international negotiation 03 sabana

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International Negotiation Stephan Langdon, MBA M.Ed

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Page 1: International Negotiation 03 Sabana

International NegotiationStephan Langdon, MBA M.Ed

Page 2: International Negotiation 03 Sabana

Negotiation

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• Isabella has worked as the executive assistant to Martina for ten years.  Isabella has worked overtime on many occasions when Martina had special projects to complete.  Martina has not given Isabella a raise in her salary for three years and Isabella is thinking about looking for a new position which could pay her more money.  Martina is concerned about losing Isabella to another employer but is worried that her own company has not made a profit in the last two years.  Isabella and Martina sit down in the conference room to negotiate a possible raise in salary for Isabella.

• ROLE #1: ISABELLA• ROLE #2: MARTINA• ROLE #3: OBSERVER (Take notes and report about

negotation)

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More Theory

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5Reference Text: Contract Negotiations, by Gregory A. Garrett, CCH, Inc. (2005), pg. 13.

Contract Negotiation Competencies• Mark H. McCormack, best-selling author of “What

They Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School,” has stated the perfect negotiator should have:

• Faultless people sense

• A strong competitive streak

• A view of the big picture

• An eye for the crucial detail

• Unimpeachable integrity

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6

Contract Negotiation Competencies

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Negotiation Process

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Negotiation Process 3 Steps (Cronkite)

Find opponents

bottom line.

Find your bottom

line.

Push’s opponent

to lower bottom

line.

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Negotiation Process 4 Steps (Shell)

Negotiation planning and preparation. • Extremely

important.

Beginning to interact• orientation to

situation, • relationship with

other side,

• information exchange.

Initial proposal• offer or demand• making concessions• narrowing of

differences.

Closing• Getting

commitment.

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Seven Stages (Folberg, Golann)

Preparation and Setting Goals

Initial Interactio

n and Offers

Exchanging &

Refining Informati

on

Bargaining

Moving toward Closure

Bridging impasse & make

decisions

Finalizing Agreeme

nt

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Negotiation Considerations

Cooperation

Competition

Enlightene

d self-

interest.

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Negotiation Considerations

Triad of Concerns

Economic

Social Emotions

• Social• How will others view the

agreement

• Emotional• How will you feel about

the agreement• Successful Negotiations • Lewicki and Fisher

• Economic• Will you be satisfied with

the economic results

Triad of concerns

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Perception• Subjective. Always check your views, opinions

and analysis of your position• One’s view of fairness. (Barry Bond’s homerun).• Be very careful of your client's (and your own)

perception of fairness. • Frames

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Bias Perception: Fixed Pie• the erroneous belief that the other party’s

interests are directly opposed to one’s own interests when, in fact, they are often not completely opposed.

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Bias Perception: Thompson and Hastie• Explored the consequences for outcomes. • They measured individual fixed-pie

perceptions after just five minutes of negotiation

• They found fixed pie predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that fixed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint profits.

• Negotiators with strong fixed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be profitably logrolled or that were completely compatible.

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Bias Perception: Why does this occur?• Biased information search • (negotiators’ faulty search for necessary information)

• Biased information processing • (negotiators’ faulty processing of available information).

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Bias Perception: Extremism• Partisan perceivers believe that their own

perceptions map onto objective reality.• When they realize that the other side’s

views differ from their own, they first attempt to “straighten out” the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist.

• partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case.

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Bias Perception: Problems with Extremism1. Exacerbates conflict

1. Partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation

2. Reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations

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Bias Perception: Reactive Devaluation Bias• Negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made

by the other party merely as a function of who is offering them

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Bias Perception: Stillinger, Epelbaum, Kelter, and Ross (1990)

• Experiment• Participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university

regarding a political issue. • Constant

• The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant. • During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn

position. • Concession

• In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession; in the third (control) condition, no concession at all was made.

• Rating• Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and significance of a

number of different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session.

• Results • Non-offered concessions were rated as more attractive and significant than

offered concessions: • The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its

value in the eyes of the participants.

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Bias Perception: Fundamental Attribution Error• People tend to view

A. their own behavior as largely determined by the situation

BUT B. regard other’s behavior as driven by chronic

dispositions

• Larrick and Su (1999) • Demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation. • Negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining

behaviors to difficult personalities rather than to situational factors.

• Fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufficient information about the opponent’s situation.

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Bias Perception: Coercion Bias• People erroneously believe that

A. coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponentsBUT B. believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effect—that is, to increase their resolve not to concede.

• Rothbart and Hallmark (1988) in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies.

• Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others,

• In-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.

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Perceptions: Framing• Framing: constructing and representing

interpretations.• Defining key issues and key problems.• Perspective.• Separates issue from other ideas.• Aggregate and process information.• Language we choose engage. notion of what we are doing: discussion, argument, fight

• Frames persist as long as they are useful. • When people hold to their frames, conflict can

occur. • Frames can be transformative.• Change frame, change conversation.• Frames can be shifted.

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2405/09/08

Modify the Other Party’s Perceptions• Make outcomes appear less attractive.• Make the cost of obtaining goals appear higher.• Make demands and positions appear more or less

attractive to the other party-whichever suits your needs.

• Haga que los resultados aparecen menos atractivos. Haga el coste de obtener metas para aparecer más arriba. Haga que las demandas y las posiciones aparecen más o menos atractivas a la otra partido-cualquiera se adapta a sus necesidades

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Manipulate the Actual Costs of Delay or Termination• Plan disruptive action:

– Raise the costs of delay to the other party.• Form an alliance with outsiders:

– Involve (or threaten to involve) other parties that can influence the outcome in your favor.

• Manipulate the scheduling of negotiations:– One party is usually more vulnerable to delaying than

the other.

• Acción que disturba del plan: Levante los costes de esperar al otro partido. Forme una alianza con otras: Implique (o amenace implicar) otros partidos que puedan influenciar el resultado en su favor. Manipule la previsión de negociaciones: Un partido es generalmente más vulnerable al retraso que el otro.

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Positions Taken During Negotiations• Opening Offer

– Where will you start?• Opening Stance

– What is your attitude? Competitive? Moderate?• Initial Concessions

– Should any be made? If so, how large?

• Oferta de abertura ¿Donde usted comienzan? Postura de la abertura ¿Cuál es su actitud? ¿Competitivo? ¿Moderate? Concesiones iniciales ¿Deben cualesquiera ser hechas? ¿Si es así cómo grande?

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Why Frames are Critical• Negotiators who

understand framing may understand how to have more control over the negotiation process.

• Frames may be malleable and, if so, can be shaped or reshaped during negotiation.

• Frames shift and change as the negotiation evolves.

• Los negociadores que entienden enmarcar pueden entender cómo tener más control sobre el proceso de la negociación.

• Los Marcas pueden ser maleables y, si es así se pueden formar o formar de nuevo durante la negociación.

• Los arcas cambian de puesto y cambian mientras que la negociación se desarrolla.

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Perceptions: Three Views of Frames• Categories of experience

• Interests, rights, power

• Process of issue development

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Language• Ohio negotiation.• Environmentalist.• Developers.

• Environmentalists.• Called polluters developers.

• Conflict.• Result of nonverbal looks and glances.• Polarizing language.

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Trust/Distrust Frame

• Trust distrust different frames.

• Main role of negotiator / mediator.

• Decide which you are doing: • Building trust.• Managing distrust.

• Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos.

• Posicion principal del negociador/del mediador.

• Decida cuál usted está haciendo: • Confianza del edificio. • Desconfianza de manejo.

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Trust/Distrust Frame• Trust Frame.

• Little step by step process.• Reliability.• Competence.

• Distrust Frame.• Apologies.• Reparation.• Say vs Do.

• Marco de la confianza. • Marcos de la desconfianza

de la confianza diversos. • Papel principal del

negociador. Poco proceso paso a paso. Confiabilidad. Capacidad.

• Marco de la desconfianza. • Apologías. • Reparación. • Diga contra hacen.

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Managing Trust• Creating positive

expectations.• Confident expectations

about the other.• Shape them by: • Language.• Clear exceptions.• Manage expectation.

• Crear expectativas positivas.

• Expectativas confidentes sobre la otra.

• Fórmelas cerca: • Lengua. • Excepciones claras. • Maneje la expectativa.

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Managing distrust• Tools.• Boarders.• Boundaries.• Processes.• Not trust building.

• Manages downside risk.• Distrust binding.• Prenuptial agreement.

• Herramientas. • Huéspedes. • Límites. • Procesos. • No edificio de la

confianza.

• Maneja riesgo de baja. • Atascamiento de la

desconfianza. • Acuerdo Prenuptial.

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Frames as Categories of Experience1 Substantive.

• What the conflict is about.2 Outcome.

• The predispositions the parties have to achieving a specific result.

3 Aspiration.• Predispositions the parties

have towards satisfying a broader set of interests.

4 Conflict Management Process.• How the parties will go

about resolving their dispute.

1. Substantivo. 1. Sobre cuál el conflicto está.

Resultado 2. Las predisposiciones

1. los partidos tienen que alcanzando un resultado específico.

3. Aspiración.1. Predisposiciones que los

partidos tienen hacia la satisfacción de un sistema más amplio de intereses.

4. Proceso de la gerencia del conflicto. 1. Cómo los partidos irán

alrededor a resolver su conflicto.

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Frames as Categories of Experience (cont.)5 Identity.• How the parties define

“who they are”.6 Characterization• How one party defines

the other party.7 Loss-gain.• How the parties view the

risks of particular outcomes.

5. Identidad. Cómo los partidos definen “quién son”.

6. Caracterización Cómo un partido define el otro partido.

7. Pérder-gane. Cómo los partidos ven los riesgos de resultados particulares.

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Decision Trap: Frame Blindness• Understanding

Frames.• Framing Traps.• Boundaries. • Reference Points .• Yardsticks .

• Metaphors.• Thinking/Cultural

Frames.• Dealing With

Frames.

• Marcos de comprensión. • Trampas que enmarcan. • Límites. • Puntos de referencia. • Criterios.

• Metáforas. Pensamiento/marcos culturales. El ocuparse de los marcos.

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Use of dialogue to reframe intractable conflicts• Reduce tension and manage

the de-escalation of hostility: • techniques such as listening

projects, study circles, and some forms of mediation.

• Perspective taking: • techniques such as

acknowledging critical identities, imaging of identities

• Reduzca la tensión y maneje el decapado de la hostilidad:• técnicas tales como

proyectos que escuchan, círculos de estudio, y algunas formas de mediación.

• Tomar de la perspectiva: • técnicas tales como

reconocimiento de las identidades críticas, proyección de imagen de identidades

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Use of dialogue to reframe intractable conflicts• Establish a common ground as a

basis for agreement: • techniques such as search for

common ground and visioning/search processes enable reframing around a smaller set of issues. and characterizations, narrative forums, and listening circles allow disputants to understand the conflict and its dynamics.

• Enhance the desirability of options and alternatives:• Several approaches exist that

may enhance the desirability of alternative options when presented to parties with divergent frames.

• Establezca un terreno común como base para el acuerdo: • las técnicas tales como búsqueda

para los procesos del terreno común y el visioning/de la búsqueda permiten reframing alrededor de un sistema más pequeño de ediciones. y las caracterizaciones, los foros narrativos, y los círculos que escuchan permiten que los disputants entiendan el conflicto y su dinámica.

• Realce la deseabilidad de opciones y de alternativas: • Varios acercamientos existen que

pueden realzar la deseabilidad de opciones alternativas cuando están presentados a los partidos con los marcos divergentes.

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Psychology Traps - Barriers to Resolution

•You see what you want

Selective Perception

•We over value our cases

•we will win more than we do

Optimistic Overconfiden

ce

•I already have 25 grand in legal fees… Lets just roll the dice

Loss Aversion

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Escalation• Discovery makes us overconfident.• We want to get more certainty. • Negotiator wants all the info (legal:depos) before theycan

decide• We spend too much money on finding information (legal:

discovery)• It increases “loss aversion”.

• Try to settle early.

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Emotions• Emotions drive negotiations: you cannot avoid

them…deal with them. • Become aware of your emotions, your clients and

the other sides. • My experience:

• Always be professional, • be courteous, • do not become vindictive • it is better to build relationships rather than break them.

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Motivational Biases

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Motivational Biases

• Self-enhancement. • Closure and

consistency. • Cooperation

(maximization of shared goals).

• Accountability (or constituency pressure).

• Realce del uno mismo.

• Encierro y consistencia.

• Cooperación (maximización de metas compartidas).

• Responsabilidad (o presión del distrito electoral).

05/09/08

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Self-Enhancement

• One of the most fundamental goals of human life is the preservation and maintenance of self-identity.

• De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert (1995) found that negotiators tend to make self-serving evaluations of conflict behavior.

• Una de las metas más fundamentales de la vida humana es la preservación y el mantenimiento de la uno mismo-identidad.

• De Dreu, Nauta, y van de Vliert (1995) encontraron que los negociadores tienden a hacer evaluaciones interesadas de comportamiento de conflicto.

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Self-Enhancement

• Self-serving evaluation of conflict behaviorwas associated with increased frustration,

• reduced problem solving, and enhanced likelihood of future conflict.

• Thus, self-enhancement may be a central motivational antecedent of conflict escalation.

• La evaluación interesada de los behaviorwas del conflicto se asoció a la frustración creciente, solución de problemas reducida, y probabilidad realzada del conflicto futuro.

• Así, el uno mismo-realce puede ser un antecedente de motivación central de la escalada del conflicto.

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Egocentric Bias

• Egocentrism leads negotiators to perceive fairness in a biased manner.

• Specifically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated.

• Egocentrism leads negotiators to perceive fairness in a biased manner.

• Specifically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated.

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Egocentric Bias

• Negotiators claim what they want and, at the same time, believe that their claim is fair.

• Egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make over-harvesting decisions and deplete common goods.

• Negotiators claim what they want and, at the same time, believe that their claim is fair.

• Egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make over-harvesting decisions and deplete common goods.05/09/08

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Self-affirmation theory

• People experience a threat to their self-esteem, they need to affirm the self (Steele, 1988).

• When people are given feedback indicating that they have not performed well on a task, they are more likely to promote themselves.

• La gente experimenta una amenaza para su amor propio, ella necesita afirmar al uno mismo (Steele, 1988).

• Cuando dan la gente la regeneración que indica que ella no se ha realizado bien en una tarea, ella es más probable promoverse.

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Self-affirmation theory

• Derogating a stereotyped target increases the self-esteem of people whose self-image has been threatened (Fein and Spencer, 1997).

• More likely to evaluate that person stereotypically if their self-images have been threatened by negative feedback (Fein and Spencer, 1997).

• La derogación de una blanco estereotipada aumenta el amor propio de la gente cuya se ha amenazado uno mismo-imagen (Fein y Spencer, 1997). Más probablemente evaluar a esa persona stereotypically si sus uno mismo-imágenes han sido amenazadas por la regeneración negativa (Fein y Spencer, 1997).

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Power of Pre-negotiation

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Step #1: Preparing Your Strategy• Assess the situation.• There are four basic bargaining situations

depending on: (1) The perceived importance of the ongoing relationship and (2) the perceived conflict over the the stakes involved (to what degree do both sides want the same limited resource such as money, power, terms, etc.)

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The Situational Matrix

I: Balanced Concerns (Business partnership, joint venture, or merger)

II: Relationships (Marriage, friendship, or work team)

III: Transactions (Divorce, house sale, or market transaction)

IV: Tacit Coordination (Highway intersection or airplane seating)

HighLow

Perceived Conflict Over Stakes

High

Low

Importanceof Relationship

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Negotiating in the Quadrants• Quadrant IV: Tacit Coordination - Calls for tactful

avoidance of conflict, not negotiation.• Quadrant III: Transactions - Stakes are

substantially more important than relationships. Leverage counts. Competition, problem solving.

• Quadrant II: Relationships - Treat the other party well, generously, the stakes are secondary. Accommodate. (Einstein job offer, e.g.)

• Quadrant I: Balanced Concerns - Problem solving or compromise

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Prepare a Bargaining Plan• Make a list of questions you intend to ask at the

beginning of the negotiation in order to assess the assumptions of the other side:• Is a relationship most important to them?• Are the stakes most important to them?• Do they believe it is a Balanced Concerns situation?

• Prepare your bargaining plan based on the other side’s assumptions.

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Bargaining Mix

• Set of issues that are or could be considered in the negotiations.

• Often, substantial differences between the parties in the importance of various issues.

• Having multiple items in the bargaining mix and being creative in dealing with them can be very helpful - in both competitive and collaborative negotiations.

• Sistema de las ediciones que son o se podrían considerar en las negociaciones.

• A menudo, diferencias substanciales entre los partidos en la importancia de varias ediciones.

• Tener artículos múltiples en la mezcla de negociación y el ser creativos haciendo frente a ellos pueden ser muy provechosos - en negociaciones competitivas y de colaboración.

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Step #2: Exchanging Information• The information exchange step has several

phases:• Developing rapport between the individual negotiators• The surfacing of underlying interests, issues, and

perceptions that concern both parties• The initial testing of expectations

• As we share information, we test our counterpart’s commitment to the norm of reciprocity.

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Developing Rapport• The “liking rule.”• We prefer to say “yes” to someone we like and trust.• We like and trust people exactly like ourselves -- similarity.• Research the decision maker’s likes and dislikes,

hobbies, sports, etc. thoroughly

• Negotiate face-to-face, not online or over the phone -- tough to build trust, rapport, and understanding.

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Relationships according to Salacuse

Sincere Interest

Human relations

Build working relationships

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Obtaining Information on Interests, Issues, and Perceptions (reconassance)

• Exchange information without giving up anything.• Ask questions -- don’t be a blabbermouth -- and

remember the cardinal rule of discovery:• Probe first, disclose later.

• Test for understanding• Make sure you understand

• Summarize

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Signaling Expectations and Leverage• Deliver bad news (deal breakers, threats) early in

a negotiation.• Sell all the deal terms early.• Indicate where you can and cannot be flexible (credibility).

• Signal your expectations and leverage.

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Signaling Leverage

Make confident demands and credible threats. Display your alternatives and leave the decision to the other side.

Emphasize the uncertain future. Bluff (act strong when you are not)

Show the other side you are investing in the relationship. Be generous.

Acknowledge the other side's power and stress the potential gains from future cooperation. Appeal to the other side's sympathy. What would they do in your position?

Strong Weak

Your Leverage as You See It

Firm

Flexible

HowYou

Want toAct

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If You Are Going to Be Flexible, Get Credit for It• Let the other side know what alternatives you

have before you show you are not going to use the alternatives (BATNAs).• By revealing your alternatives and not using them, you

get credit for being generous and reasonable.• Be fair, but always make sure you get credit for being fair.

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Match the Other’s Side’s Style• Tit for tat in style, too.• If the they are screaming, tough, fierce competitors, they

will like and respect you if you are like them.• Yell back

• If they are bullies, confront them early.

• Once again, the reciprocity principle at work.• Train people to be cooperative.

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Step #3: Opening and Making Concessions• The bargaining stage is dominated by tactics,

which depend on the situation.• Competitor Vs competitor, relationship vital, etc.

• Bargaining formally begins when negotiators on one side open with a concrete, plausible (in their mind) offer.

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Opening Tactics: Open First?• If you are uninformed about the other side’s

business, interests, or demands, never open first.• If you are well informed, always open first:• It lets you fix the range -- the zone of realistic

expectations.• Sometimes forces the other side to rethink its goals.• Most important, allows you to set the anchor.• We tend to be heavily influenced by first impressions.

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Anchoring

• When the other side hears a high or low number, they adjust their expectations (unconsciously) accordingly.• The first offer anchors the other side’s perception of your walk-away price (NBC Super Bowl).• First offer must be somewhat reasonable (no more than

50% higher than you will settle for).• As high as possible--as close to the other side’s walk-

away as possible (that’s the home run).

• Outlandish numbers at the beginning can kill the deal or destroy your credibility if you drastically reduce the offer later.

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Framing• Framing is a process of describing or explaining a

situation a particular way. • Framing is the use of analogy, metaphor, or

characterization to define the problem or to advocate a solution of that problem.

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Framing

• Frame all of your offers.• Framing emphasizes the value of your offer.• Framing provides justification for the other side to make concessions.• “Just pennies a day” frames an offer.

• To those who like to win, frame as a gain, a win -- emphasize benefits.

• For those who are afraid to lose (losses loom larger than gains to many), frame as a possible loss -- emphasize the pain and shame of losing.

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04/12/2023

Negotiating with Objective Criteria• Frame each issue as a joint search for

objective criteria.• Ask “What’s your theory?”.• Agree first on principles before discussing the

substantive issues.

• Capítulo cada edición como búsqueda común para los criterios objetivos.

• Pida "cuál es su teoría?". • Convenga primero en principios antes de

discutir las ediciones substantivas.

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04/12/2023

Negotiating with Objective Criteria

• Reason and be open to reason.• Don’t use standards to hold a position.• Splitting the difference on standards is legitimate.• Asking a third party to decide is sometimes best.

• La razón y esté abierta a la razón. • No utilice los estándares para llevar a cabo una

posición. • Partir la diferencia en estándares es legítimo. • Pedir que los terceros decidan es a veces la mejor:

mitigación.

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04/12/2023

Negotiating with Objective Criteria

• Never yield to pressure, only to principle.• Invite them to state their reasoning.• Suggest objective criteria.• Compare giving in to your BATNA and to your

reputation.

• Nunca rinda a la presión, solamente al principio. • Invíteles a que indiquen su razonamiento. • Sugiera los criterios objetivos. • Compare dar adentro a su BATNA y a su reputación.

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Opening: Optimistic or Reasonable• Depends on the situation:• Relationship - High, generous• Transaction - Open optimistically (high, but not too high) -

the highest for which there is a supporting standard or argument enabling you to make a presentable case.• Make the highest opening you can “with a straight

face.” • Don’t open high if you have no leverage and the other

side knows it.

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Optimistic Openings• Take advantage of two psychological tendencies:

The Contrast Principle and the Norm of Reciprocity.• The contrast principle: If I want you to pay me $500,000

for a schedule, and I open with $750,000 (supported by presentable, “straight-face” argument), my settlement of $500,000 seems reasonable and gives the perception of getting a good deal. If I had opened for $550,000 and only come down to $500,000, the contrast would have been small and the deal not satisfying.

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Optimistic Openings• The Norm of Reciprocity:• I make an optimistic opening ($750,000), and you reject

it.• I moderate my offer by making a significant concession

($650,000), and you feel obligated to accept it (reciprocity).• Big then small offer -- “door in the face” -- second offer

seems reasonable.

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Concession Tactics• Open optimistically and have room to make

concessions.• Concessions are the language of cooperation.

They tell the other side in concrete, believable terms that you accept the legitimacy of their demands and recognize the necessity to cooperate and sacrifice to get a fair deal.

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Concession Tactics

• To get movement, offer a small trade -- show that agreement is possible.• Give a trade or concession in your least important area.

• Price to get a desired deal term or payment, e.g.

• The other side’s first concession is in its least important area of concerns.

• Try not to give the first major concession (it raises expectations and confuses people).• Put the major issues aside, agree on small, easy issues first.

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Concession Tactics• Give small concessions and give them slowly.• The slower you give them, the more value they have.• A fast concession makes the buyer feel awful and

devalues the product.• Make them work hard for every concession, they will

appreciate it more.• Make concessions progressively smaller.

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Concession Tactics• Which tactic is best?

1. 25% 25% 25% 25%2. 0 50 % 0 50% 3. 0 0 0 100%4. 100% 0 0 05. 10% 20% 30% 40%6. 30% 20% 10% 5%

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Split the Difference?• Not unless it’s in your favor.• If the other side offers it, it usually isn’t.

• Split the split.

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Integrative Bargaining

• Tactics for integrative bargaining in which both sides start with a complete bundle of offers, demands, and interests are as follows:• After a discussion of all the issues (without offers), both sides trade issues and try to problem solve.• No issue is closed until all issues have been decided.• Sides trade issues in clusters: “If you give me what I want on issues A and B, I’ll give you what you want on X and Y” -- the “If-Then…” scenario.• For example, you can throw away deal points you don’t

need (set this up in advance).

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Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación

• Facts.• Both Sides Agree.

• Needs/Interests.• Internal and External.• What Are Our Differences? Why?• What if on Other Side.

• Alternatives.• Win-Win or Win-Lose.• Options.• BATNA.

• Hechos. • Ambos Lados Convienen. • Necesidades/Intereses. • Interno y externo. • ¿Cuáles Son Nuestras Diferencias? • ¿Por qué? • Qué si en el otro lado. Alternativas. • Ganar-Gane o Ganar-Pierda. • Opciones. • BATNA.

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Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación

• Legitimacy.• Why is your position proper.

• Communication.• Frame and Reframe What You Say.

• Relationships.• Unconditionally Constructive.• People centered.

• Legitimidad. • Porqué es su posición apropiada.

• Comunicación. • Marco y reformule qué usted dice.

• Relaciones. • Incondicional Constructivo. • Gente centrada.

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Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación

• What Do We Need.• Complete, Detailed Specifications.• Past Understanding.

• Use Internal Resources. • What – Exactly - Do We Need.• Complete, Detailed Specifications.• Past Volumes.• Projected Volumes.

• Define Performance. • Requirements.• Specifications.

• Set Priorities.

• Qué Lo hacen Necesitamos. • Especificaciones Completas, Detalladas. • Más allá De Entender.

• Utilice Los Recursos Internos. • Qué - Exactamente - Lo haga Necesitamos. Especificaciones • Completas, Detalladas. • Más allá De Volúmenes. • Volúmenes Proyectados.

• Defina El Funcionamiento. • Requisitos. • Especificaciones.

• Fije Las Prioridades.

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Other Planning Issues• Don’t Assume Everyone Knows.• What Are Real Goals of Meeting.• Contract?• Relation?• Information Exchange and Next Meeting Date?• The Importance of the Agenda and Ground Rules.

• Agreements Documents “Specs”.• Commitment.

• No asuma Que Cada uno Sabe.

• Cuáles son metas verdaderas de la reunión. • ¿Contrato? • ¿Relación? • ¿Intercambio de

información y la fecha próxima de la reunión? • La importancia de la

agenda y de los principios de base. Los

• Acuerdos Documentan "Espec.".

• Comisión.

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Negotiation Planning• From Whom Do We Want Bids.• Research all prospects in last three years.• Use trade directories, yellow pages, etc. To explore

base.• What Form of Response.• Sealed Bids With Non-Price Negotiation.• Two Step Bidding.• Negotiation.

• De Quién Nosotros Desean Ofertas. • Investigue todas las

perspectivas en último tres años. • Utilice los directorios

comerciales, los Yellow Pages, el etc. Para explorar la base de el acuardo.

• Qué forma de respuesta. • Ofertas Selladas Con La

Negociación Del No-Precio. • El Hacer una oferta De

Dos Pasos. Negociación.

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Negotiation Planning• Availability Issues.• Lead Time Commitments.• Supplier’s Inventories.

• Quality Issues.• Warranties.

• Pricing.• Target Pricing.• Acceptable Range (ZOPA).• BATNA.

• Ediciones De la Disponibilidad. • Comisiones Del Tiempo De Plomo. • Inventarios Del Surtidor.

• Ediciones De la Calidad. Garantías. • Tasación. • Tasación De la Blanco. • Rango Aceptable (ZOPA). • BATNA.