexperience.

While most research and the bulk ofevidence for conceptual metaphor the-ory remains linguistic, there is a solidbody of work demonstrating that meta-phor also structures domains as varied asvisual images (Kennedy 1982; Forceville1996), music (Johnson and Larson 2003;Zbikowski 2002), gesture (Núñez andSweetser 2006; Cienki and Müller2008), and mathematics (Lakoff andNúñez 2000). There is also evidence formetaphor operating in several modes(Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009).

Since the theory first developed, psy-chologists and cognitive scientists havesought empirical evidence to test andrefine the theory. There is now a largebody of experimental evidence for theformation of metaphors and the waypeople use them (e.g., Gibbs 1994,2011). More recently, neuroscientistshave become involved, and have begunto illuminate how metaphors develop inthe brain’s neural networks (Lakoff 2008,2014; Feldman 2006). I will be drawingon this recent research in this article toexplain how one family of conceptsabout societies can develop in the brainsof human beings around the world.

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A Metaphor for ModernOrganizationsTo illustrate how metaphors structuresocieties, let me start with a parallel pro-blem: how people in our own societyunderstand organizations. In Westernsocieties, virtually everyone has to inter-act with organizations. Governments,manufacturers, banks, retail chains, fast-food providers, transport operators,water and power utilities, and telecom-munications providers are almost univer-sally organizations. So understandingorganizations is essential for living in themodern world.

In a seminal volume, Morgan (1984)analyzed the major concepts about orga-nizations used in management theoryduring the late twentieth century. Whathe observed was that every one was ametaphor: MACHINES, ORGANISMS, BRAINS,CULTURES, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, PSYCHIC

PRISONS, FLUX and TRANSFORMATION, andINSTRUMENTS OF DOMINATION. Far the mostpowerful and pervasive of these at thetime was the first: ORGANIZATIONS ARE

MACHINES.The idea that ORGANIZATIONS ARE

MACHINES has a long genesis. Early on, itdrew intellectual inspiration from themechanistic philosophies and sciences ofthe Enlightenment, clockwork toys andautomata, and the military reforms ofthe eighteenth century. But the conceptbecame dominant during the nineteenthcentury, when the Industrial Revolutionled to more and larger machines beingestablished in workplaces. Human beingsbecame displaced from the center ofmany organizations, especially after thedevelopment of assembly line manufac-turing. People had to fit around therequirements of machines, and increas-ingly had to behave as though theywere part of the machines they worked

with. As manufacturing, in particular,started producing steadily more-complexproducts – such as cars, consumer goods,and electronics – the tasks involved inassembling them were divided up intosmaller and smaller parts. Where an arti-san might once have made a wholeobject – a chair or a jacket – an assem-bly-line worker might do only one of ahundred highly-repetitive tasks. Howeveremotionally unsatisfying such work wasfor those doing it, “division of labor”and rendering tasks routine resulted inmachine-like efficiency and predictability.

Prototypical machines – like clocksand engines – consist of a large numberof inter-dependent parts, arranged sothey interact in a specific sequence,work regularly, and produce outputs reli-ably. In prototypical “machine-organiza-tions”, such as factories, banks, and fast-food providers, people work as thoughthey are “cogs in a machine”. They needto complete a routine series of actions, ina predetermined order, synchronizedwith the actions of many other workers.Above the level of individual worker, dif-ferent functional units in an organization– manufacturing, sales, marketing, finance,etc. – also have to be meshed togetherand synchronized.

As well as the “cogs”, an essentialpart of prototypical machines is the “fra-mework”. It holds together the cogs,levers, and gears so they interact in therequired way. It provides the structurethat ensures each part meshes correctlywith the others, at the right time. In“machine-organizations”, the frameworkis provided by management. Managersin such organizations establish whattasks need to be done, ensure that staffhave the skills to achieve those tasks, andmake sure they are done in time to“mesh” with activities in other parts of

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the organization. In large organizations,managers of different divisions them-selves need to be coordinated, so theyneed to have their own managers. Oneresult of conceptualizing organizations asmachines is a management hierarchy.

While the concept of AN ORGANIZATION

AS A MACHINE developed in highly-mechan-ized industries, during the twentieth cen-tury the same principles – division of labor;rendering tasks routine; coordination andsequencing of separate tasks – wereapplied to many other types of organiza-tion as well. The sociologist, Max Weber(1978, 973), noted that bureaucratic orga-nizations run on the same mechanical prin-ciples: “the fully developed bureaucraticapparatus compares with other organiza-tions exactly as does the machine with thenon-mechanical modes of production.”While Weber was no admirer of bureau-cracies, he regarded them as technicallysuperior to all other forms of organization.“Precision, speed, unambiguity… continu-ity, discretion, unity, strict subordination,reduction of friction and of material andpersonal costs – these are raised to theoptimum in the strictly bureaucratic admin-istration…” (Weber 1978, 973). The lan-guage he uses here could be applied almostunchanged to the running of a well-oiledmachine.

Using the Metaphor to StructureOrganizationsThemetaphor AN ORGANIZATION IS A MACHINE

can be analyzed formally as a mapping froma “source domain” (MACHINE) onto a “targetdomain” (ORGANIZATION). Specific mappingswithin this metaphor include:

COGS, LEVERS > WORKERS

FRAMEWORK > MANAGERS

SPECIALIZED PARTS > SPECIALIZED WORKERS

This mapping is apparent in the lan-guage used to describe roles within thistype of organization. In a machine, thecogs and gears provide motive force.Under the mapping, workers becomethe workforce or manpower; they arethe hands that keep the wheels of industryturning.

But using this metaphor does morethan just describe organizations. Peopledraw on their experience of machinesto reason about how workers in organi-zations are to behave and be treated.Linguists term such deductions from thesource domain “entailments”. For exam-ple, if employees are understood as meremotive force, they are not expected tocontribute other human abilities, such asintellect, imagination, learning, or passion.Inasmuch as such qualities have any rolein machines, they are the prerogative ofmanagement – the framework – whichdetermines which parts of the machineinteract. As Frederick Taylor, one of theearly evangelists of machine-organiza-tions, used to say to workers, “You arenot supposed to think. There are otherpeople paid for thinking around here”(Morgan 1984, 24). This hardline separa-tion of thinking from labor is not aninevitable part of large organizations: it isan entailment of thinking aboutORGANIZATIONS AS MACHINES. Anotherentailment is the development of themanagement hierarchy, which I notedearlier.

There are three other characteristicsof metaphoric mappings I want to drawattention to here, as they will be impor-tant later in this article. First, metaphorsmap not only individual elements of thesource domain onto the target, but alsopreserve their structure and relationships.For example, a mechanical clock hasmany cogs but only one framework to

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hold them together. Mapped onto anorganization that “runs like clockwork”,there is a single boss for many workers.The structure being preserved under ametaphoric mapping is termed an“image schema”, and such structures Iwill discuss later.

Second, all metaphoric mappings areonly partial. That is, there are aspects ofboth source and target domains whichare not involved in the mapping. Asalready noted, workers are human beings,not just motive force. They think, feel,eat, have social connections, and so on– none of which are mapped by theMACHINE metaphor. A real organizationthat neglected these aspects of humannature, and treated workers as thoughthey really were cogs in the machine,would quickly go out of business. This iswhy, as Morgan (1984) found, there aremany other metaphors for organizationin our society, including ORGANISMS, BRAINS,CULTURES, and POLITICAL SYSTEMS. Peoplecreate a variety of metaphors to reasonabout different aspects of organizationsand human nature.

Third, while there are a few expres-sions people use to speak about machineorganizations, most of the metaphor isactually in the way that people reasonabout organizations. People use theirexperience of machines to draw conclu-sions about how to act in organizations.Even when there are no explicit expres-sions of a metaphor, its presence can bedetected in its entailments (e.g., Cienki2005, 2008)

Metaphors for Ancient SocietyThe metaphor ORGANIZATIONS ARE

MACHINES belongs to a family of concep-tual metaphors all based on one “imageschema” (to be described later). In this

section, I will sketch out two more shortcase studies to show other metaphors inthis family, and provide some concreteexamples that I will use later. I haveselected these case studies from societiesthat are rather more relevant to archae-ologists than modern factory-organiza-tions: ancient Sumer and the ClassicMaya.

As Morgan found with modern orga-nizations, each of these two societies isstructured by many conceptual meta-phors (just as they are generated throughmany different activities, such as warfare,marriage, trade, public spectacles, con-spicuous consumption of luxury goods,and construction of monumental archi-tecture). In the case studies below, Ihave drawn out one important metaphorfrom the tangle of concepts used in eachsociety. In each, I have highlighted keymappings under each metaphor alongwith some of the entailments. Manymore will occur to experts of eachsociety, but I have avoided burdeningthe analysis with excessive references tospecialist literature.

There are many sources of evidencefor the metaphors that people were usingto conceptualize their societies: explicitlinguistic usages; terminology people habi-tually use; etymology; iconography andartistic representations; skeuomorphism;and entailments. There are now standardmethods for the analysis of metaphorsexpressed in language (Pragglejaz Group2007). There is a growing body ofresearch of musical and visual metaphors,and methods for their identification andinterpretation are well-developed (e.g.,Zbikowski 2002, 2008; Forceville 2002,2008). Material culture has been largelyoverlooked, although Ortman (2000,2012) provides an important approachto its interpretation.

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Sumer: PEOPLE ARE FLOCKS

“The Lord is my Shepherd” (Psalm23:1). For modern Westerners, theexpression is firmly connected withChristianity, but the concept is mucholder and more widespread. The ideaof society as a FLOCK watched over bySHEPHERDS is commonplace in the ancientMiddle East, and is fully formed in eventhe earliest written records of theSumerians.

Sumerian kings are regularly called“shepherds”, and their people are flocksof “sheep”. For example: “The trust-worthy shepherd, king, the sword ofSumer, Ur-Namma, the king of the Land…” (2.4.1.1 line 31f.) (Unless noted, allfollowing quotes are from the ElectronicCorpus of Sumerian Texts, Black et al.1998–2006).

… In his city, let them [the people] gobefore him [the king] like sheep. Let him,like their shepherd, follow behind them… (1.8.2.3, line 477f., see also 2.4.1.3,lines 76f.)

If PEOPLE ARE SHEEP and KINGS ARE

SHEPHERDS then, by extension, the city,where the “sheep” are protected, is asheepfold. “Although you are a queenwho loves her city, you abandoned yoursheepfold” (2.2.2, lines 375f.).

To modern eyes, describing people assheep appears peculiar and somewhatdemeaning. However, Sumerian mythssuch as The Debate between Grain andSheep (5.3.2) and How Grain came toSumer (1.7.6) are explicit that “sheep-ness” was the original state of humanbeings.

Men used to eat grass with their mouthslike sheep. In those times, they did notknow grain, barley or flax. (1.7.6,lines 1–2)

The people of those days did not knowabout eating bread. They did not knowabout wearing clothes; they went aboutwith naked limbs in the Land. Like sheepthey ate grass with their mouths anddrank water from the ditches. (5.3.2,lines 21f.)

Thinking of people as sheep does notappear to be just a political and literaryconceit. It also appears in Sumerianaccounting. Englund (2011, 46–49)notes that in Archaic cuneiform texts,common people and state-owned herdanimals appear to be categorized in thesame way. Proto-Elamite scripts, whichborrowed heavily from Archaic cunei-form, used a decimal counting systemsolely for recording animals and whatappear to be low-status humans.Englund (2011, 74–75) notes that low-status people are marked in Sumeriancuneiform texts with the ideographsERIN2 (“yoke, shackle”) and SAG+MAR (ahead with a noose), which might indicatethey were slaves or bonded labor. Thenumber of Sumerians in labor is not clear,but it is not disputed that dependentlabor was used widely and systematicallyin Sumer (Algaze 2008, 128f., Englund1993, 70f.).

Southern [Mesopotamian] elites came toview and use fully encumbered laborer inthe same exploitative way that humansocieties, over the immediately precedingmillennia, had viewed and used the laborof domesticated animals … Scribal sum-maries [in Archaic cuneiform] detailingthe composition of groups of foreignand nativeborn captives used as laborersdescribe them with age and sex cate-gories identical to those used to describestate-owned herded animals, includingvarious types of cattle and pigs …

Because these parallels are repeated innumerous texts, they cannot beexplained away as either accidents orscribal idiosyncrasies. Rather, it would

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appear that the two classes of labour(captive “others” and domestic animals)were considered equivalent in the mindsof Uruk scribes and in the eyes of theinstitutions that employed them. EarlyNear Eastern villagers domesticatedplants and animals. Uruk urban institu-tions, in turn, domesticated humans.(Algaze 2008, 128–129)

Conceptualizing people as sheep – ormore generally, as herd animals – alsoexplains some of the specific descriptionsof human behavior found in Sumerianliterature. For example, the core task ofkings is not to “rule” or “govern”, but “tolead” their people, just as a bellwetherleads the flock. Kings may also “follow”their people, as in one of the examplesabove, just as a shepherd follows theirflock. And if groups of people are aFLOCK, then they should behave likeSHEEP when they are attacked. When ene-mies are defeated, soldiers are routinelysaid to be “scattered” far more oftenthan they are “killed” or “maimed”.

The rebel lines … They are scattered byforce, like sheep that have no shepherd.(2.4.2.03, Seg. B; see also 1.6.2, line 74)

There is an important entailment ofthe metaphor, which Sumerian and laterMesopotamian kings regularly drew out.A shepherd does not own the flock.Rather, the shepherd cares for it onbehalf of the flock’s owner. For theSumerians, the “owner” of humansappears to have been the gods; certainly,the Sumerians believed that the godsmade humans (1.7.4, lines 10–14). It isin this capacity that the gods selected thekings to lead their “flocks”. For example,the king Ur–Namma (ca. 2047–2030 BC)claims, “[The supreme god] Enlil hasgiven me the task of keeping the Landsecure … I am the good shepherd whose

sheep multiply greatly …” (2.4.1.3, lines70ff.). The king Gudea describes himselfas “the shepherd called by [the god]Ningirsu” (2.1.7, line 550).

Great An … Father Enlil … Both of you,bestow permanently the role of shep-herd of living beings, of the numerouspeople, upon Ur-Ninurta, the youthwho knows how to carry out yourorders … He knows how to direct allcountries: let him give great commands.May his shepherd’s crook make the rebellands bow low; may he let them havestable governance … May he search outfood for them to eat as if for sheep, andmay he get them … water to drink.(2.5.6.1, lines 17–26)

As these passages indicate, the meta-phors of SHEEP and SHEPHERD also shapedthe regalia of kings, which regularlyincluded the šibir, “shepherd’s crook”(from šiba “to lead”). “Where are thenoble sceptre, the staff and crook, thenoble dress, shepherdship, kingship?”(1.3.1, Seg. F, line 19). There is alsosome evidence that kings of the Ur IIIand Isin dynasties participated in a cere-monial marriage to the goddess, Inana, inwhich they took the role of her husband,Dumuzi, the shepherd god (Cooper1993, 82).

We can summarize the main meta-phoric mappings and entailments asfollows:

SHEPHERD > KING

FLOCK > PEOPLE

LEADING THE FLOCK > RULING

FLOCK’S OWNER > GODS

SHEPHERD’S CROOK > KING’S INSIGNIA

The metaphor THE KING IS A SHEPHERD

defines the primary roles for kings inSumerian society. Shepherds have twomain functions: to secure pasture and toprotect their flocks. Mapped onto

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Mesopotamian society, these translateinto: (1) providing fodder by constructingof irrigation works; and (2) protecting thepeople by building defenses and organiz-ing armed troops. These are nicely illu-strated in a post-Sumerian inscription bythe Babylonian king Ammiditana(1683–1647 BC):

I guided the land of Sumer and Akkadaright. I [settled] the widespread peoplein a dwelling of peace. I [gladdened] theheart of the land. In those days, with thewisdom that Ea had given me, in order toproudly shepherd the widespread peopleof my land in pasturage and wateringplace […] (and) let them rest in theriver meadows, I created [the fortress]D�ur-Ammiditana above the SharbitRiver on (its) east and west side.(Koppen 2006, 106)

Sheep are certainly not the only ani-mals the Sumerians used in metaphorsfor their society: cattle are also promi-nent. However, it was sheep that becamethe dominant source domain in the laterMesopotamian civilizations that suc-ceeded the Sumerians. The metaphor isapparent amongst the Babylonians,Assyrians, and across the Levant – andeven amongst the Hittites in Anatolia.The Code of Hammurabi, written inBabylon in Akkadian around 1772 BC,announces, “I am Hammurabi, Enlil’s cho-sen shepherd” (Prologue 4, see also 18,Richardson 2000, 30, 39, 269). Amongstthe regalia of the Babylonian and laterAssyrian kings was the gamlu or crook;its equivalent amongst the Hittites wasthe kalmuš (Ambos and Krausdorf 2010).

The metaphors KINGS ARE SHEPHERDS

and PEOPLE ARE SHEEP were enormouslylong-lived. They pervade the much-laterJewish and Christian scripture, compiledover 2000 years after Sumer declined.

Most of the Patriarchs are shepherds(e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob); David’s sta-tus as king of Israel is foreshadowed in hisprowess as a shepherd (e.g., 1 Samuel 17:34ff.). And Jesus, despite being a carpen-ter, describes himself as the GoodShepherd (John 10:11). The Christian tra-dition of calling priests “shepherds” or“pastors” continues in this vein: “leading”and “watching over” their “flocks”, onbehalf of God. The SHEEP and SHEPHERD

metaphors are the most common imagefor social organization in the Old andNew Testaments, appearing over fivehundred times.

Much of the Sumerian material wehave for the metaphors of SHEEP andSHEEP-HERDING come from elite sources.It is undeniable that some of this is expli-cit propaganda. However, even ifSumerian elites had self-interested rea-sons for using SHEEP-based metaphors,there are good reasons for suspectingthat these metaphors were widely usedin society, outside of elite circles.Certainly, the New Testament gospelscannot be considered the product ofelites, so the appearance of passagesbased on PEOPLE ARE SHEEP (e.g., Matthew18:12–15; Luke 15: 4–7; John 10: 1–18; 1Peter 2:5, 5: 2–4) suggest that the meta-phor was an acceptable (if largely-conventional) way ordinary peopleunderstood themselves. As the politicalanalyst Jonathon Charteris-Black (2007,97, my italics) has stressed, “Successfuland charismatic leaders create metaphorsonto which followers project their ownmeanings and in doing so find a degreeof socio-psychological and emotionalgratification”. The longevity of the SHEEP-HERDING metaphors points to “socio-psy-chological and emotional gratification” ofthe highest order, suggesting that the

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metaphors were widespread and widelyaccepted by the mass of people through-out this two-thousand-year period.

Classic Maya: PEOPLE ARE CORN

The metaphor, PEOPLE ARE FLOCKS,depends on the widespread experienceof handling domesticated animals. Plainly,such a metaphor could not develop inmost of the ancient Americas becausethey lacked economically-significantdomesticated animals (Andean llamasbeing the main exception). The conceptof humans that dominates Mesoamericais based not on animals but on CORN.Maize is the cornerstone of the CentralAmerican diet, and maize-based meta-phors are reported amongst Maya speak-ers (Carlsen 1997, 54ff.), Mixtec(Monaghan 1995), and in various Uto-Aztecan languages (Sandstrom 1991;Huichol, Shelton 1996). Under this meta-phor, the stages of maize growth aremapped onto human life. Black (1984)provides a clear example of its use in aWuwutsim (Hopi) initiation ceremony:

When the [initiation] ceremony is finallyover, frequently the father speaks to hisson, and tells him the following:[FATHER] “You really have becomecorn.” …[SON] “If you have that as flesh, why do Ihave that as flesh?” …[FATHER] “It is not that you really havebecome corn … You have been nursing(sucking) on our mother (earth) foreverything here grows up from below.… By means of its moisture you survivehere … Whenever one plants seeds,they sprout. … After a while it appearsabove ground … Then when it rains onit, with its juice (moisture) it grows. …When it has eyes (kernels) it becomesripe … One makes his flesh with that.… When one goes back home (toearth, by dying) this (body) is a stalk

… Only it became worn out, spent…” (Black 1984, 280)

On this view, procreation is seeding;infants are sprouts; the appearance ofkernels is maturity; and old age is thestalk after harvesting.

To analyze how this metaphorshaped the organization ofMesoamerican societies, I am going tofocus on the Maya, as they have the old-est system of writing in the Americas, aswell as a large body of iconography.

Stross (2006, 581) notes that,amongst modern Maya, “interchange ofhuman body part terms with maize partnomenclature is particularly notable …”.The metaphor PEOPLE ARE CORN alsoappears in historic Mayan literature. Forexample, the Popol Vuh (a Post Classicalcollection of K’iche’ myths recorded inthe early 1700s) includes a descriptionof how human beings were fashionedfrom maize (Christenson 2007, lines4822ff). Fragments of the metaphoricsystem appear in Classic Maya inscrip-tions: for example, the word for ‘child’or ‘youth’, ch’ok, means literally ‘sprout’,while k’a’ay ‘wither’ is a euphemism for‘die’ (Foster 2002, 284). Mayan iconogra-phy also makes clear that the ClassicMaya were familiar with the conceptPEOPLE ARE CORN. Perhaps the most expli-cit examples are the Tablet of theFoliated Cross at Palenque (Foster2002, 176, Figure 6.5), and the muralsat Tlaxcala (Evans 2008, 53), in whichmaize plants sprout cob-shaped humanheads.

The growth of maize and other cropswas controlled by several factors, but forthe Yucatan Maya one of the chief oneswas water. Despite high rainfall (c.1200 mm annually), the region experi-enced an annual five-month drought

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from January to May. Furthermore, mostrainfall was lost underground, through theinnumerable limestone caves of theregion. There were few major rivers andlakes, and reduced water flow in the dryseason could lead to major reductions inwater quality. Obtaining and managingwater was crucial to the Maya settlementof the region (Scarborough 1993, 1998;Lucero 2006). Obtaining water was alsopivotal to the Mayan – andMesoamerican – concept of humanflourishing: as the Hopi example aboveillustrates, because PEOPLE ARE CORN, aperson needs to draw moisture fromthe earth in order to grow and mature.

The need for water was where Mayaelites inserted themselves into a control-ling position within the metaphor, PEOPLE

ARE CORN. The elites created waterstorages, embodied the gods of rain,and had privileged relations with thewater-giving ancestors.

For the Maya, securing water involvedsolving two problems. The first was theengineering problem. There was no sin-gle “Mayan” water strategy: different sitesused different resources to secure theirwater resources (Matheny and Gurr1983; Scarborough 1993, 1998; Lucero2002). A few highland cities, such asCopan and Palenque, could rely onlarge rivers. Smaller settlements coulduse water from limestone caves or cen-otes. The city of Chichen Itza, for exam-ple, appears to have been organizedaround its two main caves: the XtolokCenote and the Sacred Cenote (Coe2011, 229). However, the very largestof the lowlands cities, such as Tikal,Caracol, and Calakmul, lacked naturalwater sources and, instead, dependedon artificial reservoirs (Folan et al. 1996;Scarborough and Gallopin 1991;Scarborough 1993, 1994). Engineering

on the summit of Tikal, for example,created a catchment of 62 hectares, cap-able of collecting 900,000 cubic metersof water, which was further supplemen-ted by four more reservoirs around thebase of the site (Scarborough 1998).Various scholars have suggested that thefirst settlers in the lowlands monopolizedgood farmland, and began to build reser-voirs on hillsides, exploiting local topogra-phy to capture water. By granting laterarrivals access to soil and water, as well asmanaging the reservoirs to maintain theirquality, these first settlers secured a levelof control over later immigrants, becom-ing the first Mayan elites (Scarborough1998).

The second problem the Mayans hadin controlling water was securing the rainnecessary to fill their reservoirs. Watercame from either the gods (principallythe rain god, Chaak) or else from theancestors, who occupied a watery under-world (doubtless modeled on the lime-stone cenotes). So obtaining waterdemanded interceding with them(Scarborough 1998; Lucero 1999, 40ff.).The relationship between Classic Mayantemples and water facilities makes theconnection between the two clear. Atmajor Classic Mayan sites, includingTikal, Calakmul, Coba, Caracol, Río Azul,and La Milpa, “reservoirs rest immediatelybelow the most grand palaces and tem-ples” (Scarborough 1998, 153).Monumental architecture is frequentlyinscribed with symbols of water: waterlilies, fish, crocodiles, as well as theWater Lily Monster and Water LilySerpent (Fash 2005). In order to call therain, all Mesoamerican peoples, includingthe Maya, performed rituals. Thisinvolved dressing as rain gods, and dan-cing as they did, performing their actions.This, argue Houston and Stuart (1996), is

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not simple impersonation: an image of agod is not just a representation, but anexpression of divinity (Houston and Stuart1996, 304, see also Looper 2009, 224–226ff.). Wearing masks, effigies, and cos-tumes allowed people to “assume theimage” (u-baachi ahn) of a god (Sharerand Traxler 2006, 149). A person,dressed as the rain-god Chaak, becomesan expression of Chaak, and is therebyable to do what Chaak does – createrain.

The Classic Maya elites appear tohave claimed special connections withthe gods, particularly those responsiblefor rain, like Chaak. Kings and gods areshown together in the Pre-Classical mur-als of San Bartolo (Saturno, Sturt, andTaube 2004). Classic Mayan rulers arevery frequently portrayed in art dressedas gods: particularly those like Chaak cru-cial to the growth of maize (Stone andZender 2011, 41). On their accession,rulers also frequently took divine names.Of the 164 Mayan kings listed by Martinand Grube (2008, 22–23), 68 incorpo-rate the names of celestial gods, includingChaak (rain), Yopaat (storm), K’awiil(lightning), Itzamnaaj (sky), and K’inich(sun). The claims of great Mayan rulersto divinity are most explicit in their title:k’ul ahaw, means “holy/divine lord”, andsets them apart from the rulers of minorcenters, ahaw. Icons of water are theexclusive preserve of great Maya rulers.While water imagery such as water-lilies,fish and frogs appears on monumentaltemples and reservoirs constructed bydivine rulers (Fash 2005; Lucero 2006,41), these are notably absent at minorsites, which also lacked both large-scalewater systems and controlling elites(Lucero 2002, 820).

Altogether, this suggests that, inClassic Mayan cities where people did

not have access to water, elites con-trolled the making and distribution ofwater – and through it, controlled thepeople conceptualized as corn. Figure 1summarizes how the Classic Mayan rulersinserted themselves into both the growthof maize but also, via the metaphor,PEOPLE ARE CORN, presenting themselvesas the controllers of forces necessary tothe flourishing of the Mayan people aswell.

The Schema Structuring theMetaphorsAll three systems of metaphors –

MACHINES, SHEEP-HERDING, CORN-GROWING –

arose independently and are based onunrelated source domains. But there arealso striking similarities between them.Consider the main components of each:

ENGINEER drives machineSHEPHERD herds/protects flockRAIN GOD WATERS CROPS

Each has a single agent who controlsor directs affairs. This agent’s actions aretheir prototypical activities (driving, herd-ing, making rain). What the agent con-trols is made up of many individualobjects (cogs, sheep, corn-plants). Theagent deals with these objects as a MASS:that is, the objects are handled collec-tively, not individually. This MASS is also agestalt (MACHINE, FLOCK, CROP): it has

Figure 1.

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structure and organization distinct fromthe parts that comprise it. (A clock, forexample, has a unity and purpose distinctfrom its component cogs.) All the objectscontrolled have one of two fundamentalattributes of life: either they grow or theyare animated: even prototypical machinesare metaphorically alive: engines “cometo life” and can “die”; cars and boats have“personalities”. These attributes are sum-marized in Figure 2.

Much contemporary archaeologicaltheory would be content to note theparallels between these three case stu-dies – and supported by similar datafrom other societies – then apply themodel empirically to other societies ana-logically. While it is undeniable that, inmany circumstances, analogy is both valu-able and unavoidable (e.g., Wylie 1985;David and Kramer 2001, 33–61), formalanalogies cannot not explain why thisparticular model of society arises, andunder what circumstances it mightdevelop in other societies. In this case,however, conceptual metaphor theoryand cognitive science allows me toexplain why this particular model devel-ops the constraints on it, and howarchaeologists can use this informationto make strong predictions in othersocieties.

I claim that these common attributesoutlined above share an underlying“image schema”. Furthermore, thisimage schema is a special case of one ofthe most studied suites of schemas: what

Talmy calls “force dynamics” (Talmy1988, 2000).

Image SchemaSchemas are central to human cognition.When we perceive or act, we have to dealwith a world of infinite variety. Weencounter many more situations oraspects than our brains could cope withif they had to deal with each individuallyand separately. Imagine having to relearnhow to drink every time we encountereda new cup! A great deal of human life,however, involves doing similar activitiesand working with similar objects. We livepatterned lives in a structured universe.What our minds do is order our percep-tions and actions into a manageable num-ber of forms. A schema – or “imageschema” as cognitive linguists have cometo call it – is “a recurrent pattern, shape,and regularity in, or of, these ongoingordering activities” (Johnson 1987, 29).

Most attention in cognitive sciencehas gone to the simplest, most basicschemas at work in perceiving and acting.Examples of detailed analyses includeOVER (Lakoff 1987, 416–461), andSTRAIGHT (Cienki 1998). These lack therich detail of an image, but they do havesome minimal internal structure, consist-ing of entities and interrelationshipsbetween those entities.

Consider the elements that might gointo the schema for CUP. Some are phy-sical properties (or, more properly,“affordances”, to use Gibson’s [1979]term). A cup has to be a CONTAINER,with a MOUTH-SIZED OPENING and, becausewe use cups to drink liquids, the openinghas to be at the TOP. Other elements ofthe schema have to do with how we usea cup and our purposes in using it. WeFILL a cup with liquid, LIFT it, and TIP theFigure 2.

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contents into our mouths, in order toDRINK (Figure 3).

In addition to having entities andinterrelationships, all image schemas aregestalts: they operate as a whole, distinctfrom the individual entities that makethem up. For example, although theschema for CUP incorporates affordances,purposes, and how we use cups, theseparts have to work together to serve as auseable concept. If they are not allengaged simultaneously, the result is notadequate to serve as the concept of aCUP. Buckets, bowls, basins, and bathtubsall share some of the elements of the CUP

schema, but we would not conceptualisethem as a cup because not all of theelements of the CUP schema are activated.

All regularly-performed sensorimotoractivities have an associated imageschema. They allow us to handle com-mon situations with a minimum of cog-nitive effort. In the case of a cup, thecombination of attributes and actionsabove will allow us to identify and useany cup, regardless of its specific design.Such a schema is not a static templatehowever: it can adapt to new scenarios. IfI break my arm, I can still find ways to liftand tip a cup, without having to developan entirely new way of drinking.

The Schemas of Force DynamicsThe schema illustrated in Figure 2 is aspecial case of a well-understood familyof schemas, “force dynamics”, which wasfirst described by Leonard Talmy (Talmy1988, 2000, 409–470, see also Johnson1987, 41–64; Lakoff and Johnson 1999,170–234). By this term, Talmy meant,“how entities interact with respect toforce … [including] … the exertion offorce, resistance to such a force, theover-coming of such a resistance, block-age of the expression of force, removalof such blockage, and the like” (Talmy1988, 49). Figure 4a–d shows a numberof ways two objects, A and B, can inter-act forcefully (somewhat simplified from

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

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Talmy’s analysis). In each case, object Ais the focus of attention, and is used tojudge the results of the interactionwith B.

In 4a, A impinges on B, which isinitially stationary, making B move. In4b, B impinges on A, which is station-ary but, in this case, A is stronger thanB, and so A blocks B’s movement. In4c, B impinges on A at an angle, caus-ing A to change course. In 4d, remov-ing B from the path of A allows A tomove.

The four schemas illustrated inFigure 4 are only a subset of Talmy’sanalysis. Each interaction can be mademore specific, depending on whetherthe force is steady, instantaneous, orchanging. Examples 4a-c only dealwith pushing, but there are otherforce dynamic schemas in whichobjects are pulled or experience attrac-tion. In all these forceful encounters,however, Talmy found that theycould be resolved into a few elementsand their interactions, which is theessence of image schemas as Johnson(1987, 28–30) defined them.

The various force dynamics Talmyanalyzed share the following basic char-acteristics. All involved two entities, oneof which is the focus of attention. Eachentity is either at rest or in motion.One entity impinges upon the other.The entities have different relativestrengths, and the stronger entity willtend to continue on its way at theexpense of the other. The result iseither motion or rest, or a change ofdirection.

What is also notable about conceptsstructured by the various FORCE schema iswhat is not usually marked. The entitiesthemselves have no attributes apart from

motion or rest. There is no quantificationof speed, and interactions do notincrease or decrease speed. Similarly,although interacting entities may changecourse, the angle of deflection is notspecified.

The limited number of elementsand ways of interacting within theseschema greatly constrains the ways inwhich interactions can be conceptua-lized. The result is that people managethe infinite variety of interactions in theworld by bundling them into a limitedset of distinct schemas. This is reflectedin the very limited range of terms avail-able for describing interactions in a gen-eral way. We normally talk aboutinteractions like those in Figures 4aand 4b as one object making theother move or stop. In English, wehave only a handful of general wordsthat describe this interaction, includingmake, cause, because, and compel. Bycontrast, interactions of the type illu-strated in Figure 4d are normallydescribed as letting or allowing or per-mitting: another restricted category.

This family of schemas is not just aproduct of language or somehowdependent upon it: it is part of ourcognitive system. We can see this inthe way we interpret a sentence like,“the ball sailed into the window, andthe window broke.” Our normal inter-pretation is that the force of the ballcaused the window to break.However, “force” and “causing” arenot present in this sentence. It is theFORCE schema, generated out of ourexperience of forceful interactions,which leads us to infer that there iscausal relationship between the ball’simpact and the window’s breaking, notthe words in the sentence.

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Extending Force DynamicsBeyond Physical InteractionsTalmy (2000, 531ff.) has shown that peo-ple use this family of force dynamic sche-mas not only to conceptualize physicalinteractions, but also social and psycho-logical interactions. For example, whenwe feel the “force of personality”, weconceptualize it in the same way as phy-sical force: a strong personality mightattract us or cause us to recoil. Whenfaced with a powerful argument, we areforced to accept its consequences: that is,the premises of the argument are strongerthan we are, forcing us to move from ourinitial position. Likewise, good mannersmight sometimes prevent us from sayingwhat we really think. That is, manners arean entity that blocks the path we wouldlike to take. At work, our boss mightpermit us to take a week’s holiday: thatis, they remove the organizational forcesthat normally prevent us from doing whatwe would like to do. Lakoff and Johnson(1999, 170–234) show we conceptualizethese interactions by drawing on ourexperience of forceful interactions withthe physical world around us. Althoughthe details vary somewhat across cul-tures, in broad outline, this extensionfrom physical to non-physical is foundeverywhere. And, because our under-standing of these non-physical interac-tions is grounded in the experience ofphysical force, such concepts inherit theschemas of the physical forces uponwhich they are based.

All of the linguistic examples I havegiven so far are based on English, and thevast bulk of research into force dynamicshas focused on English expressions.(Talmy’s research is based on cross-lin-guistic analysis, but he does not reportwhich languages were surveyed.) Thereis, however, one important subset of

force dynamic schemas that has beenexamined in great detail in languagesother than English. These are the con-cepts and linguistic expressions of causa-tion. They are based on the type ofinteractions shown in Figures 4a and 4b.Song’s (1996) survey of 408 languages(effectively, a survey of every languagewith a grammar sufficiently robust to sup-port detailed analysis) reported that everyone had some way of marking causation.And, moreover, they all involved a singlecognitive model – one that can be har-monized with the schemas illustrated inFigures 4a and 4b. From this finding, wecan deduce that that every person inevery culture will know the forcedynamic schemas illustrated in Figures4a and b, because every person willhave experience of applying force toobjects around them. In short, thisschema will be universal in humanconcepts.

Forming the Metaphors ofSocial OrganizationThe existence of this force dynamicschema in all culture allows me to explainthe formation of the social metaphors Ioutlined earlier Figure 5a shows the basicFORCE schema from Figure 4a alongsidethe RULING schema that structured thethree case studies. What is apparent isthat, structurally, the RULING schema is aspecial case of the FORCE schema, withfour constraints. The first is that theforce involved is goal directed: A acts onB in order to cause some outcome(Figure 5b). Like the FORCE schema, wecan assume that this schema will be uni-versal, because people usually apply forcewith the goal of achieving some out-come. I am going to call this schema theFORCE-OUTCOME schema.

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The other three restrictions concernthe social entity that the agent acts on. Itis: (a) a MASS of like objects (b) a gestalt,and (c) composed of objects having oneof two attributes of living things: specifi-cally, they MOVE or they GROW.

Developments in cognitive scienceover the last decade (e.g., Feldman2006; Lakoff 2008), make it possible toexplain how the FORCE-OUTCOME schemacould form the RULING schema and thevarious metaphors for society. To helpkeep the following discussion concrete, Iwill focus on sheep-herding and the for-mation of the Sumerian model of king-ship. The MACHINE and CORN metaphorsform in broadly similar ways.

I have divided the formation processinto five stages. The first involves thecreation of the SHEEP-HERDING schema.The second concerns the creation of ahuman MASS. The third describes the acti-vation of the elements that make up theRULING schema. The fourth covers theformation of the RULING schema fromthese elements, under the influence ofthe FORCE-OUTCOME schema. And finally,the fifth explains how the SHEEP-HERDING

schema becomes connected with theRULING schema, resulting in specific meta-phors like THE KING IS A SHEPHERD and THE

PEOPLE ARE A FLOCK.

Stage 0: Forming the SHEEP-HERDING

SchemaThe basic task of a shepherd is to movesheep to pasture, water, and shelter,and to prevent the sheep straying offwherever they want. Applying blowsand shouts at the rear of the flock willdrive it forward. A hand waved on theleft side will send the mob to the right.As herd animals, sheep will also tend tofollow the lead animal, so if the shep-herd leads that individual, the rest willfollow. (Humans will also take over therole of the lead ram, and as a result, thesheep learn to follow the shepherd.) Ineach case, pushing (from the rear or theside) and pulling (the lead animal) willsee the sheep go where the shepherdwants.

The FORCE-OUTCOME schema suggeststo the shepherd that steering and leadingthe herd is essentially a matter of applyingforce. It also suggests what types of forceare required and where they need to beapplied. The result is a special applicationof the FORCE-OUTCOME schema, which Iwill term the SHEEP-HERDING schema(Figure 6a). It consists of the individualSHEPHERD, the gestalt HERD (made up ofindividual sheep), the shepherd’s GOAL

(whether water, pasture, or shelter), thePATH which the shepherd wants to taketo reach the GOAL, and the FORCE theshepherd needs to apply to keep thesheep, MOVING along the PATH.

The SHEEP-HERDING schema is thenecessary background for the specificmetaphors of society. It is fully autono-mous from the business of ruling people,

Figure 5.

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however, which is why I have labeledthis Phase 0, rather than Phase 1. Thenext five phases are all specifically con-cerned with the creation of concepts ofsociety.

Stage 1. Forming the Human MASS

Phase 1 involves conceptualizing people asa MASS. Lakoff (1987, 428–429) notes thatit is a simple mental operation to transforma MULTIPLEX (a collection of many entities)

Figure 6.

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into a MASS (a single entity). Essentially, wepicture the objects involved at a distance,so that individuals blur together into asingle mass. This is the way that treesbecome a forest, buildings become a city,and soldiers become an army.

In the case of human masses, how-ever, there are some constraints, becausethe concept DISTANCE features in someother fundamental concepts. In particular,people conceptualize their social rela-tions in terms of DISTANCE via the meta-phor SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE

(“near friends”, “distant relations”). Thisconcept appears to be universal anddevelops within the first year of life(Wiseman 2014). A consequence isthat, if one person is “close” to another,they cannot also be made “distant”.

How many people do humans typi-cally regard as being “close” to them?Dunbar (1992, 1993) has argued, basedon studies of primate brain size, thathumans are capable of maintaining stablepersonal relationships with up to 100–230 others, with a mean of around 150.The result is that, in communities belowthis size, where everyone knows every-one else “closely”, it would be difficult forany individual to get the “mental dis-tance” from others to see them as anundifferentiated MASS. Forming a MASS inwhich people’s individuality becomesblurred requires living in a community inwhich the bulk people are strangers or, atleast, not intimate. This suggests a mini-mum population of maybe one or twothousand people is required before theconcept of MASS might develop readily.

Stage 2. Activating the PROBLEM-OF-RULING

Phase 2 involves a person framing theproblem: How do I MAKE the MASS of

people MOVE toward my GOALS, and, spe-cifically, go in a DIRECTION or along thePATH that the MASS is currently not travel-ling. I am going to call this the PROBLEM-OF-RULING. The exact formulation is not cru-cial: what is necessary is the activation ofmost or all of the “element concepts”,including AGENT, MASS, MOVE, DIRECTION,PATH, GOAL, and MAKE/FORCE.

Stage 3. Forming the RULING

schema from the PROBLEM OF RULING

Phase 3 sees the triggering of the FORCE-OUTCOME schema. This will occur becauseconcepts and schemas are, ultimately,activity within the brain. Specifically, theyare networks of neurons. Such networksform and are activated in a limited num-ber of ways. Over the last decade, com-putational neuroscientists have elucidatedvarious elementary neural “circuits”(Lakoff 2008, 21–23). One type that isrelevant to the formation of schemas isthe “gestalt” circuit. Since all schemas aregestalts, all of them will have this type ofcircuit, which will activate or “fire” theneurons that make up the circuit.

The “gestalt circuit” consists of anumber of elements or “nodes”, alongwith a “gestalt node”. There are twoways a gestalt circuit may be activated.(1) When the gestalt node is stimu-lated, it stimulates all of the othernodes in the circuit (Figure 7a). (2)When a sufficient number of the indi-vidual nodes are activated, the gestaltnode is also stimulated, triggering theremainder (Figure 7b).

The FORCE–OUTCOME schema willbecome activated because it shares anumber of nodes or “element concepts”with the PROBLEM-OF-RULING. If enough ofthese shared nodes become activatedwhen a person is thinking of the

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PROBLEM-OF-RULING, then the FORCE-OUTCOME schema will also becomeactivated.

The result of repeatedly co-activatingthe FORCE–OUTCOME schema and thePROBLEM-OF-RULING is that the individual“element concepts” – including AGENT,FORCE, MASS, PATH, and GOAL – will becomelinked in a structure that parallels theFORCE-OUTCOME schema (Figure 6b).

Stage 4. Linking the SHEEPHERDING

Schema With the PROBLEM-OF-RULING

The next phase also rests on the behaviorof neural networks. When a neural net-work, a concept, is activated, the activationradiates to other neurons and otherneural networks via synaptic links. If theseother neurons or networks receive suffi-cient stimulation, they will fire in turn.Closely associated concepts – that is,neural networks with many synaptic con-nections between them – are those mostlikely to become activated, because theyreceive the most stimulation.

When the FORCE-OUTCOME schema isactivated, the SHEEP-HERDING schema willbe amongst those that will receive neural

stimulation, as one amongst many appli-cations of this schema. In a culture wheresheepherding is a common experience,the synaptic links between the FORCE-OUTCOME schema and the SHEEP-HERDING

schema are likely to be strong, becauserepeated co-activation of concepts –

repeated stimulation of the synaptic path-ways – leads to the growth of synapticlinks between the underlying neural net-works (what neuroscientists call“Hebbian learning”: Feldman 2006,79ff.). Consequently, the SHEEP-HERDING

schema will be amongst the most likelyinstances of FORCE-OUTCOME schema to betriggered.

Stimulation of neural networks is alsolikely to be strongest where there is max-imum positive reinforcement of thesynaptic signals. In the case of thePROBLEM-OF-RULING, the MASS has the attri-butes of being a mass, a gestalt, and living(specifically, it moves). This will tend topromote stimulation of other conceptswith similar qualities – concepts likeHERD. This establishes a chain of neuralexcitation between the RULING schemaand the SHEEP-HERDING schema(Figure 6c). This will lead to the simulta-neous activation of corresponding partsof each schema: PEOPLE with HERD, AGENT

with SHEPHERD.Repeated co-activation of the

PROBLEM-OF-RULE and the SHEPHERDING

schema will lead to the growth of synapticlinks between the two – another case ofHebbian learning. Individual connectionswill be established first between the coreparts of each schema. This is the basis ofthe metaphors KINGS ARE SHEPHERDS andPEOPLE ARE FLOCKS. With experience, entail-ments like KINGS ARE STEWARDS OF THEIR

GODS’ FLOCKS develop, drawing on detailedexperience of sheepherding.

Figure 7.

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One-Way Metaphors betweenDomainsThis sequence of connections explainswhy metaphors used in a particularsociety are based on the most commonactivities carried out in that society. It is afunction of which activities have strongestsynaptic connection with the FORCE-OUTCOME schema.

The way these neural networks formalso explains why the various metaphorsI have described only run in one direc-tion: kings may be shepherds, but shep-herds are not kings (not routinelyanyway). When a Sumerian thoughtabout the PROBLEM-OF-RULING, it activatedthe FORCE-OUTCOME schema. In a societylike ancient Sumer, where sheep-herdingwas a widely familiar activity, one of themajor instances of the FORCE-OUTCOME

schema would have been the SHEEP-HERDING schema, because there wouldhave been strong synaptic connectionsbetween them in the brains of allSumerians. The result is that activatingthe PROBLEM-OF-RULING was likely toactivate the SHEEP-HERDING schema.(Figure 8a).

The reverse order of events wasmuch less likely. A shepherd herdingsheep would have activated the SHEEP-HERDING schema. This in turn wouldhave activated the FORCE-OUTCOME

schema, because herding sheep involvesthe purposeful application of force.However, the FORCE-OUTCOME schema isconnected with all neural circuitsinvolved in the purposeful application offorce – not just the RULING schema.Indeed, for a Sumerian shepherd, theneural circuits involved in ruling manypeople were unlikely to be prominentamongst these many connections. Otherneural circuits connected with FORCE-OUTCOME were more likely to activatefirst (Figure 8b). The result is that activa-tion of the SHEEP-HERDING schema wasunlikely to trigger the RULING schema.

Cultural Schemas for Force: TheProblem of the MayaThe MACHINE metaphor will develop in asimilar way to the SHEEP-HERDING meta-phor outlined above, even though thesource domain is quite different. Therewould, though, appear to be a majorproblem with the formation of theMayan metaphors. The MACHINE andSHEEP-HERDING schemas rest on theexperience of applying physical force: anengineer pulls on levers; a shepherd usesa crook. But the Mayan system rests on“calling the rain”. We would not normallythink of this activity as involving physicalforce. The consequence is that Phase 0(forming the Mayan equivalent to theSHEEP-HERDING schema) should not occur.Without it, the remaining phases shouldnot connect RULING with RAIN-MAKING.

As Mayan myth and iconographymake clear, however, rainmaking was infact regarded as a forceful activity, whichFigure 8.

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the Mayans conceived in terms of splittingand pouring.

The metaphor of SPLITTING appears inone of the central myths of the Maya,concerned with the annual growth ofmaize. Part of the Popol Vuh relates howthe Maize God was captured and decapi-tated by the gods of the underworld, andhis head imprisoned underneath a moun-tain (witz nal, “Maize Mountain”).Sometime after, the Rain God, Chaak,split open the mountain using his axe,K’awiil: a symbol for lightning (Houstonand Inomata 2009, 207; Taube 1992, 17;Sharer and Traxler 2006, 729–731). Theresurrected Maize God emerged fromthe mountain, bringing forth abundance.The breaking of the witz nal by Chaak,and the reappearance of the Maize Godis a common theme in Classic Mayanpaintings (Stone and Zender 2011, 41).

This myth appears to have been co-opted by Classic Maya rulers. For exam-ple, one term for a king’s accession wasch’am K’awiil “receiving the K’awiil”, whichSharer and Traxler (2006, 739) say is“the royal sceptre with an image ofK’awiil, the lightning deity”. We alsoknow that Mayan temples were referredto as “mountains”, witz, and “theirentrances seen as caves that gaveentrance to the underworld …” (Sharerand Traxler 2006, 272), that is, to theplaces where the Maize God was impri-soned. Mayan kings were plainlyexpected to re-enact the release andresurrection of the Maize God, andwere equipped with an axe/lightning/K’awiil to strike the mountain (e.g., in thetablet of the Foliated Cross, Palenque:Foster 2002, 176–177). In short, splittingwith the lightning bolt makes corn comeforth from the earth.

The other Mayan metaphor of rain-making, based on SPILLING or POURING,

appears in an alternative to the myth ofthe Maize God’s rescue. In it, the MaizeGod is freed by his sons, the Hero Twins.In paintings of the scene, one of theTwins is normally shown pouring outwater from a jar (e.g. Coe 2011, 227).The Rain God, Chaak, is also often por-trayed with an upturned water jar aroundhis neck, pouring out rain (e.g., Sharer andTraxler 2006, 726, Figure 13.4.b; Miller2012, 182, Figure 163, 185, Figure 178;Taube 1992, 25, Figure b). There is goodevidence that one way the Maya concep-tualized rain-making was as pouring waterout of a jug, as Chaak and the HeroTwins are shown doing. Moyes et al.(2009) report that the Classic Maya leftofferings of water jars for Chaak duringwater rituals conducted in caves. Theyshow that these ceremonies peaked intimes of drought, and clearly link thecollection and spilling of water with theMayans’ need for rain. Underlying suchrituals must be a concept, MAKING RAIN IS

POURING OUT WATER.Both activities, splitting the mountain

and pouring out water, illustrate how theMaya conceived of natural processes interms of forceful activities. In doing so,they activated force dynamic schemas.Once conceived in this way, these activ-ities could be incorporated into Mayanschema for organizing society.

Using the Schema inArchaeological InterpretationThe consequence of the formation pro-cess described in this article is that theRULING schema and associated meta-phors are likely to develop if two pre-conditions are met: (1) the communityis large enough for the concept of aHUMAN MASS to develop and, (2) thecommunity has experience of forceful

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interaction involving massed, livingobjects.

The specific metaphors that developaround the world will vary considerably,as societies draw on different experi-ences (crops, herds, machines, etc.),involving the application of differenttypes of forces (pushing, pulling, permit-ting, etc.). However, the underlying sche-mas ought to be similar in each case and,moreover, will all draw upon major activ-ities the communities are engaged in.

This conclusion allows archaeologiststo make strong predictions about con-cepts that might have structured pastsocieties. Such predictions can then bechecked against material evidence.Doing this for a specific culture involvesanalysis in four stages.

(1) Establish that the concept of ahuman MASS could develop inthe given culture. This involvesdemonstrating that people liveand interact in communitieswhere the bulk of others couldnot be known intimately. I havesuggested a minimum of maybetwo thousand people, but thismay vary in specificcircumstances.

(2) Identify the main activities andpractices within the communitythat the bulk of people wouldexperience first-hand or thatwould be common knowledge.Many of these will be economicactivities, but some might be wellknown because they have highprestige or involve strong emo-tions (such as war or sport).

(3) Select from these major activitiesthose which readily fit into theFORCE-OUTCOME schema: that is,they have (1) a MASS which

moves or grows, and is a gestalt;(2) an individual AGENT who actson the mass; and (3) the agent’sactions involve the application ofFORCE in order to direct or con-trol the MASS.

(4) Mapping the elements of theseselected activities onto society:AGENT onto RULER, MASS ontoPEOPLE, and so on.

This process generates hypotheses.But, by itself, it is not proof of whatconcepts a society used. Such hypothesesneed to be checked. Archaeologists cando this by generating entailments of themetaphor, then checking whether theyare actually expressed in the societythey are studying. For example, in thecase of Sumerian SHEEP-HERDING, someentailments would be:

shepherds use a crook> kings have a crook

shepherds follow the sheep> ruling is termed “following”

shepherds replace the leading animal> ruling is termed “leading”

shepherd are stewards for the owner> kings are stewards

shepherds lead sheep to pasture> kings provide pasture/food

Such entailments can be comparedwith the archaeological record. Becauseconceptual metaphors are cognitive, theymay be expressed in many modes, notjust in language or written records.Indeed, because the original context formany archaeological remains has beenlost, it is important for archaeologists toseek evidence for the metaphor from arange of sources. In the case of Sumer,the metaphorical concepts of KINGS ARE

SHEPHERDS and PEOPLE ARE SHEEP wereexpressed explicitly in royal claims, in

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myths, in accounting systems; in the lan-guage people employed for terms of gov-ernance; and in the symbols of power.

To avoid circular logic, it is importantthat archaeologists check their hypothesisusing categories of evidence independentof those used to generate the hypothesisin the first place. The hypothesis of SHEEP-HERDING in Sumer could be generatedfrom faunal remains, then checked usingelite literature, iconography, andepigraphy.

I need to stress that the process ofboth hypothesis generation and checkingdoes not require written record.Archaeologists can apply the stepsabove even in pre-literate societies.Written evidence is, of course, a usefulsource of evidence, but it is not the onlyway that major conceptual metaphors ofa society will be expressed. In theSumerian and Mayan case studies, I illu-strated how metaphoric concepts couldbe expressed in art, iconography, insignia,and accounting systems. An importantdiscussion on identifying metaphors inmaterial culture without the aid of writingis presented by Ortman (2000, 2012).

Constraints and Competitionfrom Other ConceptsNot all societies will develop metaphorsbased on the RULING schema, and even inthose that do, such metaphors may notbecome dominant. There are several rea-sons. The first is that the conditionsnecessary for the formation of theschema and metaphors may not be metin some way. Ancient India provides agood example. Cows have a significantplace in Indian life in the first millenniumBC. This might suggest a social organiza-tion based on the metaphors, the PEOPLE

ARE CATTLE and a KING DRIVES CATTLE. A few

such metaphors do exist in the earliestSanskrit literature: the Vedas (e.g., gop�ajanasya “herdsman of people” from go-“cow” Rg Veda 3:43:5). However, themetaphors never became commonplace.What prevented them was India’s castesor varna – also apparent in the Vedas(e.g., Rg Veda 10:90:11–12). With societydivided into castes, the concept of aHUMAN MASS would be difficult to develop,as people routinely saw themselves asmembers of distinct groups. (The reasonthat the few extant metaphors devel-oped in the Vedas was because theywere originally attributes of the gods,who are described as “herders ofpeople”, e.g., Rg Veda 1:91:21b, 1:144:6a,5:11:1a, 7:60:3d, 9:35:5c. Relative to thegods, all people as humans belong to theone category, and so could be concep-tualized as a MASS. Once this concept wasin place, the rest of the ruling schemadeveloped, with the result that Hindugods are called “herders” in Vedic litera-ture.) The moral for archaeologists is thatthey to ensure that each stage in theformation process could actually happenin the society they are studying.

A second reason that the RULING

schema may not develop is that it hasto compete with other concepts. InConfucian China, social organizationwas based on dé, “virtue”. InConfucianism, the chief virtue was famil-ial piety, xiào. The effect of combiningthese two principles was to map theduties of children to their parents ontothe operation of the ancient Chinesestate. Despite its size and complexity,China remained committed to SOCIETY

IS A FAMILY as one of its primary socialconcepts. This poses the question: Whydid machine metaphors dominate themodern West but China continued touse conceptually simpler, family-based

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concepts? In part it is because differentmetaphors highlight different aspects ofsociety. In his analysis of modern orga-nizations, Morgan presents nine meta-phors commonly used in the latetwentieth century: MACHINES, ORGANISMS,BRAINS, CULTURES, POLITICAL SYSTEMS,PSYCHIC PRISONS, FLUX andTRANSFORMATION, and INSTRUMENTS OF

DOMINATION. Seeing organization as aBRAIN highlights memory and learning asimportant issues, whereas the MACHINE

metaphor emphasis control and syn-chronization. Another reason that someideas dominate over other is because ofthe way human brains operate. All con-cepts are, at root, neural networks. Notall neural networks can be activated atonce. Circumstances may lead to somenetworks, some concepts, being acti-vated in favor of others. The exact pro-cesses by which one takes precedenceover another has not been addressed indetail by cognitive science, although it isagreed that concepts which activatemore frequently or strongly are likelyto be dominant (Lakoff 2014). For thisreason, conceptual metaphors based oncommon experiences are those mostlikely to become dominant over others.The most common experience allhuman beings have are those involvingtheir bodies and their social interactions.Teasing out the reason specific meta-phors become dominant is, though, anissue that would benefit from furtherresearch.

I need to emphasize that the con-cepts discussed in this article are of afundamental type. They do not directlygenerate political concepts like “democ-racy” or “socialism”. These are far moreelaborate constellations of ideas. Theymay incorporate elementary schemaslike FAMILY, BODY, and the RULING, but

they go well beyond them as well. Theformation of such “constellations” occursthrough the process of “conceptualblending”. This process has beenexplored over the last 30 years withincognitive science, alongside the theoryof conceptual metaphor (e.g., Grady,Oakley, and Coulson 1999; Coulson2001; Fauconnier and Turner 2002;Hutchins 2005). It provides anotherbody of theory for archaeologists todraw on to interpret the organization ofpast societies.

Conceptual blends draw togetheraspects of different concepts, to formnew, hybrid networks. While mostresearch to date has focused on meta-phoric blends, other concepts can also beintegrated within the brain’s neural net-works. Examples of non-metaphoric con-cepts familiar to archaeologists, thatmight be important in explaining socialorganization, are religious conceptsbased on the entopic phenomena andshamanistic practices explored by Lewis-Williams (2002, 2005). Many ancientsocieties treated their rulers as eitherdivine or divinely-connected – the Inka,Maya, early Chinese, Egyptians,Babylonians, Ashanti, and Yoruba are allexamples (e.g., Trigger 2003; Brisch2008) – and altered states of conscious-ness appear to have played a role in thereligious experience of these cultures.Outside of religion, another potentialsource of social concepts are those pre-dicted by Marxist theory. It suggests howparticular social forms develop inresponse to relations of production (e.g.,Childe 1936, 1951; McGuire 1992).Conceptual blends (like competitionamongst concepts) would benefit fromfurther research by archaeologists, tounderstand how concepts form andshape society.

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ConclusionIn this article, I have shown how animportant family of social conceptsforms. All members of this family areconceptual metaphors. These metaphorsare cognitive mappings and, ultimately,neural networks within the human brain.When these concepts and neural net-works activate, people comprehend andreason about their society by drawing oncommonplace experiences within theirculture. Modern Westerners draw ontheir use of machines, Sumerians onsheep-herding, and the Maya on corn-growing. They use these experiences tosuggest how people should be organizedwithin society. While people in the threecase studies employed very differentsource materials, the concepts they usedall share a common structure: the RULING

schema. The reason that these threeunrelated cultures all employed thesame schema is because it is based inthe universal human experience of apply-ing force to objects.

In the second half of the article, Ishowed how the RULING schema andthe specific metaphors based on itwould form as neural networks. Socialmetaphors based on this schema arelikely to develop if: (1) people live incommunities large enough for the con-cept of a human MASS to form; (2) thecommunity has widespread experienceof forceful activities, and (3) the con-cepts do not face competition fromothers, which prevent the formation ofthe necessary neural connections.

Finally, I showed how this formationprocess provides archaeologists with aframework for developing robusthypotheses about concepts that mighthave structured particular ancient socie-ties. These hypotheses can be

generated from material remains, andchecked against the archaeologicalrecord. Crucially, archaeologists do notneed written materials to create thesehypotheses or test them. Since themetaphors are based on commonplaceactivities within society, these shouldleave widespread traces in the archae-ological record. In the three case stu-dies presented, material evidence I usedto illustrate the metaphors in actionincluded art, iconography, royal insignia,and accounting systems. Ortman (2000,2012) has used pottery decoration andsettlement layout as evidence.

The foundation of this article hasbeen conceptual metaphor theory. Asnoted at the beginning of this article, ithas been little used by archaeologists. Ithas, though, taken a central place in cog-nitive science and, after 30 years ofresearch, now possesses a detailed bodyof theory and a large corpus of experi-mental evidence. In this article, I haveshown how it can provide insights intoone long-standing area of archaeologicalinterest. But cognitive scientists haveshown that conceptual metaphors struc-ture many other concepts fundamentalto human life and experience. It is a richresource for archaeologists who wish tounderstand the concepts that shaped thelives of ancient peoples.

AcknowledgementsI am grateful for the feedback from Dr JannieLoubser and the two anonymous referees on anearlier draft of this article.

FundingI received no external funding for preparing thisarticle, and I declare I have no conflict ofinterest.

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Notes on contributorDr Rob Wiseman is an archaeologist withOxford Archaeology. He holds a PhD(History) from the Australian NationalUniversity and an MA (Archaeology) fromUniversity College London. His primary interestsare Anglo-Saxon England, Bronze Age Europe,and Cognitive Archaeology. Before coming toarchaeology, he had over 20 years’ experiencein communication research and consultancy.

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